REPORT

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE

APPOINTED TO REVIEW CONDUCT OF

JCF NAMED OFFICERS
DURING THE

2010 WEST KINGSTON OPERATION

AND

RELATED MATTERS

JUNE 2017
 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW INTO THE 2010 WEST
KINGSTON OPERATION AND THE CONDUCT OF
NAMED OFFICERS OF THE JAMAICA CONSTABULARY
FORCE.
June 22, 2017

To: Mr. George Quallo

Commissioner of Police

TRANSMITTAL OF THE REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

COMMITTEE
Consequent on our appointment, we the members of Administrative Review Committee
conducted a review of the 2010 West Kingston Operation, pursuant to the Terms of Reference:
1. Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
a. Command stru
structure was appropriate;
b. Command protocol was adequate;
c. Span of command was clear;
d. Span of control was effective;
e. System to ensure effective and adequate investigation in the event of the
resort to the Use of Force by members of the JCF existed and was
followed.

2. Determine in light of the findings above, whether the conduct of the Named Officers
amount to misconduct.

3. Make recommendations consistent with the findings.

The review commenced on February 28, 2017 and concluded on June 19,2017.
2017. We hereby
submit to you our report of the review.

_______________________ _________________________ __________________

Mr. Wray Palmer, ACP Prof. Kent Pantry Hon. Errol Johnson
Chairman Member Member

_______________________ _____________________________
Dr. Hilton McDavid The Rev. Canon Hartley Perrin
Member Member

i
 ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW COMMITTEE
TIVOLI MAY 2010 OPERATION

COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
Mr. Wray Palmer Assistant Commissioner of Police Chairman

Professor Kent Pantry, CD, QC. Former DPP Panelist

Dr. Hilton McDavid Panelist

Hon. Errol Johnson, CD. JP. Panelist

The Revd. Canon Hartley Perrin, CD, JP. Panelist

Mr. Andrew Lewis Senior Superintendent of Police Legal Counsel

Mr. Wesley Watson Deputy Superintendent of Police Legal Counsel

Inspector Sharon Ranglin Secretariat

Sergeant Romieann Brown Secretariat

ii
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents Page
Letter of Transmittal i

Committee Members ii

Table of Contents iii

Executive Summary iv

1.0 INTRODUCTION 1

2.0 METHODOLOGY 7

3.0 TOR 1A. Term of Reference 1A: 9

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
- Command structure was appropriate.

4.0 TOR 1B. Term of Reference 1B: 12

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
- Command protocol [was] adequate.

5.0 TOR 1C & 1D. Term of Reference 1C & 1D: 14

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
c. Span of command was clear.
d. Span of control was effective.

6.0 TOR 1E. Term of Reference 1E: 16

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
- System to ensure effective and adequate investigation in the
event of the resort to the Use of Force by members of the JCF
existed and was followed.

7.0 TOR 2. Term of Reference 2. 20

Determine in light of the findings above, whether the conduct of
the named officers amount to misconduct.

8.0 TOR 3. Term of Reference 3. 35

Make recommendations consistent with the findings.

List of Appendices 37

A List of Abbreviations 38

B Letter Requesting Witnesses 39

C Post-Mortem Reports 40

iii
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In a published report dated June 2016, following a Commission of Enquiry into the events of the
May 2010 joint Police/Military operation in West Kingston, the Commissioners submitted their
findings to His Excellency the Governor General of Jamaica and recommended inter-alia:

'15.17 Consistent with our findings with regards to the conduct of certain officers
and other ranks of the JCF and JDF, we recommend that both forces undertake
administrative reviews of the conduct of the named officers. It is not too late for the
security forces to further examine these matters administratively as issues of internal
accountability and thereby signal to their members that such matters will be treated
seriously. We note that since May 2010, some of these officers have been promoted in
some cases to very senior ranks.

15.20 ...and where persons were identified as being in dereliction of duty or

were administratively or operationally incompetent, we recommend that these persons
should never again be allowed to lead or otherwise participate in internal security
operations. The persons to whom we refer are SSP Graham, SSP Budhoo, DSP
Tabannah, Sgt Waugh and Sgt Pratt.'

The Commissioner of Police, vested with the responsibilities for the superintendence of the
Force, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Constabulary Force Act, and in keeping with the
recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry, appointed a Committee to conduct an
Administrative review into the conduct of Named Officers and related matters.

The review commenced on February 28, 2017 at the Police Officers Club in the parish of Saint
Andrew and had a total of eleven sittings which concluded on Monday June 19, 2017.

During the period the Committee examined;

1. the Operations Plan to determine if the:

a. Command structure was appropriate
b. Command protocol was adequate
c. The span of command was clear
d. The span of control was effective
e. The system to ensure effective and adequate investigation in
the event of the resort to the use of force by members of the
JCF existed and was followed.

In light of the above, The Committee determined whether the conduct of the Named Officers
amounted to misconduct, and made recommendations consistent with their findings.

iv
Relevant sections of the report, statements, transcript, responses to adverse findings and other
documentary evidence were examined, assessed, discussed and analysed.

The Committee, having reviewed the Operations Plan, reports and statements of relevant JCF
and JDF officers, found that the command structure was headed by the JCFs Gold command;
Mr. Owen Ellington, supported by the Gold Command group which included DCP Glenmore
Hinds and DCP Clifford Blake. The role of the Gold Command group was to provide leadership,
guidance and support to Silver Commanders, allocate resources to execute the plan and to
establish command and control centers.

The Silver Command was established with ACP Donovan Graham (then SSP) supported by ACP
Budhoo (then SP) and team who manned the outer cordon.

The JCFs Ground Command Post was established on May 24, 2010 at Seprod. Retired SP
Warren Turner and team and DSP Everton Tabannah (including Inspector Pratt and Sergeant
Waugh) were assigned to enter the area of operations.

At each tier of command, the JCF, along with counterpart members of the JDF, had members
assigned with their roles and functions clearly defined. Members were given instructions through
the chain of command and in return members were reporting on their actions and
progress/results.

The Committee agreed that the command structure was appropriate, the command protocol was
adequate, and that the span of control was clear and effective.

The Committee however, found It incomprehensible that former ACP Les Green, then head of
the Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB), never gave evidence before the enquiry as to:

(a) the recovery of dead bodies,

(b) identification of bodies,
(c) evidence gathering relative to allegations of extra-judicial killings.

Notwithstanding that, there was evidence that extensive investigations were carried out by
members of the Bureau of Special Investigation (BSI) whose remit was not referenced in the
Operation Plan, but was subsequently assigned this task.

Despite the absence of the CIB participation and the delays occasioned by the prevailing
circumstances, the Committee agreed that effective and adequate investigations were carried out
in instances where deadly force was used.

The Committee found that the system was not followed according to the plan, due to the absence
of the CIB participation; however, the BSI rose to the occasion.

v
The Committee has seen overwhelming evidence that the hierarchy of the JCF acted to prevent a
public health crisis when ACP Graham (then SSP) was informed by ACP Budhoo (then SP) and
via Police Headquarters on May 25, 2010 that there were dead bodies lying around on the
ground.

Situational Analysis is critical in dynamic circumstances such as what existed during May 2010.
No member of the Mobile Reserve team had the duty to process dead bodies; this specific
responsibility was a matter for the CIB in accordance with the Operation Plan.

The Committee examined the role of ACP Budhoo and saw no evidence that the task of
collecting dead bodies was assigned to him. It is our view that, having given instruction to SP
Tabannah(then DSP) to make notations of the locations of dead bodies then he would have
discharged his responsibility.

It was further established by the Committee that the evidence tendered at the Enquiry in 2016 by
SP Tabannah, is consistent with his statement made six years earlier on July 17, 2010.

The task of recovering bodies was something that had to be done speedily, and did not allow for
the delay that would result from stopping to preserve the location of where the bodies were
found. When these bodies were being recovered, the police were operating under intense and
sustained gunfire. A balance had to be struck between retrieving the bodies and preserving their
own lives.

The Committee examined the Operation Plan, reports and statements of ACP Donovan Graham
along with those of DSP Tabannah, Insp. Pratt and Sgt. Waugh to determine in light of the
findings of item 1 of the TOR, whether the conduct of the Named Officers amounted to
misconduct.

The Committee agreed that the charge of misconduct put forward by the Commission was based
primarily on the fact that, the Named Officers did not produce records of the location where dead
bodies were found, and the failure to preserve the scenes.

It was unforeseeable that Cons. Maxwell would have died and therefore not able to account for
the task assigned to him. Without any evidence being presented, no proper conclusion of
dereliction can be made against any member of the Mobile Reserve in this instance.

The Committee was unable to determine the accuracy and trustworthiness of the KPH records
and while we do not wish to speculate, it is not far-fetched that bodies were brought to the KPH
and not recorded. In any event, this could not be a basis to find that Insp. Pratt and Sgt. Waugh
were guilty of misconduct or dereliction of duty. It must also be noted that the records at KPH
did not contain the name of Sgt. Waugh as a person who brought bodies to that location.

vi
From the examination of the pertinent documents, it was observed that the instructions given by
the Commissioner of Police to the Ground Command, were carried out by all concerned and
hence the Committee is satisfied that there was no dereliction of duty.

The Committee accepts, based on the prevailing conditions as was evident in the statements of
SP Tabannah, Insp Pratt (then Sgt), Sgt Waugh, Retired Supt. W. Turner, that the situation was
unsafe when they entered the sector after being invited to do so by the JDF.

The Commission did not identify any specific act of dereliction of duty or misconduct on the part
of any of the Named Officers. Therefore, it is the view of the Committee, that no basis existed
for the adverse findings and comments mentioned in Chapter 15.18 of the Report, and see no
reason why, the Named Officers should not be allowed to continue to serve, in their various
capacities, the JCF and the people of Jamaica.

Along with its findings, the Committee has made several recommendations for consideration.

Condolences were extended to the family, friends and colleagues of the late ACP Winchroy
Budhoo, one of the Named Officers, who died suddenly on May 10, 2017. A moment of silence
was observed at the sitting on May 19, 2017 as a sign of respect for his contribution to JCF and
the people of Jamaica.

vii
1.0 INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND

1.1 On May 24, 2010 a Joint Police/Military operation was carried out in the West Kingston

community of Tivoli Gardens to execute an arrest warrant on then fugitive Christopher

Dudus Coke and to restore law and order in the community and the country as a whole.

The security forces were met with heavy resistance from armed men loyal to Mr. Coke

which resulted in heavy casualties on both sides. Over seventy persons were killed; several

others were injured and extensive damages were done to properties, which include

properties owned by the Government of Jamaica.

1.2 An interim report on the operation was submitted to Parliament by then Public Defender,

Earl Witter, QC. with recommendation that a commission of enquiry be held in the matter.

The Government of Jamaica acted on this recommendation.

1.3 By instrument issued under the hands of His Excellency the Most Honourable Sir Patrick

Linton Allen ON, GCMG, CD, KSt.J Governor General of Jamaica, on February 21, 2014,

three Commissioners were appointed under the provisions of the Commission of Enquiry

Act 1873 (as amended), to enquiry into the events, with specific terms of reference.

1.4 Public hearings of the enquiry began on December 1, 2014 and were conducted in 9

sessions which concluded on February 19th 2016. Ninety four persons gave evidence,

which included residents of Tivoli Gardens, members of the Security Forces, Government

officials and experts.

1
1.5 In a published report dated June 2016, the Commissioners submitted their findings and

recommendations to His Excellency the Governor General of Jamaica which provide:

'15.17 Consistent with our findings with regards to the conduct of

certain officers and other ranks of the JCF and JDF, we recommend that
both forces undertake administrative reviews of the conduct of the named
officers. It is not too late for the security forces to further examine these
matters administratively as issues of internal accountability and thereby
signal to their members that such matters will be treated seriously. We note
that since May 2010, some of these officers have been promoted in some
cases to very senior ranks.

15.20 ...and where persons were identified as being in dereliction

of duty or were administratively or operationally incompetent, we
recommend that these persons should never again be allowed to lead or
otherwise participate in internal security operations. The persons to whom
we refer are SSP Graham, SSP Budhoo, DSP Tabannah, Sgt Waugh and Sgt
Pratt. ...'1

THE COMMITTEE
1.6 The Commissioner of Police, vested with the responsibilities for the superintendence of the

Force, pursuant to Section 2(a) of the Constabulary Force Act, and in keeping with the

recommendation of the Commission of Enquiry2 (hereafter the Commission), appointed a

Committee (hereinafter the Committee) to conduct an administrative review into the

conduct of named officers and related matters.

1.7 The members of the Committee are listed at page ii.

1.8 The terms of reference for the Committee was to:

2. Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
a. Command structure was appropriate
b. Command protocol was adequate
c. The span of command was clear
1
See Commission Report - page 482
2
Ibid.

2
 d. The span of control was effective
e. The system to ensure effective and adequate investigation in the event
of the resort to the use of force by members of the JCF existed and
was followed.

3. Determine in light of the above whether the conduct of the named officers
amounted to misconduct.
4. To make recommendations consistent with the findings.

1.9 The review commenced on February 28, 2017 at the Police Officers Club in the parish of

Saint Andrew. The Chairman welcomed all members of the Committee and stated the

reason for the review as provided for at Chapter 15.17 of the Commission of Enquiry

Report.

1.10 Copies of the terms of reference and other pertinent documents were circulated to members

of the committee and a plan of action discussed and agreed as to how to achieve the

objective of the review.

1.11 The Committee reviewed records, documents and statements relevant to the terms of

reference.

1.12 A full copy of the report was provided; extracts of the relevant sections/chapters were made

available to each member for ease of reference. Statements of the named officers, responses

to proposed adverse findings and other documentary evidence were provided to each

member for perusal prior to and during discussions of the issues.

3
 SITTINGS

1.13 Dates for the sittings were agreed and the Committee sat on the following days:-

1. February 28,2017
2. March 10, 2017
3. March 14, 2017
4. March 27, 2017
5. April 4, 2017
6. April 10, 2017
7. May 5, 2017
8. May 19, 2017
9. June 2, 2017
10. June 10, 2017
11. June 19, 2017

1.14 The issue was raised, whether it would be important to call any of the named officers to

provide clarity. This was debated and the committee concluded that it would be

unnecessary, as statements and responses to proposed adverse findings were available to

the Committee.

1.15 Later in the review, Dr. McDavid made a written request to the panel to have two of the

named officers; (1) ACP Donovan Graham and (2) Superintendent Everton Tabannah,

appear before the panel on the basis that clarity is needed on certain issues, regarding their

understanding of the Operations Plan.

1.16 This request prompted a reconsideration of an earlier decision by the Committee, not to call

the named officers. However, after making submissions to the Chairman, the matter was

again discussed and thoroughly debated. In the end, a majority decision was taken that it is

unnecessary to call the named officers as it would not add value to the proceedings and/or

findings.

4
1.17 The terms of reference were discussed, identifying and applying the relevant information

which provided adequate aid to the analysis and made factual determinations.

CONDOLENCES

1.18 Condolences were extended to the family, friends and colleagues of the late ACP Winchroy

Budhoo, one of the named officers, who died suddenly on May 10, 2017. A moment of

silence was observed at the sitting on May 19, 2017, as a mark of respect for his

contribution to the JCF and the people of Jamaica.

APPROACH OF COMMITTEE

1.19 The approach of the Committee was to properly analyse each term of reference and to

arrive at conclusions that are properly supported by the evidence. Extracts from the

Commission of Enquiry Report and other documentation were copied and disseminated to

members of the Committee by the Secretariat.

1.20 Minutes of each sitting was generated, corrected and agreed on at subsequent sittings.

Participation of all members were facilitated, opinions, suggestions, and requests were

entertained to the fullest. We endeavour to accord respect where disagreement and

divergent views were occasioned. Most issues/terms of reference were unanimously agreed

on.

PROMOTION IN RANK

1.21 Some of the named officers have been promoted since the West Kingston operation in

2010. The Committee decided that the officers should be addressed by their current rank

with reference made to their previous rank.

5
 COUNSEL TO THE COMMITTEE AND COMMITTEE SECRETARIAT

1.22 We wish to place on record our profound appreciation for the outstanding analysis, advice

and support by the team of Counsel to the Committee, throughout our deliberations. We

also wish to commend the Secretariat who discharged their duties professionally, ensuring

that at all times, sittings were arranged, minutes were properly organised, documentation

copied and disseminated and facilitating the overall management of the review which made

our objectives possible.

COURTLEGH STAFF

1.23 We wish also to acknowledge the Courtleigh Hotel and staff for the professional services

that were provided.

LOSS OF LIVES

1.24 The Committee acknowledges, with regret, that during the May 2010 West Kingston

Operation, several lives were lost, persons injured and properties destroyed, including

Government properties.

1.25 We thank all those who have given their time and effort to provide us with the necessary

information to have a better understanding of the system.

6
2.0 METHODOLOGY
2.1 The Committee's first order of business was to establish a plan of action to achieve the

objectives. Sections of the Commissions Report that would be pivotal to the review were

identified and these were copied and disseminated to all Committee members.

2.2 The Secretariat was given the task of providing copies of these documents for the official

commencement of the review. Also, a full copy of the Report was made available for ease

of reference at all sittings. The agreed method was to collate the pertinent documents and

examine the evidence to meet the requisite objective.

2.3 The issue was raised, as to whether it would be necessary to require any of the named

officers to appear before the Committee to provide clarity. This was debated and it was

decided that this would be unnecessary as they had already given statements and responses

to the proposed and adverse findings of the Commission.

2.4 Later on in the review, at the sitting of May 19, 2017, a formal request was made in

writing3 to the Chairman by member, Dr. Hilton McDavid, to have ACP Donovan Graham

and SP Everton Tabannah appear before the Committee to answer questions pertaining to

the Operations Plan.

2.5 The request was discussed at length and by majority vote of four to one (4:1) it was decided

that no value would be added or useful purpose would be served by having these officers

appear.

2.6 It was emphasized that all the questions outlined in the terms of reference would be

answered.

3
See Appendix B

7
2.7 Additional information was identified that was necessary for the review, such as material

from the Bureau of Special Investigation, evidence from retired Assistant Commissioner

Granville Gause, Superintendent Gladys Brown-Ellis and members of the Jamaica Defence

Force.

8
3.0 Term of Reference 1a
3.1 Term of reference 1a was:

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:

- Command structure was appropriate

3.2 The Operations Plan of the JCF which was dubbed, "Operation Keywest" was examined by

the Committee in detail. For security reasons, certain details contained in the plan will not

be outlined here.

3.3 The JDF also had an operation plan dubbed Operation Garden Parish. This plan was

unavailable to the Committee but several JCF officers stated in evidence that they attended

meetings with the JDF at Up-Park-Camp to discuss relevant parts of this plan.

3.4 According to Operation Keywest a three-tiered command structure was utilized. The

three levels were: (i) Gold (ii) Silver (iii) Bronze.

3.5 The Gold Command operated at the strategic level and was responsible for providing all

the resources to carry out the operation. The Gold Command provided strategic intent to

the Silver Commanders.

3.6 Silver Commanders were responsible for implementing strategy as communicated by the

Gold Command. The Silver Commanders were required to manage tactical

implementation through driving sets of activities which were executed by Bronze (Ground)

Commanders.

9
3.7 Bronze Commanders directly control resources at the incident scene where the action takes

place. Bronze Commanders are given different tasks or responsibilities and usually operate

directly alongside their working staff.

3.8 The Gold Command was established and was given the following responsibilities:

Provide strategic guidance for the operation.

Propel planning and resourcing.

Ensure the execution of the general tasks in a manner consistent with laws
and force polices.

Ensure thorough briefings of Silver and Bronze Commanders.

Ensure the highest levels of professionalism during the operation.

Ensure the establishment of a Command Centre at the appropriate time
prior to the operation.

Monitor the execution of the operation and issues of safety, welfare and
conduct.

Assessment on the progress of the operation and decide whether
contingencies should be activated for extending the operation beyond twelve
(12) or forty-eight (48) hours depending on the measures employed whether
Cordon and Search or Curfew.

Determine the feasibility of establishing a curfew to restrict movements from
the area under focus.

3.9 The Silver Commanders were appointed and given responsibilities for establishing inner

and outer cordons, deploying ground support teams and tactical options, securing target

locations, arrests, search, evidence-gathering and subject processing.

3.10 A number of Bronze Commanders were appointed and given detailed responsibilities.

These Bronze Commanders were responsible for executing tactical options on the ground.

10
 FINDING

3.11 The Committee, having reviewed the Operations Plan, agreed that the Command Structure

was appropriate for the task.

11
4.0 Term of Reference 1b
4.1 Term of Reference 1b was:

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:

- Command protocol [was] adequate

4.2 Command protocol refers to the system established for the communication and direction of

operations and for instructions, orders, queries, feedback and information to flow

throughout the various chains of commands. Command Protocol is essential for the

efficient and effective co-ordination and providing updates on the progress of specific

activities.

4.3 The JCF is organised along para-military lines. One implication of this, is that personnel

are duty bound to obey and execute orders received from seniors in rank and to report on

results accordingly.

4.4 As previously outlined in Section 3.0, the operation was conducted with a well defined

command structure.

4.5 Commanders communicated utilizing UHF/Microwave radio devices, cellular telephones,

text messages, emails and face to face.

4.6 Several officers, in their evidence to the Commission, spoke to making and receiving

telephone calls to and from senior officers. Officers also gave accounts of sending and

receiving certain information over the radio network

4.7 4.5 and 4.6 demonstrates the Command Protocol was properly utilized and was effective.

12
 FINDING
4.8 Having reviewed the Operations Plan, reports and statements of the JCF officers vital to the

Terms of Reference, the Committee agreed that the Command Protocol was adequate.

13
5.0 Terms of Reference 1c and 1d
5.1 Terms of reference 1c and 1d were:
Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
c. Span of Command was clear.
d. Span of Control was effective.

5.2 Span of control refers to the number of personnel under the direct control and instruction of

any particular Commander.

5.3 Clear and effective span of control is important to provide for efficient direction, control

and co-ordination of operations.

5.4 The Committee has examined statements, documents, transcripts and found that several

briefings were held with the then Commissioner of Police and Chief of Defense Staff in

attendance, along with personnel at the Silver and Bronze Command level (See

Statement/Transcript of Former Commissioner of Police (CP) Owen Ellington, Former

Deputy Commissioner of Police (DCP), Glenmore Hinds, Deputy Commissioner of Police

(DCP),Clifford Blake , Former Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), Leon Rose and

Assistant Commissioner of Police, (ACP) Donovan Graham.

5.5 The command structure was headed by the JCFs Gold command; Former CP Owen

Ellington, supported by the Gold Command group which included Former DCP Glenmore

Hinds and DCP Clifford Blake. The role of the Gold Command group was to provide

leadership, guidance and support to Silver Commanders, allocate resources to execute the

plan and to establish command and control centers.

5.6 The Silver Command was established with ACP Donovan Graham (then SSP) supported by

ACP Budhoo (then SP) and team, who manned the outer cordon.

14
5.7 The JCFs Ground Command Post was established on May 24, 2010 at Seprod.

Superintendent Warren Turner (Retired) and team, and SP Everton Tabannah(then DSP)

and team, including Inspector Pratt and Sergeant Waugh were assigned to enter the area of

operation.

5.8 At each tier of command, the JCF, along with their JDF counterparts, had their roles and

functions clearly defined. Members were given instructions through the chain of command

and in return they reported on their actions, progress and results.

5.9 Debriefing exercises were conducted and each Commander had to submit a

report/statement on the operation.

FINDING

5.10 Upon a thorough review of the conduct of the operation, the Committee agreed

unanimously, that the span of control was clear and the span of command effective.

15
6.0 Term of Reference 1e

6.1 Term of reference 1e was:

Examine the operations plan to determine if the:
- System to ensure effective and adequate investigation in the event of the
resort to the Use of Force by members of the JCF existed and was
followed.

6.2 The Operations Plan established a Silver Commander at the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police with the responsibility for:

arrest, search, evidencegathering, processing of the subject and treatment

of significant other suspects arrested/detained4

6.3 The Operations Plan also appoints Bronze Commanders with the responsibilities for:

Search, Arrest, Evidence-Gathering and Processing of Prisoners5

The Operation Plan required that those bronze commanders be appointed and briefed by the

ACP in charge of Criminal Investigation Branch (CIB).

6.4 The Silver Commander referred to in 6.2 above, is the ACP in charge of CIB.

6.5 However, having perused the transcripts, the Committee agreed that, the role of the

Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB) was not clearly demonstrated in the evidence.

4
See Operation Keywest Silver Commanders on page 6
5
See Operation Keywest Bronze Commanders on page 7

16
6.6 The Committee found It incomprehensible that former ACP Les Green, then head of the

CIB, never gave evidence before the enquiry as to:

(a) the recovery of dead bodies,

(b) identification of bodies,
(c) Evidence gathering relative to allegations of extra-judicial
killings.

6.7 The evidence revealed that former ACP Green gave evidence via video link before the

Commission and was questioned about the directives he gave to SP Michael Phipps not to

pursue investigations into extra-judicial killings. These assertions were made by SP Phipps

in a statement before the Commission.

6.8 The Commission never questioned Former ACP Les Green about his role as Silver

Commander and Chief Investigator.

6.9 Notwithstanding the above, there was evidence that extensive investigations were carried

out by members of the Bureau of Special Investigation (BSI) whose remit was not

referenced in the operational plan, but was subsequently assigned this task6.

6.10 The BSI reported directly to the Commissioner of Police and not through the command

structure.

6.11 A complaint desk was established in Tivoli Gardens by the BSI and employees of the

Office of the Public Defender, to receive complaint from aggrieved residents.

6.12 Investigations into allegations of killings by members of the security forces, were

conducted based on the insistence of the then Public Defender, Mr. Earl Witter, as no

formal reports were received from residents.

6
Statement/Transcript of ACP Granville Gause, SSP Ezra Stewart, SP Gladys Brown-Ellis and Mr. Earl Witter, former
Public Defender.

17
6.13 While it was accepted by the Committee, that the role of the CIB was not adequately

referenced, there was evidence that the Bureau of Special Investigations performed

investigative functions under arduous conditions7.

6.14 Similarly, the Forensic Scene of Crime Investigators (FSCI) carried out their functions

based on instructions received from the BSI8.

6.15 Based on the evidence provided, there were delays in the processing of scenes based on the

prevailing circumstances which saw units coming under gun-fire on entering the area.

6.16 All the bodies that were recovered were identified and x-rayed for forensic evaluation. The

causes of deaths were documented, and post mortem reports issued. This was done under

close observation of overseas forensic pathologists engaged by the Office of the Public

Defender.

6.17 All weapons assigned to the JCF officers who participated in the operation, were tested and

ballistic certificates issued. All ballistic signatures from those weapons were compared

against bullet fragments retrieved from the bodies of the deceased persons, and no match

was found.

FINDING

6.18 Despite the absence of the CIB participation and the delays occasioned by the prevailing

circumstances, the Committee agreed that effective and adequate investigations were

carried out in instances where deadly force was used.

6.19 The Committee finds that there was a system to ensure effective and adequate

investigations in the event of the resort to use of force by members of the JCF.

7
See Statement/Transcript of SP Brown-Ellis
8
See Statement/Transcript Insp Harris

18
6.20 The Committee finds that the system was not followed according to the plan. However, the

BSI rose to the occasion.

19
Term of Reference 2
7.1 Term of reference 2 was:
Determine in light of the findings above, whether the conduct of the named
Officers amount to misconduct.

7.2 The Commission in its report of 2016, made several adverse comments against Named

Officers of the JCF.

7.3 For the purpose of this Term of Reference, the review focused on five officers who were

serving at the time this Administrative Review began (hereafter the Named Officers).

7.4 These named officers are:

(i) ACP Donovan Graham

(ii) ACP Winchroy Budhoo
(iii) SP Everton Tabannah
(iv) Insp. Mario Pratt
(v) Sgt. Steve Waugh

7.5 As stated before, ACP Budhoo passed away prior to the conclusion of this Administrative

Review.

ADVERSE COMMENTS AGAINST ACP DONOVAN GRAHAM

7.6 The Commission in its report said:

11.140 We find that, as the most senior Ground Commander of the

JCF, SSP Graham did not ensure that a record was made of the locations of
bodies nor did he take any action to determine whether his instructions were
carried out on matters of vital importance to an investigation and
concerning losses of life. Accordingly, we find SSP Graham to have been in
dereliction of his duties.

11.141 To the extent that SSP Graham described himself as "the

senior person leading the men and women under my command", he must be

20
 held accountable for the deficiencies in record-keeping in relation to the
locations of dead bodies. He admitted that he received reports from SSP
Budhoo about dead bodies being seen in the community. And, according to
CoP Ellington, he telephoned SSP Graham in connection with the same
matter.'9

7.7 During the operations, then Commissioner of Police communicated to ACP Graham that he

had concerns about bodies said to be lying around in the area of operation.

7.8 ACP Graham passed on this information to the team from Mobile Reserve to look into the

concerns. It must be noted that the Mobile Reserve team having gone to the scene,

removed bodies that were seen but could not have preserved or processed the scenes, as

they neither possessed the expertise nor were they in a position to cause it to be done under

the prevailing hostile conditions.

7.9 It is to be highlighted that records were made of the bodies that were picked up. This was

evidenced in correspondence submitted to the then Honourable Prime Minister Bruce

Golding, who submitted copies of (what is now called the "Golding Papers") to the

Commission.

7.10 The Committee has seen overwhelming evidence that the hierarchy of the JCF acted to

prevent a public health crisis when ACP Graham (then SSP) was informed by ACP Budhoo

(then SP) and via Police Headquarters on May 25, 2010 that there were dead bodies lying

around on the ground. ACP Graham (then SSP), in turn gave instructions to SP Tabannah

(then DSP) on the first instance to have the bodies removed and on the second, he gave

instructions to Sgt. Waugh to have them removed.10

7.11 On May 24 & 25, 2010, teams from Mobile Reserve, who were in the area, assisted in the

removal of the bodies. Cons. Maxwell (deceased), made notes of those picked up by the

9
See Commission Report - page 405
10
See statement of ACP Donovan Graham

21
 JCF members. Without any evidence being presented, no proper conclusion of dereliction

can be made against any member of the Mobile Reserve.

7.12 Instructions contained in Appendices A-O of the Strategic Plan in no way delegated

authority for the members from Mobile Reserve to remove bodies. The situation was fluid,

therefore the JCF acted based on the prevailing conditions as they experienced it11.

7.13 Situational Analysis is critical in dynamic circumstances such as what existed during May

2010. No member of the Mobile Reserve team had the duty to process dead bodies. This

specific responsibility was a matter for the CIB in accordance with the Operation Plan.

7.14 When then Assistant Commissioner of Police Les Green, whose responsibility it was, (as

per the Operations Plan), to carry out investigations, was questioned, he was not asked

about the location of the bodies or the recordings made by Cons Maxwell. Therefore it

would not be justifiable for the Commission to make an adverse finding thereon, against

ACP Graham that he was in dereliction of duty.

ADVERSE COMMENTS AGAINST ACP WINCHROY BUDHOO

7.15 The Commission in its report said:

"11.118 SSP Budhoo was an unconvincing witness. In answer to

questions put to him by the Chairman, he said that he did not remember if
he spoke to DSP Tabannah to find out whether DSP Tabannah had carried
out his duty of enquiring whether Cons. Maxwell had recorded the locations
of bodies. SSP Budhoo then agreed that it was crucial to make notations of
the locations of bodies and, 'that is why I told Tabannah to do that', he said.
To the next question: 'Why didn't you follow up if it was so crucial?' SSP
Budhoo answered: 'I was basically assisting the Silver Command on these
matters'.

11
See Col. Jamie OGilvies, SP Gladys Brown-Ellis' & Mr. Ferdinand Maddens statements

22
 11.119 We find SSP Budhoo in dereliction of his duties to the extent
that he took no steps in circumstances where, after giving instructions to
DSP Tabannah and Sgt. Waugh concerning the retrieval of bodies and
recording the locations thereof, he did not follow up with those officers to
ensure that his instructions were carried out."12

7.16 We have examined the role of ACP Budhoo and have seen no evidence that the task of

collecting dead bodies was assigned to him. ACP Budhoo stated in his response to the

Commission that he was assisting the Silver Command when he called SP Tabannah and

gave the instructions. It is the Committees view, that having given instruction to SP

Tabannah to make notations of the locations of dead bodies, then he would have discharged

his responsibility. There is evidence that the notations were made 13 . Several officers

testified that the task had been assigned by SP Tabannah to Cons. Maxwell. Regrettably,

Cons. Maxwell passed on in October 2010, long before the Commission of Enquiry

commenced.

7.17 It is unfortunate that Cons. Maxwell died and therefore not able to account to the

Commission in relation to the task assigned to him.

7.18 The Committee concurs with the Commissions comment that:

'11.123 Whereas we accept that the operational plan of the JCF did
not assign any duty to SSP Budhoo in respect of the retrieval of bodies ...14

7.19 The finding of the Commission that ACP Budhoo was "in dereliction of duty" for not

following up, when that responsibility was not assigned to him, in the view of the

Committee, has not been established.

12
See Commission Report - page 397
13
See the "Golding Papers" where a detailed list of the location of dead bodies was included
14
See the Commission Report - Page 398

23
 ADVERSE COMMENTS AGAINST SP EVERTON TABANNAH (then DSP)

7.20 The Commission in its report said:

'10.58 We have given our reasons in Chapter 9 for concluding that

a number of persons were probably killed by members of the security forces.
However, we wish to state in this Chapter, that we were not impressed by
the evidence of DSP Tabannah, DSP Turner or Sgt. Waugh and Sgt. Pratt.

DSP Tabannah

10.59 In the case of DSP Tabannah, we prefer the timelines given

by Maj. Cheverria who testified that his watch was synchonised in
accordance with military procedure prior to embarking on the operation.
We believe that DSP Tabannah did report to Maj. Cheverria when the[y]
latter called him about 4.00 p.m. to come into the sector which had been
secured at 3.25 p.m. We find it passing strange that Maj. Kennedy walked
through sector 2 and saw no dead bodies yet DSP Tabannah claimed to
have seen two bodies.

10.60 DSP Tabannah's evidence did not inspire confidence in us

when juxtaposed with the records of KPH. He never told us that he
delivered 12 bodies to KPH on 25 May, yet the records of the hospital show
that he did go there with 12 bodies on that day. Further, both DSP
Tabannah and Sgt Waugh are contradicted by the records of KPH to the
extent that they both testified of two bodies being taken to the hospital in the
evening of 24 May and being pronounced dead by doctors. There is no
record at the hospital supporting that evidence. In fact, we doubt that two
bodies were in fact taken to KPH on 24 May. We disbelieve DSP Tabannah
that the JDF was not in control of sector 1 because of heavy gunfire. Maj.
Cheverria's testimony is that the sector was safe and there was no hostile
gunfire. We also disbelieve DSP Tabannah's evidence that he was "pinned
down for 2 hours" near the train line/intersection of Industrial Terrace and
Marcus Garvey Drive. That evidence is in conflict with the evidence of Sgt.
Pratt who said the team was "pinned down" for 4 minutes and that of Sgt.
Waugh who put the length of time as 10 to 15 minutes. Finally, whereas the
evidence of Sgts Pratt and Waugh is that they collected 25 bodies, DSP
Tabannah's evidence under cross-examination by Mr. Panton, is that they
collected 27 bodies. Quite simply, there are too many important and

24
 unexplained discrepancies in DSP Tabannah's evidence to render it
credible.'15

7.21 SP Tabannah having received the information regarding bodies lying on the ground, gave

instructions to Insp Pratt and Sgt Waugh to pick up the bodies. He proceeded to enter the

area of operation after being told by Major Cheverria, about 5:00pm, that the location was

secure.

7.22 SP Tabannah said he saw two (2) dead bodies when he walked through Sector 1 on the

May 24, 2010 and at that time Maj. Cheverria was not in his presence. However Maj.

Cheverria did say that he saw one body. No assumptions then can be made from this

discrepancy as to the number of bodies because they were at the location at different times.

Time lines should have been established by the Commission and this was not adequately

done to the standard required for it to be used as a basis to impeach ones credibility.

Therefore it is the view of the Committee that SP Tabannahs credibility ought not to be

impeached on the basis of time.

7.23 Evidence to support SP Tabannah that he and his men were pinned down for two hours was

identified by the Committee.16

7.24 After receiving the call from Maj. Cheverria, SP Tabannah and team encountered

hostilities, including, coming under sustained gunfire, which prevented the team from

proceeding further into the sector and carrying out their assigned tasks according to the

Operations Plan.

15
See Commission Report - Page 292
16
Para 8. DSP Tabannah's Statement

25
7.25 It was further established by the Committee that the evidence tendered at the Enquiry in

2016 by SP Tabannah, is consistent with his statement made six years earlier on July 17,

2010.

7.26 The Committee agreed that the analysis of the time by the Commission was misconstrued.

The Committee accepts the timeline given by SP Tabannah as the cumulative time of the

series of events that occurred from the time SP Tabannah received the call from Maj.

Cheverria, giving him the all clear to enter the sector, until the time he and his team

retreated.

7.27 Sgt. Waugh was given instructions by SP Tabannah, to take the two bodies seen lying on

the roadway, after passing the clinic in Tivoli Gardens, to the Kingston Public Hospital

(KPH). Insp. Pratt and Sgt. Waugh also gave evidence that recordings were being done by

Cons. Maxwell who was the observer. Insp. Pratt and Sgt. Waugh also gave evidence that

they received instructions from ACP Graham, ACP Budhoo and SP Tabannah.

7.28 It is clear that Instructions were being given and follow-up was taking place. SP Tabannah

communicated with ACP Graham as to the situation that existed on the ground. The events

that unfolded while Sgt. Waugh was on way to KPH were also reported to ACP Graham.17

7.29 Paragraph 5 of Sgt. Waughs response to the Commission stated that Cons. Maxwell, who

was his observer, made written notes of all persons taken to KPH on May 25, 2010 and

these notes were handed over to police personnel at the Command Post. A finding of

dereliction of duty, in the circumstances, cannot be justified and is unfounded.

7.30 The statements of SP Tabannah, Insp Pratt and Sgt. Waugh support each other and are

consistent.

17
See page 37-38 of the Commission Transcript

26
7.31 The Commission concluded that "a number of persons were probably killed by members of

the security forces." This is highly speculative as no credible evidence was led at the

enquiry to substantiate this finding.

7.32 It was also noted that the Commission, rejected the evidence of SP Tabannah that he saw

two (2) dead bodies, yet accepted the evidence of the JDF member, Maj. Kennedy who said

he saw none. This was pointed out by Retired SP Turner in his response to the proposed

adverse findings.

7.33 The Commission seemed to have being confused when it said " We find it passing

strange that Maj. Kennedy walked through sector 2 and saw no bodies yet DSP Tabannah

claimed to have seen two bodies."18 and then later said "But except for Maj. Cheverria who

saw two bodies, none of the other commanders saw any bodies in Tivoli Gardens on 24

May"19

7.34 It appeared as matter of convenience for the Commission, that the accounts proffered by

the JDF Officers were accepted in all the circumstances where it is required as a basis to

impeach members of the JCF. The time that SP Tabannah and Major Kennedy went to

Sector 2 is very important and therefore it should have been properly established before

being used as a basis to support adverse findings.

7.35 The Committee therefore does not find any evidence to support any dereliction of duty or

lack of credibility in the conduct of SP Tabannah.

18
See Commission Report - Para. 10.59 on pg. 293
19
See Commission Report - Para. 10.65 on pg. 295

27
 ADVERSE COMMENTS AGAINST INSP. MARIO PRATT AND SGT. STEVE
WAUGH

7.36 The Commission in its report said:

'10.63 The manner in which dead bodies were collected and

transported to KPH does not reflect well on Sgt. Waugh and Sgt. Pratt.
According to them, they drove around randomly on 25 May. Neither knew
where the other was. Both claimed ignorance of the roads in Tivoli
Gardens. Both attributed the task of record keeping to Cons. Maxwell who
died in October 2010 as a result of a vehicular accident. And DSP
Tabannah made no effort to retrieve Maxwell's alleged noted immediately
after the operation or at all.

10.64 Sgt Waugh's evidence that he went to KPH with bodies which
were pronounced dead by doctors at the hospital is not supported by the
records of that institution. The records of KPH, produced by Dr. Natalie
Whylie, show that no bodies were brought to the hospital on 24 May and
there is no record of Sgt. Waugh's name on the documentation of KPH.

10.65 Moreover, Sgt. Waugh's evidence that most of the bodies

were found near barricades and sandbags does not sit comfortably with
other evidence. If any of the civilians had been killed near barricades or
sandbags on 24 May, surely the military commanders of the relevant sectors
should have seen those bodies. Except for Maj. Cheverria who saw two
bodies, none of the other commanders saw any other bodies in Tivoli
Gardens on 24 May. And these observations were made after the JDF took
control of the sectors and houses had been cleared.

10.66 It is beyond belief that those military commanders would

have invited the Supts. to move their officers into a "hot zone".

10.67 In preferring and accepting the evidence of Maj. Cheverria

and Maj. Kennedy, we are mindful of the undisputed evidence that their
troops' tasks were to enter Tivoli Gardens first, secure the sectors and then
invite the JCF to enter and conduct searches and other tasks appropriate for
civil power. The safety and security of a sector were matters for the
judgement of the JDF sector commanders who entered a sector first. When
they determined that a sector was safe and secure, it was up to them to
invite the JCF in. We therefore believe Majs. Cheverria and Kennedy that
they invited DSPs Tabannah and Turner to enter the sectors at the time

28
 stated by the Major when the sectors were dominated by the JDF and made
safe.

10.68 In the result, we have concluded that it would be dangerous

to rely on the evidence of DSP Tabannah, DSP Turner, Sgt Waugh and Sgt.
Pratt.'20

7.37 The Committee accepts, based on the prevailing conditions as was evident in the statements

of SP Tabannah, Insp Pratt (then Sgt), Sgt Waugh, Retired Supt. W. Turner, that the

situation was unsafe when they entered the sector after being invited to do so by the JDF.

7.38 The task of recovering bodies was something that had to be done speedily, and did not

allow for the delay that would result from stopping to preserve the location where the

bodies were found. When these bodies were being recovered, the police were operating

under intense and sustained gunfire. A balance had to be struck between retrieving the

bodies and preserving their own lives.

7.39 The Committee was unable to determine the accuracy of the KPH records and while we do

not wish to speculate, it is not far-fetched that bodies were brought to the KPH and not

recorded. In any event, this could not be a basis to finding that Insp Pratt and Sgt Waugh

were guilty of misconduct or dereliction of duty.

20
See Commission Report - page 294

29
 OTHER EVIDENCE

7.40 Former Prime Minister The Hon. Bruce Golding in his evidence submitted to the

Commission detailed documents of information that had been provided to him, relative to

the West Kingston operation. These documents came to be known as the "Golding Papers"

throughout the Commission of Enquiry.

7.41 No evidence was presented to the Enquiry specifically identifying any misconduct by any

of the named officers.

7.42 The roles of the named officers were predominantly operational.

7.43 It is to be noted, that the carrying out of investigations, would have been the remit of the

Criminal Investigations Branch (CIB). Records that were made should have been obtained,

acted on and preserved by the CIB.

7.44 The Commission seemed not to be concerned with the dangerous nature of the operation to

extract the subject Christopher Coke and heavy gunfire targeted at the officers on the

ground, but they were overly concerned about the picking up of dead bodies.

7.45 It seemed that a lot of emphasis was placed on the utterances and perceptions of the then

Public Defender, Mr. Earl Witter. This was evident by the line of questions posed to the

officers during the Enquiry.

7.46 Colonel Jamie Ogilvie of the JDF, in his evidence to the Commission, testified that he

picked up 17 bodies. However, no questions were posed by the Commission to him or any

other member of the JDF regarding those bodies, neither was any member of the JDF cited

for actions relating to those bodies.

30
7.47 It was stated by the Commission that based on the prevailing circumstances in which the

JDF was operating, they would not be cited 21 . However, these were the same

circumstances and conditions under which the members of the JCF operated and were

cited.

7.48 JDF Sergeant Anderson, who removed two (2) dead bodies, was never called to the

Enquiry to give account. The bodies were that of Martin Lindsay and Junior Burke. These

bodies were tagged and it was confirmed that Sgt. Anderson was the person who collected

and delivered those bodies, as his name was placed on the tags as evidenced in the Post

Mortem Report.22

EVIDENCE OF SOLDIER 1 AND SOLDIER 3

7.49 Soldier No. 1 said that the police shot and killed an alleged victim in a caged area with a

high powered weapon. He also said that another prisoner protested, and he too was shot and

killed. However, there was no other evidence given supporting this claim.

7.50 He testified that other detainees were inside the cage, yet no civilian gave such an account

to that effect. In fact, he testified that he reported it to a lance corporal, yet the name of the

lance corporal was not given. Similarly, none of the JDF bronze commanders testified of

having received any such report.

21
See Commission Report Para. 10.86 - we ascribe no adverse comment to Lt. Col. Ogilvie who, we think, did his
best in the circumstances
22
See Post Mortem Report of Martin Lindsay and Junior Burke at Appendix C

31
7.51 There were serious discrepancies with the statements of Soldiers No. 1 & 3, yet it was

accepted by the Commission to be credible accounts.23 Since the evidence of Soldiers No.

1 & 3 was given anonymously, it is the view of the Committee that without corroboration it

should not have been given the weight that the Commission placed on it.

7.52 It is to be noted that the JCF members gave statements contemporaneously after the

incident to the Bureau of Special Investigations (BSI), in contrast, the JDF members

presented their statements four (4) years after the incident. The evidence presented to the

Commission was that they all gave statements in 2010 and it was stored in soft copy on a

computer and printed in 2014 just before the commencement of the Enquiry and signed.

7.53 In contrast, members of the JCF gave their statements in 2010 all of which were signed,

dated and handed over to the BSI.

7.54 The Commission should have been guided by the statements which were recorded and

given in 2010. If there were any discrepancies or shortcomings in these statements, then

the witnesses should have been questioned about it. It cannot be, that witnesses were not

asked about a particular matter which is viewed as a discrepancy in the statement given,

and subsequently, that shortcoming used as the basis for an adverse finding.24

7.55 Having examined the Commissions Report and supporting documents, the Committee is

of the view that there was no basis for a lot of the adverse findings levied against the

23
See Commission Report - Para. 9.122 on pg. 253 - We find the evidence of Soldiers No.1 and No.3 credible.
24
The Rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R. 67, HL

32
 named officers, in particular, ACP Budhoo who was cited for roles that did not fall within

his remit25.

7.56 ACP Budhoo was informed that there were bodies on the street to be removed and he gave

directives to SP Tabannah to have this done. SP Tabannah assigned the task to Insp Pratt

and Sgt Waugh, and Cons Maxwell (now deceased), was assigned the task of recording the

information.

7.57 The Committee examined the Operations Plan, reports and statements of ACP Donovan

Graham along with those of SP Tabannah, Insp. Pratt and Sgt. Waugh to determine in light

of the findings of item 1 of the TOR, whether the conduct of the Named Officers amounted

to misconduct.

7.58 The Committee agreed that the misconduct put forward by the Commission was based

primarily on the fact that, the Named Officers did not produce records of the location

where dead bodies were found and the failure to preserve the scenes.

7.59 The senior officers; ACP Graham (then SSP), ACP Budhoo (then SP) and SP Tabannah

(then DSP) followed-up on the instructions that had been given to them. They received

feedback from the men under their command, and this is evident in the statements given by

the men. The Committee finds that such evidence demonstrated that communication was

established and maintained between Ground Commander, and the teams on the ground.

This is contrary to the finding of the Commission26.

25
See Operation Plan
26
See Para. 11.119 of Commission Report at pg.397 We find SSP Buddhoo in dereliction of his duties, to the extent
that he took no step in circumstances where, after giving instructions to DSP Tabannah and Sgt. Waugh concerning

33
 7.60 From the examination of the pertinent documents, it was observed that the instructions

given by the Commissioner of Police to the Ground Command, were carried out by all

concerned and hence the Committee is satisfied that there was no dereliction of duty.

7.61 Additionally, based on the prevailing conditions as was evident in the statements of SP

Tabannah,(then DSP) Insp Pratt (then Sgt), Sgt Waugh, Retired Supt. W. Turner, the

situation was unsafe, so the recovery of the bodies was an activity that had to be done

expeditiously. When these bodies were being recovered, the police were operating under

intense gunfire.

7.62 The Commission did not identify any specific act of dereliction of duty or misconduct on

the part of any of the Named Officers. Therefore, it is the view of the Committee, that no

basis existed for the adverse findings and comments mentioned in Chapter 15.18 of the

Report, and see no reason why, the Named Officers should not be allowed to continue to

serve, in their various capacities, the JCF and the people of Jamaica.

FINDING

7.63 Upon a complete and thorough examination of the evidence, including, the Operation Plan,

various reports, transcripts and statements; and for the reasons stated above, no basis could

be found by the Committee, upon which any of the Named Officers should be cited for

misconduct and/or dereliction of duty.

the retrieval of the bodies and recording the location thereof, he did not follow-up with those officers to ensure that
his instructions were carried out.

34
8.0 Term of Reference 3
8.1 Term of reference 3 was:
Make Recommendations Consistent with the Findings

RECOMMENDATIONS

8.2 The Committee makes the following recommendations:

8.3 Proper recording and preservation of records on similar operations must be adhered to as

much as is possible.

8.4 Each team that is deployed within an area should have at least one member with local

knowledge of that area. Mapping of the area should also be considered.

8.5 The role of the CIB to investigate should be carried out, as much as is possible, by the CIB.

8.6 In future operations of this nature, the CIB must be involved from initial briefing and at

least one senior member of the investigation branch who is able to make decisions be

placed at the Command Post.

8.7 Enhanced joint specialised training between both forces should be sustained. This will

foster greater understanding when coordinating operations of a similar nature.

8.8 In all operations, care should be taken that geographical locations of all officers be

recorded and kept.

8.9 The introduction and utilization of the appropriate technology, (e.g. body worn cameras,

vehicle tracker, Global Positioning System, drone, etcetera) must be reinforced and

strengthened during operations of this nature.

35
8.10 The use of events log should be maintained by each commander and team leader. This

should be submitted along with a report upon the completion of the tour of duty.

36
 LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix A - List of Abbreviations

Appendix B - Letter from Dr. H. McDavid requesting Witnesses

to attend sitting

Appendix C - Port Mortem Reports of Martin Lindsay and Junior Burke

37
 APPENDIX A
List of Abbreviations
Abbreviation Meaning
ACP Assistant Commissioner of Police
BSI Bureau of Special Investigation
CD Commander of the Order of Distinction
CIB Criminal Investigation Branch
CP / CoP Commissioner of Police
DCP Deputy Commissioner of Police
DPP Director of Public Prosecution
DR Doctor
DPP Director of Public Prosecution
DSP Deputy Superintendent of Police
FSCI Forensic Scene of Crime
HON Honourable
INSP. Inspector of Police
JCF Jamaica Constabulary Force
JDF Jamaica Defence Force
JP Justice of the Peace
KPH Kingston Public Hospital
MAJ Major
PROF Professor
REV Reverent
QC Queens Counsel
SGT Sergeant of Police
SP Superintendent of Police
SSP Senior Superintendent of Police
TOR Term of Reference
UHF Ultra-high frequency

38
 APPENDIX B

Letter Requesting Witnesses

39
 APPENDIX C

Post-Mortem Reports

40