Corruption PDF
Corruption PDF
Corruption PDF
STRATEGIES FOR
BUSINESS,
GOVERNMENT, &
CIVIL SOCIETY
TO FIGHT
CORRUPTION
IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC
Proceedings of the 6th Regional Anti-Corruption
Conference
for Asia and the Pacific
ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific
STRATEGIES FOR
BUSINESS,
GOVERNMENT, AND
CIVIL SOCIETY TO
FIGHT CORRUPTION
IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC
Proceedings of the 6th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference
for Asia and the Pacific
Supporting the Fight against Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative
Annual Report 2007. Paris, ADB/OECD, 2008.
Fighting Bribery in Public Procurement in Asia and the Pacific. Proceedings of the 7th Regional
Technical Seminar. Paris: ADB/OECD, 2008.
Asset Recovery and Mutual Legal Assistance in Asia and the Pacific. Proceedings of the 6th Regional
Technical Seminar. Paris: ADB/OECD, 2008.
Managing Conflict of Interest: Frameworks, Tools, and Instruments for Preventing, Detecting, and
Managing Conflict of Interest. Proceedings of the 5th Regional Technical Seminar. Manila:
ADB/OECD, 2008.
Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition and Recovery of Proceeds of Corruption in Asia and the Pacific:
Frameworks and Practices in 27 Asian and Pacific Jurisdictions, Paris: ADB/OECD, 2008.
Curbing Corruption in Public Procurement in Asia and the Pacific: Progress and Challenges in 25
Countries, Manila: ADB/OECD, 2006.
Denying Safe Haven to the Corrupt and the Proceeds of Corruption: Enhancing Asia-Pacific Co-
operation on Mutual Legal Assistance, Extradition, and Return of the Proceeds of Corruption.
Proceedings of the 4th Master Training Seminar. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2006.
Knowledge-Commitment-Action against Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: Proceedings of the 5th
Regional Anti-Corruption Conference. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2006.
Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: Progress in Legal and Institutional Reform in 25
Countries. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2006.
Anti-Corruption Action Plan for Asia and the Pacific with country endorsing statements. Manila:
ADB/OECD (2002; reprinted 2005).
Curbing Corruption in Tsunami Relief Operations. Manila: ADB/OECD/TI, 2005 (available in English,
Bahasa, Sinhala, and Tamil languages).
Controlling Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: Proceedings of the 4th Regional Anti-Corruption
Conference. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2005.
Anti-Corruption Policies in Asia and the Pacific: The Legal and Institutional Frameworks. Manila:
ADB/OECD, 2004.
Effective Prosecution of Corruption. Proceedings of the 1st Regional Training Seminar. Manila:
ADB/OECD, 2003.
Taking Action against Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: Proceedings of the 3rd Regional Anti-
Corruption Conference. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2002.
Progress in the Fight against Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: Proceedings of the 2nd Regional Anti-
Corruption Conference. Manila: ADB/OECD, 2001.
Combating Corruption in Asia and the Pacific: Proceedings of the Manila workshop held in 1999.
Manila: ADB/OECD, 2000.
These documents are available for download from the Initiatives Web site at
www.oecd.org/corruption/asiapacific/publications
2009 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Asian Development Bank
All rights reserved
ISBN 978-92-64077003
This publication was prepared by the Secretariat of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and
the Pacific, composed of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) staff. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in it do not
necessarily represent the views of ADB or those of its member governments or of the OECD or its member
countries. ADB and OECD do not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and
accept no responsibility whatsoever for any consequences of their use. The term country does not
imply any judgment by the ADB or the OECD as to the legal or other status of any territorial entity.
The Initiative is also grateful to its partners for their financial and intellectual
support: the Australian Agency for International Development, German Federal
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, German Technical
Development Cooperation, Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency, Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, the American Bar
Association/Rule of Law Initiative, Pacific Basin Economic Council, Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat, Transparency International, United Nations Development
Programme, World Bank, and Asia-Europe Foundation.
The term country in this publication also refers to territories or areas; the
designations employed and the presentation of the material do not imply the
expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country
or territory on the part of ADBs Board and members or the OECD and its member
countries. Every effort has been made to verify the information in this publication.
However, ADB, OECD, and the authors disclaim any responsibility for the
accuracy of the information. ADBs Board and members and the OECD and its
member countries cannot accept responsibility for the consequences of its use
for other purposes or in other contexts.
would now like to share with you Singapores efforts, starting with government-led
systemic structures.
Government-led structures
In Singapore, we put a lot of emphasis on administrative efficiency.
Processes which are streamlined and efficient ensure better services for the
public. They also reduce opportunities for corruption and abuse. If government
services take a long time to deliver and require multiple processes and steps,
then the likelihood of corruption and malpractice will multiply. In this regard, the
Singapore government has implemented electronic services to deal with many
government transactions. Through such services, members of the public can
search and access government information as well as conduct a wide range of
transactions. These include applying for licenses and permits, making reports,
and filing tax returns.
Working together
It is thus clear that anti-corruption agencies cannot act alone. Fighting
corruption has to be a whole-of-government effort involving the improvement of
administrative processes within the public sector as well as improvement of
corporate governance standards within the private sector. Both the public and
private sectors have key roles to play. It is therefore important for anti-corruption
agencies to partner with external parties in their anti-corruption efforts. The
prevention of corruption in the private sector requires more than investigative
and outreach efforts from anti-corruption agencies. The commitment of
stakeholders has to be securedprivate entities must be encouraged to
implement systems of good governance from within. This entails putting in place
a framework of systemic processes incorporating checks and balances that
guide behaviour in the organization. A well-designed self-regulatory corporate
governance framework would reduce the possibility of improper or criminal
behaviour. More importantly, just as the public service has built up its ethos and
core values, a culture of ethical values must be cultivated in the private sector.
I am happy to note that this conference seeks to work with the various
platforms by exploring how international and regional initiatives can play a part
in raising awareness and commitment to fight corruption in the region. As chair of
the APEC Anti-Corruption Task Force for 2009, Singapore is committed to
contributing to this process of dialogue and co-operation. Singapore has also
been an active member of this ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative since 2001,
and we continue to play an active part.
From the outset, I would like state that ADB welcomes the theme of this
years conferencewhich emphasizes the need for the private sector, civil
society, and governments to work together to combat corruption. Such a
comprehensive approach is needed first and foremost because the root of
corruption is the complex web of engagement between the private and public
sectors. Corruption is not simply a public sector issue. Corrupt transactions, by
definition, require the participation of more than one actor. After all, it takes two
to tango and for every briber offering money there is a bribee asking for it. Thus,
it will take the concerted effort of all stakeholderspublic, private, and civil
societyto successfully fight the scourge of corruption. That effort means
changing attitudes, strengthening institutions, adjusting regulation, resetting
incentives, and, more generally, reconsidering how a government interacts with
its citizens in ways that minimize the opportunity for corruption.
law can increase their national income by as much as four times in the
long term.2
According to Transparency International, corruption equals a full 3% of
the worlds gross domestic product.3
Studies of the impact of corruption upon government procurement
policies in several Asian countries reveal that these governments have
paid from 20% to 100% more for goods and services than they would
have otherwise.
In addition, legislation in many countries does not yet extend to areas such
as foreign bribery or political corruption, and regulations are too often
ambiguous. Furthermore, not enough attention has been paid to reforming the
law enforcement agencies, whose cooperation is essential to the success of anti-
corruption agencies. And, although the contributions of civil society in raising
public awareness, encouraging reforms and monitoring progress are well-known,
some countries remain wary of fully engaging civil society as a partner in fighting
corruption. Building capacities and partnerships across the region is crucial to
address these ongoing challenges.
On behalf of ADB, I would like to express our appreciation to the OECD for
its strong and ongoing partnership in and contributions to this Initiative. I would
also like to thank all the development partners who have provided their strong
support.
NOTES
1 Dreher and Herzfeld, 2005.
2 World Bank Institute, 2004 and ongoing.
3 TI Anti-Corruption Handbook: corruption is defined as all instances where
entrusted power is used for private gain.
4 ADB. 2008. Governance Thematic Report 20062007.
Mario Amano
Deputy Secretary-General, OECD
It is an honor to be here today and share the opening of the 6th Regional
Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific with my distinguished
colleagues from Singapore and the Asian Development Bank.
I am very proud that the OECD and the Asian Development Bank are
partners in this conference. Our two organizations have been working together
for almost 10 years on this Initiative. I believe that our blend of expertise and
perspectives gives Asia and the Pacific a unique opportunity in the fight against
corruption. The OECD looks forward to continuing this valuable partnership as we
embark on the next decade.
I am pleased to see that so many key actors in the fight against corruption
in the region have come together for this important conference.
Your attendance here shows the reach and impact of the ADB/OECD
Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific, which will celebrate its 10th
anniversary in 2009. Over the past decade, members of the Initiative have
worked hard to fight corruption in the region, and the Initiative has supported
you through policy dialogue and analysis, and capacity building.
The Action Plan, adopted in 2001, has provided a roadmap to guide and
support members country-level reform efforts. It sets goals and standards,
adapted to the regional context, that encourage the establishment of effective
and transparent systems, and promote integrity. It has led to individual and
collective efforts to reduce economic, political, and social corruption.
Some of you may ask why the OECD, with its emphasis on helping
governments foster prosperity and fight poverty through economic growth and
financial stability, is involved in fighting corruption, and how it came to be a
partner in the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific. The
OECD recognizes that corruption goes to the core of sustainable economic
development. It can derail development plans. It aggravates the potential for
infrastructure projects to go wrong with tragic consequences, when contracts
obtained through bribery result in the construction of bridges and dams that
collapse, or factories that poison lakes and rivers. It diverts public funds from
health care, the construction of hospitals and schools, and the purchase of
childrens schoolbooks.
The Initiative has chosen as the theme for the 6th Regional Anti-Corruption
Conference the supply side of bribery in business transactions. An effective fight
against bribery in business transactions requires equal emphasis on the supply of
bribes by domestic and foreign companies and the demand for bribes from
public officials.
Combating the supply of bribes also happens to be the focus of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention. This is because the 30 OECD member countries and the
7 non-member countries that are State Parties to the Convention felt that they
had a unique opportunity to deter companies from their countries from bribing
foreign public officials in international business transactions.
The countries that belong to the Convention have also analyzed the trends
and patterns in the challenges that they have faced. This has enabled them to
mutually support each other in finding solutions. It is in this same spirit that the
countries that joined the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention are keen to share
experiences with members of the Initiative facing similar challenges in
implementing international standards, such as the United Nations Convention
against Corruption (UNCAC). For this reason, I am pleased that three parties to
the OECD Anti-Bribery ConventionAustralia, Japan, and the Republic of
Koreaare also members of the Initiative.
The OECD also shares the UNCACs focus on corruption and sustainable
development. The OECD Development Assistance Committees Network on
Governance works with donor countries to incorporate anti-corruption efforts into
development activities. The OECD introduced anti-corruption provisions in
bilateral development aid in 1996, and the DAC GOVNET strengthened support
for country-led anti-corruption strategies with the publication of the Principles for
Donor Action in 2003. In 2007, DAC Ministers agreed on a Collective Action
Agenda for Improving Governance to Fight Corruption which proposes a
harmonized approach among donors, and recognizes the role that both aid
donors and recipients can play to fight corruption.1
Another area of anti-corruption work at the OECD concerns the use of tax
measures to prevent and detect bribery. A 1996 Recommendation of the OECD
Council provides for the non-deductibility of bribes, 3 which is an important
disincentive for corruption in business transactions. It also provides tax officials
with a basis for detecting and reporting bribes. The OECD Bribery Awareness
Handbook for Tax Examiners4 helps tax examiners detect and identify bribes. It is
available in several languages, including Chinese, Japanese, and Korean.
I am pleased that you have brought your energy, ideas, and commitment
to the table today. I believe that the next 2 days will bring many fruitful
exchanges, innovative ideas, and productive partnerships.
In closing, I would like to share with you my wish that you will leave this
conference with renewed faith in the power of your collective action as
members of this Initiative to make a real impact on corruption in the region. I
congratulate you on nearing the 10th anniversary of this Initiative, and remind
you to stay positive and to be proud of every achievement that you have made
and will continue to make as you face the challenges of fighting the terrible
scourge of corruption.
NOTES
1 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/42/39618679.pdf
2 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/24/41549036.pdf
3 www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34551_2048174_1_1_1_1,00.html
4 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/20/37131825.pdf
Peter Ho, Head, Civil Service, and Permanent Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, Singapore
This is the 6th Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific
organized by the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative. I am quite struck by the
diversity of participation in the conference. We have participants not only from
the anti-corruption agencies, but also from other government departments.
These include audit and procurement agencies, regulatory agencies,
Ombudsmans office, and so on. International organizations, civil society
(including Transparency International), and private sector organizations are also
represented.
Getting different government agencies to set aside turf issues and work
together is a big challenge. But it is a vital part of good governanceeven if it is
easier said than done. As the world becomes more complex, policy issues and
challenges become more interconnected. But the traditional allocation of
responsibilities of government to ministries and agencies creates a silo effect.
When issues span more than one agency, timely and effective responses are
difficult to achieve. What is required is that government officials cooperate with
officials from other agencies in solving problems from a whole-of-government
viewpoint. This includes fighting corruption. For instance, the officers from anti-
corruption agencies proactively offer ideas and insights they have gathered from
their work to help government agencies strengthen their processes and systems
to prevent corruption.
In recent months, the subject of regulation has often been raised. In the
eyes of many, the financial crisis was caused largely by inadequate regulation of
the financial sector. In the context of anti-corruption, what this means is that
regulators and corporations have to ensure that the right processes are put in
place, coupled with an appropriate degree of regulation, so that the
opportunities for corruption are reduced in the first place.
I hope all of you had excellent opportunities to learn from the workshops,
as well as opportunities to socialize and to network. If you are not coming on
official business, I do hope that you will still come again to Singapore for holidays.
In fact, next year, Singapore will be chairing APEC and will host the APEC Anti-
Corruption Task Force, where we will further explore the issue of publicprivate
sector governance through a workshop. We welcome your participation in the
workshop.
To our overseas participants and speakers, I wish all of you a safe journey
home.
I also thank the ADB for our ongoing, fruitful relationship that supports the
fight against corruption in Asia and the Pacific. This meeting has shown how
much can be accomplished when our organizations work togetherwith our
partners and member economiesto identify key challenges and seek solutions.
Finally, I thank all our partner and donor organizations. I hope that the
conversations you have heard and actions you have seen over these past two
days have shown that your contributions and support are making a real
difference in fighting corruption in Asia and the Pacific.
This meeting has been a great opportunity for experts and key officials on
the ground in the fight against corruption to come together and discuss the key
issues in this important area. We have seen time and again how important a
regional perspective is in considering these issues.
truly move the fight against corruption forward. I thank you all for being part of
the fight.
Since its entry into force in 2005, the UN Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC) has added significant momentum to the global anti-corruption
movement. It complements requirements under the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, further supporting intergovernmental efforts to fight bribery in
business. The UNCAC is likewise instrumental in fostering a business climate that
discourages corruption. Its wide-ranging provisions require states to: implement
effective criminal laws that deter bribery; establish preventive mechanisms
against corruption; and ensure that the financial sector is not vulnerable to
laundering and transfer of illicit assets derived from corruption.
Business and civil society are allies in the fight against bribery
The economic case for fighting corruption appeals not only to
governments but also to individual companies and the business sector overall.
Companies and their representatives can be tempted to pay bribes to retain
contracts or to gain other short-term advantages in their business. However, they
increasingly realize that they can be victimized as targets of bribe solicitation, or
when they lose contracts to corrupt competitors. This awareness has led
companies to take action individually and collectively to reduce corruption in
business transactions.
John Bray
Director, Analysis, Control Risks
However, despite these advances, the hardest part may still lie ahead. The
intellectual battle has been won. At a policy level, no one now seriously contests
the importance of combating corruption. In most countries, well-drafted laws are
now in place, and the remaining gaps are being filled. We have the basis of an
international framework. The challenge now is implementation: how can we
apply these new laws and frameworks so that they really make a difference in
the lives of ordinary people?
We know the reason for these failures: lack of political will. All too often,
politicians have other prioritiesand this is true both in industrialized and in
developing countries. Sometimes this is simply the result of complacency. In other
cases, politicians believe that their careers are more likely to be advanced
through various forms of political patronage, a practice which itself often borders
on corruption, and they do not wish to damage the interests of their supporters.
In both cases, the result is that law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies do
not get the resources that they need to do their jobs effectively.
In the 2006 Control Risks survey, more than 35% of respondents reported that they
had been deterred from an otherwise attractive investment because of the host
countrys reputation for corruption. Countries with poor governance standards
are less likely to be able to attract the high-quality companies that they need to
advance their economic development.
Singapore understands the economic and reputational case very well; its
high standards of governance and low levels of corruption are essential
ingredients that enhance the countrys appeal to the many international
companies who operate in its territory. Hong Kong, China likewise understands
the business case, and acts on it. Its Independent Commission Against Corruption
(ICAC) is, per head of population, one of the best-resourced agencies in the
world.
Responsible business leaders take changes in the law very seriously, and
this is a key part of the business case. However, it is not the only one. Similarly,
personal values also are an important, indeed vital, driver for high standards of
ethicsbut still far from being the only one. As much as anything, the business
anti-corruption case rests on the need for long-term sustainability.
Companies that pay bribes may be able to make short-term gains, but
bribery is not a sustainable business model. First, by paying bribes, companies
immediately incur demands for more, like throwing meat to dogs. Secondly, if
they do not secure the benefit they supposedly have paid for, they are in no
position to complain: they certainly have no recourse in the courts to enforce
illicit contracts. Thirdly, times change, the officials and politicians who accept
bribes move on or die, and their successors may or may not be susceptible to the
same blandishments.
In late 2008, times are certainly changing. In periods of plenty, fraud and
corruption are more likely to pass unnoticed. By contrast, malpractice is more
likely to be detected during a recession when every dollar counts. Companies
cannot survive unless they retain the confidence of their shareholders and
customers, and they are in a better position to do so if they can point to high
standards of ethics and legal compliance.
fire safety inspector threatens to close down a factory for spurious safety reasons
unless he or she receives a bribe.
In Bribelines first year, there were 148 reports of bribery demands in P.R.
China, and of these, 20% were concerned with companies attempts to win new
business6. However, 24% of the demands were backed by a threat to inflict some
kind of harmful action: the hypothetical case of the fire safety inspector
threatening to close down a factory would be an example. In another 24% of the
cases reported, officials were seeking extra payment for the timely delivery of
some service, such as the issuing of a vital official document.
Timelydeliveryofservice 24%
A
voidharmfulaction 24%
Winningnewbusiness 20%
Favourabletreatment 9%
Receivepaymentforservicesalreadyrendered 6%
Exercisinginfluenceoveranothergov'tofficial 3%
Other 9%
To their credit, the Chinese authorities are working hard to crack down on
all kinds of business corruption. In order to win the support of their various business
communities, governments need to show understanding of the many cases
where companies see themselves as victims rather than instigators of corruption-
related crime and to do something about them.
39% 39%
40% 35% 36% 36%
30% 31%
28%
30% 26% 26%
21%
20% 16%
10%
0%
Co Oi IC Fin Po Ph Re De
ns l,g T an we arm ta i fe n
t ru as ce r a l ce
cti ,m
on i ne
Source: International Business Attitudes to Corruption. Control Risks and Simmons &
Simmons, 2006.
Governments cannot and should not bear the entire burden of promoting
anti-corruption standards in the private sector. Business associations led by
people with firsthand private sector experience typically are better placed to
understand the problems faced by their members, to educate them and to
devise solutions. Government agencies can endorse and support such initiatives,
but they should not expect to run them.
NOTES
1 Heimann, Fritz and Dell, Gillian. Progress Report 2008. Enforcement of the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions. Berlin: Transparency International.
www.transparency.org/content/download/33627/516718
2 Control Risks and Simmons & Simmons. 2006. International Business Attitudes to
Corruption Survey 2006. London. www.control-
risks.com/pdf/corruption_survey_2006_V3.pdf
See also Control Risks and Simmons & Simmons. 2007. Facing up to Corruption. A
Practical Business Guide. www.control-
risks.com/pdf/Facing_up_to_corruption_2007_englishreport.pdf
3 World Bank. 2004. A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. World Bank
Development Report 2005. Washington and New York: World Bank and Oxford
University Press. www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/08/01/0000
11823_20050801104043/Rendered/PDF/2882902005E.ver.010.pdf
4 Grene, Sophia. 2008. Investing in doing good can be good risk management,
Financial Times. 2 November.
5 www.bribeline.org
6 Trace International. 2008. BRIBELine China Report Provides New Details on Bribery.
www.traceinternational.org
The full report is available at
secure.traceinternational.org/news/pdf/China_PR_and_Report.pdf
7 Transparency International. 2002. Business Principles for Countering Bribery.
www.transparency.org/global_priorities/private_sector/business_principles
8 International Chamber of Commerce. 2005. ICC Rules of Conduct and
Recommendations to Combat Extortion and Bribery.
www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption/
9 www.weforum.org/pdf/paci/PACI_Principles.pdf
10 www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle10.html
11 www.fidic.org
12 www.anticorruptionforum.org
The first time I entered into Anti-Corruption endeavours was in 1977, when
the Asia-Pacific Council of American Chambers of Commerce (APCAC)
appointed me to develop arguments against the draft Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act (FCPA) that the US Congress had developed in reaction to several major
corruption scandals involving bribes paid by American corporations to non-
American public officials outside the United States. APCAC chose me because I
was an American lawyer with a legal practice in Bangkok and was a past
president of the American Chamber of Commerce Thailand.
I was soon to realize that the FCPA, with some tweaking a year or so later,
was actually a good law. It was the first significant law against bribery of foreign
public officials adopted by a major industrialized nation. Over the years, it
spawned an avalanche of conventions, legislations, self-governing rules and
codes of conduct guiding the conduct of business in corrupt environments. It
was then my privilege to have attended in Manila in 1999 the first gathering of
the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific. So it is most
heartening indeed to see 9 years later that this Initiative is thriving.
Well, the good news in Thailand is that Thailand has begun its climb
upwards on TIs Perception of Corruption Index; this progress is due to some
recent constitutional changes, which have established several independent anti-
corruption agencies, and to the expansion of the court system to address and
deal specifically with corruption and abuse of power by government officials.
Corruption is still a most serious problem in the Land of Smilesup to 60% of the
costs of some procurement projects are estimated to have been diverted by
Background
Today, the ICC is the global voice of virtually all sectors of international
business. Founded in 1919, and enjoying consultative status with the UN since
1945, the ICC operates through chapters in 84 countries. It espouses self-
regulation of business through a series of voluntary self-imposed rules, standards,
and codes. The ICC supports the ICC International Court of Arbitration as well as
a number of bureaus, councils, and some 16 Commissions of which Anti-
Corruption is one.
The Anti-Corruption Commission started in 1977 when it issued its first report
and its Rules of Conduct and RecommendationsCombating Extortion and
Bribery. 2 The UN failed to take up the ICCs recommendation for an anti-
corruption convention, andin 1997, 20 years after the ICCs Rules of Conduct
were issuedOECD eventually stepped in and adopted the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions.
ICC Rules
Since 1977, the ICC Rules have been updated several times. Addressed to
the private sector, civil society, and enterprises, they are simple in concept and
consist of only nine Articles that cover
prohibition of bribery and extortion (both publicprivate and private-to-
private)
Whistle-blowing
The Commission remains busy. In July of this year, 2008, the Commission
issued its Guidelines on Whistle Blowing. Such Guidelines are a first by any world
business organization. These Guidelines seek to help companies establish and
implement internal whistle-blowing programs to promote disclosure of
questionable or illegal corporate conduct, and concurrently to protect whistle-
blowers from retribution. Experience demonstrates that absent insider disclosures,
many instances of fraud and malfeasance would go undetected, often causing
substantial damage and losses.
The Business Case against Corruption.3 The compilation of this work was released
on 15 July 2008.
RESIST project
A second joint project by these anti-corruption affinity groupswhich
represent the vast bulk of the global private sectoris now under way. Called
RESISTfor Resisting Extortion and Solicitation in International Transactions
and still in draft form, this Initiative will create a training tool that provides
practical guidance on how to respond to an inappropriate demand by a client,
business partner, or public authority. It is designed to help companies reduce
their exposure to corruption and find ways to react to solicitations in a legally and
ethically acceptable manner, which, of course, makes good business sense.
Real-life scenarios are presented in two main categorieshow to prevent and
how to react to (i) solicitations in the context of the procurement process and (ii)
solicitations in the context of the implementation process and daily operations.
The RESIST tool should be ready for publication in 2009.
Closing
Let me leave you with three ideas:
First, read the book ILLICITHow Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are
Hijacking the Global Economy by my old friend, Moises Naim, editor of the
Foreign Policy journal. It will scare the hell out of you, and it should. It is about
corruption and a trade war we are not winning, yet.
to keep it on the straight and narrow to do what is right. That is my job as CVO.
The full definition and/or job description is set forth in Item No. 35 of my third idea
for you.
Conclusion
Corruption has been with us since the days of Pharaoh in ancient Egypt,
and it is not going to go away. None of us will be out of work any time soon. But
globally organized anti-corruption endeavours in earnest are relatively new
phenomena. These efforts will falter and probably fail without the unrelenting
commitment and never ending cooperation of global, regional and local
governments, and judiciaries, together with civil society and the worlds private
sector, all acting in concert. That is where you and I can make ourselves useful
and our presence felt.
As a lawyer I cannot leave you without one piece of free legal advice
which I actually learned during my days in the US Navy: Dont let the bastards
get you down.
NOTES
1 A full overview of the activities of the ICC Anti-Corruption Commission, in depth
analysis, and full texts of referenced conventions and guidelines is available at
www.iccwbo.org.
2 The 2005 revision of the document is available at
www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/7.7/2005_ICC_Anti-
Corruption_Rules_FINAL.pdf
3 www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_
business.pdf
The theme for this conference Fighting Corruption in Asia and the Pacific:
Strategies for Business, Government, and Civil Society reminds us that corruption
is a problem which must be tackled from multiple angles. I shall therefore touch
on the nature of corruption, what it takes for anti-corruption enforcement, and
what can be done to curb corruption in the private sector. I must say up-front
that I have never been in business. I think some of my fellow panel members
have not been in business, either. My perspectives are based on what
Singapores Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has seen, what people
tell us, what I hear, and what we gather from cases that CPIB has handled.
Nature of corruption
Sometimes, we refer to the private sector as the supply side and public
sector as the demand side of corruption. While this is generally accurate, it can
overly generalize and lead us to overlook some facts of corruption. Private
companies can and do bribe other private companies, so that private
companies are on both the demand and supply side. We cannot ignore this
conduct. In Singapore, unlike some countries, enforcement action can be taken
where private companies bribe other companies or where private individuals
bribe other private individuals. Consistent action within the private sector will
keep these issues top-of-mind and set the standards expected from businesses.
In many instances, the demand and supply sides are represented by the
public sector and private sector, respectively. In economic terms, demand and
supply have a close relationship. Does demand drive supply or supply drive
demand? Sometimes this is a chicken and egg issuewhich came first? Was it
the bribe demand that came first, leading to bribe supply? Or was it the supply
that came first and enticed the demand? In reality, we have seen cases where
the government official was the greedy one, who sticks his hand out to press
businesses for bribes. Then again, we have seen cases where businesses actively
offer bribes to entrap government officials to do their bidding. So who came first?
This is ripe for an academic argumentbut it really does not matter. Both sides
are equally devious and must be dealt with decisively.
Enforcement issues
Prosecuting both parties, however, entails difficult challenges. If both sides
are accused, who are your prosecution witnesses? We need to be thorough in
investigation workand amass all the evidence we can get by way of interviews
with witnesses, interested parties, involved parties; gathering physical,
documentary, and computer evidence; and following the money trail. Without
comprehensive evidence, we will not be able to deal with both the supply and
demand sides of the corruption equation.
Where the usual infrastructure may be inadequate, civil society also helps
to highlight potential problem areas, suggest improvements and report
corruption cases.
Corporate governance also does not mean writing volumes of rules and
rigidly applying them. There has to be a sufficient level of control, without stifling
enterprise and the free market principles that are essential for the private sector
to thrive. Singapore will see Integrated Resorts with Casinos open at the end of
2009. This involves a lot of money, and businesses operating in this context have
to comply with regulations. There is, of course, potential for abuse and
corruption. However, the answer is not to overregulate and control everything
down to the last detail because that will make it hard for businesses to operate.
The answer is establishing an appropriate level of regulation and good internal
corporate governance.
Recently, the Singapore Institute of Directors has enhanced training for its
members, who serve on various Boards. It is a good Initiative and recognizes the
importance of training. Modern business can be complex and we cannot
assume that all Directors will know their roles when they are appointed to a
Board. They need some orientation to understand the business they are in and
the contribution expected of them.
Summing up
Singapore law allows us to take action against Singapore companies who
commit corruption overseas. Recently I met an official from International
Enterprise Singapore, the government agency spearheading the development
of Singapores external economic capacities. She said that Singapore businesses
sometimes complain that they come across as stupid and silly when other
foreign companies bribe their way to contracts overseasand they do not do so
because Singapore law forbids them from bribing foreign public officials. When
our officers meet business leaders, we are also asked about this issue. On the
surface, it appears as if Singapore companies will lose competitiveness because
of our extra-territorial provision that forbids them from paying bribes or facilitation
payments.
This is appealing logic, but bribery cannot sustain business in the long run.
In the longer run, the company that spends its time bribing its way will not be as
competitive as a company that focuses on developing its products and services
and fine-tuning its competitive edge. Those who bribe will be found and dealt
with. We have seen examples in various parts of the world where large
corporations have kept slush funds to pay bribesin a matter of time, they are
found and the company and personnel are dealt with severely.
I think all companies around the world should adopt good governance
practices and behave responsibly within their home country, where they comply
with their domestic laws, and overseasregardless of whether they are covered
by an extraterritorial provision like companies incorporated in Singapore. That
way, the private sector as a whole contributes to fighting corruption.
have gradually built up their awareness of trading in accordance with the laws
and regulations, and the latent rule of securing trading opportunities and
commercial profit by means of gift giving and bribery is being corrected in some
areas and fields.
Investigation
Case investigation is the second component of the campaign. We have
delivered heavy punches at commercial bribery and resolutely curbed its
spread. Judiciary, administrative, and law enforcement departments at all levels
have determinedly cracked down on commercial bribery cases that violate laws
and regulations and involve provision or acceptance of improper benefits.
Prioritizing investigation
Investigations of commercial bribery cases will prioritize important cases
and cases involving cross-border commercial bribery. The first priority concerns
investigation into important cases; cases are considered important if commercial
bribery occurs in certain sectors, involves certain individuals, or has a particular
impact on society. In this respect, efforts are concentrated to curb commercial
bribery in project construction; land transfer; and the financial sector. Special
attention is also paid to cases that involve public servantsleaders in particular
who abuse their authority of approval, execution, and jurisdiction to engage in
collusion with businessmen, power-for-money deals, solicitation or acceptance of
bribes, and other bribery cases seriously encroaching the public interests. Severe
penalties will be imposed on those who take or offer bribes.
We shall also intensify the management of cash and foreign currency and
establish an early warning system against financial risk. In addition, an early
warning mechanism for high-value capital outflow and a system for sharing
system financial information should be established and improved. Finally, anti-
money laundering measures should be improved by integrating certain non-
financial institutions into supervision system.
Kuniko Ozaki
Director, Division for Treaty Affairs (UNODC)
the third session of the Conference, which will be held in November 2009 in
Qatar, the most important and most challenging development is the
establishment of a mechanism to review of implementation of the Convention.
Based on its mandate from the Conference of the States Parties, the Open-
ended Intergovernmental Working Group for Review of Implementation is
preparing terms of reference for a mechanism to review implementation of the
Convention, for consideration and possible adoption by the Conference at its
third session. This work draws on 33 proposals submitted by States, among them
four States that are participants in the ADB/OECD Initiative. Further, 29 countries
from all regions have volunteered to test a variety of implementation review
methods in a voluntary pilot program run by UNODC, among them five
participants in the ADB/OECD Initiative. The program will report its findings to the
Conference of the States Parties at its third session.
The fight against corruption is one of the main tools for creating a good
business climate and fostering economic development. Full ratification and
implementation of the UNCAC is a challenging, yet necessary milestone, and it
involves a variety of activities and actors.
I have drawn attention to these two TI surveys, as they show that business is
seen to be relatively corrupt and that business behaviour overseas is seen as
worse than at home in many cases.
Transparency International
I should perhaps say a brief word about my organization, Transparency
International. TI is the leading global anti-corruption NGO with national chapters
in over 90 jurisdictions, including 20 in Asia and the Pacific. Transparency
International is non-profit and independent. TIs funding comes from a wide
range of sources: governments, foundations and, increasingly, corporations.
In Asia and the Pacific, an important priority is for countries which have not
yet ratified the UNCAC to do so urgently. I would single out in particular India,
Japan, Singapore, and Thailand as important countries; most are taking
preparatory steps, but have yet to ratify the UNCAC. In all countries, effective
implementation will require much effort, both making necessary changes to laws
and institutions and putting resources into both corruption prevention and
enforcement.
Companies engaging in bribery not only run the risk of being subject to
criminal sanctions. Blacklistingthe exclusion from business opportunities
particularly by international financial institutions such as the World Bank and ADB,
is increasing as well. In many cases, it is a particularly effective sanction.
same risk of sanctions as those who take bribesand that extortion is also
effectively curbed. In some cases, laws need to be strengthened and in many
cases, enforcement needs to be more even-handed.
Recognising that business enterprises find it very hard to resist paying bribes
if competitors do so, TI works with important industry sectors to encourage a self-
regulatory approach to curbing corruption among key competitors. Such sectors
include construction and engineering, defense procurement and others.
NOTES
1 www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
2 www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi
3 www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
4 See www.oecd.org/document/37/0,3343,en_2649_34487_39656933_1_1_1_1,00
.html for the full text of the speech.
5 See Senior Minister Hos presentation on p. 15 in this volume.
6 See John Brays presentation on p. 38 in this volume.
7 See David Lymans presentation on p. 47 in this volume.
Both the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the UNCAC require countries
to establish the offense of bribery of a foreign public official; thus far, few
countries in Asia and the Pacific have done so. Increased transnational business,
closer economic ties among countries, and regional and international economic
integration make sanctioning of transnational bribery even more urgent.
Sanctions imposed on individuals who carry out bribe transactions may not
deter bribery, especially in high value business transactions. Therefore, the OECD
and UN Conventions further require countries to establish liability of legal persons
for corruption and bribery.
It is with this difficulty in mind that the monitoring mechanism under the
OECD Convention was created. This process of peer pressure and review has
caused numerous countries to make significant changes so as to bring their legal
systems up to the Conventions standards. The monitoring process is also
responsible for the increased number of investigations and prosecutions of
foreign bribery that have seen companies pay hundreds of millions of euros in
fines and confiscation. This experience of treaty implementation through
monitoring can be usefully shared in Asia and the Pacific.
Only 73% of countries which filed reports under the UNCAC self-assessment
process consider that they have fully implemented the Conventions mandatory
provisions on criminal law; more than one-third of reporting Parties had not yet
criminalized bribery of foreign public officials.
The breadth of the OECD Convention can also been seen in the definition
of a foreign public official. The OECD Convention does not only cover bribery
of officials in the executive branch of government; it also includes officials
holding legislative, administrative or judicial office, whether appointed or
elected. Also covered are persons exercising a public function, including for a
Beyond the core criminal offences, the OECD Convention also contains a
number of complementary features that enhance the fight against transnational
bribery. Parties are required to make laundering the proceeds of transnational
bribery a crime. False accounting associated with transnational bribery must be
punished. Parties must assist one another by providing mutual legal assistance
and extradition where appropriate. They must also have sufficiently broad
jurisdiction to prosecute offences that take place wholly or partly in their
territories, and offences that take place abroad when committed by a national.
Statutes of limitation must allow an adequate period of time for investigation and
prosecution.6
The monitoring process is carried out within the OECD Working Group on
Bribery in International Business Transactions. The Working Group consists of all 38
Parties to the Convention and meets four times per year at OECD Headquarters
in Paris, France. Delegates from the Parties may include prosecutors, officials from
law enforcement and Ministries of Justice, and diplomats.
The Working Group carries out its monitoring function through a peer
review process that comprises two phases (so far). In Phase 1, the Working Group
examines whether each Partys domestic legislation conforms to the OECD
Convention. The examination looks at all aspects of the Convention described
above, i.e., it covers laws on the foreign bribery offence, corporate liability,
money laundering, false accounting, etc. Phase 1 also looks at compliance with
the 1996 OECD Council Recommendation on the non-tax deductibility of bribes.8
What if bribery occurs even though the company has internal controls
for preventing such acts? What if a countrys constitution does not
permit criminal liability of legal persons?
Confiscation of the proceeds of corruption: How are the proceeds of
corruption quantified, especially if the proceeds are derived from a
contract for services (e.g., for building a bridge) that was obtained
through bribery?
Jurisdiction: When should a country exercise jurisdiction to prosecute
foreign bribery that takes place abroad? What if the corrupt act is
carried out by a foreign subsidiary abroad?
Mutual legal assistance and extradition: Does bank secrecy impede
the provision of mutual legal assistance? Does the requirement of dual
criminality prevent co-operation if the requested state does not have a
foreign bribery offence?
The monitoring process has also identified issues relating to the application
and enforcement of the relevant laws. The Working Group has found instances in
which a Party has not given sufficiently high priority to investigating and
prosecuting foreign bribery cases. This often results in allegations that are not
investigated or prosecuted, or in the early termination of investigations and
prosecutions. In other cases, the Working Group has observed inadequate
resources and skills for investigating foreign bribery. There were also examples in
which Parties did not designate a specific agency to investigate and prosecute
foreign bribery cases, resulting in allegations that were neglected.
The enforcement aspect of the monitoring process has also seen results.
The number of foreign bribery investigations and prosecutions has increased
steadily. As of October 2008, there have been at least 65 convictions for foreign
bribery (roughly half in the United States) and 200 ongoing investigations (albeit
some in very preliminary stages) among the 38 Parties. In one case, one
jurisdiction levied fines and confiscation of over EUR 201 million against a single
company. The same company then received further criminal and administrative
penalties of USD 1.6 billion in a second jurisdiction.
Progress can also be seen in specific countries. For example, the Working
Group noted in 2005 that one country had not designated a specific body for
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery cases. Consequently, a number of
serious allegations were not being investigated. By 2008, the same country had
designated a specific body to deal with foreign bribery cases and spent
significant resources investigating such cases. It also had increased investigations
and obtained its first conviction for foreign bribery.
Overall, it is fair to say that the monitoring process has had significant
impact in improving both the laws relating to foreign bribery and the
enforcement of those laws. Although there is room for improvement in most
Parties, it is important to bear in mind that the OECD Convention has been in
force for only 10 years and that its implementation remains work in progress. It is
also important to recall that before 1999 most Parties did not have an offence of
foreign bribery, and virtually all Parties allowed tax deduction of bribes. This
makes a compelling case for a continuing, rigorous monitoring of the
Conventions implementation.
Even for members that are not yet Parties to the UNCAC, meeting the
criminalisation standards in the UN Convention is an important goal.
Demonstrable compliance with these standards sends a strong message that a
country has an effective anti-corruption framework. This, in turn, can help build a
foundation for sustainable development by attracting investment into the
country. It also makes that countrys companies more welcome in foreign
markets. Sound bribery offences are also crucial to recovering stolen assets from
overseas, since obtaining domestic convictions and confiscation orders are vital
to recovery. Compliance with international standards on criminalising bribery can
have positive effects in many areas.
There are several ways to share the OECD experience and knowledge
with members of the ADB/OECD Initiative. The Initiatives thematic review in 2009
will look at the bribery offences in its member countries and draw on the
experience under the OECD Convention. This will be similar to the earlier
thematic review on extradition, mutual legal assistance, and asset recovery. 12 In
addition, all of the Working Groups evaluations reports are available on the
internet.13 The 2006 Mid-Term Study of Phase 2 Reports 14 contains a wealth of
information about cross-cutting issues that Parties to the Convention have had to
overcome. Also available are technical publications such as Corruption: Glossary
of International Criminal Standards, 15 which compares the OECD Convention,
the UNCAC and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.
The OECD can also share its experience through technical events and
conferences, such as this 6th Regional Conference of the ADB/OECD Initiative in
Singapore. Other avenues can also be explored if there are sufficient interest
and resources, e.g., missions by experts to interested countries to discuss
common challenges, and regional expert workshops with the Initiatives
members.
Conclusion
Since the OECD Convention came into force in 1999, the Parties to the
Convention have rigorously monitored its implementation. As a result, the Parties
have accumulated a wealth of knowledge on the criminalisation of foreign
bribery in many countries. Given the similarities between the OECD Convention
and the UNCAC, this body of information will be extremely useful to members of
the ADB/OECD Initiative as they implement the UN Convention. By sharing this
experience, it is hoped that the Initiatives members can avoid many of the
mistakes and obstacles that arose in the Parties to the OECD Convention.
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as Each Party shall take such measures as may be
may be necessary, consistent with its legal necessary, in accordance with its legal
principles, to establish the liability of legal principles, to establish the liability of legal
persons for participation in the offences persons for the bribery of a foreign public official.
established in accordance with this Convention.
Article 3 Sanctions
2. Subject to the legal principles of the State
1. The bribery of a foreign public official shall be
Party, the liability of legal persons may be
punishable by effective, proportionate and
criminal, civil or administrative.
dissuasive criminal penalties. []
3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the
2. In the event that, under the legal system of a
criminal liability of the natural persons who have
Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to
committed the offences.
legal persons, that Party shall ensure that legal
4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that persons shall be subject to effective,
legal persons held liable in accordance with this proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal
article are subject to effective, proportionate and sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for
dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, bribery of foreign public officials.
including monetary sanctions.
[]
NOTES
1 The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect
the official views of the OECD or of the governments of its member countries.
2 The full name of the Convention is: OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transaction. All OECD anti-bribery
instruments are available at: www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption
3 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Article 1(1).
4 Ibid., Article 1(4)(a).
5 Ibid., Articles 2 and 3.
6 Ibid., Articles 4-11.
7 Ibid., Article 12.
8 The full name of this OECD Council recommendation is: Recommendation of the
Council on the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials.
9 The full name of this OECD Council recommendation is: Revised
Recommendation of the Council on Combating Bribery in International Business
Transactions.
10 South Africa, which became a Party to the Convention in June 2007, has
undergone its Phase 1 examination and is scheduled for Phase 2 in 2009. Israel
became a Party in December 2008 and will soon undergo Phase 1 examination.
11 www.oecd.org/topic/0,3373,en_2649_34855_1_1_1_1_37447,00.html
12 The Report of the thematic review is available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/28/47/37900503.pdf
13 www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html
14 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/39/36872226.pdf
15 www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/38/41194428.pdf
Kuniko Ozaki
Director, Division for Treaty Affairs (UNODC)
Second, these 11 offenses do not only provide the basis for effective
international criminalization of corruption. They also serve as the point of
reference for the other chapters of the Convention they provide the range of
offenses for which international cooperation must be provided and to which the
asset recovery provisions of Chapter V apply. They define the conduct that must
be established as an extraditable offense (Article 44), and set parameters for
cases in which full mutual legal assistance must be afforded (Article 46). Further, if
such conduct generates proceeds of crime, the Convention regulates the kind
of mechanisms that States must have in place for the confiscation of such
proceeds (Article 31) and for international cooperation for the purposes of
confiscation (Articles 54 and 55). The proceeds of the conduct defined in those
11 offenses must be returned or disposed of according to Article 57 of the
Convention. Given their role in the facilitation of international cooperation, the
11 offenses of the Convention have a central role as emerging global standards
in criminal law.
In its resolution 2/1, the Conference of the States Parties welcomed the
development of the self-assessment checklist. It further requested the Secretariat
to explore the option of expanding the self-assessment checklist to create a
comprehensive information-gathering tool. An expert group meeting was held in
Vancouver, Canada, on 1517 April 2008, on the formulation of comprehensive
software to gather information on the implementation of the five crime-related
international legal instruments that fall under the mandate of UNODC: The United
Nations Convention against Corruption, the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime and the three Protocols thereto. After being
consulted and test-run with Member States, the final version of the
The Fiji Islands, Indonesia, Mongolia. and the Philippines are participating in
the Voluntary Pilot Programme for the Review of Implementation of the
Convention run by UNODC. In the Pilot Programme, 29 countries from all regions
are testing a variety of review methods, based on a peer review methodology.
The program is gathering experience for the establishment of a mechanism to
review UNCAC implementation. This experience will be reported back to the
Conference of the States Parties at its third session. Further, the program entails
an important technical assistance component. Taking the self-assessment as a
starting point, countries are discussing their implementation gaps, technical
assistance needs and technical assistance opportunities in detail with their
reviewing partner countries and the Secretariat. At the request of the country
under review, priorities for further action or an action plan can be developed.
The advent of transnational crime and corruption has seen the dawn of
the bewitching hour for all States. However, States must not take the attitude, as
did the witches in Shakespeares Macbeth, that Fair is foul, foul is fair. States
must always use effective but fair means to pursue and apprehend criminals
involved in transnational crime.
Never has our common agenda in Asia and the Pacific been so symbiotic,
mutually beneficial, and convergentfrom combating piracy, drug trafficking,
people smuggling, money laundering to bribery and corruptionall calling for
greater regional and bilateral cooperation.
for corruption, Warren Hastings, the first Governor of Bengal, argued before the
House of Lords that the socio-political nature of Asia meant that the act of
accepting bribes was perfectly acceptable, and that he should not be judged
based on moral standards of the West. Hastings was acquitted.2
There is also the notion that only the lower echelons of a bureaucracy
allow themselves to be tempted by corrupt payments. The corollary of this, of
course, is that senior officials are in fact immune to such temptation and
impervious to such attempts at inflection on their character.
Even a cursory glance at the events of the past 20 years would result in a
universal rejection of the above presumptions. Centuries-old bias and
stereotyping have to be discarded in light of numerous high-profile corruption
scandals. From Marcos to Montesinos, Abacha to Chiluba, Heads of State,
military rulers, intelligence chiefs, corporate executives, National Olympic
Committee officials, cricket and football stars, probably no job or post has been
immune to the pervasive reaches of the corrupt act. Indeed, it may well be that
every person has a price at which she or he can be bought. However, the
dilemma for the global law enforcement community is that for many, the price is
all too easily payable. Moreover, the phenomenon of globalization has created
a borderless world, and cross-border transactions and interactions are
commonplace. Likewise, improvements in technology facilitate the ease with
which large sums of money can be moved around without raising suspicion. This
has created more opportunities for bribery to occur at all levels.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the corresponding period has seen the
advent of numerous international legal instruments, such as:
1996 Organization of American States Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption (OAS Convention);
1997 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention)
2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
(UNTOC); and
2003 United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC).
Monitoring
The OAS Convention, which entered into force in 1997, marked a major
triumph in the fight against corruption. At the time, it was distinctive in that it
included developed and developing countries, and displayed what can be
regarded as a defiant rejection of corruption, given the various political
upheavals which were plaguing the developing countries of the Americas region
at that time. Compared with some later initiatives, the OAS Convention was
ahead of its time in some aspects: It applied not only to active bribery (the giving
of the bribe) but also to passive bribery (the receiving of the bribe), and required
States to enact legislation criminalising such acts. Nevertheless, some critics view
the OAS Convention as flawed, given its weak monitoring of implementation,
which has only in the past five years picked up pace.
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, which entered into force in 1999, has
the central focus on combating bribery of foreign public officials through the use
of domestic law,3 establishing the jurisdiction of domestic courts for offenses by
their nationals which occur abroadbut does not apply to bribery which is
purely domestic, and does not require legislation to criminalize bribery of a
States own public officials. However, unlike the OAS Convention,
implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is monitored closely.
Monitoring is carried out by the OECD Working Group on Bribery, and takes
place in two phases: Phase 1 monitoring assesses whether States Parties have in
place legislation in conformity with the Conventions standards; Phase 2 assesses
whether legislative and institutional frameworks are effective in practice.
resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003. The UNCAC had the distinction of becoming
the first legally binding, international anti-corruption instrument. Conceived and
born out of the growing realization that corruption allows organized crime and
terrorism to flourish, reduces foreign direct investment, and is an obstacle to
social and economic development, it would not be surprising to expect the
UNCAC to contain robust provisions on implementation and a strong review
mechanism. In a most heavy and telling omission fraught with significance, the
UNCAC does not actually contain any explicit review mechanism at all. Instead,
its Article 63 (7) merely states is that the Conference of States Parties shall
establish, if it deems necessary, any appropriate mechanism or body to assist in
the effective implementation of the convention. The use of such discretionary
language appears to be an attempt by the negotiating States to display an
ideological new bottle but which actually contained no new wine. Is the UNCAC
therefore going to be a case where the paper rhetoric does not match the
ground reality? Only time will tell.
Unfortunately, the UNTOC is not without defects. Its Article 9(1) provides
that a State Party is to take measures appropriate and consistent with its legal
system. Effectively, this means that States can avail themselves of an
exception and avoid effective enforcement on constitutional grounds. Indeed,
in some countries, Heads of State and Heads of Government and even other
high-ranking officials enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution. This can thwart
effective prosecution and also the tracing, seizure, and forfeiture of proceeds of
corruption, especially if the immunities are absolute or broadly defined.
It appears that the UK authorities faced a dilemma: On the one hand, the
investigation could have been halted without any difficulty based on domestic
law; on the other hand, the strict requirements of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention would not permit such an abrupt halt.
Whether or not the UK has complied with its obligations under the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention can be debated.6 However, perhaps more importantly,
one needs to consider what kind of impact the BAE case has had in the global
fight against corruption. It would appear extremely difficult to avoid the
conclusion that the SFO decision may well have significantly weakened the UKs
role and image in the worldwide fight against corruption. However, is this
necessarily a new position? The UK's apparent failure to properly enforce laws
prohibiting the bribery of foreign public officials had been identified as a
weakness before: the OECD previously adversely cited the UK on the grounds
that no prosecutions had been brought in the UK since the Convention was
ratified in 1999!
Going forward
As some commentators have pointed out, it is one thing to tell the world
that ones nation is participating in an international convention, and another
matter altogether to actually live up to the convention itself.7 Essentially, States
Parties to a Convention have to take on board the idea that signing that
Convention is just the beginning, not the end.
It would seem that the answer to these questions has been with us, but we
may have inadvertently let it slip by. Firstly, during the drafting of the UNCAC,
Norway submitted a proposal for a two-phase evaluation based on the
mechanism practiced for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. The first phase
would focus on ensuring that domestic legislation is in line with the Convention,
and a second phase would consist of a study of enforcement measures put in
place.
Additionally, the role that the UNCAC accords to civil society is weak: a
mechanism may be established to assist in the effective implementation of the
Convention, but only if it deems it necessary.8 This allows States a large degree
of leeway to decide if and how far to incorporate the Convention into domestic
law. Notwithstanding its weaknesses, the monitoring mechanism practiced for
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention demonstrates that peer review and mutual
evaluation can help raise public awareness. Likewise, the role of NGOs, such as
Transparency International (TI), cannot be underestimated. Its lobbying and
monitoring efforts around the world have kept alive the ideal of wiping out
corruption on the global agenda, and have ensured that this does not remain a
pious hope.
Conclusion
In his message to the Third Global Forum on Fighting Corruption and
Safeguarding Integrity, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said, Corruption
impoverishes national economies, undermines democratic institutions and the
rule of law, and facilitates the emergence of other threats to human security,
such as organized crime, human trafficking, and terrorism.
The formal or official position of companies is, of course, that bribes are
unacceptable. When it comes to doing business, however, many companies will
no doubt acknowledge (albeit in hushed tones) their fear that they will lose the
deal to someone who does pay facilitation payments or tea money.
Let me conclude nowit has been said that the 21st century will be the
century of change. It is believed that more things will change in more places in
the next 10 years than in the past 100 years. We are already witnessing the
tumultuous changes that the US subprime crisis brings and that has now already
changed into an almost unprecedented global financial crisis. What will not
change, however, is the scourge of corruption and the global threat it poses to
developed and developing countries alike.
NOTES
1 The views expressed by the writer are his personal views and do not reflect the
views of the Attorney-Generals Chambers of Singapore or of the Government of
Singapore.
2 The Impeachment of Warren Hastings, Papers from a Bicentenary
Commemoration, 1989, Edinburgh University Press.
3 Art 1(1) of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Anti-Bribery Convention). The full text of
the Convention is available at
www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html
4 Art 9(2) of the UNTOC.
5 Art 42 of the UNCAC.
6 The report regarding the UK by the OECD Working Group on Bribery, the body that
assesses the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, is available at
www.oecd.org/document/24/0,3343,en_2649_34859_1933144_1_1_1_1,00.html
7 Luz Esta Nagle, The Challenges of Fighting Global Organized Crime in Latin
America, 26 Fordham International Law Journal (2003), 1649, at 1665.
8 Art 63(7) of the UNCAC.
9 TI has labelled this development as a major setback. See
www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_02_01_u
ncac_final
The scandals surrounding the collapse of Enron led to calls for higher
standards of senior management accountability, both in the US and
internationally. The Enron affair undermined public trust in major companies, and
governments and companies themselves are still working to rebuild confidence.
One important outcome was the 2002 US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) which has
led to important corporate governance reforms. Other countries have
introduced their own corporate governance reforms; Japans measure, passed
into law in 2006, is known informally as J-Sox.
Eddie How explained how Shells integrity system works. The Business
Integrity Division receives extensive resources, and Mr. Hows sole responsibilities
are related to business integrity.
4. Challenges
Challenges in promoting corporate compliance and integrity systems
include
poor ethical standards at the senior level: the tone at the top is not
always as positive as it should be;
ensuring compliance at the middle-management level is always
demanding, especially in high-risk countries;
major companies (such as Shell) can afford business integrity divisions;
this is more difficult for smaller firms with limited resources;
honest companies have to develop strategies to win business in the
face of competition from corrupt rivals.
also debated; speakers stated that legal frameworks should address private-to-
private corruption and that corporate disclosure requirements can help to
strengthen the regulatory framework. Participants concluded both policy and
regulation are needed, in addition to voluntary initiatives designed and
implemented by the private sector. The fight against corruption requires that the
private and public sectors, as well as civil society, work together.
ACRAs vision is for Singapore to be the trusted and best place for business.
Our mission is to provide a responsive and trusted regulatory environment for
businesses and public accountants. Essential to achieving this mission is
continually strengthening the integrity of our regulatory framework through
constant review and refinement of our legislation and policies, as well as
effective corporate regulatory actions.
A disclosure-based regime
Singapore operates a disclosure-based regime based on a regulatory
strategy involving an informed market that reacts to relevant information. On a
fundamental level, company directors have the duty to act in the best interests
of the corporate entity. These include disclosure obligations, which are primarily
the responsibility of directors, who rely on information and advice given by others
such as advisors or employees under certain conditions. Annual audits required
of larger companies contribute to ensuring the integrity of the information that is
conveyed to shareholders and other stakeholders (such as creditors)and help
guarantee that corporations are equipped with a system of internal controls
which assure effective corporate compliance with relevant obligations.
Under the Companies Act, directors have a duty to at all times act
honestly (Companies Act, section 157) and to disclose any conflict of interests
to the other directors (section 156). An officer or agent of a company shall not
make improper use of any information acquired by virtue of his position to gain
an advantage for himself or others, or cause detriment to the company (section
157). Two other mechanisms aim to regulate conduct of directors and provide
adequate transparency. First, certain transactionssuch as loans to directors,
loans to persons connected to the directors of a lending company, or payments
to directors for loss of office are prohibitedunless shareholders approve of such
transactions or the transactions fall under the exceptions provided in law.
Second, a company must keep a register to reflect the directors shareholdings
or interests in shareholdings in the company or related corporations.
ensure a high level of awareness. For example, a letter sent to every newly
appointed director details the legal obligations of directors. Talks and seminars
are also regularly conducted by ACRA to raise awareness of these and other
compliance issues.
Minute books must be kept with records of all general meetings and
directors meetings. Failure to do so is an offense (Companies Act, section 188).
The minute books are open to inspection by members (section 189). Other
information filed with ACRA, and therefore available to the public, includes
basic company information such as the constitution of the company
and the particulars of its shareholders and directors;
charges created by the company and changes in status;
financial data on the company; and
application to winding up or deletion from the corporate registry.
Conclusion
Trust is essential for the wheels of business to turn smoothly. Hence, the
integrity of corporate officers and of the information they provide to investors
cannot be overstated. ACRA recognizes this and will continue to work toward
maintaining a trusted environment for business.
The session opened with a discussion on what conflict of interest is, how
the definition and practical implications have evolved, and why it matters in
todays context. Rules, laws, and policies are not enough: understanding the
issues and ensuring capacity to implement the rules, laws, and policies are
equallyif not moreimportant. In many cases, conflict of interest standards
exist or are included within specific legislation, but they are not enforceable.
Jnos Bertok
Principal Administrator, Innovation and Integrity Division, Public
Governance and Territorial Development Directorate
Corruption and conflicts of interest are related phenomena; they are two
sides of the same coin. Corruption can arise from a conflict of interest which has
been inadequately identified or managed. In a rapidly changing public sector
environment, conflicts of interest will always be an issue for concern. A too-strict
approach to controlling the exercise of private interests may be conflict with
other rights, or be unworkable or counterproductive in practice, or may deter
some people from seeking public office altogether. Therefore, a modern conflict
of interest policy seeks to strike a balance by identifying risks to the integrity of
public organizations and public officials, prohibiting unacceptable forms of
conflict, managing conflict situations appropriately, making public organizations
and individual officials aware of the incidence of such conflicts, and ensuring
effective procedures are deployed for the identification, disclosure,
management, and promotion of the appropriate resolution of conflict of interest
situations.
OECD Toolkit for Managing Conflict of Interest in the Public Sector presents
specific techniques, resources, and strategies for identifying, managing, and
preventing conflict-of-interest situations more effectively; and increasing integrity
in official decision making, which might be compromised by a conflict of interest.
This Toolkit provides nontechnical, practical help to enable officials recognize
problematic situations and help them ensure that integrity and reputation are
not compromised. The tools themselves are provided in generic form. They are
based on examples of sound conflict-of-interest policy and practice drawn from
various OECD member and nonmember countries. They have been designed for
adaptation to suit countries with different legal and administrative systems.
Post-public employment
There is increased concern about movement. Increased mobility of
personnel between the public and the private sectors has supported labor-
market dynamism. When officials leave public officeeither permanently or
temporarilyto work for private or nonprofit sectors, however, concerns of
impropriety (such as the misuse of insider information and position) can put
trust in the public service at risk. Consequently, many countries are making it a
priority to review and modernize arrangements to effectively prevent and
manage conflict of interest in post-public employment. Most post-public
employment offenses occur when public officials use information or contacts
acquired while in government to benefit themselves, or others, after they leave
government. However, despite the use of the term post-public employment,
these offenses can also occur before officials actually leave government. Major
post-public employment problem areas involve public officials when they
seek future employment outside the public service;
conduct post-public employment lobbying back to government
institutions;
switch sides in the same process;
use insider information such as commercially sensitive information;
and
are reemployed in the public service, for example, to do the same
tasks.
To help policy makers, the OECD developed Principles for Managing Post-
Public Employment Conflict of Interest that provide a point of reference for
reviewing and modernizing post-public employment policy and practice. The
Principles were designed to support efforts to prevent actual or potential conflict
of interest in public office, such as by requiring that public officials should not
enhance their future private sector employment prospects by giving preferential
treatment to potential employers in decision making. In reviewing their actual
arrangements, policy makers may consider systematically examining the extent
to which existing regulations, policies, and practices can meet the requirements
of the principles as a first step.
The post-public employment system covers all entities for which post-
public employment is a real or potential problem and meets the
distinctive needs of each entity.
The post-public employment system covers all important risk areas for
post-public employment conflict of interest.
The restrictionsparticularly the length of time limits imposed on the
activities of former public officialsare proportionate to the gravity of
the post-public employment conflict of interest threat that the officials
pose.
The restrictions and prohibitions contained in the post-public
employment system are effectively communicated to all affected
parties.
The authorities, procedures, and criteria for making approval-decisions
in individual post-public employment cases and for appeals against
these decisions are transparent and effective.
The enforcement sanctions for post-public employment offenses are
clear and proportional, and are timely, consistently, and equitably
applied.
The effectiveness of the policies and practices contained in each post-
public employment system is assessed regularly and, where
appropriate, is updated and adjusted to emerging concerns.
Arief T. Surowidjojo
Founding partner of Law Firm Lubis Ganie Surowidjojo; Former
chairperson of the Supervisory Board of Transparency International
Indonesia
If a more precise definition of CoI is included in the law, it is more likely that
law enforcers will enforce it. But while definition is compromised, or could give rise
to different interpretations, a loophole is opened; and regardless of how narrow
the loophole is, the concept of CoI is rendered ineffective and useless in a
corrupt environment.
This law is not the only example of confused drafting; the United Nations
guide for Anti-Corruption Policies states that:2
The Policy Brief on the OECD Guidelines for Managing Conflicts of Interest
in the Public Sector 4 states that the concept of conflict of interest arises in a
multiplicity of situations, such as
A public official having private business interests in the form of
partnerships, shareholdings, board memberships, investments,
government contracts, etc.;
A public official having affiliations with other organizations (e.g., a
senior public official sits on the board of a nonprofit organization that
receives funding from the officials agency); and
A public official leaving office to work for a regulated private company
or a chief executive taking up a key position in a government agency
with a commercial relationship with his/her former company.
and setbacks
In Transparency Internationals Corruption Perception Index 2007,
Indonesia ranks 144 out of 180; its index is 2.3.5 The Political and Economic Risk
Consultancy (PERC) ranked Indonesia as the third most corrupt country among
13 Asian economies.6 The International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 2007 ranked
Indonesias investment climate as 123 out of 178.7
The countrys leadership is in question. Crises call for tough and firm
decisions, even though they might sometimes be unpopular. It is a widely made
criticism that few days after winning the 2004 election, the current administration
began to take decisions with a view to winning the 2009 election. The current
administration has been praised for its anti-corruption agenda, although the
success of the KPK in the establishment of corruption-prevention measures and
sending corrupt public officials to jail is not linked to the performance of the
current administration but rather to the dedication and integrity of the KPK, its
commissioners, and its staff.
Most worrying among the reform failures is that the judiciary does not really
support the reform of the judiciary. The results have been very underwhelming,
even though good laws have been enacted; police, prosecutors, and judges
have been trained; resources are available; new systems, technology and
governance systems have been introduced. The decisions of the courts indicate
that either the quality of the judiciary is still low or that the level of corruption in
the law enforcement agencies is still high.
The current global financial crisis will affect the ability of Indonesia to deal
with its economic and financial issues; this will also affect the result of the general
election in 2009. Economic and political turmoil will also influence how efforts to
eradicate corruption and to fight for a clean government will be implemented in
the near future.
The laws and regulations basically deal with conflict of interest in respect
to: official oaths of public officials; public officials taking on multiple functions;
codes of ethics of public officials; conflicts of interest in public function (i.e.,
issuing a policy in favor of affiliates interests, having business interests in any
company or organization); not taking roles in political parties; not practicing a
profession while being a public official (lawyers, public accountants, etc.).
amounting to several billion USD. Messrs. Kalla and Bakrie are respectively chair
and co-chair of the Golongan Karya (Golkar) Party, a party that supported
Suhartos repressive regime for the last 32 years of his administration.
For the last several years, the Bakrie group has been trying to convince the
Government that a mud explosion in Sidoarjo, East Java, that paralyzed
thousands of hectares of land was a natural disaster and not a technical error
caused by an oil operation of one of their affiliates. If it were declared as a
national natural disaster, the operator of the mines would be freed from any
liabilities. In a more recent case, shortly after the global economic crisis started to
affect the Indonesian capital markets, Bumi Resources, a member of Bakrie
Group, encountered difficulties in servicing its debts. Media reports suggest that
the Bakrie Group tried to influence the Minister of Finance and the Capital
Markets authority to suspend trading of Bumis shares during the negotiations with
a buyer. The Bakrie Group is considering initiating legal action against an
Indonesian media company. Tempo Magazine, in its November 2008 edition,
reported Jusuf Kalla from the offices of the Vice President said clearly: whats
wrong with the Government helping [Bakrie Group]? He was quoted to say that
the Bakrie Group is a national asset.
The ADB/OEDC Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific held a
regional technical seminar on Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest in
Jakarta in August 2007. Since then, KPK and development partners have been in
Policy recommendations
Indonesia has ratified the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC),
and a domestic law for its implementation has been enacted. The UN
Convention contains important provisions on conflict of interest that reflect
global governance and business standards. Policy efforts should start with a
mapping activity on the laws and regulations that must be adjusted to the
principles of the Convention. Subsequently, pressure needs to be exerted to
force Government and Parliament to comply with the UN Convention.
The process to adjust the laws and regulations as set out above needs
considerable time and effort. Pending the completion of these efforts, there
should be a general rule applied to all public officials or prospective public
officials, obliging them to
prior to election and appointment processes, declare and register
publicly all business and other interests that he/she and family and
affiliates own or control;
update any changes to such interests that intervene in the course of
their function in public office;
declare arising conflicts of interest to a responsible body;
abstain from making any decision in a potential direct or indirect
conflict of interest situation;
subject themselves to an investigation by the responsible body when a
conflict of interest occurs; and
comply with the recommendations or disciplinary actions administered
by the responsible body.
with the benchmarks generally available in the market, and the body or agency
in charge of monitoring conflict of interest shall be able to follow up any reports
from the public, and take necessary measures or actions.
NOTES
1 See Quentin Reed: Sitting on the Fence, Conflict of Interest and How To Regulate
Them. U4 Issue 6.2008. Available at www.cmi.no/publications/file/?3160=sitting-on-
the-fence
2 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: United Nations Anti-Corruption Toolkit,
pp. 1516. The document is available at
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_toolkit_sep04.pdf
3 Quoted after Quentin Reed: Sitting on the Fence, Conflict of Interest and How To
Regulate Them (see note 1 above).
4 September 2005. Available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/15/36587312.pdf
5 The CPI is available at www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi
6 www.asiarisk.com
7 The index is available at www.doingbusiness.org/economyrankings/
Expert views can be valuable, and help people formulate opinions. Quite
often, however, these experts face conflicts of interest between their professional
obligations and their own self-interest to provide good advice.
Given what we now know generally about motivated reasoning and self-
serving biases in human cognitionand specifically about the incentive and
accountability matrix within which auditors work (Bazerman, Morgan, &
Loewenstein, 1997)we should view personal testimonials of auditor
independence with scepticism.
Most professionals feel that their decisions are justified and that concerns
about conflicts of interest are overblown by ignorant outsiders who malign them
unfairly. Perhaps the most notable feature of the psychological processes at work
in conflicts of interest is that they can occur without any conscious intention to
indulge in corruption. Psychological research on the impact of motivated
reasoning and self-serving biases questions the validity of this assumption. The
evolution of several audit-related professional services over time and the impact
of non-audit fees have also played a significant role in the discussion between
Independence and conflict of interest.
requirement was repealed in 1982 by the SEC, which concluded that the
required disclosure was not generally of sufficient utility to investors to justify
continuation, despite evidence showing that knowledge of a consulting
relationship creates a perceived lack of auditor independence.
Much has been written and spoken about the loss of public confidence in
financial reporting during the late 1990s and early 2000s, and the auditors
performance of this gatekeeper role. A few factors could be taken into
consideration to understand this significant erosion of trust:
The rise of non-audit, consulting services: Revenues from activitiessuch as
systems design, tax planning, assistance with data processing procedures,
and a host of other high-margin advisory servicesbecame increasingly
important. In many cases, clients were paying their auditors more for
consulting than for the financial statement audit. As a consequence, firms
began to see the lower-margin audit as a hindrance to more lucrative
consulting engagements.
Downward pressure on auditing fees: Firms faced considerable pressure to
keep the audit fee low, or risk losing both their audit and (more profitable)
non-audit relationships with clients. In a growing market, clients viewed the
audit opinion as merely another standardized commodity to be purchased
as economically as possible.
Increased reliance on more cost-efficient means of auditing: The tactic of
using the audit to gain entry to other work, coupled with the difficulty in
raising audit fees, meant that the costs of auditing had to be controlled.
That, in turn, led to more emphasis on risk-based auditing, the theory under
which auditors plans their work based on judgments about which aspects of
the clients business are the most likely prone to error or fraud. In the areas of
perceived low risk, the auditor relies more heavily on internal controls and
management representations. Though theoretically strong, this processif
not judiciously appliedcan have disastrous consequences, particularly if
the underlying judgment about risk turns out to be incorrect. An example of
this is WorldCom.
What is independence?
Various legal and other definitions are available for independence The
Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants, issued by International Federation of
Following are few key examples from Indian regulatory context on the
independence of chartered accountants (CA) as auditors: Section 226 of the
Companies Act prohibits the appointment of a CA as auditor if there exists
certain relationships or indebtedness to the Company or the auditor is a
shareholder, while section 334 of the Companies Act also provides for special
resolutions to be adopted if the appointed auditor has relationships with any
director or managers in the company.
Under the CA Act, the areas of restrictions are: fees and kind of fees that
can be paid to the auditor which are not success based, services that can be
provided (liquidator, internal auditor, management consultant, etc.) and if
substantial interest or director or in the employment as an officer in the company
either himself or through partner or relative.
A number of theories have been written and talked about in this context:
Conclusion
Abraham Lincoln once said: You cannot build character and courage by
taking away a man's initiative and independence. This saying holds true in the
auditing world as well: initiative is required by auditors to take right decisions,
keeping in mind the factsand walking the lane of independence is a very
essential characteristic of this profession.
However, like so many other professional issues this issue requires rigorous
debate, robust research and, ultimately clears professional judgment. Structures
and processes will certainly support both the fact and perception of auditor
independence, but in the final analysis it is the integrity of the auditor which
ensures that correct judgment calls are made.
In the case of the transport sector, and many other infrastructure sectors
also, public officials will often be qualified technical professionals in the sector. As
such, they will usually have a network of peers, developed partly through their
academic and professional training, and partly through trade and professional
associations, which run in parallel to their public employment. Furthermore, some
may well come from extended families with financial interests in supply,
construction or consulting firmsor have strong geographical or political ties to a
regionthat may induce indirect benefits or cause indirect influence over
decisions. Guidelines for when an official should recuse themselves from certain
situations or decisions are therefore important but difficult to devise.
Conflict of interest situations can also arise for any third party group
brought in to monitor the situation, especially if the private sector or public
officials capture the situation in a scheme to cover corrupt activities and to co-
opt or influence the third party monitor. Third party monitors may be provided
with transportation, accommodation, entertainment, or even direct
remuneration of varying levelsusually through the private sectorin order to
influence their judgment. While some of these may begin as simple administrative
arrangements, they may easily be extended in scope or amount as bribes, and
in some forms may later be used for blackmail or coercion purposes, in order to
maintain secrecy over the scheme and influence over the decisions being
made.
For the private sector, there are many stages in the value chain or project
cycle where a potential conflict of interest could be exploited. General
facilitation through small or large gifts, hospitality and entertainment, including
sporting events such as golf, have all been used to develop a spontaneous and
reliable relationship with public officials which is expected to yield payback
through favors in critical stages of the project cycle. The stages that are the most
vulnerable are those where significant discretion is involved or where
transparency is lacking in the processing of information.
For auditors, a conflict of interest situation arises, especially for a firm which
has been incumbent for some time, in the judgment distinguishing substantial
variances from minor ones, and in the hope for continuity of business from year to
year.
NOTES
1 More information on this concept is available in Managing Conflict of Interest in
the Public Sector: A Toolkit. OECD 2005, p. 43. A free read-only version is available
at browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/browseit/4205121e.pdf
Businesses also work together on the regional level to fight bribery and
corruption. The APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) has developed a Code
of Conduct for Business based on work by civil society and the international
business community (notably TI, the ICC, and the WEF). The code, which APEC
leaders endorsed in September 2007, sets out comprehensive yet concise
standards addressing bribery risks. It is also intended to assist small and medium-
sized enterprises, which typically have fewer resources for integrity measures.
Regional Initiatives are a catalyst for reform and change, but countries
must translate these regional programs into local action in order to enjoy their
full benefits. For example, the K-PACT, a joint effort by all stakeholders of Korean
society and government to counter corruption in the country, facilitated Korean
companies involvement in the Global Compact. A national network for the
Global Compact was also created.
The EITI also requires efforts at the country level to achieve its goals. In
Timor-Leste, a country rich in natural resources and a participant in EITI, all parts
of society and government cooperate in implementing the EITI work program. EITI
provides a framework for this cooperation and the international exchange of
experience, while leaving ownership and responsibility to the country level. EITI is
a tool in a process rather than an end in itself. Working toward its goals provided
Timor-Leste with an opportunity to build a multi-stakeholder collaboration.
First of all, I would like to thank the Asian Development Bank and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development for inviting me to
speak at this conference. It is indeed an honor for me to share my thoughts on
pertinent issues with regard to combating corruption in my capacity as the Co-
Chairman of The Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG).
Another key APG work area is research and analysis into money
laundering and terrorist financing trends and methods, to better inform APG
members of systemic and other associated risks and vulnerabilities.
1. Low pay and poor conditions of those in the public sector produce a
systematic vulnerability to corruption.
2. Financial expertise in identifying corruption typologies is lacking.
3. APG member jurisdictions with cash-based economies face great
difficulties in distinguishing money from legitimate and illegitimate
sources.
4. Absence of a dedicated anti-corruption body and a lack of vigorous
media scrutiny keep corrupt acts hidden.
5. Weak political will of senior managers and the government to develop
a robust anti-corruption culture lead to low levels of prevention and
enforcement.
6. Concerns exist that Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) may block anti-
money laundering investigations, impede the suspicious transaction
reporting system, and undermine good governance standards.
7. It is difficult to keep investigations secret in small jurisdictions where
tipping off is a constant danger.
8. Law enforcement and prosecutors are often more interested in
pursuing the predicate crime rather than money laundering or
corruption offenses.
9. Finally, because corruption-related money laundering often
necessitates international action, such investigations tend to be
complex, time-consuming, and expensiveand require considerable
expertise.
Conclusion
Today I have shared with you information on APGs work, its research
findings on trends and vulnerabilities in respect to corruption-related money
laundering issues in the region and some of its strategies to combat such crimes.
The APG is working on training its member jurisdictions to prevent and detect
corruption as well as to successfully prosecute those responsible for offering and
accepting bribes and laundering the proceeds. However, there is still a strong
sense that more needs to be done to promulgate an anti-corruption culture.
Of course, APG is not alone in the battle against corruption and money
laundering, nor are the law enforcement agencies. Workshop 3 highlighted how
the private sector can work on corporate compliance programs and integrity
systems.4 To bring down crime, we need to work hand in hand together with the
private sector. We have to act together as a group to fight against the criminals.
Criminals in this new age are tenacious in probing our systems for gaps and
creative in devising new methods to overcome safeguards.
NOTES
1 See www.fatf-gafi.org
2 APG Scoping Paper.
3 APG Scoping Paper.
4 See these presentations on p. 99 and following in this volume.
APEC was slow to address corruption directly; it starting instead with work
on developing transparency principles for general application and then
adapting them to specific situations, from customs to clearance to direct
investment and procurement. However, partly in response to pressure from the
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), which was advocating development of
an APEC Anti-Corruption Convention, APEC Leaders agreed in 2004 to endorse
the APEC Course of Action on Fighting Corruption and Ensuring Transparency.
One of the key priorities of the Action Plan is to encourage APEC member
economies to ratify the UNCAC. APEC Leaders also decided to establish the
APEC Anti-Corruption and Transparency Task Force (ACT). ACT meets twice a
year at Senior Officials Meetings leading up to the Leaders meeting late in the
calendar year.
that they are illegal under the domestic laws of most countries although not
expressly prohibited by the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) or
the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.
The Code which fits on one page of paper is titled Business Integrity
and Transparency Principles for the Private Sector and begins with the
statement: The enterprise shall prohibit bribery in any form. 1 It requires
enterprises to develop a comprehensive program to counter bribery.
The ACT plans a pilot rollout of the Code in Australia, Chile, and Vietnam,
focusing on the SME sector. SMEs are considered to need particular help in
addressing integrity issues due to their relative lack of resources and their greater
vulnerability to corruption pressures in many cases.
UN Global Compact
An example of a global initiative with great resonance in Asia and the
Pacific is the UN Global Compact.
Business should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion
and bribery.
NOTES
1 The Business Integrity and Transparency Principles for the Private Sector are
available at
www.apec.org/apec/news___media/2007_media_releases/060907_aus_bizcodec
onduct.MedialibDownload.v1.html?url=/etc/medialib/apec_media_library/downl
oads/taskforce/act.Par.0002.File.v1.1
2 See Mr. Geo-Sung Kims presentation on p. 145 in this volume.
3 See Mr. Lymans presentation on p. 47 in this volume.
4 See Mr. Brays presentation on p. 38 in this volume
5 www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/clean_business_is_good_
business.pdf
Transparency International Korea has been inviting major players from the
public and private sectors to build a coalition for promoting transparency and
fighting against corruption. As a result, the Korean Pact on Anti-Corruption and
Transparency, K-PACT, proposed by TI-Korea in 2004, was signed on 9 March
2005.
Article 16 of the K-PACT states: The private sector should participate in the
UN Global Compact based on ten principles of the human rights, labor
standards, environment, and anti-corruption areas. K-PACT aims to empower
the movement for change in the private sector itself.1
At the time of the K-PACT signing ceremony, not one single participant in
the UN Global Compact came from Korea. Now, in the fourth year of K-PACT,
144 participants in the UN Global Compact come from the Republic of Korea.
This result is partly due to the K-PACT Initiative, but other forces also contributed
to this progress, such as the fact that the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-Moon,
is a Korean national.
NOTES
1 More information on the K-PACT is available at www.pact.or.kr/english
2 For a graphical depiction of this concept, please see
www.transparency.org/policy_research/nis
At the end of this process, which must be completed within 2 years, stands
an external validation. Validation is an essential element of the EITI global
standard. It provides an independent assessment of progress and identifies
measures to strengthen the EITI process. Only countries that meet all Validation
Indicators are awarded the EITI Compliant status. The Validation is carried out by
an independent validator who applies a defined assessment methodology.
If the EITI International Board 2 considers a country to have met all the
indicators in the Validation grid, the country will be recognized as EITI Compliant.
If a country has made good progress, but does not meet all of EITI requirements,
the country may apply to retain its Candidate status for a limited period. Where
validation shows that no meaningful progress has been achieved, the Board will
revoke the countrys Candidate status.
In late November 2008, the Timor-Leste EITI Working Group was in the
process of finalizing a template for a first Timor-Leste EITI Report which is due to be
released in early June 2009.
NOTES
1 More detailed information on EITI, its mechanisms, and participants is available at
http://eitransparency.org
2 At the biannual EITI International Conference, held in Doha, Qatar on 16-19
February 2009, the Secretary of State of Timor-Leste, Mr. Alfredo Pires, has been
appointed member of the International Board of EITI for 2009-2011. Mr. Pires is the
first member of the International Board from an Asian-Pacific country.
3 The work plan is available at
www.timor-leste.gov.tl/EMRD/ETTI/TL%20EITI%20Workplan%20Final%20(English).pdf
We have just heard examples of regional and global initiatives that bring
governments, the private sector, and civil society together in the fight against
corruption. What is clear is that fighting corruption is everyones problem; no one
segment of society can solve this problem alone. The 13th International Anti-
corruption Conference (IACC) is a biannual event that also recognizes this point
and brings together governments, private sector entities, civil society
organizations, academia, the media, and international organizations. The 13th
IACC was held in Athens in early November 2008, just a few weeks prior to this 6th
Regional Anti-Corruption Conference for Asia and the Pacific. This contribution
brings the key messages emerging from the 13th IACC to Asia and the Pacific.
There was also considerable discussion around an emerging issue: the still-
unfolding global financial crisis and impending recession.
Corruption in the Natural Resource and Energy Sectors: The oil and gas
industry was identified as extremely vulnerable to corruption. It was also noted
that, if left unchecked, corruption in this sector can have dire consequences,
including quickly increasing rather than reducing poverty. Examples included the
case of the President of Equatorial Guinea; records indicate he has purchased a
home worth USD 36 million in the US, and one credit card receipt shows
USD 250,000 for a single days shopping Equatorial Guinea has with the highest
economic growth rate, and a significant portion of the population lives on less
than USD 1 per day. Imagine the schools, hospitals, public health facilities that
USD 36 million would finance. These consequences were discussed, along with
strategies and partnerships available to mitigate them, including the EITI. Better
enforcement and awareness of land and resource rights were identified as ways
to improve the governance of natural resources.
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was also highlighted, noting the continuing fallout
from the UK Governments decision to terminate the investigation into alleged
corruption in the BAE-Saudi-Arabia Al-Yamamah arms deal.
The issue of asset recovery was discussed with a call for increased
transparency as assets are recovered and returned. Conference participants
also noted the corrosive effective of political corruption, and identified political
corruption as the greatest threat to democratic governance in the 21th century.
Disclosure and civil society oversight were identified as vital mitigating measures.
The 14th IACC will be held in Bangkok in 2010. The conference will provide
an excellent opportunity for Asia and the Pacific to showcase experience,
lessons and progress made in the regional fight against corruption.
NOTES
1 This presentation is based on the Summary Report from the 13th IACC as posted
on the conference's website www.13iacc.org
2 The website www.oecd.org/corruption/asiapacific/capacitybuilding provides
information on this seminar and access to the proceedings that contain Mr.
Rubadus presentation.
In the early days after the ICAC was put in place, the community was
more concerned with corruption in the public sector. In the first 15 years after it
commenced operation, over 50% of the corruption complaints ICAC received
related to public-sector corruption. In the first 10 years, the proportion went from
87% in 1974 down to 65% in 1983. This downward trend has continued, and now
private-sector corruption complaints exceed public-sector complaints.
Since the mid-80s, the ICAC has been pursuing corruption in the private
sector as vigorously as in the public sector. Over the years, the ICAC has
allocated more and more of its investigative resources to private-sector
corruption, as the volume of complaints relating to the private sector has
increased. Since 1989, private-sector corruption has taken up more than 50% of
the complaints received by the ICAC. As at the end of October 2008, 65% of the
complaints received in 2008 related to private-sector corruption.
faces and is not limited to this simple situation. Although this may be the most
common form of private-sector corruption, there are many other forms as well.
Corruption is used also to facilitate other crimes, such as fraud, which may
be committed by the senior management of a company. Senior management
of companies may also bribe employees of other companies to benefit from that
other company which will have a much wider effect on society. This occurred,
for instance, when the management of a listed company bribed a fund
manager to make him purchase a large block of shares; this was done in order to
keep the price of the listed companys shares high and maintain market
confidence in the company. When the activities of the corrupt management
were uncovered, the share price of the listed company dropped and many
innocent investors in the company suffered a loss.
A further area in which the ICAC has encountered corruption that has had
serious consequences for an institution is in the banking industry. Bank staff who
are bribed to approve large loans which are insufficiently secured can put the
financial position of the bank at risk.
Thus, corruption can manifest itself in various forms, some of which may
affect only the particular company that is the victim of it; others may involve a
large group of people; and some forms may affect virtually the whole
community. Some say that the true victim of corruption is society. Although this is
more readily apparent with public-sector corruption, it is equally true of
corruption in the private sector.
ICAC uses its own forensic accounting experts and persons with technical
expertise in computer forensics. Both of these specialist areas have become
increasingly important in the investigation of private-sector corruption.
In one of Hong Kong, Chinas leading cases on one of its more unusual
anti-corruption offensesillicit enrichment by government officialsour Court of
Appeal discussed whether an aspect of this offense which reverses the burden of
proof was in accord with human rights law. The Court of Appeal upheld this
provision. The Court declared that the public had a right to protection against
corruption and the equal-protection-clause in our Bill of Rights Ordinance
guaranteed this right. The Court said, If the law only protected persons accused
of corruption, but failed to protect members of the general public from the evils
and perils of corruption, then it would deny them equal protection.
Conclusion
I hope that this information and experience demonstrates the need for a
private-sector corruption offense. Hong Kong, Chinas experience has certainly
taught it the need for such an offense and I am sure that many other countries
have learned the same lessons from fighting corruption. Indeed, the importance
of having a private sector corruption offense was recognized by the drafters of
the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Like Hong Kong, China, the
authors of this Convention realized that in order to effectively eradicate corrupt
practices from a society, it is necessary that the citizens of that society do not
tolerate corruption in the private sector and that the private sector not be
treated any differently from the public sector. This is why the UNCAC encourages
the creation of a private-sector bribery offense.
The mission of the ICAC may have a slightly different emphasis now
compared to its mission when it first started its work. However, this mission is still to
combat corruption within the whole of Hong Kong, Chinas society so that every
citizen can feel free of this evil.
Administrative measures
Alongside the statutory measures dealing with corrupt offenders, strict rules
and regulations govern the conduct of public officers to ensure a high standard
of discipline. For government officials, the Instruction Manual (IM) stipulates that
each officer has to conduct himself in a manner which upholds the integrity of
the Public Service. He or she must not act in such a way that gives rise to public
perception that he or she has obtained special advantage through his or her
official position or connections. Each officer has a duty to exercise care to
preserve his or her ability to be fair and impartial. He or she should avoid
becoming beholden to any party because of past favors or special
concessionary treatment.
delivery of goods or services, the bidder will be reminded that bribing public
officers administering the contract may render their contracts to be terminated.
A clause to this effect forms part of the standard contract conditions. A
contractor found to indulge in corruption is prosecuted. In addition, this
contractor is debarred from future government contracts for up to 5 years.
These rules help uphold good conduct of public officials and help deter
the private sector from committing corruption. Applied to the interface between
public and private sectors, they help reduce corruption tendencies.
First, corruption in the private sector affects public interest. Some people
used to think erroneously that private-sector corruption is a private affair
between the giver and the taker. However, consider the following: When a
supermarket purchaser takes bribes from a supplier, the supplier will inevitably
mark up its cost to cover the bribes. As a result, the supermarket, which
purchased the goods at a higher price will sell it an even higher price. The public
suffers in the end.
Third, the private sector is a key pillar of Singapores economy and drives
national economic growth. Singapore needs a level playing field for all, and the
private sector must be clean to attract foreign businesses to work and invest in
Singapore.
The private and public sectors are also intertwined, which is another
reason why it matters that CPIB watches over the private sector as well. As the
government outsources more and more of its traditional functions to the private
sector, many private companies are now performing functions that the
government used to carry out. Corruption in segments of the private sector that
are involved in strategic functions can also impact key areas of government and
society at large.
Charity sector
A governance code has also been introduced in the charity sector, after
a series of malpractices in charity organizations were uncovered. For instance,
not long ago, the CPIB prosecuted the CEO of the National Kidney Foundation
for using a false document, resulting in a three-month jail sentence. The
Government has since reviewed the laws, and a Commissioner of Charities was
established to oversee all charity organizations; also, a Code of Governance was
promulgated for the charity sector. The Code is a set of principles and standards
accepted as an industrys best practices, which stakeholders in the charity sector
aim to adopt as an exercise of good faith.
Tough punishment
To successfully combat corruption, in addition to adopting strict and
effective enforcement, we need tough punishments meted out on convicted
offenders to serve as a deterrent to the like-minded.
Punishment can be severe and depends on the impact and severity of the
act. In fact, many private-sector cases have resulted in jail sentences
comparable to those applied for public-sector corruption.
Apart from criminal sanctions, the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) also
provides for civil recourse for recovery of bribe money. This was tested in court
recently. The CPIB had prosecuted a facilities manager in a large private
company for taking about SGD 300,000 as bribes in return for awarding
contracts. He was convicted and sentenced to 10 months in jail and ordered to
pay to the State a penalty of about SGD 300,000, equal to the amount of bribes
he had pocketed. After the prosecution, his company brought a civil suit against
him to recover the amount of bribes he had accepted during his incumbency.
The accused appealed to the court, on the grounds that he had been ordered
to pay back the equivalent of the bribe as a penalty and cannot be required to
pay a second time, and on a second occasion, through the civil suit. The Court
of Appeal dismissed his appeal stating that the law expressly provided for two
distinct provisionsa criminal proceeding to disgorge benefits, and civil
proceedings to recover the bribe money. Hence, there can be a double
disgorgement. This sends a clear message to corrupt offenders: they will be
made to pay heavily for their corrupt activities; this constitutes a further
deterrence against corruption.
Conclusion
It is imperative to deal with corruption in the public and private sectors, as
there is a great linkage between the two sectors. Singapore has dealt with both
sectors for a long time.
Donors also remain concerned with the integrity of their own operations,
as the example of the Asian Development Bank shows. ADB, a key development
partner in Asia and the Pacific, pursues two policy goals: supporting member
countries efforts to bolster their anti-corruption frameworks, and seeking to
eliminate corruption from its lending and technical assistance programs. To do
so, ADB established a comprehensive policy to support anti-corruption efforts in
its member countries; its Integrity Division ensures that the ADBs own operations
adhere to ethical standards. The Integrity Division investigates allegations,
provides training, promotes awareness, and conducts project procurement-
related audits. All multilateral development banks have now largely harmonized
their definitions of corrupt practices, and coordinated sanctions for corrupt
practices. Some important differences remain, however, such as publishing
blacklists of contractors that have engaged in corruption.
I would like to share with you the efforts of the Office of the Ombudsman
of the Philippines in fighting corruption; what the office has done and continues
to do toward sustaining our development agenda; and the ultimate goal of
reducing to a considerable extent, if not eliminating, corruption in our country.
Two other bodies support the Office of the Ombudsman: The Commission
on Audit, also an independent and constitutionally mandated office, has the
duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and
receipts of government expenses and expenditure, or uses of public funds and
property. The Anti-Money-Laundering Council investigates suspicious bank
transactions, triggers the freezing of accounts alleged to contain proceeds of
unlawful activities, and initiates filing of complaints for money laundering.
To address red tape and to provide a level playing field for business, and
to create an improved business environment, the Philippine Government
adopted corruption prevention initiatives, as illustrated by the following
examples:
Philippine Bidding Documents and the Generic Procurement Manual
were issued to standardize the bidding process in government
procurement projects.
The Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) issued uniform
guidelines for blacklisting manufacturers, suppliers, distributors,
contractors, and consultants for certain offenses including any
documented unsolicited attempt by a bidder to unduly influence the
outcome of the bidding in his or her favor.
Today, Korea is the worlds 12th largest economy and a member of the
OECD. The volume of Koreas official development assistance (ODA) to
developing countries has steadily grown since 1987. In 2007, Koreas ODA
recorded more than USD 680 million.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis brought about the bankruptcy of major
Korean companies which had received preferential treatment from the
government, resulting in poor financial structure and excessive corporate debt.
Koreas foreign exchange reserves were drained, and the country was on the
brink of defaulting on its foreign loans.
In the late 1990s, Korean civil society groups came together to form the
Citizens Coalition for Anti-Corruption Legislation. This audacious move of civil
societycoupled with the governments strong anti-corruption platformled to
the enactment of the Anti-Corruption Act in July 2001 and the creation of the
Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) in January 2002.
Recently, the ACRC has been receiving numerous calls from other
countries for technical assistance, and international organizations such as UNDP,
the UN, and TI have suggested that Korea should play a more active role in the
In 2007, the ACRC helped introduce its Integrity Survey to Indonesia. Similar
to TIs Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), the Integrity Survey is a kind of "naming
and shaming" policy, intended to discourage corrupt practices and encourage
good behaviour by exposing wrongdoers to public humiliation.
The ACRC has been conducting the Integrity Survey since 2002, surveying
more than 90,000 people who recently experienced services provided by over
300 public institutions in Korea.
In October 2008, three KPK officials were seconded to the ACRC for 2
weeks to study its AIA system, which is expected to be introduced to Indonesia as
early as 2009.
Following the Korea-Indonesia MOUthe first of its kind that Korea has
ever signed with a foreign countrythe ACRC plans to step up cooperation with
anti-corruption agencies in other countries that have recently asked ACRC for
assistance in building their anti-corruption capacity and institutions.
Under the MOU, effective for 2 years starting from 2007, the ACRC provides
comprehensive consulting services including: establishing a survey model to
assess the status of corruption in each country; supporting the development of
national anti-corruption strategies; assisting in the establishment of a model to
review and assess national anti-corruption policies and systems; and providing
education and training to anti-corruption officials.
produced and handed over to the ACC a technical guide to its major anti-
corruption measures.
At the working group meeting following the workshop, the three parties
agreed to transfer to Bangladesh Koreas know-how on system improvement,
Future work
The ACRC plans to make greater efforts to assist countries in Asia and the
Pacific in building their anti-corruption capacity, in close cooperation with
international organizations and donor agencies. It will also willingly respond to
calls from the international community to share its expertise and knowledge in
preventing corruption.
The first risk is what we call the fiduciary risk. It constitutes the risk that donor
funds are not used for their intended purposes. The recent increase in aid volume
exacerbates this concern.
The first driver behind this change is linked to the modalities of aid delivery:
the traditional supply-driven structure of projectsoffered and initiated by
donorswas gradually replaced by donor support of demand-driven programs,
i.e., programs that developing countries requested. Later, the Paris Declaration
on Aid Effectiveness2 triggered and accelerated the provision of sector-specific
and general budget support.
Both these drivers shifted the focus of donors response to corruption from
ring-fencing to the strengthening of country systems. In this effort, donors initially
endeavoured to strengthen institutions of horizontal accountability, i.e.,
government agencies that oversee, control, redress, and, where required,
sanction other government agencies.
Eventually, however, all efforts will stand and fall with the commitment to
reform by the governments of developing countries.
Apart from supporting the work of the OECD Working Group on Bribery to
monitor the implementation and enforcement of the OECD Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, donors can take additional
measures to tackle the supply side of corruption. This includes measures to
promote the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and to raise awareness
of the work of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and of the issues of money
laundering and other illicit financial flows.
Donors can also venture into efforts on the home front by proactively
involving the private sectorincluding both transnational corporations and small
and medium-sized enterprisesand by reminding companies of their corporate
social responsibilities. Joint activities among governments, civil society, and the
private sector should receive strong support, notably the Kimberly Process, the
Publish-What-You-Pay campaign, and the Extractive Industries Transparency
Initiative (EITI).
NOTES
1 Representing the OECD Development Assistance Committee Network on
Governance Anti Corruption Task Team (OECD DAC GOVNET ACTT).
2 For information on the Paris Declaration visit www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness
List of Participants
Conference Agenda
Government representatives
Afghanistan
Rahela HASHIM SIDIQI
Senior Advisor, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service
Commission (IARCSC)
Sayed Ikram AFZALI
Project Specialist, UNDP Country Office
UNDP/ACT Project, Ministry of Finance
Australia
Luke John Breedon
Senior Consultant Corruption Prevention, Education & Research
Corruption and Crime Commission of Western Australia
Jessica Wilby
Principal Research Officer, Corruption and Crime Commission of Western
Australia
Bangladesh
Md. Matiar RAHMAN
Joint Secretary, Cabinet Division, Government of Bangladesh
Bhutan
Karma THINLAY
Head, Prevention Services, Anti-Corruption Commission
Brunei Darussalam
Hjh Siti Norkalbi bte Sheikh Haji Hussin
Chief Special Investigator, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Prime Ministers Office
Hasrina Suzanty bte Haji Jamil
Special Investigator, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Prime Ministers Office
Cambodia
Sambath SAR
Permanent Member of Anti-Corruption Unit, Office of the Council of Ministers
Cook Islands
Janet MAKI
Ombudsman
East Timor
Danilo Afonso-Henriques
Senior Executive Officer, Office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs
Fiji Islands
Ralulu CIRIKIYASAWA
Principal Auditor, Surcharge and Compliance, Ministry of Finance, National
Planning and Sugar Industry
Indonesia
Bibit Samad RIANTO
Vice Chairman, Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
Giri SUPRAPDIONO
International Cooperation Specialist, Coordinator for International
Cooperation Unit
Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)
Japan
Keiko MIZOGUCHI
Official of OECD Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Economic Affairs Bureau
Korea, Republic of
So-yeong YOON
Deputy Director, Anti-Corruption International Cooperation Division
Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission
Kyrgyz Republic
Bakyt BAKETAYEV
Head of the National Anti-Corruption Commission
Macao, China
Ioc San HO
Chief of Cabinet of the Commissioner, Commission Against Corruption
IAO Man Leng
Advisor, Commission Against Corruption
Ivo Donat Firmo MINEIRO
Chief Investigation Officer, Commission Against Corruption
Shu Qing TANG
Chief of Community Relations Department, Commission Against Corruption
Malaysia
Samarajoo MANIKAM
Deputy Commissioner, Anti-Corruption Agency
Abdul Razak HAMZAH
Senior Superintendent, Anti-Corruption Agency
Maldives
Ibrahim NAEEM
Auditor General of Maldives, Auditor Generals Office
Mexico
Aragon Lagunas Miguel Guillermo
Procuraduria General de la Republica
Titular de la Unidad Especializada en Investigacion de Delitos Cometidos por
Servidores Publicos y contra la Adminsitracion de Justicia
Lopez Trujillo Armando
Embassy of MexicoSingapore
Mongolia
Sunduisuren DORJ
Deputy Chief, Commissioner in Charge, Independent Authority Against
Corruption
Badral DELGER
Head of Internal Affairs, Senior Commissioner, Independent Authority against
Corruption
Nepal
Lalit LIMBU
Acting Chief Commissioner, Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of
Authority (CIAA)
Mahesh Sharma POUDEL
Joint Attorney, Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)
Pakistan
Shahnawaz BADAR
Director General, National Accountability Bureau
Palau
Satrunino TEWID
Acting Public Auditor
Philippines
Ma. Merceditas GUTIERREZ
Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman
Dina Joy TENALA
Assistant Ombudsman, Office of the Ombudsman
Samoa
Leasi Papali T. SCANLAN
Governor, Central Bank of Samoa
Gilbert WONGSIN
Manager, Financial Institutions Department, Central Bank of Samoa
Singapore
Kee Hean SOH
Director, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Prime Ministers Office
Teck Hin KOH
Deputy Director (Operations), Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Prime
Ministers Office
Huey Chin CHEW
Acting Deputy Director (Plans & Projects), Corrupt Practices Investigation
Bureau, Prime Ministers Office
Seow Lian ANG
Assistant Director (Intelligences), Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
Prime Ministers Office
Wai Kit FONG
Investigation Officer, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Prime Ministers
Office
Wee Liam CHIN
Head Investigation, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, Prime Ministers
Office
Spain
Juan Antonio PELAEZ BOHIGAS
Economic and Commercial Counsellor, Embassy of Spain/Commercial
Office
Sri Lanka
Ameer ISMAIL
Chairman, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption
Thailand
Terdsak PUTSON
Director, International Affairs Division
Public Sector Anti-Corruption Commission, Ministry of Justice
Kannika SRISOMKIAT
Foreign Relations Officer, Foreign Affairs Division
The Office of Public Sector Anti-Corruption (PACC), Ministry of Justice
Mr. Chadil Suppawannakit
Senior Officer, The National Counter Corruption Commission (NACC)
United Kingdom
Keith MCCARTHY
Head of Anti-Corruption, Serious Fraud Office
Vietnam
NGUYEN Huu Loc
Deputy Director General, Department for International Cooperation
Government Inspectorate of Vietnam
Yemen
Saadaldeen, TALIB
Member, Head of International Cooperation Sector
Supreme National Authority for Combating Corruption
Nalina SOMBUNTHAM
Consultant, Transparency International, Maldives
Emily George TAULE
Executive Director, Transparency International, Papua New Guinea
Rezki Sri WIBONO
Deputy Secretary General, Transparency International Indonesia
World Bank
Joel TURKEWITZ
Lead Governance Specialist, World Bank, Bangkok
Naseer RANA
Advisor, Governance and Anticorruption, South Asia Region
Arief SUROWIDJOJO
Founding partner of Law Firm Lubis Ganie Surowidjojo;
Former chairperson of the Supervisory Board of Transparency International
Indonesia;
Chairperson of the Board of Advisory of the Indonesian Society for
Transparency
Roy SZE
Regional Security Manager (East Asia), Shell Eastern Petroleum Pte Ltd,
Singapore
Neil THAMOTHERAM
Director, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Thailand
Kathleen MOKTAN
Director, Capacity Development and Governance Division
Regional and Sustainable Development Department
kmoktan@adb.org
Marilyn PIZARRO
Consultant, Capacity Development and Governance Division
Regional and Sustainable Development Department
mpizarro@adb.org
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
2, rue Andr Pascal
75775 Paris CEDEX 16, France
Tel +33 1 4524 9582
Fax +33 1 4430 6307
Christine URIARTE
General Counsel, Anti-Corruption Division, Directorate for Financial and
Enterprise Affairs
christine.uriarte@oecd.org
William LOO
Legal Analyst, Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific
Anti-Corruption Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
william.loo@oecd.org
Joachim POHL
Project Co-ordinator, Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific
Anti-Corruption Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs
joachim.pohl@oecd.org
Agenda
Wednesday, 26 November 2008
Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, Senior Minister of State for Law & Home
Affairs, Singapore
Workshop 1 Workshop 2
Combating bribery: the role of Conflict of interest
international criminal law the soft side of corruption
standards
Corruption undermines competition and The intersection between the public and
increases the costs of doing business. An private sector can create opportunities
effective legal and regulatory framework for bribery, but corruption does not
informed by international legal always manifest as a financial crime.
instruments and based on international Conflict of interest occurs when private
standards, which recognizes corruption interest compromises public interest.
and bribery as criminal acts, is necessary
The workshop will define conflict of
to support government efforts to reduce
interest, discuss various regulatory
corruption.
approaches for managing conflict of
This workshop will: discuss the issue of interest, and discuss how conflict of
bribery within the Asia and Pacific context; interest manifests at the sector level.
discuss international legal standards and
Chair:
their enforcement (in particular UNCAC);
Koh Teck Hin, Deputy Director
present the challenges facing (Operations), CPIB, Singapore
governments as they attempt to
implement anti-corruption and anti-bribery Rapporteur:
offenses; and explore options for involving Janet Maki, Ombudsman, Cook Islands
civil society in the legislative process. In Speakers:
addition, it will explore how experience Janos Bertok, Principal Administrator,
implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Directorate for Governance and
Convention could assist Asia and the Territorial Development, OECD
Pacific countries implement international
Arief T. Surowidjojo, Lawyer, Indonesia
criminalization standards.
Navita Srikant, Partner, Ernst & Young,
Chair: Hamid Sharif, Principal Director,
India
Central Operations Services Office, ADB
William Paterson, World Bank
Rapporteur: Andrew Boname, Regional
Anti-Corruption Advisor, ABA Rule of Law
Initiative
Speakers:
William Loo, Anti-Corruption Division,
OECD
Kuniko Ozaki, Director, Division for Treaty
Affairs, UNODC
Mathew Joseph, Deputy Principal Senior
State Counsel, Attorney-General's
Chambers, Singapore
Jaswant Singh, Deputy Senior State
Counsel, Attorney-General's Chambers,
Singapore
Workshop 5 Workshop 6
Private sector corruption: last Fighting corruption and the
piece of the puzzle sustainable development agenda
The general inclination is to think of The development community recognizes
corruption occurring involving private the profound harm that corruption inflicts
and state owned actors, in the case of on development, and particularly on the
influence peddling, offering and poor. A number of bi- and multilateral
receiving bribes etc. However, corruption donors with programs in Asia and the
also occurs within the private sector. This Pacific coordinate their efforts through
corruption can be more difficult to the OECD Development Assistance
address as it falls outside the remit of Committee (DAC) Governance Network.
typical public sector integrity
This workshop will focus on key corruption
mechanisms.
issues that impact on sustainable
The workshop will examine how development in Asia and the Pacific
corruption manifests in private-to-private (e.g., in mineral extraction, oil and gas
transactions, tools, and options available industries, and forestry), and follow-up
to address this form of corruption and the discussions at the 13th IACC in Athens. It
linkages with the rule of law. will look at the issue of facilitation
payments and how they weaken
Chair: Joel Turkewitz, Lead Governance
development. It will also discuss how
Specialist, World Bank
donors incorporate anti-corruption into
Rapporteur: tbd the broader support for governance, and
Speakers: how they can support efforts aimed at
Jermyn Brooks, Director, Private Sector drying out the sources of bribes prevalent
Programs, Transparency International in the business sector.
10:4511:15 Refreshments
BLURB
Strategies for Business, Government, and Civil Society to Fight Corruption in
Asia and the Pacific
Bribery is bad for business, so why do businesses continue to bribe? What roles do
business, government, and civil society have in the fight against corruptionand
notably in the fight against bribery in business? The 6th Regional Anti-Corruption
Conference for Asia and the Pacific gathered experts from countries and
jurisdictions of Asia and the Pacific, OECD member countries, leading enterprises
and businesses associations, civil society, and development partners to respond
to these questions and to share their experiences in fighting bribery in business.