3aepublic .

of tbe ~bilippinen
~upreme ~ourt
:fflanila

EN BANC

SALVADOR ESTIPONA, JR. y G.R. No. 226679

ASUELA,
Petitioner, Present:

SERENO, C. J.,
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
- versus - BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,*
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, REYES, JR., and
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial GESMUNDO, JJ.
Court, Branch 3, Legazpi City,
Albay, and PEOPLE OF THE Promulgated:
PHILIPPINES,
August 15, 2017
Resp~~~~~~~-----------------~~~::o~-..x
x----------------------------

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition 1 is the

constitutionality of Section 23 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, "2 which provides:

On wellness leave.
With Urgent Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
~~
2 ~
Approved on June 7, 2002. (/.
Decision -2- G.R. No. 226679

SEC 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. - Any person charged under

any provision of this Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be
allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. 3

The facts are not in dispute.

Petitioner Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. (Estipona) is the accused in

Criminal Case No. 13586 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 (Possession of Dangerous Drugs). The Information alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 2016, in the City of

Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or
otherwise use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or
prescription, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have, in his possession and under his control and custody, one (1) piece
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked as VOP 03/21/16- l G
containing 0.084 [gram] of white crystalline substance, which when
examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrocloride
(Shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LA W. 4

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to

Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, 5 praying to withdraw his not guilty
plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and
Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) with a penalty of rehabilitation
in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the
dangerous drug seized in his possession. He argued that Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165 violates: (1) the intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section
2 thereof; (2) the rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section
5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and (3) the principle of
separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

In its Comment or Opposition6 dated June 27, 2016, the prosecution

moved for the denial of the motion for being contrary to Section 23 of R.A.
No. 9165, which is said to be justified by the Congress' prerogative to
choose which offense it would allow plea bargaining. Later, in a Comment

This repealed Section 20-A ofR.A. No. 6425 ("Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972"), as amended by
R.A. No. 7659 ("Death Penalty Law''), which was approved on December 13, 1993. It provided:
SEC. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this
Act where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the
provision on plea-bargaining.
Rollo, p. 47.
Id. at 49-51.
Id. at 52.
{/
Decision -3- G.R. No. 226679

or Opposition 7 dated June 29, 2016, it manifested that it "is open to the
Motion of the accused to enter into plea bargaining to give life to the intent
of the law as provided in paragraph 3, Section 2 of [R.A. No.] 9165,
however, with the express mandate of Section 23 of [R.A. No.] 9165
prohibiting plea bargaining, [it] is left without any choice but to reject the
proposal of the accused."

On July 12, 2016, respondent Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional

Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, Albay, issued an Order denying
Estipona's motion. It was opined:

The accused posited in his motion that Sec. 23 of RA No. 9165,

which prohibits plea bargaining, encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
procedure because plea bargaining is a "rule of procedure." Indeed, plea
bargaining forms part of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly
under Rule 118, the rule on pre-trial conference. It is only the Rules of
Court promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its constitutional
rule-making power that breathes life to plea bargaining. It cannot be found
in any statute.

Without saying so, the accused implies that Sec. 23 of Republic

Act No. 9165 is unconstitutional because it, in effect, suspends the
operation of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court insofar as it allows plea
bargaining as part of the mandatory pre-trial conference in criminal cases.

The Court sees merit in the argument of the accused that it is also
the intendment of the law, R.A. No. 9165, to rehabilitate an accused of a
drug offense. Rehabilitation is thus only possible in cases of use of illegal
drugs because plea bargaining is disallowed. However, by case law, the
Supreme Court allowed rehabilitation for accused charged with possession
of paraphernalia with traces of dangerous drugs, as held in People v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 191366, 13 December 2010. The ruling of the
Supreme Court in this case manifested the relaxation of an otherwise
stringent application of Republic Act No. 9165 in order to serve an intent
for the enactment of the law, that is, to rehabilitate the offender.

Within the spirit of the disquisition in People v. Martinez, there

might be plausible basis for the declaration of Sec. 23 of R.A. No. 9165,
which bars plea bargaining as unconstitutional because indeed the
inclusion of the provision in the law encroaches on the exclusive
constitutional power of the Supreme Court.

While basic is the precept that lower courts are not precluded from
resolving, whenever warranted, constitutional questions, the Court is not
unaware of the admonition of the Supreme Court that lower courts must
observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions. Upon
which admonition, it is thus not for this lower court to declare Sec. 23 of
R.A. No. 9165 unconstitutional given the potential ramifications that such

Id. at 53. ol
Decision -4- G.R. No. 226679

declaration might have on the prosecution of illegal drug cases pending

before this judicial station. 8

Estipona filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in an

9
Order dated July 26, 2016; hence, this petition raising the issues as follows:

I.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHICH
PROHIBITS PLEA BARGAINING IN ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
SAID LAW, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAW.

II.
WHETHER SECTION 23 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT ENCROACHED UPON THE POWER
OF THE SUPREME COURT TO PROMULGATE RULES OF
PROCEDURE.

III.
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AS PRESIDED BY
HON. FRANK E. LOBRIGO, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DECLARE SECTION 23 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 10

We grant the petition.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), contends that the petition should be dismissed outright for
being procedurally defective on the grounds that: ( 1) the Congress should
have been impleaded as an indispensable party; (2) the constitutionality of
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be attacked collaterally; and (3) the
proper recourse should have been a petition for declaratory relief before this
Court or a petition for certiorari before the RTC. Moreover, the OSG argues
that the petition fails to satisfy the requisites of judicial review because: (I)
Estipona lacks legal standing to sue for failure to show direct injury; (2)
there is no actual case or controversy; and (3) the constitutionality of Section
23 ofR.A. No. 9165 is not the !is mota of the case.

On matters of technicality, some points raised by the OSG maybe

correct. Nonetheless, without much further ado, it must be underscored that

10
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 46, 54-55.
Id. at 3, 15-16.
Cl
 Decision -5- G.R. No. 226679

it is within this Court's power to make exceptions to the rules of court.

Under proper conditions, We may permit the full and exhaustive ventilation
of the parties' arguments and positions despite the supposed technical
infirmities of a petition or its alleged procedural flaws. In discharging its
solemn duty as the final arbiter of constitutional issues, the Court shall not
shirk from its obligation to detennine novel issues, or issues of first
impression, with far-reaching implications. 11

Likewise, matters of procedure and technicalities normally take a

backseat when issues of substantial and transcendental importance are
12
present. We have acknowledged that the Philippines' problem on illegal
drugs has reached "epidemic," "monstrous," and "harrowing" proportions, 13
and that its disastrously harmful social, economic, and spiritual effects have
broken the lives, shattered the hopes, and destroyed the future of thousands
especially our young citizens. 14 At the same time, We have equally noted
that "as urgent as the campaign against the drug problem must be, so must
we as urgently, if not more so, be vigilant in the protection of the rights of
the accused as mandated by the Constitution x x x who, because of excessive
zeal on the part of the law enforcers, may be unjustly accused and
convicted." 15 Fully aware of the gravity of the drug menace that has beset
our country and its direct link to certain crimes, the Court, within its sphere,
must do its part to assist in the all-out effort to lessen, if not totally eradicate,
the continued presence of drug lords, pushers and users. 16

Bearing in mind the very important and pivotal issues raised in this
petition, technical matters should not deter Us from having to make the final
and definitive ~ronouncement that everyone else depends for enlightenment
and guidance. 7 When public interest requires, the Court may brush aside
procedural rules in order to resolve a constitutional issue. 18

x x x [T]he Court is invested with the power to suspend the

application of the rules of procedure as a necessary complement of its
power to promulgate the same. Barnes v. Hon. Quijano Padilla discussed
the rationale for this tenet, viz. :

11
See Garc.:ia v. Judge Drilon, et al., 712 Phil. 44, 84(2013).
12
GMA Network, Inc. v. COMELEC, 742 Phil. 174, 209-210 (2014).
13
See People v. Castro, 340 Phil. 245, 246 (1997); People v. Camba, 302 Phil. 31 I, 323 (1994);
People v. Tantiado, 288 Phil. 241, 258 (1992); Peopie v. Zapanta, 272-A Phil. 161, 166 (1991); People v.
Taruc, 24i Phil. 177, 186 (1988); and People v. Ale, ;229 Phil. 81, 87 (1986).
14
People v. Tantiado, supra, as cited in People v. Cami:Ja, supra, and People v. Caco, 294 Phil. 54,
65 (1993).
15
People v. Qilintana, 256 Phil, 430, 436 (1989).
16
See People v. Gatlabayan, 669 Phil. 240, 26 ! (2011 ); People v. Lagmay, 365 Phil. 606, 632
( 1999); and People v. Arcega. G.R. No. 96319, March 31, J 992, 207 SCRA 681, 688.

{/
17
Sf:e GMA N2twork; Inc. v. CO!v!ELC supra ll(:t;: 12, at 210.
18
!vlatib:1g r Benipayo, 429 Phil. 554, 579 ( ?O(j;:).
Decision -6- G.R. No. 226679

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be

viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect
this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be
so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court
itself has already declared to be final, x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford

every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just
determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held
that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override
substantial justice. 19

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

Rule-making power of the Supreme

Court under the 1987 Constitution

Section 5( 5), A1iicle VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xx xx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.

The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is

now Our exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments. 20 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 21 then
Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno traced the history of
19
Philippine Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Inc. v. Teodoro R. Yangco 2nd And 3rd
Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc., 731Phil.269, 292 (2014). (Citation omitted and italics supplied)
20
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in RE: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the GSISfrom Payment of Legal Fee, 626 Phil. 93, 106 (2010) and Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, 627 Phil.
543, 549 (2010).
21
Supra.
c/!
Decision -7- G.R. No. 226679

the Court's rule-making power and highlighted its evolution and

development.

x x x It should be stressed that the power to promulgate rules of

pleading, practice and procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this
Court to enhance its independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani
Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular
trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of
justice." Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this
Court for it enhances its independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the
power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative
power for it was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or
supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:

"Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power

to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice
and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."

The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear

on its surface. In In re: Cunanan Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of
law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71 % in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck
down the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno
held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a
judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting
the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may
do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question." The
venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate
power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive
character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court qualified the absolutist
tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice oflaw in the Philippines. cf"
Decision -8- G.R. No. 226679

The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the

1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this
Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in
all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or
supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x." More completely,
Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:

xx xx

"Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.

xx xx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and

procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."

Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to
promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.

The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more

independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power
of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:

xxx

"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the

following powers:

xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and

enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. "

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
.first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also
granted for the .first time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importontly, the /~
 Decision -9- G.R. No. 226679

Constitution took away the power of Congress to repeal, alter, or

supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine,
the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no
longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive. x
x x.22

Just recently, Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division/ 3

further elucidated:

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction

of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto Congress,
the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

xx xx

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice (Echegaray), the Court traced

the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with
Congress. As it now stands, the 1987 Constitution textually altered the
old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend
the rules, thus solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making
powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a " [s] tronger
and more independent judiciary."

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

would show that the Framers debated on whether or not the Court's rule-
making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial
suggestion to insert the sentence "The National Assembly may repeal,
alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the
Supreme Court," right after the phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated
bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged[,]" in the enumeration of
powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino
proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the word
"[under]privileged," place a comma(,) to be followed by "the phrase with
the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually, a compromise
formulation was reached wherein (!) the Committee members agreed to
Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the phrase "the National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice
and concurrence of the Supreme Court" and (~) in turn, Commissioner
Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." The changes were approved,
thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The
22
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra note 20, at 85-88. (Citations omitted). See also RE:
Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSJS from Payment of Legal Fee, supra note 20, at I 06-
108 and In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees, 629
Phil. 1, 4-5 (2010).
23
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015, 774 SCRA 431.

cft
 Decision - 10 - G.R. No. 226679

prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the Supreme Court

and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter,

or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.xx x. 24

The separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our

government has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole
25
province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of
26
the procedural rules promulgated by the Court. Viewed from this
perspective, We have rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress,
in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court (Rules),
to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto 27 -Appeal from the decision of the Office

of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.

2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose

Cooperative, Inc. 28 - The Cooperative Code provisions on
notices cannot replace the rules on summons under Rule 14 of
the Rules.

3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS

from Payment of Legal Fees; 29 Baguio Market Vendors Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge
30
Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power
Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; 31 and Rep. of
the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. 32 - Despite statutory
provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not
exempt from the payment of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of
the Rules.

24
Carpio-Morales v. Court ofAppeals (Sixth Division), supra, at 505-508. (Citations omitted).
25
RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GS!Sfrom Payment of legal Fee, supra note
20, at 108.
26 Id.

c/
27
356 Phil. 787 (1998).
28
738 Phil. 37 (2014).
29
Supra note 20.
30
Supra note 20.
31
Supra note 22.
32
638 Phil. 353 (2010).
 Decision - 11 - G.R. No. 226679

4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division/ 3 - The

first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits
courts except the Supreme Court from issuing temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules,

this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules
of procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. To reiterate, the Court's authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of
. . . 1.mdepen dence. 34
0 ur mstitut10na

Plea bargaining in criminal cases

Plea bargaining, as a rule and a practice, has been existing in our

jurisdiction since July 1, 1940, when the 1940 Rules took effect. Section 4,
Rule 114 (Pleas) of which stated:

SEC. 4. Plea of guilty of lesser offense. - The defendant, with the consent
of the court and of the fiscal, may plead guilty of any lesser offense than
that charged which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
complaint or information.

When the 1964 Rules became effective on January 1, 1964, the same
provision was retained under Rule 118 (Pleas). Subsequently, with the
effectivity of the 1985 Rules on January 1, 1985, the provision on plea of
guilty to a lesser offense was amended. Section 2, Rule 116 provided:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - The accused with the consent
of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is
necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (4a, R-118)

As well, the term "plea bargaining" was first mentioned and expressly
required during pre-trial. Section 2, Rule 118 mandated:

33
Supra note 23.
34
See Carpio-Morales v. Court ofAppeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 517-518, citing Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes, supra note
20, at 550.

~
Decision - 12 - G.R. No. 226679

SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects. - The pre-trial conference shall

consider the following:

(a) Plea bargaining;

(b) Stipulation of facts;
( c) Marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and
expeditious trial. (n)

The 1985 Rules was later amended. While the wordings of Section 2,
Rule 118 was retained, Section 2, Rule 116 was modified in 1987. A second
paragraph was added, stating that "[a] conviction under this plea shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double
jeopardy."

When R.A. No. 8493 ("Speedy Trial Act of 1998 ') was enacted, 35
Section 2, Rule 118 of the Rules was substantially adopted. Section 2 of the
law required that plea bargaining and other matters 36 that will promote a fair
and expeditious trial are to be considered during pre-trial conference in all
criminal cases cognizable by the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, and the
Sandiganbayan.

Currently, the pertinent rules on plea bargaining under the 2000

37
Rules are quoted below:

RULE 116 (Arraignment and Plea):

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused,

with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed
by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the
accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or
information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

RULE 118 (Pre-trial):

SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases

cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan
Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after arraignment and within
thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special

)5
Approved on February 12, 1998.
J6
Such as stipulation of facts, marking for identification of evidence of parties, and waiver of
objections to admissibility of evidence.
37
Effective December 1, 200 I (People v. Mamarion, 459 Phil. 51, 74 [2003]).
t/
 Decision - 13 - G.R. No. 226679

laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to

consider the following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;
( c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
( d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits
the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial
of the criminal and civil aspects of the case. (Sec. 2 & 3,
Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is a rule ofprocedure

The Supreme Court's sole prerogative to issue, amend, or repeal

procedural rules is limited to the preservation of substantive rights, i.e., the
former should not diminish, increase or modify the latter. 38 "Substantive law
is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of
the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective
or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtain
redress for their invasions." 39 Fabian v. Hon. Desierto 40 laid down the test
for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

It will be noted that no definitive line can be drawn between those

rules or statutes which are procedural, hence within the scope of this
Court's rule-making power, and those which are substantive. In fact, a
particular rule may be procedural in one context and substantive in
another. It is admitted that what is procedural and what is substantive is
frequently a question of great difficulty. It is not, however, an
insurmountable problem if a rational and pragmatic approach is taken
within the context of our own procedural and jurisdictional system.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court,

for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates
procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right
to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as
a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with
procedure. 41

38
CONSTITUTION, A1t. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Ogayon v. People, 768 Phil. 272, 288 (2015) and
San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. v. CA, 352 Phil. 405, 415-416 (1998).
39
See Carpio-Morales v. Court ofAppeals (Sixth Division), supra note 23, at 516-517.
40

7
Supra note 27.
41
Fabian v. Desierto, supra at 808-809. See also Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth
'"P'"
o;,;,;on), nok 23, at 517; &mW" and Exchange Comm;,,;on v. Judge La;go, et al., 768 Phil.
Decision - 14 - G.R. No. 226679

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural

42
rule violates substantive rights. For example, in People v. Lacson, Section
8, Rule 117 of the Rules on provisional dismissal was held as a special
procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute, making
the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part thereof, so
that its expiration operates to extinguish the right of the State to prosecute
the accused. 43 Speaking through then Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr., the Court opined:

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has

fixed a time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases
provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a
priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first
impression, unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced
the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy
disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the
accused. It took into account the substantial rights of both the State and of
the accused to due process. The Court believed that the time limit is a
reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases
with the consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The
time-bar fixed by the Court must be respected unless it is shown that the
period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a denial of
justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency
of the time-bar.

The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the

Revision of the Rules and approved by the Court en bane primarily to
enhance the administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to
due process of the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious
practice of trial courts of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on
motion of either the prosecution or the accused or jointly, either with no
time-bar for the revival thereof or with a specific or definite period for
such revival by the public prosecutor. There were times when such
criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to causes beyond the
control of the public prosecutor or because of the indolence, apathy or the
lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the prejudice of the State
and the accused despite the mandate to public prosecutors and trial judges
to expedite criminal proceedings.

It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay

as it usually operates in his favor, especially if he greatly fears the
consequences of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the
hushed inaction by which dominant cases have been known to expire.

The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases

may impair or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the
disappearance or nonavailability of its witnesses. Physical evidence may

269-270 (2015): Jay/a, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 751 Phil. 123, 141-142 (2015); Land Bank of the
Phils. v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 503 (2003); and Bernabe v. Alejo, 424 Phil. 933, 94 l (2002).
42
41
448 Phil. 317 (2003).
See Los Banos v. Pedro, 604 Phil. 215, 229 (2009).
Al (/ ,
 Decision - 15 - G.R. No. 226679

have been lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have
faded. Passage of time makes proof of any fact more difficult. The accused
may become a fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer
the lapse of time from the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the
more difficult it is to prove the crime.

On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a

criminal case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the
case may be revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the
chances of the accused for employment, curtail his association, subject
him to public obloquy and create anxiety in him and his family. He is
unable to lead a normal life because of community suspicion and his own
anxiety. He continues to suffer those penalties and disabilities
incompatible with the presumption of innocence. He may also lose his
witnesses or their memories may fade with the passage of time. In the long
run, it may diminish his capacity to defend himself and thus eschew the
fairness of the entire criminal justice system.

The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise
the malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system
44
for the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.

Also, We said in Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. 45 that Section 6,

Rule 120 of the Rules, which provides that an accused who failed to appear
at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the remedies
available against the judgment, does not take away substantive rights but
merely provides the manner through which an existing right may be
implemented.

Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court, does not take away per
se the right of the convicted accused to avail of the remedies under the
Rules. It is the failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on
the scheduled date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that
forfeits their right to avail themselves of the remedies against the
judgment.

It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of

Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only
works in pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to "provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases."
This provision protects the courts from delay in the speedy disposition of
criminal cases - delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the
46
judgment of conviction.

44
People v. Lacson, supra note 42, at 387-389. (Citations omitted).
45
Supra note 41. /7JI'
46
Jaylo, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., id. at 142-143. (Citation omitted). V,
 Decision - 16 - G.R. No. 226679

By the same token, it is towards the provision of a simplified and

47
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that
the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way of disposing criminal
charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an
"important," "essential," "highly desirable," and "legitimate" component of
the administration of justice. 48 Some of its salutary effects include:

x x x For a defendant who sees slight possibility of acquittal, the

advantages of pleading guilty and limiting the probable penalty are
obvious - his exposure is reduced, the correctional processes can begin
immediately, and the practical burdens of a trial are eliminated. For the
State there are also advantages - the more promptly imposed punishment
after an admission of guilt may more effectively attain the objectives of
punishment; and with the avoidance of trial, scarce judicial and
prosecutorial resources are conserved for those cases in which there is a
substantial issue of the defendant's guilt or in which there is substantial
doubt that the State can sustain its burden of proof. (Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 [1970])

Disposition of charges after plea discussions x x x leads to prompt

and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much of the
corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pretrial confinement for
those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even
while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of
the guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned. (Santobello v. New York,
404 U.S. 257, 261 [1971])

The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and
uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the
chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever
potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve
vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by
those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while
awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. (Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 [1977])

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as "a process

whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval." 49 There is give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining. 50 The essence of the agreement is
47
CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5). See also Neypes v. Court of'Appea/s, 506 Phil. 613, 626
(2005) and San Ildefonso lines, Inc. v. CA, supra note 38, at 415-416.
48
See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (l 977); and
the Majority Opinion and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concurring Opinion in Santobe//o v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971).
49
People v. Villarama, Jr., 285 Phil. 723, 730 (1992), citing Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979,
p. 103 7. See also Gonzales Ill v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al, 694 Phil. 52, I 06 (2012);
Atty. Amante-Descal/ar v. Judge Ramas, 601 Phil. 21, 40 (2009); Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, 573 Phil.
368, 375 (2008); and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75.
50
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
ell
 Decision - 17 - G.R. No. 226679

that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid
potential losses. 51 Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system - speed, economy, and finality - can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the court. 52

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, 53 the rules on

plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them.

The decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the

defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and by the
apparent likelihood of securing leniency should a guilty plea be offered and
accepted. 54 In any case, whether it be to the offense charged or to a lesser
crime, a guilty plea is a "serious and sobering occasion" inasmuch as it
constitutes a waiver of the fundamental rights to be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, to be heard by himself and counsel, to meet the
witnesses face to face, to bail (except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong), to be
convicted by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself. 55

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic

rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. 56 Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party 57 and the prosecutor, which
51
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990).
52
See Santobello v. New York, supra note 48 and Blackledge v. Allison, supra note 48.
53
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
54
id.
55
See Brady v. United States, supra, and Mr. Justice Douglas' Concun-ing Opinion in Santobello v.
New York, supra note 48, at 264.
56
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977). See also Mr. Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion in
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2011).
57
The State is the offended party in crimes under R.A. No. 9165. In People v. Villarama, Jr., supra
note 49, at 732 the Court ruled:
"x x x While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so
by law because they infringe upon the rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human
dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998,
October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts
themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's survival is endangered because its basic
unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended
party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action
in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the government is duty
bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as though he were
the person directly injured by the offense (see United States v. Samia, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in

CV-
this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the Fiscal
who acts in behalf of the government."
Decision - 18 - G.R. No. 226679

is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is

58
necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is
to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based
on what the evidence on hand can sustain. 59

[Courts] normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to

prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are well known.
Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple. In addition to assessing
the strength and importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider
other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement
priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce
resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot accommodate the
litigation of every serious criminal charge. Because these decisions "are
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake," we have been "properly hesitant to examine the decision
whether to prosecute. "60

The plea is further addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court,
which may allow the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The word may denotes an
exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to
61
make such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of
guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged is not supposed to be
allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the
accused. 62

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or

even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case. 63 As
regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court's exercise of
discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof. 64 "Grave abuse of
discretion" is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility; it arises when

5H
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.
59
Id.
60
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987).
61
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 732. In Capati v. Dr. Ocampo ( 199 Phil. 230, 234
[ 1982], citing In Re: Hirsh's Estate SA. 2d 160, 163; 334 Pa. 172; Words & Phrases, permanent edition,
26a.), the Court also held:
"It is well settled that the word 'may' is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term 'may be' connotes possibility; it does not
connote certainty. 'May' is an auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or
possibility."
62
Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 377 and People v. Vil/arama, Jr, supra note 49,
at 730.
63
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, id. at 376; People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 75; Ladino v.
Hon. Garcia, 333 Phil. 254, 258 (1996); and People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731. __j;
64
See Daan v. Hon. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at 378. C/.,
 Decision - 19 - G.R. No. 226679

a court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing

. .
JUnspru d ence. 65

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to

a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish
the guilt of the crime charged. 66 The only basis on which the prosecutor and
the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not
guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the evidence on record.
As soon as the prosecutor has submitted a comment whether for or against
said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's
evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his
change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be
served. 67 The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of
the prosecution's evidence. 68 Absent any finding on the weight of the
evidence on hand, the judge's acceptance of the defendant's change of plea is
improper and irregular. 69

On whether Section 23 of R.A. No.

9165 violates the equal protection
clause

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of

R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of
the law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the
policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending
deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a
qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to declare as invalid the
prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made
part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued
for the purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is

GRANTED. Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165 is declared
unconstitutional for being contrary to the rule-making authority of the
Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.

65
Sofronio Albania v. Commission on Elections, et al., G.R. No. 226792, June 6, 2017.
66
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 252, as cited in Gonzales III v. Office of the President
of the Philippines, et al., supra note 49, at 106 and People v. Mamarion, supra note 37, at 76.
67

68
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49, at 731.
See People v. Villarama, supra.
{?.
69
People v. Villarama, Jr., supra note 49.
 Decision - 20 - G.R. No. 226679

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

~~ANTONIO T. CARPIO 0 J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

....

~~&~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice

~~~ J()__ ltjVL/

~~~~-DEL CASTILLO ESTELA 1'f: PERLAS-BERNA BE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Decision - 21 - G.R. No. 226679

On wellness leave
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA
Associate Justice

-~
\&
E ZTIJAM
ciate ustice
ANDRE
Asso ~
u
REYES JR.
e Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice

CERTIFIED XEROX COPY:

1l:tip~~;~
CLERK OF COURT, EN BANC
SUPREME COURT