STATE OF MISSOURI vs.

WILLIAM ARTHUR BALL

339 SW 2D 783

FACTS

On October 15, 1958, Krekeler Jewelry Store was robbed by two men. They took watches and rings
amounting to $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Subsequently, Krekeler identified William
Arthur Ball from pictures and during the trial.

In his motion for new trial, Ball objected to the fact that a police officer who arrested him was allowed
to testify that $258.02 in currency and two pennies were taken from him. It is said that the introduction
of these exhibits were immaterial and irrelevant neither tended to prove nor disprove any issues
involved in the case; that said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by
Krekeler or by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from the A.L. Krekeler & Sons
Jewelry Company on Oct. 15; and that said evidence was considered by the jury to the prejudice of the
appellant.

ISSUE

WON the effects confiscated from Ball should be admissible in evidence

RULING

No. Not only was Krekeler unable to identify the money or any of the items on Balls person as having
come from the jewelry store so that in fact they were no admissible in evidence, the charge here was
that Ball and his accomplice took jewelry of the value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register.
There was no proof as to the denomination of the money in the cash register, it was simply a total of
$140. Here 19 days have elapsed, there was no proof that Ball had suddenly come into possession of
the $258.02 and in all these circumstances the mere possession of a quantity of money is in itself no
indication that the possessor was the taker of money charged as taken, because in general all money of
the same denomination and material is alike, and the hypothesis that the money found is the same as
the money taken is too forced and extraordinary to be receivable.

In the absence of proof or of a fair inference from the record that the money in Balls possession at the
time of his arrest came from or had some connection with the robbery and in the absence of a plain
showing of his impecuniousness before the robbery and his sudden affluence, the evidence was not in
fact relevant and in the circumstances was obviously prejudicial for if it tend to prove the offense for
which the appellant was on trial, the jury may have inferred that he was guilty of another robbery.
G.R. No. 156052 February 13, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO and

BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of
Manila, respondent.

x----------------------x

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS

SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, movants-intervenors.

x----------------------x

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, movant-intervenor.

Facts: After we promulgated our decision in this case

on March 7, 2007, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron),
Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (collectively, the oil
companies) and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Department of Energy (DOE), filed
their respective motions for leave to intervene and for
reconsideration of the decision.
Chevron1 is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines while Shell and Petron are engaged in the
business of manufacturing, refining and likewise importing, distributing and marketing of
petroleum products in the Philippines.2 The DOE is a governmental agency created
under Republic Act (RA) No. 76383 and tasked to prepare, integrate, coordinate,
supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the government
relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.

On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance

No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001.
and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the
area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners
and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan
Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered
into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that
:scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option.
Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of
Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal
requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale
down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution

No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of
understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending
the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to
issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also
called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027
and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals.

Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Whether or not the judicial admissions is applicable to the respondent.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor
of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One
of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put
into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian
or negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were
contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it
binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30,
2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No.
8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city
of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The Rule On Judicial Admissions Is Not Applicable Against Respondent

The oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027
was repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379 (where Petron
assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027) when the parties in their joint
motion to withdraw complaint and counterclaim stated that the issue ...has been
rendered moot and academic by virtue of the passage of [Ordinance No. 8119]. They
contend that such admission worked as an estoppel against the respondent.

Respondent countered that this stipulation simply meant that Petron was recognizing
the validity and legality of Ordinance No. 8027 and that it had conceded the issue of
said ordinances constitutionality, opting instead to question the validity of Ordinance No.
8119.The oil companies deny this and further argue that respondent, in his answer in
civil case no. 06-115334 (where Chevron and Shell are asking for the nullification of
Ordinance No. 8119), expressly stated that Ordinance No. 8119 replaced Ordinance
No. 8027:[81]

... Under Ordinance No. 8027, businesses whose uses are not in accord with the
reclassification were given six months to cease [their] operation. Ordinance No. 8119,
which in effect, replaced Ordinance [No.] 8027, merely took note of the time frame
provided for in Ordinance No. 8119.... Ordinance No. 8119 thus provided for an even
longer term, that is[,] seven years; (Emphasis supplied)

Rule 129, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in

the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. (Emphasis supplied)

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a
position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not
applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil
case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not the same as this case before us.To
constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which
it is offered.
Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not
supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be
considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded
Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119s) validity. We frown on
the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning
under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment.
Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or
ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

G.R. No. 171702 February 12, 2009

MANILA MINING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and style of MANILA
MANDARIN MARKETING, Respondent.

Facts:

1. Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in
the business of selling electrical materials.

2. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued
at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged
interest of 18% per annum, and in case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorneys fees equal to 25% of
the claim.

3. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to
give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was covered by nine invoices.

4. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed presenting evidence,
MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied. RTC further directed MMC to present
evidence.

5. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola
confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to present the original sales invoice and
purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices
and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMCs representatives.

6. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMCs account.
De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMCs
accounting department. As proof, he showed three customers acknowledgment receipts bearing the
notation:

I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and
the amount stated below, together with the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase
order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing acknowledgment of my/our
receipt of goods.

7. The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with interest and liquidated
damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision, hence the present petition for review on
certiorari.

Petitioner contends, among others, that respondents claim for payment was premature inasmuch as
the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent to its accounting department. Consequently,
Tans claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did not
automatically give rise to its obligation to pay, in light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which provides
that, where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not
performed, such party may refuse to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the
condition.

Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial, claiming
that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence
Rule and that by Tans failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed
evidence under Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners obligation to pay had already legally accrued considering that respondent
has not fully complied with all the prerequisites for payment imposed under petitioners purchase
orders, there being no proof that respondent had actually done so.

Held:

Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit. Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this Courts
power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of law that may have
been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial
court, are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on this Court.

In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials
to MMC. Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of consent to the
perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the transactions.

As regards respondents failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best
evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are directly in issue. Where the existence of the
writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC
did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not
submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the
documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale between the parties.

G.R. No. L-18857 December 11, 1967

THE CAPITAL INSURANCE and SURETY CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESTEBAN M. SADANG and MARIA LACHICA, defendants-appellees.

Facts: Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. subscribed to a bond in the amount of P42,000.00 in behalf

of Mateo Pinto and in favor of Macondray Farms, Inc to guarantee the payment of fishpond

rentals and other obligations of Pinto. The protect Capital Insurances interest, Pinto, Esteban
Sadang and Maria Lachica executed an Indemnity Agreement and a deed of Real Estate

Mortgage on the property located in Nueva Vizcaya. Pinto failed to pay the rentals worth

P24,668.83 to Macondray Farms causing Capital Insurance to pay as surety and the latter

claiming reimbursement from Pinto et al. Despite repeated demands, no reimbursement was

made and a case was filed by Capital Insurance against Pinto, Sadang and Lachica. Despite the

sale of Pintos properties, a deficiency of P14,456.44 was still remaining, thereby leading Capital

Insurance to claim the amount from Sadang and Lachica. In their defense, they argue that their

liability only extends to the amount of P20,000 and given the fact the Pinto already paid P19,700

and were supposed to be only liable for the difference which is P300. The trial court ruled in favor

of Sadang and Lachica, holding them liable for only P300. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial

courts decision, albeit modifying it to include the stipulated interest. It stated that the testimony of

Sadang was clear enough that he agreed to be a merely an indemnitor only on condition that he

would answer for the first P20,000 of the total P42,000 bond, and that the moment the first

P20,000 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to them. The trial

court found the testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as actually drafted

seems to be vagued or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against Capital insurance,

whose layer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the

parties as explained by Sadang and Lachica.

Issue: Whether or not the real intention of the parties is revealed by the testimony of appellee Esteban
Sadang concerning the circumstances which led to the inclusion of the particular stipulation
aforequoted.

Held: The foregoing testimony is clear enough. Esteban Sadang agreed to be an indemnitor only on
condition that he would answer for the "first P20,000.00 of the total P42,000.00 bond," and that "the
moment the first P20,000.00 is paid the bonding company automatically releases my responsibility to
them." The trial court found the said testimony to be uncontradicted. If the mortgage contract as
actually drafted seems to be vague or ambiguous, the doubt must be resolved against appellant, whose
lawyer prepared the document, and in accordance with the real intention of the parties as explained by
defendants-appellees.
The trial court correctly held said defendants-appellants liable only for the sum of P300.00. However, it
failed to provide for the stipulated interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, which if not paid
would be liquidated and added to the capital, quarterly, and to order foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties in case of non-payment.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the modification indicated above
concerning interest, the same to begin from the date of the filing of the complaint. In case of non-
payment of the sum thus adjudged, including interest, the mortgaged properties will be sold as provided
in Rule 68. No costs in this instance.

G.R. No. L-16741 January 31, 1962

FLORENCIA Q. DE ABRAHAM, ALFONSO ABRAHAM, and JESUS

ABRAHAM, petitioners,
vs.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JUAN C. YSMAEL, PRISCILLA RECTO-
KASTEN, respondent.
Facts: On September 3, 1943, Juan C. Ysmael, obtained a loan from Alfonso Abraham, Sr. in the amount
of P12,500.00 in Japanese currency notes, and executed a promissory note in favor of the latter
promising to pay the loan within 90 days with interest at the rate of 10% per annum. The note was
executed in the presence of Florencia Q. Abraham, the creditor's wife, who affixed her signature at the
bottom thereof as a witness thereto. Upon the maturity of the note, a demand was made for its
payment, but the debtor failed to pay.

On February 9, 1945, Alfonso Abraham, Sr. died. On the other hand, Juan C. Ysmael died intestate on
April 23, 1952 leaving the note still unpaid.

On November 13, 1954, in Special Proceedings No. Q-285 for the settlement of the intestate estate of
Juan Ysmael, pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Florencia Q. Vda. de Abraham,
together with her sons, Alfonso and Jesus, all surnamed Abraham, filed a pleading entitled
"Reclamation" demanding payment of the amount represented by the note. Because no regular
administrator of the estate had yet been appointed by the court, the "Reclamation" was not acted upon.
However, as soon as Priscilla Recto-Kasten was appointed administratrix, the claimants reproduced their
"Reclamation" before the lower court and the same was finally set for hearing. As agreed upon by the
parties, the reception of evidence was delegated to a commissioner. During the hearing before the
commissioner, the counsel for the administratrix interposed a general and continuing objection to the
testimony of Florencia Vda. de Abraham invoking the provisions of Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules
of Court. However, after the claimant had testified, he lengthily cross-examined her on the very matters
against which he interposed a general objection. The appellate court concluding that "the lower court
erred in finding that the claimants have established a just and valid claim, and in allowing the claim
supposing it was a claim with consideration when the same had been barred by prescription, estoppel
and laches," reversed the Order-Decree appealed from. Hence, this petition for review brought by the
claimants.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners have established a just and valid claim. And if the answer is in the
affirmative, whether the same is already barred by prescription and laches.

Held: The record shows that petitioners have established the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note and that respondents failed to present any evidence to destroy the same. It is
interesting to note that the promissory note executed by the deceased was produced before the Court
and marked as Exhibit B-1, and the circumstances under which the same was executed was extensively
described by Florencia Q. de Abraham during the hearing, who, strikingly is one of the witnesses to the
said instrument. Much to the surprise of the Court this description was more vividly given by the said
witness not in answer to the questions propounded by her lawyer but on cross-examination of counsel
for the administratrix, who feebly attempted to destroy the due execution and genuineness of the said
document. It is indeed unfortunate that counsel for the administratrix did not choose to present
evidence to destroy the alleged genuineness of the promissory note (Exhibit B-1) in support of his
theory, despite his insinuation during the course of the trial that he might try to secure the services of
an expert to determine the genuineness of the signature of the late Juan C. Ysmael mentioned therein.
Again counsel manifested that if Exhibit B-1 is a genuine document the same has been fully paid already,
(t.s.n., p. 83), however, counsel did not present any proof to support this contention.

It is true that Section 26(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides:.

(c) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an
executor administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or against such person of unsound
mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind;

The reason for the rule apparently is that a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate as to what his
examination of a witness may bring forth. Having made his selection of one of two courses which he
may pursue, he has no right, after he discovers that the course selected is not to his advantage, and
after he has put the opposite party to the expense, and has consumed the time of the courts in a trial of
the case in accordance with the course selected, to change his position and make another and different
selection. Such course would be unfair both to the opposite party and to the court and should not be
countenanced in any court of justice.

People vs. Sandiganbayan

275 SCRA 505

FACTS:
Paredes, was the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then
Governor of the same province and is at present a Congressman.
Atty. Sansaet is a practicing attorney who served as counsel for
Paredes in several instances. In 1976, Paredes applied for a free
patent over a piece of land and it was granted to him. But later,
the Director of Lands found out that Paredes obtained the same
through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. A civil
case was filed and Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes. A
criminal case for perjury was subsequently filed against Paredes
and Sansaet also served as counsel.
Later, TeofiloGelacio, a taxpayer, initiated perjury and graft
charges against Paredes and Sansaet, claiming that they acted in
conspiracy, by not filing an arraignment in the criminal case. To
evade responsibility for his own participation, he claimed that he
did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes, and to
discharge himself as a government witness. The Sandiganbayan
claimed that there was an attorney-client privilege and resolved to
deny the discharge.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the testimony of Atty. Sanset is barred by the
attorney-client privilege

HELD :
Statements and communications regarding the commission of a
crime already committed, made by a party who committed it, to an
attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications.
However, the communication between an attorney and client
having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid
or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privilege
ordinarily existing in reference to communications between an
attorney and a client. The falsification not having been committed
yet, these communications are outside the pale of the attorney
client privilege.
Moreover, Sansaet himself was a conspirator in the commission
of the falsification. For the communication to be privileged, it must
be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end. The
existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from
attaching.

G.R. No. L-568 July 16, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JUAN FRANCISCO, defendant-appellant.