EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-40330. November 20, 1978.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMADO DANIEL alias

"AMADO ATO" , accused-appellant.

Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.

Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra
and Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for appellee.

DECISION

MUOZ PALMA , J : p

This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a
complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato"
of rape alleged to have been committed as follows:
"That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein
accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
the undersigned complainant, against her will, and in her own room situated at
No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.

"That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having given
provocation for it, is present." (p. 1, CFI record).

The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its
decision on May 30, 1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not
more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than
SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of
appeal; forthwith the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. LexLib

On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a
decision the dispositive portion of which follows:
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel
has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the
penalty for the crime herein charged.

"We find, however, that the sentence imposed upon the accused in the judgment
appealed from is not in accordance with law.
"Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, providing that
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 'The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

'Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly

weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua
to death.'

"Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No.
296, as amended)
'The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided,
in
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; . . . '

"WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate
further proceedings pursuant to law." 2

By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this
Court and in a Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very
root of a longstanding practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since
the creation of the Court of Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the
offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals
with findings of facts and of the guilt of the accused, but without imposing the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2,
of the Rules of Court? 5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other Justices, expresses the view that for
this Court to acquire jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have
imposed on the appellant the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts
warranted. llcd

The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold
the view that the dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in
accordance with the Constitution and the law, and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on
the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1917, 6 a case was certified to this
Court by the Court of Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it
was "on the opinion that the penalty that should be imposed in this case is reclusion
perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor General, and not reclusion temporal, as
imposed by the lower court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
"Wherever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be
of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed,
the said Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had
been brought before it on appeal."

In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say,
strong reactions from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not
dwell on them. Simply stated, it was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to
make its findings of facts to support its opinion that the penalty to be imposed upon the
appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case within the
jurisdiction of this Court.
From the resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We
quote the following pertinent portions:
"The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals,
as provided in the above-quoted provision of the law, must of necessity depend
upon the correctness of that opinion. There is nothing in the law precluding this
Court from exercising its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its
own jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review, the
Court of Appeals is bound to make in its order of certification such findings of
facts as are necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or
death is the penalty to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3,
which provides that where a court to which an appeal has been taken has no
appellate jurisdiction over the case and it certifies the same to the proper court, it
must do so 'with a specific and clear statement of the grounds therefor.' The
requirement of clear and specific grounds is precisely a device to prevent
erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a superior court.

"Furthermore, the words 'shall refrain from entering judgment thereon' appearing
in the provision above-quoted, are a sufficient indication that the Court of
Appeals, at the time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the
evidence and was ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from
the facts established by proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life
imprisonment, instead of entering judgment thereon, it certifies the case to the
Supreme Court for final determination. Since the certification is the only ground
for determining our jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but
also findings of fact, the latter being more important than the former for they
supply the real basis for determining jurisdiction. . . . .
"The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of
First Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in
such cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be
erroneous on its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already
exhausted its jurisdiction by rendering judgment on the merits containing both
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and under such circumstance it is more
practical for the administration of the law that this Court should exercise its
appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and correcting all errors both of
fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial court. But here, the
Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the merits and is
refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it believes that
such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to transfer
the case to this Court. It is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in
order to prevent an erroneous transfer.

xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 "Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259),
offenses, for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
offenses arising from the same occurrence or committed on the same occasion,
come within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the remaining
offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. . . . .
"We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment
or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong,
the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals." (pp. 613-616, supra, italics
supplied)

In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial
compliance with the law as the order of certification made reference to the opinion and
recommendation of the Solicitor General whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact
to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment should be imposed upon the appellant.
Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the Resolution. LLpr

Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court
of Appeals is bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine
whether the appellant is guilty or not, but dissented from that portion of the Resolution
which accepted the case as he was of the opinion that the case should have been
remanded to the Court of Appeals. 7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as
it held that it was necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the
reasons for its opinion that death penalty or life imprisonment should be imposed. He
particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it
is placed, by force of the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court for the latter to decide the appeal on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was joined in his dissent by
Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino
Padilla. 8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos
that is, for the Court of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt,
but also to impose the penalty either of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in
order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which
confers on the Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose
the corresponding penalty in criminal cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion
perpetua or death.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, in "(A)ll criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment." 9 This jurisdiction is constitutional; the Supreme Court may not be deprived
thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 1 0
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of
Sec. 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court 1 1 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be
imposed" and "shall refrain from entering judgment", viz:
"xxx xxx xxx

"Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be
of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed,
the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith
certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had
been brought before it on appeal." (emphasis Ours)

As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is that
should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life imprisonment should be
imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon. . ."
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals
shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion
perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only
logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to
impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with
an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule
121 and Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final
judgment final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or
appellate court within the reglementary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes
final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal. 1 2 It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded
in the book of entries of judgments. 1 3
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124
enjoins the Court of Appeals from "entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be
entered.
But then the argument is advanced what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court
when the decision being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from
appeals from the Court of First Instance where there is a complete judgment to be passed
upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the case is for final determination
by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Hence, based on
the findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on
Us, this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom"
(People v. Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense committed. LexLib

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase "shall refrain from rendering
judgment," there would be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent
of the Ruiz was so clear to the Court when it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did
not envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or ambiguity in its
implementation under the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule
in the spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and
jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of
the testimony of the offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the
time of the incident was a little less than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial
court found the charge of rape duly established. The happenings are briefly summarized in
the People's brief as follows:
"The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November
20, 1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang, Tublay, Mountain
Province (pp. 3, 12, id.) At the time of the incident in question on September 20,
1965, complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao,
Guisad, Baguio City, as she was then a first year high school student at the
Baguio Eastern High School (pp. 3, 12, 20, id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
"On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just
arrived in the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was
then raining and the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station,
she waited inside the bus (pp. 3, 22, id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the
accused came and started molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold
of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, id.). But she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, id.).
She called the attention of the bus driver and the conductor about the actuation
of the accused, but it seemed that the former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25,
id.).
"Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100
meters away (pp. 4, 25, id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, id.). When the
jeep started to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, id.).
"When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to
negotiate a distance of ten meters (p. 5, id.). The accused also alighted and again
he tried to carry her bag (p. 5, id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag,
he was adamant in following her (p. 5, id.).
"Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it
when the accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, id.).
When she entered her room, the accused went in (p. 7, id.). He pulled a dagger
eight inches long and threatened her: 'If you will talk, I will kill you'. (p. 7, id.).
Margarita was stunned into silence because of her fear (p. 7, id.). Thereupon, the
accused held her hair with his left hand and forced her to lie down in bed (p. 7, id,)
He also placed his left hand with a handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the
same time holding the dagger and her neck with his right hand (pp. 7-8, id.). She
was forcibly made to lie down and, at this moment, the accused removed the
buttons of his pants (p. 8, id.). He then put down the dagger on the bed (p. 8, id.).
Her attempts to extricate herself from the accused was to no avail as she was
only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds (p. 35, id.) while
the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds (pp. 8, 59,
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8, 36, id), used his thigh to separate the legs of
Margarita (p. 38, id.), tried, but failed, to remove her panty (p. 36, id.). He
nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant
after prying open the part of her panty covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, id.).
Then he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, id.).
Margarita lost consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9,
id.).

"The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the
terrible misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, id.). She was immediately brought to
the Baguio General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, id.). Then they
proceeded to the Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to
the Health Center where she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who
thereafter submitted his medical report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, id.).
Margarita and her father gave their respective statements before the police
authorities (Exh. B, pp. 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.). She signed her criminal complaint
prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.)." (pp. 2-4,
Brief at p. 83, rollo).

The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu, was called to the witness stand and he
testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on
September 23, 1965 and his findings as contained in the report were as follows: cdphil

"1. Hymen circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00
and 11:00 o'clock positions in the face of a clock.

"2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
"3. Vaginal Orifice tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
"4. Vaginal wall-tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
"5. Vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or
extra-cellular diplococci." (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)

Dr. Micu concluded that "de oration was recent". He further declared that the condition
of the hymen revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident
complained of, and that the number of lacerations and contusions at the base of the
hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual act. 1 4
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other
since 1963, and there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident
of September 20, 1965 inside the room of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in
fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her, the first time having
occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her, but to his
surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 1 5
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the
findings of facts of the trial court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the
latter had examined the evidence as a result of which it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible
motive could a thirteen-year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that
could only bring down on her and her family shame and humiliation and make her an object
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people of her hometown. It cannot
be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to what can
be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body, an
investigation by police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has to
unravel lewd and hideous details of a painful event which she would prefer to forget and
leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all these and preferred to face the cruel
realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of speaking out the
truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl
although he promised to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita
was only twelve years and ten months old and was not of marriageable age, hence,
marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's testimony that the
complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the
trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to
ask for help or attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding
house, she failed to do so. According to counsel there were people at the Dangwa station,
in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney parking place where the girl took a
jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the closest of which
was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so
as to prevent appellant from molesting her. 1 6
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the
moment she saw the appellant inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or
raping her. All that the appellant did inside the bus was to hold her bag and she called the
attention of the driver and the conductor to the impertinence of appellant but the two did
not do anything about it. 1 7 And when Margarita walked from the bus to the jeepney
station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was
following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that
appellant was following her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 1 8 All along
Margarita could not call the attention of the people in the street or shout for help inasmuch
as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing anything against her. And when
Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 1 9 and in fact she
went straight to her room and it was at that particular moment when appellant barged into
the room before she could close the door. In short, the poor girl was simply taken by
surprise by the forced entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long
dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that some may manifest an
aggressive or violent attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while
others, like 12-year old Margarita, may assume a silent, fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of
the accused at the time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the
medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no
blood stains on her dress and underwear. cdrep

The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of
Margarita's straightforward and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old
farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126 lbs., and five feet and six inches tall, 2 0
overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act despite her resistance.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4'8" in height, and weighed around 95 lbs. 2 1
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it
brings about the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible,
is beside the point." 2 2
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to
consummate his evil purpose. In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12
year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by a man of superior physical strength. In
holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
"It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the
existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in
accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is
only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to
consummate the purpose which he had in view." (4 Phil. 434, 437 citing
Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa doctrine has
been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of the latest
is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.).

And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence
necessary in rape is naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of
the parties and their relation to each other. 2 3
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits
herself against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of
Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl
if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally weakened whatever resistance
Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to consummate his
coitus on the victim. 2 4
One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the
time of the trial in 1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily
submitted to a lie detector test with the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of
the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is, the latter was telling the truth on the
questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced Margarita Paleng into
having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 2 5
On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We
quote from his decision the following:
"As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and
credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends
upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject.
If subject is hard and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to
affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to
fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other
persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions
propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it."
(pp. 172-173, CFI record)

To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon
with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 offended party. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house,
her room constituted for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article
14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the
place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his
home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the
penalty next lower in degree is to be applied.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the
crime of rape as charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and order him to indemnify Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay the costs. LibLex

Decision Modified.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, J., concurs.
Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero, JJ., on the merits.
Castro, C.J., takes no part on the merits, also files a separate opinion on the preliminary
question, concurred in by Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Santos, Fernandez and
Guerrero, JJ.
Barredo, J., concurs in the judgment of conviction but I join the Chief Justice as regards the
preliminary question.
Antonio, J., concurs with the Chief Justice on the preliminary question, and with Justice
Palma on the judgment affirming the conviction of the accused.
Santos, J., concurs with the judgment on the merits of the appeal but joins the Chief
Justice on the preliminary question.
Fernandez, J., took no part on the merits.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
AQUINO , J., concurring:

The phrase "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" found in section 12 of Rule 124
and in section 34 of the Judiciary Law means that the Court of Appeals should not decide
the case. The Court of Appeals has been certifying to this Court criminal cases, wherein the
imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua, without rendering any judgment but
merely expressing its opinion that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous and
that the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua. Invariably, this Court accepted
those cases and decided the same. This Court's jurisdiction in criminal cases, as defined in
the Constitution, cannot be diminished but it can be enlarged.
Appealed criminal cases may be divided into three classes: (1) those wherein the lower
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 court imposed the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua and which are within this Court's
exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed
reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty and which fall within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, and (3) criminal cases wherein the trial court imposed a penalty of
reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty but a Division of the Court of Appeals, while in the
process of deciding the case, comes to the conclusion that the imposable penalty is death
or reclusion perpetua. That third class of criminal cases should be elevated to this Court
"for final determination".
Reclusion perpetua was properly imposed in this case upon the appellant who is a
pedophiliac.

CASTRO, C.J., separate opinion:

1 .
The preliminary issue at bar is: What is the correct course of action that the Court of
Appeals should take when, in a criminal case properly appealed to it, that court determines
that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be imposed
instead of the lesser penalty imposed by the court a quo? Should it refrain from rendering
judgment and forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court? Or should it render
judgment imposing what it considers as the proper penalty (either life imprisonment or
death) but refrain from entering judgment and thereafter certify the case to the Supreme
Court?
At the center of scrutiny is the pertinent provision of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended, and the identical statement in the second paragraph of section 12 of
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, both of which read:
"Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division [of the Court of Appeals]
the said division should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, the said court shall refrain from entering
judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court for
final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on appeal."

Justices Claudio Teehankee, Cecilia Muoz Palma and Ramon C. Aquino interpret the
phrase "entering judgment" in the inhibitory clause "shall refrain from entering judgment" to
mean "rendering judgment" or "pronouncing judgment," arguing that "[t]his can be the only
logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction" to
impose the penalties of death and life imprisonment. They thus opt to maintain the present
practice 1 of requiring no more than a forwarding certification (embodying findings of fact
supporting the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed)
by the Court of Appeals for the purpose of placing such case within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. LLjur

For the reasons hereunder stated, we consider their interpretation unwarranted and
therefore reject the conclusion that it leads to.
2 .
Section 34 of the amended Judiciary Act and the second paragraph of section 12 of Rule
124 of the Rules of Court must be construed in the light of the unequivocal phraseology of
paragraph (d), subsection (2), section 5 of Article X of the Constitution, which states:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 "Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"xxx xxx xxx

"(2) Review and revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferiors
courts in

"xxx xxx xxx

"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment.""

Varying the language of this provision only to the extent necessary to carry out its
intention, the rst subdivision of the third paragraph of section 17 of the Judiciary Act
made exclusive the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the following words:
"The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm on appeal as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in

"(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is
death or life imprisonment; . . ."

The constitutional mandate, given due statutory acknowledgment, sets forth the pertinent
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. We accord capital significance to the phrases
"final judgments and decrees of inferior courts" and "the penalty imposed." These phrases
are crystal-clear. Read together with the remainder of the provision, they state in precise
and unmistakable terms the sole intended inescapable meaning that the Supreme Court
shall have appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of inferior courts in criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. No hermeneutic expertise or
exercise can validly fashion some other meaning or intention.
3 .
The constitutionally determined nature of the criminal cases falling within the periphery of
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court fixes our perspective, defines and delimits
our judicial prerogative in the interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, and dictates
the manner in which the law in question should be read and made operative.
This being so, the clause enjoining the Court of Appeals to "refrain from entering judgment"
wherever it "should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should
be imposed" cannot validly be interpreted as a bar to that appellate court's "rendering
judgment." If the meaning given to the law by the minority should prevail and the case is
forwarded, as this case before us was, to the Supreme Court on a bare certification by the
Court of Appeals, then we have the unacceptable happenstance of an ordinary legislative
act upstaging the fundamental law, since, plainly, the Supreme Court will be constrained to
exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" in criminal cases
where NO "final judgment" in which "the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment" has
been rendered or pronounced.
The minority view would thus result not only in an unconstitutional imposition on the
Supreme Court of assumption of jurisdiction over a case that is beyond its original
appellate competence but would also compel abandonment by the Court of Appeals of
appellate jurisdiction legally and duly vested in and acquired by it. cdphil

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 4 .
Because sec. 34 of the Judiciary Act does not and cannot have primacy or ascendancy
over the Constitution, we assert that the Court of appeals is legally empowered to impose
the penalties of death and life imprisonment. Four basic and compelling considerations
underlie our view.
First: There is no law no law at all that states such prohibition in categorical terms.
The minority view rests solely on the strained interpretation foisted on the very law under
consideration and this interpretation, as we have said, is entirely unwarranted.
Second: In the case at hand, the Court of appeals duly and legally assumed appellate
jurisdiction over the accused Amado Daniel's appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio sentencing him to suffer a penalty less than life imprisonment. This
cannot be debated since section 29 of the Judiciary Act specifically places such appeal
within the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional ambit with the statement that

"The Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases,
actions, and proceedings, not enumerated in section seventeen of this Act,
properly brought to it."

Thus, absent any constitutional or legal constraints, the Court of Appeals should have
rendered the proper judgment in the case. For, verily, judicial jurisdiction is "the power
with which judges are invested for administering justice that is, for trying civil or
criminal cases, or both, and deciding them and rendering judgment. . . ." 2 (emphasis
supplied)
Third: Harking back to the Constitution, the Court of Appeals, by unmistakable
constitutional categorization, is an "inferior court. " And it is its judgments as such inferior
court which, so the Constitution plainly states, are the subject of the Supreme Court's
plenary power of review, revision, reversal, modification or affirmance.
Fourth: Absurdity and incongruity should not be read into the law so as to support the
view that a panel of three Justices of the Court of Appeals is denied the power to impose
the penalties of life imprisonment and death at the same time that such power is
recognized in a single judge of a lower court of admittedly lesser category.
5 .
The resulting conclusion that the Court of Appeals must impose the proper penalty does
not justify the apprehension that the Supreme Court will be hampered in the exercise of its
jurisdiction because the findings of fact made by the inferior appellate court "will have to
be respected." This stated procedural practice has never been honored in the absolute.
The ultimate function of the Supreme Court is to render justice. And we need not elaborate
on or belabor the numerous occasions when, to attain this objective, the Court shunted
aside technicalities to bare wide open the controversy and inquire into each and every
aspect, be it legal or factual or a mixture of both.
And this is one perfect instance where the avowed ends of justice must override practice
and procedure, for, no less than human life is at stake. And this would not be a novelty.
When a trial court's judgment imposing the death penalty is elevated to this Court en
consulta,we strip the case into minutiae: fact by fact, detail by detail, facet by facet. We see
no reason why, when a decision imposing the penalty of death or life imprisonment is
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 rendered by the Court of Appeals, the same manner of meticulous inquiry should not be
resorted to by the Supreme Court. A sentence imposing death or life imprisonment is of
the self-same gravity, whichever is the sentencing tribunal. 3
6 .
It is rather obvious that the phrase "entering judgment" is completely disparate from the
term "rendering judgment." There is no need to perambulate and meander the provisions of
sections 1 and 2 of Rule 36 of the Rules of court need merely be read to perceive the
strikingly sharp antithesis between the two phrases. These sections read: LibLex

"Section 1. Rendition of judgments. All judgments determining the merits

of cases shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it [sic] is based, signed by
him, and filed with the clerk of the court.
"Section 2. Entry of judgments and orders. If no appeal or motion for new
trial is filed within the time provided in these rules, the judgment or order shall be
entered by the clerk. The recording of the judgment or order in the book of entries
of judgments shall constitute its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive
part of the judgment or order and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate
that such judgment or order has become final and executory."

The word "enter" (which undeniably is the root of "entering") "with reference to
judgments has acquired a de nite meaning in our procedure. There simply exists no
ambiguity to warrant embroiled interpretation. We need not hammer out meaning from
the word 'entered.' It is there. Section 2, Rule 36 chisels out the legal import of the
word." 4 To repeat and stress the Rule, "[t]he recording of the judgment or order in the
book of entries of judgments shall constitute its entry." Upon the other hand, the
rendition of judgment is the judicial act of the writing by the judge of the decision and
the filing thereof with the clerk of court. 5
Such being the precise acceptations of the terms "entering judgment" and "rendering
judgment," we see no cogent reason why our indisputably learned lawmakers should have
written in the former when they meant the latter. If, as the minority would have it, the
intention was just that, why then has not section 34 of the Judiciary Act been accordingly
amended, considering that the said Act has been amended no less than ninety (90) times 6
since its enactment thirty years ago in 1948?
The conclusion is thus ineluctable that section 34 of the Judiciary Act means exactly what
it says. (And its intendment cannot and should not be altered through the expedient of
palpably tortuous and torturous statutory interpretation.) This rightly projects the limited
character of the said section a procedural device designed to effect and make effective
the jurisdictions of both the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. Read as written, this
section neither imposes nor curtails constitutionally and legally established jurisdictions.
The Court of Appeals can and must render a decision and impose the proper penalty of
death or life imprisonment, and, to effect the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, refrain
from entering its judgment, and forthwith certify the case to the Supreme Court.
7 .
Aside from according the respect that is due to the Constitution and setting aright the
import of section 34 of the Judiciary Act, our reading of the law will obviate unnecessary,
pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases between the Supreme Court and the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 Court of Appeals. We advert to that portion of the Ramos 7 decision, cited with approval by
Justice Muoz Palma, which states:
"We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to
support its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment
or death. While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the
correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the
conclusions to be correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong,
the case will be returned to the Court of Appeals." (emphasis supplied)
We particularly and especially object to the return of the case to the Court of Appeals if the
Supreme Court "finds" the legal conclusions in the certification "to be wrong." This incident
will never come to pass if section 34 is correctly construed that is, as we construe it
for, the Supreme Court will acquire jurisdiction over the case from the very inception and
can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully completed the exercise of its
jurisdiction, do justice in the case.
8 .
ACCORDINGLY, this Court directs that, henceforth, should the Court of Appeals be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) should be
imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is
less than reclusion perpetua, the said Court, with a comprehensive written analysis of the
evidence and discussion of the law involved, render judgment expressly and explicitly
imposing the penalty of either death or reclusion perpetua as the circumstances warrant,
refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record
thereof to this Court for review.
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1. p. 173, CFI record.

2. The Tenth Division was composed at the time of Justices Ramon C. Fernandez, Ricardo
C. Puno, and Sixto A. Domondon, with Justice Puno as the ponente, pp. 107-108, of rollo.
3. p. 127, ibid.

4. The Court of Appeals was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 3. Abolished in 1945
under Executive Order No. 37 issued by the President of the Philippines, the appellate
court was recreated under R.A. No. 52 upon the inauguration of the Philippine Republic.
See Moran on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 14.
5. Formerly 145-K, Revised Administrative Code, later adopted in Section 34, RA 296,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948.

6. 79 Phil. 612.
7. pp. 617-619, ibid.

8. ibid., pp. 620-629.

9. Art. VIII, Sec. 2(4), 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Sec. 5, subsec. 2(d), 1973 Constitution.

10. Art. VIII, Sec. 1, 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Sec. 1, 1973 Constitution.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com

 11. formerly 145-K Revised Administrative Code and Sec. 34, Judiciary Act of 1948.
12. Section 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court.

13. Section 2, Rule 36, ibid.

14. tsn, Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 14-16.

15. tsn, December 23, 1965, pp. 43-57.

16. pp. 18-19, Appellant's brief.

17. tsn December 9, 1965, pp. 24-25.

18. pp. 25-27, ibid.

19. pp. 30-31, ibid.

20. tsn. December 23, 1965, p. 59.

21. tsn. December 9, 1965, p. 35.

22. Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, May 14, 1878, 5 Viada, 5th ed., page 224, pt. 8,
cited in People v. Momo, 1931, 56 Phil. 86, 87.

23. 57 SCRA 320, 328.

24. See People v. Garcines, 1974, 57 SCRA 653.

25. See pp. 165-166, CFI record.

CASTRO, C.J., concurring:

1. People vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 612.

2. Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 95, quoting Escriche, Diccionario de

Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, Vol. 3, p. 743, ed. 1875.
3. See U.S. vs. Laguna, 17 Phil. 532: "The requirement that the Supreme Court pass upon a
case in which capital punishment has been imposed by the sentence of the trial court is
one having for its object. . . the protection of the accused. Having received the highest
penalty which the law imposes, he is entitled under that law to have the sentence and all
the facts and circumstances upon which it is founded placed before the highest tribunal
of the land to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and conclusively
determined."

4. Dirige vs. Biranya, 17 SCRA 840.

5. People vs. Soria, 22 SCRA 948; Ago vs. CA, 6 SCRA 530; 49 C.J.S. p. 222.

6. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (RA 296) was amended by Republic Acts Nos. 431, 643, 644,
843, 859, 1186, 1404, 1605, 1914, 1963, 1969, 2613, 2682, 2696, 2718, 2875, 3067, 3084,
3086, 3087, 3090, 3114, 3327, 3599, 3632, 3749, 3828, 4057, 4134, 4235, 4322, 4533,
4644, 4728, 4769, 4798, 4814, 4821, 4833, 4838, 4892, 5052, 5064, 5067, 5075, 5084,
5103, 5107, 5116, 5126, 5129, 5135, 5140, 5147, 5204, 5277, 5296, 5341, 5382, 5389,
5433, 5440, 5468, 5479, 5675, 6031, 6092, 6157, 6159, 6263, 6264, 6439, 6445, and
6546, and by Presidential Decrees Nos. 204, 289, 363, 411, 411-A, 506, 516, 537, 722,
723, 827, 974, 1130, 1439, 1482, and 1600.
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com
 7. 79 Phil. 612, at p. 616.

* Justice Felix V. Makasiar was then the Solicitor General who filed the brief for the People
in this Court.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2016 cdasiaonline.com