THIRD DIVISION

BPI FAMILY BANK, G.R. No. 123498

Petitioner,
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

AMADO FRANCO and COURT OF Promulgated:

APPEALS,
Respondents. November 23, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Banks are exhorted to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous
care and utmost fidelity. We reiterate this exhortation in the case at bench.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the

Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 43424 which affirmed with
modification the judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
55, Manila (Manila RTC), in Civil Case No. 90-53295.

This case has its genesis in an ostensible fraud perpetrated on the petitioner
BPI Family Bank (BPI-FB) allegedly by respondent Amado Franco (Franco) in
conspiracy with other individuals,[3] some of whom opened and maintained
separate accounts with BPI-FB, San Francisco del Monte (SFDM) branch, in a
series of transactions.
 On August 15, 1989, Tevesteco Arrastre-Stevedoring Co., Inc. (Tevesteco)
opened a savings and current account with BPI-FB. Soon thereafter, or on August
25, 1989, First Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC) also opened a time deposit
account with the same branch of BPI-FB with a deposit of P100,000,000.00, to
mature one year thence.

Subsequently, on August 31, 1989, Franco opened three accounts, namely, a

current,[4] savings,[5] and time deposit,[6] with BPI-FB. The current and savings
accounts were respectively funded with an initial deposit of P500,000.00 each,
while the time deposit account had P1,000,000.00 with a maturity date of August
31, 1990. The total amount of P2,000,000.00 used to open these accounts is
traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco allegedly in consideration of Francos
introduction of Eladio Teves,[7] who was looking for a conduit bank to facilitate
Tevestecos business transactions, to Jaime Sebastian, who was then BPI-FB
SFDMs Branch Manager. In turn, the funding for theP2,000,000.00 check was
part of the P80,000,000.00 debited by BPI-FB from FMICs time deposit account
and credited to Tevestecos current account pursuant to an Authority to Debit
purportedly signed by FMICs officers.

It appears, however, that the signatures of FMICs officers on the Authority

to Debit were forged.[8] On September 4, 1989, Antonio Ong,[9] upon being shown
the Authority to Debit, personally declared his signature therein to be a forgery.
Unfortunately, Tevesteco had already effected several withdrawals from its current
account (to which had been credited the P80,000,000.00 covered by the forged
Authority to Debit) amounting to P37,455,410.54, including the P2,000,000.00
paid to Franco.

On September 8, 1989, impelled by the need to protect its interests in light

of FMICs forgery claim, BPI-FB, thru its Senior Vice-President, Severino
Coronacion, instructed Jesus Arangorin[10] to debit Francos savings and current
accounts for the amounts remaining therein. [11] However, Francos time deposit
account could not be debited due to the capacity limitations of BPI-FBs
computer.[12]

In the meantime, two checks[13] drawn by Franco against his BPI-FB current
account were dishonored upon presentment for payment, and stamped with a
notation account under garnishment. Apparently, Francos current account was
garnished by virtue of an Order of Attachment issued by the Regional Trial Court
of Makati (Makati RTC) in Civil Case No. 89-4996 (Makati Case), which had been
filed by BPI-FB against Franco et al.,[14] to recover the P37,455,410.54
representing Tevestecos total withdrawals from its account.

Notably, the dishonored checks were issued by Franco and presented for
payment at BPI-FB prior to Francos receipt of notice that his accounts were under
garnishment.[15] In fact, at the time the Notice of Garnishment dated September 27,
1989 was served on BPI-FB, Franco had yet to be impleaded in the Makati case
where the writ of attachment was issued.

It was only on May 15, 1990, through the service of a copy of the Second
Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 89-4996, that Franco was impleaded in
the Makati case.[16] Immediately, upon receipt of such copy, Franco filed a Motion
to Discharge Attachment which the Makati RTC granted on May 16, 1990. The
Order Lifting the Order of Attachment was served on BPI-FB on even date, with
Franco demanding the release to him of the funds in his savings and current
accounts. Jesus Arangorin, BPI-FBs new manager, could not forthwith comply
with the demand as the funds, as previously stated, had already been debited
because of FMICs forgery claim. As such, BPI-FBs computer at the SFDM
Branch indicated that the current account record was not on file.

With respect to Francos savings account, it appears that Franco agreed to an

arrangement, as a favor to Sebastian, whereby P400,000.00 from his savings
account was temporarily transferred to Domingo Quiaoits savings account, subject
to its immediate return upon issuance of a certificate of deposit which Quiaoit
needed in connection with his visa application at the Taiwan Embassy. As part of
the arrangement, Sebastian retained custody of Quiaoits savings account passbook
to ensure that no withdrawal would be effected therefrom, and to preserve Francos
deposits.

On May 17, 1990, Franco pre-terminated his time deposit account. BPI-FB
deducted the amount of P63,189.00 from the remaining balance of the time deposit
account representing advance interest paid to him.

These transactions spawned a number of cases, some of which we had

already resolved.

FMIC filed a complaint against BPI-FB for the recovery of the amount
of P80,000,000.00 debited from its account.[17] The case eventually reached this
Court, and in BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. First Metro Investment
Corporation,[18] we upheld the finding of the courts below that BPI-FB failed to
exercise the degree of diligence required by the nature of its obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care. Thus, BPI-FB was found liable to
FMIC for the debited amount in its time deposit. It was ordered to
pay P65,332,321.99 plus interest at 17% per annum from August 29, 1989 until
fully restored. In turn, the 17% shall itself earn interest at 12% from October 4,
1989until fully paid.

In a related case, Edgardo Buenaventura, Myrna Lizardo and Yolanda Tica

(Buenaventura, et al.),[19] recipients of a P500,000.00 check proceeding from
theP80,000,000.00 mistakenly credited to Tevesteco, likewise filed suit.
Buenaventura et al., as in the case of Franco, were also prevented from effecting
withdrawals[20] from their current account with BPI-FB, Bonifacio Market, Edsa,
Caloocan City Branch. Likewise, when the case was elevated to this Court
docketed as BPI Family Bank v. Buenaventura,[21] we ruled that BPI-FB had no
right to freeze Buenaventura, et al.s accounts and adjudged BPI-FB liable
therefor, in addition to damages.

Meanwhile, BPI-FB filed separate civil and criminal cases against those
believed to be the perpetrators of the multi-million peso scam. [22] In the criminal
case, Franco, along with the other accused, except for Manuel Bienvenida who was
still at large, were acquitted of the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under
Article 351, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. [23] However, the civil
case[24] remains under litigation and the respective rights and liabilities of the
parties have yet to be adjudicated.

Consequently, in light of BPI-FBs refusal to heed Francos demands to

unfreeze his accounts and release his deposits therein, the latter filed on June 4,
1990 with the Manila RTC the subject suit. In his complaint, Franco prayed for the
following reliefs: (1) the interest on the remaining balance [25] of his current account
which was eventually released to him on October 31, 1991; (2) the balance [26] on
his savings account, plus interest thereon; (3) the advance interest [27] paid to him
which had been deducted when he pre-terminated his time deposit account; and (4)
the payment of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees.

BPI-FB traversed this complaint, insisting that it was correct in freezing the
accounts of Franco and refusing to release his deposits, claiming that it had a better
right to the amounts which consisted of part of the money allegedly fraudulently
withdrawn from it by Tevesteco and ending up in Francos accounts. BPI-FB
asseverated that the claimed consideration of P2,000,000.00 for the introduction
facilitated by Franco between George Daantos and Eladio Teves, on the one hand,
and Jaime Sebastian, on the other, spoke volumes of Francos participation in the
fraudulent transaction.

On August 4, 1993, the Manila RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered

in favor of [Franco] and against [BPI-FB], ordering the latter to pay to the former
the following sums:

1. P76,500.00 representing the legal rate of interest on the amount

of P450,000.00 from May 18, 1990 to October 31, 1991;

2. P498,973.23 representing the balance on [Francos] savings account as

of May 18, 1990, together with the interest thereon in accordance with the banks
guidelines on the payment therefor;

3. P30,000.00 by way of attorneys fees; and

4. P10,000.00 as nominal damages.

The counterclaim of the defendant is DISMISSED for lack of factual and

legal anchor.

Costs against [BPI-FB].

SO ORDERED.[28]

Unsatisfied with the decision, both parties filed their respective appeals
before the CA. Franco confined his appeal to the Manila RTCs denial of his claim
for moral and exemplary damages, and the diminutive award of attorneys fees. In
affirming with modification the lower courts decision, the appellate court decreed,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification ordering [BPI-FB] to pay [Franco] P63,189.00
representing the interest deducted from the time deposit of plaintiff-
appellant. P200,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, deleting the award of nominal damages (in view of the award of moral
and exemplary damages) and increasing the award of attorneys fees
from P30,000.00 to P75,000.00.

Cost against [BPI-FB].

 SO ORDERED.[29]

In this recourse, BPI-FB ascribes error to the CA when it ruled that: (1)
Franco had a better right to the deposits in the subject accounts which are part of
the proceeds of a forged Authority to Debit; (2) Franco is entitled to interest on his
current account; (3) Franco can recover the P400,000.00 deposit in Quiaoits
savings account; (4) the dishonor of Francos checks was not legally in order; (5)
BPI-FB is liable for interest on Francos time deposit, and for moral and exemplary
damages; and (6) BPI-FBs counter-claim has no factual and legal anchor.

The petition is partly meritorious.

We are in full accord with the common ruling of the lower courts that BPI-
FB cannot unilaterally freeze Francos accounts and preclude him from
withdrawing his deposits. However, contrary to the appellate courts ruling, we
hold that Franco is not entitled to unearned interest on the time deposit as well as
to moral and exemplary damages.

First. On the issue of who has a better right to the deposits in Francos
accounts, BPI-FB urges us that the legal consequence of FMICs forgery claim is
that the money transferred by BPI-FB to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that
it was able to recover possession of the same when the money was redeposited by
Franco, it had the right to set up its ownership thereon and freeze Francos
accounts.

BPI-FB contends that its position is not unlike that of an owner of personal
property who regains possession after it is stolen, and to illustrate this point, BPI-
FB gives the following example: where Xs television set is stolen by Y who
thereafter sells it to Z, and where Z unwittingly entrusts possession of the TV set to
X, the latter would have the right to keep possession of the property and preclude Z
from recovering possession thereof. To bolster its position, BPI-FB cites Article
559 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is

equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been
unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same.
 If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner
cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

BPI-FBs argument is unsound. To begin with, the movable property

mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a specific or determinate
thing.[30] A determinate or specific thing is one that is individualized and can be
identified or distinguished from others of the same kind.[31]

In this case, the deposit in Francos accounts consists of money which, albeit
characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible.[32] The quality of being
fungible depends upon the possibility of the property, because of its nature or the
will of the parties, being substituted by others of the same kind, not having a
distinct individuality.[33]

Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been
unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current
possessor, BPI-FB simply claims ownership of the equivalent amount of
money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly debited from FMICs
account and credited to Tevestecos, and subsequently traced to Francos account.
In fact, this is what BPI-FB did in filing the Makati Case against Franco, et al. It
staked its claim on the money itself which passed from one account to another,
commencing with the forged Authority to Debit.

It bears emphasizing that money bears no earmarks of peculiar

ownership,[34] and this characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case
which involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary function is
to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its
title.[35] Money, which had passed through various transactions in the general
course of banking business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.

Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is not a specific or determinate personal

property, BPI-FBs illustrative example, ostensibly based on Article 559, is
inapplicable to the instant case.

There is no doubt that BPI-FB owns the deposited monies in the accounts of
Franco, but not as a legal consequence of its unauthorized transfer of FMICs
deposits to Tevestecos account. BPI-FB conveniently forgets that the deposit of
money in banks is governed by the Civil Code provisions on simple loan or
mutuum.[36] As there is a debtor-creditor relationship between a bank and its
depositor, BPI-FB ultimately acquired ownership of Francos deposits, but such
ownership is coupled with a corresponding obligation to pay him an equal amount
on demand.[37] Although BPI-FB owns the deposits in Francos accounts, it cannot
prevent him from demanding payment of BPI-FBs obligation by drawing checks
against his current account, or asking for the release of the funds in his savings
account. Thus, when Franco issued checks drawn against his current account, he
had every right as creditor to expect that those checks would be honored by BPI-
FB as debtor.

More importantly, BPI-FB does not have a unilateral right to freeze the
accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds therein were
proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly involved in. To
grant BPI-FB, or any bank for that matter, the right to take whatever action it
pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived from shady transactions, would
open the floodgates of public distrust in the banking industry.

Our pronouncement in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v. Court of

Appeals[38] continues to resonate, thus:

The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world

and plays a vital role in the economic life of every civilized nation. Whether as
mere passive entities for the safekeeping and saving of money or as active
instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous
presence among the people, who have come to regard them with respect and even
gratitude and, most of all, confidence. Thus, even the humble wage-earner has not
hesitated to entrust his lifes savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they
will be safe in its custody and will even earn some interest for him. The ordinary
person, with equal faith, usually maintains a modest checking account for security
and convenience in the settling of his monthly bills and the payment of ordinary
expenses. x x x.

In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the
utmost fidelity, whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of
millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down to the
last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to
reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he
sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever directs. A
blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of the check without good
reason, can cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not also financial loss
and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
 The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of
the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
their relationship. x x x.

Ineluctably, BPI-FB, as the trustee in the fiduciary relationship, is duty

bound to know the signatures of its customers. Having failed to detect the forgery
in the Authority to Debit and in the process inadvertently facilitate the FMIC-
Tevesteco transfer, BPI-FB cannot now shift liability thereon to Franco and the
other payees of checks issued by Tevesteco, or prevent withdrawals from their
respective accounts without the appropriate court writ or a favorable final
judgment.

Further, it boggles the mind why BPI-FB, even without delving into the
authenticity of the signature in the Authority to Debit, effected the transfer
of P80,000,000.00 from FMICs to Tevestecos account, when FMICs account
was a time deposit and it had already paid advance interest to FMIC. Considering
that there is as yet no indubitable evidence establishing Francos participation in
the forgery, he remains an innocent party. As between him and BPI-FB, the latter,
which made possible the present predicament, must bear the resulting loss or
inconvenience.

Second. With respect to its liability for interest on Francos current account,
BPI-FB argues that its non-compliance with the Makati RTCs Order Lifting the
Order of Attachment and the legal consequences thereof, is a matter that ought to
be taken up in that court.

The argument is tenuous. We agree with the succinct holding of the

appellate court in this respect. The Manila RTCs order to pay interests on
Francos current account arose from BPI-FBs unjustified refusal to comply with
its obligation to pay Franco pursuant to their contract of mutuum. In other words,
from the time BPI-FB refused Francos demand for the release of the deposits in
his current account, specifically, from May 17, 1990, interest at the rate of 12%
began to accrue thereon.[39]

Undeniably, the Makati RTC is vested with the authority to determine the
legal consequences of BPI-FBs non-compliance with the Order Lifting the Order
of Attachment. However, such authority does not preclude the Manila RTC from
ruling on BPI-FBs liability to Franco for payment of interest based on its
continued and unjustified refusal to perform a contractual obligation upon
demand. After all, this was the core issue raised by Franco in his complaint before
the Manila RTC.

Third. As to the award to Franco of the deposits in Quiaoits account, we

find no reason to depart from the factual findings of both the Manila RTC and the
CA.

Noteworthy is the fact that Quiaoit himself testified that the deposits in his
account are actually owned by Franco who simply accommodated Jaime
Sebastians request to temporarily transfer P400,000.00 from Francos savings
account to Quiaoits account.[40] His testimony cannot be characterized as hearsay
as the records reveal that he had personal knowledge of the arrangement made
between Franco, Sebastian and himself. [41]

BPI-FB makes capital of Francos belated allegation relative to this

particular arrangement. It insists that the transaction with Quiaoit was not
specifically alleged in Francos complaint before the Manila RTC. However, it
appears that BPI-FB had impliedly consented to the trial of this issue given its
extensive cross-examination of Quiaoit.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of

evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings
as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise
these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after
judgment; but failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these
issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is now within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended
and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and
the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the amendment to be made. (Emphasis supplied)

In all, BPI-FBs argument that this case is not the right forum for Franco to
recover the P400,000.00 begs the issue. To reiterate, Quiaoit, testifying during the
trial, unequivocally disclaimed ownership of the funds in his account, and pointed
to Franco as the actual owner thereof. Clearly, Francos action for the recovery of
his deposits appropriately covers the deposits in Quiaoits account.
 Fourth. Notwithstanding all the foregoing, BPI-FB continues to insist that
the dishonor of Francos checks respectively dated September 11 and 18, 1989 was
legally in order in view of the Makati RTCs supplemental writ of attachment
issued on September 14, 1989. It posits that as the party that applied for the writ of
attachment before the Makati RTC, it need not be served with the Notice of
Garnishment before it could place Francos accounts under garnishment.

The argument is specious. In this argument, we perceive BPI-FBs clever

but transparent ploy to circumvent Section 4, [42] Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. It
should be noted that the strict requirement on service of court papers upon the
parties affected is designed to comply with the elementary requisites of due
process. Franco was entitled, as a matter of right, to notice, if the requirements of
due process are to be observed. Yet, he received a copy of the Notice of
Garnishment only on September 27, 1989, several days after the two checks he
issued were dishonored by BPI-FB on September 20 and 21, 1989. Verily, it was
premature for BPI-FB to freeze Francos accounts without even awaiting service of
the Makati RTCs Notice of Garnishment on Franco.

Additionally, it should be remembered that the enforcement of a writ of

attachment cannot be made without including in the main suit the owner of the
property attached by virtue thereof. Section 5, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that no levy or attachment pursuant to the writ issued x x x
shall be enforced unless it is preceded, or contemporaneously accompanied, by
service of summons, together with a copy of the complaint, the application for
attachment, on the defendant within the Philippines.

Franco was impleaded as party-defendant only on May 15, 1990. The

Makati RTC had yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of Franco when BPI-
FB garnished his accounts.[43] Effectively, therefore, the Makati RTC had no
authority yet to bind the deposits of Franco through the writ of attachment, and
consequently, there was no legal basis for BPI-FB to dishonor the checks issued by
Franco.

Fifth. Anent the CAs finding that BPI-FB was in bad faith and as such liable
for the advance interest it deducted from Francos time deposit account, and for
moral as well as exemplary damages, we find it proper to reinstate the ruling of the
trial court, and allow only the recovery of nominal damages in the amount
of P10,000.00. However, we retain the CAs award of P75,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
 In granting Francos prayer for interest on his time deposit account and for
moral and exemplary damages, the CA attributed bad faith to BPI-FB because it
(1) completely disregarded its obligation to Franco; (2) misleadingly claimed that
Francos deposits were under garnishment; (3) misrepresented that Francos
current account was not on file; and (4) refused to return the P400,000.00 despite
the fact that the ostensible owner, Quiaoit, wanted the amount returned to Franco.

In this regard, we are guided by Article 2201 of the Civil Code which
provides:

Article 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the
obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and
probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have
foreseen or could have reasonable foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall
be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the
non-performance of the obligation.(Emphasis supplied.)

We find, as the trial court did, that BPI-FB acted out of the impetus of self-
protection and not out of malevolence or ill will. BPI-FB was not in the corrupt
state of mind contemplated in Article 2201 and should not be held liable for all
damages now being imputed to it for its breach of obligation. For the same reason,
it is not liable for the unearned interest on the time deposit.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it
partakes of the nature of fraud.[44] We have held that it is a breach of a known duty
through some motive of interest or ill will. [45] In the instant case, we cannot
attribute to BPI-FB fraud or even a motive of self-enrichment. As the trial court
found, there was no denial whatsoever by BPI-FB of the existence of the accounts.
The computer-generated document which indicated that the current account was
not on file resulted from the prior debit by BPI-FB of the deposits. The remedy
of freezing the account, or the garnishment, or even the outright refusal to honor
any transaction thereon was resorted to solely for the purpose of holding on to the
funds as a security for its intended court action, [46] and with no other goal but to
ensure the integrity of the accounts.
 We have had occasion to hold that in the absence of fraud or bad
[47]
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded; and that the adverse result of an action
does not per se make the action wrongful, or the party liable for it. One may err,
but error alone is not a ground for granting such damages. [48]

An award of moral damages contemplates the existence of the following

requisites: (1) there must be an injury clearly sustained by the claimant, whether
physical, mental or psychological; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award for
damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code.[49]

Franco could not point to, or identify any particular circumstance in Article
2219 of the Civil Code,[50] upon which to base his claim for moral damages.

Thus, not having acted in bad faith, BPI-FB cannot be held liable for moral
damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code for breach of contract. [51]

We also deny the claim for exemplary damages. Franco should show that he
is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages before the court may
even consider the question of whether exemplary damages should be awarded to
him.[52] As there is no basis for the award of moral damages, neither can exemplary
damages be granted.

While it is a sound policy not to set a premium on the right to litigate, [53] we,
however, find that Franco is entitled to reasonable attorneys fees for having been
compelled to go to court in order to assert his right. Thus, we affirm the CAs
grant of P75,000.00 as attorneys fees.

Attorneys fees may be awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or

incur expenses to protect his interest,[54] or when the court deems it just and
equitable.[55] In the case at bench, BPI-FB refused to unfreeze the deposits of
Franco despite the Makati RTCs Order Lifting the Order of Attachment and
Quiaoits unwavering assertion that theP400,000.00 was part of Francos savings
account. This refusal constrained Franco to incur expenses and litigate for almost
two (2) decades in order to protect his interests and recover his deposits. Therefore,
this Court deems it just and equitable to grant Franco P75,000.00 as attorneys
fees. The award is reasonable in view of the complexity of the issues and the time
it has taken for this case to be resolved. [56]
 Sixth. As for the dismissal of BPI-FBs counter-claim, we uphold the Manila
RTCs ruling, as affirmed by the CA, that BPI-FB is not entitled to
recover P3,800,000.00 as actual damages. BPI-FBs alleged loss of profit as a
result of Francos suit is, as already pointed out, of its own making. Accordingly,
the denial of its counter-claim is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of

Appeals Decision dated November 29, 1995 is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of unearned interest on the time deposit and
of moral and exemplary damages is DELETED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
 ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (retired
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Portia Alino Hormachuelos, concurring; rollo, pp. 40-55.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 70-79.
[3]
Antonio T. Ong, Manuel Bienvenida, Jr., Milagros Nayve, Jaime Sebastian, Ador de Asis, and Eladio
Teves. Rollo, pp. 160-207. RTC, Quezon City, Branch 85, Decision in Crim. Case No. Q91-22386.
[4]
Account No. 840-107483-7.
[5]
Account No. 1668238-1.
[6]
Account No. 08523412.
[7]
President of Tevesteco.
[8]
BPI-FBs Memorandum, rollo, pp. 104-105.
[9]
Executive Vice-President of FMIC.
[10]
The new BPI-FB SFDM branch manager who replaced Jaime Sebastian.
[11]
BPI-FBs Memorandum, rollo, p. 105.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Respectively dated September 11 and 18, 1989. The first check dated August 31, 1989 Franco issued in
the amount of P50,000.00 was honored by BPI-FB.
[14]
Supra note 3. The names of other defendants in Crim. Case No. Q91-22386.
[15]
Franco received the Notice of Garnishment on September 27, 1989, but the 2 checks he had issued were
presented for payment at BPI-FB on September 20 & 21, 1989, respectively.
[16]
Francos Memorandum, rollo, p. 137.
[17]
Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-5280 and entitled First Metro Investment Corporation v.
BPI Family Bank.
[18]
G.R. No. 132390, May 21, 2004, 429 SCRA 30.
[19]
Officers of the International Baptist Church and International Baptist Academy in Malabon,
Metro Manila.
[20]
The checks issued by Buenaventura et al. were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
[21]
G.R. No. 148196, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 431.
[22]
Supra note 3.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 160-208.
[24]
The Makati Case for recovery of the P37,455,410.54 representing Tevestecos total withdrawals wherein
Franco was belatedly impleaded, and a Writ of Garnishment was issued on Francos accounts.
[25]
P450,000.00.
[26]
The reflected amount of P98,973.23 plus P400,000.00 representing what was transferred to Quiaoits
account under their arrangement
[27]
P63,189.00.
[28]
CA rollo, p. 79.
[29]
Rollo, p. 54.

[30]
See Article 1460, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code. A thing is determinate when it is particularly designated
or physically segregated from all others of the same class.
[31]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. IV, 1985, p. 90.
[32]
See Article 418 of the Civil Code, taken from Article 337 of the Old Civil Code which used the words
fungible or non-fungible.
[33]
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. II, 1983, p. 26.
[34]
United States v. Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147, 158 (1914).
[35]
Id.
[36]
Article 1980 of the Civil Code: Fixed, savings, and current deposits of money in banks and similar
institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning loan. See Article 1933 of the Civil Code.
[37]
Article 1953 of the Civil Code: A person who receives a loan of money or any other fungible thing
acquires the ownership thereof, and is bound to pay the creditor an equal amount of the same kind and quality.
[38]
G.R. No. 88013, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 360, 366-367.
[39]
See Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78, 95.
[40]
TSN, July 30, 1991, p. 5.
[41]
Id. at 5-11.
[42]
SEC. 4. Papers required to be filed and served. Every judgment, resolution, order, pleading
subsequent to the complaint, written motion, notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment or similar papers shall
be filed with the court, and served upon the parties affected.
[43]
See Sievert v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-84034, December 22, 1988, 168 SCRA 692, 696.
[44]
Board of Liquidators v. Heirs of Maximo Kalaw, et al., 127 Phil. 399, 421 (1967).
[45]
Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 123 Phil. 256, 264-265 (1966).
[46]
CA rollo, p. 74.
[47]
Suario v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 50459, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 688, 696;
citing Guita v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 576, 580 (1985).
[48]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, G.R. No. 149454, May 28, 2004, 430
SCRA 261, 293-294.
[49]
United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ramos, 461 Phil. 277, 298 (2003); citing Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
v. Spouses Vazquez, 447 Phil. 306 (2003).
[50]
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also
recover moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brother and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of
this article, in the order named.
[51]
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
[52]
Article 2234 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show that
he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may consider the question of whether or
not exemplary damages should be awarded. In case liquidated damages have been agreed upon, although no proof
of loss is necessary in order that such liquidated damages may be recovered, nevertheless, before the court may
consider the question of granting exemplary in addition to the liquidated damages, the plaintiff must show that he
would be entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages were it not for the stipulation for liquidated
damages.
[53]
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, supra note 48, at 296.
[54]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208, par. (2).
[55]
CIVIL CODE, Art. 2208, par. (11).
[56]
Ching Sen Ben v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 544, 555 (1999).