FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 5270. January 15, 1910.]

THE UNITED STATES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . H. N. BULL , defendant-

appellant.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE WAR, TREATIES, AND TO

ACQUIRE TERRITORY; STATUS OF ACQUIRED TERRITORY. The Constitution confers
upon the United States the power to make war and treaties, and to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, but does not
become a part of the United States until formally incorporated therein by Congress.
Until this is done, it is the duty of Congress to provide all needful rules and regulations
for its government, and in legislating with reference thereto, Congress is limited only by
those provisions of the Constitution which go to the very root if its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place.
2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE AND
CHARACTERISTICS. The Government of the Philippine Islands is not that of a State or
a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into
the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not on the inhabitants of the Philippines and the Philippine Government.
3. ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS ORGANIC LAWS. For
its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looks to the
orders of the President before Congress acted, and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed
will of the President and Congress, instead of the sovereign constituency which lies
back of American constitutions.
4. ID.; A COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISM WITH THE USUAL
DEPARTMENTS. Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is
a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments
exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments.
5. ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT. The legislative power
delegated to the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms, subject to
specific limitations. The grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but
to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.
6. ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS. An act of the legislative authority
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 of the Philippine Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its
enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic law.
7. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION BY CONGRESS OF POWER TO SUSPEND ACTS
UNTIL APPROVED. The reservation by Congress of the power to suspend valid Acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature, does not operate to suspend such Acts
until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid Acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled.
8. ID.; ID.; POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE. The power to
regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States it may regulate foreign commerce with such
territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through the legislative body created by it,
to which its power in that respect is delegated. Congress has not, except in certain
specific instances, legislated directly upon the subject, but, by the grant of general
legislative power, it has authorized the Government of the Philippines to enact laws
with reference to matters not covered by the Acts of Congress, and report its action to
Congress for approval or disapproval. The limitations upon the power of the
Commission or Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries.
9. ID.; ID.; ACT NO. 55. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over
the control of the Islands and was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
Amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The Military Government and the Civil
Government instituted by the President had the power, whether it be called legislative
or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
territory. The Act passed in furtherance of this power has remained in force since its
enactment, without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to
have met with its approval.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND CREWS OF SHIPS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS.
When a foreign merchant ship enters territorial waters, the ship's officers and crew are
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, subject to such limitations only as
have been conceded by the territorial sovereign through the proper political agencies.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS ON SHIPS. The offense of
failing to provide suitable means for securing animals while transporting them on a ship
from a foreign port to a port of the Philippine Islands is within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Philippines when the forbidden conditions existed during the time the ship
was within territorial, regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT NO. 55. In a prosecution
under Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, the information need not allege that the
court was sitting at a port where the cattle were actually disembarked. The allegation in
the information that an act was done willfully includes the allegation that it was done
knowingly.

DECISION

ELLIOTT , J : p

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 The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the
judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of
error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts suf cient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in
violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as
applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insuf cient to support the
conviction.
The information alleges:
"That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the
said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port, to wit, the
port of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that
the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about
the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongfully carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677)
head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then
and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means
for tying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there
cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their
noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the
deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding;
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of
said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission."
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient
forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals
during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of
shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours
from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation."
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding
to section 1 thereof the following:
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so
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 as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from
vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary
suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon of from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to
the horns."

Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that

"Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall,
for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecutions under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked."
1. It is contended that the information is insuf cient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the
offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of
the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such
animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136,
which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act
No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.
S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province into which such ship or water craft upon which the offense or
crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of
the jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by
the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States.
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila
Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
(Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bon ls, Le Droit Int., sec. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the
violation of the statute continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel
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 was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure
in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done
within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that
jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has
complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal
right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ships of all friendly powers. The exemption of such
vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within
comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-
General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the
commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the
country into which he comes." (1, Op. U. S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late
as 1820. In the leading case of The Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U. S.),
116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels
enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from
jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality."
The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that
"the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law
of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle
of courtesy and mutual deference between nations." (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252
and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, 2. C. X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local of cials exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crews are justiciable by their own of cers acting under the laws to
which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and nds its
justi cation in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-
being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the
same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-de ned theories as
to the extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them. According to the French
theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern
the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
courts of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in
foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bon ls, Le Droit Int.
(quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de
la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been
admitted or claimed by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it
by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act,
1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to
restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says
that
"It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of
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 merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they
become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the
country are touched." (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities,
unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements
consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2
Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.)
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of The Exchange, said that
"When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to
continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country."
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and
this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman,
c92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article
13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the
United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consuls, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as
may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation
whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly
to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee,
168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events
which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one
member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may
have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the
local authorities.

In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a
"quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galvestion, Texas. They were prosecuted
before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by
the Government to take necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the
aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of
similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian
charge, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879
the mate of the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of
Philadelphia Country for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying
in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.),
363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State
Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count
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 Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
"I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration
in connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of
the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden
and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are
those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing
out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offenses for which the
party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
"This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of
such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls in
conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such
differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such
differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent
for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local
laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty
which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such
cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the
procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact
there has been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the
complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against
the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p.
315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against
another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a
fair and reasonable construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation
of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to do with any difference between the captain and
the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into who
port he came. We thus nd that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the courts of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is
claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the
appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very
strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the
language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which
the animals are brought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.

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 It is also contended that the information is insuf cient because it fails to allege
that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The
allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation
that it was committed knowingly. As said in Wood house vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company
(67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an
act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with
knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The rst one is that the complaint did not show,
in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of.
This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondents counsel-that the words
'willfully' and 'knowingly ' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies
that it was done by design-don for a set purpose; and I think that it would necessarily
follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94
III., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but
his defense rests upon the assertion that "according" to his experience, the system of
carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was
done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it
is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or
public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It need not
necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce
judgment according to right. A complaint which compile with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.)
The Act, which is in the English language, imposes upon the master of a vessel
the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to
avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the
complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully
carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . .
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold
of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that he language of the Spanish text of the information
does not charge him with failure to provide "suf cient" and "adequate" means. The
words used are "medios su cientes " and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that
the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is
translatable by the words "adecuado," " suficiente," and " conveniente," according to the
context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in
view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the
animals."
2. The appellant's argument against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and
the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of
the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and omissions
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 incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the
Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs
vs. People (Colo.), 11 L.R.A., N.S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the
Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the
principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of
the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.

The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war
and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard
against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being
questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV. sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of territory by the United States, and until it is formally
incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon
Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local
government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U.S., 194 U.S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has
provided such governments for territories which were within the Union and for newly
acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and
judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with
which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of
the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the
Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by
its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton,
11 Otto (U.S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has
delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary
for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annual the action of
the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 138; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within
such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into
contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people
that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 289.) In legislating
with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182
U.S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197; Dorr vs.
U.S., 195 U.S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 516.)
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 This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the
United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the
acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of
1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not
locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized
territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United
States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands, (Sec.
1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United
States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above stated. The city of
Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military
commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands.
The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
persons and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by
proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military
governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of
December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish eet and
the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands
and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace
the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the period of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace
was rati ed, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Nogueras,
214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the President
as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized
a civil government, which, however, had its legal justi cation, like the purely military
government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the
President embraced legislative, executive, and judicial functions, all of which he might
exercise personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As
stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901
"The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens
that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all
three of these different powers-the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions
prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determinations of right; and of
executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined."
President Mckinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly
as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government
was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the
approval of the President, "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as
should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or Congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of
rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs
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 duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands;
the establishment of an educational system throughout the Islands; the establishment
of a system to secure an ef cient civil service; the organization and establishment of
courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and department governments,
and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to
provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to
the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain speci c restrictions for the protection of individual
rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was
"not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The speci c restrictions
upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excursive nes
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment in icted; that no person shall be put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a
punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or expost facto law shall be passed; that
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided
that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . .
shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and
shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for
the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the
inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion,"
Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the of ce of Civil Governor was created, and the executive
authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred
to that of cial. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President
as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the
Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress
assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with
the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.

The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form of government
which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation,
and approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all
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 the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act not the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of
the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the of ce of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and
rati ed. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after
the rati cation of the treaty of peace was also rati ed and approved by Congress. (Act
of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S.,
197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all
statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of
the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be
transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses-the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the
United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although
its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the
constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The
authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United
States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different
parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the
Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts
of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally
and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular
sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power to
legislate upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when
it exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal
equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to
some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not
a member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to exercise much
control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in
the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive
he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges.
In instituting this form of government the intention must have been to adopt the
general constitutional doctrines which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the
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 Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress
must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted.
The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must
determine the validity of legislature enactments, as well as the legality of all private and
of cial acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the
Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the
protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act
of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the
States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central governments.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an
Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains
a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid
unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its inaction. An
act of the legislative authority of the Philippine Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered
by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the
organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general
terms subject to speci c limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that speci c authority is conferred upon the Philippine
Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself
legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not
as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See
Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U.S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by
the Government of the Philippines tends strongly to con rm the view that for purposes
of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of
general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress
from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily
understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they
met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby
reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,
sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines
until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U.S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether
the Legislature has been expressly or by implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3,
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 Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operates only upon the States of the
Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to
regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with
such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by
it, to which its power in this respect is delegated. Congress has by direct legislation
determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines,
and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the
needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other speci c
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its
general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved
power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do
not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign
countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of
March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the
territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.),
73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other
action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are
therefore satis ed that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by
Act No. 275, is valid.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning

of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question
which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain
cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence: amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence:
"That the defendant, H.N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian
steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to
the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and
carabaos from Chinese and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
"That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and
captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large
number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay,
and within the jurisdiction of this court; an that fifteen of said cattle then and
there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken
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 legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as
aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so
transported aboard said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and
into the city of Manila, without any provision being made whatever upon said
decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable
condition and position for such transportation.
"That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle aboard
steamships coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by was
of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and
supports at the front, sides, and rear thereof, and cross cleats upon the floor on
which they stand and are transported, so that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without
slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account of transportation in
the manner in which said animals or cattle were transported in this case. Captain
Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman,
has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system
for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever
during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf,
that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or
common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred
cattle without supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can be safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the
decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One
animal falling or pitching, if he is united or unprotected, might produce a serious
panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the
manner found in this case."
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a ne of two hundred and
fty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

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