1

Bennett
Christopher Bennett
Urban Studies 137: Final Paper
Microfinance for Housing & Collective Land Purchase: Evaluating a Novel Strategy

More than 1 billion people live in slums worldwide, and inhabitants of these
blighted urban environments are often unable to access the credit needed to improve their
habitat or to move elsewhere.i Microfinance institutions have developed financial
products collectively know as microfinance for housing (MFH) to fill this gap. Yet MFH
is far from scale, in large part due to substantial legal and political hurdles within the land
sector. Land tenure and titling is often ambiguous in slums, and when tenants face
constant threat of eviction it signals they are less than credit-worthy.ii Since the evidence
on whether formal titling can remedy the situation is mixed, new innovations are needed.
This paper evaluates one- collective land purchase- by first extending the existing
literature on group versus individual liability to the world of MFH. Just as Grameen’s
joint liability scheme improves the prospect of uncollateralized loans, collective purchase
through trusts and cooperative might decrease collateral and risk barriers. Through case
studies from Nairobi, Kenya, I evaluate the extent to which self-organized collective land
purchases by poor slum-dwellers have succeeded- both for lending institutions and for the
land-buying cooperatives and trusts that relocate. I argue that while collective purchase
has clear benefits- it transforms individually insolvent borrowers into a collectively
solvent organization and offers benefits beyond those of household-level MFH loans- it is
still hamstringed by three substantial challenges: incomplete settlement, tenure security,
and unfavorable regulation. I conclude by suggesting ways in which lessons learned in
group lending might enhance the success of this strategy in the future.
Microfinance for Housing
Significance
The one billion people living in slums are trapped in blighted urban environments
that lack access to even the most basic of services, such as toilets, sewers, water taps,
electricity, health clinics, and primary schools.iii Families in this so-called ‘bottom
billion’ must contend with overflowing sewers, contaminated and expensive water,
expensive and dirty indoor cooking and lighting fuels, and overcrowded public schools
miles away. Microfinance for housing (MFH) is a subset of microfinance offered to meet
the housing needs of these poor households who want to either improve their existing
houses or to move to a new settlement and yet do not meet the requirements of the formal
banking sector. In “Micro-finance of housing: a key to housing the low or moderate-
income majority,” Bruce Ferguson describes the three reasons that households in
developing markets are typically ineligible for traditional household finance products.
First, traditional mortgages require collateral, yet most households have only para-legal
proof of ownership or none at all.iv Second, mortgages require regular monthly periods
over a series of several months, yet this is poorly suited to low-income households that
are often self-employed, have variable income, and face crises that absorb much of their
short-term income.v Third, existing financial institutions gain profit only from large
mortgages, and so have no incentive to make the smaller loans appropriate for low-
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income households. The bottom billion is the most obvious target market for MFH
products, but they are not the only ones who qualify. Slightly wealthier households-
dubbed the ‘missing middle,’- are also candidates for MFH; they range from well-to-do
households in slums to commercially subdivided neighborhoods in sprawling developing
cities. These households require a mortgage loan of modest size and medium duration,
yet the size of these loans is often below the traditional threshold of profitability.vi

MFH Products
There are a few salient differences between MFH loans and traditional micro-
enterprise finance (MEF). One is that the amount of the MFH loans is higher and the
payback time is much longer. Typically, they consist of small mortgage loans in the range
of $300-$4,000 for home improvement.vii Yet loans offered to wealthier households,
dubbed ‘mini-mortgates’, are much higher. Smaller loans are generally short to mid-term,
in the range of 3-36 months, while larger loans can take up to 10 years to repay. Because
of the larger risk and more substantial relationship involved in these loans, MFIs have
developed innovative ways of screening lenders. One strategy is to only allow clients to
take out an MFH loan once they have graduated from a certain number of regular loans;
for example, Grameen started offering them some years ago as a reward for successful
repayment of MEF loans. Another strategy is to require a mandatory savings or payroll
deduction program to reduce risk.

Scale
While traditional housing finance comes only from banks, MFH can also come
from MFIs, non-government organizations (NGOs), cooperatives, credit unions, and non-
banking financial institutions (NBFIs).viii Organizationally, they run the gamut from MFIs
like FINCA, Grameen, SEWA, and Accion, to Foundations like Jamii Bora in Kenya,
Banks like CARD in the Phillipines, and NBFIs like Finamerica in Colombia. There are
few accurate estimates of MFH’s global scale. Merrill et al. reports based on a 2005-6
survey that ACCION’s MFH loans were the largest of any organization, at some $117
million. However, many other organizations had a higher percent of their portfolios as
housing loans; in the case of SEWA, it was 27%.ix If the one billion figure referenced
early is a rough benchmark for demand, then supply is currently an order of magnitude
behind. Like microfinance as a whole, MFH faces substantial barriers to scale; these
include limited information and capacity on loan products as well as broader capital
market failures.x MFH must operate within the context of the shelter sector, however, and
therefore relies upon the availability of legitimate land and infrastructure- a significant
and unique barrier. The rest of the paper explores this last challenge in depth.

Shelter Sector Barriers

Land Security and Credit Worthiness
In the vast majority of the developing world, the urban poor as well as large
subsets of the middle class do not have access to secure land provided by either the public
or formal private sectors; this scarcity has increased the attractiveness of informal land
procurement strategies, from squatting to illegal commercial land subdivision in slums.xi
In turn, this insecurity generates detrimental effects on the credit-worthiness of the poor.
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The availability of land and the security of the title is a major impediment to MFH from
the perspective of both the lending institution and the mortgage borrowers. For lenders,
land insecurity signals a lack of collateral as well as uncertainty that the borrower will be
willing to repay and invest in the future in property.xii After all, if the owner of the
property might be evicted or have his home demolished at any moment, what incentive
does the lender have to approve their loan? From the perspective of the borrower, land
insecurity exercises a substantial chilling effect on housing development, improvement,
and the development of home-based enterprises.xiii Because these tenants realize that their
situation is transient, they are reluctant to invest in it. DeSoto argues that a lack of legal
title detracts from the wealth of the poor directly by restricting their ability to leverage
their own assets.xiv
Evaluating Land Titling
So what can be done to remedy this situation and make land more secure? The
prevailing viewpoint, held by the World Bank and other major international institutions,
follows from DeSoto’s argument, and stresses the importance of de jure tenure
formalization through delivery of real individual property rights and private sector
development.xv DeSoto claims that simply extending formal land titling will increase
collateral, thereby improving the ability of the poor to leverage their own assets and
receive credit. xvi Yet the question of whether or not titling increases either access or
credit-worthiness is an empirical one, and the evaluation of its success so far is at best
inconclusive. G. Payne, et al. find that the evidence is “thin and mixed,” and that
perversely, titling often causes higher rates of evictions as rents rise and low-income
tenants are forced to leave the area.xvii Regarding credit, Durand-Lasserve, et al. conduct a
literature review of existing evaluations of titling impact and conclude that “access to
formal mortgage credit has not increased” in any case study.xviii They hypothesize that
although titling results in an efficiency gain by creating collateral, lenders are still
reluctant to lend if they value the location, such as the slum, over the inhabitant. Perhaps
the most persuasive evidence comes from Torrero and Field (2006), who evaluate Peru’s
distribution of 1.2 million property titles in a national urban titling program. They find
that the odds of a household obtaining a loan did not increase after titling, and that a “full
34% of titled households remain fully rationed out of the formal credit market.”xix Why is
this the case? One explanation is that formal approaches like titling often ignore existing
government policies that govern informal uses of land. These informal rules often
determine the actual way in which land transactions and dispute occur.xx Another is that
formalization programs often challenge local culture or tradition and backfire. In sum,
these mixed results do not suggest that property titling is useless; merely that it is
insufficient to remedy the substantial collateral and risk problems hamstringing MFH.
Group versus Individual Liability
Foundational Literature
If land titling is an insufficient strategy to confront the issues of loan collateral
and risk, what might work instead? In this section I return to the hallmark innovation of
micro-enterprise loan products: group lending. In his 1990 article “Peer Mentoring and
the Credit Markets,” Joseph Stiglitz suggests that this strategy is the key innovation that
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has allowed the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh to achieve such high financial
performance. The signature Grameen group lending innovation involves lending to self-
organized groups of around five farmers, who then become mutually responsible for
repaying the loan. Stiglitz argues that this innovation reduces informational barriers and
enhances incentives by exploiting the local knowledge of members of the group – a
strategy he dubs peer monitoring.xxi Although this strategy effectively transfers risk from
the lender to the borrowers, he finds that “the gains from peer monitoring more than
offset the loss in expected utility from the increased risk-bearing.”xxii In 1999, Ghatak and
Guinnane broaden the success of this strategy beyond peer monitoring and conduct an
economic analysis of joint-liability lending institutions as a whole. They argue that joint-
liability can perform the “apparent miracle of giving solvency to a community composed
almost entirely of insolvent individuals” because the innovation effectively addresses the
four major hurdles that confront lenders: adverse selection, moral hazard, auditing costs,
and enforcement.xxiii In turn, they find that joint liability mechanisms “achieve better
screening to contend with adverse selection, encourages peer monitoring to reduce moral
hazard, gives group members incentives to enforce the repayment of loans, and reduces
the lender’s audit costs for cases where some group members claim not to be able to
repay.”xxiv In short, these joint-liability mechanisms correct the collateral and risk barriers
that had earlier stood in the way of solvency.
More Recent Research
Most recently, Rai, et al. find that joint or group liability alone, however, is
insufficient to efficiently induce borrowers to assist each other. They suggest that cross
reporting, a ‘message game’ in which borrowers can report back to the bank at village
meetings, increases the effective bargaining power of lenders and guarantees that group
members assist each other.xxv This mechanism was built into the classical group lending
innovation that Grameen first piloted, although has not been incorporated in all later
iterations. These evaluations of the success of group liability are all either theoretical,
employing an economic model, or quasi-experimental. Karlan, et al. is currently in the
early stages of evaluating the success of group versus individual liability in the
Philippines using a randomized control trial methodology. Karlan tracks the expansion of
Green Bank, which offers both group-liability loan plans and individual liability plans.
The pilot phase is based on preliminary data drawn from 93 loaning centers; it suggests
that there is no significant difference in repayment between group and individual
programs, and that individual programs actually attract more clients.xxvi Like many of the
randomized control trials taking place in the world of microfinance today, however, these
early results are subject to a small time horizon and so should be taken lightly.
Extending Group Liability to MFH
Even if group liability does not currently pass a rigorous experimental litmus test,
the economic literature certainly echoes the success of this innovation. Yet what might
group liability’s applicability be to the world of microfinance for housing? In the
remainder of this paper, I introduce and evaluate one parallel opportunity- collective land
purchases. Unlike formal interventions like titling, collective land purchase is a ‘hybrid’
strategy. This means that it involves both the formal purchase of a large tract of land, and
then employs an informal sub-division of that land among the members of the housing
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cooperative or trust who have relocated. This hybrid strategy functions as follows:
individuals come together and pool their financial resources for the purpose of buying
land according to what they can contribute, often supported by finance for low-income
housing. The amount of capital that they contribute determines the number of shares they
receive, and eventually the proportion of the land they receive; this allows even the very
poor to become a member.xxvii This sort of purchase takes place through one of two
entities: cooperatives, which are legal entities but not collectively owned, and trusts,
which are. In either case, the comparison to the original group lending is fairly obvious.
Rather than individual loans, trusts and cooperatives pool their financial resources in
order to purchase land collectively. This mirrors the transfer of risk that Stiglitz
introduced, and implies peer monitoring and mutual responsibility. Like Ghatak and
Guinnane discuss, this strategy transforms insolvent households in slums into a
collectively solvent cooperative that can take on risk and collateral. So although
collective land purchases take place in a different sector and on a different scale than
MEF group lending, this strategy satisfies the conditions of group liability.
The Strategy in Action: Collective Land Purchase in Nairobi, Kenya
Context of Case Study
Although a theoretical evaluation of the success of group liability schemes
indicates that the strategy is promising, that conclusion would be hasty without empirical
grounding. Thankfully, collective land purchase has already occurred within the
developing world, where communities of the urban poor are self-organizing into land-
buying cooperatives and trusts. In this section, I provide context on Nairobi, Kenya and
introduce the six cases of collective land purchase (and in one case, relocation) that Bob
Hendriks presents in “The social and economic impacts of peri-urban access to land
secure tenure for the poor: the case of Nairobi, Kenya,” (2008).
Nairobi is home to nearly ¼ of the population of Kenya, and is one of the most
densely populated cities in sub-Saharan Africa, at some 3,079 person per square
kilometer.xxviii The existing crowdedness of the city is exacerbated b a large influx of
population from the rural countryside; in turn, some 250,000 new units are required each
year to keep pace with the growth. The Government of Kenya’s National Housing
Corporation (NHC) and Housing Finance Company of Kenya (HFCK) are the two
government bodies charged with developing affordable housing projects, yet they have
not done so since the early 1990s because of limited funding.xxix The decline of public
funding has traced the rise of private funds. Over 95% of the residential structures in
Kenya are built and financed through the private sector, yet these services are typically
offered only to formal-sector workers with audited statements. Naturally, there has been a
huge overflow of unmet demand for shelter. This has evolved into the rapid development
of large informal settlements and slums. By many estimates more than half of Nairobi’s
population lives in these areas, and the largest- Kibera- has over half a million
residents.xxx Because these environments are spontaneous, they are highly irregular-
without planning, infrastructure, basic services, and of course, formal title.
Naturally, residents of these insecure and volatile environments are looking for
any way possible to relocate to more favorable shelter. Because land and infrastucture is
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scarce to non-existent within
Nairobi itself, the poor have taken
the rather innovative approach of
purchasing land in peri-urban
environments within the range of
25-65 kilometers outside of the
city. Hendriks elucidates six of
these planned or actual relocation
attempts to new and more secure
peri-urban land. Two of the
organizations, Bellevue Housing
Cooperative (BHC) and the
Original Wapenda Afya Bidii
Women’s Group (OWAB), are
housing cooperatives organized
among the rural poor. The
remaining four organizations-
Ghetto Saving Scheme (GSS), Toi
Market Savings Scheme (TMSS),
Kaputei New Town (KNT), and
Shanglia Baba Na Mama (SBNM)-
are trusts. Many of the
organizations listed are composed
Figure 1: Locations of the 6 Case of a shared ethnic identity, and one
of Studies them- OWAB- is only for women.
They range in membership from only 48 membership households in the case of OWAB
to 10,000 active members in the case of SBNM. Finally and crucially, only one of the
case studies- BHC- has actually relocated to its intended location. The six organizations’
proposed peri-urban sites are visible in Figure 1.
Evaluation
These case studies provide an exceptionally useful test for whether group liability
schemes in MFH work well. The first and simpler question is whether or not these
strategies improved the solvency of the urban poor who participated. In short, does
collective land purchase correct the problem of collateral and riskiness? The results are
unambiguous; in all of the six case studies that Hendriks presents, we see financial
investment by micro-finance institutions, NGOs, or the affordable housing sector. In two
cases, Kaputiei New Town and Shangilia Baba Na Mama, a combination of savings,
loans from the affordable housing sector and funding from trusts- such as Jamii Bora-
provided the investment needed to acquire the land.xxxi In the Bellevue Housing
Cooperative and the Wapenda Womens’ Group, affordable loans were paired directly
with micro-finance loans. In the last two cases, the Toi Market Savings Scheme and
Ghetto Savings Scheme, savings and loans from the affordable housing sector sufficed
for funding. Much like the joint-liability schemes in MEF, this strategy successfully used
the power of joint liability to change previously insolvent clients into solvent ones.
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From the perspective of the members rather than institutions, there are additional
benefits beyond those of traditional MFH. While individual liability MFH loans keep
borrowers in the same slum environment they started off in, collective land purchases
offer the possibility for a new slate. Members who do eventually relocate to peri-urban
areas receive far more secure and serviced shelter. All members necessarily receive a
share certificate- an informal guarantor of their right to live on the land- and due to the
security of the collective land deed, no longer face the risk of eviction. Compared to the
lack of clean water, electricity, sewage and basic services that they earlier received, in all
existing proposals members gain substantial service improvements such as bathrooms,
electricity, and tap water. Kaputei New Town presents a good example of the vision for a
sustainable and prosperous community. KNT’s innovative plan for an eco-friendly
community includes residential neighborhoods, commercial, cultural, and social centers,
and a wetlands wastewater recycling facility.xxxii
Despite the proven success of this strategy in garnering funding and the potential
benefits to members, the collective land purchase strategy faces three significant barriers
to future success- whether in Kenya or in other environments. The first is incomplete
settlement- the fact that plans for relocation might not fully or ever transpire. The second
is tenure security- as hybrid systems might not actually deliver secure property rights.
The third is regulation within the shelter sector, which when unfavorable might totally
preclude the possibility of collective land purchase strategies.
1. Incomplete Settlement
The promise of future benefits is a double-edged sword, for members can only
realize them if relocations actually occur. For all six of the communities studied, the
relocation process has been extraordinarily drawn out and difficult. Among the six cases
that Hendriks presents, total delivery time from land acquisition to settlement ranges
“from three years to eight years, and in one case up to twelve years.”xxxiii As mentioned
earlier, only one of the organizations- BHC- relocated, and it took them three years. In all
of the other cases it has taken upward of six years. There are different reasons for the
delay, from extended legal battles over community design (KNT) to land use and
regulation disputes (OWAB) to changes in the sense of urgency for relocation
(SBNM).xxxiv Even if relocation does eventually takes place, another threat is the
possibility of decay of community due to a lack of income-generating opportunities if the
community is too far from economic opportunity. Some of the communities chose to
relocate near to a main road so have opportunities to create a market area, hotel, and gas
station for visitors.xxxv However empirically, tenants in the only relocated community-
BHC- generated the majority of their income simply renting out rooms to other tenants.
In turn, BHC has decreased in size over time, as some 63 members- 45% of the total-
stayed for some time before leaving the community.xxxvi
2. Tenure Security
Bellevue Housing Cooperative- the only case we can reasonably evaluate-
relocated in 1997, and yet not a single member has since received an “individual formal
title deed.”xxxvii Formally, this strategy did not increase tenure security. In informal terms,
the benefits are still unclear. Share certificates- the informal guarantees of ownership
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contingent on completion of loans- were purchased by 29% of residents. For those who
chose not to pay for the guarantee, they still experienced far more security in the
relocated areas than in the slums through the presence of a collective title deed and trust
between members.xxxviii Although titling has ambiguous effects, as it does not necessarily
guarantee an increase in assets, it is undoubtedly an important legal document that is
useful in future transactions, renting, and relocation. The fact that BHC has yet to
formally improve the tenure security of any of its members, and informally does so on a
marginal basis, is a significant shortcoming.
3. Shelter Sector Regulation
Kenya is a relatively unique case in the flexibility of its informal system and its
free-market orientation. For example, the land acquisition process used by trusts and
cooperatives relies upon the ability to transfer secure collective tenure to informal
individual share certificates. Each of these share certificates, then, may eventually be
converted into formal individual tiles in principles of the loan.xxxix This legal environment
is simply infeasible in many other developing, and especially African, nations, in which
property rights are underdeveloped and subject to political tampering. Ato Onoma
reminds us that political rulers often benefit from insecure and informal property rights
systems that enhance their own interests.xl Even Kenya’s history bears witness to past
abuse, which reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s under the corrupt leadership of
President Moi. Moi and his political elites used their power to “aggressively undermine
property rights institutions,” and it was only after reformers came to power in 2002 that
proper rules were restored.xli Therefore, when informal regimes are widespread and
reinforced by political power, it is unlikely that flexible schemes like collective land
purchase can succeed. Consider two such cases. In Benin, land tenure has remained based
almost solely on informal, customary land law, and in turn expropriation and possession
without title have become the norm.xlii Kenya’s neighbor Tanzania, meanwhile, has
abused emerging land markets by capturing gain from land market transactions. New
land reforms are ‘hollow’, and prevent residents of peri-urban Dar es Salaam from
receiving either title or enforcement for relocation.xliii
Improving the Strategy
If collective land purchase has theoretical promise but comes up short in practice,
how might the strategy be improved? Incomplete settlement and tenure security might
simultaneously be improved by increasing the incentive of individual members to follow
through with their commitments. Group liability in the world of micro-enterprise finance
offers a glimpse of how that might be achieved. Stiglitz’ study suggested that joint
liability in micro-enterprise finance only functioned efficiently in small groups. Small
groups increased the risk of a single member’s default but not by too much, and avoided
the free-rider and default problems that might occur in a larger group.xliv At larger
numbers, risk simply becomes two large and the peer monitoring effects too diffuse. This
suggests that although the strategy of collective land purchase is correct, the scale of joint
liability is off. In Hendriks’ case studies, we see a much larger range, from 50-10,000
members. The results of default and free riding are obvious in the one case of relocation.
The Bellevue Housing Corporation relocation failed to induce 39 of the 139 members to
ever relocate- some 25%- while another 45% of the total group relocated but eventually
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moved out. This indicates that many members who contributed to the upfront savings
necessary for relocation either did so incompletely or never at all due to perverse
incentives. I suggest that a middle ground between large-scale cooperatives and small-
scale group lending might be more effective. For example, larger housing cooperatives
could divide up the larger community of members into sub-communities that would
mutually reinforce loan repayment within a smaller group setting. This would bring both
the efficiency gains that come in small group lending as well as the large-scale
organization that is needed to carry out a collective land purchase.
This strategy is not without precedent, as MEF cooperatives already employ dual
group levels in order to improve joint liability. For example in Kenya’s Jehudi scheme,
there are both small ‘watano’ borrowing groups within the larger association or KIWA.xlv
Another variation of this approach is to apply the principle of co-signing; like group
liability schemes, this strategy creates an incentive to monitor the actions of the other
individuals who have signed the loan.xlvi Co-signing is not entirely foreign to the world of
MFH. Merrill notes that in addition to membership in savings groups, MFH loan products
are often only extended with co-signers.xlvii Again, sub-sets of the larger member
community could co-sign together as a part of the collective land purchase. In both of
these cases, smaller groups or co-signers ought to be carefully picked with attention to
whether they know each other and interact on a regular basis.xlviii Confusion over liability
in poorly designed groups is already an issue in MEF finance, and these strains would be
heightened when relocation is involved.
These strategies could improve the joint liability mechanisms of collective
purchase programs. However, they would not necessarily solve the structural and
regulatory impediments that might still hold back the strategy- such as regulatory delays
impeding relocation and problems converting shares to formal title. Likewise, scalability
is a significant challenge that is not easily addressed by any one strategy. A favorable
political and regulatory environment might be a necessary prerequisite for the types of
hybrid strategies that collective land purchase necessitates. Even given these constraints,
there are promising opportunities to facilitate the process elsewhere and in future
iterations. The most substantial of these is the potential for organizations to partner
directly with trusts or cooperative during the land purchase process. NGOs or even MFIs
could assist with strategic land buying and selection process on behalf of cooperatives
and trusts, help to execute contracts between these organizations and private sector
business, and provide infrastructure grants.xlix A good example of this is Jamii Bora Trust.
Putting aside the legal battles that have prevented rapid implementation, this organization
helped to organize the largest and undoubtedly most impressive of these relocation plans.
There is a major opportunity for local and national support organizations to assist the
cooperatives and trusts with the financial and legal legwork involved in this process,
thereby accelerating relocation wherever it is feasible.
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Endnotes
i
Merrill, 1
ii
Hendriks, 38
iii
Ibid., 39
iv
Ferguson, 186
v
Ibid., 187
vi
Merrill, 6
vii
Ibid., 3
viii
Merrill, 2
ix
Merrill et al., 5
x
Merrill, 9
xi
Hendriks, 1
xii
Merrill, 9
xiii
Hendriks, 38
xiv
De Soto, 7
xv
Hendriks, 29
xvi
De Soto, 7
xvii
Payne et al., 138
xviii
Durand-Lasserve et al., 5
xix
Field and Torero, 27
xx
Hendriks, 30
xxi
Stiglitz, 353
xxii
Stiglitz, 372
xxiii
Ghatak et al., 196-7; quote is from Plunkett (1904)
xxiv
Ghatak et al., 225
xxv
Rai et al., 219
xxvi
Karlan et al., 37
xxvii
Hendriks, 32
xxviii
Brown et al., 4
xxix
Brown et al., 7
xxx
Brown et al., 9
xxxi
Hendriks, 34
xxxii
http://www.acumenfund.org/investment/jamii-bora.html
xxxiii
Hendriks, 42
xxxiv
Hendriks, 42
xxxv
Hendriks, 49
xxxvi
Hendris, 46
xxxvii
Hendriks, 45
xxxviii
Hendriks, 46
xxxix
Hendriks, 33
xl
Onoma, 206
xli
Onoma, 174
xlii
Woodman et al., 94
xliii
Woodman et al., 296
xliv
Stiglitz, 361
xlv
Ghatak et al., 219
xlvi
Stiglitz, 362
xlvii
Merrill, 3
xlviii
Ghatak et al., 217
xlix
Hendriks, 60
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