IN THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STEPHEN FRIDAY,
Petitioner and Appellant, No. _______
v. Related Appeal
SUPERIOR COURT OF MONTEREY, No. H032863
Respondent
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Monterey
Real Party in Interest Superior Court
No. SS041854

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

RELATED APPEAL PENDING

TO THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES

OF THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL:

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of mandate to the Superior Court

of the County of Monterey and alleges as follows:
1. This petition for a peremptory writ of mandate is filed in connection with the
related pending appeal in People v. Friday, Court of Appeal No. H032863.
Petitioner respectfully requests this Court to take judicial notice of the record filed
in the related appeal. References infra to a courts transcript (CT) or reporters
transcript (RT) are to the record in No. H032863.
2. On January 16, 2008, after being advised that, if he pleaded guilty, he would
receive a sentence of four years in prison if a motion to dismiss the prior
conviction allegation should be denied, or two years if it should be granted, and
that he would begin earning presentence credits from the day he began his parole
in 2005, petitioner changed his plea to no contest and admitted an allegation of a
prior conviction within the meaning of the Three Strikes law. (CT 185, 186, 190-
192.)

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3. The prosecutor said that she would verify the parole date and calculate the
credits. (CT 194.) She sent defense counsel a memorandum by facsimile on the
same day, January 16, 2008. It indicated that credits as of January 30, 2008,
would be based on 854 actual days. (CT 262.)
4. Petitioner believed that after application of presentence custody credits he
would either be released, having served his full sentence, or have very little
sentence left to serve. (CT 257.)
5. After learning that he would not receive the full presentence credit he expected,
petitioner on March 3, 2008, filed a motion to withdraw the plea. (CT 234.) That
motion was denied on April 16, 2008. (CT 248, 6RT 1505.)
6. Also on April 16, 2008, the court sentenced petitioner to four years in prison
(the low term of two years, doubled due to the strike), and granted presentence
custody credits of only 420 actual days plus 210 conduct credits. (CT 248.)
7. Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on April 21, 2008 and requested a
certificate of probable cause, based upon the motion to withdraw the plea. (CT
250.)
8. On May 5, 2008, the Superior Court denied the request for certificate of
probable cause. (CT 251.)
9. Respondent Superior Court abused its discretion by failing to issue a certificate
of probable cause. Petitioner stated a reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional or
other ground going to the legality of the proceedings to be challenged on appeal.
Petitioner has a clear, present and substantial right to the performance of
respondents duty to properly exercise its discretion by virtue of Penal Code1
section 1237.5. That section requires petitioner to seek a certificate of probable
cause and the court to grant it upon a proper showing.
10. Petitioner is the person beneficially interested in the issuance of the writ
because he is the appellant in People v. Friday, case number H032863, pending

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Further statutory references are to this Code unless otherwise noted.

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before this Court, in which he intends to raise issues going to the validity of his
plea and the judgment and sentence thereon.
11. The People of the State of California are the real party in interest. The People
have an interest directly affected by this proceeding in that they are the plaintiffs
and respondents in petitioners appeal.
12. Petitioner has performed all the conditions precedent to the filing of the
petition by requesting the Superior Court to issue the certificate of probable cause.
At all times herein mentioned, respondent has been able to properly exercise its
discretion by issuing the certificate but has refused to do so.
13. Petitioner has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law other than the relief sought herein in that a certificate of probable cause is
required by Penal Code section 1237.5 for an appeal attacking a judgment based
on a plea of guilty or no contest and has been denied by respondent.
14. This petition is made to this Court in the first instance rather than to the
Superior Court because that court is the respondent herein and the party that failed
to fulfill its responsibility.

WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that this court take judicial notice of the record in
Case No. H032863 and issue a peremptory writ of mandate ordering respondent to
issue a certificate of probable cause for petitioners appeal in Case No. H032863,
Monterey Superior Court Case No. SS0-41854.

Respectfully submitted,
By his attorney,

June 25, 2008 __________________

Maureen L. Fox

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 VERIFICATION

I, Maureen L. Fox, am the attorney for petitioner in his related appeal. I

have read the foregoing petition and know the contents thereof. The matters set
forth in the petition are true of my knowledge, except as to matters alleged on
information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct.
June 25, 2008 __________________
Maureen L. Fox

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 POINTS & AUTHORITIES

I. Mandate is the Proper Remedy for a Courts Failure to Issue a Certificate

of Probable Cause.

Review of an order denying an application in the trial court for a certificate

of probable cause is properly raised by a petition for a writ of mandate in the court
of appeal. (In re Brown (1973) 9 Cal.3d 679, 683 superseded by statute on another
point; People v Castelan (1995) 32 Cal. App.4th 1185, 1188.)

II. The Superior Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Issue a Certificate of
Probable Cause because Appropriate Grounds Going to the Legality of the
Proceedings were Presented in Petitioners Request.

A. A Certificate Of Probable Cause Is Properly Denied Only When The Issues

Raised Are Clearly Frivolous And Vexatious.

Section 1237.5 authorizes appeals based on reasonable constitutional,

jurisdictional or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings, provided
the defendant files a statement with the trial court showing such grounds and trial
court executes and files a certificate of probable cause. These requirements seek to
preclude appeals that raise no issues cognizable after a guilty plea or which are
clearly frivolous and vexatious. (In re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 650-651;
People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 75-76; People v. Hoffard (1995) 10
Cal.4th 1170, 1178-1179.)
In this respect, it is not the trial courts province to determine if there was
an error in the proceedings but simply to eliminate those appeals having no
possible legal basis. (People v. Warburton (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 815, 819.)
Thus if the statement submitted by the defendant in accordance with section
1237.5 presents any cognizable issue for appeal which is not clearly frivolous and
vexatious, the trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to issue a certificate of
probable cause. (People v. Holland (1978) 23 Cal.3d 77, 84, overruled on another
point in People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1097, fn. 7. Italics in original.)

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The trial court should issue the certificate if there is an honest difference of
opinion about the issue. Signing the certificate does not mean the trial court
believes the contention is meritorious. (People v. Ribero (1971) 4 Cal.3d 55, 63,
fn. 4.)

B. The Record Raises Legitimate And Cognizable Issues On Appeal As To

Whether Petitioner Should Be Allowed To Withdraw His Plea.

The issue of the denial of petitioners motion for leave to withdraw his plea,
raised in the request for certificate of probable cause, is cognizable on appeal and
is not frivolous or vexatious.
[A]n appeal should be held to be frivolous only when it is prosecuted
for an improper motive - to harass the respondent or delay the effect
of an adverse judgment - or when it indisputably has no merit - when
any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and
completely without merit.
(In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982) 31 Cal.3d 637, 650.)

Petitioners appeal is not of that nature.

A plea of guilty or no contest is valid if the record demonstrates the plea
was voluntarily and intelligently made. (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132,
1178; People v. Lytle (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.) The defendant's waiver of
constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences. (Brady v. United States (1970) 397 U.S. 742, 748.) A plea is
involuntary when induced by threats, misrepresentation, including unfulfilled or
unfulfillable promises or improper promises. (Brady, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 755.)
A guilty plea that is not made knowingly or intelligently is involuntary, and has
been obtained in violation of due process and cannot form the basis of a criminal
conviction. (Henderson v. Morgan (1976) 426 U.S. 637, 644-645; McCarthy v.
United States (1969) 394 U.S. 459, 466; U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.)

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 When a guilty plea is entered in exchange for specified benefits such as
the dismissal of other counts or an agreed maximum punishment, both parties,
including the state, must abide by the terms of the agreement. The punishment
may not significantly exceed that which the parties agreed upon. (People v.
Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1024.) A sentence that imposes a punishment
more severe than that specified in the plea bargain violates not only section 1192.5
but also implicates due process concerns and raises a constitutional right to some
remedy. (People v. Brown (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1221; People v. Walker,
supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1024.) Some pleas not coming within section 1192.5s
provision for plea bargaining may likewise present a danger of involuntary,
unintelligent, or inaccurate pleading. These pleas may have been at least
implicitly negotiated, as when the court provides the defense with an indicated
sentence. These pleas may present the same dangers of false pleading as explicit
plea bargains reached under section 1192.5. (People v. Hoffard, supra, 10 Cal.4th
at p. 1184, fn 12.)
Prior to petitioners change of plea, the court assured him that he would be
deemed as having started earning presentence custody credits from the time that he
began his parole. (CT 186.) The memorandum faxed by the prosecutor to defense
counsel on January 16, 2008, indicated that credits as of January 30, 2008, would
be based on 854 actual days. (CT 262.) That memorandum lends support to
petitioners position (CT 257) that, based on what he heard in court prior to his
guilty plea, he understood that he would receive substantially more than the 420
actual days of credit (630 days total) that he received at sentencing. (CT 248.)
Through a motion to withdraw the plea petitioner brought to the courts attention
the fact that, in changing his plea, he had relied on the courts assurance that he
would begin earning credits as of the day of his release on parole. (CT 234.) The
court denied that motion at the sentencing hearing. (6RT 1505.)
Where a defendant has entered a plea based upon an assurance by an officer
of the state and that assurance is not honored, and the matter is brought to the

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courts attention at the time of sentencing, the defendant is entitled to a remedy
that redress[es] the harm caused by the violation without prejudicing either party
or curtailing the normal sentencing discretion of the trial judge. (People v.
Mancheno (1982) 32 Cal.3d 855, 860, quoted in People v. Walker, supra, 54
Cal.3d at p. 1028.) Permitting petitioner to withdraw his plea would have that
effect.
Because the issue of the denial of petitioners motion for leave to withdraw
his plea is neither frivolous nor vexatious, a certificate of probable cause should
issue so that he may present this issue in his appeal. (See (In re Chavez, supra, 30
Cal.4th at p. 647; People v. Panizzon, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76; People v.
Ribero, supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 63.)

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, petitioner respectfully requests that this Court
issue a writ of mandate directing the trial court to grant his previously denied
request for a certificate of probable cause.
Respectfully submitted,
By his attorney,

June 25, 2008 __________________

Maureen L. Fox

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 WORD COUNT CERTIFICATION

I, Maureen L. Fox, counsel for appellant, certify pursuant to the California

Rules of Court, that the word count for this document is 2,089 words, excluding
the tables, this certificate, and any attachment permitted under the rules. This
document was prepared in Microsoft Word, and this is the word count generated
by the program for this document.
I certify under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Gatos, California, on June
23, 2008.

__________________
Maureen L. Fox
Attorney for Petitioner
Stephen Friday