CAP760 - Hazard & Risk

Safety Regulation Group
CAP 760
Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard

Identification, Risk Assessment and the
Production of Safety Cases
For Aerodrome Operators and Air Traffic Service Providers
www.caa.co.uk
Safety Regulation Group
CAP 760
Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard

Identification, Risk Assessment and the
Production of Safety Cases
For Aerodrome Operators and Air Traffic Service Providers
13 January 2006
CAP 760 Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and the Production of Safety Cases
Civil Aviation Authority 2006
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students, please contact the CAA at the address below for formal agreement.
ISBN 0 11790 495 3
First edition 13 January 2006
Enquiries regarding the content of this publication should be addressed to:

Air Traffic Standards Department, Safety Regulation Group, Civil Aviation Authority, Aviation House,
Gatwick Airport South, West Sussex, RH6 0YR.
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Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) on behalf of the UK Civil Aviation Authority.
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List of Effective Pages
Chapter Page Date Chapter Page Date
iii 13 January 2006 Appendix B 3 13 January 2006

iv 13 January 2006 Appendix B 4 13 January 2006
v 13 January 2006 Appendix B 5 13 January 2006
vi 13 January 2006 Appendix B 6 13 January 2006
Revision History 1 13 January 2006 Appendix B 7 13 January 2006
Foreword 1 13 January 2006 Appendix C 1 13 January 2006
Foreword 2 13 January 2006 Appendix C 2 13 January 2006
Glossary 1 13 January 2006 Appendix C 3 13 January 2006
Chapter 1 1 13 January 2006 Appendix C 6 13 January 2006
Chapter 1 2 13 January 2006 Appendix C 7 13 January 2006
Chapter 1 3 13 January 2006 Appendix D 1 13 January 2006
Chapter 3 1 13 January 2006 Appendix E 1 13 January 2006
Chapter 3 6 13 January 2006 Appendix F 1 13 January 2006
Chapter 3 9 13 January 2006 Appendix G 1 13 January 2006
Appendix A 1 13 January 2006 Appendix G 13 13 January 2006
Appendix A 2 13 January 2006
Appendix B 1 13 January 2006
Appendix B 2 13 January 2006
13 January 2006 Page iii

Contents
List of Effective Pages iii
Revision History 1
Foreword 1
Glossary 1
Chapter 1 System Lifecycle

Introduction 1
Planning for Safety 1
Feasibility and Concept - Safety Activities Early in a Project 1
Design and Development 2
Tender and Contract 3
System Realisation 3
Transition to Service 3
On-going Operation and Maintenance 4
Changes 5
Removing the System from Service/Decommissioning 5
Chapter 2 Risk Assessment and Mitigation - Introducing the

Seven-Step Process
Introduction 1
When Risk Assessment and Mitigation is Required 1
Summary of the Seven Steps 2
Chapter 3 The Seven-Step Risk Assessment and Mitigation Process
Step 1 System Description 1

Step 2 Hazard and Consequence Identification 2
Step 3 Estimation of the Severity of the Hazard Consequences 5
Step 4 Estimation/Assessment of the Likelihood of the Hazard
Consequences Occurring 8
Step 5 Evaluation of the Risk 9
Step 6 Risk Mitigation and Safety Requirements 11
Step 7 Claims, Arguments and Evidence that the Safety
Objectives and Safety Requirements Have Been Met
and Documenting this in a Safety Case 12
13 January 2006 Page iv

Appendix A Hazard Identification using Brainstorming
Introduction 1
Initial Planning 1
Preliminary Brainstorming (Scoping Brainstorm) 3
Preparation for Full Brainstorming 3
Preparing a Brainstorming Session 4
Conduct of the Brainstorming Session 5
After the Brainstorming Session 5
Appendix B Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
Introduction 1
The FMECA Process 1
Defining the System to be Analysed 3
Block Diagrams 3
Narrative Text 3
Defining Failure Modes 4
Performing the Analysis 4
Common Mode Failures 5
The FMECA Report 6
Updating the Hazard Log 6
Appendix C Hazard and Operability Studies
Introduction 1
Initial Planning 1
Preparation for the HAZOP Study 2
Planning a HAZOP Session 3
Breakdown of the HAZOP process 4
After the HAZOP Session 6
Appendix D Using Event Trees
Introduction 1
Example use of an Event Tree 1
Identifying Barriers and Mitigations Using Event Trees 2
Procedure for Event Tree Analysis 3
13 January 2006 Page v

Appendix E Diagrammatic Representation of Safety Arguments
Introduction 1
Goal Structured Notation - GSN 1
Example of Goal Structured Notation 5
Appendix F Hazard Logs
Introduction 1
Developing a Hazard Log 1
Appendix G Required Level of Confidence in Evidence
Introduction 1
Determining the Required Level of Confidence for Derived Safety
Requirements 1
Determining the Required Level of Confidence for Statutory Safety
Requirements 1
Accepted Evidence Levels and Sources 3
HIGH - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements 3
MEDIUM - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements 3
LOW - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements 3
Required Level of Confidence Tables 4
13 January 2006 Page vi

Revision History
1st Edition 13 January 2006

International and European standards have been revised in recent years to require the use of
Safety Management Systems and the production of Safety Cases by Air Traffic Management
organisations. This first edition of CAP 760 has been produced by the Aerodrome, Air Traffic
and Licensing Standards Division of the CAA Safety Regulation Group to assist air traffic
service providers and aerodrome operators to develop Safety Cases that meet the relevant
international standards thereby enabling them to gain regulatory approval for their services and
operations.
13 January 2006 Revision History Page 1

Foreword
1 Introduction
1.1 International regulations and standards1 require that any new system, procedure or
operation that has an impact on the safety of aerodrome operations or Air Traffic
Services (ATS) shall be subject to a risk assessment and mitigation process to support
its safe introduction and operation. Safety-significant changes to existing systems
must also be addressed in the same way. The result of the assessment should be
documented and this is typically achieved by developing a Safety Case. The term
'Safety Case' is used in respect of a set of one or more documents that include
claims, arguments and evidence that a system meets its safety requirements. A
Safety Case provides all the documentation and references necessary to
demonstrate, both to the operator themselves and to the CAA, that a new system or
a change to an existing system is tolerably safe and will meet specified Safety
Objectives.
1.2 This document is a consolidated reference addressing the development of a Safety
Case for the purposes of assuring the safety of ATS and aerodrome operations. It
should be noted that the concepts associated with a Safety Case are not unique to
the aviation environment, and similar requirements may be placed on aerodrome
operators and Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) for other purposes by other
regulatory bodies (for example by the Health and Safety Executive in relation to the
wellbeing of employees and other individuals).
1.3 This guidance is based on a seven-step safety assessment process defined in 'The
Manual of Safety Management for Air Traffic Services' presented at the ICAO 11th
Air Navigation Conference (Information Paper No.9). Other approaches may be taken
for hazard identification and risk assessment; ultimately, what is important is that the
Safety Case presents adequate evidence and argument to demonstrate that the new
system or change is tolerably safe.
1.4 The purpose of this document is to provide guidance to aerodrome operators and
ANSPs on the development of a Safety Case and, in particular, on hazard
identification, risk assessment and the mitigation techniques that may be used.
1.5 For conciseness, the terms 'system' and 'project' are used throughout this document
and should be considered to include the following constituents:
a) any equipment;
b) any procedure (e.g. operational procedure used by the aerodrome operator or air
traffic service provider or, alternatively, a maintenance procedure for related
equipment); and
c) the people involved.
1.6 During the life of a system or the development of a project there may be several
iterations of risk assessment and mitigation and updates to the Safety Case as more
detailed system design and performance information becomes available. The Safety
Case is, therefore, a 'living document' and should be developed along with the
lifecycle of the system. Work on the Safety Case should therefore begin when a
project is at its initial concept phase and the content should be added to as the project
progresses throughout its lifecycle through to its removal from service.
1. Including ICAO Annex 11 Air Traffic Services, Single European Sky Common Requirements and EUROCONTROL Safety
Regulatory Requirements (ESARRs).
13 January 2006 Foreword Page 1

1.7 International and nationally recognised standards may be applicable to certain types
of systems or equipment. The guidance contained within this document shall not be
used in place of any requirements and/or guidance contained in applicable standards.
The standards take precedence over the guidance contained within this document.
1.8 The international requirements concerning safety assessment of Air Traffic Service
and aerodrome operations are continually evolving. The CAA is keeping abreast of
such developments and are considering when to publish requirements and guidance
for the UK industry. For example, within 18 months from the publication of this initial
guidance, the CAA is planning to publish additional requirements and guidance that
further promote compliance with the Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirement
concerning Risk Assessment and Mitigation (known as ESARR4) or the embodiment
of ESARR4 into Single European Sky Common Requirements.
13 January 2006 Foreword Page 2

Glossary
Term or
Meaning
abbreviation
Accident An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight
until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which:
a) a person is fatally or seriously injured as a result of:
- being in the aircraft; or
- direct contact with any part of the aircraft, including parts which have
become detached from the aircraft; or
- direct exposure to jet blast;
except when the injuries are from natural causes, self-inflicted or inflicted
by other persons, or when the injuries are to stowaways hiding outside the
areas normally available to the passengers and crew; or
b) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure which:
- adversely affects the structural strength, performance or flight
characteristics of the aircraft; and
- would normally require major repair or replacement of the affected
component, except for engine failure or damage, when the damage is
limited to the engine, its cowlings or accessories; or for damage limited to
propellers, wing tips, antennas, tyres, brakes, fairings, small dents or
puncture holes in the aircraft skin; or
c) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practical A risk is low enough that attempting to

make it lower, or the cost of assessing the improvement gained in an
attempted risk reduction, would actually be more costly than any cost likely to
come from the risk itself.
AIS Aeronautical Information Service A service established within a defined

area of coverage responsible for the provision of aeronautical information and
data necessary for the safety, regulatory, and efficiency of air navigation.
ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider Any provider of:

a) Air Traffic Control (ATC) service;
b) Flight Information Service (FIS);
c) Air Traffic Advisory service;
d) Air Traffic Alerting service;
e) Aeronautical Information Service (AIS);
f) Meteorological service; or
g) Communications, Navigation or Surveillance (CNS) services.
ATC Air Traffic Control A service provided for the purpose of preventing collisions
between aircraft or between aircraft and obstructions (in the manoeuvring area)
and for the purpose of expediting and maintaining an orderly flow of air traffic.
Applicable safety The requirements for the provision of aerodrome and air traffic services or
regulatory facilities, applicable to the specific situation under consideration, concerning,
requirements inter alia:
a) technical and operational competence and suitability to provide the service
or facility;
b) systems and processes for safety management;
c) technical systems, their constituents and associated procedures.
13 January 2006 Glossary Page 1

Term or
Meaning
abbreviation
ATS Air Traffic Services The provision of air traffic control, flight information and/or
air-ground communications services.
CAE Claim Argument Evidence A graphical method to represent claims,

arguments and evidence.
Derived safety Those Safety Requirements that have been generated by undertaking a hazard
requirements identification and risk assessment process (as described in this guidance) on
the components of the system.
DRACAS Defect Reporting And Corrective Action System A formal procedure for
recording all system defects, analysing them and taking corrective action as
necessary.
ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement Material published by

EUROCONTROL for adoption by member states, containing safety
requirements covering a range of topics.
FIS Flight Information Service Non-radar service for the purpose of providing
information useful for the safe and efficient conduct of flights e.g. information
concerning weather, serviceability of facilities, conditions at aerodromes, etc.
FISO Flight Information Service Officer Person qualified to provide a discrete FIS
(i.e. not in association with an air traffic control service).
FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis A systematic hazard

identification and assessment methodology that sequentially identifies the
impact of a range of component failure scenarios on the system function.
GSN Goal Structured Notation A graphical method to represent claims,

arguments and evidence.
Hazard Any condition, event, or circumstance which could induce an accident.
HAZOP Hazard and Operability study A systematic functional hazard identification

process that uses an expert group to conduct a structured analysis of a system
using a series of guide words to explore potential hazards.
Incident An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an

aircraft which affects, or would affect, the safety of operation.
MOR Mandatory Occurrence Reporting Formal scheme for the national recording
and reporting of safety-significant incidents.
RFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
Risk A combination of the likelihood of an hazard occurring and the severity of the
accident that could result; e.g. the higher the risk, the more likely the accident
will occur and/or the more severe will be the consequence.
Risk assessment A process that for identified hazards, evaluates their risk in terms of probability
and severity of consequences.
Safety barriers Term used to indicate systems, sub-systems or methods used to reduce the
likelihood of a hazard escalating into an incident or accident, and/or reduce their
severity.
Safety The set of quantitative or qualitative criteria to be used in a safety assessment

assessment to determine the acceptability of the assessed level of safety.
criteria

Term or
Meaning
abbreviation
Safety case A documented body of evidence that provides a demonstrable and valid
argument that a system is adequately safe for a given application and
environment over its lifetime.
Safety case report A report that summarises the arguments and evidence of the Safety Case.
Safety objective The definition of a hazard together with its target maximum rate of occurrence.
A goal or target that, where achieved, demonstrates that a tolerable level of
safety is being, or will be achieved for the hazard concerned.
Safety Specified criteria of a system that are necessary in order to reduce the risk of
requirement an accident or incident to an acceptable level. Also a requirement that helps
achieve a Safety Objective.
Serious incident An incident involving circumstances that indicate that an accident nearly
occurred. Typical examples include:
- A near collision requiring an avoidance manoeuvre, or when an avoiding
manoeuvre would have been appropriate to avoid a collision or an unsafe
situation.
- Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) only marginally avoided.
- An aborted take-off on a closed or engaged runway, or a take-off from such
runway with marginal separation from obstacle(s).
- A landing or attempted landing on a closed or engaged runway.
- Gross failure to achieve predicted performance during take-off or initial
climb.
- All fires and smoke in the passenger compartment or in cargo
compartments, or engine fires, even though such fires are extinguished
with extinguishing agents.
- Any events which required the emergency use of oxygen by the flight crew.
- Aircraft structural failure or engine disintegration which is not classified as
an accident.
- Multiple malfunctions of one or more aircraft systems that seriously affect
the operation of the aircraft.
- Any case of flight crew incapacitation in flight.
- Any fuel state which would require the declaration of an emergency by the
pilot.
- Take-off or landing incidents, such as undershooting, overrunning or running
off the side of runways.
- System failures, weather phenomena, operation outside the approved flight
envelope or other occurrences which could have caused difficulties
controlling the aircraft.
- Failure of more than one system in a redundancy system which is
mandatory for flight guidance and navigation.
Statutory safety Those Safety Requirements applicable to a system that have been specified in
requirements Standards or by the CAA.
System Used to describe the collection of equipment, procedures and/or personnel

required to carry out a function.
TLS Target Level of Safety A safety objective defined as a tolerable accident rate
in terms of probability of an accident given a certain quantity of activity.
VCRI Verification Cross Reference Index A record detailing the system

requirements against the location of the evidence where the requirement is
proven to be met or how it is planned to prove the requirement.

Chapter 1 System Lifecycle
1 Introduction
1.1 Aerodrome and ATS projects commonly pass through a variety of phases during their
life from initial concept through to decommissioning. Safety needs to be planned for
and addressed in all of these phases although the depth of risk assessment will vary
depending upon the stage of the project and the degree of risk that exists. Performing
risk assessment early in the project can identify hazards that impact on the design of
the system. It is better that these hazards and their impact are identified early in a
project so that the system can be designed to take account of them, rather than
incurring expense trying to change a design or retrospectively to generate safety
assurance evidence later in a project. Also failure to update earlier safety analyses
with information that subsequently becomes available in later project phases may
invalidate the earlier analyses.
2 Planning for Safety
2.1 Planning for safety is as important a part of a project as planning for operational use.
Consideration should be given to developing a Safety Plan for a project detailing:
a) the scope of the project or system that is being considered (consider equipment,
procedures and people aspects);
b) the safety activities planned to be carried in the different project phases (see the
sections below);
c) when or at what stage in the project the safety activities will be carried out;
d) the staff responsible for contributing to the safety activities; and
e) the authority of staff e.g. having the authority to approve safety documentation or
having the authority to accept unresolved risks on behalf of the organisation etc.
2.2 Not only can a Safety Plan be used to enable the project to be completed efficiently
and without unexpected or unnecessary cost but it can also form a part of the
argument in the Safety Case that safety has been adequately managed.
2.3 Early in the planning stage of a project, there may be some benefit in producing an
outline of how it is intended to argue the safety of the system e.g. identifying the sort
of safety assurance evidence that may be required. This outline can help to identify
activities that need to be scheduled in the overall safety plan.
2.4 What follows is an outline of the typical phases of a project that should be planned
for. It should be noted, however, that each project is different and you may find that
different, fewer or additional phases are more suited to a particular project.
3 Feasibility and Concept - Safety Activities Early in a Project
3.1 The feasibility and concept phase occurs early in a typical project where the project is
a developing set of ideas and options but has no detail. Typically a concept of
operation or an early draft of operational requirements may be developed. Performing
a high-level hazard identification and risk assessment early in the project can identify
hazards that impact on the design of the system. It is better that these hazards and
their impact are identified early in a project, and suitable measures are taken at that
13 January 2006 Chapter 1 Page 1

stage, rather than incurring possible expense or delay having to change a design or
provide further safety assurance evidence where the hazards were missed and
discovered later.
3.2 Early in the project it is beneficial to identify the Applicable Safety Regulatory
Requirements, including National and International Standards and Recommended
Practices, local Regulations and guidance material applicable to the intended system.
These will influence the design of the system and compliance to these standards and
regulations will often mitigate hazards inherent to the project. For example, for Air
Traffic Service systems the following may be applicable:
a) ICAO Standards and recommended Practices, e.g. ICAO Annex 10 and Annex 11.
b) Single European Sky Interoperability Rules and Common Requirements.
c) European Standards e.g. Eurocae MOPS (Minimum Operational Performance
Specifications); Eurocontrol ESARRS (European Safety Regulatory Requirements).
d) CAA CAPs e.g. CAP670 Air Traffic Services Safety Requirements.
3.2.1 For aerodrome projects, the following may be applicable:
a) ICAO SARPs e.g. ICAO Annex 14.
b) European Standards, e.g. EUROCONTROL ESARRs.
c) CAP 168 Licensing of Aerodromes.
d) CAP 232 Aerodrome Survey Requirements.
e) CAP 642 Airside Safety Management.
f) CAP 655 Aeronautical Ground Lighting.
g) CAP 683 The Assessment of Runway Surface Friction for Maintenance Purposes.
h) CAP 699 Standards for the Competence of Rescue and Fire Fighting Service
(RFFS) Personnel Employed at United Kingdom Licensed Aerodromes.
i) CAP 748 Aircraft Fuelling and Fuel Installation Management.
4 Design and Development

4.1 As a project changes from a concept to a reality, more detailed system design is
undertaken and more knowledge of the system and its operational requirement is
gained. Performing risk assessment partway through a design phase, building on
previous assessments, can help designers focus on the riskiest parts of the system,
identifying and implementing mitigations as necessary e.g. equipment back-ups,
alternative procedures, increased training, a higher level of software development
scrutiny etc. It is not possible to be specific about when a risk assessment should be
conducted during system design because this will depend on the size, complexity and
speed of development of the project.
4.2 Applicable Safety Regulatory Requirements pertinent to the design must be
considered as the system is developed. The generation of compliance matrices
against the standards can help ensure that every requirement is satisfactorily
addressed. Very often it may not be possible for the ANSP or aerodrome operator to
demonstrate compliance with the standards without the assistance of an equipment
supplier or developer. This is particularly likely where the standard imparts a
requirement covering the processes to be followed when developing the system e.g.
as in the case of a software development standard. In such cases the ANSP or
aerodrome operator must review the evidence provided to them from their
subcontractor or supplier to satisfy themselves that the relevant requirements have
been met.

5 Tender and Contract
5.1 Often a project will involve an external company supplying equipment or services
under contract. When devising the contract it is important to include those safety
aspects that need to be addressed by the supplier. These aspects may include:
a) evidence of good system development practice;
b) evidence of compliance to applicable standards;
c) specific system test requirements required as evidence that safety requirements
have been met;
d) conduct of hazard identification;
e) the use of a Hazard Log; and
f) training of operators and maintainers.
5.2 Clearly it is important to identify what safety aspects need to be included in the
contract prior to placing the contract. It is important therefore to conduct a risk
assessment of the proposed system prior to placing the contract to identify any safety
requirements that must be achieved and the types and level of evidence that the
system supplier will be expected to provide in order to demonstrate that the
requirements have been achieved.
5.3 For some contracts, it may be appropriate to include the conduct of periodic safety
reviews or a clause that enables the ANSP or aerodrome operator to withdraw from
the contract without penalty if the relevant safety standards are not maintained.
6 System Realisation
6.1 During the realisation of the system, the items listed under 'Tender and Contract'
above will be further developed.
6.2 Typically during the realisation of a system, there will be changes to the original
design intent as unexpected problems arise and methods are devised to deal with the
them. Care must be taken to not only consider the effects of these changes on the
functionality of the system, but to consider the safety impact of these changes. The
use of a 'change control system', e.g. a formal method of notifying, considering and
authorising the changes, will ensure that changes are given due consideration. The
review and confirmation of the safety impact should form part of this change control
system and may require additional risk assessment and mitigation activity to ensure
that any new hazards are identified and assessed (and also to remove any that are no
longer applicable).
7 Transition to Service
7.1 Before putting a system into service an acceptable safety case for the system should
be in place. This safety case, ideally developed in accordance with the 7-step
procedure detailed within this guidance, will identify the safety requirements and
present the evidence that these safety requirements have been met along with any
shortcomings. Evidence typically required for the transition into service phase may
include:
a) Site Acceptance Test (SAT) results;
b) systems integrations test results; and
c) operational trial results.

7.2 It may be necessary to contact the CAA for Approval of the system prior to putting it
into service. Also Single European Sky (SES) requirements are being developed that
may require additional regulatory action in respect of the system prior to it being put
into service. Contact your CAA Inspector for guidance regarding what regulatory
action may be required.
7.3 Part of the risk assessment process should examine the impact of the introduction of
the new system or variations on existing systems and services. For example, there
may need to be a break in the service during the changeover from one system to
another; the overall system needs to be able to tolerate this break. There may also be
interfaces to other systems within the aerodrome and ATS environment; these
interfaces must be assessed both to ensure that the change or new system can be
accommodated safely and that there are no impacts on existing systems by the
project under consideration. Approval for a break to an existing service may also need
to be sought from the CAA.
7.4 The assessment may have identified the provision of reversionary procedures as
mitigation should the new system cause initial problems.
8 On-going Operation and Maintenance
8.1 Part of the risk assessment of the system should look at the risks associated with
operating and maintaining the system. Typically this will identify safety requirements
to ensure that operators and maintainers are appropriately trained and that
procedures covering operation and maintenance are produced and used. This should
be planned for early in the project especially where training is required to be provided
by equipment suppliers.
8.2 As part of a Safety Management System (SMS) operators are required to ensure that
operational or technical occurrences which are considered to have significant safety
implications are investigated immediately, and any necessary corrective action is
taken (required by ESARR3). Consideration should be given to developing a defect
reporting and corrective action system (sometimes known as DRACAS) in order to log
and react appropriately to any defects or failures of the system. Records of such faults
may be used to help identify persistent areas of failure or trends that may lead to more
serious failures. Analysis of the records may identify new hazards that need to be
addressed in the safety case, or a failure to meet safety requirements or objectives,
which will require mitigation.
8.3 Schemes for recording safety significant events, such as the CAA Mandatory
Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme1, should not only be used for the recording of
incidents, but should be used to trigger analysis of what caused the incident and what
needs to be done to prevent it reoccurring.
8.4 Auditing of procedures to ensure operators and maintainers are properly applying the
procedures is another way to provide evidence that safety requirements to do with
their application are being met. The written reports of this auditing process can be
used as evidence in the safety case. Similarly, audits may be conducted of suppliers
to ensure that the supplied services are of a satisfactory standard.
8.5 Periodically revisiting the safety case of a system should be planned for. If a system
has been in service for a long period of time, any assumptions about the environment
or the conditions that the system is operated under may change e.g. the numbers of
aircraft using the aerodrome may increase over time; are the safety requirements still
valid and can the systems cope?
1. Or other scheme compliant with the requirements of EUROCONTROL ESARR2 Reporting and Assessment of Safety
Occurrences.

8.6 Some assumptions and requirements specified in the safety case may only be able
to be fully substantiated after a period of operation of the system. The verification of
these should be addressed after an appropriate period of time. In the interim period,
it may be necessary to apply additional mitigations until such time as it can be shown
that the requirement is satisfied.
9 Changes
9.1 There can be many reasons to make changes to an existing system, for example:
a) to correct defects;
b) to replace or update ageing equipment;
c) to increase functionality;
d) to modify procedures e.g. where there are efficiencies to be gained;
e) where staff changes reduce the level of experience or expertise.
9.2 A change to a system can be considered as a small project, with the lifecycle phases
described above being applicable to a variable extent depending on the size of the
change. As in the System Realisation section above, the use of a change control
system will ensure that changes are given due consideration and include assessing
the safety impact of the change.
9.3 The guidance above, covering 'transition to service', may be applicable for the change
i.e. the safety case for the system may need updating and approval by the CAA prior
to the change being put into service. Contact your CAA Inspector for guidance on
whether this is the case.
10 Removing the System from Service/Decommissioning
10.1 Where a decision has been made to remove a system from service, a risk
assessment of the impact of removing the system should be conducted. Where the
system is being replaced by another system, then this aspect may be covered by the
risk assessment associated with putting the new system into service. When a
system is being removed but not being replaced, the impact on other systems to
which this one relates should be assessed.
10.2 There may also be hazards specifically related to decommissioning the system, for
example, disruption to control rooms or interference to manoeuvring area operations,
which need to be considered.
10.3 The impacts of decommissioning should be documented in the safety case and the
safety case closed and filed for future reference.

Chapter 2 Risk Assessment and Mitigation - Introducing

the Seven-Step Process
1 Introduction
1.1 Risk assessment and mitigation is a structured and systematic process for the
identification of hazards and the assessment of the risk associated with each hazard,
or group of hazards. The acceptability of the risks is determined by comparing the
assessed level of risk to the predetermined safety assessment criteria1 or Safety
Objectives.
1.2 ICAO Annex 11 Air Traffic Services (paragraph 2.26.5) requires that any significant
safety-related change to the ATC system shall only be implemented after a safety
assessment has demonstrated that an acceptable level of safety will be maintained.
Therefore, any new system or any change to an existing system should be assessed
through a structured risk assessment and mitigation process.
1.3 ICAO Annex 14 Aerodromes (paragraph 1.4) places a similar requirement on licensed
aerodromes.
1.4 ICAO published an Information Paper (No.9) for the ICAO 11th Air Navigation
Conference containing a draft of 'The Manual on Safety Management for Air Traffic
Services'. This was subsequently updated and published as ICAO Doc. 9859. Within
this manual is a safety assessment process defined by a seven-step process. The
guidance contained here is based upon that process.
2 When Risk Assessment and Mitigation is Required
2.1 Although it is not possible to produce an exhaustive list detailing every circumstance
requiring risk assessment the following are some typical examples where such an
assessment would be required:
a) Implementation of new, or changes to, communications, surveillance or other
safety-significant systems and equipment, including those providing new
functionality and/or capabilities.
b) Physical changes to the layout of runways and/or taxiways at an aerodrome.
c) Physical changes to apron road schemes.
d) Introduction of a new aircraft type or class to an aerodrome.
e) Development or modifications of aerodrome procedures, including new
procedures to operate at the aerodrome premises, changes to fire and rescue
procedures etc.
f) Changes/Establishment of training or re-training of operational and technical staff.
g) A change to separation minimum to be applied within an airspace or at an
aerodrome.
h) New operating procedures, including departure and arrival procedures, to be
applied within an airspace or at an aerodrome.
1. A tolerability table is reproduced in Step 5 of this guidance, however users should generate their own assessment
criteria, but this must be justified.

i) A reorganisation of the ATS route structure.

j) A resectorisation of the airspace.
k) Introduction of a new Safety Management System (SMS) for an organisation,
where the SMS requires Risk Assessment of the systems that it covers.
2.2 Confidence in safety is required before any changes to a system are put into service;
the risk assessment and mitigation process should therefore start early in the lifecycle
of a new system. For a large and complex project, there will be several phases of Risk
Assessment and mitigation, each becoming more detailed as the design and
development of the system progresses. The final pre-implementation Risk
Assessment then forms the basis for the periodic safety reviews of the operational
system, which should continue throughout its lifecycle until decomissioning. See the
previous chapter for more information on a project lifecycle.
3 Summary of the Seven Steps
3.1 Risk assessment and mitigation requires a systematic approach. The complete
process can be divided into seven steps. These are:
Step 1 - System description.
Step 2 - Hazard and consequence identification.
Step 3 - Estimation of the severity of the consequences of the hazard occurring.
Step 4 - Estimation/assessment of the likelihood of the hazard consequences
occurring.
Step 5 - Evaluation of the risk.
Step 6 - Risk mitigation and safety requirements.
Step 7 - Claims, arguments and evidence that the safety requirements have been
met and documenting this in a safety case.
3.2 Figure 1 illustrates the risk assessment and mitigation process. The process is
iterative and there may be a need to perform a number of cycles throughout the
project lifecycle in order to assess proposed risk mitigation measures for their
effectiveness and impact.
3.3 The following Chapter will examine each of the seven steps in more detail.

STEP 1
Describe the system and its
operational environment
STEP 2
Identify Hazard and
consequence(s)
STEP 3 STEP 6
Classify the severity of the Identify risk mitigation measures
consequence(s) (Safety Requirements)
STEP 4
Classify the likelihood of the
consequence(s) manifesting
STEP 5
Evaluate the risk
No (Don't know)
No
Is the risk acceptable? Is the risk ALARP?
Yes
Yes
Recommend applying ALARP

even where risk is acceptable
LIFECYCLE
Iterations as system design Yes
Can you live with the
progresses and additional
remaining risk?
hazards are identified and
mitigations implemented
No
Abandon project or revise original

project objectives
STEP 7
Develop claims, arguments and
evidence that the Safety Information from all steps above
Requirements have been met. feed in here
Develop the Safety Case and
proceed to the next lifecycle stage.
Figure 1 The Seven-Step Approach

Chapter 3 The Seven-Step Risk Assessment and

Mitigation Process
1 Step 1 - System Description
1.1 The key activities in Step 1 are to describe:

a) the system/change;
b) the purpose of the system;
c) how the system will be used (concept of operation);
d) the system functions (operational requirements);
e) the boundaries of the system; and
f) the environment including the interface with any larger system.
1.2 If all potential hazards are to be identified, the people involved in the safety
assessment must have a good understanding of the proposed new system or change
to the existing system, and how it will interface with the other components of the
overall aerodrome or ATS system of which it is a part. This is why the first step in the
safety assessment process is to prepare a description of the proposed system or
change and the environment in which it will operate.
NOTE: The system description and subsequent risk assessment process may be limited to
the description of a concept in the early stages of a project (see Chapter 1, System
Lifecycle).
1.3 The hazard identification process can only identify hazards that come within the scope
of the system description. The boundaries of the system, as defined for the purposes
of the risk assessment, must therefore be sufficiently wide to encompass all possible
impacts that the system could have. In particular, it is important that the description
includes the interfaces with any larger system of which the project may be a part.
1.4 A detailed description of the system should include:
a) the purpose of the system;
b) how the system will be used (this may be described as a concept of operation);
c) a description of system functions (this may be achieved, in part, by describing the
operational requirements of the system);
d) the system boundaries and the external interfaces;
e) other systems that may be influenced by, or influence this one; and
f) a description of the environment in which the system will operate.
NOTE: To aid readability, long technical descriptions of how individual equipments work
should be avoided. Reference to technical documents may be made instead.
1.5 The safety impact of a potential loss, degradation or failure of the system will be
determined, in part, by the characteristics of the operational environment in which the
system will be integrated. The description of the environment should therefore
include any factors that could have a significant effect on safety. These factors will
vary from one case to another. They could include, for example:
a) traffic characteristics;
b) aerodrome infrastructure;

c) reliance on space based systems e.g. Communications satellites and Global

Navigation Satellite Systems;
d) bird hazard;
e) movement area;
f) hours of operations (day/night);
g) weather, e.g. prevalence of crosswinds or windshear, or duration of Low Visibility
Operations;
h) frequency of diversions due to severe weather.
1.6 The description of the system should include any assumptions about interfaces or
other systems with which this system interacts. Justification for the assumptions
should be included where possible.
1.7 The description of the system should also address pre-existing contingency
procedures and other non-normal operations, for example during:
a) failure of ATS equipment;
b) depletion of the Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS);
c) reduction of the declared distances.
1.8 For many projects it will be appropriate for the system description to address the
strategy for transition from the old to the new system. For example, will the existing
system be decommissioned and replaced immediately with the new system, or will
the two systems be operated in parallel for a period of time?
1.9 There may be several updates to the System Description throughout the Lifecycle of
the project. It is important to keep the System Description up to date as design
decisions are made and implemented. Without this, there is a risk that Hazard
Identification sessions, that may take place at several stages in the life of a project,
may not be considering the latest system design.
1.10 The system description will often be best presented using a combination of text and
diagrams. The use of diagrams can be an effective means of conveying information,
for example:
a) use of flow diagrams to show a system process or the sequence of activities
required by a procedure;
b) use of drawings to show the aerodrome layout including taxiways, runway
crossing points, RFFS location, fuel stores, ATS equipment location etc.;
c) use of drawings or diagrams showing airspace arrangements including sectors,
standard departure and arrivals routes, missed approach routes, radar vectoring
area etc.;
d) use of block diagrams to show interactions between system components and the
flow of information and data.
2 Step 2 - Hazard and Consequence Identification
2.1 The key activities in Step 2 are:

a) create a hazard log;
b) identify the hazards;
c) identify the consequences of each hazard; and then
d) update the hazard log.

2.2 Hazard Log

2.2.1 A Hazard Log is a formal method used to document hazards identified for a system.
The Hazard Log consists of a series of forms where details of each hazard can be
recorded. Details of the risks associated with each hazard together with any
mitigation measures should also be entered on the forms when the information
becomes available. Appendix F shows an example structure of a Hazard Log form.
2.3 When To Perform Hazard Identification
2.3.1 The hazard identification step should be initiated at the earliest possible stage in the
project lifecycle. For large-scale projects, there may be several hazard identification
sessions at different stages of the project development. The level of detail required
will depend on the complexity of the system under consideration and the stage of the
system lifecycle at which the assessment is being carried out. In general, it can be
expected that there will be less analysis required for an assessment carried out during
the initial operational requirement definition stage than for one during a later detailed
design stage.
2.4 Sources of Hazards
2.4.1 The hazard identification step should consider all the possible sources of system
failure. Depending on the nature and size of the system under consideration these
could include:
a) the equipment (hardware and software);
b) the operating environment (including physical conditions, airspace and air route
design, runway hot spots1 and obstacles);
c) the human operators (pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance engineers);
d) the human machine interface (HMI);
e) operational procedures;
f) maintenance procedures;
g) external services e.g. electricity, telephone lines;
h) contracted services.
2.4.2 All possible configurations of the system should be considered. For example, if
staffing levels and sectorisation of airspace are different at night than during the day,
both configurations should be examined for hazards. Operations when equipment is
off-line for regular maintenance should be considered.
2.4.3 Non-standard aerodrome operating configurations should also be considered, if
appropriate, for example during Low Visibility Operations or whilst there is 'Work in
Progress'.
2.5 Hazard Identification Methods
2.5.1 Hazard identification methods break down into the following 3 generic approaches:
a) Historical - Use and analysis of existing hazard logs and accident/incident reports
(this may be required as part of a safety management system). Also any hazards
identified from other risk assessment processes on other systems that may be
similar to this system (for example, has a similar system gained significant in-
service history in a comparable mode of operation?);
1. A 'Hot Spot' is the generic term applying to known runway incursion risk location.

b) Brainstorming - Planned and organised sessions aimed at encouraging a team of

participants of various relevant experience and expertise to explore the system for
potential hazards in a creative way. Appendix A gives guidance on a brainstorming
process;
c) Systematic - Sessions involving a thorough sequential review of a system often
using system diagrams and descriptions as prompts together with keywords to
help focus the on the types of failures to be assessed. Systematic hazard
identification processes include:
Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) - Appendix B gives
guidance on running a FMECA.
Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) - Appendix C gives guidance on
running a HAZOP process.
NOTE: For maximum effectiveness the Historical and Brainstorming approaches should be
used in conjunction with the Systematic processes. The output of the historical
analysis can be fed into the Systematic and Brainstorm analysis processes to trigger
further exploration of any identified hazards in the new context.
2.5.2 Some of the more complicated hazards identified using the above processes,
especially those involving sequences of events, may benefit from further examination
using Event Trees. These can be used to explore the range of consequences and
available barriers for a particular hazard. Appendix D gives further guidance on how to
use Event Trees.
2.5.3 For effective Hazard Identification it is important that the appropriate staff and system
experts become involved in the hazard identification processes. Typical of the people
who may become involved are:
a) air traffic controllers;
b) pilots;
c) maintenance and design engineers;
d) specialist aerodrome staff such as RFFS staff, security staff and refuelling staff.
NOTE: For efficiency, the staff involved with the Hazard Identification processes above may
include the assessment of severity and likelihood (Steps 3 and 4) in the same
sessions following the hazard identification process.
2.6 Ad Hoc Hazard Logging
2.6.1 An effective Safety Management System (SMS) should ensure that all staff are
encouraged to seek out and report safety issues and potential hazards as part of
normal day-to-day working. Relevant hazards identified in this way should be captured
within the Hazard Log.
2.6.2 For effective ad-hoc hazard capture, the methods for reporting the hazards should be
clearly defined i.e. procedures should be in place that identify how to log a hazard and
to whom hazards should be reported.
NOTE: A culture should be developed within the organisation to encourage the reporting of
hazards.
2.7 Hazard Consequences
2.7.1 The consequences of the hazard are determined by analysing what could happen if
the hazard manifested itself into an accident or incident. Some consequences may be
obvious, with there being only one possible outcome as the result of a particular
hazard. However other hazards may result in a range of consequences of varying

severity. Using Event Tree analysis (see Appendix D) can help determine the range of
consequences. The extent1 of the effects on the following should be considered:
a) air crew (workload, ability to perform functions);
b) air traffic controllers (workload, ability to perform functions);
c) the functional capabilities of the aircraft;
d) the functional capabilities of the ATS ground systems;
e) the ability to provide safe air traffic management services (e.g. the magnitude of
the loss or corruptions of air traffic management services or functions).
f) aerodrome operational staff (workload, ability to perform functions);
g) aerodrome operational procedures (they might be corrupted).
2.7.2 Once all the hazards have been identified they must be entered into the Hazard Log
together with their potential consequences.
2.8 Recording the Results of Hazard Identification
2.8.1 All identified hazards should be assigned a hazard number, and recorded in a Hazard
Log.
2.8.2 The Hazard Log should eventually contain a description of each hazard, its
consequences, the assessed likelihood and severity (steps 3 and 4), and any required
mitigation measures (step 6).
2.8.3 Additional Hazard Log entries will need to be made where there is more than one
credible consequence of concern.
NOTE: It is not always the most severe consequence that is the highest risk. This is
because the most severe consequence may be very unlikely to occur, whilst less
severe, yet undesirable consequences may be more likely to occur. It should be
remembered that 'risk' is a combination of severity and probability.
2.8.4 The Hazard Log should be updated as new hazards are identified and proposals for
mitigation are introduced throughout the project lifecycle.
2.8.5 The hazards recorded in the Hazard Log should be used to feed into the later risk
assessment steps of this procedure.
3 Step 3 - Estimation of the Severity of the Hazard Consequences

a) assess the severity of each consequence; and
b) record results in the Hazard Log.
3.2 Prior to the commencement of this step, the consequences of each hazard identified
in Step 2 should have been recorded in the hazard log. Step 3 involves the
assessment of the severity of each of these consequences.
3.3 The same group that performed the hazard identification may assess the severity of
the consequences.
3.4 While the assessment of severity of the consequences will always involve some
degree of subjective judgement, the use of structured grouped discussions, guided
by a standard severity classification scheme, and with participants, who have
extensive experience in their respective fields, should ensure that the outcome will
be an informed judgement.
1. Consider the quantity of aircraft, pilots and air traffic controllers affected and the geographical extent of the problem.

3.5 Table 1 contains a Severity Classification Scheme that may be used. The severity
classification for all credible consequences of a hazard should be determined from the
table. If an alternative scheme is used it should be clearly defined.
3.6 Once the assessment of severity has been completed for all the identified hazards
and consequences, the results, including the rationale for the severity classification
chosen, should be recorded in the Hazard Log.

Table 1 Example Severity Classification Scheme
CAP 760
Accidents Accident - as defined in Council directive 94/56/EC1 for air traffic services.
13 January 2006
Also includes loss of or substantial damage to major aerodrome facilities. Serious injury or death of multiple staff/
members of public at the aerodrome.
Serious Incidents Serious Incident - as defined in Council directive 94/56/EC1 for air traffic services.
For the aerodrome, an event where an accident nearly occurs. No safety barriers remaining. The outcome is not under
control and could very likely lead to an accident. Damage to major aerodrome facilities. Serious injury to staff/members
of public at the aerodrome.
Major Incidents A major incident associated with the operation of an aircraft, in which safety of aircraft may have been compromised,
having led to a near collision between aircraft, with ground or obstacles.
A large reduction in safety margins. The outcome is controllable by use of existing emergency or non-normal procedures
and/or emergency equipment. The safety barriers are very few approaching none. Minor injury to occupants of the
aircraft or staff/members of public at the aerodrome. Minor damage to aircraft or major aerodrome facilities may occur.
Significant Incidents Significant incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident, a serious or major incident could have occurred,
if the risk had not been managed within safety margins, or if another aircraft had been in the vicinity.
A significant reduction in safety margins but several safety barriers remain to prevent an accident.
Reduced ability of the flight crew or air traffic control to cope with the increase in workload as a result of the conditions
impairing their efficiency.
Only on rare occasions can the occurrence develop into an accident.
Nuisance to occupants of the aircraft or staff/members of public at the aerodrome.
No Effect Immediately No immediate effect on safety
No direct or low safety impact. Existing safety barriers come into play to avoid the event turning into a significant
incident or accident.
1. As defined in Council directive 94/56/EC of 21 November 1994 establishing the fundamental principles governing the investigation of civil aviation accidents and incidents, OJ L 319
of 12 December 1994, p. 14-19. See the Glossary for definitions of Accident and Serious Incident taken from the Council directive reference. Major Aerodrome Facilities may
include: Aerodrome buildings and hangars, fuel installations, air traffic service equipment installations, the runway and lighting system, principle taxiways, rescue service vehicles,
service vehicles etc.
Chapter 3 Page 7
Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard Identification, Risk Assessment and the Production of Safety Cases
4 Step 4 - Estimation/Assessment of the Likelihood of the Hazard

Consequences Occurring

a) estimate the likelihood of hazard consequences occurring; and
b) record the details in the Hazard Log.
4.2 The estimation of the likelihood of the consequences of a hazard occurring uses a
similar approach to that adopted in Steps 2 and 3; that is, by means of structured
discussions using a standard likelihood classification scheme as a guide. Table 2
shows an example of a classification scheme for this purpose.
4.3 Table 2 specifies the likelihood as qualitative categories e.g. 'remote', 'frequent' etc.
but also includes numerical values for the probabilities associated with each category.
In some cases, data may be available which will allow direct numerical estimates of
the likelihood of failure to be made. For example, for the hardware elements of a
system, data is often available on historical component failure rates. Evidence gained
from in-service experience of failure rates of existing similar systems may also give
an indication of the likelihood of failure.
4.4 The estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of incidents associated with human
error will generally involve a greater degree of subjective assessment (and it should
be borne in mind that even when assessing hardware, there is always the possibility
of failures due to human error such as incorrect maintenance procedures).
4.5 Early in the project lifecycle there may not be much information on which to base an
estimate or assessment. However, the use of structured group discussions with
participants who have extensive experience in their respective fields, and the
adoption of a standard likelihood classification scheme, should ensure that the
outcome will be an informed judgement.
4.6 Later on in the project lifecycle, for example after this 7-step procedure has been run
through more than once, evidence will start to be amassed that can be used to
improve the credibility of the likelihood assessment. This evidence will be needed
later in step 7 to help build the argument that the Safety Objectives (i.e. the objective
to ensure that all hazards are tolerable) have been met.
4.7 Once the assessment of likelihood has been completed for all the identified hazards,
the results, including the rationale for the classification chosen, should be recorded in
the hazard log.
NOTE: An alternative to estimating the probability of an accident/incident occurring at this
stage in the process is to establish the tolerable probability of an accident/incident
occurring for a hazard. This would then become a Safety Objective that could be
passed on to the system designers in order for them to have a safety target to
design to. Setting the Safety Objectives involves using Table 3 in Step 5 to identify
the maximum acceptable probability for a particular hazard consequence severity
taking the accumulation of hazards that lead to the same consequence severity into
account.

Table 2 Probability or Likelihood Classifications
Probability of Occurrence Definitions
Extremely Extremely Reasonably

Remote Frequent
improbable remote probable
Qualitative Should Very unlikely Unlikely to May occur May occur

definition virtually to occur occur during once during several
never occur the total total times during
operational operational operational
life of the life of the life
system system
Quantitative < 10-9 per 10-7 to 10-9 10-5 to 10-7 10-3 to 10-5 1 to 10-3 per
numerical hour per hour per hour per hour hour
definition
Quantitative Never Once in Once in 10 Once per 40 Once per

annual/daily 1000 years years to days to hour to
equivalent to once in once in once in 10 once in 40
(approximate) 100,000 1000 years years days
years
5 Step 5 - Evaluation of the Risk

a) decide whether the risk is acceptable or not; and
b) record the details in Hazard Log.
5.2 The acceptability of a risk is dependent on both the likelihood of it occurring and the
severity of its consequences. Acceptability is therefore usually based on comparison
with a severity/probability matrix, sometimes called a Tolerability Matrix. It is
therefore necessary to generate a Tolerability Matrix in order to set and evaluate the
Risk.
5.3 An example Risk Classification/Tolerability Matrix is shown in Table 31. The Safety
Objective is to ensure that all risks associated with hazards fall in the 'Acceptable'
cells of the matrix.
5.4 Air Traffic Service Providers and Aerodrome Operators may devise their own Risk
Tolerability Matrix, however justification for the figures used in the matrix must be
provided to the CAA.
1. The Safety Objective for the tolerable level of accidents in European Controlled Airspace has been set in ESARR4 as
1.55 x 10-8 accidents per flight hour (or 2.31 x 10-8 per flight). Table 3 is loosely based on this.

5.5
Table 3 Risk Classification/Tolerability Matrix
Probability of Occurrence (Likelihood)

Remote Frequent
< 10-9 per 10-7 to 10-9 10-5 to 10-7 10-3 to 10-5 1 to 10-3 per
hour per hour per hour per hour hour
Accidents Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable
Serious Acceptable Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable

ESARR 4 Severity
Incidents
Major Acceptable Acceptable Review Unacceptable Unacceptable

Incidents
Significant Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Review Unacceptable

Incidents
No Effect Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Review

Immediately
5.6 Each consequence should be checked against the above table for tolerability by
placing the consequence in the correct Table Cell that lines up the Likelihood and
Severity. The consequence will fall in one of the three regions:
a) Acceptable - the consequence is so unlikely or not severe enough to be of
concern. The risk is tolerable and the Safety Objective has been met. However,
consideration should be given to reducing the risk further to As Low As Reasonably
Practical (ALARP - see later) in order to further minimise the risk of an accident or
incident.
b) Review - the consequence and/or likelihood is of concern; measures to mitigate
the risk to ALARP should be sought. Where the risk still lies within the 'Review'
region after ALARP risk reduction has been undertaken, then the risk may be
accepted provided that the risk is understood and has the endorsement of the
individual ultimately accountable for safety within the organisation.
c) Unacceptable - the likelihood and/or severity of the consequence is intolerable.
Major mitigation or redesign of the system may be necessary to reduce the
likelihood or severity of the consequences associated with the hazard.
5.7 Several different hazards may all lead to the same consequence (accident/incident).
Where this is the case it is not sufficient to assess the tolerability of each hazard
independently because this may be misleading. For example there may be fifty
hazards that all lead to the same undesirable consequence, where each hazard has a
very low probability of occurring e.g. 'extremely remote' in Table 3 above. When
considering the tolerability of each individual hazard and consequence, it may be
found that each one sits in the 'ACCEPTABLE' region of the Tolerability Matrix.
However when all fifty hazards are considered together there will be an increase in
the probability of the consequence occurring that may move the consequence from
the 'ACCEPTABLE' region to the 'REVIEW' or 'UNACCEPTABLE' region of the Table.
It is therefore important to identify those hazards that contribute to the same
consequence and add the probabilities together to get an overall probability of the
consequence occurring. It is this overall probability for the consequence occurring
that is used to identify where the consequence sits in Table 3 above.

5.8 Summation of probabilities is not straightforward where qualitative probability

estimates have been used because there are no numbers to add together. Where this
is the case the following simple assumptions may be made:
a) More than 50 'Extremely Improbable' hazard consequences are required to move
the overall consequence probability into the 'Extremely Remote' category.
b) More than 50 'Extremely Remote' hazard consequences are required to move the
overall consequence probability into the 'Remote' category.
c) More than 50 'Remote' hazard consequences are required to move the overall
consequence probability into the 'Reasonably Probable' category.
d) More than 50 'Reasonably Probable' hazard consequences are required to move
the overall consequence probability into the 'Frequent' category.
5.9 Where several hazards all contribute to the same consequence and risk reduction is
required due to where the consequence sits in the tolerability matrix, the matrix can
be used to prioritise the most significant hazards to attempt to mitigate first. This is
achieved by placing all the individual hazard consequence probabilities in the matrix
to see which lie within, or close to the intolerable regions. These hazards are the
highest risk and should be mitigated first where practical. This may enable the overall
risk to fall into an acceptable category more quickly through addressing the most
significant hazards first rather than dealing with a number of less significant hazards
of less impact.
5.10 ALARP means a risk is low enough that attempting to make it lower, or the cost of
assessing the improvement gained in an attempted risk reduction, would actually be
more costly than any cost likely to come from the risk itself. This does not
automatically mean the risk is acceptable though; a judgement will need to be made
and justified.
5.11 Once the assessment of acceptability of the risk has been completed for all the
identified hazard consequences, the results should be recorded in the hazard log. It is
particularly important that all cases where the risk falls in the 'REVIEW' region of the
Table but has been accepted as ALARP and tolerable are well documented and that
the justification for the decision is clearly stated.
6 Step 6 - Risk Mitigation and Safety Requirements

a) mitigate those risks identified as Unacceptable;
b) apply ALARP principles generally; and
c) generate Safety Requirements.
6.2 As already noted in Step 5, if the consequence does not meet the predetermined
acceptability criteria, an attempt should always be made to reduce the risk to a level
which is acceptable, or if this is not possible, to ALARP using appropriate mitigation
measures.
6.3 It is recommended to apply the ALARP principle to all identified risks, even where the
risks fall in the 'Acceptable' region of the tolerability matrix. This is in order to support
the goal of constant safety improvement whenever practicable.

6.4 The identification of appropriate risk mitigation measures requires a good

understanding of why the hazard is likely to manifest and the factors contributing to
the severity of its consequences, since any mechanism that will be effective in
reducing risk will have to modify one or more of these factors.
6.5 Risk mitigation measures may work through reducing the probability of occurrence,
or the severity of the consequences, or both. Achieving the desired level of risk
reduction may require the implementation of more than one mitigation measure.
6.6 Risk mitigation strategies include:
a) revision of the system design;
b) modification of operational procedures;
c) changes to staffing arrangements; and
d) training of personnel to deal with the hazard;
e) development of emergency and/or contingency arrangements and plans; and
f) ultimately, ceasing operation.
6.7 The earlier in the system lifecycle that hazards are identified, the easier it is to change
the system design if necessary or beneficial. As the system nears implementation,
changing the design becomes more difficult and costly. This could reduce the
available mitigation options for those hazards that are not identified until a late stage
of the project.
6.8 The effectiveness of any proposed risk mitigation measures must be assessed by
first examining closely whether the implementation of the mitigation measures might
introduce any new hazards or whether they change the basis on which other
assessments have been made. Having decided that a simple mitigation measure may
be suitable it will often be necessary to repeat steps 3, 4 and 5 in order to evaluate
the acceptability of the risk with that proposed mitigation measure in place. If the
proposed mitigation measure can affect other parts of the system - or, perhaps, even
the suitability of the system to achieve its intended function - it may be necessary to
repeat step 2 or even step 1. Unfortunately it is not possible to give any more specific
guidance on when it might be necessary to reassess the system as a whole because
this judgement can only be made by those who fully understand the system.
6.9 Mitigation measures that are necessary for the system to meet the safety criteria are
referred to as Safety Requirements and must be clearly documented. Putting the
system into operational service cannot proceed until all these Safety Requirements
are met. Step 7 of this process addresses the arguments and evidence required to
show that each Safety Requirement has been satisfied.
7 Step 7 - Claims, Arguments and Evidence that the Safety Objectives and
Safety Requirements Have Been Met and Documenting this in a Safety
Case

a) identifying all applicable Safety Objectives and Safety Requirements;
b) developing Claim, Argument and Evidence statements; and
c) documenting the results in a logical and complete manner.

7.2 Introduction
7.2.1 The documenting of claims, arguments and evidence that a system meets its Safety
Requirements is part of the Safety Case (or Safety Case Report) and may be
presented as a stand-alone document for the system.
7.2.2 Safety Objectives and Requirements will have been identified in the previous steps
of this procedure, however further Safety Objectives and Safety Requirements may
be applicable from regulatory material and other standards, including those
internationally adopted.
NOTE 1: For conciseness in section 7 the term 'Safety Requirement' is used to mean both
'Safety Objective' and 'Safety Requirement' as appropriate.
NOTE 2: Reference to Safety Requirements in the section below refers to those identified
in the hazard analysis process (steps 1 to 6) and those applicable from regulatory
material and other standards.
7.2.3 Safety Requirements that relate to the performance of software within air traffic
service related systems are subject to extra scrutiny due to the additional problems
that software has historically shown to manifest. Software related Safety
Requirements must comply with the arguments and evidence requirements
described in CAP670 Part B Section 3 SW01; guidance within SW01 shows how this
can be achieved.
7.2.4 Evidence can vary in quality, depth and quantity and it is important that the level of
evidence provided to demonstrate that a Safety Requirement has been achieved is
commensurate with the criticality of the Safety Requirement. It is not always obvious
when this is the case therefore guidance is provided to show the level of evidence
expected for various criticality levels (see Appendix G).
7.2.5 Evidence can come from a variety of sources and guidance is provided in this section
on the sources of evidence.
7.2.6 Presentation of evidence alone is not sufficient to demonstrate that a Safety
Requirement has been satisfied. The evidence must be associated with a claim being
made and an argument that explains how the evidence demonstrates that the Safety
Requirement has been met.
7.2.7 Some Safety Requirements have to be broken down into a smaller set of Safety
Requirements which when combined demonstrate the higher-level requirement.
Accordingly, claims, arguments and evidence that prove the full set of lower level
requirements can be used as evidence of satisfaction of the top-level requirements.
Guidance on methods of representing a hierarchical structure of claim, argument and
evidence is provided later in this section.
7.2.8 In some cases it may not be possible to fully demonstrate achievement of a Safety
Requirement, or it may be necessary to make assumptions when demonstrating
achievement of Safety Requirements where there is no supporting evidence. Where
this is the case, then the shortfall in evidence must be clearly documented so that any
residual risk due to any uncertainty may be considered and either accepted, or worked
on further to reduce the risk.
7.2.9 The Safety Requirements, claims, arguments, evidence and any shortfalls identified
need to be documented in a coherent manner to allow easy understanding and to
facilitate future review and update. It should be remembered that Safety Cases are
living documents that develop along with the lifecycle of the project (see Chapter 1,
Lifecycle). Guidance is provided on the structure and content of a Safety Case (or
Safety Case Report) in the following paragraphs.

7.3 Safety Case (or Safety Case Report) Presentation and Structure
7.3.1 A Safety Case is the key document that demonstrates that a system is safe. It (or a
summarised version of it in the form of a Safety Case Report) is the document that
the Regulator may audit to ensure that the ANSP or aerodrome operator has satisfied
themselves that the system has been fully analysed and demonstrated to be safe. It
is also a key document likely to be called up as evidence for any legal action involving
a failure of safe operations. It is therefore important that the following are considered
to ensure that the document is concise, clearly presents the information and is
complete:
a) Provide a title page clearly stating the system under consideration and at what
stage in the project this Safety Case covers.
b) Provide an Amendment Record that logs the history of the document e.g. the
various drafts and formal issues with a short note of what has changed at each up-
issue.
c) Provide a Contents Page stating what each section of the document covers and
any tables, figures, diagrams or appendices that are included.
d) Write in plain English. Avoid overly long sentences; use well-understood terms
rather than the obscure.
e) Use figures and diagrams to support the text e.g. one well-labelled radar coverage
diagram can convey more information quickly than a long textual description of the
coverage.
f) Adopt a logical and sequential structure to the document (more on this follows).
g) Use page numbering.
7.3.2 Modern information technology (IT) systems can be employed to make finding your
way around a Safety Case and supporting information easier. For example it may be
possible to burn a safety case and supporting evidence to a Compact Disk (CD) and
use hyperlinks within the Safety Case text to call up the evidence documents.
7.4 Safety Case Structure
7.4.1 Table 4 shows a suggested Safety Case structure. It is recommended that this be
followed, although other logical structures may be used. Note also that depending on
the stage in the lifecycle that the project is, not all sections in the table may be
applicable.
NOTE: Some complex organisations with separate departments responsible for different
aspects of a Safety Case may choose to divide the Safety Case into multiple parts.
This is not necessary and the documentation can be provided in whatever form is
most suitable.

Table 4 Suggested Structure of a Safety Case
Part or Section Description
Title Page Include: the name of the organisation to which the Safety Case is relevant; the
system being covered; stage in the project; issue status; date of issue;
author(s).
An 'Authorised By' sign-off table may be included where this is a Quality
Management requirement for the organisation.
Configuration A table showing the version history of the document including a brief
Control Page description of what changed between versions
Executive A brief description of the Safety Case including: a short introduction to the
Summary system, where the Safety Requirements have come from, whether they have
been met, key outstanding activities, residual risks and the conclusions drawn.
Acronyms and Include a list explaining any acronyms or abbreviations used in the safety case.
Abbreviations
Contents Page Include chapters or sections, tables, diagrams, figures, appendices and page
numbering for these.
Scope Include: The overall role of the system, why it is needed, where it fits in with
other systems and the limits to what this Safety Case covers.
Functional Include a description of the functions of the system; include the operational
Description requirements; use diagrams and figures; show where this system fits in with
others including any interfaces to other systems.
System Describe the components of the system, interfaces between them; use
Description diagrams and figures; describe the different allowable configurations of the
system. Record here the version number, build state or procedure issue for
which this Safety Case is applicable.
System Describe how the system will, or does operate; include the concept of
Operation operation; describe the flow of information or data; inputs and outputs (e.g.
human machine interface [HMI] aspects); what processes are carried out or
what decisions are being made.
System Design Describe how the system was designed; who designed it; any design standards
used.
Note: This section can be expanded to act as supporting (backing) evidence
where Safety Requirements call for evidence of good design practice.
Design Include any systems or inputs that this system depends upon for safe
Dependencies operation. Be brief where these have already been described in the previous
sections of the document.
Assumptions Include any assumptions about interfaces or other systems with which this
system interacts and any other assumptions; include justification for the
assumptions where possible.
Note: These assumptions are likely to have been made during the hazard
identification and risk assessment processes.
Safety Objectives Where Safety Objectives have been set for individual hazards, then these
should be stated. Where the tolerable probability for a set of hazards sharing
the same consequence severity has been used (as in the case of using a risk
matrix to set Safety Objectives) then the tolerable probability for each severity
level should be stated, along with a list of hazards associated with each severity
level.

Table 4 Suggested Structure of a Safety Case (continued)
Safety State how the Safety Requirements came about, referencing out to related
Requirement documentation e.g. reports from brainstorming, HAZOPs or FMECA.
Derivation
Safety State the derived Safety Requirements for the system i.e. the safety
Requirements requirements derived by this procedure. Where available/applicable, include the
Required Level of Confidence for each Safety Requirement i.e. High, Medium or
Low (See Appendix G).
Statutory Safety Reference out to regulatory material containing Safety Objectives and
Objectives and Requirements applicable to this system; only restate them if compact (See
Requirements paragraph 7.5 - Safety Requirements below).
System Address each Safety Objective and Safety Requirement; include the claim(s),
Assurance associated argument(s) and reference the evidence that supports each
argument; reference to diagrammatic representations of arguments if used
(See Appendix E for more information).
Identify the status of the Requirement i.e. is it met, not yet met or only partially
proven?
State whether any further work to prove that the Requirement is met is planned
e.g. at later stages of the project (See paragraph 7.6 - Claims, Arguments and
Evidence below).
Limitations and Identify any deficiencies found with the system.

Shortcomings Identify any Safety Objectives or Requirements that have only partially been
proven, have failed to be proven or have insufficient evidence to provide the
required level of confidence (except those Requirements where further
validation work is already planned).
Identify any counter evidence for the system i.e. any evidence that
demonstrates that a Requirement is not met.
Reiterate any assumptions for the system for which there is no, or insufficient
validation or rationale.
Ongoing Identify any Safety Objectives or Requirements that require ongoing monitoring
Monitoring in order to accrue evidence that the Requirement continues to be met.
Conclusion Draw a conclusion on the Safety Case. State whether your organisation
believes the system is safe to be put into service or what additional work is
necessary in order for this to be the case; or state whether you believe that the
planned work will lead to system being safely put into operational service. State
any limitations and shortcomings that your organisation is prepared to live with
and any that are unacceptable, including any actions to rectify the situation.
References Where applicable, include the following references:

a) Standards;
b) Supporting hazard identification and risk assessment documentation;
c) Sources of evidence.
Appendices Appendices should be used to store text, diagrams, tables etc., that if
contained in the main body of the Safety Case, may distract from the main flow
of the document. Typically, appendices should contain:
a) Extracts from MATS Pt 2/Aerodrome Manual e.g. where they form part of
the system description;
b) Compact items of evidence (reference should be made to larger documents
rather than reproducing them);
c) Standards Compliance matrices;
d) Verification Cross Reference Indices (VCRI).

7.5 Safety Requirements (including Safety Objectives)

7.5.1 The purpose of the Safety Case is to demonstrate that all Safety Requirements for
the system under consideration have been addressed and that the system is tolerably
safe. It is necessary, therefore, to clearly state the Safety Requirements being
addressed early in the Safety Case.
7.5.2 Safety Requirements to be stated come from several sources:
a) Those generated by the risk assessment process (Steps 1 to 6 of this procedure).
These are called 'Derived Safety Requirements';
b) Those applicable from regulatory material and/or standards, called 'Statutory
Safety Objectives and Requirements', for example:
ICAO Annexes e.g. Annex 10 technical requirements for communications,
navigation and radio (including radar and ADS-B) systems;
Single European Sky Common Requirements, Implementing Rules and
Community Specifications;
CAP168 Licensing of aerodromes for aerodrome requirements;
CAP670 ATS Safety Requirements for technical and resource requirements
(including software Safety Requirements);
CAP 744 United Kingdom Manual of Personnel Licensing - Air Traffic
Controllers for training and competence requirements;
CAP 700 Operational Safety Competences - A UK Code of Practice for
aerodrome management competence requirements.
7.5.3 Identifying Safety Requirements from the many interoperability and other
requirements contained in international standards (such as those identified in 7.5.2 b)
above) is not always straightforward. One of the simplest ways to identify whether
any particular Requirement is a Safety Requirement is to pose the question, 'if this
requirement fails to be met, or is only partially met, will it increase the safety risk of
the system under consideration?' If it does increase the probability of an incident, or
the likely severity of an incident to an intolerable level, then it should be considered a
Safety Requirement that will need to be addressed in a Safety Case.
7.5.4 Requirements found in International Standards that are not explicit Safety
Requirements are often concerned with interoperability and will still need to be
complied with where the standard has been endorsed by the UK CAA or Europe as a
whole. Therefore consideration should be given to demonstrating compliance to all
requirements within the standards and documenting the results in the Safety Case.
This saves having to go through the process of differentiating between safety and
non-safety requirements with the possibility of making errors leading to some safety
requirements being overlooked. It is acceptable for a Safety Case to include such
aviation-related requirements.
7.5.5 Where it is practical to do so, then the safety requirements should be restated within
the safety case e.g. The Derived Safety Requirements generated from the Risk
Assessment process (steps 1 to 6) would normally be restated.
7.5.6 Where impractical to restate the Safety Requirements e.g. where International
Standards documents are involved with many detailed Requirements, then
references to the documents and sections where the Safety Requirements can be
found needs to be made in this part of the Safety Case.

7.5.7 A compliance matrix or verification cross-reference index (VCRI) can be useful in

documenting compliance to referred standards. These consist of tables listing the
paragraph numbers from the standard, a shortened form of the requirement, where
the requirement is proven to be met e.g. test specification reference, analysis report
etc. (or how it is intended to be proven where not yet proven) and any deviation or
limitation in meeting the requirement that has been identified. Spreadsheet or
Database software can be used to manage these tables.
NOTE: It is often impractical for ANSPs or aerodrome operators to demonstrate compliance
to detailed sets of technical requirements, such as those found in ICAO SARPs,
themselves. They are therefore advised to place the requirement to provide
evidence of compliance to these standards on the suppliers of the equipment or
services at the contract stage. It is then up to the ANSP or aerodrome operator to
satisfy themselves that the evidence provided is acceptable.
7.6 Claims, Arguments and Evidence
7.6.1 It is not enough to merely state that a Safety Objective or Requirement has been
satisfied; it must be proven. This can be achieved through statements linked to
evidence clearly showing that a Requirement has been met. The statements take the
form of a claim, justified by an argument supported by evidence.
7.7 Claim
7.7.1 A claim is a simple statement typically used to indicate that a safety objective or
requirement has been met as demonstrated by the associated argument and
evidence. It may be the case that a complete claim can not be made due to
incomplete or weak evidence being available, in which case the deficiency in the
claim should be clearly stated and addressed later in the 'limitations and
shortcomings' section.
7.7.2 A claim may be sub-divided into a number of smaller sub-claims which when
combined meet the overall higher-level claim. If representing this in text, then this
needs careful structuring to avoid confusing or losing the reader. The following may
help:
a) Use of a hierarchical numbering system e.g. 1.1, 1.2, 1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.3 etc.;
b) Use of paragraph indents (as often used in software programming) where the
indented text may be sub-claims of the preceding non-indented text;
c) Tabulation of the text, with separate tables for each top-level claim and its sub-
claims.
7.7.3 Alternatively, the hierarchy of claims, arguments and evidence can be represented
diagrammatically using one of a number of notation systems (typically associated with
software tools). See Appendix E for more information.
7.8 Arguments
7.8.1 Arguments are statements justifying why a claim is valid and point to the supporting
evidence. Depending of the amount of evidence available supporting a claim being
made, more than one argument per claim or sub-claim may be required to encompass
all of the evidence.

7.9 Evidence
7.9.1 Evidence is used to support an argument that a Safety Objective or Requirement has
been met as associated with claim-argument-evidence statements or diagrammatic
representation of arguments. There can be many sources of evidence, however it is
important to think about two key types of evidence:
a) Direct Evidence - This is evidence clearly linked to the Requirement itself e.g. a
test result showing that a safety critical parameter is within tolerance.
b) Backing Evidence - This is evidence that supports the Direct Evidence, thus giving
Direct Evidence more credibility e.g. a qualified test engineer using certified test
equipment carried out the testing or that an approved designer designed an
instrument flight procedure.
7.9.2 In general, Direct evidence comes from three sources:
a) Test Evidence - the running of test procedures and simulations designed to
exercise the equipment or operational procedures and to measure the
performance against predefined criteria. This also includes inspection against
checklists derived from standards e.g. ICAO Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs), Eurocae Minimum Operational Performance Standards
(MOPS), CAA Publications (CAPs) etc.
b) Field Service Evidence - using records of satisfactory performance of identical or
similar systems as evidence for the new system.
c) Analytical Evidence - predictions of performance based on design information or
analysis of a limited amount of testing or field service evidence.
7.9.3 It is important that the evidence presented in support of an argument is appropriate
and credible. When recording evidence the following factors should be considered:
a) Scope - The evidence should cover the full extent of the Requirement(s)
concerned. Where it does not, further evidence may be required to extend its
scope.
b) Completeness - There should be no gaps in the evidence. Where there are gaps,
then further evidence to fill the gaps may be required.
c) Accuracy - Where tests, simulations or field evidence is used, these should be
based on an accurate representation of the system being considered. Also, where
tests or simulations are used, then the test equipment used should be shown to
have the precision required to accurately measure the performance.
d) People - The people involved in obtaining or developing the evidence should be
qualified or have the necessary experience to do this well.
e) Configuration Control and Traceability - Good configuration control i.e. the
ability clearly link the evidence to a documented system build state or procedure
issue, provides credibility that the evidence is applicable to the system being
considered.
f) Quality Management - The credibility of evidence is improved where it is
demonstrated that it was developed under a good Quality Management regime
e.g. review and sign-off procedures are in place and are used; test equipment is
certified and internal quality and safety reviews take place etc.
g) Scrutiny - The credibility of evidence increases where it has been subjected to
independent scrutiny e.g. by inspection by internal or external qualified or
experienced inspectors.

h) Quantity and Diversity - The more corroborating evidence there is, particularly
from different and diverse sources, the more confidence there will be in the
evidence to support a Safety Requirement.
i) Depth - Evidence can vary in depth e.g.:
Evidence could cover default operation, operation within expected limits or
operation to extreme limits.
It could be at a system level or go down to component level.
The greater the depth of the evidence then the more confidence there will be in
that evidence.
j) Presentation - Evidence, along with claims and arguments, should be presented
in a manner that is straightforward to understand and follow. Poorly presented
evidence erodes its credibility.
7.9.4 An area of difficulty arises when deciding the quality and level of evidence required to
provide reasonable assurance that, for example, a Safety Objective or Requirement
has been met. This often comes down to a judgement call by those involved.
However, what is perceived to be a reasonable level of evidence by a ANSP or
aerodrome operator may not be seen as acceptable by the Regulator. Where this is a
problem a method has been devised to define the quantity, type and diversity of
evidence required to achieve a certain level of confidence. Appendix G provides
details on this method.

Appendix A Hazard Identification using Brainstorming
1 Introduction
1.1 This guidance on brainstorming has been derived from the Eurocontrol Safety
Assessment Methodology guidance on Identification of Hazards (Ref:
SAF.ET1.ST03.1000-MAN-01-01-03-B2 FHA V2 Ch3 GUI B2).
1.2 Hazard identification using brainstorming is complimentary to systematic functional
hazard identification e.g. HAZOPs, FMECA etc. The brainstorming method can reveal
hazards not identified in the systematic approach.
1.3 Ideally hazard identification using brainstorming should be conducted prior to the
systematic approach. This is due to participants in both methods being more open
and less focussed on design issues during the brainstorming if they have not been
made aware of the detail of the project as required by the systematic approach.
1.4 Table 1 provides an overview of the complete brainstorming process, from initial
planning and preparation through to evaluating the results. The remainder of this
document expands upon each point made in the table.
2 Initial Planning
2.1 Hazard identification using brainstorming can be undertaken at several stages in the
lifecycle of a project. Early in a project, brainstorming may be undertaken once a
concept of operation or proposed system description has been drafted. This is
necessary to enable the brainstorming group to have an overview of the project and
some material to work from. As the project develops and more detail becomes
available, the brainstorming exercise may be repeated.
2.2 Due to other commitments e.g. staff rosters, some experts who are valuable to a
brainstorming session may need considerable notice to ensure their availability.
Depending on the nature and scope of the system under consideration, these may
include:
a) Air Traffic Controllers.
b) Pilots.
c) RFFS Staff.
d) Aerodrome Operations Staff.
e) Security Staff.
f) Refuelling Staff.
13 January 2006 Appendix A Page 1

Table 1 The Complete Brainstorming Process
Plan Align risk assessment (including Hazard Identification) activities with the
project plans
Involve the Aerodrome Operator, ATC service provider and airline for
participating controllers, pilots etc. early in the project due to their limited
availability.
Prepare Arrange participants which may include:

Relevant Operational Experts e.g. controllers, pilots etc. (ideally NOT
involved in the project development or previous systematic hazard
identification)
Moderator
Note taker
Expert on operation or system (e.g. senior ATCO, project manager,
Aerodrome Operations Manager, senior system engineer)
Safety analyst
Prepare how to brainstorm
Prepare hazards and categorizations using:
Preliminary scoping brainstorms
Literature, hazard logs and incident/ accident databases
Make presentations of:
What a hazard is, how to brainstorm and rules
General background of the project and operation
Make a schedule for the brainstorming session
Arrange practical issues:
Room free from distractions
Flipchart
Laptop PC and Projector
Availability of refreshments
Brainstorm Introduce using prepared presentations

Brainstorm:
Take care that basic rules are respected:
As many hazards as possible
No criticism, No dismissals and No analysis
Make short notes of hazards on flipchart
Steer the meeting using prepared hazards and categories
Apply short breaks before productivity drops significantly
Close the session
Evaluate Distribute minutes of brainstorm with hazard log, requesting corrections

Evaluate the effectiveness of the brainstorm:
Are all categories covered?
Are there any suspect categories lacking hazards?
Decide whether and when another brainstorming session is needed

3 Preliminary Brainstorming (Scoping Brainstorm)
3.1 The purpose of the preliminary brainstorming activity is to establish a set of Hazard
Categories and Issues that can be later used to guide the full brainstorming activity.
Typically the Moderator of the brainstorm group can undertake the preliminary
brainstorm on their own or with the help of others e.g. a Safety Analyst. This activity
should take place before the full brainstorm.
3.2 Input to the preliminary brainstorm can be historical hazard data on similar systems
e.g. incident / accident databases, reporting schemes or hazard logs.
3.3 The output of the preliminary brainstorm should be a list of hazard categories and
issues, typically:
a) Operational Aspects.
b) Technical Aspects.
c) Potential Conflicts: departures; taxiways.
d) Flight Phases.
3.4 Since the preliminary brainstorming activity is a one or two person exercise, and the
purpose of it is not to produce any detail, the conduct of the exercise can be left to
the choice of the participants. The guidance that follows for full brainstorming does
not necessarily apply to the preliminary brainstorm.
4 Preparation for Full Brainstorming
4.1 Participants
4.1.1 The number of participants at a brainstorming session should be limited to a
maximum of 6 people. More than this becomes unproductive and special
arrangements should be made to regain some efficiency:
a) Dividing the larger group up into working pairs;
b) Participants undertaking individual note taking followed by group discussion of the
findings of each person.
4.2 Participants with Administrative Roles
4.2.1 All participants take part in the brainstorming ideas generation activities, however
some participants also have an administrative role:
a) Moderator: Controls the flow and timing of the meeting; states the rules of
conduct and introduces material and hazard categories to consider. The principle
goal of the moderator is to ensure the brainstorming activity is productive;
b) Safety Analyst: Should be familiar with hazard, cause and effect and help the
group with safety terminology and structuring the record of hazards;
c) Note Taker: Somebody noting down the detail of the hazards; this may be on a
laptop PC connected to a projector so that the participants can correct any
misunderstandings (however the correction of notes should take a lower priority
than the generation of ideas);
d) Operation/System Expert: This should be somebody familiar with the planned
project such that they can answer any clarification questions about the project by
participants. Typically this may be the Project Manager, Senior Air Traffic Controller

or Senior Systems Engineer. They would normally present the project overview at
the beginning of the session.
NOTE: The Moderator and Safety Analyst may be the same person. The Note Taker may be
the Safety Analyst (where not also the Moderator) thus enabling the definition of
hazards using correct safety terminology.
4.3 Creative Participants
4.3.1 The above participants have an administrative role to play in the brainstorming
process. However the principle role of the remaining participants is to creatively
identify hazards with the planned system or project. Key to this is the inclusion of
Operational Staff:
a) Air Traffic Controller: Where possible this person should not be familiar with the
planned project prior to the brainstorming session, but should be familiar with the
type of ATC functions planned to be performed e.g. approach control, area control
etc.
b) Pilot: Where possible this person should not be familiar with the planned project
prior to the brainstorming session, but should be familiar with the types of aircraft
and operations that may be involved in the planned project.
c) Relevant Aerodrome Personnel: Where possible this person should not be
familiar with the planned project prior to the brainstorming session.
5 Preparing a Brainstorming Session
5.1 Session Logistics

5.1.1 Brainstorming sessions can be taxing on participants, therefore the following should
be considered when arranging the logistics of a session:
a) A meeting room protected from distractions e.g. no calls to be taken.
b) The preparation of a meeting schedule that divides the allocated time up into
manageable chucks with frequent refreshment breaks e.g. several half hour
sessions split by 10 minute breaks.
NOTE: Participants are normally more pro-active in morning sessions than afternoon
sessions.
c) Easy availability of refreshments.
5.2 Introductory Brainstorming Presentation
5.2.1 Some participants to a brainstorming session may not be familiar with the process or
what is expected of them. It is therefore important to explain this, ideally in the form
of a short presentation covering:
a) Definition of a hazard.
b) How the brainstorm will be managed i.e. the rules:
No contradiction or dismissals allowed.
How participants should inform the group of their hazard ideas e.g. open
free-for-all discussion; notes on post-its to be stuck on a board; hands raised
awaiting moderator attention.
NOTE: Participants are advised to have notepaper and pens to jot down hazards as they
occur to them just in case hazards start 'queuing' to be discussed or recorded.

5.2.2 The Moderator would normally undertake the above presentation lasting no longer
than 10 minutes.
5.3 Project or System Presentation
5.3.1 The brainstorm participants need material to work off, therefore an overview of the
project should be presented:
a) This should last no longer than half an hour.
b) It should not be very detailed, but typically cover:
The objective of the project.
Concept of Operation e.g. Airspace Configuration and Interfaces; Aerodrome
Layout; traffic characteristics; timeframe.
Human Roles (from an ATC, Pilot or Aerodrome Personnel point of view).
Policies and Procedures.
Technical Systems.
c) It should be biased towards pictures and diagrams.
NOTE: The pictures and diagrams e.g. airport layout, airways structure and charts, should
be made into posters and stuck around the room where the brainstorming activity
takes place to promote their constant consideration and easy reference.
5.3.2 The Operation/System Expert would normally undertake the above presentation.
6 Conduct of the Brainstorming Session
6.1 After the Introductory Brainstorming Presentation and the Project or System
Presentation (see above) have been delivered, the Moderator would take control of
proceedings by directing the group to consider the hazard categories and issues
previously identified at the preliminary brainstorming stage.
6.2 All participants would explore each of the categories and issues and feel free to raise
any safety related issues that occur to them. Hazards raised should be quickly noted
down on a flipchart to be discussed and expanded further (although not analysed in
detail at this stage).
6.3 The Safety Analyst would help formulate any identified Hazards into appropriate
wording and the Note Taker would ensure that these are correctly recorded.
6.4 If using a laptop PC and projector, the note taker can ensure that the correct
understanding of the hazard as raised by the participant has been recorded.
6.5 This continues, according to the planned schedule, until all the categories and issues
identified from the preliminary brainstorm have been exhausted. However, if during
the brainstorm activity, further issues and general hazard categories have been
identified in addition to those identified during the preliminary work, then these
should be explored until exhausted.
7 After the Brainstorming Session
7.1 The minutes or notes of the brainstorming session, which should be sectioned into
the hazard categories raised at the meeting, should be supplied to the participants
within a few days for error checking.

7.2 The results of the Hazard Identification process should be reviewed and a judgement
made as to the how successful the process has been. If, for example, it appears that
a particular hazard category has not raised the expected number of hazards, then
consideration should be given to arranging further brainstorming sessions (in the
lifecycle of a project, there may already be several iterations of Hazard Identification
planned providing the opportunity to focus up on any particular issue at a later stage).
7.3 The hazards identified from the Brainstorming Session, together with other Hazards
identified by other methods feed in to the next steps of the Hazard Analysis process
to ascertain the severity and likelihood of their consequences.
7.4 The hazards identified from the Brainstorming Session should be entered in the
Hazard Log where this is being maintained (see Appendix F).
NOTE: The brainstorming group may consist of the same team conducting the risk
assessment; therefore the group may allocate initial severity and likelihood
information to the hazard consequences immediately after the brainstorming
process to aid the later assessment.

Appendix B Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis
1 Introduction
1.1 Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a popular method used for
identifying hazards for risk assessment. It is a systematic analysis method used to
identify hazards at a functional overview level that can be developed further as more
system detail becomes available.
1.2 Although the FMECA process itself is simple, it can be time consuming and the
quantity of data assessed and recorded can make it appear complicated. A methodical
and disciplined approach to undertaking FMECA work is essential if the full benefit of
the FMECA analysis is to be delivered.
1.3 Generic guidance on the FMECA and FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) can
be found in:
a) International Standard IEC 812 - Analysis Techniques for System Reliability -
Procedure for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis.
b) Mil-Std 1629A - Procedure for Performing A Failure Modes and Effects Criticality
Analysis (although withdrawn from publication the FMECA process in this standard
is commonly used).
1.4 This document provides more specific guidance on performing FMECA analysis to
identify and categorize hazards when considering Air Traffic Service and Aerodrome
operations.
2 The FMECA Process
2.1 Figure 1 shows a flow diagram of the FMECA process.

2.2 The FMECA process can be undertaken at several points in the life cycle of a project,
typically:
a) At the initial Concept of Operations or Project Intentions/Ideas stage - where
system functions have been defined, but not necessarily the equipment, people or
procedures. Running a FMECA at this early stage will identify the most critical
functions or constituents of a system that may influence later design choices.
b) At initial system design or initial project definition - where functions are now
associated with equipment types and more information on the people and
procedures involved is available. Running a FMECA at this stage can help in the
final selection of equipment.
c) At the final stage on the actual equipment, procedures and people that will be
used. Running a FMECA at this stage will identify any equipment/procedure
specific failure consequences that may not have been apparent at the less detailed
stages and confirm or update the findings, estimates and assumptions of any
earlier FMECA activities.
2.3 Performing a FMECA at the earliest practical point in a project may reduce the amount
of work required later on. It may be found that some top-level functions do not pose
significant hazards if they fail; as such, further detailed FMECA analysis on lower level
system design supporting this function may not be required. Any decision to limit later
analysis based on this should be justified and recorded.
13 January 2006 Appendix B Page 1

2.4 An individual or a team of people may undertake the FMECA. Depending on the level
at which the FMECA is being performed and its scope, the individual or team should:
a) Have good knowledge of the Concept of Operation or Project Intentions.
b) Have good knowledge of the environment in which the system will operate.
c) Have experience of Operational Procedures, where these are being analysed.
d) Have good knowledge of the equipment functions and failure modes.
Figure 1 The FMECA Process

3 Defining the System to be Analysed
3.1 A FMECA can be scoped to run at any level, from complete integrated systems to
individual equipments. Typically the following applications of FMECA may apply:
a) Running a top-level functional FMECA on an entire Air Traffic or Aerodrome
operation. This will help define the top-level interactions and critical functions and
help define the structure in which lower level FMECA analysis will sit.
b) Running a medium level FMECA on a set of sub-systems supporting one overall
function e.g. a Surveillance System, combining Radar Sensor, Data Transmission
and Display systems or an Aerodrome Refuelling operation involving people,
equipment and procedures etc.
c) Running a detailed FMECA on an individual equipment or procedure. This may be
the case where new or replacement equipment is being installed in an existing
system, or where a procedure has been modified or replaced with a new one.
NOTE: It is recommended that Air Traffic Service providers and Aerodrome Operators who
identify a requirement for a detailed individual equipment level FMECA consider
passing this requirement on to the sub-contractor or equipment supplier i.e. where
the detailed design expertise on the equipment resides.
3.2 At whatever level the FMECA is being performed, it is essential that the system to be
analysed be clearly defined. Typically this will entail the development of Block
Diagrams and supporting narrative text.
4 Block Diagrams
4.1 The purpose of a block diagram is to give a pictorial representation of the system
components, what they do and how they relate to each other. Depending on the level
of the FMECA, blocks and links between blocks may contain different information.
4.2 Blocks may contain: Function Titles; System Elements (Equipment, People and
Procedures), Sub-Systems (e.g. part of an equipment or procedure) down to
component level. These should be labelled within the blocks. It is recommended to
number the blocks for easier reference during any discussions and for easier text
referencing in the narrative description.
4.3 Links between blocks are generally directional i.e. inputs and outputs (or more
generally influences on the block and influences the block has on other blocks). The
lines between the blocks should be labelled with the influence it has.
NOTE: If using a FMECA process to analyse Procedures, then the block diagram may take
the form of a series of steps shown as a sequence of operations.
5 Narrative Text
5.1 The purpose of the narrative text is to provide a description of the system. Typically
this relates to the block diagram, expanding on functions and influences where
necessary. Any assumptions about the system can be stated here. Text relating to
system elements shown in the block diagram can be related through reference to the
numbering of the blocks.

6 Defining Failure Modes
6.1 Rather than randomly think up failure conditions for each element of the system, it is
recommended to identify a set of failure conditions that can be sequentially applied
to each system element. Top-level failure modes are common across many systems
and typically include:
a) Operated too soon or unexpectedly.
b) Failed to stop operating at the correct time.
c) Failed to operate when required.
d) Operated, but with errors.
e) Failed during operation.
6.2 Depending of the level of the FMECA analysis and the system elements being
considered, a set of more specific failure modes can be defined. For ATS equipment
these may include:
a) Failed to transmit.
b) Stuck in transmit.
c) Intermittent Transmit.
d) Data lost.
e) Partial Data lost.
f) Total Data Corruption.
g) Partial Data Corruption.
6.3 For Aerodrome Functions these may include:
a) Fuel Spillage.
b) Manoeuvring Area surface damage.
6.4 For Procedures these may include:
a) Failed to undertake a step.
b) Skipped a step.
c) Undertook steps in wrong order.
d) Partially completed a step.
7 Performing the Analysis
7.1 With the block diagram of the system, associated narrative text and list of possible
failure modes it is now possible to start the analysis. The results of the analysis need
to be recorded and Figure 2 gives an example of construction of a table suitable for
this purpose.
7.2 The analysis process can be a long one, with many failure modes being analysed that
are very unlikely to occur or have insignificant consequence. However it is important
to systematically run through all of these to record the fact that they were considered.
Many sheets for recording the results may be required. Industry has produced
FMECA Software to run on a PC to help record and present results.

7.3 The analysis process involves addressing each element shown in the block diagram
in turn, applying the failure modes to the inputs and outputs or the function itself and
recording the following in the Table:
a) The system element being considered, including its identity number (where
numbered in the block diagram).
b) The Failure Mode being applied.
c) The possible causes of the failure - at the higher-level analysis this can be limited
to generic failure causes, rather than a long list of specific causes. At the lower
level analysis, specific causes can be listed.
d) The local effect of the failure - this can be limited to the effect on output to the next
system element, describing the characteristics of the effect.
e) The end effect of the failure - this is the overall effect on the Air Traffic Service or
Aerodrome Operation. Here it may be expeditious to indicate the Severity Level
according to Table 1 (see Chapter 3 - Step 3).
f) The Failure Detection Methods - record any mechanisms for identifying the failure
condition e.g. Control and Monitoring Systems, ATCO Detection on the Display.
g) Barriers and Mitigations - record any existing mechanisms for reducing the
probability of the failure occurring or reducing its severity (consequence). This is
only for existing mechanisms, and not for defining new barriers or mitigations - this
comes later in Step 6 of the 7 Step process. Also see Appendix D on Event Trees
to see whether event tree analysis will help identify any barriers.
h) The Probability of the Failure occurring - data may be available from equipment
suppliers or field service history of similar equipment. Estimates from experienced
Operational Staff and Engineers may be the best alternative.
i) The Tolerability of the Failure - Use Table 3 (see Chapter 3 - Step 5) with the
recorded severity and probability figures to identify and record the Tolerability
criteria e.g. Acceptable, Review or Unacceptable.
NOTE: This is a slight deviation from the traditional FMECA process, but makes sense
where following the 7 Step process.
j) Any other Comments - here record anything of significance not recorded in the
other sections of the table e.g. any additional assumptions or the rationale for
difficult decisions made.
8 Common Mode Failures
8.1 Environmental effects and some system failures may have an impact on more than
one system. Consideration should be given to these, for example:
a) Failure of the outside electricity supply.
b) Adverse weather.
c) Failure of air conditioning.
d) Fire.

9 The FMECA Report
9.1 Due to the volume of analysis material likely to be produced as a result of the FMECA
process, it is important to summarise the process and results in a FMECA report. The
purpose of the FMECA process described above is to identify and categorise hazards
in order that they may be considered further in the later steps of the 7 Step process.
9.2 It may be that several FMECA processes have been undertaken to analyse a
complicated or large system. The FMECA report is a place to bring together the
results of these analyses.
9.3 The report should contain:
a) The scope of the report i.e. what systems have been analysed.
b) Summary of how the analysis was performed: who, when and how the analysis
was conducted.
c) A summary of all the failure conditions other than those found to be
inconsequential.
10 Updating the Hazard Log
10.1 The hazards identified by the FMECA process should be entered in the Hazard Log
where this is being maintained (see Appendix F).

System I/D Failure Detection Barriers/
Cause Local effect End effect Severity Probability Comment
element no. mode method mitigation
CAP 760
13 January 2006
Figure 2 Example Structure of FMECA Table
Appendix B Page 7
Appendix C Hazard and Operability Studies
1 Introduction
1.1 A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a systematic functional hazard

identification process that uses an expert group to conduct a structured analysis of a
system using a series of guide words to explore potential hazards.
1.2 The HAZOP systematic approach to Hazard Analysis is complimentary to non-
systematic approaches such as the brainstorming method.
1.3 Table 1 provides an overview of the complete HAZOP process, from initial planning
and preparation through to evaluating the results. The remainder of this document
expands upon each point made in the table.
2 Initial Planning
2.1 HAZOP can be undertaken at several stages in the life cycle of a project. Early in a
project, HAZOP may be undertaken once a concept of operation has been drafted. As
the project develops and more detail becomes available, the HAZOP process should
be repeated typically at the Detailed Design stage, and once the System has been
implemented. Therefore performing HAZOP studies should be programmed into
project and safety plans from the outset.
2.2 Operational staff, e.g. Air Traffic Control Officers (ATCO), System Engineers, Pilots
and various Aerodrome Staff are normally key participants in a HAZOP group.
However operational commitments may limit their availability. Therefore advanced
planning and notification of HAZOP activity is required to enable the Air Traffic Service
Provider (ATSP), the Airline and the Aerodrome Manager to plan the release of these
staff.
Table 1 The Complete HAZOP Process
Plan Align risk assessment (including Hazard Identification) plans to the project
plans
Involve ATC service provider, the airline and the Aerodrome Manager for
participating Operational Staff early in the project due to their limited
availability.
Prepare Arrange participants

Study Leader - who plans and controls the meetings
A Recorder (Note Taker) who assists the Study Leader with
administration
System Expert or Designer - must be able to explain the design intent
of the system components
Users of the System e.g. ATCOs, Engineers, Pilots and Aerodrome
Staff.
Other Experts, particularly those knowledgeable about hazards with
similar systems
13 January 2006 Appendix C Page 1

Table 1 The Complete HAZOP Process (continued)
Prepare the HAZOP

Prepare System Representations: Components, Entities and
Attributes
Prepare Guide Word lists
Make presentations of
The HAZOP process and rules of conduct
General System introduction
Make a schedule for the HAZOP session
Arrange practical issues:
Room free from distractions
Flipchart
Laptop PC and Projector
Availability of refreshments
HAZOP Introduce using prepared presentations

HAZOPS
Conduct sequential analysis of the system
Make short notes of hazards on flipchart
Agree causes and consequences for credible hazards and record
them
Apply short breaks before productivity drops significantly
Close the session
Evaluate Distribute records of HAZOP with hazard log, requesting corrections

Evaluate the effectiveness of the HAZOP:
Any unanswered questions?
Decide whether and when another HAZOP session is needed
3 Preparation for the HAZOP Study
3.1 Participants
3.1.1 The number of participants at a HAZOP study should be limited to between 5 and 7
people.
3.1.2 The following participants should be involved in a HAZOP study session:
a) Study Leader: Controls the flow and timing of the meeting; states the rules of
conduct of the meeting. The Study Leader should lead the meeting through the
analysis by postulating possible deviations from design intent by applying the
HAZOP guide words sequentially to the system design. The Study Leader should
be:
Independent of the project, but knowledgeable of the design
representations (block diagrams etc) and knowledgeable in the technical/
operational field of the system.
Ideally familiar with, or trained in leading a HAZOP study.
A competent chairperson, maintaining harmonious control over proceedings.

b) Recorder (Note Taker): Somebody noting down the detail of the hazards; this may
be on a laptop PC connected to a projector so that the participants can correct any
misunderstandings.
c) Operation/System Expert: This should be somebody directly involved with the
planned project. They will need to explain the design role of each part of the
system under consideration. Typically this may be the Project Manager, Senior Air
Traffic Controller or Senior Systems Engineer. They may also present a project
overview at the beginning of the session.
d) Users of the System: Typically these will be Operational Staff such as:
Air Traffic Controller (or FISO): where possible this person should be familiar
with the planned project or should be familiar with the type of ATC functions
planned to be performed e.g. Approach, Area etc.
Pilot: where possible this person should be familiar with the planned project
or should be familiar with the types of aircraft that may be involved in the
planned project.
Engineer: where possible this person should be familiar with the planned
project or have experience operating or maintaining similar systems.
Aerodrome Staff: depending on the nature of the system, these could be
RFFS staff, security staff, refuelling staff etc. Where possibly these people
should be familiar with the planned project and the type of functions to be
performed.
e) Other Experts: Other Operational or System experts familiar with the system or
who can add value to the HAZOP process e.g. a Safety Analysis expert may be
present who could help the group with Safety terminology and structuring the
record of hazards (this role may be combined with the role of Recorder to more
efficiently facilitate the meeting).
4 Planning a HAZOP Session
4.1 Session Logistics

4.1.1 HAZOP sessions can be taxing on participants, therefore the following should be
considered when arranging the logistics of a session:
a) A meeting room protected from distractions e.g. no calls to be taken.
b) The preparation of a meeting schedule that divides the allocated time up into
manageable chucks with frequent refreshment breaks e.g. several half hour
sessions split by 10 minute breaks.
NOTE: Participants are normally more pro-active in morning sessions than afternoon
sessions;
c) Easy availability of refreshments.
4.2 Introductory HAZOP Presentation
4.2.1 Some participants to a HAZOP session may not be familiar with the process or what
is expected of them. It is therefore important to explain this, ideally in the form of a
short presentation covering:
a) Definition of a hazard.
b) How the HAZOP will be managed i.e. the rules.

4.2.2 The Study Leader would normally undertake the above presentation lasting no longer
than 10 minutes.
4.3 Project or System Presentation
4.3.1 Although many of the HAZOP participants may already be familiar with the project,
some may not be, therefore an overview of the project should be presented:
a) This should last no longer than half an hour.
b) It should not be very detailed, but typically cover:
The objective of the project.
Concept of Operation e.g. Airspace Configuration and Interfaces; Aerodrome
Layout; traffic characteristics; timeframe.
Human Roles (e.g. from an ATC, Pilot etc. point of view).
Procedures.
Technical Systems.
c) It should be biased towards pictures and diagrams.
NOTE: The pictures and diagrams e.g. airport layout, airways structure and charts, should
be made into posters and pinned or placed around the room where the HAZOP
activity takes place for easy reference.
4.3.2 The Operation/System Expert would normally undertake the above presentation.
5 Breakdown of the HAZOP process
5.1 Documented Representation of the System

5.1.1 One of the key requirements of the HAZOP session is a clear and complete
representation of the system being analysed. This is necessary in order to allow the
Study Leader to sequentially select the components or interconnections to be
analysed.
5.1.2 The system representation would normally take the form of a block diagram showing
system components and their interconnections. These can be at the physical level or
logical level.
5.1.3 More than one diagram may be required to represent the complete system.
5.1.4 The system representation should show the system as a set of:
a) Components: Discrete structures within the total system e.g. a radio transceiver
as used to communicate with aircraft or between ground staff.
b) Interconnections between components: e.g. linking a radio transceiver output to
an airborne receiver in an aircraft or other receivers at the aerodrome.
c) Entities: These relate directly to a component or an interconnection between
components. They take the form of nouns that describe the sub-components of
the main component and/or describe the content of the interconnections e.g. an
entity of the radio transceiver would be the microphone. Typical entities of
interconnections are 'data' and 'control data'.
d) Attributes: These are words that describe the properties of an entity. They
normally involve mechanical or electrical properties that can have values
associated with them e.g. voltage, level, bit rate and throughput. The attributes of
an entity are the items against which the HAZOP guide words are applied e.g. for

the radio transceiver microphone, attributes include transformation (audio to

electrical) and dynamic range.
NOTE: The above sounds more complicated than it is in practice. In general terms the
system is broken down to a component, then sub-component level with
interconnections and then labelled with physical or electrical attributes relating to the
function the component, sub-component or interconnection performs.
5.1.5 It is important to take care in putting the system representation together as it forms
the starting point of the HAZOP study.
5.2 Guide Words
5.2.1 A set of generic guide words is shown in Table 2.
5.2.2 More specific guide words may be generated relating more explicitly to the system
under consideration.
Table 2 Generic HAZOP Guide Words
Generic Guide Words
NO No part of the design intention is achieved e.g. No Power
MORE An increase above the design intention is present e.g. Too much power
LESS A decrease below the design intention is present e.g. Too little power
AS WELL AS The design intention is achieved, but something else is present e.g.
electrical noise on the power
PART OF Only some of the design intention is achieved e.g. intermittent power
REVERSE The design intention is the opposite of what happens e.g. no power, but
shorted to earth or current reversed
OTHER THAN The design intention is substituted by something different e.g. DC Power
expected, but AC Power presented instead
EARLY Something happens earlier in time than expected
LATE Something happens later in time than expected
BEFORE Relating to a sequence or order, something happens before it is expected
AFTER Relating to a sequence or order, something happens after it is expected
5.3 Conduct of the HAZOP Session

5.3.1 The Study Leader will make use of the System Representation to sequentially run
through all attributes associated with components, sub-components and
interconnections (entities).
5.3.2 Initially the Study Leader will identify a System Component or Interconnection from
the Design Representation. The Operational/System Expert then explains the
intended function of the choice made.
5.3.3 The Study Leader will then sequentially run through the entities and attributes
associated with the component or interconnection applying each of the Attribute
Guide Words (see Table 2) in turn.
5.3.4 The group will consider whether the deviation from intended function as understood
from the guide word is credible or not. If not credible, the decision should be recorded

for completeness and for ease of future reference. If credible, the following should
be recorded:
a) Details of the hazard identified including any detection mechanisms.
b) Recommendations for mitigating the hazard or its effects.
c) Recommendations for further study where there is uncertainty about any aspects
of the hazard, cause or consequences.
d) Any questions to be answered due to uncertainties.
e) Cross reference to any other relevant studies and documents.
5.3.5 Figure 1 shows a recommended method for recording the results of the HAZOP
study.
NOTE: The presence of protection or monitoring mechanisms must not stop the hazard
being explored. Their effectiveness in reducing the probability or mitigating the
consequences of the hazard may be assessed and the results recorded in the
HAZOP documentation.
5.3.6 The Study Leader concludes the analysis of the chosen attribute-guide-word by
summarising the findings, which are documented by the Recorder.
5.3.7 If using a laptop PC and projector, the Recorder can ensure that the correct
understanding of the hazard, causes and consequences as discussed by the
participants have been recorded.
5.3.8 This continues, according to the planned schedule, until all system components,
entities, attributes and guide words have been exhausted.
6 After the HAZOP Session
6.1 The record of the HAZOP session should be supplied to the participants within a few
days for error checking.
6.2 The results of the Hazard Identification process should be reviewed and a judgement
made as to the how successful the process has been. If, for example, unanswered
questions were raised at the HAZOP session, then answers to these need to be
found and consideration given to whether a further HAZOP session is required to
address any new information.
6.3 The hazards identified from the HAZOP Session, together with other Hazards
Identified by other methods feed in to the next steps of the Hazard Analysis process
to ascertain the severity and likelihood of their consequences.
6.4 The hazards identified using the HAZOPs process should be entered in the Hazard
Log where this is being maintained (see Appendix F).
NOTE: The HAZOP group may consist of the same team conducting the risk assessment;
therefore the group may allocate initial severity and likelihood information to the
hazard consequences immediately after the HAZOP process to aid the later
assessment.

Title of System Under Analysis: System description:
CAP 760
Figures/Diagrams Used:
Date:
13 January 2006
Study Leader:
Recorder:
Team Members:
Entity Indication
HAZOP Guide Questions/
(sub-component/ Attribute Cause Consequence or Comments
item word Recommendations
interconnections) protection
Figure 1 Example HAZOP Record Sheet
Appendix C Page 7
Appendix D Using Event Trees
1 Introduction
1.1 Event Tree analysis is used to analyse sequences of events that lead to incidents or
accidents. It should not be used for hazard identification. It is used to support hazard
identification and risk assessment by providing further insight into hazardous events
by examining the coincidental circumstances that need to be in place, and the barriers
that need to be breached, in order for a hazard to manifest into an accident or incident.
Event Trees can therefore be used on hazards to identify a more realistic likelihood of
an accident or incident occurring.
1.2 Event Trees can be used to determine the likelihood and severity of a range of
consequences given different sequences of events. This is best illustrated by an
example.
2 Example use of an Event Tree
2.1 Consider the erroneous plotting of an aircraft position on a radar display. This may
have been identified as a hazard during a systematic hazard identification session,
however it is not clear what the consequence of the plot error is without considering
other related factors e.g.:
a) Is the error persistent or just a one off glitch?
b) Does the air traffic controller believe the error, i.e. is the displayed position of the
plot in error credible?
c) Will the controller take action to redirect aircraft based on the erroneous plot data?
d) Will there be another aircraft nearby with the potential to cause a conflict? i.e. if
the erroneously plotted aircraft is the only aircraft in the area, then there will be no
conflict with other aircraft;
e) Will the pilots notice the potential conflict and resolve it?
f) Will the safety nets e.g. Short Term Conflict Alert and Traffic Collision Avoidance
System alert to the potential conflict leading to it being resolved?
g) Will the aircraft actually touch as they pass each other?
2.2 The above sequence of events can be shown diagrammatically as an Event Tree as
shown in Figure 1, where the erroneous plot on the radar screen is the 'initiating
event' i.e. the first triggering event of the sequence. The subsequent links in the tree
are often called 'lines of assurance' and consist of the protective systems, human
actions or other coincidental events that have some association with the initiating
event.
2.3 Each branch of the tree can have a probability associated with it (shown in the
brackets of Figure 1). The product of the paths through the trees to each
consequence can be calculated. It can be seen from the above sequence that even
where the erroneous plotting of an aircraft on a radar display is a common event i.e.
1 in 10, the other coincidences that have to occur and the barriers (e.g. the controller,
the pilot and the safety nets) that help prevent the critical incident occurring will mean
the probability of the aircraft colliding is low. However it can also be seen that the
above sequence may produce a range of incidents of differing severity and probability
e.g. loss of controller situational awareness and loss of separation are both more likely
than the aircraft colliding, but also of less severity.
13 January 2006 Appendix D Page 1

3 Identifying Barriers and Mitigations Using Event Trees
3.1 Modelling hazards using event trees can help identify all of the barriers and
coincidences that need to occur in order for an incident to occur. This helps produce
more realistic and reduced probabilities for incidents occurring. This can help reduce
the amount of arguments and evidence work required in the later stages of the risk
assessment and mitigation process.
3.2 The event tree process can help in the design of the system, identifying where best
to place barriers or mitigations that help prevent incidents occurring.
NOTE: These barriers and mitigations become Safety Requirements i.e. without them in
place, the risk of an incident increases.
3.3 Event trees can be used after an incident has occurred to help find out the causes,
likelihood of the event re-occurring and where best to put barriers to help prevent the
event occurring again.
Controller Controller Pilots fail to Safety nets Incident

Initiating Error is Other aircraft The aircraft
believes redirects detect the fail to alert to sequence Outcome
event persistent are nearby collide
the error aircraft conflict conflict identifier
Aircraft
position
1.1 No significant event
error on
NO (0.09)
radar
display (0.9)
1.2 No significant event
(0.1)
NO (0.009)
(0.9)
YES
(0.1) Controller loss of
1.3
NO situational awareness
(0.5) (0.0005)
YES
(0.1) Controller loss of
1.4 situational awareness
NO (0.5)
(0.00025)
YES Reportable incident-
(0.5) possible loss of
1.5
NO separation (0.000225)
(0.9)
YES
Reportable incident-
(0.5)
1.6 possible loss of
NO (0.9) separation (0.0000225)
YES (0.1)
1.7 Reportable incident-
NO (0.9) severe AIRPROX
(2.25x10-6)
YES
(0.1)
Aircraft mid-air
YES (0.1)
1.8 collision - loss of life
(2.5x10-7)
Figure 1 Event Tree for Erroneous Plot Position

4 Procedure for Event Tree Analysis
4.1 The procedure for performing Event Tree analysis consists of the following six steps:
a) Identify or Define the system or procedure of interest.
b) Identify the initiating events of interest.
c) Identify Lines of Assurance, Other Related or Coincidental Events or Other
Influencing Factors.
d) Define the incident and accident scenarios - the event trees.
e) Analyse incident sequence outcomes.
f) Summarise and present the results.
4.2 Each step is covered in more detail below.
4.3 Step 1 - Identify or Define the System or Procedure of Interest
4.3.1 Where using event tree analysis to support other systematic hazard analysis
processes (e.g. HAZOPs and FMECA), then it is likely that the systematic processes
will have already defined the system or procedure to be analysed. Where this is the
case, the event tree analysis can re-use this information.
4.3.2 Where no previous systematic analysis has been conducted, then it will be necessary
to define the system or procedure on which the event tree analysis is to be based.
The following should be considered:
a) The functions intended to be performed.
b) The equipment and people involved.
c) The boundaries of the system.
d) Interfaces between different sub-systems and interactions between people.
e) Different initial conditions of the system or procedures e.g. is the equipment in
operational or stand-by mode?
4.3.3 The system description, covering the above, can be presented in the form of narrative
text with supporting diagrams (e.g. system block diagrams).
4.4 Step 2 - Identify the Initiating Events of Interest
4.4.1 Event tree analysis may be performed on a sub-set of hazards that have been
selected from a larger set of hazards. The larger set of hazards should have been
developed from a systematic hazard identification process such as HAZOP or FMECA
or other broad hazard identification technique. The larger set of hazards needs to be
reviewed to identify those hazards of a more complex or interactive nature that
warrant further analysis using event trees. This review should be conducted by
experts in the system and may form part of the systematic hazard identification
process.
4.4.2 When performing event tree analysis, it may be more expeditious to eliminate certain
categories of events from the analysis that could impact on all event trees e.g. acts
of sabotage and wide scale natural disasters. Other common mode failure points such
as power supplies may also be excluded from event trees being used to explore in
detail particular problem areas. The failure of the power supplies may be modelled at
a more generic level. The limitations should be stated.
4.4.3 Often the types of hazard identified may be grouped into sets of similar events and
dealt with generically, which may help limit the number of Event Trees needed to be
produced.

4.5 Step 3 - Identify Lines of Assurance, Other Related or Coincidental Events or

Other Influencing Factors
4.5.1 This step involves identifying a pool of factors from which the branches of the event
tree will be later formed.
4.5.2 There are various factors that affect whether an initiating event will lead to an
incident. These factors need to be identified and can include:
a) Barriers, safeguards and mitigations. These are equipment and procedures
purposefully designed to prevent the initiating event manifesting into a serious
incident. In the example of Figure 1 these would be the Safety Nets that alert the
air traffic controller or pilots to the potential conflict.
b) Administrative or Personnel Systems such as the fire brigade or other emergency
response. These can limit the severity of an incident.
c) Human detection and intervention. This is where humans in the chain of events
detect the hazard and take steps mitigate it. In the example of Figure 1 both the
Air Traffic Controller dismissing the plot error as incredible and the pilots seeing the
potential conflict are examples of human detection.
d) Coincidental Events. These are events that need to occur at the same time, or in
sequence with the initiating event in order for the incident chain to propagate. They
are chance events. In the example of Figure 1 'other aircraft are nearby' and 'the
aircraft touch' can be considered coincidental or chance events.
e) Other Influencing Factors. These are other phenomena that may affect the
probability or severity of an incident. They include the weather and time of day. The
example at Figure 1 does not include weather, but it can be seen that low visibility
weather conditions may affect the ability of the pilots to detect the conflict
situation.
4.5.3 At the end of this step a pool of factors should be defined from which the event tree
can be constructed.
4.6 Step 4 - Define the Incident and Accident Scenarios - the Event Trees
4.6.1 This step defines the structure of the Event Tree by starting with the initiating event
and selecting related factors from the pool developed in the step above and putting
them in the sequence they are likely to occur.
4.6.2 There is a logical progression to an incident sequence that moves forward from the
time the initiating event occurs. As the incident sequence progresses and becomes
more severe or less probable, different systems respond in different ways.
Understanding the progression and timing of the system, physical and human
responses is essential in developing the logic of the event tree.
4.6.3 Care must be taken when constructing the tree to consider the following:
a) System Dependencies - Most systems interact with other machines and
processes in some way. These interactions may influence or degrade the level of
protection offered by redundant equipment and fallback systems. For example the
failure of the air conditioning system in a control tower may not only cause some
electronic equipment to overheat and fail, but also place air traffic controllers trying
to cope with the failing equipment under physical duress that may hamper their
performance.
b) Conditional Responses - The probability of success for a line of assurance (i.e. a
mitigation or barrier) may be conditioned on the success or failure of the lines of
assurance that precede it. For example the ability of pilots to be able to visually

detect a potential conflict may be conditioned on the preceding weather conditions

or time of day. It is therefore not unusual for the same line of assurance factor to
have different probabilities associated with it in different event trees or parts of the
same tree depending on what the preceding events or factors are.
c) Allocating the correct probabilities - Where possible, probabilities of event tree
branch outcomes should be shown in the event tree. However obtaining confident
probability data for the effectiveness of barriers can be difficult e.g. the probability
that a human will act in a particular way is difficult to predict. The following may
help provide more confident probability estimates:
Modelling the particular protection device, procedure or human e.g. by using
Human Reliability Analysis (a technique for predicting human performance -
not covered in this guidance document).
Using field evidence of other system performance to estimate this system
performance.
The judgement of experts in the systems concerned.
4.7 Step 5 - Constructing the Event Tree Logic
4.7.1 Event tree construction consists of the following steps:
a) List the initiating event on the left side of the tree.
b) List the lines of assurance, barriers and other influencing factors or conditions
across the top of the tree in sequential order.
c) Identify success and failure branches at each branch point (the point below a listed
line of assurance etc.) and add probabilities if known. Consider the following:
Some branch points may have more than two outcomes.
Some branch points may have only one outcome where its conditional
probability is 1 or 0 i.e. as a result of a preceding event, the outcome of this
event is 100% certain.
d) Keep positive or high probability branches of branch pairs or groups at the top of
each branch point to aid later sorting of priority items i.e. if highest probability
outcomes are always kept to the top, then the topmost outcome will be the most
probable.
e) Continue developing the branches and branch points to the right until the
sequence of factors is exhausted.
4.7.2 Figure 1 is an example of what an Event Tree can look like.
4.8 Step 6 - Analyse the Incident Sequence Outcomes
4.8.1 The final outcome for each combination of branches is listed at the right hand side of
the event tree. It may also be beneficial to label each of the branch combinations with
a sequence identifier number or letter to aid any later reference to specific sequences
in the event tree.
4.8.2 The final consequence of each sequence of events may be obvious and can be easily
appended to the Event Tree in the final column. However, for some sequences of
events it is not immediately clear what the consequences may be. Where this is the
case, then further work modelling the event sequence or using expert judgement
may be necessary to determine the consequence before entering this in the event
tree.
4.8.3 Where probabilities have been used in the event tree branches, then the probability
for each sequence of events leading to an outcome can be calculated by multiplying
all of the probabilities in a sequence together.

4.8.4 A qualitative assessment of the likelihood of an outcome can be based on counting

the number of branches (barriers, mitigations and coincidences) between the
initiating event and the outcome i.e. counting the number of events that have to come
together in order to cause the outcome. A low number means an outcome is likely,
whilst a high number equates to an unlikely outcome. A judgement call will be needed
to assess just how likely or unlikely the outcome is from the knowledge of how
effective the protective systems or procedures forming the event tree branches are.
4.9 Step 7 - Summarise The Results
4.9.1 Where large sets of Event Trees have been produced a practical way of presenting
the information from the trees is required. This can be achieved through tabulating the
following:
a) Initiating event.
b) Event sequence number (for traceability back to the event tree).
c) The probability or likelihood.
d) The outcome or consequence.
4.9.2 Table 1 shows the summary table for the event tree of Figure 1.
Table 1 Event Tree Summary Table
Initiating Event: Aircraft Position Error on Radar Display
Incident
Sequence Probability Consequence
Number
1.1 0.09 No significant Event
1.2 0.009 No significant Event
1.3 0.0005 Controller Loss of Situational Awareness
1.4 0.00025 Controller Loss of Situational Awareness
1.5 0.000225 Reportable incident - possible separation loss
1.6 0.0000225 Reportable incident - possible separation loss
1.7 2.25x10-6 Reportable incident - severe Airprox
1.8 2.5x10-7 Aircraft mid-air collision - loss of life

Appendix E Diagrammatic Representation of Safety

Arguments
1 Introduction
1.1 There are a number of diagrammatic ways to represent safety arguments. For
example, the University of York1 developed Goal Structured Notation (GSN) in the
1990s and Adelard2 developed Claim Argument Evidence (CAE) notation around the
same time.
1.2 For illustrative purposes this Appendix concentrates on GSN and its use.
1.3 GSN uses a top-down block diagram approach to representing safety arguments that
is simple to understand. It is the way in which GSN diagrams are intuitively
understood by a wide range of people who may need to understand the safety
arguments for a system that makes it valuable.
1.4 GSN diagrams may also grow with the development of the safety case through
different parts of the project lifecycle.
1.5 This Appendix gives a basic explanation of the GSN symbols and an example of their
use.
NOTE: The inclusion of this Appendix on GSN is not CAA endorsement of the GSN system
over any other diagrammatic way to represent safety arguments. Users are free to
use any diagrammatic notation that meets their requirements.
2 Goal Structured Notation - GSN
2.1 GSN uses a set of block diagram shapes filled with text to represent different parts
of a safety argument. Each block should be numbered. The block diagram shapes are
shown in Figure 1 and their uses are explained as follows.
2.1.1 The Goal - (a rectangle) the goal is the ambition that the safety argument or
arguments are trying to satisfy. Goals can take the form of Safety Requirements or
Safety Objectives. A Goal would normally appear at the top of the GSN diagram and
there may be further sub-goals at a lower level that contribute to meeting the top-level
goal. Number using G1, G2, G3 etc for top-level goals and G1.1, G1.2 etc for sub-
goals.
2.1.2 The Strategy - (a rhombus) the strategy would normally appear just below a Goal and
will explain how the Goal will be demonstrated to be met. It is optional. A typical
strategy will be to divide the goal up into a set of smaller safety requirements and
address each one in turn. More than one strategy can be attached to the goal above
i.e. there may be multiple ways to demonstrate, or partially demonstrate a goal, that
combine to create a more credible proof. Note that High and Medium Required Level
of Confidence for safety requirements specify that diverse sources of evidence are
required (see Appendix G). Number using S1, S2, S3 etc.
2.1.3 The Context - (a curved sided rectangle) the context can be attached to any other
shape and contains the operational environment for which this argument is valid.
Number using C1, C2, C3 etc.
1. www.cs.york.ac.uk
2. www.adelard.co.uk
13 January 2006 Appendix E Page 1

2.1.4 The Assumptions - (an oval with an 'A' to the bottom right) the assumptions can be
attached to any other shape and contain anything that has to be assumed for this
argument to be valid. Number using A1, A2, A3 etc.
2.1.5 The Justifications - (an oval with a 'J' to the bottom right) the justifications can be
attached to any other shape and contain the reasoning behind the content of the
associated shape. For example the justification for a Target Level of Safety figure
used in a safety requirement may be that a regulatory body mandates it. Number
using J1, J2, J3 etc.
2.1.6 The Solutions - (a circle) the solution normally equates to items or sets of evidence
that demonstrate that the goal or sub-goal above is being met. Number using S1, S2,
S3 etc.
2.1.7 Linking Arrows - these take two forms:
a) Links with solid arrowheads generally flow in the direction top to bottom and
represent the words 'is solved by'.
b) Links with hollow arrowheads generally flow horizontally and are associated with
context, assumption and justification shapes and represent the words 'in the
context of'.
2.1.8 To be developed - (a diamond) this symbol found at the bottom of a goal, sub-goal or
strategy indicates that further work to demonstrate this goal is required. Typically this
is found in safety cases early in the lifecycle of a project i.e. before the system has
been implemented and evidence amassed.

Figure 1

3 Example of Goal Structured Notation
3.1 Consider a surveillance system designed to provide a service suitable for a minimum
of 3NM separation within a defined volume of airspace. In this example we will
assume that a hazard identification and risk assessment process has been conducted
on the surveillance system and that a number of safety requirements concerning the
system have been generated. We will assume that one such safety requirement is as
follows: 'The accuracy of the displayed position of aircraft within the surveillance
system shall be sufficient to operate safely using 3NM separation'.
3.2 We can consider this safety requirement as a top-level goal within a GSN structure as
shown in Figure 2 (although in practice this requirement is likely to be one of several
sub-goals of a higher level goal e.g. 'the performance of the surveillance system shall
meet the operational requirements').
3.3 Associated with this top-level goal is the context for which the GSN structure is valid
i.e. within the desired coverage volume as defined in the Operational Requirement.
3.4 Leading down from the top-level goal is a strategy. This sets out how it is intended to
prove that the goal has been satisfied. In this case the strategy is to examine each of
the surveillance sub-systems for the characteristics of their errors, combine them into
one probability distribution, separate 2 such distributions by the desired separation
i.e. 3NM and integrate the area where the tails overlap to obtain a probability of
collision due to surveillance system position error.
3.5 Below this strategy are a series of sub-goals that consider each of the surveillance
sub-systems in turn and below these are solutions in the form of sources of evidence
that demonstrate the sub-goals are met.
3.6 Shown in the middle at a lower level is the important sub-goal G1.5. This goal is that
the combination of the various sub-system errors and the analysis of the overlapping
tails of the probability distributions should be tolerably safe. Associated with this goal
is an assumption of what a tolerably safe overlap (or probability of collision) is and a
justification for the figure shown in the assumption i.e. it appears in a regulatory
standard.
3.7 Below this is the final solution in the form of evidence that the analysis shows that a
tolerably safe figure can be achieved.

G1
C1
Within the desired
CAP 760
The accuracy of the displayed position

operational coverage volume
of the aircraft within the radar system
defined in Operational
shall be sufficient to operate safely
Requirement document
using 3NM seperation
13 January 2006
Str 1
Sum the errors of the of the sub-systems;
associate with a probability distribution;
separate 2 distributions by 3NM and
integrate the overlapping tails to
determine the probability of collision
G1.1 G1.2 G1.3 G1.4
The Radar azimuth error The radar range error shall The radar data distribution The radar display errors
shall be small such that be small such that when quantisation error shall be small shall be small such that
when combined with other combined with other errors, such that when combined with when combined with other
errors, 3NM separation can 3NM separation can be other errors, 3NM separation errors, 3NM separation
be safely used safely used can be safely used can be safely used
S1.1b S1.2b
S1.1a S1.2a S1.3a S1.4a
Measured Measured range
Theoretical Theoretical Theoretical Theoretical
azimuth performance of
analysis of radar analysis of radar analysis of data analysis of radar
performance of the radar
azimuth errors range errors distribution errors display errors
the radar
G1.5 A1.5 J1.5

The tolerable The tolerable probability
The overlapping tails of the combined error
probability of collision of collision of 7 x 10-7 is
distributions when seperated by 3NM shall
is 7 x 10-7 stated in CAP 670
achieve a tolerable probability of collision
A J
S1.5
Analysis results of
overlapping error tails
show tolerable
collision risk is met
Figure 2 Goal Structured Notation Example
Appendix E Page 5
Appendix F Hazard Logs
1 Introduction
1.1 Hazard Logs are a structured way to record the hazards identified pertaining to a
project or system and to record the actions that are planned or have taken place to
address the hazards registered.
1.2 The Hazard Log should be used at the very beginning of a project and be kept up to
date as a living document throughout the lifecycle of the project.
1.3 Early in the life of a Hazard Log, the information logged for each hazard may be
limited. As the project develops and further risk assessment and mitigation processes
are undertaken, more detail can be added to the Log.
1.4 At milestones of a project, for example just before putting a new system into
operational service, the Hazard Log can be reviewed to see the status of the
associated hazards i.e. to ensure that all hazards have been addressed (mitigated) or
accepted and prove to be a tolerable risk.
1.5 The Hazard Log can be used to log the outcome of the Hazard Identification
processes e.g. Brainstorming, FMECA, HAZOPs etc.
2 Developing a Hazard Log
2.1 The Hazard Log normally takes the form of a series of forms, where each form filled
in represents one hazard or one of several possible consequences of a hazard.
Figure 1 shows the typical composition of a Hazard Log. Within the form are a series
of headings that are explained further in the following text.
2.2 Project or System: State the project or system to which the hazard identified is
applicable.
2.3 Hazard Log ID: Use this entry to uniquely number this hazard log entry for document
control purposes.
2.4 Hazard ID: Copy any Hazard Identity (ID) number allocated during the Hazard
Identification process.
2.5 Identified by: Name the person or group that identified the hazard and/or the hazard
identification process used.
2.6 Date Created: Enter the date that this Hazard Log form was first used.
2.7 Last Update Action: State the last fields on this form that were updated.
2.8 Date of Last Update: Enter the date the last time this form was updated.
2.9 Hazard Description: Describe the hazard. This may take the form of how the hazard
was recorded during a hazard identification process.
2.10 Hazard Category: Use this field to enter categories for sorting hazards e.g. Technical,
Operational, Training, and Procedural etc.
2.11 Hazard Consequence: Enter the consequence that the hazard could manifest.
NOTE: A single hazard may have more than one consequence. Use multiple sheets where
other significant consequences need to be logged.
13 January 2006 Appendix F Page 1

2.12 This Hazard Probability (Qualitative and/or Quantitative): Enter the probability of
the hazard manifesting into the consequence. Enter a probability value if available, or
qualitative description (see Table 2 from Chapter 3 Step 4).
2.13 Cumulative Hazards Probability (Qualitative and/or Quantitative): Where it has
been identified that more than one hazard leads to the same consequence, enter the
summation of the probabilities of the contributing hazards to identify the total
likelihood of the consequence manifesting.
2.14 Severity: Enter the severity (see Table 1 from Chapter 3 Step 3).
2.15 Proposed Action/Mitigation: Enter the action or mitigation that has been devised to
deal with this hazard.
2.16 Proposed By: Name the person or team that proposed the action or mitigation.
2.17 Actionee: Name the person, team or organisation that will be carrying out the action
or mitigation.
2.18 Planned Date: Enter the date when the Proposed Action/Mitigation is intended to be
implemented.
2.19 Mitigation/Action Taken: State the action actually taken (this may be as proposed
above).
2.20 Date of Action: Enter the date the action was taken.
2.21 Action Status: State whether the Action is ongoing, partially complete or complete.
2.22 Status of this Hazard Log Entry: Enter whether this Hazard Log entry is awaiting
any further input, is awaiting closure etc.
2.23 Date Closed: Enter the date when it was agreed that no further action would be taken
with respect to this Hazard Log entry.
2.24 Continuation Sheet? (Y/N): Enter 'Y' where there is further information relevant to
this Hazard Log entry contained on an additional sheet of paper.

Project or system Hazard Log ID
Hazard ID Identified by Date created
Last update action Date of last update
Hazard Description
Hazard Category
Hazard Consequence
This hazard probability (Qualitative and/or quantitative) Severity
Cumulative hazards probability (Qualitative and/or quantitative)
Proposed action/mitigation
Proposed by Actionee Planned date
Mitigation/action taken
Date of action Action status
State of this hazard log entry Date closed
Continuation sheet? (Y/N)
Figure 1 Hazard Log Form

Appendix G Required Level of Confidence in Evidence
1 Introduction
1.1 The more critical a Safety Requirement is i.e. the more likely and more severe the
consequences of failure to meet that Safety Requirement are, then a higher level of
assurance is required to provide confidence that the Safety Requirement is met.
1.2 An increased level of confidence comes from an increased quantity, quality and
diversity of evidence (see Chapter 3 paragraph 7.9). Conversely, a low criticality or low
probability hazard does not require large quantities of evidence to prove that the
associated Safety Requirement has been met.
1.3 The concept of Required Level of Confidence has been developed to provide a
measure of the quantity, quality and diversity of evidence necessary to adequately
prove that a safety requirement has been met.
NOTE: Reference to Safety Requirements throughout this Appendix applies equally to
Safety Objectives.
2 Determining the Required Level of Confidence for Derived Safety

Requirements
2.1 The Required Level of Confidence can be determined by identifying the criticality of
the Safety Requirement being considered. The criticality of the Safety Requirement
can be determined by analysing the effect of removing the safety requirement to see
what severity of consequence manifests and with what likelihood. For Safety
Requirements generated by this procedure this information should already be
available at Step 5 where the consequence has been categorised in terms of severity
and likelihood. Table 1 can then be used to look up the Required Level of Confidence
for the hazard by locating the cell in the table where the probability and severity are
aligned.
NOTE: Several hazards may all lead to the same consequence. It is the severity and overall
probability of the consequence that is important, not the individual hazard threads1.
It may therefore be necessary to sum the probabilities of the contributing hazard
threads and use this total to identify where the overall consequence sits in the
Required Level of Confidence table (for more on summing probabilities, see Chapter
3 Step 5). The Safety Requirement(s) of each contributing hazard thread will then
inherit the Required Level of Confidence for the consequence.
3 Determining the Required Level of Confidence for Statutory Safety

Requirements
3.1 Externally applicable requirements found in International Standards and other

mandatory requirements documentation such as CAA CAPs and European Common
Requirements may contain large numbers of detailed requirements, many of which
are also Safety Requirements i.e. where the requirement is not complied with, there
is an increase in the likelihood of an incident occurring, or the severity of the incident.
Ideally, the Required Level of Confidence for each identified safety requirement
should be established. However due to the large quantity of requirements,
1. A hazard thread consists of the hazard, consequence, likelihood, severity, mitigation and safety requirement.
13 January 2006 Appendix G Page 1

categorising the hazards by assessing what would happen if each one was not
complied with may not be practical. An acceptable approach to this is to consider sets
of requirements as contributing to an overall function of a system e.g. a set of
technical requirements for a system may contribute to a system working correctly.
This top-level function can then be assessed in terms of its failure or corruption to
determine the criticality of the incidents that manifest themselves. This criticality can
then be adopted by the set of requirements that contribute to the overall function. It
is likely that the criticality of the top-level function under consideration will have
already been established as part of this hazard identification and risk assessment
process of this procedure e.g. during brainstorming, HAZOP or FMECA analysis.
From the criticality determined for the top-level function and hence the set of
requirements, the Required Level of Confidence can be looked up from Table 1
below.
3.2 The Risk Classification/Tolerability Table of Step 5 has been copied here as Table 1
and modified to show the Required Level of Confidence (within brackets) for each cell
of table as either:
a) HIGH.
b) MEDIUM.
c) LOW.
3.3 Where the user has defined their own risk classification matrix at step 5, then the
following will apply:
a) Any cells marked Unacceptable will take on the required level of confidence value
HIGH.
b) Any cells marked Review will take on the required level of confidence value
MEDIUM.
c) Any cells marked Acceptable will take on the required level of confidence value
LOW.
Probability of Occurrence

Remote Frequent
< 10-9 per 10-7 to 10-9 per 10-5 to 10-7 10-3 to 10-5 1 to 10-3 per
hour hour per hour per hour hour
(Required Level of Confidence)
Accidents Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable

(MEDIUM) (HIGH) (HIGH) (HIGH) (HIGH)
ESARR 4 Severity
Serious Acceptable Review Unacceptable Unacceptable Unacceptable

Incidents (LOW) (MEDIUM) (HIGH) (HIGH) (HIGH)
Major Acceptable Acceptable Review Unacceptable Unacceptable

Incidents (LOW) (LOW) (MEDIUM) (HIGH) (HIGH)
Significant Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Review Unacceptable

Incidents (LOW) (LOW) (LOW) (MEDIUM) (HIGH)
No Effect Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Review

Immediately (LOW) (LOW) (LOW) (LOW) (MEDIUM)
Table 1 Risk Classification and Required Level of Confidence

4 Accepted Evidence Levels and Sources
4.1 Each of the Required Levels of Confidence is expanded upon in the text and tables
that follow showing the expected level and depth of evidence required for each of the
three categories: HIGH, MEDIUM and LOW. This is further broken down into
suggested Direct and Backing evidence for three types of evidence: Test, Field
Service and Analytical.
5 HIGH - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements
5.1 High confidence evidence is where any uncertainties or assumptions are minimised
or err on the side of pessimism i.e. the worst is assumed. For high confidence the
quantity of evidence should be substantial and diverse forms of evidence should be
used i.e. Testing, Field Service and Analytical evidence.
5.2 For equipment and systems supplied by third parties, the cooperation of the supplier
is essential because design specifications, manufacturing specifications, design test
results and quality assurance data is typically required to support claims and
arguments.
5.3 Where possible evidence should be subjected to independent scrutiny through
rigorous internal or external quality assurance inspection or audit.
6 MEDIUM - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements
6.1 Medium confidence evidence is where any uncertainties or assumptions are

minimised or err on the side of optimism i.e. the worst may not be assumed. For
Medium confidence the quantity of evidence should be balanced to the risk. At least
two diverse forms of evidence should be used i.e. Testing, and Field Service or
Testing and Analytical evidence etc.
6.2 For equipment and systems supplied by third parties, the cooperation of the supplier
may be required because design specifications, manufacturing specifications, design
test results and quality assurance data may be required to support claims and
arguments.
6.3 Where possible, evidence should be subjected to independent scrutiny through
internal or external quality assurance inspection or audit, however a sampling
approach to the audit may be used.
7 LOW - Required Level of Confidence General Requirements
7.1 Low confidence evidence is where any uncertainties or assumptions are minimised
or err on the side of optimism i.e. the worst may not be assumed. For Low confidence
the quantity of evidence may be low. Only one form of evidence may be required.
However it is recommended to use more than one form of evidence.
7.2 For equipment and systems supplied by third parties, design and manufacturing
evidence may not be required, unless it can be provided cost effectively. However
good working practice will still need to be demonstrated so some information from
the supplier organizations may be required.
7.3 The evidence should be subjected to scrutiny through inspection or audit, however a
sampling approach may be used.

8 Required Level of Confidence Tables
8.1 Tables 2 to 10 suggest various forms of evidence at different levels according to the
Required Level of Confidence as follows:
Table 2 - HIGH Confidence Test Evidence
Table 3 - MEDIUM Confidence Test Evidence
Table 4 - LOW Confidence Test Evidence
Table 5 - HIGH Confidence Field Service Evidence
Table 6 - MEDIUM Confidence Field Service Evidence
Table 7 - LOW Confidence Field Service Evidence
Table 8 - HIGH Confidence Analytical Evidence
Table 9 - MEDIUM Confidence Analytical Evidence
Table 10 - LOW Confidence Analytical Evidence

Table 2 HIGH Confidence Test Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
Backing Required evidence
form level
evidence
TEST HIGH Direct evidence a) Tests and acceptance criteria are specified for all relevant behavioural characteristics for each safety
requirement.
b) Testing was carried out that shows that the acceptance criteria for each characteristic tested has been met.
c) Test Specifications, Acceptance Criteria, Test Results, Analysis of Test Results and Analysis of Faults
discovered during testing should all be documented and available.
d) All faults discovered during testing have been analysed and their existence does not adversely affect safety.
Backing a) Tools used in testing have been validated. For example where simulators are used, these should have been
evidence tested and found acceptable; where specific test equipment is used, it should be within calibration and
certificates should be available.
b) Test procedures and the tests themselves are sufficiently thorough and are representative of the demands
that will be made on the system when it is in service. For example evidence showing how the test
procedure was derived, the reason for each test and why it is considered an appropriate test should be
provided; a Verification Cross Reference Index (VCRI) may be useful in this respect, linking source
requirements to tests. All safety requirements should be covered by testing where possible and practical.
Any safety requirements not covered by testing must be covered by analytical and/or field service evidence.
c) The test specifications were generated independently of the design e.g. the staff or organisation developing
the test specifications were not the same as those that designed the system.
d) The testing was performed independently from the design e.g. the staff or organisation carrying out the
testing were not the same as those that designed the system.
e) The test specifications and testing should be subject to audit and scrutiny during testing by Quality
Assurance representatives within the organisation or from an external organisation; audit and test
observation reports should be available.
Appendix G Page 5
Table 3 MEDIUM Confidence Test Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
TEST MEDIUM Direct evidence a) Tests are specified for all relevant behavioural characteristics for each safety requirement.
b) Testing was carried out that shows that the acceptance criteria for each characteristic tested has been met.
c) Test Specifications, Acceptance Criteria, Test Results, Analysis of Test Results and Analysis of Faults
discovered during testing should all be documented and available.
Backing a) Tools used in testing have been validated. For example where simulators are used, these should have been
evidence tested and found acceptable; where specific test equipment is used, it should be within calibration and
certificates should be available.
b) Test procedures and the tests themselves are sufficiently thorough and are representative of the demands
that will be made on the system when it is in service. For example evidence showing how the test
procedure was derived, the reason for each test and why it is considered an appropriate test should be
provided; a Verification Cross Reference Index (VCRI) may be useful in this respect, linking source
requirements to tests.
c) The test specifications and testing should be subject to scrutiny during testing by Quality Assurance or
other customer representatives within the organisation or from an external organisation.
Appendix G Page 6
Table 4 LOW Confidence Test Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
TEST LOW Direct evidence a) Tests are specified for a sample of behavioural characteristics of the safety requirements.
b) Testing was carried out that shows that the acceptance criteria for the sample of characteristics tested has
been met.
c) Test Specifications, Acceptance Criteria, Test Results and Analysis of Faults discovered during testing
should all be documented and available.
Backing a) None required - however it is recommended to provide the backing evidence applicable for the Medium
evidence Evidence Level where available.
Appendix G Page 7
Table 5 HIGH Confidence Field Service Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
FIELD HIGH Direct a) An analysis process specifying pass/fail criteria was specified for each characteristic of the system safety
SERVICE evidence requirement that is being justified from Field Service experience.
b) The analysis of Field Service records show that the pass criteria for each characteristic of the safety requirement
being justified from Field Service experience has been satisfied.
c) For credible Field Service Experience the following should be available as evidence: length of service; history of
modifications; list of users.
Backing a) The proposed system and the system from which Field Service evidence is being claimed should be identical;
evidence where differences exist, then the affect on the applicability of the evidence should be analysed and recorded.
b) The proposed operational environment and the operational environment from which Field Service evidence is
being claimed should be identical; where differences exist, then the affect of on the applicability of the evidence
should be analysed and recorded.
c) All functions and characteristics of the system safety requirements being justified from Field Service experience
should be shown to be exercised in the deployed system.
d) A Defect Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) is in place for the deployed system, and is
operated in a reliable manner, adequate to support the claims made for the system. A Mandatory Occurrence
Reporting (MOR) scheme can be considered a Defect Reporting scheme for Operating Procedures.
e) The Reporting schemes should be subject to periodic audit by Quality Assurance representatives in the
organisation or from an external organisation.
f) For all failures of the system recorded the cause of the failure has been identified, corrected, or that the failure is
not relevant because it has no safety impact.
g) The Field Service records are correct and complete.
h) The procedures and any tools used to support the analysis of the Field Service experience were verified and
validated; these may have been subject to audit by Quality Assurance representatives.
Appendix G Page 8
Table 6 MEDIUM Confidence Field Service Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
FIELD MEDIUM Direct evidence a) An analysis process specifying pass/fail criteria was specified for each characteristic of the system safety
SERVICE requirement that is being justified from field service experience.
b) The analysis of Field Service records show that the pass criteria for each characteristic of the safety
requirement being justified from Field Service experience has been satisfied.
c) For credible Field Service Experience the following should be available as evidence: length of service;
history of modifications; list of users.
Backing a) The proposed system and the system from which Field Service evidence is being claimed should be
evidence identical; where differences exist, then the affect on the applicability of the evidence should be analysed
and recorded.
b) The proposed operational environment and the operational environment from which Field Service evidence
is being claimed should be identical; where differences exist, then the affect of on the applicability of the
evidence should be analysed and recorded.
c) All functions and characteristics of the system safety requirements being justified from Field Service
experience should be shown to be exercised in the deployed system.
d) A Defect Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (DRACAS) is in place for the deployed system,
and is operated in a reliable manner, adequate to support the claims made for the system. A Mandatory
Occurrence Reporting (MOR) scheme can be considered a Defect Reporting scheme for Operating
Procedures.
e) The Reporting schemes should be subject to periodic review or audit.
f) For all failures of the system recorded the cause of the failure has been identified, corrected, or that the
failure is not relevant because it has no safety impact.
g) The Field Service records are correct and complete.
Appendix G Page 9
Table 7 LOW Confidence Field Service Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
FIELD LOW Direct evidence a) An analysis process specifying pass/fail criteria was specified for a sample of characteristics of the system
SERVICE safety requirement that is being justified from field service experience.
b) The analysis of Field Service records show that the pass criteria for the sample of characteristics of the
safety requirement being justified from Field Service experience has been satisfied.
c) For credible Field Service Experience the following should be available as evidence: length of service;
history of modifications; list of users.
Backing a) The proposed system and the system from which Field Service evidence is being claimed should be similar;
evidence where differences exist, then the affect on the applicability of the evidence should be analysed and
recorded.
b) The proposed operational environment and the operational environment from which Field Service evidence
is being claimed should be similar; where differences exist, then the affect of on the applicability of the
evidence should be analysed and recorded.
c) A sample of functions and characteristics of the system safety requirements being justified from Field
Service experience should be shown to be exercised in the deployed system.
d) For all failures of the system recorded the cause of the failure has been identified.
e) The Field Service records are correct and complete.
Appendix G Page 10
Table 8 HIGH Confidence Analytical Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
ANALYTICAL HIGH Direct evidence a) An analysis process with pass/fail criteria was specified for each attribute of the safety requirement that is
being justified by analysis of the design.
b) The specified acceptance criteria for each attribute of the safety requirement being justified by analysis of
the design have been satisfied.
Backing a) The design documentation is capable of supporting the identification of the appropriate safety requirements
evidence and their attributes.
b) The design documentation is a sufficient representation of the system allowing adequate analysis of the
design (more than one design notation may be used as part of the design documentation at any given
design level).
c) The analytic methods and techniques used are appropriate for the attributes of the safety requirement.
d) The analysis techniques have been applied by adequately qualified and experienced staff (Staff are deemed
to be appropriately qualified and experienced if they understand the design documentation, are experienced
in using it, and understand the analysis approach, the required attributes and the system context).
e) Assumptions used in the analysis (e.g. about the environment, hardware, software, operating system and
other interfaces) have been validated.
f) The formal proofs or arguments submitted are logically correct. This may be shown either by manual
inspection or by tool-based checking,
g) Any procedures and tools used to support the analysis have been verified and validated.
h) Any analysis tools or procedures used do not corrupt or cause the system to deviate from its design intent
such that the integrity of the results are compromised.
i) Evidence of the analytical process and results of the analysis have been subjected to inspection or audit by
independent external qualified personnel. Audit and/or inspection reports should be available.
Appendix G Page 11
Table 9 MEDIUM Confidence Analytical Evidence
CAP 760
Evidence Evidence Direct or Required evidence

form level Backing
13 January 2006
evidence
ANALYTICAL MEDIUM Direct evidence a) An analysis process with pass/fail criteria was specified for each attribute of the safety requirement that
is being justified by analysis of the design.
b) The specified acceptance criteria for each attribute of the safety requirement being justified by analysis
of the design have been satisfied.
Backing a) The design documentation is capable of supporting the identification of the appropriate safety
evidence requirements and their attributes.
b) The design documentation is a sufficient representation of the system allowing adequate analysis of the
design (more than one design notation may be used as part of the design documentation at any given
design level).
c) The analytic methods and techniques used are appropriate for the attributes of the safety requirement.
d) The analysis techniques have been applied by adequately qualified and experienced staff (Staff are
deemed to be appropriately qualified and experienced if they understand the design documentation, are
experienced in using it, and understand the analysis approach, the required attributes and the system
context).
e) Assumptions used in the analysis (e.g. about the environment, hardware, software, operating system and
other interfaces) have been validated.
f) The formal proofs or arguments submitted are logically correct. This may be shown either by manual
inspection or by tool-based checking,
g) Evidence of the analytical process and results of the analysis have been subjected to inspection or audit.
Appendix G Page 12
Table 10 LOW Confidence Analytical Evidence
CAP 760
Direct or
Evidence Evidence
13 January 2006
form level
evidence
ANALYTICAL LOW Direct evidence a) An analysis process with pass/fail criteria was specified for a sample of attributes of the safety requirement
that is being justified by analysis of the design.
b) The specified acceptance criteria for the sample of attributes of the safety requirement being justified by
analysis of the design have been satisfied.
Backing a) The design documentation is a sufficient representation of the system allowing adequate analysis of the
evidence design
b) The analytic methods and techniques used are appropriate for the attributes of the safety requirement.
c) The analysis techniques have been applied by competent staff.
Appendix G Page 13

CAP760 - Hazard & Risk

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Safety Regulation Group

Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard

For Aerodrome Operators and Air Traffic Service Providers

Guidance on the Conduct of Hazard

For Aerodrome Operators and Air Traffic Service Providers

Civil Aviation Authority 2006

ISBN 0 11790 495 3

First edition 13 January 2006

Enquiries regarding the content of this publication should be addressed to:

Printed copy available from:

List of Effective Pages

Chapter Page Date Chapter Page Date

iii 13 January 2006 Appendix B 3 13 January 2006

13 January 2006 Page iii

List of Effective Pages iii

Chapter 1 System Lifecycle

Chapter 2 Risk Assessment and Mitigation - Introducing the

Chapter 3 The Seven-Step Risk Assessment and Mitigation Process

Step 1 System Description 1

13 January 2006 Page iv

Appendix A Hazard Identification using Brainstorming

Appendix B Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis

Appendix C Hazard and Operability Studies

Appendix D Using Event Trees

13 January 2006 Page v

Appendix E Diagrammatic Representation of Safety Arguments

Appendix F Hazard Logs

Appendix G Required Level of Confidence in Evidence

13 January 2006 Page vi

1st Edition 13 January 2006

13 January 2006 Revision History Page 1

13 January 2006 Foreword Page 1

13 January 2006 Foreword Page 2

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practical A risk is low enough that attempting to

AIS Aeronautical Information Service A service established within a defined

ANSP Air Navigation Service Provider Any provider of:

13 January 2006 Glossary Page 1

CAE Claim Argument Evidence A graphical method to represent claims,

ESARR EUROCONTROL Safety Regulatory Requirement Material published by

FMECA Failure Modes Effects and Criticality Analysis A systematic hazard

GSN Goal Structured Notation A graphical method to represent claims,

Hazard Any condition, event, or circumstance which could induce an accident.

HAZOP Hazard and Operability study A systematic functional hazard identification

Incident An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an

RFFS Rescue and Fire Fighting Service

Safety The set of quantitative or qualitative criteria to be used in a safety assessment

13 January 2006 Glossary Page 2

System Used to describe the collection of equipment, procedures and/or personnel

VCRI Verification Cross Reference Index A record detailing the system

13 January 2006 Glossary Page 3

Chapter 1 System Lifecycle

2 Planning for Safety

3 Feasibility and Concept - Safety Activities Early in a Project

13 January 2006 Chapter 1 Page 1

4 Design and Development

13 January 2006 Chapter 1 Page 2

5 Tender and Contract