SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 183622. February 8, 2012.]MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALANMEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN,
petitioner
,
vs vs
. LOUELLA A.. LOUELLA A.CATALAN-LEECATALAN-LEE,
respondent
.RESOLUTIONRESOLUTIONSERENOSERENO,
J
p
:Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision
11
andResolution
22
regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate ofOrlando B. Catalan.The facts are as follows:Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorcein the United States from his rst wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriagewith petitioner herein.On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.Thereafter, on 25 February 2005, petitioner led with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofBurgos, Pangasinan a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for herappointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketedas Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his rst marriage, led a similar petition with theRTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.The two cases were subsequently consolidated.Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of
litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
HcaDIA
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interestedperson qualied to le a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estateof Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case forbigamy was led against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan,and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.Apparently, Felicitas Amor led a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracteda second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12December 1959.On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
33
The trial court ruled thatsince the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was notrecognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was notvalid.
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Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action withthe trial court in Dagupan City led by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner.It considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt ofpetitioner for the crime of bigamy.Finally, the trial court found that, in the rst place, petitioner had never been married toEusebio Bristol.On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition forthe issuance of letters of administration led by petitioner and granted that of privaterespondent. Contrary to its ndings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that themarriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when shemarried Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previousbigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not aninterested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
44
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated thematter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for
Certiorari,
alleging grave abuse ofdiscretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters ofadministration.
HCEcaT
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition led by respondent should have beendismissed on the ground of
litis pendentia
. She also insisted that, while a petition forletters of administration may have been led by an "uninterested person," the defect wascured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determinewho has a better right to administer the decedent's properties, the RTC should have rstrequired the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitionerundertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead led a petition for review ratherthan a petition for
certiorari
. Nevertheless, since the Petition for
Certiorari
was led withinthe fteen-day reglementary period for ling a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43,the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, itruled in this wise:
As to the issue of
litis pendentia,
we nd it not applicable in the case. For
litis pendentia
to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identityof the parties or at least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b)identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on thesame acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgmentwhich may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,amount to
res judicata
in the other. A petition for letters of administration is aspecial proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or proceeding toestablish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to anordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent.The only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration canhardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the samedecedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, thepetitioner was not a party to the petition led by the private respondent, in thesame manner that the latter was not made a party to the petition led by theformer. The rst element of
litis pendentia
is wanting. The contention of thepetitioner must perforce fail.
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Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory theprovision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an"interested party," inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whetherhe has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered, could be appointedas administrator for as long as he les his petition ahead of any other person, inderogation of the rights of those specically mentioned in the order of preferencein the appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rulesof Court, which provides:xxx xxx xxxThe petitioner, armed with a marriage certicate, led her petition for letters ofadministration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred toadminister the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certicate, likeany other public document, is only
prima facie
evidence of the facts statedtherein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy andThe fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy andwas acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner.was acquitted has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegalmarriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before therst marriage has been dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declaredpresumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. TheThededuction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in thededuction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in thesaid case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlandosaid case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with OrlandoB. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even anB. Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even anattempt from the petitioner to deny the ndings of the trial court.attempt from the petitioner to deny the ndings of the trial court. Thereis therefore no basis for us to make a contrary nding. Thus, not being aninterested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissalof her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in place.xxx xxx xxxWHEREFOREWHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSEDDISMISSED for lack of merit.No pronouncement as to costs.
AacDHE
SO ORDERED.SO ORDERED.
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(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.
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She alleged that the reasoning ofthe CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, onthe other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that withher acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.Hence, this Petition.At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate thending of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to EusebioBristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, itfollows that the rst marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take noteof the ndings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol,both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate ofOrlando.Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-Awas dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdictionrecognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine wasestablished as early as 1985 in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
77
wherein we said:
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It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the CivilCode, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolutedivorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy andmorality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may beHowever, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may berecognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to theirrecognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to theirnational law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released privatenational law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released privaterespondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,under which divorce dissolves the marriage.under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . .
We reiterated this principle in
Llorente v. Court of Appeals
,
88
to wit:
In
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
we held that owing to the nationality principleembodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered bythe policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to ourconcept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled thatthe Court ruled thataliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according toaliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according totheir national law. their national law.
CaTcSACaTcSA
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Citing this landmark case, the Court held in
Quita v. Court of Appeals Quita v. Court of Appeals
,,that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen whenthat once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen whenhe obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in
Van Dorn Van Dorn
wouldwouldbecome applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right tobecome applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right toinherit" from him.inherit" from him.In
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,
we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent inhis country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorceThere, we stated that divorceand its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar asand its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar asrespondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civilrespondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civillaw on the status of persons.law on the status of persons.For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must bereversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente fromWe hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente fromhis rst wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as ahis rst wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as amatter of comitymatter of comity. . . .
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still rst be proven as we have enunciated in
Garcia v. Recio
,
99
to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is givenpresumptive evidentiary value, the document must rst be presented andadmitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decreeitself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. Thedecree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an ofcial body ortribunal of a foreign country.Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or documentmay be proven as a public or ofcial record of a foreign country by either (1) anofcial publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the ofcer having legalcustody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copymust be (a) accompanied by a certicate issued by the proper diplomatic orconsular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be anauthentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is notsufcient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence mustcompliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must
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