2017 05 15 Final Report RDK Technical Audit
2017 05 15 Final Report RDK Technical Audit
2017 05 15 Final Report RDK Technical Audit
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ................................................................................................................................... 4
Limitations......................................................................................................................................... 5
1. General Introduction.............................................................................................................................. 6
1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Objective ......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Scope............................................................................................................................................... 7
1.4 Methodology ................................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Summary of Key Findings General Trends........................................................................................ 9
1.6 Report on Missing Equipment ......................................................................................................... 23
2. DHT Unit ............................................................................................................................................... 2
2.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 The Main Integrity Risks .................................................................................................................... 5
2.3 General Comments ........................................................................................................................... 8
2.3.1. Pressure Equipment (Vessels, exchangers, air coolers and heaters) .............................................. 8
2.3.2 Piping ........................................................................................................................................ 9
2.3.3 CUI Programs ........................................................................................................................... 10
2.3.4 TA Planning ............................................................................................................................. 11
2.3.5 Onstream Inspection Programs (OSI Application) ....................................................................... 11
2.3.6 Use of contemporary NDE techniques to assess condition of equipment ..................................... 11
2.3.7 Risk Assessments and Risk Based Inspection (RBI) ...................................................................... 11
2.3.8 Inspection Performance Metrics and KPIs.................................................................................. 12
2.3.9 Pressure relieving and other safety devices ............................................................................... 12
3. HF Alkylation Unit ................................................................................................................................ 17
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 17
3.2 The Main Integrity Risks .................................................................................................................. 17
3.3 General Comments ......................................................................................................................... 18
4. FP-2 Unit ............................................................................................................................................. 25
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 The Main Integrity Risks .................................................................................................................. 25
4.3 General Comments ......................................................................................................................... 26
5. NHT Unit ............................................................................................................................................. 29
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 29
5.2 The main integrity risks ................................................................................................................... 29
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11.3.1 Record Keeping Documentation Quality Documentation Availability, Material lists or MSDs,
(reports, equipment analysis, drawings etc.) ...................................................................................... 64
11.3.2 Piping .................................................................................................................................... 64
11.3.3 Discrepancies between PIRS dwg and PIRS DB ......................................................................... 65
12. HV-6 Unit........................................................................................................................................... 67
12.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 67
12.1.1 Distillation Column (C-1, previously DA-1)................................................................................ 67
12.1.2 ADOS Section ......................................................................................................................... 67
12.1.3 Fouling of the ADOS Section ................................................................................................... 67
12.2 The Main Integrity Risks ................................................................................................................ 68
12.3 General Comments ....................................................................................................................... 68
12.3.1 Record Keeping Documentation Quality Documentation Availability, Material lists or MSDs,
(reports, equipment analysis, drawings etc.) ...................................................................................... 68
12.3.2 Discrepancy between PIRS dwg and PIRS DB ............................................................................ 69
13. Fitness for Service Assessment of Stripper V-5 of FCCU ........................................................................ 72
13.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 72
13.2 Engineering Assessment................................................................................................................ 76
13.2.1 Design Condition .................................................................................................................... 76
13.2.2 Parametric Study.................................................................................................................... 77
13.2.3 Results of Sensitivity Assessment ............................................................................................ 79
13.3 Conclusions and Recommendations............................................................................................... 81
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Executive Summary
Management of the Multidisciplinary Project Team (MDPT) and Refineria di Korsu (RdK) have approached
E&D Technologies LLC (E&D) with a request to carry out a technical audit of the a portion of the refinery to
assist them with future business decision about the refinery. The objective of the audit has been to provide
Refineria di Korsou N.V. (RdK), the owner of the Curacaos Isla Refinery, with a general overview of the plant
stationary equipment condition by conducting technical audit of the refinery.
E&D Technologies LLC (E&D) have approached the task by reviewing the originals and copies of the files
available in inspection archives as well as through interviews of Isla Refinery personnel to the degree they
have been made available. Extracted data and information have been summarized in excel style spreadsheets,
which have been individually prepared for each analyzed units. We have also identified equipment in the
spreadsheets by colour. Red colour have been used for equipment, which based on the data available, may
require significant repair or replacement within five (5) years from the date of the audit. Equipment has been
identified by yellow colour if the available information hasnt been sufficient to make such judgement. Green
colour has been used on equipment for which enough information has been available to assume useful life
extends beyond the five-year period. Refer to table 1.1 below for the list of units reviewed during the audit.
General trends in opportunities and suggestions for improvement applicable to most process units have been
extracted from the database and summarized below. Equipment issues for individual units were listed in
individual tables per unit. These tables a part of this report. Special fitness for service assessment of stripper
V-5 of FCCU has been prepared and it is appended at the end of the report.
ISLA Refinery appears to have an acceptable control and management system and operational such as DCS,
SAP and probably uses other systems (not in audit scope) to control their daily business. In inspection and
reliability/ availability area however, there are number of opportunities where improvements could be made
by introduction of management systems. ISLA has a good, well led inspection team but their efforts and
progress have been significantly stymied by lack of suitable, modern and dedicated inspection database,
which would allow them to collect, analyze and plan their activities more effectively. There is a number of
such system packages on the market. Use of such systems is essential to meet contemporary demands on
reliability and safety in refineries.
One example of a significant benefit could be significant improvement in forecasting capability of equipment
residual life. While reliable loss of containment statistics have not been made available it has been apparent
from statements made by inspection personnel and from inspection reports that loss of primary containment
(LOPC) incidents have been comparatively frequent. In some cases, run to failure mode has been said to be
a matter of policy. In other cases, LOPC incidents may have been unforeseen. While run to failure mode is
practiced in selected situations in other refineries as well, we feel that well thought-out risk based decision
process is required to select equipment, which can be allowed to be run to failure. We havent been able to
secure a written policy on the subject. While no major catastrophic incidents have occurred recently in the
Isla Refinery, its performance and reliability /availability has been probably adversely affected by
combination of variable crude supply and some inspection and maintenance practices, which do not always
correspond to practices of similar refineries E&D specialists are familiar with and/or with RAGAGEP
(recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices). Details supporting this view are included in
the audit assessment documents. It has been a consensus within the E&D specialist group that integrity of
Isla Refinery can be improved and that the refinery has been relatively fortunate in avoiding a major incident.
E&D Technologies also report on items which appear not to comply with RAGAGEP (recognized and generally
accepted good engineering practices) for the units listed in the Agreement. This could increase risk of plant
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safety, reliability, environmental incidents and premature shutdown or long-term cessation of operations.
Not all of such potential situations could however been detected during the audit.
Limitations
In preparing for the audit, E&D Technologies LLC (E&D) has relied on data and reports provided by Refineria di
Korsou N.V. (RdK) and ISLA refinery staff and on representations made by the RdK team and ISLA personnel
interviewed in the course of the reviews. We note that while we relied on representations made, the persons
consulted are solely responsible for the integrity and accuracy of their verbal and documented responses to
our enquiries, and for the integrity and accuracy of project and related (printed and electronic) documents
provided. We further note, that our report is a high level review by subject matter experts for management
information and it is not intended for day to day inspection or maintenance decisions such as inspect or not
to inspect or repair equipment or other operational decisions without further verification. Such verifications
and decisions have to be done by refinery staff based on their own knowledge and understanding of the
equipment condition. The selection and execution or any other use of recommendations listed in this report is
the responsibility of RdKs Management.
Report Disclaimer: This disclaimer governs the use of this report. E&D does not warrant or guarantee that the
information in the report is correct, accurate, complete or non-misleading, and that the use of guidance in the
report will lead to any particular outcome or result.
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1. General Introduction
Opening discussions about the audit of the refinery between MDPT/RdK and E&D Technologies have been
initiated in May 2015. Preliminary exploratory visit and audit preparation work started in September 2015.
Definition of requirements and scope have been prepared and modified throughout year 2016 as per MDPT
requirements to reflect changes in business environment. Based on MDPT/RdK requirements the final stages
of the audit and technical integrity assessment of the Curacao Isla refinery stationary process equipment has
been conducted from January 4, 2017 to April 11, 2017. This report summarizes, audit findings and
recommendations for critical equipment in units selected and agreed to by MDPT/RdK during the project kick-
off meetings.
Figure 1.1
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1.2 OBJEC TI VE
The objective of the audit is to provide RdK with a general overview of the plant stationary equipment condition
by conducting technical audit of the refinery and remaining life assessment when needed, as it may impact
equipment integrity and plant reliability and help them with future business decisions. This report identifies
the status of executed work to the date of its completion, lists main categories of issues, and presents emerging
general trends and points out some specifics issues detected thus far. Furthermore, it outlines work to be
undertaken including information and documentation collection should RdK/MDPT choose to proceed with
additional unit analysis and integrity and reliability improvements.
1.3 SCO PE
The scope of the technical audit at the refinery has been prepared in accordance with the RDK TOR / RFP
Technical Audit at Refinery and Oil Terminal in Curacao dated December 2014 and as modified by the
subsequent addendums and requests for new proposal to conduct a technical audit at the oil refinery in
Curacao dated May 1 2015. Critical equipment of selected units has been agreed and approved by RDK prior
to the project kick-off. Selected units are CD-3, DHT (Distillate Hydrotreater), HF Alky, FP-2, NHT, VGO-MHC,
FCCU Fractionator, FCCU R&R, LVI, and Platformer. Reviewed has been stationary pressure equipment and
piping listed on Process Flow Diagrams of these units.
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The E&D audit team was comprised of five subject matter specialists. The opening meeting with the audit team
and stakeholders was held on Jan 9 2017 and followed by another kick-off meeting on Jan. 16-17 2016.
The team relied on the data, reports and representations provided by RdK and ISLA refinery staff and other
personnel interviewed during the course of the reviews. For approximately 6 months, E&D examined reports
obtained from the refinery on inspections, maintenance and other applicable and available materials. These
were combined with the information obtained from meetings and interviews with select personnel from RdK
and the Isla Refinery.
Subject matter specialists of E&D Technologies carried out the audit based on information provided by various
sources. It was expected that 1) Inspection and related data are comprehensive and readily available. 2)
Equipment is designed and manufactured per the recognized codes such as ASME, DEP.
It is assumed that the refinery inspection program does follow the concepts of API 510 PV Inspection Code and
API 570 Piping Inspection Code and related mandatory references of these documents. Refinery inspection
practices and results will be compared to these Codes.
Condition of the equipment has been assessed in accordance with the practices outlined in the above
Inspection Codes and compliance verified against equipment design Code, where ASME Section VIII and B31.3
Codes have been applicable. In situation where equipment has been designed to different Codes and
application of the ASME Code would not be meaningful such equipment would have been assessed in
accordance with the RAGAGEP concepts (recognized and generally accepted good engineering practices).
Meaningful basic assessment shall be made as a part of the audit. Few situations, which fell outside of the
design or inspection Codes were assessed for fitness for service in accordance with API 579. It was also
assumed that refinery was using some method of RBI (risk based inspection). This turned out not to be
actively pursued by the refinery at this time.
Inspection and maintenance data have been provided by the client and used by the team at their face value.
Where data were not interpretable, team specialists questioned them but it is the client responsibility to
provide relevant data for the analysis. Also, assessments were generally made based on RAGAGEP (recognized
and generally accepted good engineering practices) and on concepts expressed in the top 11 primary reasons
for continuing FEMI (Fixed Equipment Mechanical Integrity) failures in the hydrocarbon process industry listed
below.
1. Inadequate or lack of identifying and managing the highest priority FEMI risks in each
process unit
2. Inadequate or lack of comprehensive Corrosion Control Documents (CCDs) for each process
unit
3. Inadequate or lack of a thorough, comprehensive piping inspection program
4. Inadequate or lack of a comprehensive program for Integrity Operating Windows (IOWs) for
FEMI
5. Inadequate or lack of a comprehensive Management of Change (MOC) process for FEMI
issues
6. Inadequate implementation of all the guidance contained in the latest editions of industry
codes and standards for FEMI
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7. Inadequate or lack of comprehensive programs to learn from the bigger FEMI failures in the
industry before similar failures at your site
8. Insufficient inspection planning and not using the best available technology for non-
destructive examination (NDE)
9. Inadequate or lack of comprehensive FEMI record-keeping and data analysis
10. Insufficient FEMI training and knowledge transfer for all those with a role in maintaining
FEMI
11. Insufficient or lack of reliable basic documentation such as PFDs, MSDs, P&IDS and key
equipment design information.
Recommendation:
Develop proper risk assessment processes and procedures and Implement RBI in as soon as practical.
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Piping
The refinery uses piping isometric drawings, which show CMLs (Condition Monitoring Locations).
Measurements are recorded and trended using calculated CML average short and long-term
corrosion rates and actual reading point short and long corrosion rates. Probabilistic methods of
residual life determination are not used.
CMLs are assigned with little knowledge of actual corrosion mechanisms. This tends to lead to
significant over inspection in areas where internal corrosion doesnt take place and under
inspection in areas of active corrosion.
Recommendations: Develop and implement system of corrosion analysis (CCM: Corrosion Control
Manuals or CCD: Corrosion Control Documents) and system of IOWs, which can guide inspector in
planning their inspections. This is key for being able to handle corrosion in a pro-active way.
Develop trending system for equipment thickness measurements as that used for piping. Develop
an overall, integrated inspection program forecasting reliably residual life based on assessment
and control of active damage mechanisms and risk. Implement integrated inspection management
system based on one of the commercially available platforms.
Record keeping is done in the form of basic inspection observations, which are then collected and
summarized in TA reports. Observations discuss mostly results of visual inspections. Component
thickness measurements are typically addressed in only a summarization of the lowest thickness
measurements and do not provide calculated corrosion rates or remaining projected life.
In case of piping, the PIRS system uses a system of inspection sketches to communicate measurement
locations and areas requiring repairs or replacements more accurately. The inspection isos /sketches
allow to locate the right fitting but they do not necessarily allow to identify the same point. A slight
deviation from the exact previous UT location could show an incorrect corrosion rate.
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Recommendations: Consider separating the CUI detection and repair program into an activity with
its own focus, procedures and budget. Agree on criteria for initiating inspection, methods of
inspection used and rejection criteria. Numerous methods are available for CUI detection. Their use
will vary based on technical feasibility, costs and risks. TA worklists need to be prepared jointly to
optimize the repair program.
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Recommendations: While the access to the advanced NDE may be more difficult on the island, greater
use of advanced techniques would reflect itself in better life predictions and reduced TA scope while
improving reliability.
For heat exchanger tube monitoring, consider using techniques such as IRIS, ECT and RFECT to better
quantify corrosion and remaining tube wall thicknesses. For piping thickness monitoring, consider using
more profile radiography. This technique can be particularly advantageous for inspecting small bore
piping ( 4 NPS) and for detecting localized corrosion, such as can often be found in piping dead legs,
and with localized corrosion mechanisms associated with welds.
Inadequate monitoring of high temperature hydrogen attack (HTHA) and detection program.
Refinery hasnt been applying the latest API RP941, which doesnt give credit to C-0.5Mo material and
which lowered limits for non-PWHT CS weldments. HTHA may be occurring in several pieces of refinery
equipment. This equipment is identified in the individual unit report and unit analysis spreadsheet.
This may represent significant risks to the refinery as there is numerous C-0.5Mo equipment and some
CS equipment appears to operate above the limits (C-0.5Mo doesnt get any credit over CS) based on
data available to us. Chemical Safety Board recommendations have been made mandatory in the US
after the Tesoro exchanger incident. http://www.csb.gov/tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire/
Recommendations: Review carefully long-term exposure (since installation) to hot hydrogen of all
equipment, which operates above the contemporary API RP941 limits. This audit report identifies most
of them but not necessarily all equipment, which may be so affected. Details are discussed with
individual cases. It needs to be mentioned that even contemporary HTHA NDE methods are not fully
reliable and sampling may not identify all problems as HTHA resistance depends on thermal and
forming history each component has been exposed to during its fabrication.
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condition exists. Much of the refinery process equipment and piping can at one time or another be
exposed to sulfide cracking conditions. PWHT is not required for compliance with the NACE MR0103
but may be required or recommendable in other situations. (refer to NACE SP0472, Methods and
Controls to Prevent In-Service Environmental Cracking of Carbon Steel Weldments in Corrosive
Petroleum Refining Environments).
Recommendations: Revise your special emphasis program to bring them up-to-date, better still
replace these with targeted Corrosion control manuals (CCMs). Clarify application of NACE MR0103 for
purchasing and fabrication of equipment: all equipment in sour service should meet the MACE MR0103
requirements and clarify rules for PWHT. It is probably better philosophy to consider all process piping
in basic refinery units as potentially exposed to sulfide cracking and make exception for equipment,
which positively will not be exposed than the other way around.
No programs have been identified for monitoring of critical valves (other than relief valves)
Certain valves have critical safety related functions. Such critical check valves are usually installed on
transfer lines between heaters and reactors in medium and high pressure hydroprocessing or
hydrocracking units. Other critical valves may be check valves a MOVs with a safety function, or
emergency SD valves. These valves should receive special monitoring and maintenance.
Relief/safety valve maintenance program is in place and is functional. This home-built ACCESS based
monitoring program has limited analytical and reporting capabilities. Newer systems not only monitor
the maintenance aspects of relief valves but allow to check their continued suitability for different
relieving scenarios, handle MOC, material management and other important aspects of overall relief
valve management program.
Recommendations: Develop and implement focused inspection and maintenance program for
critical valves and implement comprehensive relief valve management program.
Use of partial patches or lap patches (external or internal liners) to reinforce thinned areas.
Lap patches have been applied at number of locations. Lap patches should be considered only to be
temporary repairs. Insert/flush as well as lap/fillet weld patches should be designed and installed in
accordance with engineering procedures complying with ASME PCC-2 and API 510 Code rules.
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Proactive management of integrity via monitoring of quality of workmanship of Inspection and maintenance
contractors to ensure they work in accordance with procedures as well as operators to ensure they
are operating within set and agreed IOWs (integrity operating windows).
Recommendations: QA and QC programs for maintenance and NDE work monitoring should be fully
implemented and followed.
Heaters
Refinery heaters suffer mainly from the pitch fuel firing. Probably some are of somewhat obsolete
design and possibly suffer from less than optimum operation. Massive cost are incurred almost every
TA for refractory repairs, casing repairs and replacements as well as tube replacements due to
corrosion, overheating or environmental cracking.
Recommendation: Much can indeed be attributed to the fuel fired but some improvements could
possibly be achieved if the heaters are reviewed by heater design and material specialists and in cases
where warranted firing models applied to optimize the firing and reduce equipment damage.
While primary objective of the audit report is to identify specific issues, we list additional important suggestions,
which could improve equipment integrity, process safety and costs in future in table 1.2.
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Table 1.3 DHT UNIT Specific Equipment Related Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
Integrity risk : Top section of the Fractionator has Major repair Big ticket
been found in deteriorated condition both externally or item, possibly
and internally. Top 2m of shell appear to have been replacement also integrity
replaced and miscellaneous external patches have is indicated. issue
been applied. In 2008 the Column has been LOPC (loss of
C-1101 recommended for replacement (per TSPH plant primary
Frac. change). No evidence of replacement having been containment)
Col. done in 2011 or 2013. Further deterioration is likely, risk
both external and internal. Column top section may
be beyond usability /reparability and it may present a
LOPC (loss of primary containment) risk. Re-asses
conditions based on known data, consider
replacement at an early opportunity.
Main Integrity risk : the reactor is made from C- HTHA Possibly
1/2Mo material and may be susceptible to HTHA program is integrity
based on the design condition on the PFD. This not Issue as well
material is not recommended by API 941 for similar adequately as big ticket
hydrogen service. Proper inspection was not carried exercised. item
R-1101
DHT- out because the record showed that only one nozzle Reactor may
Rx
1100 has been inspected for HTHA in y 2000 (17 years ago). be
Therefore, integrity of the vessel is difficult to threatened
ascertain and is questionable. Detailed FFS by HTHA and
assessment is needed for further operation failure by
fracture
The hottest shells for the F/E train: C-1/2Mo material Components Possibly
is not recommended for hydrogen service at the of the Integrity
E-1101 design conditions. Issues and risks are similar to the Exchanger Issue
E&D R-1101 above. might fail by
Detailed FFS assessment is needed for further fracture
operation
These REACs appear to suffer from ammonium salt Tube may fail Possibly
fouling and corrosion. Tubes are not regularly unexpectedly integrity
internally inspected along their full length; corrosion Issue as well
E-1102 mitigation measures not fully effective. Condition of as big ticket
A-D the tubes cannot be guaranteed and their condition item
may be deteriorated beyond usefulness.
Detailed FFS assessment is needed for further
operation
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Table 1.4 VGO-MHC - Specific Equipment Related Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
REACs: the main integrity risk in this unit appear to be Leak in hi Potoentially
condition of the cold end of the REACS E1502. Existing pressure air an integrity
inspection program cannot assess tubing condition cooler can Issue as
adequately. Tubing is not inspected internally hence LOPC result in fire well as big
(loss of primary containment) incident risk of this high or explosion ticket item
pressure air-cooler is elevated. Detailed FFS assessment is resulting in
E1502 needed for further operation. damage or
Process conditions leading to fouling and corrosion are destruction
not well controlled (wash water) and probably not fully of
understood. surrounding
Tools for predicting and eliminating this corrosion are equipment.
nowadays available and can be applied. Internal
inspection of tubes in this unit is recommended.
Second Integrity risk can be represented by V-1501 HP If damage to Potentially
Separator, which operates in high hydrogen charging and the vessel an integrity
corrosive environment. Vessel is corroding and is being continues it Issue
repeatedly internally coated. Such coatings ared deemed may render
VGO to be of questionable effectiveness by other refinery the vessel un
- operators. Coating is regularly deteriorated (in a few reliable or
MHC months) and may not be effective in preventing hydrogen unusable.
embrittlement or HIC/SOHIC. Hydrogen /HIC cracking has
been detected. ISLA personnel is persuaded of the
effectiveness of these coatings. Coating damage is
V-1501
ascribed to steam out operation only.
Last recorded visual inspection 2008. No documented
evidence of proper WFMT inspection (with high quality
surface prep per NACE specs).
Plate spec: A212 B FBQ; it is an older material (not made
any more), more susceptible to HIC damage or SOHIC in
the vessel compared to newer materials. HP separators
usually operate in more aggressive environment and
frequently suffer from HIC problems.
Thorough FFP assessment of the vessel is recommended.
Other risks can be the generally poor performance of Frequent High costs,
both furnace coils and possible ammonium salt deposit replacements medium
and corrosion in the cold end of the E-1568. Nuisance integrity
leaks risk
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Table 1.5 NHT UNIT - Specific Equipment Related Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
H2 blistering and HIC detected. No PWHT done Damage may Integrity
on some weld repairs. Also failures of internal spread to issue
coating are common. No systematic WFMT threaten
V-1301 program with high quality surface preparation is integrity of the
in place. Carry out FFS evaluation to support vessel
further operation or replace vessel with suitable
design and manufacture.
Shell of the exchanger approaching end of life Components of Integrity
NHT
(corrosion); reassess condition or replace shell. the Exchanger issue
E1306
might fail by
fracture
Piping Effluent piping upstream and downstream of Sections of the
systems the E1307 is badly corroded and will require high pressure Integrity
73004 comprehensive replacement piping might Issue
& fail significant
73006 fire risk
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Table 1.7 HV6 UNIT Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
Over years the column suffered from Significant Possibly an
significant corrosion, sulfur, NA, Caustic repairs/ integrity
Vacuum cracking, Ohd dew point corrosion. It is upgrades will Issue as well
Column C-1 difficult to assess accurately the level of be required as big ticket
(DA-1) damage and whether it is economically item
HV6
repairable for long-term service. Carry out
detailed FFS analysis.
Exchangers These units suffer from S and NA corrosion. Future cost Potentially
# 4, 5, 6, 7, Due to large number of units this may be a issue big ticket
8 significant cost item. item
Table 1.8 LVI -HF UNIT - Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
E1304 Ammonium salt corrosion is not well Leaks can integrity
LVI-HF HP Gas Air controlled, leakage occurs. High pressure lead to LOPC Issue
Cooler unit. & fire.
Table 1.9 HF-Alky UNIT - Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
Corrosion occurs, units nearing end of life. Possibility of integrity
Leak means releasing of large are with fire or Issue
Air Coolers
isobutane containing HF. contamination
A-605 A-E
of area with
HF acid.
Corrosion in top section of the column, Potential for Integrity
based on inspection projections w.t. leakage and issue and
C-604, HF
probably below retirement thickness. Top contamination potentially
stripper
HF ALKY section should be replaced with Monel big ticket
clad material item.
HF containing piping is representing Potential for Integrity
elevated risk because the temperatures leakage, fire issue.
are not well controlled, the record of high and HF
water incidents is not entirely reliable (not contamination
Piping
monitored by inspection) special materials
required for HF (low resid elements) are
not consistently used.
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Table 1.10 FP-2 UNIT Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
Corrosion in the top section, corrosion Possible integrity
under the strip lining. Upper section collapse of Issue and
including the cone was recommended for the shell, possibly big
Vacuum replacement during next TA in 2015. In internal fire, ticket item
Column, C-1 the long-term top 25 may need outage.
replacement with clad section.
FP-2 Corrosion issues should also be
understood and addressed.
Piping: C-1, Sections of this piping system were being Possible pipe integrity
Vac Column, replaced over time. Some sections are still collapse, air Issue and
Overhead original and likely near the end of its life. intake into possibly big
Circuit piping. ticket item
22120
Table 1.11 FCCU RR Section - Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
Overheating of the vessel led to the Loss of
deformation of the shell and metallurgical function and Big Ticket
changes affecting properties of the significant item
material. outage for
Circumference of the vessel increased the whole
132mm from 1990 to 2012 (6mm/year). FCCU
Creep is suspected to be one of the
V-5
damage mechanisms. Mechanical integrity
Stripper
of the vessel is questionable and decision
to continue to use or replacement has to
be made. Remaining life can be asses
more accurately if material properties and
operating condition are given. For long
FCC-Reactor
term use, we recommend to replace the
&
vessel with new design/material.
Regenerator
Measurements show line thinning at a Possibility of Integrity and
Rx OHd
high rate. 13 section will likely need early LOPC big ticket
line
replacement incident and item
MK56-58
fire
Graphitization was identified in 2011 If graphi- Integrity and
turnaround. Graphitization occurs in tization big ticket
carbon steels and Carbon 1/2 Mo at concentrates item
Rx temperatures ranging from 450C to 620C. around weld
standpipe More accurate definition of the damage is zones,
MK 5-7 recommended or plan for replacement sudden
next T/A. Consider material upgrade to at failure of
least 1% Chrome, 1/2 moly. equipment
may occur
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Table 1.12 FCCU FRACTIONATOR- Selected Specific Issues and Big Ticket Items
Unit Item Issue Impact Note
High corrosion rates may have already LOPC, fire , Major
resulted in section of the pipe being detonation integrity
below retirement limit. This stream Issue
contains high concentration of LPG and
Fractionator
in case of leak there is a potential for
24 Ohd
detonation.
line
Similar risks may exist in the GRU
FCCU -
(downstream section) De-ethanizer or
Fractionator
De-butanizer ohd systems. (not part of
this audit scope)
Cs material in the service may suffer
from irregular and high corrosion rates,
Slurry
which are difficult to monitor. Cr-Mo
Piping
materials are significantly more reliable
in this service.
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Inspectors compared the presence of the equipment with the drawings of specific units and we identified
several equipment are not in the place. Summary of findings are listed below in table 1.14.
Table 1.14 Missing Pumps and Motors Table 1.14 Missing Pumps and Motors (contd)
Unit Equip- Motor Pump Comment Unit Equip- Motor Pump Comment
ment # ment #
Cat 4A No Yes 1106B Not in service
Cracker P-608A No Yes 1108A No No
P-603A No Yes 1108B No No
P-603B No Yes 1109A No No
P607B No No DHT 1109B No No
P-613 No Yes 1112A No No Not in service
FP-2 9 No Yes 1113 Not in service
Poly P-10 No No 1116A Not in service
Plant P-12 No No 1116B Not in service
p-18 No No K1101B Not in service
p-20 Yes No K1301A Not in service
p-25 No No LVI K1301B Not in service
P37 Yes No 1302B Yes No
GT-7 p-001 No No 1324A No No
p-7A No No
p-10 No No
p-10A Not in service
VGO 811A Not in service
811B Not in service
1507A No No
1507B No No
1509 Not in service
1553 Not in service
1564B No No
1601 No
1602A Not in service
7 Yes No
8 Yes No
15 Yes No
16 Yes No
22 Yes No
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2. DHT Unit
This report summarizes audit findings for RDK DHT Unit (Distillate Hydrotreater, 1100 series equipment) as
shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. This unit treats straight run Gas Oil Distillates from CD-3 and CD-2 Units. It reduces
organic Sulphur and Nitrogen content and to some degree, heavy metals in the feed stock to meet the refinery
Gas Oil fraction specifications. Original process description mentions also TCU Gas Oil as feed stocks. The new
bloc diagram doesnt support that options however and shows that the TCUs GO is normally routed to MHC
VGO for treatment. This second version makes the feed mix somewhat less complex and less aggressive.
Hydrogen needed in the process is supplied form a SMR type hydrogen plant and supplemented by Cat
Reformer hydrogen. Product of the unit is Gas Oil stream with H2S gas and sour water as by-products. These
are concentrated and converted into elemental sulphur in SWS/Amine and Sulfur Recovery Units.
Generally, long term corrosion rates in the unit are not excessive, at least not in recent
years. Exceptions are vacuum condensers (E1511, -12), which have been replaced number of times (more
than 10 times during the last 20 years!). This, however, may change if the ISLAs plans to process higher Sulfur
and Nitrogen feeds are realized. Limitation to the feed quality downgrading may be the limited conversion
capability to meet product specifications. The feed stock quality changes should be monitored, understood
and included in the integrity monitoring plans.
First section of this report covers systemic findings, which are more general nature and quite similar for
majority of the unit, which have analysed. Since the inspection process is developed and administered by the
same inspection group only relatively small differences in the systemic issues can be found amongst the
analyzed process Units.
The Table 2.1 summarizes areas of concern based on the type of issue, such as short residual life, susceptibility
to certain type of damage etc. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be prioritized
addressed based on the refinery business priorities.
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Based on available data, probably the main integrity risks in this unit appear to be unknown condition of the
Reactor R1101 components. Material of construction of the reactor is identified as C-0.5Mo and there is a risk
of HTHA given the hydrogen partial pressure under design/operating temperature shown on drawings. Actual
long-term/lifetime operating history (e.g. DCSD printouts) hasnt been made available however.
Recent failure of F/E exchangers of a Hydrotreater by HTHA in Tesoro refinery in Anacortes have been
investigated by CSB. Number of recommendations have been reached. The most important one being that the
CS curve of non-PWHT weldment, CS curve is also used for C-0.5 Mo materials, has been further lowered. It is
possible that some of refinery equipment does not meet the requirements of API RP 941 exposing the refinery
to integrity/safety risk and increased liability risk.
Original operating conditions of R1101 is shown below in Fig. 2.3. C-1/2Mo curve has been eliminated in 1977,
replaced by CS curve and in 2015 the CS curve has been further lowered by approximately 40C. Relevant CSB
link http://www.csb.gov/tesoro-refinery-fatal-explosion-and-fire/ is well describing the issues.
Based on information made available there could be a hydrogen damage to some sections of the Reactor shell
or forged components, which the test methods reported in available inspection files would likely not
detect. Special inspection techniques need to be applied and their reliability has been deemed by their users
to be low. Also since the sensitivity of the C-0.5Mo to HTHA depends on thermal history of (method of
manufacture and heat treatment) examination of one component will not necessarily prove soundness of
other components. For these reasons number of operators have decided to replace C-0.5Mo equipment in
hydrogen service by higher Cr-Mo alloys.
While the vessel is equipped with internal cladding from austenitic SS316, which has lower Hydrogen
permeability compared to ferritic steels and may be considered to reduce the Hydrogen concentration at the
cladding/base metal interface, most Operators do not consider this as being an adequate mitigating measure
and do not take a credit for the SS cladding in thick wall vessels operating in hot hydrogen service.
The second major threat may be also the risk of HTHA at the hot end of the Feed/Effluent exchanger E1101
bank, shells D and E, which are also made of C-0.5Mo. These units have been identified as operating above the
CS line, which also represents the C-0.5Mo material, Fig. 2.3 originates from RDK/ISLA files. Lowering of the
Nelson curve may bring the E-1101-C into the non-recommended zone if some non-PWHT welds (new or
repairs) have been installed. The same argument concerning material testing as the one indicated for the R-
1101 case applies for the hot components of these exchangers. Due to the lower thickness of the components
and gradually lowering temperature gradient the probability and of damage may be somewhat less compared
to the Reactor. This, however, would not eliminate the need to address this potential issue.
.
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Figure 2.3 1977 - Nelson Curves (Operating Limits for Steels in Hydrogen Service)
For comparison the latest curves from API RP 941 are shown below in Fig. 2.4. The drop of the curve for non-
PWHT CS may result in inclusion of equipment, which has been considered in the past to be operated in a
safe zone.
Figure 2.4 Operating Limits for Steels in Hydrogen Service to Avoid High Temperature Hydrogen Attack
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Cold end of this E-1101 exchanger bank (units A and B) appear also to suffer from ammonia chloride salt
fouling and corrosion. Refer to the de-sublimation curves shown below in Fig.2.5 to estimate the corrosion
potential. More discussion is provided in section 6 VGO-MHC Unit.
The third significant threat is salt fouling in the REACs E-1102 A-D. Ammonia salt fouling goes hand in hand
with corrosion, whether it is chloride or bisulfide type. Due to lack of actual long term process data
it is difficult to analyze in detail.
Special mention warrant units E1506, 1511 and 1512. Some of these units have been replaced more than 10
times during the last 20 years. These unit foul, fail but operate under vacuum, so while this is an integrity and
cost problem the level of risk of the LOC (cooling water leaks into sour water systems) is lower. In our opinion
the contemplated redesign using different more corrosion resistant material (Titanium) should
be implemented.
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2.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
A) Inspection Sketches
Record keeping by ISLA inspectors is currently in form basic inspection observation notes, which are written
into a SAP module and then inserted into an equipment file in paper form. Observations are summarized in
TA reports. Observations available in the inspection files discuss mostly results of visual inspections. Wall
thickness (W.T.) measurements if available are usually referred to as satisfactory, but sometimes without
actual measurement record.
System of centralized UT and other NDE program results appears not to be available for equipment such as
pressure vessels, columns, heaters and heat exchangers. Since trending of wall thickness measurements is not
done, quantitative estimates of residual life cannot be effectively done. It is unclear how estimates of residual
life are done with any degree of accuracy. In many (most?) cases inspection is not based on well understood
corrosion or degradation mechanisms and how they relate to operating conditions. Refer also to assessment
of the Special Emphasis Programs.
Measurements are not collected consistently and they are almost never trended. Measurements are sometime
indicated on hand made sketches. Older files do show use of dedicated inspection sketches. These however
do not show open shell envelop to locate the CML accurately.
Without having standardized comprehensive system of inspection drawings / sketches dedicated to the NDE
record it is in our opinion nearly impossible to assess progress of changes in equipment condition in a
quantitative way and to predict residual life with a measure of accuracy or do the effective NDE planning. Most
operators use sketches with level of detail corresponding to simplified General Assembly (GA) drawing of
equipment to identify areas of measurement or observed damage and repairs. In the ISLA system, we didnt
find standardized equipment inspection sketches of newer vintage, which would show the general
configuration on open envelop format, materials, operating conditions and key appurtenances.
B) Bundle Inspection
Only visual inspection of bundles and tube ends is usually reported. In the VGO-MHC unit essentially no internal
tube inspections using either borescopes, eddy -current, IRIS or similar quantitative techniques has been
reported although reports from 2012 CD-3 TA show some use of EC inspection. Tube removal and splitting to
assess condition are apparently also not practiced. No measurement trending has been done reported so far
during bundle inspections. It is our opinion that accuracy of the bundle life prediction without doing quality
internal tube inspections is expected to be low. This may lead to either unplanned leakage or premature
replacements.
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Wall thickness measurements should be kept in a computerized central record register/ data bank.
Develop standardized data sheets which would summarize whatever relevant information can still be
located in refinery archives and other sources, like personal files etc.
Current standards for TA planning contain a major component of condition based decisions, i.e.
equipment is included in the maintenance program bases assessment of its actual condition and the
risk it represents for Operations. This is much more effective approach to plant efficiency compared to
the simple time based inspection.
E&D Technologies specialize in development of such plant inspection programs based on detailed
corrosion analysis of process units. Proposals for or development of such inspection systems can be
prepared for RDK management upon request.
2.3.2 Piping
In case of piping the PIRS (Piping Inspection Records System) this system uses inspection sketches discussed
above, which show CML / TML locations. This is available for piping only however. The system is developed in
adequate detail and is suitable to communicate measurement locations and areas requ iring repairs o
replacements. Results of piping wall thickness measurements are recorded in spreadsheets of the PIRS system
(MS AXES based).
Corrosion rates are calculated and residual life estimated bases of simple arithmetic extrapolation of data. No
other more complex data manipulations such as risk assessment or statistical evaluations are performed by
PIRS.
CMLs are assigned based on historical experience without a benefit of more sophisticated corrosion analysis.
This may lead to significant over inspection in areas where little or no internal corrosion takes place and an
under-inspection in areas of active corrosion. Also, the system of queries and reports allowing analysis of data
in different ways, such as what if type of queries, is limited. No statistical evaluations or measurement
quality assessments are available in the PIRS system.
Notwithstanding some of the shortcomings, implementation of PIRS has led to a very substantial improvem ent
in piping reliability since the time it has been implemented.
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While piping inspection programs are significantly more structured compared to the pressure equipment it still
lags behind contemporary standards of risk based concepts and more complex evaluations of data.
Key component of piping inspection, exchanger bundles and pressure equipment, is understanding of the
knowledge of relevant corrosion mechanisms and parameters, which influence them. Such comprehensive
analysis would allow us to focus on areas of active corrosion and distribute the inspection effort more
effectively, i.e. help to prevent missing those areas, which require more intensive coverage and reduce
inspection intensity in areas, where corrosion in not taking place.
The PIRS system has been claimed to cover all key process piping systems. While its usefulness is
undisputable the system still contains some errors and inaccuracies and would benefit from a QC review.
First step in development of knowledgeable based corrosion & Inspection system is assessment of
individual process loops. Subsequent steps consist in implementation of the following programs:
1. Appropriate grouping lines and equipment into loops (development of corrosion loops and
Material Selection Diagrams with all relevant information needed for corrosion analysis).
2. Corrosion assessment of the loops.
Development of parameters influencing corrosion and setting of integrity operating
windows (IOWs).
3. Development of inspection/NDE programs for uniform and localized corrosion.
4. Development of inspection/NDE for dead-leg corrosion.
5. Inspection programs for injection/mix point corrosion.
6. Inspection/NDE of vents and drains (small connections)
7. Inspection of critical valves and check valves (similar to the RV inspection program)
Relief valves are covered by a separate basic inspection and maintenance program, which is
in place and appears functional but it has not been evaluated in detail.
We have noted that since approx. 2015 the maintenance and inspection group are engaging in an more
extensive piping external corrosion programs. It is likely that units, which have been shut down for turnarounds
in 2016 and 2017 have their piping inspected and repaired. Since a comprehensive CUI program is not
specifically defined in writing it is not clear what criteria are used to decide on equipment repair and how
effective such program is even though the plan for repairs of piping external corrosion for example in CD-3
area for the Spring 2017 TA appeared to be quite significant.
Development of specific inspection programs for corrosion under insulation (CUI) is in most plants known to
E&D are usually carried out as parallel to the internal corrosion monitoring but separately administered
programs. Most of the external corrosion detection can be done during operations and it is independent of
operations. In case of RDK, where CUI is a major component of piping system repairs it would probably be
useful to be able to separate the costs of maintenance due to external deterioration from that of internal
deterioration so the improvements in design, protection or material changes and be analyzed based on their
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RDK Audit 2017 Final Report
own merit. Details of such programs need to be developed. There is no CUF (corrosion under fire proofing)
inspection program at RDK.
2.3.4 TA Planning
TA planning appear to be almost exclusively time based, i.e. it is based on predetermined period. Commonly
it appears to be a 4year interval between major TA. Sometimes it is extended to 6 years. Not all equipment is
opened and internally inspected every SD. There has been no evidence pointing towards using condition
based planning. This may lead to under inspection in some cases if the equipment is not effectively assessed,
e.g. refer to the above mentioned relatively rare use of NDE methods. Comprehensive information/statistics
on LOPC and unplanned outages have not been made available.
It is our opinion that the quality of the inspection programs does not consistently support extended internal
inspection intervals if low LOPC frequencies and high availability factors for units are required. Also there is a
safety aspect associated with extension of inspections.
Recommendations
Most refineries have converted to condition based or hybrid planning condition based combined
with time based planning and risk assessment to determine optimum TA interval. Such programs
offer the best reliability and lower program cost. It would be advantageous for RDK to develop such
capabilities on ASAP bases. E&D Technologies specializes in implementation of such programs.
From the available inspection reports, it would appear that almost all inspection is carried out during TA.
Little systemic inspection is done during the run. While some hot components are more difficult to inspect
onstream this could be optimized to increase the OSI component of the inspection programs to spread
the work load more uniformly and provide fresher, more accurate data for maintenance decisions.
Recommendation:
Develop and implement an optimized OSI program.
It has been mentioned above that advanced NDE methods have been used sparingly. Methods such as guided
wave, phase array (PAUT), tube inspection such as Eddy Current (ET), remote field eddy current (|RFT), Flux
leakage (FL), internal rotating Ultrasonic Inspection (IRIS), Borescope, laser or white light., real time
radiography, neutron back scatter, profile radiography, infrared scanning, etc. all these and other are available
to assess condition of equipment more accurately.
Risk assessment matrices have been developed but not used in the inspection program applications. Cursory
review indicated that the assessment methodology used has been atypical leading to different result reached
when other techniques are applied. This system is not usable in its current development. The plan is to
implement RBI by the year of 2020.
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Recommendation: Accelerate the RBI development and application with targeted completion by
2018.
There is and homemade program developed and used for RV status monitoring. Its capabilities are relatively
limited however it reports on condition of the valve and overdue repairs and appears to be up-to-date. This
program hasnt been studied in detail.
Recommendation: Implement one of the most commonly used programs for RV inspection. Most of
the commercially available inspection programs will provide greater flexibility and their application
considered when refinery documentation system is upgraded.
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3. HF Alkylation Unit
This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK Hydrofluoric (HF) Alkylation Unit.
While the refining industry has long shown that HF alkylation units can be operated in a safe and reliable
manner, these units are considered to have some of the highest consequence risks. This unit uses liquefied
petroleum gases (LPG) and HF acid, which if released in quantity may cause significant fires, explosions and
highly toxic hazards. In addition, the unit contains various process streams that if not operated within well-
defined safe limits or sufficiently alloyed may result in relatively high rates of corrosion and cracking.
Some examples of corrosion on various pieces of equipment and piping systems noted in this
assessment represent characteristics of various operational issues, such as operating at excessive
temperatures, e.g., greater than 50C in carbon steel systems containing free or concentrated HF, acid carry-
overs and having water content greater than about 1.5 wt %.
Table 3.1 summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be
addressed on a priority basis.
Another potentially high risk in the HF Alkylation unit involves the Recycle Condenser Air Coolers, E-605A, B, D
and E. These air cooler bundles have required re-tubing after 4 to 12 years of service. Since the last re-tubes
were in March 2006 (E bundle has not been re-tubed since 2002) they may be approaching end of life. It should
be noted that since the last inspection, conducted in 2012, was only a visual inspection, rather than an IRIS or
RFECT examination, little significance should be given to the results of that inspection of the tubes. While most
refinery air coolers are not typically considered high risk equipment, these are somewhat unique in that they
contain either trace or main HF acid and isobutane, where even a relatively small leak, given the right
environmental conditions, could result in a hazardous condition. Most refiners have either chosen not to use
air coolers in this service in the initial design of their HF Alkylation units or have modified their units to have
shell-and-tube exchangers. While air coolers can be safely operated in this service, frequent, effective
inspections are required.
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RDK Audit 2017 Final Report
Also, C-604, the HF stripper column, may represent a significant risk, particularly an economic risk. Inspection
write-ups state that the only corrosion noted since the 1984 replacement of the top head and top shell-can
due to internal corrosion has been localized to welds, requiring weld build-up. However, UT
measurements taken in April 2012 of the second shell-can from the top shows to have UT measurements down
to 11.1 mm. This shell-can was originally 14 mm thick (nominal) with a 3 mm design corrosion allowance. If
the 2012 measurements are correct, then this section of the column is currently below the specified minimum
required thickness. Because of the corrosive nature of this service, i.e., it operates above 60C with significant
levels of HF, many refiners have chosen to upgrade the upper sections with Alloy 400 (Monel) materials.
3.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analysed. It is covered in the general section of the report.
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HF Acid Cooler, E-604A The 30-70 Cu-Ni tube bundle was last replaced in 2011 after 9
years of service. Based on this information the bundle may
require retubing within the next 5 years.
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Fractionator/Stripper The bundle has been retubed three times in its history, with an
Condenser, E-614 average life of approximately 10 years. Even using its longest
life span, i.e., 13 years, it is already near or at end of life. It
should be noted that the last inspection in 2012 was only a
visual inspection.
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4. FP-2 Unit
This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK FP-2 (Feed Preparation 2) Unit. The FP-2 unit is
what many refiners call a Vacuum Flasher. This unit takes its feed of long residue from CD -2 and CD-3. It
operates at relatively low pressures, ranging from full vacuum to about 11 or 12 BARG for the side streams.
However, the temperatures can be as high as 400C, as seen at the feed inlet to the fractionation column, C-1.
The primary corrosion mechanisms typically seen in vacuum flashers are high temperature sulfidic corrosion,
naphthenic acid corrosion and acid corrosion (commonly found in the upper sections and overhead of the
fractionation system). CUI has also been known to be particularly aggressive in insulated equipment and piping
located in cooler areas of the unit, typically from the area on the fractionator where the number 2 reflux
returns (tray 14 and upward until the equipment is no longer insulated).
Table 4.1 summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be
addressed on a priority basis.
Another significant area of concern is with the vapor piping system in the overhead of the fractionation column,
C-1. Although some (possibly all) of the 54" NPS portion of this piping circuit was replaced in 2015, the 36"
NPS portions have not been renewed since they were replaced in sections during the 1990's. Based on
corrosion rate calculations, significant portions of this 36" NPS could reach end of life within the next 5 years.
Also, the bundle for the Pre-condenser Exchanger, 2L-1B, could pose a significant reliability and financial risk.
The bundle in this exchanger was last re-tubed in 2012. The typical life of the bundle ranges from 3 years to
10 year with admiralty tubes (B-111-687). Due to the lack of reliability of the tubes, the exchanger parallel to
this one was re-tubed in 2015 with titanium tubes. This exchanger has 2054 tubes, thus re-tubing in the future
with titanium will be a significant expense.
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4.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed. It is covered in the general section of the report.
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5. NHT Unit
5.1 I NTROD UCTI ON
This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK Naphtha Hydrotreating Unit.
This unit takes its feed from the CD-3 unit. Figure 5.1 shows PDF of the unit. The feed is unstabilized gasoline
(naphtha), which contains sulfur and nitrogen. The sulfur in the feed can lead to corrosion, both from salts
(H2SOx) and high temperature sulfidic corrosion (at temperatures above approximately 270C). In the reaction
part of this process the nitrogen in the feed is partially converted into ammonia (NH 3) which can form corrosive
salts at the point of condensation, resulting in ammonium chloride and ammonium bisulfide corrosion. The
reaction section of this unit operates at moderately high pressures and temperatures, e.g., 25 BARG at 380C.
Table 5.1 summarizes areas of concern identified in this assessment. Equipment and recommendations listed
in this table should be addressed on a priority basis. Section 5.2 describes three major items to address. An
excel spread sheet which provides assessment criteria and evaluation scheme is also provided in the appendix.
Another integrity risk in the NHT involves V-1301, the High Pressure Separator. In April 1977, the sump on this
vessel was replaced due to H2 blistering (no PWHT was done to the repairs). Then in April 1989, the vessel
welds were 100% examined with WFMPT, with numerous cracks being found. Most of these cracks were
superficial and ground out in shallow depths less than the corrosion allowance and were not weld repaired.
However, cracks found in the sump welds were determined to be 11 - 12 mm in depth and after being ground
out were weld repaired and (again as in 1977) no PWHT was done. Since that time the vessel has been
internally coated with coal tar epoxy. However, failures of the coating have been noted, as in June 2004 when
approximately 10 M2 of the coating was found to be "blistered" and required replacement. Failures of this
coating expose the metal surface to a potential crack inducing environment, particularly since this vessel is
fabricated from non-HIC (hydrogen induced cracking) resistant materials and is not post weld heated.
Also, the channel head for E-1306, the hottest Feed to Effluent Exchanger, may be susceptible to HTHA (High
Temperature Hydrogen Attack). The conditions on the PFD show a reactor outlet temperature of 380C at 22
BARG. Assuming a H2 partial pressure of 75% (18 BARG), this means that the head operates approximately
65C above the current carbon steel Nelson curve for PWHT carbon steel (the curve currently recommended
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for C-1/2Mo materials). According to the documentation provided, no examination for this mechanism has
ever been conducted.
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed.
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Figure 5.2 Operating limits for steels in hydrogen service to avoid HTHA (ref. API RP 941 Figure 1)
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6. VGO MHC
The following report summarizes audit findings for RDK VGO-MHC Unit (Mild Hydrocracker - 1500 series
equipment). This unit treats streams from Lube oil/Furfural Units, FP 1&2, Flashed distillates and bottoms from
both TC Units and form FP 1 and 2, essentially preparing the feed for FCCU. Refinery Process Handbook also
mentions side streams from HV 6 and 7 but newer bloc diagram does not show such streams. This Unit reduces
organic Sulphur and Nitrogen content and to some degree heavy metals in the feed stock to meet the
specifications of the FCCU feed. Hydrogen needed in the process is supplied from a SMR type hydrogen plant
and is supplemented by Reformer hydrogen.
Product of the unit is Vacuum Gas Oil for further cracking in FCCU for Mogas and Avgas production and naphtha
stream for treatment at NHT. Streams with H2S gas and sour water are by-products, converted into elemental
sulfur in SWS/Amine Unit and Sulfur Recovery Units.
Generally, corrosion rates in the unit are not excessive, at least not in recent years. One of the reason for low
corrosion rates may be relatively low loading of the refinery resulting in lower throughout and lower
concentration of corrosive compounds. This however may change if ISLAs plans to process higher Sulfur and
Nitrogen feeds in future are realized. Unit conversion capability is limited and to meet product specifications
will downgrades in feed quality will also have to be limited. Notwithstanding the feedstock quality changes
should be monitored, understood and included in the integrity monitoring plans.
First section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of more general nature and quite similar to the
majority of the other Units, which have been analyzed. Since the inspection process is developed and
administered by the same group only relatively small differences in the systemic issues has been found
amongst the Units assessed during this review.
The Table 6.1 summarizes areas of concern based on the type of issue, such as short residual life, susceptibility
to certain type of damage etc. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be addressed on
priority basis.
First integrity risk could be the condition of the cold end of the REACS (Reactor Effluent Air Coolers) E1502.
Corrosion is not well controlled nor the inspection program able to assess their condition adequately. REAC
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corrosion is a weak spot of most hydrocracking units and should be receiving close attention. Corrosion in th ese
systems can be localized and at times severe. The most frequent damage is caused by Ammonium Chloride salt
deposits or Ammonium Bi-sulfide in high velocity and turbulence areas. Numerous failures have occurred in
these REAC systems. Since information on the precursors to the corrosive compounds hasnt been available
we could not quantify the corrosion risks. Water wash is commonly utilized to dilute or prevent deposition of
the ammonium salts but it effectiveness depends very much on the injection system design and operation and
wash water application and quality. Guidelines for design and operation of such systems are available. We did
not locate comprehensive design data for this WW system. Example of targets for acceptable corrosion rates
are shown below in Fig. 6.1
Figure 6.1 Targets for ammonium bisulfide corrosive parameters, acceptable corrosion rates
Inspection group appears not to have any responsibility for monitoring of the key parameters of this injection
system. Also details of the WW system design have not been available in inspection. Corrosion is often localized
and difficult to detect. Inadequate wash water system will not reduce the corrosion risk to the desired levels.
Without having process data available we would estimate that the main risk would come from Ammonium
chloride salts corrosion. Ammonium bisulfide concentration may not be high enough in this unit to cause
severe corrosion but this is just an educated guess.
Proper data are needed to assess corrosion risks in these systems accurately. For example of ammonium salt
deposition curves refer to the Fig. 6.2 below. These are approximate; more flexible and more accurate models
are available.
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Second Integrity risk can be represented by V-1501 HP Separator, which operates in high hydrogen charging
and corrosive environment. It is being patched with coatings of questionable effectiveness. (Inspection group
is persuaded of the coatings effectiveness although this is probably unique approach. ED Technologies
specialists are not aware of any other plant using similar coatings in similar services) Hydrogen. HIC cracking
has been detected but its seriousness doesnt appear to be thoroughly assessed. Thorough inspection and FFP
assessment of the vessel is recommended to ensure it is free of serious HIC damage and fit for service.
Other risks can be the generally poor performance of both furnace coils. Compared to the indu stry,
replacement rates of the tubes are high. Some of the damage can again, be ascribed to the high sulfur pitch
fired in theses heaters. Despite the high sulfur fuel used if the SS 347 material is delivered and installed in
appropriate condition to its operating modes damage due to the PASC damage should be low. Closer attention
should be paid to the damage mechanism as well as to the condition (chemistry and heat treatment) of the
tubes installed. Methods to minimize PASC damage are available. Catastrophic damage (leak) in a tube may
lead to a backflow and to emptying the reactor content through the heater, resulting in its destruction. We
were not able to locate a check valve on the heater outlet (outstanding action!), which would be capable of
preventing the back flow. Another caveat with these check valves is that they tend to foul and get stuck in
open position even after a few weeks in operation. About 15y old study by SIOP of all Shell refineries resulted
in finding over 60% of these valves stuck in open position. Both design and location of the valves is key to
assure their function. These valves should be on critical valve list and inspected as frequently as necessary to
assure that they are functional.
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Also there is a possibility of ammonium salt deposits and corrosion already in the cold end of the E-1568.
Corrosion history is spotty so mainly the chloride content should be monitored and related to the temperature
profile of the exchangers. De-sublimation/ deposition temperatures of the salts can be assessed relatively
accurately with modern models. This can be monitored and corrosion reduced or even prevented. More details
on other equipment is listed in Table 1 below.
6.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
RECORDS & DOCUMENTATION QUALITY AVAILABILITY, MATERIAL LISTS OR MSDS (REPORTS,
EQUIPMENT ANALYSIS, DRAWINGS ETC.)
A) Inspection Sketches
Record keeping by ISLA inspectors is currently in form basic inspection observation notes, which are written
into a SAP module and then inserted into an equipment file in paper form. Observations are summarized in
TA reports. Observations available in the inspection files discuss mostly results of visual inspections. Wall
thickness (W.T.) measurements if available are usually referred to as satisfactory, but sometimes without
actual measurement record.
Since trending of wall thickness measurements is not done, quantitative estimates of residual life cannot be
effectively done either. Measurements are sometime indicated on make-up sketches, however this doesnt
happen consistently and they are almost never trended. Older files show use of dedicated inspection sketches.
These however do not show the open shell envelop to locate the CML accurately. System of centralized UT and
other NDE program results appears not to be available for equipment such as pressure vessels, columns,
heaters and heat exchangers. It is unclear how estimates of residual life are done with any degree of accuracy.
In many (most?) cases inspection is not based on well understood corrosion or degradation mechanisms and
how they relate to operating conditions. Refer also to assessment of the Special Emphasis Programs.
Without having standardized comprehensive system of inspection drawings / sketches dedicated to the NDE
record it is in our opinion nearly impossible to assess progress of changes in equipment condition in a
quantitative way and to predict residual life with a measure of accuracy or do the effective NDE planning. Most
operators use sketches with level of detail corresponding to simplified GA drawing of equipment to identify
areas of measurement or observed damage and repairs. In the ISLA system, we didnt find standardized
equipment inspection sketches, which would show the general configuration, materials, operating conditions
and key appurtenances and, which could be used to define location of NDE measurement or specific damage.
Also, we found in number of cases that inspection report from one SD is copied to another SD almost verbatim.
Quality of the inspection could be improved by use of standardized inspection plans,
B) Bundle Inspection
Only visual inspection of bundles and tube ends is usually reported. In the VGO-MHC unit essentially no internal
tube inspections is done using either borescopes, eddy -current, IRIS or similar quantitative techniques. Tube
removal and splitting to assess condition are apparently also not practiced. No measurement trending is done
during bundle inspection either. It is our opinion that accuracy of the bundle life prediction without doing
quality internal tube inspections is expected to be low. This may lead to either unplanned leakage or premature
replacements.
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Wall thickness measurements should be kept in a computerized central record register/ data bank.
Develop standardized data sheets which would summarize whatever relevant information can still be
located in refinery archives and other sources, like personal files etc.
Current standards for TA planning contain a major component of condition based decisions, i.e.
equipment is included in the maintenance program bases assessment of its actual condition and the
risk it represents for Operations. This is much more effective approach to plant efficiency compared to
the simple time based inspection.
E&D Technologies specialize in development of such plant inspection programs based on detailed
corrosion analysis of process units. Proposals for or development of such inspection systems can be
prepared for RDK management upon request.
6.3.3 Piping
In case of piping the PIRS (Piping Inspection Records System) this system uses inspection sketches discussed
above, which show CML / TML locations. This is available for piping only however. The system is developed in
adequate detail and is suitable to communicate measurement locations and areas requiring repairs o
replacements. Results of piping wall thickness measurements are recorded in spreadsheets of the PIRS system
(MS AXES based).
Corrosion rates are calculated and residual life estimated bases of simple arithmetic extrapolation of data. No
other more complex data manipulations such as risk assessment or statistical evaluations are performed by
PIRS.
CMLs are assigned based on historical experience without a benefit of corrosion analysis. This may lead to
significant over inspection in areas where little or no internal corrosion takes place and under-inspection in
areas of active corrosion. Also the system of queries and reports allowing analyzing data in different ways such
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as what if type of queries is limited. No statistical evaluations or measurement quality assessments are
available in this system.
Notwithstanding some of the shortcomings, implementation of PIRS has led to a very substantial improvement
in piping reliability since the time it has been implemented.
While piping inspection programs are significantly more structured compared to the pressure equipment it still
lags behind contemporary standards of risk based concepts and more complex evaluations of data.
Key component of piping inspection, exchanger bundles and also pressure equipment, is the knowledge of
relevant corrosion mechanisms and parameters, which influence them. Such comprehensive analysis allows to
focus on areas of active corrosion and distribute the inspection effort more effectively, i.e. help to prevent
missing those areas, which require more intensive coverage and reduce inspection intensity in areas, where
corrosion in not taking place.
The PIRS system has been claimed to cover now all key process piping systems. While its usefulness is
undisputable the system still contains some errors and inaccuracies and would benefit form a QC review.
First step in development of knowledgeable based corrosion & Inspection system is assessment of
individual process loops. Subsequent steps consist in implementation of the following programs:
1. Appropriate grouping lines and equipment into loops (development of corrosion loops and
Material Selection Diagrams with all relevant information needed for corrosion analysis).
2. Corrosion assessment of the loops.
3. Development of parameters influencing corrosion and setting of integrity operating windows
(IOWs).
4. Development of inspection/NDE programs for uniform and localized corrosion.
5. Development of inspection/NDE for dead-leg corrosion.
6. Inspection programs for injection/mix point corrosion.
7. Inspection/NDE of vents and drains (small connections)
8. Inspection of critical valves and check valves (similar to the RV inspection program)
9. Relief valves are covered by a separate basic inspection and maintence program, which is in
place and appears functional but it has not been evaluated in detail.
We have noted that since approx. 2015 the maintenance and inspection group are engaging in a more
extensive piping external corrosion programs. It is likely that units, which have been shut down for turnarounds
in 2016 and 2017 have their piping inspected and repaired. Since a comprehensive CUI program is not
specifically defined in writing it is not clear what criteria are sued to decide on equipment repair and how
effective such program is even though the plan for repairs of piping external corrosion for example in CD -3
area for the Spring 2017 TA appeared to be quite significant.
Development of specific inspection programs for corrosion under insulation (CUI) is in most plants know to
E&D are usually carried out as parallel to the internal corrosion monitoring but separately administered
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programs. Most of the external corrosion detection can be done during operations and it is independent of
operations. In case of RDK, where CUI is a major component of piping system repairs it would probably be
useful to be able to separate the costs of maintenance due to external deterioration from that of i nternal
deterioration so the improvements in design, protection or material changes and be analyzed based on their
own merit. Details of such programs need to be developed.
TA Planning
TA planning appear to be almost exclusively time based, i.e. it is based on predetermined period. Commonly it
appears to be a 4year interval between major TA. Sometimes it is extended to 6 years. Not all equipment is
opened and internally inspected every SD. There has been no evidence pointing towards using condition based
planning. This may lead to under inspection in some cases if the equipment is not effectively assessed, e.g.
refer to the above mentioned relatively rare use of NDE methods. Comprehensive information/s tatistics on
LOPC and unplanned outages have not been made available.
It is our opinion that the quality of the inspection programs does not consistently support extended internal
inspection intervals if low LOPC frequencies and high availability factors for units are required. Also there is a
safety aspect associated with extension of inspections.
Recommendations
Most refineries have converted to condition based or hybrid planning condition based combined with
time based planning and risk assessment to determine optimum TA interval. Such programs offer the
best reliability and lower program cost. It would be advantageous for RDK to develop such capabilities
on ASAP bases. E&D Technologies specializes in implementation of such programs.
From the available inspection reports, it would appear that almost all inspection is carried out during TA. Little
systemic inspection is done during the run. While some hot components are more difficult to inspect on stream
this could be optimized to increase the OSI component of the inspection programs to spread the work load
more uniformly and provide fresher, more accurate data for maintenance decisions.
Recommendation:
Develop and implement an optimized OSI program
It has been mentioned above that advanced NDE methods are being used sparingly. Methods such as guided
wave, phase array (PAUT), tube inspection such as Eddy Current (ET), remote field eddy current (|RFT), Flux
leakage (FL), internal rotating Ultrasonic Inspection (IRIS), Borescope, laser or white light., real time
radiography, neutron back scatter, profile radiography, infrared scanning, etc. all these and other are available
to assess condition of equipment more accurately.
Inspection reports show little evidence of sophisticated NDE method application. While not all NDE methods
would be economically available on the Island but when considering the TA scope and schedule and the
improvements use of optimized NDE can bring to it
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Risk assessment matrices have been developed but not used in the inspection program applications. Cursory
review indicated that the assessment methodology used has been atypical leading to different result reached
when other techniques are applied. This system is not usable in its current development. The plan is to
implement RBI by the year of 2020,
Recommendation: Accelerate the RBI development and application with targeted completion by
2018.
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This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK FP-2 FCC Fractionation Unit, which includes all
equipment and piping at the point where the reactor effluent piping ties into the fractionation column, C -1,
throughout the fractionation section, then up to the point where the piping leaves the plot limit and goes to
the GT-7 unit and various downstream treaters. The FCC reactor effluent piping is covered in the FCCU
reactor/regenerator report for this assessment. The fractionation section of the FCCU operates at low to
moderate pressures (< 27 BARG), with temperatures ranging from ambient to 520C (the reactor effluent to
the fractionation column).The equipment and piping in the hotter sections of this unit can be sus ceptible to
high temperature sulfidic corrosion. The cooler sections often tend to be susceptible to ammonium chloride
and ammonium bisulfide corrosion, as well as wet H2S cracking.
Table 7.1 summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be
addressed on a priority basis.
Based on available data, the highest integrity risk in this unit appears to be in the slurry piping. As with many
FCC units, this unit has carbon steel piping in the slurry system. This design anticipates that sulfur will be
stripped out of the fractionator bottoms stream using stripping steam in the lower section of the
fractionation column. It is apparent that this design is not effectively stripping the sulfur from the slurry prior
to reaching the bottoms piping. This is resulting in significant amounts of high temperature sulfidic
corrosion. Slurry piping is known to suffer from irregular corrosion, which is controlled by a Si content of the
CS components. Low Si (<0.12%Si) results in significantly higher corrosion rates compared to higher Si
materials. Components with less than 0.1%Si may suffer from rate which are 4 times or more greater than
high Si components. The abrasive characteristics of some slurry stream tend to exacerbate this corrosion
mechanism. The solutions to this issue can include improving the steam stripping of the process or up-
grading the material of the slurry. Many refiners have opted to up-grade the material in the high
temperature (> 260C) slurry circuits from carbon steel to chromium-moly materials. If RDK choses this
option, up-grading to 9Cr 1/2Mo rather 5 Cr is typically the preferred approach because of the marginal
price difference and the significantly greater corrosion resistance of the 9Cr material.
Another high risk currently in the FCC Fractionator involves the fractionator overhead piping system, which is
comprised of two 24 NPS vapor lines which reduce down to 16 branches at the first set of condensers.
Premised on thickness data these two piping circuits are seeing significant corrosion. The thickness data shows
that all seven 24" components which have CMLs had lost from 1.50 to 3.60 mm by the time of the last
inspection of these CMLs (2009). If the corrosion has continued since 2009 at the same rates all six CMLs are
currently below their designated renewal thickness of 6.0 mm. Even if one uses a much less conservative
renewal thickness of 3.5 mm, all seven 24" NPS CMLs and three 16" CMLs (inspected in 2016) are approaching
end of life. Also, both the intermediate reflux piping (Circuits 25066, 2566A and 25069) and the HCO piping
(Circuits 25042 and 25046) are showing evidence of significant high temperature corrosion and may require
some replacements soon. As with the slurry piping, up-grading the material in these piping circuits may be
warranted.
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7.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed.
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Recommendation: Inspect this circuit and plan for a full renewal soon.
This circuit was last renewed in 2012. CMLs 3 and 8 on this circuit are
showing significant corrosion. Only 6 of the 10 CMLs in this circuit
have been inspected since the circuit was renewed. Premised on the
Piping: HCO
2016 thickness data they will be at their designated renewal thickness
Reflux piping,
in the next five years.
Circuit 25069
Recommendation: Verify the corrosion rates in this circuit and plan on
possibly renewing the circuit within the next 5 years.
This circuit is the 10" NPS intermediate reflux from C-1, the main
fractionator. This line was last inspected in 2009 and was showing
significant corrosion at that time. If the high corrosion rates
Piping: HCO experienced between the time the circuit was renewed in 2006 and
Reflux piping, the 2009 inspection has continued, then the circuit is now below its
Circuit 25066A designated renewal thickness.
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The following report summarizes audit findings for RDK CD-3, Wet Avtur Tr, Gas Tail, Anine and Caustic Treater
and the SWS based on the inspection records we had at our disposal. Figures 8.1 -
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8.3 GE NE RA L I TEMS
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed. It is similar to other units and it is covered in the general section of the
Final Report.
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9.3 GE NE RA L COMME NT S
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed. It is covered in the general section of the Final Report.
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This report summarizes the assessment findings for the LVI-HF unit (Low Viscosity Index Hydrofinisher). This
unit uses Luboil feed (NND-40, NND-70, NND-650 etc.) from the Distilling and Luboil (DL) area and hydrogen
from the Platformer unit. The products (LVI-40, LVI-50, LVI-450 etc.) are routed to storage.
Process Handbook indicates that this unit operates with high-pressures and temperatures (up to 142 bar and
375 C). Feed is said to be delivered in batches. After preheating in feed/effluent exchangers and a fired heater
it is passed through two three beds reactors, where the required conversions are achieved (i.e.
desulphurization and de-aromatization). The reactor effluent, after preheating the feed, is cooled in an air
cooler and then flashed off in a four separator system.
The gas is sent to the cold low pressure separator, while the liquid is preheated by the drier and fractionator
bottom product and a hot oil heater and fed to the fractionator. In the fractionator flashpoint and viscosity of
the product are corrected. After drying in the vacuum drier, the product is routed to its storage tanks at OPS,
from where it is shipped out as final product.
The main damage mechanisms in this unit are Ammonium Chloride corrosion, HCl corro sion, Ammonium
Bisulfide corrosion, Under-deposit corrosion and Hydrogen Embrittlement. Variability in batch composition
may result in variable concentration of corrodents, which in turn may result in larger areas of the system be
subjected to corrosion. Understanding of the variations are need to be able to locate zones of corrosion more
accurately.
Table 10.1 summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be
addressed on a priority basis.
Another significant area of concern are the two Ejector Condensers (E-1323 A/B). The corrosion of the shell
is caused by HCl formation. The method of pH control needs to be understood in order to recommend design
changes. The tubes (cooling water) have a history of algae depositing and under-deposit corrosion. The
cooling water treatment needs to be improved to prevent algae formation.
The main causes of pipe rejections in hydrocarbon service were, poor welds and CUI.
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This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed. It is covered in the general section of the report.
Main reactors should be assessed for potential of temper and hydrogen embrittlement.
PFD is not up-to-date. For example, vessels V-1301 and V-1302 are shown but these vessels were taken out
of service.
No MSDs were available. The material selection of equipment was taken from the equipment construction
drawings where possible. No comprehensive records were available that documented changes in material
selection. In some cases material selection changes were found in inspection reports that were not
otherwise available.
In case of piping, the PIRS system uses a system of inspection sketches to accurately communicate
measurement locations and areas requiring repairs or replacements. The Criticality Analysis Matrix only
partially captured piping systems. The PIRS piping data was used to make the list of piping systems complete.
A discrepancy was found between the materials data on the PIRS drawings and the PIRS database. All piping
components identified as API 5L-B in the PIRS database are identified as A106-B on the PIRS drawings. Piping
purchased under API and ASTM specifications may not always have identical chemistry.
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This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK Platformer Unit. Hydro -treated naphtha feed
received from the NHT-2 is mixed with hydrogen-rich gas prior to preheating in the fired charge heater.
Subsequently, the mixture is passed through the first reactor. Due to endothermic reactions, the mixture has
to be reheated in the first interheater (fired) before entry in the second reactor, and again reheated in the
second fired interheater before entering the third reactor. The reactor effluent is cooled by heat exchange
against fresh feed and further cooled by air coolers and water coolers before passing to the product separator,
where gas and liquid product are separated at high pressure. The majority of the flashed hydrogen-rich gas is
recycled to the platformer feed, whilst the net make-gas is used in the hydrotreater and hydrodesulphurizer
units.
The primary damage mechanisms typically seen in hot section of this unit i.e. in the charge heater / reactor
section are: creep/stress rupture, creep embrittlement (MPC rated class 4 cracking in 1.25Cr steels, usually
concentrated around stress riser locations), reheat cracking and potential for high temperature hydrogen
attack. In the reactor effluent, cold section ammonium chloride or HCl corrosion can occur. CUI has also been
known to be particularly aggressive in insulated equipment and piping located in cooler areas of the unit,
typically downstream of the Reactor Effluent Charge Exchanger (E-1701 A-D) up to the Reactor Effluent Trim
Cooler (E-1702 D-E) and downstream of the Stabilizer Feed Bottom Exchanger (E-1703 A-B) to the Stabilizer
Overhead Condense (E-1706 A-B) until the equipment is no longer insulated).
Note on corrosion mechanism: a n alumina-supported reforming catalyst requires moisture to activate the acid
function and provide homogeneous chloride content over the whole catalyst bed. When the environmental
atmosphere is too wet, however, chloride in the catalyst will be leached off and thus, deteriorate its effectiveness
and corrosion is experienced in downstream location where water dew-point is approached. Usually the chloride
content on the catalyst should be kept in the range of 0.9 1.2 wt% for most bimetallic catalysts. To meet this
requirement, an environment of 15 ppm of hydrogen chloride and 1020 ppm of water should be provided in the
circulating gas over the bimetallic reforming catalysts. Therefore, tight water control must be performed along with
chloride control to maintain a proper chloridewater balance in the feed to assure catalyst function and at the same
time prevent corrosion. Consult your catalyst provider for specific details.
Table 11.1 below summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should
be addressed on a priority basis.
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The Reactor Effluent Air Cooler suffers from pitting corrosion. Re-tubing of E1702 B1 was scheduled for 2008,
but the actual re-tubing could not be verified from the inspection records.
The bottom of the Stabilizer O/H condensers E-1706 A/B are heavily corroded, 6mm WT loss, the remaining
wall (May 2013) was 11.1 min which is too close to the min required WT (10.9mm). Condensing acid water or
chloride salts can cause severe corrosion. This location/ exchanger have been implicated in a few severe
incidents in other plants.
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed. It is covered in the general section of the Final Report.
11.3.1 Record Keeping Documentation Quality Documentation Availability, Material lists or MSDs,
(reports, equipment analysis, drawings etc.)
The material selection was not documented in Material Selection Diagrams and consequently it needed to be
pieced together from the original data sheets and the inspection records. Changes in material selection which
have occurred over time were hard to identify.
11.3.2 Piping
The refinery uses piping isometric drawings, which show CMLs (Condition Monitoring Locations).
Measurements are recorded and trended using calculated CML average short and long-term corrosion rates
and actual reading point short and long corrosion rates. Probabilistic methods of residual life determination
are not used.
CMLs are assigned with little regard of actual corrosion mechanisms. This leads to significant over inspection
in areas where internal corrosion doesnt take place and under inspection in areas of active inspection.
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Recommendation:
Confirm material used (P11 or P12). P11 has 0.5-1.0 wt% Si, while P12 has max 0.5 wt% Si. P11 has
higher HTHA resistance (API RP 945) than P12. In case P12 is used, verify if the pH2, T operating
point is located under the Nelson curve (integrity issue).
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This report summarizes the assessment findings for the RDK HV-6 Unit (High Vacuum Unit 6). HV-6 is almost
identical to HV-7.
The almost identical HV-6/7 separate the long residue ex CD-2B in several fractions of which some are used as
raw material for the manufacture of various lube oil grades. The long residue is heated up in fired heaters to
380C before going into the Distillation Column (C-1, previously named Vacuum Column DA-1). In this column,
Vacuum Gasoil and about six distillate grades, so-called Neutralized Naphthenic Distillates (NND 1 s), (NND40,
NND45, NND50, NND70, NND270, NND650), are drawn off.
The Distillation Column (C-1, previously DA-1) comprises of a neutralization section where ADOS (caustic Soda,
NaOH solution) is circulated in order to remove naphthenates. ADOS is routed to the ADOS diluent recovery
units (ADRU) for the recovery of naphtenic acids diluted in neutral oil.
Naphthenic acids present in the vacuum distillates are neutralized with continuous caustic soda injection (appr.
0.2% m/m) in order to meet a TAN specification of less than 0.05 mg KOH/g of the distillates produced. The
ADOS section consists of a neutralisation section (trays #36 and #37), a wash section (trays #34 and #35), total
draw of tray #38, a demister (York screen) between tray #33 and #34, M-deck between tray #38 and tray #39.
The purpose of the wash section is to avoid entrainment of caustic into the distillates in the lube oil
intermediate. The heaviest distillate produced (either NND 650 or NND 1100) is used as wash oil.
Fouling of the trays in the ADOS section is unavoidable. Both crystallisation of caustic soda (when the
temperature drops below 340C) and coking of other components in the ADOS, promoted by the presence of
caustic, result in fouling up of the neutralisation trays. When these trays get partially blocked the entrainment
into the wash section will give fouling of the wash trays as well.
The sodium content of these streams increases from 3-5 ppm after start up to 25 ppm or higher. For NND 650,
being a feedstock for LVI 450 production on the LVI-HF a sodium content above 5 ppm is considered
unacceptable in view of de-activation of the catalyst.
The plan was to replace bubble cap trays with sieve trays (ease of maintenance). It is not clear whether this
was actually done.
The primary corrosion mechanisms typically seen in HV-6 are high temperature sulfidic corrosion, naphthenic
acid corrosion (commonly found in the upper sections and overhead of the fractionation system) and caustic
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corrosion in the ADOS section of Distillation Column. CUI has also been known to be particularly aggressive in
insulated equipment and piping located in cooler areas of the unit.
Table 12.1 summarizes areas of concern. Equipment and recommendations listed in this table should be
addressed on a priority basis.
This section of this report covers systemic findings, which are of a general nature and similar for majority of
the units which have been analyzed.
12.3.1 Record Keeping Documentation Quality Documentation Availability, Material lists or MSDs,
(reports, equipment analysis, drawings etc.)
Tag numbers of coolers, exchangers and vessels on the PFD do not match tag numbers in inspection reports.
Tag numbering system was changed at one point. PFDs are not up to date, it does not show most recent
equipment compared with inspection reports.
No MSDs were available. The material selection of equipment was taken from the equipment construction
drawings where possible. No good records were available that documented changes in material selection. In
some cases material selection changes were found in inspection reports.
The original equipment data sheets were not available. The installation date is the date on the equipment
construction drawings, as no equipment data sheet was available.
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In case of piping, the PIRS system uses a system of inspection sketches to communicate measurement locations
and areas requiring repairs or replacements. The piping section in the Criticality Analysis Matrix was not
complete, the PIRS piping data contained 22 more line numbers.
Recommendations: Verify the piping material on PIRS dwg 04056. Material should be P5, 5Cr- Mo.
In case it is API 5L-B, pipe section shall be replaced with P5, 5Cr- Mo.
Perform FFP and Remaining Life Assessment analysis (API 579 or other)
to understand the condition of the column.
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The stripper V-5 vessel shows increase in diameter after suffering a few high temperature excursions
prior to 1990. Circumference of the vessel has been increased at a rate of 6mm/year since 1990. The
cause of the diameter change was not identified, therefore mostly visual inspections during the
turnaround were relied on for assuring integrity of the vessel.
Based on the review of the inspection reports, it appears that ISLA might not have followed all the
recommendations made in 1992. Also it is not known how many times the vessel might have been
subjected to temperatures above the design values during subsequent years. At this time fitness for
service integrity assessment cant be carried out in its full extent due to lack of information. Material
properties including high temperature creep behavior and in particular complete history of past
pressure and temperature excursions as well as future operating conditions need to be available to
carry out complete fitness for service assessment. Mechanical integrity for continue-to-use of V-5
Stripper remains in question.
Since the vessel has prior damages such as bulging and carbide precipitation (from metallographic
analysis), material degradation has likely occurred. Relevant embrittlement mechanism and
weldability should be carefully assessed prior to attempting weld repairs. C-1/2Mo material is known
to be prone to strain age embrittlement and other types of embrittlement. Several brittle fracture
incidents were reported when hydrotesting after repair.
If the vessel is to continue to operate missing data need to be found or developed (e.g. appropriate
material testing done) and the additional integrity assessment conducted.
A bulging was discovered from the stripper V-5 vessel during the 1988 FCCU turnaround (T/A). A core
sample was supposedly cut from the bulged area and a remaining life assessment and metallographic
assessment were conducted in 1990 T/A. Dimensional measurements showed that the bulging was
generalized to all courses and all around the vessel. It was not certain that the deformation occurred
as a result of creep damage throughout 34 years of operation or as a result of thermal excursions.
Diameter of the vessel increases every time it was measured during the turnaround. Table below
summarizes the findings related to stripper
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Since there were no supporting data nor evidence for the cause of bulging, ISLA decided to estimate remaining
life of the vessel using metallographic method and post-exposure creep rupture testing. Three core samples
were removed from the stripper to conduct an accelerated creep tests in an attempt to estimate remaining
life assessment utilizing Larson-Miller parameter. According to a report issued on August 23 rd, 1991, excerpts
from the report are as follows:
1. Remaining life assessment based on 10 accelerated creep-rupture tests was not sufficiently accurate
and precise to render useful practical information. Although a probabilistic approach was used to
quantify the uncertainties and make effective use of inaccurate testing approach was used to quantify
the uncertainties and make use of inaccurate testing results, the analysis produced remaining life
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predictions in between 3.5 years and 43 years if the stripper is operated continuously at the design
pressure and temperature.
2. Without a reliable remaining life estimate, we shall still depend much on future regular inspection
results to eliminate the possibility of failure. This inspection, however, will have to be specially
designed to detect creep failure problems.
3. No conclusive evidence has been found to suggest an imminent failure incident with the stripper.
4. Previous knowledge that is existence of shell bulging in the order of 2% and the uncertainty about the
real causes of this bulging.
5. Since creep failure in this type of vessel is expected to be preceded by further bulging of the shell
and/or cracking at the longitudinal welds, an inspection program is proposed which is intended for
monitoring both aspects.
On the other hand, a report issued by MSCM (MSM Note No 92-7360) concluded that the data scatter and
uncertainty was so large; therefore, there is no point on assessing the remaining life estimation based on creep
test. Unreliability of the prediction will be even larger than normal if use is made of complicated procedures.
Selected testing conditions were not adequately representing the operating conditions. There was consensus
about the fact that the bulging in the stripper was the result of high temperature excursions rather than long
term creep under near normal operating conditions. The memo also noted, however, That is not to say that
the stripper does not exhibit any creep damage but the failure of dangerous cracking is not expected to occur
in the near future, certainly not before the forth coming turnaround. A thorough inspection is being completed
again for the next turnaround, which is scheduled for 1993.
Circumference measurements at the T/A since 1990 are shown in the Table below:
25.5 years have passed since the remaining life assessment and another report issued in 1992 claimed that
the previous remaining life assessment was invalid. It should be noted that the circumference has increased
132 mm between 1990 and 2012 on average of 6 mm per year and 6.5 mm per year increase between 1999
and 2012.
At this moment it is not clear whether the increases in circumference has been mainly caused by additional
temperature excursions, measurements errors, creep or combination of the above. From the data shown
above indicated that the damage still exists and will not be restored unless it is replaced with a new material.
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As noted in 1992 Report, the remaining life assessment performed in 1989-1990 should be invalidated for
many reasons noted in the No-92-7349 report. One of the reasons is that the test condition is much higher
than the operating condition. In such a case, it will be difficult to estimate reasonable remaining life by
extrapolating the Larson-Miller parameter as shown in Figure 1 (Reference API 579 committee work Figure
13.5-2). A great deal of technology progresses have been made since 1991 regarding high temperature life
assessment. (ref: Prager, M. Development of Project Omega Method for the Life Assessment in the Creep
Range ASME PVP, 1994, Kim. DS & Mead, HE Creep Remaining Life Assessment of Heater Tubes using Omega
Method, ASME PVP 1999, API RP 579, 2007). American Petroleum Institute (API) Recommended Practice API
RP 579 Fitness For Service and ASME FFS-1 was published to estimate a more accurate remaining life
assessment and testing. More realistic remaining life assessment can be made by utilizing the Omega method.
In order to carry out the assessment, actual material data, process temperature and pressure should be given.
Since no available data were provided, only sensitivity analyses were made to provide perspectives.
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Figure 13.1 Inaccuracy of extrapolating L-M parameter at low stress range (ref: Figure 13.5-2 Larson-Millar
Parameter of the Currently Employed API Curves Along With the Proposed Curves and New Data in US
Customary Units: 2.25Cr-1Mo)
Since no material creep data and operating history are available, FFS parametric assessment was conducted
based on the assumptions noted below:
Specific Omega data for ASTM A-204 Grade A (C-1/2Mo) was not available. Therefore, typical C-1/2Mo
Omega data were used.
No general metal wall loss i.e., FCA = 0.0
Stress change due to diameter change was negligible.
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Determine remaining life (L) at the given stress level and temperature by utilizing creep rupture data for the
material
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Remaining life can be estimated more accurately when real material data and operating history are given. Since
we could not find the relevant data, a sensitivity analysis was done for various temperature and pressure range.
E&D Technologies developed a computer program to estimate the remaining life based on API 579. Results are
shown in figures 2 and 3. As shown in the figures, plenty of remaining life is expected if the vessel is operated
within the design limit.
10000000
1000000
100000
Life(years)
10000
1000
100
10
1
25 30 35 40 45 50
Pressure(psi)
Figure 13.2
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100000
Life( years)
10000
1000
100
10
950 1000 1050 Temp (F) 1100 1150 1200
Figure 13.3
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Based on reviewing the data provided by ISLA, we have made the following conclusions and recommendations:
1. Circumference of the vessel has been increased at a rate of 6mm/year since 1990. Remaining life
assessment and integrity of the vessel cannot be done because of lack of material data as well as
operating history.
3. Based on the available data, it doesnt seem that ISLA followed all the recommendations made in
1992 shown in Table 13.1.
4. The integrity of V-5 stripper cannot be confirmed and more accurate assessment can be done if proper
metallographic assessment and Omega sample testing is performed. Based on the information
provided, I would recommend replace the Stripper with a new material which would allow flexibility
of the future operation while maintaining reliability and integrity of the vessel.
5. Since the vessel has prior damages such as bulging and carbide precipitation from metallographic
analysis, material degradation, weldability and embrittlement mechanism should be carefully
examined prior to attempting weld repairs. C-1/2Mo material is known to be prone to strain age
embrittlement and other types of embrittlement. Several brittle fracture incidents were reported
when hydrotesting after repair (example picture attached).
6. Mechanical integrity for continue-to-use of V-5 Stripper is in question. Thorough integrity assessment
should be conducted if the vessel is to continue to operate.
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