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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA Reportable

NATAL PROVINCIAL DIVISION

Case No : 8652\08
In the matter between:

JACOB GEDLEYIHLEKISA ZUMA APPLICANT

and

NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC

PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

NICHOLSON J

Introduction

1. The applicant is Jacob Gedleyihlekisa Zuma. The applicant sets

out in some detail his career including his participation in the

liberation struggle for political rights for all in South Africa. He is

66 years of age and served time on Robben Island for a political

offence. Thereafter the applicant went into exile to fight for the

political rights of the oppressed in this country. Since the advent

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of democracy he has occupied a number of senior posts in the

African National Congress (ANC) and is currently the president.

2. Apart from his party political career the applicant has at all

material times to this application held high political office. He was

a member of the KwaZulu-Natal legislature and the Member of the

Executive Council (MEC) for Economic Affairs and Tourism for

that province from April 1994 to June 1999.

3. The applicant became a member of the National Assembly of

Parliament in June 1999. He was appointed the Deputy President

of the Republic of South Africa on 19 June 1999 and became

leader of government business in Parliament. The remainder of

his career will appear from the facts enumerated in the judgment

hereinafter.

4. The Respondent is the National Director of Public Prosecutions

(‘the NDPP’).

5. The Society for the Protection of our Constitution, a voluntary

association, applied to join these proceedings as an amicus

curiae.
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6. The applicant was represented at the hearing by Mr K J Kemp SC,

assisted by Mr MDCSmithers and Miss AA Gabriel, the NDPP by

Mr W Trengove SC, assisted by Mr W Downer SC, Mr George

Baloyi, Mr A Breitenbach, Ms Kameshni Pillay and Mr A

Steynberg, while the Society was represented by Mr Z Omar. I am

immeasurably grateful to counsel for their efforts which have

made my very difficult task a lot easier by their thorough heads of

argument and other materials.

Background

7. On 23 August 2003 the then NDPP Mr Bulelani Ngcuka held a

press conference at which he announced that his office had

decided to prosecute one Mr Schabir Shaik and a number of

corporate entities in which he had substantial interests, but not

the applicant who at that time was the deputy President of the

Republic of South Africa.

8. This prosecution was pursued and Mr Shaik was in due course

convicted and sentenced to an effective term of fifteen years

imprisonment. The corporate entities were also sentenced

appropriately. The Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional

Court have confirmed the convictions and sentence. It was

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common cause during that case (‘the Shaik trial’) that between

October 1995 and September 2002, Shaik personally, and some of

the corporate appellants, made numerous payments totalling a

substantial amount of money to or on behalf of the applicant.

9. Discovery of the payments ultimately led to the prosecution of

Shaik and the corporate entities. They were charged with three

main counts and in each instance with a number of lesser

alternate charges. The main charge on count 1 was that of

contravening section 1(1)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Corruption Act 94 of

1992 (the CA).

10. The State alleged that during the relevant period Shaik and one or

other of the corporate entities made 238 separate payments of

money either directly to or for the benefit of the applicant. The

State alleged that the object of the payments was to influence the

applicant to use his name and political influence for the benefit of

Shaik's business enterprises or as an ongoing reward for having

done so.

11. The main charge on count 3 was one in terms of s 1(1)(a)(i) of the

CA. During September 1999, Ms Patricia de Lille, a member of

Parliament, made allegations concerning corrupt practices during

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what has become known as the arms deal. This related to the

purchase of armaments by the Government of the Republic of

South Africa from a number of overseas and local contractors. As

a result of her complaints a number of State institutions,

including the Auditor-General, the National Prosecuting Authority

and the Public Protector, became involved.

12. Thomson-CSF (Thomson), a French company with which Shaik

had participated as part of a consortium (the German Frigate

Consortium), had acquired a significant stake in the arms deal, in

particular, the provision of an armaments suite for corvettes for

the South African Navy purchased by the Government. The State

alleged that Mr Shaik's participation, through a local company

called African Defence Systems (ADS), in which Thomson

acquired a majority stake, was as a result of the applicant’s

influence.

13. It alleged further, that during September 1999 and at Durban,

Shaik, acting for himself and his companies, met Alain Thétard, a

Thomson executive, and that a suggestion was made that in

return for payment by Thomson to the applicant of R500 000 per

year, until dividends from ADS became payable to Shaik, the

applicant would shield Thomson from the anticipated enquiry and

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thereafter support and promote Thomson's business interests in

South Africa.

14. The State alleged that the suggestion was then approved by

Thomson's head office in Paris and that a seal was set on this

arrangement at a meeting in Durban during March 2000 involving

Thétard, Shaik and the applicant. This led to a document

described in the evidence as 'the encrypted fax' being sent by

Thétard from Pretoria to Thomson's head office.

15. A few days after Mr Shaik was convicted and sentenced (see S v

Shaik & Others 2007 (1) SACR 142 (D)), on 20 June 2005, the

successor of Mr Ngcuka, the new NDPP Mr Vusi Pikoli,

announced that his office had decided to prosecute the applicant.

This was followed up by the service on the applicant of a

provisional indictment in November of the same year. The

indictment was a mirror image of counts 1 and 3 of the charges of

which Mr Shaik had been convicted.

16. The matter came before Msimang J on 31 July 2006. The State

applied for a postponement to complete its investigations and

finalize the indictment. The application was opposed. Msimang

J, in his judgment of 20 September 2006 refused the

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postponement and called on the State to proceed with the trial.

When the State indicated that it was not ready to proceed to trial,

he struck the matter from the roll.

17. On 27 December 2007 the National Prosecuting Authority (“NPA”)

decided once again to prosecute the applicant. That decision was

followed up with the service of an indictment on the applicant on

28 December 2008. The applicant is currently charged together

with Thint Holding (Southern Africa)(Pty) Ltd (the second

accused) and Thint (Pty) Ltd (the third accused), with 18 counts,

including charges of racketeering, corruption, money laundering

and fraud.

The present application

18. Prior to the matter being called in court on 4 August 2008 the

applicant brought an application in which he seeks an order in the

following terms:

‘1.

That it is declared that the decision taken by the National

Prosecuting Authority during or about June 2005 to prosecute
the applicant is invalid and is set aside.

2.
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That it is declared that the decision taken by the National

Prosecuting Authority during or about December 2007 to
prosecute the applicant, which decision was implemented by
the service on the applicant on 28 December 2007 of an
Indictment, a copy of which is annexed to the applicant’s
founding affidavit as annexure “A” thereto (“the Indictment”),
is invalid and is set aside.

3.

That it is declared that the Indictment is invalid and is set

aside.

4.

That the respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this

application on the scale as between attorney and client, such
costs to include the costs consequent upon the employment
of three Counsel.

5.

That the applicant is granted such further, other and/or

alternative relief as to the above Honourable Court may seem
meet.’

19. At the outset I must emphasise that these proceedings have

nothing to do with the guilt or otherwise of the applicant on the

charges brought against him. They deal with the disputed

question of a procedural step that the State was required to

comply with prior to instituting proceedings against the applicant.

If there are defects, at best for the applicant, the present

indictment may be set aside. Once the defects are cured, subject

of course to any other applications that are brought, the State is

at liberty to proceed with any charges they deem meet.

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The application of the amicus curiae

20. The Society for the Protection of our Constitution applied

to join these proceedings as an amicus curiae. It is

necessary to deal with its application on the basis that its

participation, evidence and submissions may have an impact

on how the application should be approached. The Society

gave notice in its application that it would seek an order, in

terms of s 168 of the CPA, that the criminal prosecution

against the applicant be stayed until he completed his

anticipated term of office as President of the Republic of

South Africa, alternatively that it be quashed in its entirety.

21. I am not aware of any case in our law, whether civil or

criminal, in which an amicus curiae applied for relief in its

own name. The observation must also be made that the

relief that the Society seeks is drastic and considerably more

far-reaching than that sought by the applicant himself.

The request by the amicus for a commission of enquiry into the

violation of the applicant’s constitutional rights.

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22. The amicus in his heads of argument asks for an order in

the following terms:

‘20 a) An order that an investigation be conducted

forthwith to identify all individuals who participated
in the violation of the constitutional rights of
President Zuma. These people must be charged
with the crime of defeating the ends of justice…’

23. The amicus is effectively asking for the appointment of a

commission of enquiry into the violation of the applicant’s

constitutional rights. The courts have laid down when such

commissions should be appointed.

24. In these papers frequent mention is made of the alleged

irregularities in the arms deal. The applicant says in his founding

affidavit at paragraph 26 that ‘questions relating to alleged

irregularities in the arms deal were raised from September 1999.

These were raised in the press and parliament.’

25. There are also widespread calls for a commission to be appointed

to investigate the Arms Deal. This court has no power to appoint

any commission of enquiry. The President is responsible for

appointing commissions of inquiry in terms of Section 84 (2) (f) of

the Constitution. In terms of Section 1 (1) (a) of the Commissions

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Act No. 8 of 1947, if the President has established a commission

of inquiry he may make the provisions of the Act applicable

provided the investigation objectively relates to a matter of

‘public concern’.

26. It was held in President of RSA and others v SARFU and others

2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) that the term ‘public concern’ must be a

concern of members of the public which is widely shared

(paragraph 175).

27. In Bell v Van Rensburg NO 1971 (3) SA 694 C the court referred at

page 710 et seq to the Salmon Report in England with approval

which held that the inquisitorial methods of commissions should

never be used for a matter of purely local or minor public interest

but should always be restricted to matters of material public

interest with regard to which there exists a nation wide crisis of

confidence. In such cases the court concluded that no other

method of investigation would be adequate.

28. The court in the Bell case also approved statements to the effect

that commissions should be appointed to maintain the unsullied

integrity of our public life, without which a successful democracy

is not possible. It held that it is essential that on the infrequent

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occasions when crises in public confidence take place, the evil, if

it exists, should be exposed so that it can be eradicated lock,

stock and barrel. On the other hand if it does not exist the general

public can be satisfied that there is no substance in the general

rumours and suspicions that gave rise to such crises. The court

concluded that the public places its confidence in such a

commission to conduct the most assiduous investigation and to

call evidence in order to expose the truth. It is only in this manner

that public confidence can be restored.

29. Mr du Plooy the deponent to the answering affidavit of

respondent has indicated that all his investigations were as a

result of what Ms Patricia de Lille said in Parliament. He says

‘The investigations had their origins in broad-ranging

allegations of impropriety relating to the arms deal.
Those allegations were made, inter alia, in September
1999 by an opposition member of Parliament Ms Patricia
de Lille.’

30. It would be naïve to suggest that the allegations concerning

corruption relating to the arms deal have ceased or diminished in

intensity. They purport to involve very senior figures in

government from the President downwards. The Constitutional

Court – the highest judicial custodians of the fountain of all our

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power and authority – the constitution – has said the following of

and concerning corruption and maladministration.

‘[4] Corruption and maladministration are inconsistent

with the rule of law and the fundamental values of our
Constitution. They undermine the constitutional
commitment to human dignity, the achievement of
equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms. They are the antithesis of the open,
accountable, democratic government required by the
Constitution. If allowed to go unchecked and
unpunished they will pose a serious threat to our
democratic State.’

Per Chaskalson P (as he then was, later Chief Justice) in

South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v
Heath and Others 2001 (1) SA 883 (CC).

31. In S v Ebrahim 1991 (2) SA 553 (AD) the court cited with approval

the American case of Olmstead v United States 277 US 438, where

Justice Brandeis said the following:

‘Decency, security and liberty alike demand that

Government officials shall be subjected to the same
rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the Government will
be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.
Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher.
For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. Crime is contagious. If the Government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it
invites anarchy.’
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32. The applicant is accused of writing a letter dated 19 January 2001

to Gavin Woods MP the chairperson of the Parliamentary

Standing Committee on Public Accounts with the intention of

blocking the Heath Unit from investigating the Arms Deal. The

applicant points out that the President’s office drafted the letter.

There is no denial filed by the President. The court can hardly be

unaware of the other dark mutterings emanating from the

applicant that if he goes down others will follow him. Like a

blinded Samson he threatens to make sure the temple collapses

with him. The impression created is that the applicant has

knowledge he will disclose if he is faced with conviction and

sentence.

33. Only a commission of enquiry can properly rid our land of this

cancer that is devouring the body politic and the reputation for

integrity built up so assiduously after the fall of Apartheid. If the

allegations made by Ms de Lille and a group of courageous

journalists are true then there is no better reason for a

commission to probe this corruption.

34. If their allegations are not true then the political leaders of our

society should not be permitted to be defamed and slandered in

this shameless and despicable way. If they are innocent they

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should not be required to resort to the ordinary courts to defend

their good names and reputations. The public purse should fund

a commission of enquiry so that they can govern in peace and

tranquility and not under an ever present cloud of suspicion and

scandal.

35. There is unimpeachable authority for this. The amicus seeks an

order for a commission to vindicate the reputation of the

applicant. This has been done on at least one previous occasion

by the president. On 19 September 2003, scarcely one month after

Mr Ngcuka held his press conference to announce his intention to

prosecute Mr Shaik and not the applicant, a commission of

enquiry was instituted by the President under Gov Gaz No 25481

Regulation Gazette No 7771, to

‘Inquire into, make findings, report on and make

recommendations concerning the following: Whether at
any stage prior to 1994, the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, Mr BT Ngcuka, was –

(a) registered with the security

branch or any other service of
any other security service of
any pre-1994 government as an
agent under the code name RS
452 or under any other code
name; and

(b) Acting as an agent for the

Security Police and/or National
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Intelligence Service of any pre-

1994 government.’

36. That commission was appointed to investigate the scandalous

allegations made of the NDPP at that time. It seems to me so

much more important to appoint a commission to thoroughly

investigate whether there is truth in the allegations of widespread

corruption and, if there is not, to clear the name of President

Mbeki and those others unjustly accused.

37. To return to the request of the Amicus for this court to appoint a

commission of enquiry into the scandalous allegations made of

the applicant. From the above it is abundantly clear that the court

cannot perform such a function. To make such an order would be

what is known in the law as a brutum fulmen – a useless

thunderbolt. It is only the president who is empowered by the

constitution to appoint commissions. That relief sought by the

amicus must therefore be refused.

38. The other relief sought by the amicus, seeking orders staying or

dismissing the charges against the applicant permanently or until

his term of office as President of South Africa ceases, is similarly

misconceived and must be dismissed.

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39. There are other reasons why the application of the amicus cannot

succeed. In Certain Amicus Curiae Applications, In re: Minister of

Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others

(CCT8/02)(5 July 2002) the Constitutional Court said the following:

‘The role of an amicus is to draw the attention of the

court to relevant matters of law and fact to which
attention would not otherwise be drawn. In return for the
privilege of participating in the proceedings without
having to qualify as a party, an amicus has a special
duty to the court. That duty is to provide cogent and
helpful submissions that assist the court. The amicus
must not repeat arguments already made but must raise
new contentions; and generally these new contentions
must be raised on the data already before the court.
Ordinarily it is inappropriate for an amicus to try to
introduce new contentions based on fresh evidence.’

40. The NDPP, on behalf of the State, objected to the admission of the

Society as an amicus, while the applicant, through his counsel,

while not expressly supporting the application, did not object

thereto. In his affidavit in support of the amicus application, Mr

William Mahlangu, the chairperson of the Society attacks the

method of securing attendance at court of the applicant which is

not a live issue in the application at all. The deponent also makes

similar allegations of a political conspiracy against the applicant

which add nothing to what the applicant has said himself. I

accordingly find that the admission of the Society will not be of

any assistance to this Court in its deliberations.

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The applications to strike out

41. The respondent has applied to strike out 15 items, some including

multiple paragraphs, of the applicant’s founding affidavit. The

first item relates to the biographical material of the applicant and

his part in the struggle for democratic rights in South Africa. The

remaining paragraphs complained of can be broadly described as

being offensive because they insinuate that there is political

meddling in the prosecution process. This is a serious allegation

and must be examined with the most anxious deliberation, as it

strikes to the heart of our democracy. The independence of the

NPA and the prohibition on executive interference will be

examined in detail later in the judgment. The role of the courts to

monitor and halt any such executive action was unequivocally

asserted by the Constitutional Court in In Re Certification of the

Constitution of the RSA 1996(4) SA 744 at para [146] where the

Court held that

‘[section] 179(4) [of the Constitution] provides that the

national legislation must ensure that the prosecuting
authority exercises its functions, without fear, favour of
prejudice. There is accordingly a constitutional
guarantee of independence, and any legislation or
executive action inconsistent therewith would be
subject to constitutional control by the Courts.’
(Emphasis added.)
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42. There is therefore an emphatic constitutional imperative to outlaw

any executive action which seeks to interfere with the

independence of the prosecuting authority. The applicant in turn

applies to strike out seven paragraphs and one annexure in the

respondent’s answering affidavits. The material that causes

offence relates to allegations of improper conduct by applicant

and his legal representatives and the inclusion of other

proceedings about such conduct and the award of costs in such

other proceedings.

43. These are substantive applications and are accompanied by

affidavits setting out the reasons for striking out the relevant

paragraphs. Both applications include prayers for punitive costs

on the attorney and client scale. At no stage did either party

abandon these applications and the court is therefore compelled

to deal with them. It is of course trite that in order to rule on what

is irrelevant, or scandalous and vexatious the court has to look at

the merits and what is relevant to the live issues therein. See

Elher (Pty) Ltd v Silver 1947 (4) SA 173 (W) at 176-7. I accordingly

propose to look at the merits before determining the strike out

applications.
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Was applicant entitled to make representations in terms of the relevant

law?

44. The crisp issue for determination is whether the applicant was

entitled to make representations to the NDPP before the decision

was taken to prosecute him.

45. Section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South

Africa, Act no 108 of 1996 provides as follows:

‘[The National Director Public Prosecutions] may review a

decision to prosecute or not to prosecute, after consulting the
relevant Director of Public Prosecutions and after taking
representations within a period specified by the National
Director Public Prosecutions, from the following:

(i) The accused person.

(ii) The complainant.

(iii) Any other person or party whom the National

Director considers to be relevant.’

46. The NDPP contends that these provisions do not apply to the

decision to prosecute the appellant in this matter. It is common

cause that the applicant was not afforded an opportunity to make

representations.
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47. The obligation to hear representations forms part of the audi

alteram partem principle. What is required is that a person who

may be adversely affected by a decision be given an opportunity

to make representations with a view to procuring a favourable

result. The affected person should usually be informed of the gist

or the substance of the case, which he is to answer. The affected

person has no general right to receive every piece of information

relevant to the decision. See Chairman, Board on Tariffs and

Trade v Brenco Inc and Others 2001(4) SA 511 (SCA) paras 13, 14,

29, 30 and 42. Radio Pretoria v Chairman, Independent

Communications Authority of South Africa 2003(5) SA 451 (T)

para 24.6.

48. In order to give effect to the right to procedurally fair

administrative action, the respondent had to give the applicant

adequate notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed

administrative action. The proposed administrative action was the

exercise of the discretion to change his decision not to prosecute

to one prosecuting the applicant.

49. The duty to give a reasonable opportunity to make

representations had to be in the context of the reasons not to

prosecute the applicant which had changed thereafter.

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50. In the case of Nisec (Pty) Ltd v Western Cape Provincial Tender

Board and Others 1998 3 SA 228 (C) at 234-5 Davis J held that

‘In summary, it appears that a right to a hearing does

include the provision of such information which would
render the hearing meaningful in that the aggrieved
party is given an opportunity to know all the
ramifications of the case against him and thereby is
provided with the opportunity to meet such a case.’

51. The ramifications of the case against the applicant would surely

include the basis upon which the respondent had since changed

his thinking about the decision to prosecute. As Colman J said in

Heatherdale Farms (Pty) Ltd and Others v Deputy Minister of

Agriculture and Another 1980 (3) SA 476 (T) at 486D--F:

`It is clear on the authorities that a person who is

entitled to the benefit of the audi alteram partem rule
need not be afforded all the facilities which are allowed
to a litigant in a judicial trial. He need not be given an
oral hearing, or allowed representation by an attorney or
counsel; he need not be given an opportunity to cross-
examine; and he is not entitled to discovery of
documents. But on the other hand (and for this no
authority is needed) a mere pretence at giving the
person concerned a hearing would clearly not be
compliance with the rule. . . . What would follow . . . is,
firstly, that the person concerned must be given a
reasonable time in which to assemble the relevant
information and to prepare and put forward his
representation; secondly he must be put in possession
of such information as will render his right to make
representations a real, and not an illusory one.'
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52. The right to make representations would only be real and not

illusory if the applicant knew what criteria were applied in not

prosecuting him and how those had changed. I will return to the

competing contentions of the parties in this matter but it suffices

to say that the applicant submits the two decisions were as a

result of a political campaign against him and the respondent

maintains it was as a result of new evidence that had been

discovered.

53. The applicant claims that the decision to prosecute him

constitutes a ‘review’ of an earlier decision not to prosecute,

hence he is entitled to make representations to the NDPP in terms

of section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution, and the virtually

identically worded section 22(2)(c) of the National Prosecuting

Authority Act 32 of 1998 (‘the NPA Act’).The applicant has to have

regard to the provisions of the national legislation, even though

he refers to the constitution. It has been held that where

legislation is enacted to give effect to a constitutional right, a

litigant may not bypass that legislation and rely directly on the

Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling short of

the constitutional standard. See South African National Defence

Union v Minister of Defence and others 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) at

paragraph 51. The applicant does not challenge the

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constitutionality of the relevant provision in the NPA Act. Where

the two are in virtually identical terms it does not seem to me to

be a problem to refer to the wording in the constitution. The fact

that such wording is contained in that document could hardly

diminish its status. It must always be borne in mind that section 2

provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic;

law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations

imposed by it must be fulfilled.

The nature of the proceedings

54. There was some debate as to the nature of these proceedings. Mr

Kemp suggested that they were in the nature of or akin to section

106(1)(h) of the Criminal Procedure Act, no 51 of 1977, which is to

the effect that when an accused pleads to a charge he may plead

that the prosecutor has no title to prosecute. Sub-section (3)

provides that an accused shall give reasonable notice to the

prosecution of such a plea though such may be waived by the

prosecutor or the Court may on good cause shown dispense with

such notice or adjourn the trial to enable such notice to be given.

55. It is manifest that such a plea is available if the prosecutor has

not been properly appointed and in that case the proceedings are
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a nullity. I have a number of difficulties with the submission that

this application is akin to or even in terms of section 106. Firstly

the section commences with the words ‘When an accused pleads

to a charge’. It is manifest that the applicant has not had the

charges in the indictment put to him let alone pleaded to them. In

addition I understand that it was the intention of the applicant to

seek further particulars to the charge before it was put to him.

56. The second problem relates to the ambit of this particular plea. It

has been held that the sub-section refers specifically to a plea

addressing whether the prosecutor has title to prosecute. The

plea therefore relates to the right or authority of the prosecutor to

appear as a prosecutor in the case. See Ndluli v Wilken NO and

others 1991(1) SA 297 (AD) at 306 C – D. I do not, therefore,

believe that section 106 avails the applicant at this stage.

57. Are the proceedings therefore civil in nature? Mr Trengove

argued that the Court is precluded from considering this

application because it does not constitute administrative action in

terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act No 3 of 2000

(PAJA). Section 6(1) provides that any person may institute

proceedings in a Court or tribunal for the judicial review of an

administrative action. ‘Administrative action’ is defined in section

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1(ff) to mean any decision taken by an organ of State which

adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct,

external legal effect, but does not include a decision to institute

or continue a prosecution.

58. It is clear that a decision not to prosecute an accused is subject

to review by the Court though not one to institute a prosecution.

Put differently, the Court’s jurisdiction to review a decision to

prosecute is excluded. Although clearly not identical this

exclusion has much in common with what are termed ouster

clauses.

59. In Rex v Padsha 1923 AD 281 the Appellate Division had reason

to consider a section of the Immigration Regulation Act 22 of 1913

which provided that any person or class of persons deemed by

the Minister on economic grounds inter alia shall be a prohibited

immigrant. Acting under these powers the Minister issued a

notice in which he deemed every Asiatic person to be unsuited on

economic grounds to come and live in this country. Surprisingly

the majority of judges in that Court upheld the validity of the

notice. The majority decision saw nothing wrong with

stigmatising the whole population of Asia as unsuitable on

economic grounds from entering South Africa. Broadly stated,

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every Asiatic, the majority held, would threaten the job security of

the population of this country.

60. Even traders, teachers, lawyers and priests were not welcome.

Clearly the South African experience of one particularly

troublesome immigrant had immense influence on the Court’s

decision. The Court said and I quote

‘Moreover, a person of that class, exercising influence

over his fellow Asiatics may become a disturbing factor
in the industrial processes of the country, as actually
happened in the now historic case of Gandhi.’

61. Fortunately Innes CJ, in the minority, saw things differently. The

relevant law conferred upon Immigration Boards’ exclusive

jurisdiction in deciding immigration matters and ousted the

jurisdiction of the Courts. Chief Justice Innes then said

‘It is competent for Parliament to oust the jurisdiction of

Courts of law if it considers such a course advisable in
the public interest. But where it takes away the right of
an aggrieved person to apply to the only authority which
can investigate and, where necessary, redress his
grievance, it ought surely to do so in the clearest
language. Courts of law should not be astute to
construe doubtful words in a sense which will prevent
them from doing what prima facie is their duty, namely,
from investigating cases of alleged injustice or
illegality.’
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62. The Courts have followed the words of Innes CJ in a large number

of decisions which have adroitly side-stepped ouster clauses in a

plethora of statutes.

63. PAJA excludes the Court’s right to review a decision to

prosecute. Does this ouster provision preclude this Court

investigating a defective procedure which preceded the making of

the decision? Assuming the right of an accused to make

representations, would this oust the right of the Courts to review

a failure by the NDPP to afford such a right? It should be borne in

mind that a review is essentially a court procedure aimed at

inadequacies in the process and not the merits of the decision.

64. The decision taken to prosecute the applicant would be one in

terms of section 179(5)(d) of the Constitution which is one taken,

after consulting with DPPs and taking representations from the

accused inter alia. On this hypothesis the decision by Mr Pikoli

and his successor Mr Mpshe was not such a decision taken after

consulting such persons and it falls outside the provision

precluding the Court’s review powers. Put differently, the

jurisdictional facts that should have preceded the making of the

decision, were consultations with the DPPs and the right of the

accused inter alia to make representations. Once these

 29

jurisdictional facts were absent the decision ceased to be one in

terms of section 179(5)(d) and became justiciable under PAJA.

65. There is ample authority for this proposition, including Minister of

Law and Order v Hurley and another 1986(3) 568 AD at 584 et seq.

In that case the Court referred with approval to Rex v Padsha

(supra). Hurley’s case involved an ouster clause relating to arrest

and detention of persons in terms of section 29(1) of the Internal

Security Act 74 of 1982, which could only take place if a

policeman with the rank of lieutenant-colonel or higher had

reason to believe the person had committed certain offences.

The Court held that the ouster clause did not avail the police if a

policeman, for example, of a lower rank performed the arrest. It

did not avail the policeman also if he did not have reason to

believe in the sense of informing the Court of the reasons. (See

page 584 F – I).

66. In casu, therefore, if a decision needed the accused to make

representations such was not a decision in terms of section

179(5)(d) if no representations were entertained. I believe the

Court’s jurisdiction remains unimpaired. It is not therefore

necessary to consider the fascinating arguments as to whether

PAJA constitutes an exclusive codification of the rights of review.

 30

I am of the judgment that this application is in the nature of a civil

review and I have therefore excluded my assessors from such

decision.

The proper approach to interpretation

67. The courts have held that the proper approach to the

interpretation of a statute is to seek the intention of the

legislature. The rules of interpretation are set out in S v Toms: S v

Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (AD) at 807H-808A where the court stated

as follows:

‘The primary rule in the construction of statutory

provisions is to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature. One does so by attributing to the words of
a statute their ordinary, literal, grammatical meaning.
Where the language of a statute, so viewed, is clear
and unambiguous effect must be given thereto, unless
to do so… would lead to absurdity so glaring that it
could never have been contemplated by the
Legislature, or where it would lead to a result contrary
to the intention of the Legislature, as shown by the
context or by such other considerations as the Court
is justified in taking into account… The words used in
an Act must therefore be viewed in the broader context
of such Act as a whole… When the language of a
statute is not clear and unambiguous one may resort
to other canons of construction in order to determine
the Legislature’s intention. (Case references omitted.)

68. Both counsel Mr Kemp and Mr Trengove submitted that there was

no ambiguity and that sensible meaning could be given to the

 31

words in the sub-section in question. It may be as well at the

outset to define the limits of the competing arguments over the

interpretation of the sub-section. It is clear that what occurred

was a decision by the NDPP either by himself or in all probability

in conjunction with the head of the Directorate of Special

Operations, a Deputy National Director, Mr McCarthy. Secondly,

the process they went through in deciding to prosecute the

applicant was clearly a review in its ordinary sense of a

reconsideration, alteration or substitution of a previous decision

not to prosecute.

69. Although the right or duty to review a decision to prosecute or

not to prosecute is clearly discretionary once the NDPP and Mr

McCarthy decided to embark on that exercise there must be some

circumstances in which, when they did so, they were obliged to

consult the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions (DPPs) and

take representations within a period specified by the National

Director Public Prosecutions, from the accused person, the

complainant and any other person or party whom the NDPP

considers to be relevant. In other words there is no merit in an

argument that there are no circumstances in which he or they are

not obliged to consult inter alia the accused.

 32

70. As it common cause that this obligation to take representations

relates only to the NDPP it does not apply to a prosecutor in the

Magistrates’ Court or the High Court, when confronted with a

possible review of a decision to prosecute or not to. The words

‘after consulting the relevant DPPs’ seemed to be the cause of the

most controversy in argument. Mr Trengove submitted that the

duty of a NDPP to take representations of an accused were

limited to only those occasions when he was overruling a

decision of a DPP and not when he was overruling his own

decision or the decision of his predecessor.

71. In other words the contention of the applicant, so the argument

for respondent went, meant that the sub-section should be read

without the words in question. In that event the sub-section would

read that ‘[The National Director Public Prosecutions] may review

a decision to prosecute or not to prosecute after taking

representations within a period specified by the National Director

Public Prosecutions, from the following: the accused person, the

complainant and any other person or party whom the National

Director considers to be relevant.’

72. Had the sub-section read in that fashion there would have been

no doubt that the applicant had to have a chance to make

 33

representations once the NDPP embarked on a review. Mr Kemp

submitted that the sub-section does not state that ‘[The National

Director Public Prosecutions] may review a decision to prosecute

or not to prosecute of a Director of Public Prosecutions, after

consulting etc…’ It is also clear that the words in italics are not

present and their inclusion would have also put the matter

beyond any doubt. The real importance in the sub-section seems

to be to allow representations, by an accused, where a decision

not to prosecute has been reversed, and to a complainant, where

a prior decision to prosecute has been altered to one not to

prosecute.

73. Assuming that there must be occasions when representations

had to be heard from an accused, those made by the NDPP would

be in more serious matters than those made by the DPPs and

their subordinates. Looked at from the perspective of the NDPP,

the right to simply reverse his own previous decision not to

prosecute, might be seen to arise from his elevated status. From

the perspective of the accused, the fact that a decision required

the attention of the NDPP would necessarily be of great moment

to him (the accused) and would obviously require such an

accused to be afforded the opportunity to make representations.

That he cannot make representations in such a case, on the

 34

respondent’s version, would also, for obvious reasons, be an

absurdity.

74. Another absurdity would be that an unscrupulous DPP intent on

having a previous decision changed could either change it

himself or ask someone below the rank of NDPP i.e. a Deputy

National Director to review the decision. In each case the accused

would be out in the cold in the sense of not being able to make

representations.

75. I am of the view that all these considerations incline me to hold

that there does seem to be some ambiguity in the sub-section and

the words are not capable of unequivocal interpretation. Looked

at from the accused’s perspective there is also a glaring absurdity

that the review of a decision not to prosecute him of a lower

subordinate of the NDPP, i.e. the DPP, in arguably a less serious

matter would entitle him to make representations, while a more

serious matter involving the decision of the NDPP alone would

leave him out in the cold.

76. Given that there are these and other glaring absurdities and that

the negation of the right of an accused to make representations

may lead to a result contrary to the intention of the Legislature, it

 35

is necessary to look at the context in which the words appear in

the Act as a whole. As appears from the authority cited earlier

when the language of a statute is not clear and unambiguous one

may also resort to other canons of construction in order to

determine the Legislature’s intention.

77. To ascertain the intention of the legislature we have to look at the

mischief the new provisions were designed to remedy. In order to

properly understand the provisions of the section it is necessary

to look at the history of the Act and its predecessors.

78. From time immemorial the executive has cherished the notion of

usurping the independent function of the prosecuting authority

and directing criminal prosecutions at its political opponents.

That it was so under the Apartheid Government is manifest and

the catalogue of prosecutions, from the Treason Trial in the early

sixties, to the plethora of prosecutions thereafter under the

Terrorism Act of 1967, bear witness to that stratagem. Many

activists, fighting against the apartheid system, languished for

many years behind bars, as a result of prosecutions at the

instance of the executive.

 36

79. The political control of prosecutions was effected by a series of

statutes, the last, during the Apartheid era, being section 3 of the

CPA. Section 3 of the CPA provided the authority to prosecute

prior to 1992 and gave the Minister of Justice complete control

over the provincial attorneys-general. Section 3(5) provided as

follows:

‘An attorney-general shall exercise his authority and perform

his functions under this Act or under any other law subject to
the control and directions of the Minister who may reverse any
decision arrived at by an attorney-general and may himself in
general or in any specific matter exercise any part of such
authority and perform any of such functions.’

80. The daunting prospect of the Minister of Justice, in the new South

Africa, giving directions for prosecutions against the architects

and executioners of the Apartheid policy, galvanized the mostly

white legislature to pass the Attorney-General Act, no 92 of 1992,

(the AG Act) in its death throes. The AG Act took away all political

control over prosecutions, repealed section 3 of the CPA and

provided in section 5(1) that every attorney-general had the

authority to prosecute in any court within his jurisdiction. Section

108(1) of the Interim Constitution repeated the notion of an

absence of political interference, when it vested attorneys-general

with the power to institute prosecutions on behalf of the State.

 37

81. Section 179 of the Final Constitution introduced the notion of

National Director of Public Prosecutions (the NDPP) with powers

of control over the old provincial attorneys-general, who now

became Directors of Public Prosecutions.

82. A perusal of the remaining sub-sections of section 179 assists in

interpreting the statute. Section 179(5) provides the NDPP with

the responsibility to determine, with the concurrence of Cabinet

members, responsible for the administration of justice and after

consulting DPPs, prosecution policy which must be adhered to in

all prosecutions. In addition he bears the responsibility to issue

policy directives, which must be observed in all prosecutions.

The corollary of this is the power of the NDPP to intervene in the

prosecution process when prosecution policy directives are not

complied with.

83. Section 179 provides for the creation of the Prosecuting authority.

In terms of sub-section (1) it calls into being a single national

prosecuting authority consisting of the NDPP, who is the head of

the prosecuting authority, and is appointed by the President, and

Directors of Public Prosecutions (‘DPPs’) and prosecutors as

determined by an Act of Parliament.

 38

84. Sub-section (2) of section 179 provides that the prosecuting

authority has the power to institute criminal proceedings on

behalf of the state, and to carry out any necessary functions

incidental to instituting criminal proceedings.

85. Sub-section (3) provides that national legislation must ensure that

the DPPs are appropriately qualified; and are responsible for

prosecutions in specific jurisdictions, subject to subsection (5).

Sub-section (4) continues by providing that national legislation

must ensure that the prosecuting authority exercises its functions

without fear, favour or prejudice. I interpolate here to mention that

this is but one of many clear indications that the NDPP and the

prosecuting authority are independent and must be free of all

political interference. Further reference will be made to this but it

is instructive to note that the Constitutional Court has asserted

this independence in no uncertain terms. Mention has been made

of the Certification case in which the Constitutional Court held

there is accordingly a constitutional guarantee of independence,

and any legislation or executive action inconsistent therewith

would be subject to constitutional control by the Courts.

86. In Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security and Another 2002

(1) SACR 79 (CC) the court held

 39

‘Prosecutors have always owed a duty to carry out their

public functions independently and in the interests of
the public.’

87. Sub-section (5) provides that the NDPP must determine, with the

concurrence of the Cabinet member responsible for the

administration of justice, and after consulting the DPPs

prosecution policy and must issue policy directives which must

be observed in the prosecution process. The NDPP may intervene

in the prosecution process when policy directives are not

complied with and may review a decision to prosecute or not to

prosecute as I have indicated above.

88. Sub-section (6) provides that the Cabinet member responsible for

the administration of justice must exercise final responsibility

over the prosecuting authority. That this does not imply any right

to interfere with a decision to prosecute is clear from what

follows.

89. In their submissions to the Enquiry into the NDPP (the Pikoli

Enquiry) by the South African Institute for Advanced

Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International law by

Hannah Woolaver and Michael Bishop published in Advocate

August 2008 at page 31 the authors state :

 40

‘Therefore, the Minister's powers of oversight are

confined to those included in the Act. As already
discussed, these include the requirement that the
Minister approve prosecution policy, and various duties
on the NDPP to provide information and submit reports
to the Minister. The Act gives no power to the Minister
regarding the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in
individual cases. As such, individual decisions
regarding whether or not to prosecute in a particular
case are not within the purview of the Minister's ‘final
responsibility'. These rest in the exclusive discretion of
the prosecuting authority, and ultimately the National
Director.’

90. I agree with this summary of the position. Pursuant to the

imperative to produce national legislation parliament has passed

the NPA Act, which provides in terms of section 22 for the NDPP

as the head of the prosecuting authority, to have authority over

the exercising of all the powers, and the performance of all the

duties and functions conferred by the Constitution or that Act

law. Of particular interest in the present enquiry is sub-section

(4) which provides that in addition to any other powers, duties

and functions conferred on the NDPP he may conduct any

investigation he may deem necessary in respect of a prosecution

and may direct the submission of and receive reports from a DPP

in respect of a case, a matter, a prosecution or a prosecution

process or directions.
 41

91. Section 32 provides a further indication of the desire of

Parliament to prevent interference, political and otherwise from

the decisions to prosecute. It provides for the impartiality of, and

oath or affirmation by members of prosecuting authority. Sub-

section (1)(a) provides that a member of the prosecuting authority

shall serve impartially and carry out his duties and functions in

good faith and without fear, favour or prejudice and subject only

to the Constitution and the law. Sub-section (1)(b) provides a very

strong imperative against interference with a member of the

prosecuting authority. It provides that no organ of state and no

member of an organ of state nor any other person shall

improperly interfere with, hinder or obstruct the prosecuting

authority in the exercise of its duties and functions.

92. To enforce the seriousness of this prohibition on any interference

by any person from the President downwards section 41 provides

that contravention of that sub-section is a serious offence and

any person contravening it shall be liable on conviction to a fine

or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or to both

such fine and such imprisonment.

 42

93. That there should be no political influence was trenchantly stated

in S v Yengeni 2006 (1) SACR 405 (T) at paragraph [51] where

Bertelsmann and Preller JJ observed

‘The Constitution guarantees the professional

independence of the [NDPP] and every professional
member of his staff, with the obvious aim of ensuring
their freedom from any interference in their functions by
the powerful, the well-connected, the rich and the
peddlers of political influence.’

94. What the learned judges were saying in that case was that the

independence of the prosecuting authority is vital to the

independence of the whole legal process. If one political faction

or sectional interest gains a monopoly over its workings the

judiciary will cease to be independent and will become part of a

political process of persecution of one particular targeted political

enemy.

95. How then does this impact on the power of the NDPP to review a

decision to prosecute or not to prosecute? He sits at the apex of

the prosecuting authority, insulated from political interference

and is the final decision maker in the prosecuting process.

Should an accused challenge a decision to prosecute, the NDPP

is the final port of call in the administrative process of making

representations. Having been largely instrumental in creating

 43

prosecuting policy and after giving prosecuting directives he is

obliged to ensure they are carried out.

96. The hierarchy of prosecuting authority requires that decisions to

prosecute are made by various levels in descending order from

the NDPP and down through the ranks of DPPs to the lowest

prosecutor. The NDPP is empowered alone to authorize

prosecutions in certain instances including the Prevention of

Organised Crime Act, no 121 of 1998, sections of the Films and

Publications Act 65 of 1996, and The Implementation of the Rome

Statute of the International Criminal Court Act, no 27 of 2002. The

fact that authorization is required from the NDPP tends to suggest

that he is not involved in the actual prosecution itself and

authorizes the DSO to prosecute. Apart from that the lower levels

of prosecutors below DPPs exercise a delegated authority to

bring prosecutions in the courts.

97. Acting on this delegated authority prosecutors decide to

prosecute or not depending on criteria established in the policy

directives emanating from the prosecution policy. The

prosecution policy talks of exercising its function ‘without fear,

favour or prejudice’ and that the process must be ‘fair,

transparent, consistent and predictable’. It purports to promote

 44

‘greater consistency in prosecutorial practices nationally’. It

requires

‘members of the Prosecuting Authority to act impartially and in

good faith. They should not allow their judgment to be
influenced by factors such as their personal views regarding
the nature of the offence or the race, ethnic or national origin,
sex, religious beliefs, status, political views or sexual
orientation of the victim, witnesses or the offender.’

98. The policy states further that

‘The decision whether or not to prosecute must be taken with

care, because it may have profound consequences for victims,
witnesses, accused and their families. A wrong decision may
also undermine the community’s confidence in the
prosecution system… Once a prosecutor is satisfied that there
is sufficient evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of a
conviction, a prosecution should normally follow, unless
public interest demands otherwise.’

99. The prosecution policy deals with the question of public interest

and mentions factors that should be taken into account including

‘the seriousness of the offence,… the manner in which it was

committed, the motivation for the act and the relationship
between the accused and the victim. The nature of the offence,
its prevalence and recurrence, and its effect on public order
and morale.’

100. The policy also makes mention of ‘the need for individual and

general deterrence, and the necessity of maintaining public

confidence in the criminal justice system.’

 45

101. Mention is also made of the circumstances of the offender

including, ‘previous convictions, criminal history, background,

culpability and personal circumstances as well as other

mitigating and aggravating factors.’

102. The policy speaks about restarting a prosecution and says the

following

‘People should be able to rely on and accept decisions

made by members of the Prosecuting Authority.
Normally, when a suspect or an accused is informed
that there will not be a prosecution or that charges have
been withdrawn, that should be the end of the matter.
There may, however, be special reasons why a
prosecutor will review a particular case and restart the
prosecution. These include… an indication that the
initial decision was clearly wrong and should not be
allowed to stand; an instance where a case has not been
proceeded with in order to allow the police to gather and
collate more evidence, in which case the prosecutor
should normally have informed the accused that the
prosecution might well start again… a situation where a
prosecution has not been proceeded with due to the
lack of evidence, but where sufficient incriminating
evidence has since come to light…’

103. Regard should also be had to the Code of Conduct of the

National Prosecuting Authority which was framed by the NDPP in

terms of section 22(6)(a) of the NPA Act and which is binding on

all members of the Prosecuting Authority. It provides that

 46

‘prosecutors should be individuals of integrity whose

conduct should be honest and sincere who should
respect, protect and uphold justice, human dignity and
fundamental rights as entrenched in the Constitution…
strive to be and be seen to be consistent, independent
and impartial…’

The NDPP as a reviewing authority

104. It is important to note that there is a constitutional imperative

to carry out the prosecution policy and directives as the

constitution uses the peremptory ‘must’ in stipulating those

duties of the prosecution authority. The constitution and the NPA

Act, read with the prosecution policy and directives posit a model

of criminal justice with a National Director at the apex who is

independent, fair, consistent and absolutely free of political

influence. In fact to try to influence him is a criminal offence.

Everywhere in the constitution, the NPA Act, the prosecution

policy and directives and the Code of conduct are references to

independence of prosecutors and their duty to act without fear or

favour.

105. As the head of the prosecuting authority the NDPP must

insure that all prosecutors follow the Constitution, the Act, and

the other instruments. His powers to review or reconsider a

decision to prosecute or not to prosecute a person must be made

 47

in the light of these principles. His constitutional imperative to

review decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute is a unique role

ascribed to him and allows him to exercise this discretion.

106. The concept of a review or reconsideration assumes a role

somewhat elevated to and distant from the person whose

decision is being reviewed. It also assumes an unbiased, open

and honest reappraisal of the decision to prosecute. It is not to be

lightly entertained and is a constitutional imperative directed at

affording an accused the right to the reconsideration of a

prosecution based on an acknowledgement of the

embarrassment, dislocation, disruption and trauma that the mere

bringing of a prosecution can entail. The effect of the arguments

raised by the respondent is that the applicant is not entitled to

enjoy this privilege, which is extended to others who by no

stretch of the imagination can be regarded as necessarily more

worthy.

107. In this regard I do not consider this application as a satellite or

ancillary proceeding and I would distinguish it from the cases,

both South African and foreign, cited by Mr Trengove, illustrating

the very understandable reluctance of courts to consider matters

which should more properly be ventilated in the trial proper. See

 48

R v DPP, ex parte Kebeline and Others [2000] 2 AC 326 (HL),

Sharma v Brown-Antoine and Others [2007] 1 WLR 780 (PC). In

none of those cases was there a provision which is the equivalent

of section 179(5)(d).

108. The NDPP is the only member of the prosecuting authority

who has such a constitutional and statutory obligation to review

and any findings I make are restricted to this very narrow issue.

109. When the NDPP reviews a decision he will exercise this very

important obligation in the light of the prosecution policy and

directives and other considerations. On various occasions

prosecutors have declined to prosecute because of the old or

young age of the offender, the triviality of the offence, and the

personal tragic consequences to the offender of his offence,

where his crime touches those near and dear to him.

110. The NPA Act contemplates a number of prosecution scenarios

which need to be considered in turn. The first scenario envisages

that the NDPP or any Deputy NDPP, designated by him, has the

power to institute and conduct a prosecution in any court in the

Republic in person in terms of section 22(9) of the NPA Act. In

other words the NDPP can handle the whole case himself and
 49

appear personally in court and conduct the prosecution. Nowhere

in the papers does it appear that this is such a case.

111. The second scenario posits a prosecution by the DPPs, the old

attorneys-general in their area of jurisdiction, in terms of section

24 of the NPA Act. Counsel were in agreement that the words

‘after consultation with the relevant DPP’ in the Constitution

would mean that a review of one of their decisions by the NDPP

would definitely require him to take representations from the

accused, the present applicant. At the time of the writing of

section 179(5)(d) there was no DSO and the occasions when the

NDPP prosecuted in person would have been rare, if they ever

occurred at all. Even today the manifold duties envisaged by the

Constitution and the NPA Act would preclude him ever appearing

in person.

112. It follows, therefore, that at the time of the promulgation of

relevant sub-section of the Constitution and, indeed the NPA Act,

all prosecutions would have been conducted by the DPPs in their

geographic regions or their duly authorized prosecutors in the

High and Magistrates Courts. This is abundantly clear and is

supported by the affidavit of Mr Hofmeyr for the respondent,

where he explains that the agreement reached at the

 50

Constitutional Committee of 4 April 1996 that drafted the

legislation was to that effect. The agreement read in part

‘Mr Schutte reported that political parties had reached

the following agreements regarding the Attorney-
General:

i There would be one prosecutorial authority: consisting

of the national attorney-general and other attorneys-
general;

ii The attorneys-general would in principle be

responsible for prosecutions, with the national attorney-
general being responsible for laying down policy
guidelines and ordering in specific cases a prosecution
where the guidelines have not been met, or where an
attorney-general has not met the guidelines and has
refused to prosecute…’

113. So at the time of its enactment the sub-section in question

would have availed every accused provided the NDPP decided to

review a decision to prosecute as they would have all emanated

from the DPPs. Excluded would have been the rare occasions he

appeared in person.

114. Since the establishment of the DSO, what was the effect of that

on the right of an accused to make representations, when the

NDPP decided to review a decision to prosecute? The DSO has

the power to prosecute and institute criminal proceedings in

terms of section 7 of the NPA Act and it seems clear that the

prosecution of Mr Shaik and the applicant was carried out by

 51

them. The present indictment against the applicant is signed by

Aubrey Thanda Mngwengwe and he describes himself as an

Investigating Director of the DSO.

115. Section 7(3) of the NPA Act provides that the head of the

Directorate of Special Operations shall be a Deputy National

Director assigned by the National Director. In terms of section

13(1)(aA) the president, after consultation with the Minister and

National Director, may appoint one or more Directors of Public

Prosecutions to the DSO. These would be properly qualified

advocates, as the legislation prescribes, and similar to the A-Gs

of the old days. The effect of this would be that there would be

DPPs, who were head of the prosecution authority, in the

provinces i.e. the old A-Gs, and the DPPs in the DSO.

116. The investigation into the applicant was ‘carried out by the

DSO’ as Mr Ngcuka said at his press conference. The decision

was made by the NDPP and Mr McCarthy, who was a Deputy

National Director of Prosecutions and head of the DSO. This is

not denied by the respondent in his answering affidavits. In fact

the respondent puts up an affidavit by McCarthy in which he says

‘Ngcuka and I did not accept the investigation team’s

recommendation…’
 52

117. The NDPP and McCarthy overruled the decision of the

investigation team, which was headed in all probability by a DPP.

Senior Special Investigator du Plooy says in the answering

affidavit he was ‘duly designated by the Investigating Director to

conduct the investigation…’ Such would be an Investigating DPP.

If the NDPP was to properly exercise his review powers with

regard to DPPs it necessarily implies that he did not make the

decision as such to prosecute as this would nullify his

independence with regard to the review. Although he clearly did

make the decisions in conjunction with McCarthy and probably a

DPP that fact alone should, in my judgment, not have disentitled

an accused to make representations.

118. The DSO as a juristic entity had not come into being and

naturally there is no mention of it in 179(5)(d). Should the

Constitution be read so as to include the DSO (which does have

DPPs) when it mentions consultation with the relevant DPPs?

Section 39 of the Constitution

119. Section 39 of the Constitution deals with the interpretation of

legislation including the Bill of Rights. It provides as follows:

 53

‘39(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or

forum—

(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and

democratic society based on human dignity, equality
and freedom;

(b) must consider international law; and

(c) may consider foreign law.

(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing

the common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights.

(3) …’

120. If it is clear that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court

must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic

society that is based on human dignity, equality and freedom. The

provision of the right to make representations to an accused

would pay appropriate tribute to his right to human dignity, given

the opprobrium that is normally attendant upon a criminal trial. It

would be grossly unequal to allow representations to an accused

on the happenstance that his case emanated from a decision by a

DPP and not the Deputy National Director, who was head of the

DSO. It might well have gone through the hands of a DPP (the

advocate with legal knowledge) in the DSO. I have mentioned that

the head of the investigation team was probably a DPP and

 54

therefore the decision to prosecute involved consultation with

him. We know from the press articles annexed that Mr Mpshe was

consulting with his investigation team (headed by a DPP) before

instituting a prosecution in the second half of 2007. I therefore

conclude that he should have consulted with the applicant as

well.

121. As I have mentioned sub-section (2) provides that when

interpreting any legislation, which must include the Constitution

itself, otherwise it would be self contradictory, every court must

promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. These

rights include the very values that I have mentioned of human

dignity, equality and freedom. The proper exercise of the NDPP’s

review may in a proper case result in an accused’s freedom in the

sense that if he decides to decline to prosecute, the accused does

not stand in jeopardy of conviction and incarceration.

122. A consideration of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional

Court, with regard to interpreting legislation, would seem to

fortify me in this view. In Investigating Directorate: Serious

Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors 2001

(1) SA 545 (CC) the Court held at paras [21]-[24] that:

 55

'All law-making authority must be exercised in

accordance with the Constitution. The Constitution is
located in a history which involves a transition from a
society based on division, injustice and exclusion from
the democratic process to one which respects the
dignity of all citizens, and includes all in the process of
governance. As such, the process of interpreting the
Constitution must recognise the context in which we
find ourselves and the Constitution's goal of a society
based on democratic values, social justice and
fundamental human rights… The Constitution requires
that judicial officers read legislation, where possible, in
ways which give effect to its fundamental values.
Consistently with this, when the constitutionality of
legislation is in issue, they are under a duty to examine
the objects and purport of an Act and to read the
provisions of the legislation, so far as is possible, in
conformity with the Constitution…

Accordingly, judicial officers must prefer interpretations

of legislation that fall within constitutional bounds over
those that do not, provided that such an interpretation
can be reasonably ascribed to the section…’

Reading in and reading out

123. It must be recalled that section 179(5)(d) speaks of the right

the NDPP has to review decisions and then there is a comma

followed by a number of sub-clauses. The sub-clauses conclude

with the right of the NDPP to consult with any other person or

party whom the NDPP considers to be relevant. Clearly the widest

possible powers are given to the NDPP when he embarks on his

review. It would seem to me to do no injustice to language to

include the head of the DSO who is a Deputy NDPP.

 56

124. As I have indicated when section 179 of the Constitution was

fashioned all prosecutions flowed through the DPPs (except the

rare occasions – if ever - when the NDPP personally prosecuted)

and therefore every time the NDPP reviewed a decision he would

have had to hear representations from the accused. With the

advent of the DSO in 2000 no amendment was made to the NPA

Act or the Constitution to include prosecutions that have their

genesis there. In dealing with the present state of the NPA Act it

is necessary to embark on the process of interpretation known as

reading in.

125. The South African courts first accepted the notion of reading

in as an acceptable constitutional remedy in National Coalition of

for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home

Affairs and Others 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC). In that case the court set

out the following considerations inter alia for embarking on the

process of reading in. I am paraphrasing paragraphs [73] – [76] of

the judgment. The court held that the resulting provision once

the words have been read in, must be consistent with the

constitution. The resulting provision must interfere as little as

possible with the laws adopted by the legislature and the court

must be able to, in reading in the words, define with sufficient

 57

precision how the statute ought to be extended to comply with

the constitution. I believe that to read into the legislation in

question (the NPA Act) in such a manner as to extend the group

that presently appears to be limited to DPPs, to include the NDPP

himself and Deputy NDPPs, would be eminently consistent with

the constitution and would define with sufficient precision the

group involved.

126. All these circumstances incline me to the view that a proper

interpretation of the sub-section in question means that the NDPP

ought to have taken representations from the applicant before

deciding to prosecute him. The failure to do so means that what

he did was not a decision in terms of section 179(5)(d) and it was

not therefore prohibited from scrutiny and review by the court in

terms of PAJA.

The NDPP offer to hear representations

127. The denial of the right to make representation was attacked on

another basis and although made in a slightly different context I
am inclined to determine that point as well on the basis of the
decision of the Constitutional Court in the case of S v Jordan and
others (Sex Workers Education and Advocacy Task Force and
others as Amici Curiae) 2002(6) SA 642 (CC) at para 21.
 58

128. Mr Kemp on behalf of the applicant has argued that the NDPP,

in the person of Mr Ngcuka, extended an invitation to the

applicant, alternatively the world at large, to make representations

on the matter of the prosecution in the matter of Mr Shaik, his

entities and the applicant. Mention has been made of the Press

statement made on 23 August 2003 and such contains the

following paragraph:

‘25. We have never asked for nor sought mediation. We do not

need mediation and we do not mediate in matters of this
nature. However, we have no objection to people making
representations to us, be it in respect of prosecutions or
investigations. In terms of section 22(4)(c) of the Act, we are
duty bound to consider representations.’ (Emphasis added).

129. What value does the court place on the NDPP’s statement that

he had no objection to people making representations to him, be

it in respect of prosecutions or investigations? The statement

was prefaced with the mention of mediation and it could only

have referred to a possible mediation with the applicant and his

legal representatives. The NDPP undertook to consider

representations. The simple corollary of this was that he had no

objection to their receipt. But he went further and said that in

terms of section 22(4)(c) of the NPA Act, he was duty bound to

consider the representations. Again that seemed to be a promise

and pledge to consider the representations.

 59

130. Section 22(4)(c) provides that in addition to any other powers,

duties and functions conferred or imposed on or assigned to the

National Director by section 179 or any other provision of the

Constitution, this Act or any other law, the National Director, as

the head of the prosecuting authority, may consider such

recommendations, suggestions and requests concerning the

prosecuting authority as he or she may receive from any source.

131. The NDPP said he was duty bound to accept such

representations as were tendered in terms of that section. The

simple meaning was that it was a solemn undertaking to consider

them when they came from any source. As far as I understand the

position that offer was never retracted or withdrawn by Mr

Ngcuka or any of his successors.

132. The applicant’s attorneys wrote a letter to the NDPP dated 11

October 2007 requesting an opportunity to make prior

representations in respect of any decision to charge him. The

letter is annexed and reads in part as follows:

‘The recent developments in the NPA inter alia;

1. The suspension of the National Director of Public

Prosecutions;
 60

2. The meeting of the Directorate of Special

Operations of 25 June 2007;
3. The appointment of an acting National Director of
Public Prosecutions

has not gone unnoticed.

Further, it has been reported that your office is intent on

engaging in a review of certain cases of which the case
against Mr Zuma constitutes one such case.

Through the proceedings and the documentation filed of

record between Mr Zuma and the NDPP it is abundantly
clear that certain allegations have been made about the
manner in which both the investigation and the
prosecution have occurred.

Accordingly may we request that in the conduct of such

a review, that we be afforded an opportunity to make
representations either orally or in writing which may
better inform the decision which we understand you are
applying your mind to.’

133. The suspension mentioned in the letter refers to the

suspension of Mr Pikoli by the President and the appointment of

an acting National Director, Mr Mpshe. The allegations that were

made clearly related to the charge from the applicant that his case

was being politically driven. The response by Mr Mpshe given the

next day was very laconic and reads as follows:

‘The J.G. Zuma matter is not a subject of a review. This

matter is undergoing further investigations the normal
route for a decision to be taken. It is still being dealt with
by the DSO.’
 61

134. It could be argued that this is not a refusal to hear his

representations but it was hardly a positive response. If the

applicant’s matter was not subject to a review then there would

be no need for the NDPP to hear representations. The only

implication is that it was a refusal to consider any

representations. It is not clear that the applicant was following up

on the offer, made by Mr Ngcuka, at the press conference I have

mentioned. Even if he was unaware of such offer it does not seem

to matter, as long as the offer remained open.

135. Mention is made in the letter of the review of certain cases and

this is clarified as follows by the applicant, who states that during

2007 the NPA reviewed various cases, including that of

Commissioner J Selebi. Certain newspaper reports are annexed.

Following Mr Pikoli’s suspension Mr Mpshe was appointed acting

NDPP and he applied to have certain warrants directed at Mr

Selebi set aside.

136. Applicant says ‘My case was one of those reported to be under

review. It would be odd and constitute unequal and discriminatory

treatment if my case was not reviewed and no representations

were called for.’

 62

137. The newspaper article in question states

‘The NDPP will decide soon whether to proceed with

charging two of the country’s most powerful figures
ANC presidential frontrunner Jacob Zuma and police
commissioner Jackie Selebi. The NPA said yesterday
that Mokotedi Mpshe was ‘deliberating’ the way forward
in both cases… NPA spokesman Tlali Tlali said Mpshe
had met the team investigating Zuma and was presented
with a ‘final briefing’ on the continuing probe into
allegations of corruption. This could herald the
beginning of the end of a seven-year investigation into
Zuma who has emerged as the runaway candidate for
the presidency of the ANC… Tlali said prosecutions
boss Mpshe would carefully consider all the information
presented to him by the investigating team before
making a decision…

Mpshe is also applying his mind to the matter involving

Selebi. Tlali said the panel appointed to review the
charges against Selebi had also submitted a report to
Mpshe yesterday. ’

138. Mr Mpshe, as I have indicated, denies that the case of the

applicant was under review. Be that as it may, the question which

remains was whether he was obliged to give the applicant the

chance to make representations, arising out of the promise of the

predecessor, at the press conference or out of the request made

by the applicant’s lawyers.

139. It is difficult to evaluate the real significance of the offer made

by Mr Ngcuka and the letter requesting the chance to make

representations, sent four years later, without considering the

 63

events that took place in between. The applicant suggests the

delay was all part of the political machinations of the NDPP, who

denies it most vehemently. The applicant also suggests that the

refusal to hear his representations was as a result of the political

meddling, which had bedeviled his prosecution from the outset.

The respondent wishes to strike these allegations from the

record. In other words, the applicant’s contentions are that the

independence of the NDPP was compromised and that this

affected not only the initial decision, but also the later ones. For

this reason it was all the more important for him to make

representations, concerning his prosecution.

140. It is also necessary to look at these happenings to understand

why certain key events took place. The first relates to the reasons

for the decision not to prosecute the applicant in the first place.

Secondly it must be borne in mind that in the mean time Mr Pikoli

was suspended and Mr Mpshe was now saddled with the

responsibility of deciding whether to hear representations

promised by his second to last predecessor.

Legitimate expectation
 64

141. The court has to consider whether the statement made by the

NDPP at the press conference gave the applicant the legitimate

expectation of making representations before the decision was

reversed. In President of the Republic of South Africa v SARFU

2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) at page 94 paragraph [212] the full court dealt

with the doctrine of legitimate expectation and approved the

judgment in Administrator, Transvaal and others v Traub and

others 1989 (4) SA 731 (AD). In the last-mentioned case the court

dealt with legitimate expectation at 755 et seq and said the

following inter alia (I omit the footnotes and case references):

‘[L]egitimate expectations… are capable of including

expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights,
provided they have some reasonable basis…[E]ven
where a person claiming some benefit or privilege has
no legal right to it, as a matter of private law, he may
have a legitimate expectation of receiving the benefit or
privilege, and, if so, the Courts will protect his
expectation by judicial review as a matter of public
law.... Legitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise
either from an express promise given on behalf of a
public authority or from the existence of a regular
practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to
continue....

The particular manifestation of the duty to act fairly

which is presently involved is that part of the recent
evolution of our administrative law which may enable an
aggrieved party to evoke judicial review if he can show
that he had "a reasonable expectation" of some
occurrence or action preceding the decision complained
of and that that "reasonable expectation" was not in the
event fulfilled.'

As the cases show, the principle is closely connected

with "a right to be heard". Such an expectation may take
 65

many forms. One may be an expectation of prior

consultation. Another may be an expectation of being
allowed time to make representations....'

142. Did a legitimate, or reasonable, expectation arise in this matter

either from an express promise, given on behalf of a public

authority or from the existence of a regular practice which the

claimant can reasonably expect to continue?

143. It might be argued that this was a vague and general invitation

to the public at large to make representations on any matter. The

words ‘any source’ are of the widest import and are not confined

in any respect. They must include the applicant, if given their

widest interpretation. If given a narrow interpretation they would

seem to be directed at the applicant and his lawyers. Mention was

made to mediation in the same paragraph which could only have

referred to the applicant. Secondly, the paragraph that precedes

this one says the following:

’24. We did not leak the questions put to the Deputy President
to anyone else. Only two people in the entire organizations
had the questions, the National Director and one of his
deputies. The questions were given to the lawyers of the
Deputy President. They would know best.’

144. The offer to allow representations could not apply to Mr Shaik

and his corporate entities, as a decision had been already made

 66

to prosecute them. As a consequence of this the applicant is the

obvious person to whom they are addressed.

145. Was this a serious offer by the NDPP or an off- the- cuff

expression of goodwill to a man that had been within a hair’s

breadth of being prosecuted himself? I get the impression that

the applicant was not entirely off the hook so to speak and that

investigations into him would continue once the NDPP had

assessed how the prosecution against Mr Shaik proceeded.

Portions of affidavits by Mr McCarthy the head of the DSO are put

up to indicate that during or after the press conference Mr Ngcuka

gave no promise that the applicant would never be prosecuted –

in fact he said he might well be.

146. When he made the offer to hear representations Mr Ngcuka

explained how exhaustive the two year investigation was and said

the following:

’27. Evidence was obtained through searches and seizures

that were conducted in Durban, France and Mauritius.
Documentation was obtained from various entities, including
118 bank accounts relating to numerous entities and
individuals. A vast number of witnesses from across the
business and private spectrum were interviewed, consulted
and questioned over the period.’
 67

147. Mr Ngcuka informed the press that all these endeavours

persuaded the investigation team to recommend a prosecution

against the applicant. He then stated:

’32. After careful consideration in which we looked at

the evidence and the facts dispassionately, we have
concluded that, whilst there is a prima facie case of
corruption against the Deputy President, our prospects
of success are not strong enough. That means that we
are not sure if we have a winnable case.’

148. The normal test for the institution of a prosecution is set out in

Du Toit et al in Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act at

page 1-4M as follows:

‘A prosecutor has a duty to prosecute if there is a prima

facie case and if there is no compelling reason for a
refusal to prosecute. In this context ‘prima facie case’
would mean the following: The allegations, as supported
by statements and real and documentary evidence
available to the prosecution, are of such a nature that if
proved in a court of law by the prosecution on the basis
of admissible evidence, the court should convict.
Sometimes it is asked: Are there reasonable prospects
of success? The prosecution, it has been held, does not
have to ascertain whether there is a defence, but
whether there is a reasonable and probable cause for
prosecution – see generally Beckenstrater v Rottcher
and Theunissen 1955(1) SA 129 (AD) at 137 and S v
Lubaxa 2001 (2) SACR 703 (SCA).’

149. In other words Mr Ngcuka was saying that he had what would

normally be sufficient to prosecute the applicant and yet he

 68

declined to so. This decision was most strange for other

important reasons connected to the nature of the offences.

Bribery, as a common law offence, or in its statutory form, under

the Corruption laws, is a bilateral offence. It cannot be committed

by a person alone. In the papers reference is made to an affidavit

in prior proceedings by Mr Ngcuka in which he says

‘At the time when I prepared my announcement, I was in

possession of a draft indictment against, inter alios,
Schabir Shaik. In this indictment, reference was of
necessity made to his relationship with [Mr Zuma] and
the bribe agreement with Thetard. This indictment
spelled out, far more eloquently than my statement,
what was clearly a prima facie case of corruption
against [Mr Zuma].’

150. Given that a decision was made to prosecute Mr Shaik and his

corporate entities, the decision not to prosecute the applicant,

when there was a prima facie case and bribery is a bilateral crime,

was bizarre to say the least. It was a total negation of the

Constitutional imperatives imposed on the NDPP to prosecute

without fear and favour, independently and in consistent, honest

and fair fashion. I have already made reference to the

Constitution, the NPA Act and the prosecution policy, directives

and code of conduct in this regard.

 69

151. The question of public policy could never have come into

question, nor was it given as a reason. As the prosecution policy

points out, the circumstances of the offender can be taken into

account, but if the person implicated occupied the second to

most senior position in government, as Deputy President, that

was hardly a reason to decline to prosecute. I have already

mentioned the powerful words of the Constitutional Court

concerning corruption and how it can destroy a country. Squires

J in S v Shaik and others 2007(1) SACR 12 said at page 239:

‘I do not think I am overstating anything when I say

that this phenomenon can truly be likened to a cancer,
eating away remorselessly at the fabric of corporate
probity and extending its baleful effect into all aspects
of administrative functions, whether State official or
private-sector manager. If it is not checked, it
becomes systemic and the after-effects of systemic
corruption can quite readily extend to the corrosion of
any confidence in the integrity of anyone who has a
duty to discharge, especially a duty to discharge to the
public, leading eventually, and unavoidably, to a
disaffected populace.’

152. See also S v Shaik and others 2007(1) SACR 247 and 319

(SCA) where bribery was called an ugly offence and insidious

because it is difficult to detect and more difficult to eradicate.

153. The more senior the status of a person in the government

hierarchy the more seriously the courts regard his corruption. In

S v Van der Westhuizen 1974(4) SA 60 (C) at 63 G-H the court said

 70

that ‘the nature of the office held by a person who takes a bribe

can have a bearing on the sentence. If he holds a high office, this

fact may be regarded as an aggravating circumstance.’

154. The legitimate quest for the bigger fish in the world of crime

was eloquently expressed in Mohunram v National Director of

Public Prosecutions and Another 2007(4) SA 222 (CC) at para

[155] where Sachs J in the Constitutional Court said, in the

context of the forfeiture of assets, involved in organised crime,

that

‘If the (Asset Forfeiture Unit) is to accomplish the

important functions attributed to it, it should not unduly
disperse the resources it has at its command. Its
manifest function as defined by statute is to serve as a
strongly empowered law enforcement agency going
after powerful crooks and their multitude of covert or
overt subalterns. The danger exists that if the AFU
spreads its net too widely so as to catch the small fry, it
will make it easier for the big fish and their surrounding
shoal of predators to elude the law. This would frustrate
rather than further the objectives of the [Prevention of
Organised Crime Act]."

155. If there was a prima facie case of serious corruption against

the Deputy President there were, in my view, no reasons of public

policy why he should not have been prosecuted simultaneously

with Shaik. Its failure to do so brought justice into disrepute. The

NDPP should either have charged the applicant or made no

 71

mention of a prima facie case of corruption. The applicant is

effectively complaining that he was found guilty (at the Shaik trial)

in absentia: Shaik was convicted but the applicant was dismissed

as Deputy President. He puts up the speech by the President in

which he says:

‘As Honourable Members would know, the judgment

contains detailed matters of fact and inference against
which penalties have been meted out. At the same time,
proceedings pertaining to a possible appeal to higher
courts are still pending. However, the judgment contains
some categorical outcomes.

These are that the court has made findings against the
accused and at the same time pronounced on how these
matters relate to our Deputy president, the Hon Jacob
Zuma, raising questions of conduct that would be
inconsistent with expectations that attend those who
hold public office.’

156. The applicant complains of the legality of such a procedure.

He says the following

‘Shortly before the 20th (on or about Sunday, 6 June

2005), I was requested by the President of the RSA,
through others, to resign in the light of the Shaik
judgment. The request at that time was hard to justify on
any legal basis.’

157. In the ordinary course of events, if one was relying on a

judgment of a court, one could not say that the findings of fact
 72

and law were correct, until a final court of appeal had decided

them. Secondly, a judgment in a criminal case against one party

is not evidence against persons, who were not parties to the

proceedings. In other words the fact of the conviction of Mr Shaik

and his corporate entities was not evidence against the applicant.

In R v Lee 1952 2 SA 67 (T) the court held as follows:

‘Now a judgment in personam, whether given in civil or

in criminal proceedings, though it is evidence of the fact
that the judgment was given, is not evidence, against
persons who are not parties to the proceedings, of the
truth or correctness of the judgment… Judgments inter
partes, or, as they are sometimes called, judgments in
personam, are not… admissible for or against
strangers in proof of the facts adjudicated. They are not
admissible against them because it is an obvious
principle of justice that no man ought to be bound by
proceedings to which he was a stranger, and over the
conduct of which he could therefore have exercised no
control…’

158. At common law, had the applicant been an ordinary employee

and not Deputy President or a cabinet minister, it would have

been illegal for the President to have taken into account the

judgment of Mr Shaik in dismissing the applicant. According to

section 90(2) of the Constitution, however, the president appoints

the deputy president and Cabinet ministers, assigns their powers

and functions, and may dismiss them. Even though the

President’s decision was unfair and unjust, given the fact that the

applicant was not given a chance to defend himself in a court of

 73

law, it was not an illegal act given his power to hire and fire his

Deputy or cabinet ministers, at his will.

159. Immediately after his dismissal the applicant was charged, as I

have indicated, with mirror images of the charges against Mr

Shaik, more especially those in counts 1 and 3. The applicant

complains that this was all part of a political strategy, because of

the rivalry between himself and the President for the position of

President of the ANC, to be decided at Polokwane in December

2007. He maintains that this strategy involved stigmatizing him as

being prima facie corrupt and charging Mr Shaik, without ever

letting him defend himself, and then dismissing him. This was

one of the allegations that the respondent sought to strike out. It

is also a matter of common knowledge that the applicant was

replaced by Mrs Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka as Deputy President.

160. These allegations are a modern echo of what the French Cardinal

Richelieu, Chief Minister of Louis Xlll, once said in the seventeenth

century when he observed that in matters of state the weakest are

always wrong. Others have inclined to the same view. The great

Greek historian Thucydides in the fifth century BC wrote that the

question of justice only enters where the pressure of necessity is

equal. He was cynical enough to aver that the powerful exact what
 74

they can, and the weak grant what they must. Fortunately with the

advent of the rule of law matters are now quite different. The courts

are there to make sure that power and wealth are not deciding

factors in the courts.

161. The Canadian Supreme Court has described the judicial function

as ‘absolutely unique’ with the consequence that ‘The judge is in “a

place apart” in our society and must conform to the demands of this

exceptional status’. See Therrien (Re), 2001 SCC 35 (CanLII) ([2001] 2

S.C.R. 3 • (2001), 200 D.L.R. (4th) 1) at para 108 -112. When the public

forfeited their right to resort to arms they placed the resolution of

their disputes in the hands of judges and agreed to abide by their

decisions. There came into being a secular priesthood that should

remain apart from the taint of politics.

162. In the decision of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v Anderson [1942]

AC 206 the duties of judges were emphasized. Given the genesis

of the applicant’s charges there is some irony in his mention of

the ‘clash of arms’ in the passage in question, but it must be

borne in mind that the judgment was given during the worst days

of World War 2. Lord Atkin said:

‘In this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not
silent. They may be changed but they speak the same
language in war as in peace. It has always been one of
 75

the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for

which on recent authority we are now fighting, that the
judges are no respecters of persons and stand between
the subject and any attempted encroachments on his
liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive
action is justified in law.’

163. In order to understand the background of the decision; firstly,

not to charge the applicant and, thereafter, to charge him, it is

necessary to understand the background and reasoning process.

It is also necessary to try and explore the reasons for these

decisions to evaluate his right to make representations. I have

indicated that the cases show that he must be given the gist of

the reasons for the change of mind, otherwise his right to make

representations will be illusory. Finally, of course, it is necessary

to decide whether the allegations of political meddling are

scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant as alleged in the strike out

applications.

164. I have mentioned that the independence of the NPA and the

prohibition on executive interference has been asserted by the

Constitutional Court in the Certification case. It will be recalled

that the court held that any executive action inconsistent with

prosecutorial independence would be subject to constitutional

control by the Courts. This court must carry out that function, not

only in the interests of the present applicant, but also on behalf of

 76

all the people of South Africa, who have a very legitimate interest

in this fundamental principle.

165. In the Certification case the Constitutional Court referred to

the decision of Ex parte Attorney-General, Namibia : In re The

Constitutional Relationship between the Attorney-General and the

Prosecutor-General 1995(8) BCLR 1070 (Nms). In the last

mentioned case Leon AJA quotes with approval the remarks of

Ayoola J at a key note address when opening the First

Conference of Commonwealth Directors of Public Prosecutions

as follows at pages 1085 - 6 :

‘The manner in which such discretion (to prosecute or

not) is exercised and the process of prosecutorial
decision-making are central to the criminal justice
system. If prosecutorial decisions are to lead to public
confidence in the system and are to be consistent with
human rights norms they must also not only be just but
also be seen to be so. The mechanism for arriving at
such decisions must itself be seen to be such as can be
conducive to fairness.’

166. Leon AJA went on to quote the following passage with

approval at page 1086 :

‘Experience in many parts of Africa has shown that

arbitrary and oppressive use of prosecutorial powers
have often been potent weapons of fostering political
ends to the detriment and ultimate destruction of
democracy. On the other hand, experience, such as that
 77

of Gambia, has also shown that where there is no abuse

of prosecutorial powers public confidence in the
criminal justice system is maintained.’

167. Whether the NDPP was influenced by the executive is not

easy for the applicant to prove as that sort of knowledge would

obviously lie with the NDPP. He would not, obviously, be privy to

the oral or written instructions that the executive may have given

to the prosecuting authority. The NDPP denies it most

emphatically and says at all times the decision, not to prosecute

the applicant, and, thereafter to prosecute him were his alone. In

fact he stigmatizes the allegations of political interference as

scandalous, vexatious and irrelevant.

168. When a party has peculiar knowledge of a fact he is not for

that reason saddled with the burden of proving that fact: peculiar

knowledge affects the quantum of evidence expected from the

party but does not affect the incidence of the burden of proof. If

such party fails to adduce evidence, in other words to transmit

his or her knowledge to the court, the inference which is the least

favourable to the party’s cause may be drawn from the proven

facts.

See Abrath v The North Eastern Railway Co (1883) 11 QB 440;

Union Government v Sykes 1913 AD 156; Molteno Bros v SA
Railways 1936 AD 321 333; Naude v Tvl Boot & Shoe
 78

Manufacturing Co 1938 AD 379 392; Durban City Council v SA

Board Mills Ltd 1961 3 SA 397 (A) 405A; Gericke v Sack 1978 1
SA 821 (A) 827E. The same rule applies in criminal cases: R v
Cohen 1933 TPD 128; Rex v Hoffman 1941 OPD 65; S v Theron
1968 4 SA 61 (T) 63; S v Langeveldt 1969 1 SA 577 (T) 581H;
S v Witbooi 1971 4 SA 138 (NC) 140–141. See also Galante v
Dickinson 1950 2 SA 460 (A) 465; Botes v Van Deventer 1966 3
SA 182 (A) 1888; Henry v SANTAM Insurance Co Ltd 1971 1 SA
468 (C) 472–473.

169. The effect of all this is that the Courts take cognizance of the

handicap under which a litigant may labour where facts are within

the exclusive knowledge of his opponent and they have in

consequence held, as was pointed out by Innes JA in Union

Government v Sykes 1913 AD 156 at page 173, that ‘less evidence

will suffice to establish a prima facie case where the matter is

peculiarly within the knowledge of the opposite party than would

under other circumstances be required.’

170. The titanic political struggle between the applicant and the

President is no concern of the court unless it impacts on issues

to be decided in this application. The rivalry of the applicant and

the President is hardly open to question and the polarization of

the country into opposing camps before and after Polokwane is

well known. The President of this country is restricted to two

terms of office by operation of the constitution and his campaign

to seek the leadership of the ANC was hotly contested by the

applicant.
 79

171. In LAWSA Second Edition Vol 5(3) title Constitutional Law at

paragraph 221 the learned author Professor George Devenish

describes the functions and role of the President as follows.

‘The Constitution creates an executive presidency, and

not merely a titular one as prevailed under the 1961
Republican Constitution…The president is elected by
Parliament from among its members, but must vacate
his or her seat on assuming office, thereby establishing
an extra-parliamentary presidency. This allows the
incumbent to be free to a certain extent from the
turbulent and unpredictable nature of South African
party politics, as is manifested in the robust party
political activity in the National Assembly, although the
president remains the leader of the victorious governing
political party. Such a president is then able to fulfil a
unifying, reconciling and, if necessary, mediating role in
the profoundly cleavaged society that South Africa is,
with its potential for conflict and violence.’

172. Had the President won the election as party leader at

Polokwane he could still not have been elected President of the

country, without a constitutional amendment. The learned

professor refers to the practice that the president of the majority

party is the president of the country. The corollary of this is that if

the president of the party was not president of the country that

unifying and reconciling role in our profoundly cleavaged society

would not take place.

 80

173. At its lowest then the decision to stand as party leader was

controversial and not in accordance with the Westminster system

we espouse in this country. The applicant claims his woes are

attributable to his decision to accept nomination of others and

stand for the position of head of the party, as a rival to the

incumbent president. Clearly the stakes were high and the

competition fierce.

174. We know that the decision not to prosecute him was for

reasons totally antithetical to the constitutional duties of the

NDPP to make consistent, fair and honest decisions without fear

or favour and we are conscious of the irrationality of charging the

briber and not the recipient of bribes, but does this alone show

political conspiracy? One has to examine the decision not to

prosecute the applicant to ascertain whether it was made from

fear or favour and whether it was consistent.

175. At first blush a decision not to prosecute the Deputy President

of the country appears to be as a favour to the second to highest

ranking politician in the country. The applicant denies this and

puts quite a different slant on the objective. He says it was all part

of a political agenda that had as its objective the favouring of

President Mbeki in his quest for a further term of office as ANC

 81

President. Those are allegations that the respondent seeks to

strike out of the record. Is there any evidence of this? Mr Ngcuka

says that he and Minister Maduna ‘informed the Deputy President

about this investigation shortly after it started.’ That hardly

constitutes proof of any interference.

176. It is important to establish how extensive the political

interference, influence or pressure has to be to be recognized by

the courts. In Sharma’s case, mentioned above, the Privy Council

of the House of Lords in England considered an appeal from the

West Indies. The appellant was the Chief Justice of Trinidad and

Tobago and he was charged with attempting to pervert the course

of justice by trying to influence the decision of the Chief

Magistrate in a trial involving Mr Basdeo Panday, the Leader of

the Opposition and a former Prime Minister. Mr Panday was

charged with corruption and the Chief Justice had three meetings

with the Chief Magistrate during which he tried to influence the

decision in favour of Mr Panday.

177. The prosecution authorities investigated the removal of the

Chief Justice, in terms of their constitution and the matter was

placed in the hands of the Deputy Director of Public

Prosecutions. She brought a prosecution against the chief justice

 82

for perverting the course of justice during his three meetings with

the Chief Magistrate, when he spent time trying to secure a result

in favour Mr Panday. The Chief Justice brought an application to

review the decision to prosecute him and sought an order staying

all action consequential on that decision to prosecute. In other

words he was asking the court to declare the indictment invalid.

Had the Chief Justice been successful with his application, the

indictment would have been set aside and no further charges

could be brought until the prosecuting authority had been purged

of the malign political influence.

178. The Chief Justice in that matter alleged that there was

improper, politically-motivated interference in the prosecution

process against him i.e. the Chief Justice, by the Prime Minister

and the Attorney-General and the others, including the Deputy

Director who brought the prosecution.

179. The Privy Council gave two separate judgments the main

judgment being by Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Walker of

Gestingthorpe, who said the following at page 786 et seq:

‘The rule of law requires that, subject to any immunity

and exemption provided by law, the criminal law of the
land should apply to all alike. A person is not to be
singled out for adverse treatment because he or she
 83

holds a high and dignified office of state, but nor can the
holding of such an office excuse conduct, which would
lead to the prosecution of one not holding such an
office. The maintenance of public confidence in the
administration of justice requires that it be, and be seen
to be, even-handed.

It is the duty of police officers and prosecutors engaged

in the investigation of alleged offences and the initiation
of prosecutions to exercise an independent, objective,
professional judgment on the facts of each case. It not
infrequently happens that there is strong political and
public feeling that a particular suspect or class of
suspect should be prosecuted and convicted… This is
inevitable, and not in itself harmful so long as those
professionally charged with the investigation of
offences and the institution of prosecution do not allow
their awareness of political and public opinion to sway
their professional judgment. It is a grave violation of
their professional and legal duty to allow their judgment
to be swayed by extraneous considerations such as
political pressure.’

180. I would say that in South Africa it goes far beyond being a

‘grave violation of their professional and legal duty [for

prosecutors] to allow their judgment to be swayed by extraneous

considerations such as political pressure’ as it is a very serious

criminal offence for which the legislature has put a maximum

sentence of 10 years imprisonment for any breach.

181. The other Lords of the Privy Council did not differ on this point

and Baroness Hale of Richmond, Lord Carwell and Lord Mance

approved a previous decision of the Court of Appeal. That

decision was to the effect that the court has power to interfere
 84

with a prosecution, because the judiciary accepts responsibility

for the rule of law. As such it embraces a willingness to oversee

executive action and to refuse to countenance behaviour that

threatens either basic human rights or the rule of law. (At page

794 G-H). These very same principles are, of course, core values

of our own constitution. The learned Lords then said at page 795

A-B:

‘In our opinion, the same responsibility extends to the

oversight of executive action in the form of a police or
other prosecutorial decision to prosecute. The power to
stay for abuse of process can and should be understood
widely enough to embrace an application challenging a
decision to prosecute on the ground that it was arrived
at under political pressure or influence or was motivated
politically rather than by an objective review of proper
prosecutorial considerations (such as, in England, those
set out in the Code for Crown Prosecutors issued under
the Prosecution of Offences Act, 1985.)’

182. An examination of the above passage posits that the test is

therefore a proscription of decisions to prosecute that are arrived

at under political pressure, or influence, or those that were

motivated politically, rather than by an objective review of proper

prosecutorial considerations. The South African equivalents are

of course the prosecution policy, the code and directives I have

already mentioned above. They posit a prosecution model which

is totally independent of political influence and which prosecutes

fairly, consistently and without fear or favour to anyone. I have

 85

already indicated why the failure to prosecute the applicant was

an egregious breach of those principles.

183. The learned Lord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Walker of

Gestingthorpe then stated that under the Judicial Review Act

2000, judicial review lies against a public prosecutor, for instance,

if he acts on instructions from an unauthorized person. The Lords

then continue

‘It is well established that a decision to prosecute is

ordinarily susceptible to judicial review, and surrender
of what should be an independent prosecutorial
discretion to political instruction (or the Board would
add, persuasion or pressure) is a recognized ground of
review…’

184. After indicating the clear principles involved the case was

decided on the facts. In that matter the prosecutor had no

meetings with any politicians or even any contact. The Privy

Council then decided at page 793 that

‘there was no reasonable basis for concluding that the

Deputy DPP’s decision or advice was influenced by
political pressure. She had been expressly instructed to
make her own independent decision. She swore that she
did so, having no contact with the Prime Minister on any
subject nor with the Attorney General on this subject.’

185. The Privy Council then dismissed the appeal of the Chief

Justice for a lack of any evidence of interference of any sort and

 86

effectively denied his bid to stay all actions consequent on the

decision to prosecute.

186. Our South African law is no different. In S v Yengeni op cit the

appellant – a former member of Parliament – had been convicted

of corruption arising out of an aspect of the arms deal, relating to

his purchase of a motor vehicle. The appellant had discussed his

potential sentence with a former Minister of Justice and

Constitutional development, Mr Maduna and the then NDPP, Mr

Ngcuka. This discussion took place at a meeting at the Minister’s

home during January 2003. It was also common cause that the

three of them agreed that ‘should the appellant plead guilty to a

“watered-down” charge, the State would not seek a custodial

sentence. Bertelsmann and Preller JJ said the following at

paragraph [57]

‘It was indubitably ill-advised for the former National Director

of Public Prosecutions [Mr Ngcuka] to be seen to participate in
a discussion with the Minister [Mr Maduna] and the appellant.
The independence of the office that he held, and the fearless
and unfettered exercise of the extensive powers that this office
confers, are incompatible with any hint or suggestion that he
might have lent an ear to politicians who might wish to
advance the best interests of a crony rather than the search
for the truth and the proper functioning of the criminal and
penal process.’
 87

187. In this matter apart from Minister Maduna informing the

applicant about this investigation shortly after it started, was

there any other suggestion that there was political interference?

Is there a suggestion that what Bertelsmann and Preller JJ

warned against had taken place? Was there a breach of the

independence of the office that he held, and interference with the

fearless and unfettered exercise of the extensive powers that this

office confers as the judges said? Is there a hint or suggestion

that the NDPP might have lent an ear to politicians as the learned

judges admonished? Was there political pressure, influence or

persuasion of any sort as the Privy Council suggested in

Sharma’s case?

188. In the press statement Mr Ngcuka states that he conducted the

investigation ‘without any undue influence from the executive or

any arm of our government.’ He should have said it was

conducted without any influence whatsoever. I might interpolate

to say that the prosecution policy and code of conduct emphasise

very clearly that statements should not be made to the media

before a prosecution is instituted. At the press conference, which

was broadcast on national television, Mr Ngcuka then thanks a

number of his staff and then says the following of and concerning
 88

Dr Maduna, who was present, at the press conference, sitting next

to him:

‘More importantly, I want to extend my greatest appreciation to

Dr Panuell (sic) Maduna, the Minister of Justice, for his
unstinging support. Minister, you’ve once more demonstrated
political leadership.’

189. Given that there should not be a hint or suggestion that the

NDPP might have lent an ear to politicians he is here expressing

his greatest appreciation to a politician for his ‘unstinging’ (sic)

support. Perhaps he meant ‘unstinting’. Even if he meant the

Minister was not stingy in his support – in other words very

generous in the time and energy he spent on the matter, it is a

startling statement, given the total independence the NDPP is

supposed to exercise.

190. The comment that the Minister’s generous support

demonstrated once more his political leadership leaves much to

be desired. How does a decision to prosecute Mr Shaik and not

the applicant provide a further demonstration of political

leadership? Is the reason that he said this that the decision not to

prosecute the applicant needed political evaluation and Mr

Ngcuka learned from the advice of his leader? That seems to be

the most plausible inference. The presence of the Minister at the

 89

press conference is otherwise inexplicable and seems to indicate

a total lack of appreciation of the independence of the NPA.

191. I must conclude that the Minister gave generous amounts of

his time and energy to the NDPP and political leadership in the

long period leading up to the press conference. Laconic as these

comments may be they certainly are not consonant with ‘the

fearless and unfettered independent exercise of extensive

powers’ referred to by the learned judges in the Yengeni matter.

The comments certainly strengthen the inference that the

decision not to prosecute the applicant was politically driven.

192. There is another disturbing feature in the decision to withdraw

charges against Thint in the Shaik matter. Mr Du Plooy, the

deponent to the opposing papers, filed on behalf of the NDPP,

explains how the charges against Thint were withdrawn. He

explains that Thint was accused no 11 in the Shaik trial and that

some months prior to the trial date Thint approached Minister

Maduna and indicated it wished to meet with him and Mr Ngcuka.

These matters are not in dispute and curiously are volunteered by

the respondent himself. It is not clear whether a physical meeting

took place but that is the most plausible inference. Following on

the approach to Mr Maduna some discussion must have taken

 90

place as two trips were made to Paris by Mr Ngcuka and Mr

McCarthy but, apparently, to no avail. The political meddling, that

the judges in Yengeni’s matter had been so critical of, was being

repeated. At paragraph 35 of Du Plooy’s answering affidavit the

following appears:

’35.1 In the latter half of 2003, an intermediary ostensibly

acting for the Thint group contacted Minister Maduna
and indicated that the group wished to meet with him
and Mr Ngcuka. Pursuant to this approach, Mr Ngcuka
traveled to Paris on two occasions in the second half of
2003 (Mr McCarthy accompanied Mr Ngcuka on one of
these occasions). Nothing came of those discussions.

35.2 In early 2004, Mr Maduna was contacted by the

legal representatives of Thint. Pursuant to this
approach, a meeting was held at Mr Maduna’s house in
April 2004 at which the Thint delegation indicated their
willingness to co-operate with the prosecution. It was
agreed that they would contact Mr Ngcuka’s office to
discuss the terms of their co-operation.

35.3 On 19 April 2004 a meeting was held between

Thint’s representatives on the one hand, and Mr Ngcuka
and Mr McCarthy on the other. They concluded an
agreement. Mr Ngcuka confirmed the agreement in a
letter to Thint’s counsel later that day. The agreement
was that, if Mr Thetard made an affidavit verily to the
effect that he was the author of the encrypted fax, the
NPA would, amongst other things, retract warrants for
Mr Thetard’s arrest and withdraw the prosecution
against Thint.

35.4 On 20 April 2004 Mr Thetard made an affidavit

confirming that he was the author of the encrypted fax.
On 4 May 2004 Mr Ngcuka confirmed that he would
withdraw the charges against Thint on the date of the
next appearance in the Shaik matter. Notwithstanding
the fact that shortly afterwards Mr Thetard made a
further, unsolicited affidavit evidently aimed at
 91

undermining his first affidavit, the NPA decided to keep

its side of the bargain and the charges were withdrawn
against Thint on 11 October 2004.’ (Emphasis added.)

193. What is clear from the respondent’s own papers is that the

Minister had a meeting with Mr Ngcuka, the NDPP and

representatives of an accused in the case. It is clear from the

above that once the group spoke to the Minister he contacted

Ngcuka who went to Paris on two occasions. What is clear is the

Minister must have made his input into the offer and its

consequences for the prosecution against Shaik. This fax was of

course crucial in the future case against the applicant. The fax

must have been the subject of discussions in Paris.

194. We know that in early 2004, Mr Maduna was contacted by the

legal representatives of Thint and a meeting was held at his

house. The Thint delegation indicated their willingness to co-

operate with the prosecution. An agreement was reached at this

meeting at which the minister was present. The terms were that

Thint would cooperate and Mr Thetard would make an affidavit to

the effect that he was the author of the encrypted fax. In return for

this cooperation the NPA would withdraw the charges.

195. Clearly the Minister and Mr Ngcuka were using the oldest

device in the ancient art of prosecution - to continue the angling

 92

metaphor of Sachs J in the Constitutional Court - using a sprat to

catch a mackerel. So long as Thint (the sprat) agreed to agree that

it wrote the fax then the prosecution could then catch Shaik (the

mackerel). The applicant maintains that the ultimate objective of

the strategy was to prosecute Shaik and, when he was convicted,

fire the applicant. I have explained why he regarded that as unjust

given that the NDPP had never had the courage to charge him and

give him a chance to defend himself. So the applicant maintains

that he was the big fish - if one were to continue this dubious

metaphor - as the deputy president of the country and rival of the

President in the race for the presidency of the ANC. These

contentions fall into the series of allegations the respondent

wishes to strike out of applicant’s affidavit.

196. Put at its very lowest Mr Maduna seems to have played a not

insignificant part in the planning of the strategy in question,

whatever its end objective might be. Given the constitutional

imperative for the NDPP to be totally independent, and decide

without fear or favour it was a most regrettable occurrence, in the

light of the fact that it also constituted a serious criminal offence.

197. Is there any evidence that political interference has continued?

Annexed to the Respondent’s answering affidavit in this matter is

 93

a supporting affidavit by Mr Pikoli, put up in the adjournment and

permanent stay applications before Msimang J, in which he says

the following:

’30. It is denied that the prosecution has not approached

the Presidency about the matter [the arms deal enquiry].
The NPA and the prosecution team have in fact been
engaging with the Director- General in the Presidency in
this regard since February 2006.’

198. This paragraph is in response to paragraphs 29 and 30 of the

applicant’s founding affidavit, in the proceedings before Msimang

J, in which he sets out what role the President played in the arms

deal acquisition process. The applicant does not suggest that the

President was guilty of any corruption but suggests that the

President is in possession of sufficient knowledge to clear the

applicant.

199. Other documents filed include admissions by the NPA,

through its spokesman Makhosini Nkosi, made on 9 July 2006

that the President has never been the subject of investigation, as

that was never warranted, as there was no evidence of

impropriety by him. The meetings with the Director-General in the

Presidency could not, therefore, have been about the President’s

involvement. Nor is there any suggestion that any crimes in

connection with the arms deal were committed in the office of the
 94

President. The ongoing meetings could only relate to the

complicity of the present applicant. These consultations with the

office of the Presidency on the implied ongoing basis from

February 2006 are also cause for concern given the constitutional

imperative of independence.

200. There is one further matter to be considered, which the

applicant alleges provide proof that there was a political

influence, pressure or persuasion to prosecute him during

December 2007 when Mr Mpshe was at the helm of the NPA. The

applicant says that ‘It is also pointed out that the NPA during 2007

reviewed various cases including that of Commissioner J Selebi. I

annex hereto newspaper reports reflecting this.’

201. In an article by Mr Sam Sole, dated 5 October 2007 in the Mail

and Guardian, annexed to the papers, mention is made of certain

warrants of search and arrest issued against Mr Selebi. The

warrants had not been executed and Mr Pikoli contacted the

President who instructed the Minister of Justice to write to Mr

Pikoli. The article says the following:

‘She did so, apparently demanding access to the Selebi

docket and seeking to circumscribe Pikoli’s prerogative
to make a decision. Pikoli replied, asserting that
prerogative and warning the Minister over her attempt to
 95

interfere. That prompted Mbeki to suspend Pikoli on

September 23. On September 28, the acting national
director of Public Prosecutions, Mokotedi Mpshe,
applied successfully to have the arrest warrant
cancelled. He later revealed that the Selebi case is the
only one that is being ‘reviewed’ by him. The
inescapable conclusion is that this is as a result of
Mbeki’s intervention… we can only conclude that the
difference between the two cases is that the decision on
Zuma was politically palatable to Mbeki whereas the
decision on Selebi was not.’

202. The respondent states in reply that the paragraph is disputed.

He goes on to say

‘It is incorrect that Mpshe reviewed “various cases

including that of Commissioner J Selebi”. In fact he
reviewed only Selebi’s case, at the request of the
Minister of Justice. Once again, the applicant bases his
assertions on unsubstantiated and inaccurate press
reports.’

203. The only other response by the respondent is to be found

earlier in the answering affidavit, at paragraph 89.

‘89. Between the hearing on 27 to 29 August 2007 of the

appeals in the SCA concerning the August 2005
searches and seizures and the handing down of the
SCA’s judgments on those appeals on 8 November
2007, the President suspended Mr Pikoli as NDPP,
stating that there had been an irretrievable breakdown in
the working relationship between Mr Pikoli and the
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Ms
Brigitte Mabandla. The President appointed Mr Mpshe as
the acting NDPP.’
 96

204. An affidavit is put up by Mr Pikoli but nowhere does he deal

with the allegations in the article by Mr Sole. The applicant knew

little or nothing of these goings on and put up the best evidence

he could find. Mr Pikoli was the NDPP and must have known the

answers to these allegations. By law he is supposed to admit or

deny or confess and avoid these allegations or face the prospect

of the court accepting the allegations as correct. See Moosa v

Knox 1949 3 SA 327 N at 331.

205. From the above it is clear that there is no attempt by Mr Pikoli

to deal with the allegation of the blatant interference by the

Minister and the fact that Mr Pikoli asserted his rights of

independence. There is no refutation that the Selebi warrants

were cancelled by Mr Mpshe after political interference and that

Pikoli was suspended because he refused to do so. There is an

admission that Mpshe reviewed only Selebi’s case, at the request

of the Minister of Justice. The other admission relates to the fact

that the President suspended Mr Pikoli as NDPP, stating that

there had been an irretrievable breakdown in the working

relationship between Mr Pikoli and the Minister.

206. At the level of the most plausible inference, in the absence of

any other competing one, it must be inferred that there was again
 97

political interference at the very time Mr Mpshe was

contemplating charging the applicant. Mr Pikoli does not deal

with the allegation that the issuing of the warrants against Selebi

was not palatable to the President but the decision to prosecute

the applicant was.

207. The NDPP states unequivocally that the NDPP Mr Pikoli was

suspended by the President because of a breakdown in his

relationship with the Minister of Justice. There should be no

relationship with the Minister of Justice – certainly insofar as his

decisions to prosecute or not to prosecute anybody from the

Commissioner of Police downwards. All that is clear from the

Constitution, the NPA Act and the various prosecution policies,

directives and codes of conduct. The suspension of the National

Director was a most ominous move that struck at the core of a

crucial State institution. Of importance to the applicant was the

fact that Pikoli’s replacement, Mr Mpshe, who had to decide his

fate, must have realized that to disobey the executive would in all

probability ensure his own professional demise.

208. The trial of the applicant was not proceeded with before

Msimang J and struck off the roll on 20 September 2006. The

judge in that matter made serious comments about the manner in

 98

which the NDPP was dealing with the matter. I have dealt with the

bilateral nature of corruption and the inexplicable decision not to

prosecute the applicant in August 2003. It is very difficult to

understand why the State did not proceed against the applicant

on the evidence they had, given that it had resulted in a fifteen

year sentence for Shaik.

209. The applicant states in his founding affidavit that after all

these proceedings he and those who wished him to occupy a

leadership role in the ANC ‘were concerned about the criminal

charges being re-launched at all and moreover being launched at

a critical time in the political process’. He goes further and

suggests that this was a stratagem to cloak him in the guise of an

accused at the critical moments in the political process and so

hamper his election as ANC President. There does seem to be

merit in that contention. I am therefore not inclined to strike out

these allegations.

210. The timing of the indictment by Mr Mpshe on 28 December

2007, after the President suffered a political defeat at Polokwane

was most unfortunate. This factor, together with the suspension

of Mr Pikoli, who was supposed to be independent and immune

from executive interference, persuade me that the most plausible

 99

inference is that the baleful political influence was continuing. If

the NDPP is to be totally independent and perform his functions

without fear and favour he should not be liable to suspension by

the executive at any given moment.

211. In the decision of the Privy Council of the House of Lords in

England in Grant v DPP [1982] AC 190 at 201 Lord Diplock said of

the Jamaican Constitution

‘The office of the Director of Public Prosecutions was a

public office newly-created by section 94 of the
Constitution. His security of tenure and independence
from political influence is assured. In the exercise of his
functions, which include instituting and undertaking
criminal prosecutions, he is not subject to the direction
or control of any other person.’

212. I might interpolate to say that it seems to me that the only way

to ensure the independence of the NDPP is to make his

appointment and dismissal on the same conditions as that of a

judge. If his security of tenure and independence is not assured

and he can he suspended by the executive, the whole legal

process is in serious jeopardy.

213. What Mr Maduna and his successor Miss Mabandla did is also

the responsibility of the President and his whole cabinet. The

most renowned definition of collective responsibility of the

 100

Cabinet appears in LAWSA Second Edition, volume 5(3), title

Constitutional Law, paragraph 227 where Lord Salisbury is

quoted as saying:

‘For all that passes in Cabinet every member of it who

does not resign is absolutely and irretrievably
responsible and has no right afterwards to say that he
agreed in one case to a compromise, while in another he
was persuaded by his colleagues . . . It is only on the
principle that absolute responsibility is undertaken by
every member of the Cabinet, who after a decision is
arrived at, remains a member of it, that the joint
responsibility of Ministers to Parliament can be upheld
and one of the most essential principles of
parliamentary responsibility established.’

214. In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of SA 108 of 1996

s 92(2) Cabinet ministers are also accountable, collectively and

individually, to Parliament for the exercise of their powers and

performance of their functions. Is it possible that the Mr Maduna

was on a frolic of his own or acting on instructions? It seems very

improbable that in so important a matter as one involving the

Deputy President (his political superior) a mere minister would

get involved without the President knowing and agreeing.

215. The allegations of corruption affected not only the government

but the party and the whole country. Given the keen competition

between the applicant and the president for the leadership is it

conceivable that the president did not know? The President is

 101

after all the only person who can dismiss the Deputy President in

terms of the Constitution. In terms of sub-sections 96(3)(4) and

(5), added by annexure B to Schedule 6 of the Constitution,

Ministers are accountable individually to the president and to the

National Assembly for the administration of their portfolios. In

terms of the Constitution all members of the Cabinet are

correspondingly accountable collectively for the performance of

the functions of national government and its policies.

Furthermore, ministers must administer their portfolios in

accordance with the policy determined by the Cabinet. However,

should it happen that a minister fails to administer the portfolio in

accordance with the policy of the Cabinet, the president may

require the minister concerned to bring the administration of the

portfolio into conformity with that policy.

216. It seems to me that in terms of the law, more especially

emanating from the Constitution, there is responsibility

attributable to the President and his cabinet for what Mr Maduna

did. This would, of necessity, also apply to what Ms Mabandla did.

I am therefore not convinced that the applicant was incorrect in

averring political meddling in his prosecution. I will deal with the

consequences of this on the striking out applications later in the

judgment.
 102

217. If there was political interference in the earlier decision not to

prosecute the applicant and in all probability the later one to

prosecute him what does one make of the offer of the NDPP that

the applicant can make representations at any time about the

investigation or prosecution? It seems to me that if he was

afforded the chance to make representations at any time for any

reason, it would be the duty of NDPP as he expressed it to

consider these.

218. The applicant expresses this as follows, after explaining that

there was no new evidence, at the time Mr Pikoli decided to

prosecute him. At paragraph 73 he says

’73. It is in this context that the NDPP’s failure to comply

with the provisions of section 179(5) must be
considered. Where such extraneous factors as the
politics of the day and a change in decision without any
new evidence are present, there is indeed an obligation
to be extra vigilant in ensuring compliance with Section
179(5) to the fullest extent. And if there is new evidence,
surely one seeks an explanation from the person to be
charged in these circumstances.’

219. Given the political entanglements and machinations in the

whole matter of the applicant’s prosecution, there does seem to

be merit in this submission. This would apply more especially if

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the political thinking changed and consideration was to be given

to charging him.

220. There is a distressing pattern in the behaviour which I have

set out above indicative of political interference, pressure or

influence. It commences with the ‘political leadership’ given by

Minister Maduna to Mr Ngcuka, when he declined to prosecute the

applicant, to his communications and meetings with Thint

representatives and the other matters to which I have alluded.

Given the rules of evidence the court is forced to accept the

inference which is the least favourable to the party’s cause who

had peculiar knowledge of the true facts. It is certainly more

egregious than the ‘hint or suggestion’ of political interference

referred to in the Yengeni matter. It is a matter of grave concern

that this process has taken place in the new South Africa given

the ravages it caused under the Apartheid order.

221. In the Yengeni matter the judges went on to emphasise the

importance of the independence of the prosecuting authority

when they stated at paragraph [52]

‘The independence of the Judiciary is directly related to,

and depends upon, the independence of the legal
professions of the [NDPP]. Undermining this freedom
from outside influence would lead to the entire legal
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process, including the functioning of the Judiciary,

being held hostage to those interests that might be
threatened by a fearless, committed and independent
search for the truth.’

222. There is a contradiction between Mr Mpshe and Mr Tlali as to

whether the applicant’s case was under review. After Msimang J

struck the matter off the roll the NDPP had to make up his mind

whether to charge the applicant afresh. Whichever version is

accepted – in other words, irrespective of whether there was to be

a review of the applicant’s case - that was a decision the NDPP

had to make. When he made it he told the applicant that he would

not hear any of his representations.

223. What weight can be given to his promise to listen to all

representations at the press conference held by Mr Ngcuka? It is

also clear that the respondent always acknowledged the

applicant’s right to make representations. At paragraphs 154.2

and 164 respondent says

‘154.2 The applicant has in any event had ample

opportunity to make representations on the decision to
prosecute him since it was taken. He could have made
these representations to Pikoli who took the decision to
prosecute him. He could moreover more recently have
made the representations to the NPA either before or
after the current decision to reinstitute charges. He
required no invitation to make such representations…’
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‘164… Any accused person, and indeed any suspect, is

free to make representations to the NPA regarding a
pending or anticipated prosecution. The applicant,
represented as he is by senior and experienced counsel,
must be well aware of this.’

224. In the light of these statements it is most strange and

disturbing that Mr Mpshe shut the door on the applicant making

any such representations. In my view the promise at the press

conference was binding on the NDPP on two scores. Firstly,

because it was an invitation to the applicant to make

representations and he acquired a legitimate expectation to make

them pursuant to the promise. Secondly, the NDPP told the

applicant and the world at large that he was duty bound to

consider any such representations in terms of section 22(4)(c). It

is reinforced by the subsequent attitude.

225. The NDPP is a very important appointment. If his word is worth

nothing then our National Prosecuting Authority is in peril. In

Wronsky and another v Attorney-General 1971 (3) SA 292 (SWA)

the applicants had applied for an order directing the respondent

in terms of section 14 of Ordinance 34 of 1963 (S.W.A.) to decide

immediately whether or not he refuses to prosecute certain

persons; and in the event of his refusal to immediately furnish a

certificate nolle prosequi. The respondent had stated that he had

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not yet decided as he wished to study further statements before

he decided. It was not alleged that he had acted mala fide.

226. It was held, that the application should be refused. Hoexter J

(as he then was) held that where mala fides was neither alleged

nor proved the court had no reason to doubt the allegations of the

attorney-general that he was not in any position to make a

decision. The court held at pages 294-5 that it was obliged to take

into account what it termed ‘the elevated position of the attorney-

general’.

227. The court approved a dictum by Acting Judge President

Watermeyer to the effect that the attorney-general ‘is the highest

official in charge of prosecutions and the Court is bound to place

great reliance and great trust in what he says.’ See Heller v

Attorney-General 1932 CPD 102 at page 104.

228. It seems clear that the applicant was entitled to place great

reliance and trust in what Mr Ngcuka said in inviting

representations at the press conference.

229. Because of the political meddling I am of the view that the

respondent did not maintain his independence and was not in a

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proper position to carry out his duties to honour the promise to

hear representations or to respond properly to the request to

receive representations. I am not saying the political meddling is

a sufficient ground on its own to secure the relief at all. That was

not an issue as such in this application. What I mean is that it was

legitimate of the applicant to place it before the court to evaluate

his right to make representations.

230. I am of the view that the applicant had a legitimate expectation

that his representations be heard by Mr Pikoli in the first instance

and Mr Mpshe especially after the promise at the press

conference and the letter requesting an opportunity to make such

representations.

231. For this additional reason I believe the NDPP ought to have

heard the applicant’s representations.

232. It is interesting that in the Sharma judgment to which I have

referred extensively earlier on the Deputy DPP did invite

representations from the Chief Justice in that case.

‘On 2 June she supplied the Chief Justice with a

summary of the allegations being investigated and told
his legal representative that she would consider any
representations he might think it necessary to make.
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Such representations were submitted to her in writing

on 23 June.’

233. I might add in conclusion on this point that I wonder at the

wisdom of the respondent in not hearing the applicant’s

representations, when he asked to make them. That would

certainly have allowed the matter to proceed more speedily. There

are many complaints and recriminations about procrastination in

this matter. The constitutional court has spoken about the

undesirability of points taken to delay matters. The courts have

over the years said much the same.

234. In Le Grand (t/a Jeannes) v Carmelu (Pvt) Ltd (t/a Lynwood

Fashions) 1980 (1) SA 240 (ZRA) MacDonald CJ at 242D - G said

the following

‘The civil courts in common with the criminal courts

exist to do justice and not to provide some practitioners
with a forum in which, relying upon technical and wholly
academic points, to attempt to prevent a court
adjudicating upon the real issues.’

235. The respondent complains that the applicant keeps preventing

the matter from proceeding to trial. It must always be borne in

mind that the State decided not to prosecute the applicant in the

Shaik matter five years ago on 23 August 2003, in the peculiar

circumstances I have mentioned. That was after an exhaustive

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two year investigation, interviewing hundreds of witnesses in

several countries and at great cost no doubt to the taxpayer.

More than two years ago the State asked for an adjournment for

the criminal trial against the applicant, which was correctly

refused by Msimang J. So all the blame for delays is not to be

attributed to the applicant.

236. It was said with commendable clarity and forthrightness in R v

Hepworth 1928 AD 265 at 277 that:

'A criminal trial is not a game where one side is entitled

to claim the benefit of any omission or mistake made by
the other side, and a judge's position in a criminal trial is
not merely that of an umpire to see that the rules of the
game are observed by both sides. A judge is an
administrator of justice, he is not merely a figure head,
he has not only to direct and control the proceedings
according to recognised rules of procedure but to see
that justice is done.'

237. The court has gained the impression that all the machinations

to which I have alluded form part of some great political contest

or game. For years the applicant is under threat of prosecution for

serious corruption and yet never brought to trial. There is a ring

of the works of Kafka about this. In addition I have mentioned the

applicant’s threats of disclosure should he go down.

The applications to strike out

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238. As I have mentioned the respondent and applicant have both

brought applications to strike out allegedly offensive material in

the affidavits of their opponents. The material in applicant’s

founding papers, apart from excessive biographical material,

which is really of no great moment, relates to his allegations of

political meddling in his investigation and prosecution. The

material concerning his tax charges flows from this allegation and

must be considered with it. As appears from the above findings I

am satisfied that political meddling cannot be excluded and I am

of the judgment that it existed to a sufficiently egregious degree

that it justified inclusion in the papers.

239. Put differently, if the applicant was not prosecuted for what

appears to be some ulterior political motive, when he became

entitled to make representations, he needed to know what had

changed in the political thinking or circumstances that justified

the new decision to prosecute him. The applicant needed to know

why he was not prosecuted in a bilateral offence to understand

why he was now being prosecuted.

240. I am of the view that the respondent’s application to strike out

must be dismissed with costs.

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241. The applicant’s striking out motion is aimed at allegations that

his attacks on the political meddling in the prosecution were

made without foundation and were scandalous and vexatious. As

I have found they were relevant to establish the background and

the basis for the first decision not to prosecute, the applicant was

not prohibited from raising them. The respondent was not then

entitled to attack the applicant and his legal team and their bona

fides in including them. The applicant’s striking out application

must be granted with costs.

The delay

242. It seems clear to me that the applicant cannot attack the Pikoli

decision to prosecute him as that indictment became a nullity

once Msimang J struck the matter off the roll. This was the view

of the Constitutional Court in the letter of request appeal under

case no CCT 90/07 where it said

[41] …‘[O]nce a case is struck from the roll, the case

terminates and is no longer pending. There is no
guarantee that the criminal proceedings will be
reinstated. Removal of a matter from the roll is therefore
abortive of the currency of the trial proceedings. Should
the trial ever be enrolled, it would start anew.’
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243. The decision by Mr Mpshe to prosecute the applicant was

therefore the reversal of the decision of Mr Ngcuka not to

prosecute him. As PAJA is applicable the applicant was obliged

to bring the application for review within six months and he has

done so. Even if it is not applicable he was required to bring his

application within a reasonable time. It seems to me that he has

fulfilled that requirement. See Wolgroeiers Afslaers (Edms)

Beperk v Munisipaliteit van Kaapstad 1978(1) SA 13 (AD).

244. The question remains whether all the charges should be

declared to be invalid. At some levels the respondent has thrown

the book at the applicant, so to speak, by including charges

relating to tax evasion etc. These related to payments he had

allegedly received from Mr Shaik or his companies and which

should have been included in his tax return as gifts (bribes).

Some of the payments would also date after the initial decision

not to charge him. At some levels they are all interrelated and it

does not seem to make practical sense to attempt some sort of

severance exercise. In any event the offer to hear his

representations probably covered any charges to be brought

against him should the respondent decide to charge him.

The question of costs

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245. As I have found these to be civil proceedings costs must

follow the event. I am not inclined to grant attorney and client

costs in any of the applications before me. In the main application

I am of view that the costs of three counsel are justified. In the

other applications relating to the striking out and admission of

the Amicus Curiae I believe one counsel of junior status would

have been sufficient.

246. I must repeat that this application has nothing to do with the

guilt or otherwise of the applicant. It deals only with a procedural

point relating to his right to make representations before the

respondent makes a decision on whether to charge him again.

Once these matters are cured the State is at liberty to proceed

again against the applicant, subject to any further proceedings he

may bring.

247. I therefore grant the following orders:

a. It is declared that the decision taken by the National

Prosecuting Authority during or about 28 December 2007 to

prosecute the applicant, a copy of which is annexed to the

applicant’s founding affidavit as annexure “A” thereto is

invalid and is set aside.

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b. The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant’s costs of suit

including those consequent upon the employment of three

counsel.

c. On the respondent’s application to strike out certain

paragraphs of applicant’s founding affidavit I make the

following order:

‘The application is dismissed with costs.’

d. On the applicant’s application to strike out certain paragraphs

of the respondent’s answering affidavit I make the following

order:

‘The application is granted with costs.’

e. On the application of the Amicus Curiae, I make the following

order:

‘aa. The application to join as an Amicus Curiae is

refused.
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bb. The applicant in the Amicus Curiae application is

ordered to pay the respondent’s costs, incurred in

opposing that application.’