1

A Commentary
on Theistic Arguments

Ayatullah Jawadi Amuli

Translated and Edited by

Hassan Allahyari
2
 3

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Com-

passionate
Glory be to Him,
Who carried His servant by night
from the Holy Mosque to the farthest
Mosque,
the precincts of which We have blessed,
that we might show him some of Our signs,
He is the Al-hearing, the Al-seeing.

The Noble Qur’an

 5

About the Author

Āyatullah Abdullah Jawādī Āmulī was born in 1351 A.H.
(1933 A.D.) into a religious family in Āmul, Iran. After
completion of his rudimentary education under his father, a
distinguished and pious scholar in Āmul, the author’s
yearning for knowledge drew him to the local Islamic
seminary. He stayed there for five years and studied under
renowned teachers some of whom had been students of the
late Ākhūnd al-Khurāsānī, the author of Kifāyat al-Usūl.
In 1369 A.H. (1942 A.D.), he migrated to Tehran and, as
counseled by his father, referred to Āyatullah Shaykh
Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī, who introduced him to the
Marwī seminary in Tehran. There, the author studied
advanced courses of fiqh, usūl, hādith, philosophy, and
other customary disciplines of the seminary. His stay at
Tehran continued until 1374 A.H. (1947 A.D.), and during
that period, he studied Sharh al-Mandhūma, al-Ishārāt wa
al-Tanbihāt, and some parts of Al-Asfār under prominent
scholars such as Āyatullah Sha‛rānī and Āyatullah Ilāhī
Qumsha’ī. In the mean time, he continued to study
advanced levels of fiqh under Āyatullah Shaykh
Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī.
In the year 1374 A.H. (1947 A.D.), he joined the holy
seminary of Qum, which was rapidly gaining reputation as
a major center for Shiite learning. For a while, he attended
lectures of the late Grand Āyatullah Burūjerdī. He went to
the fiqh classes of Āyatullah al-Muhaqqiq al-Dāmād for
thirteen years, and attended the lectures of usūl al-fiqh of
the late Imam Khomeini, may Allah sanctify his tomb, for
seven years. He also benefited from the renowned teacher
of Divine gnosis and tafsīr, ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī, under
whom he completed Al-Asfār, irfān, and other advanced
courses in hadīth and tafsīr.
 7

Translator’s Word
The objective of this book is to analyze, from the
perspective of Transcendent Wisdom (al-Hikma al-
Muta‛āliyya), arguments that have been put forward for the
existence of the Deity. Accordingly, familiarity with basic
ontological perspectives of Transcendent Wisdom is
imperative in order to fully benefit from these discussions.
Though I have tried to make this work as close to the
academic parlance of the west as possible, a fastidious
reader may still find many instances that can be further
improved. I take responsibility for the mistakes that may
have gone undetected, welcome suggestions, and request
the reader to overlook my faults and show magnanimity and
pardon with respect to my shortcomings.

Acknowledgements and Dedication

The efforts and encouragement of many people have
contributed to the development of this translation. I
appreciate the help and support provided by Syed Shiraz
Agha, Jāved Akbarī, Kauthar Ali Khan, Syed Sulaymān
Hasan, and many others.
I would like to thank in particular my mentor, the great
‛Allāmah and the possessor of the Tranquil Soul, Ghulām
Redhā Fayyādhī, may Allah bless us with the length of his
life, teacher of Divine gnosis at the holy seminary of Qum.
His eminence graciously gave me the honor of being at his
company and patiently responded to my queries. It has also
been a pleasure to benefit from Dr. Muhammad
Legenhausen, professor of philosophy at Imam Khomeini
Research Institute of Qum, whose encouragement and
vision have always been inspiring.
As a token of esteem, admiration, and deep affection, I
would like to take the privilege to dedicate this humble
work to those Shi‛a youth of the western world who are
fond of Islamic intellectual disciplines. May the Imam of
the Age, my soul and the souls of the world be the ransom
 8
of the dust of his steps, help us to be of service to Islamic
doctrines. May God, the Glorified, accept this unworthy
effort from me and may He make it of use to me and my
brothers in faith.1

Hassan Allahyari
Qum, June, 1997

1 Note: I have also added a few explanatory footnotes at certain

points as deemed necessary; these are distinguished by an asterisk
(*).
 9

Table of Contents
About the Author 5
Translator’s Word 7
Table of Contents 9
The Author’s Preface 15

Knowledge and Sophistry 19

Priority of Ontology over Epistemology 21

Metaphysical Sources of Knowledge 22
Open and Latent Skepticism 23
Incorporeality, Universality, Immutability, and
Continuity of Knowledge 23
Corollaries of Knowledge 25
Knowledge and Mental Existence 28
Divisions of Knowledge32
Knowledge, Faith, and Theoretical and Practical
Reasons 32
Self-evident and Primary Cognitions 34
Necessary Truth of Primary Propositions 35
Difference between Epistemic Certitude and
Psychological Certitude 36
Epistemic Certitude, Probability, and Social Conventions
38
Foundation of Discursive Propositions on Primary and
Self-Evident Propositions 41
Primariness of the First Figure 41
 10
The Principle of Non-Contradiction 43
The Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Validity of
the First Figure 45
The Principle of Non-Contradiction and Multiplicity of
Definite Propositions 46
The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Traditions 48
Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr’s Criticism of the Use of
Syllogism 49
Intuitive Knowledge and its Categories 52
Soul and the Intuitive Knowledge thereof 55
Abstraction and Universalization of Causation 59
Knowledge and Epistemology 61
Philosophy in its General and Specific Senses 63
Philosophy and Particular Disciplines 65

Faith and Reason 67

Sophistic Impartations and the Denial of

Commensurability of Faith with Reason 71
The Mutual Existential Necessitation between Faith and
Reason in the Islamic Traditions 73
The Ignorant Devout and the Unlearned Pious 76
First Knowledge is the Cognition of the Almighty 77
Disparagement of Acquired Knowledge and Mistrust of
Theoretical Disciplines 78
The Commensurability of Religious Tenets with
Philosophic Arguments 79
Rational Arguments in the Islamic Scriptures 80
 11
The Legacy of Nahj al-Balāgha to the History of Islamic
Thought 84
Non-questionability of Monotheism and
Indemonstrability of Atheism 89
Difference between the Arguments of Divine Existence
and the Arguments of His Attributes 92

The Demonstration of Contingency and Necessity 97

Notions of Contingency and Necessity and Signs of

Contingency 99
Argument from Contingents to the Necessary 101
Instrumentality of the Mediates and the Efficacy of the
Necessary 104
Hudūth of the Mediates and Eternity of the Divine Grace
107
Criticisms and Evaluations 110
Evaluation of Hume’s Criticism 112
The Denial of Philosophic Meaning of Necessity and its
Answer 114
Evaluation of the Epistemological Criticism 120

The Arguments from Motion and Huduth 123

Premises of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth 125

Evaluation of the Argument from Causality 126
Limitations of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth
127
Evaluation of Criticisms of the Arguments from Motion
and Hudūth 131
 12
The Demonstration of Contingency of Impoverishment
135

Transition from Quidditative Contingency to

Contingency of Impoverishment 137
Contingency of Impoverishment and the Essential
Independence of the Necessary 143
Unique Qualities of the Demonstration of Contingency of
Impoverishment 148

The Ontological Argument of Anselm 151

Argument in the Form of Reductio ad Absurdum 153

Gaunilo’s Criticism and its Adduction 154
The Fundamental Flaw of Anselm’s Argument 156
Failure to Make Distinction between Concept and
Extension in the Demonstrations of Gnostics 160
The Evaluation of Kant’s Tripartite Criticism of
Anselm’s Argument 163
Addendum 172

The Demonstration of the Veracious 175

The Demonstration of the Veracious in Ibn Sīnā’s Works

177
The Demonstration of the Veracious in Transcendent
Wisdom 178
The Demonstration of the Veracious in ‛Allāmah
Tabātabā’i’s Works 181
Allamah Tabātabā’i’s Exposition of the Demonstration
187
 13
The Qualities of the Demonstration of the Veracious 189

The Argument from Design 191

What is Order? 193

Does Order Exist? 195
Why does Order Exist? 198
The Argument from Design and the Noble Qur’ān 202
The Argument from Design and the Problem of Evil 205

The Argument from Miracles 207

Miracles in the View of Islamic Philosophers and

Western Theologians 211
Extraordinary Events: Mu‛jiza, Karāma, I‛āna, and
Ihāna 212
Miracles as Rational Proofs 213
Rational Possibility and Ordinary Impossibility of
Miracles 215

The Argument from Religious Experience 219

Religious Experience and Demonstrative Reasoning 221

Definite and Indefinite Shuhūds 223
Deviation from Rational Cognition and Decline into
Open and Latent Skepticism 226

The Moral Arguments 229

Discursive Arguments based on Moral Commands 231

The Common Criticism of the Moral Arguments 232
 14
The Affirmation of Incorporeal Existence through
Analysis of Reason 234
Kant’s Moral Arguments 235
The First Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument 235
The Second Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument 236

The Demonstration of Primordial Nature 241

Usage of Reciprocity in the Demonstration of Primordial

Nature 243
Two Expositions of the Demonstration of Primordial
Nature 245
The Minor Premise of the Demonstration of Primordial
Nature 247
A Criticism and Its Evaluation 250
The Demonstration of Primordial Nature in The Noble
Qur’ān 251
Index 255
 15

The Author’s Preface

Man’s life is founded on his beliefs and the central tenet of
all religious beliefs is the existence of God. Failure to
understand the conceptual and propositional foundations
(al-mabādī al-tasawuriyya wa al-tasdīqiyya) of theism can
evoke objections and doubts with respect to belief in the
Deity.
The best way to reach God, Whose Being is more apparent
and obvious than any other thing and Whose presence is
nearer to everything than any other thing, is, verily, to dust
the trail of knowledge off the blinders of ego and vanity.
God’s invisibility is due to the severity of His
manifestation, and His remoteness is because of His
extreme proximity. If an entity’s manifestation were to be
more evident than knowledge, notion, and knower, and it
were to be so near that even nearer than a thing is to itself,
such a keen manifestation necessarily creates invisibility,
and such extreme proximity causes distance. This
invisibility and distance is, however, prevalent with respect
to the eyes which are veiled; because someone who sees
himself, he cannot see God. However, by resisting the
temptations of ego and liberation from the iniquities of
conceit, man’s and inability can be reversed, and then in
proportion to his ontological capacity (si‛a al-wujūdiyya),
he may view God. And by admitting, “We know Thee not,
the knowing Thou deserve”,1 he may refine His gnosis to
perfection.
Given their denial of incorporeal existence and viewing the
reality restricted to the physical world, the rejecters of
monotheism and revelation question things that are not
perceivable through sensation (ehsās). So eloquently does
the Noble Qur’ān narrate this naturalist perspective of a
group of Israelites who refused to believe in anything
beyond their immediate sensation: “O’ Moses, never will

1Al-Majlisī,Muhammad Bāqir. Bihār al-Anwār. (Tehran: Dār al-

Kutub al-Islamiyya), vol. 71, 23.
 16
we believe in thee until we see God manifestly.”1 And
about the idolaters of Hijāz, the Divine book says, “And say
those who hope not of Our meeting, ‘Why have not angels
been sent down upon us, or see we not our Lord?’ Indeed
they think too high of themselves and have exceeded a
great excess.”2
The Noble Qur’ān states that all along history, hearts of
those who maintain naturalistic worldview have been alike.
“And say those who know not: ‘Why speaketh not God
unto us or why cometh not unto us a sign’; Even so spoke
those before them; their hearts are alike. We have indeed
made clear the signs to people who are certainly sure.”3 In
view of the fact that their hearts are alike, most of the
interrogatories and objections of materialist skeptics are the
same which have been projected time and again since the
antiquity, and first, Divine Apostles have offered profound
answers to them and after them, their followers, namely the
religious theosophers and the mutakellimūn, have defined
and expanded on these answers. However, the
interrogatories of every age reflect that age’s specific
ideological trends and predilections; and accordingly, the
answers are proffered in a manner that is prudent and
proportionate to that time. History bears witness to
individuals who were submissive to truth and in its path
they did not confuse lunacy for lucidity. They managed to
extract liberty from the confinements of ego and embrace
and believe in the truth. It also testifies to individuals who
succumbed to their ego and failed to reach the reality, and if
they were able to discover it, their sordid disposition did
not permit them to believe in it. Pharaoh and his courtiers
realized the authenticity of Moses’ miracles, but “denied
them in inequity and arrogance while their hearts were
convinced.”4 In response to their denial, says Moses,

1 2: 55
2 25: 21
3 2: 118
4 27: 14
 17
“Indeed, you know that none hath sent these down save the
Lord of heavens and the earth.”1 Therefore, one has to be
alert to certain indirect fallacies such as the accusations of
being primitive, reiterating ancient dogmas and tales, and
the futility of this answer and that answer; and given the
similarity of hearts and identity of doubts, the very same
profound and cogent answers of revelation and scripture
that have been expanded on and clarified by theosophers,
have to be proffered in a manner adorned with the
expediencies of the time.

This book is a compendium of lectures that were delivered

during 1413 A.H. (1992 A.D.) to an erudite audience in the
holy seminary of Qum. We are most appreciative of Hujjat
al-Islam Hamīd Pārsāniyā for his toils in rewriting and edit-
ing these lectures.
It ought to be stated that many of the book’s analyses of
thinkers outside the real of Islamic intellectual tradition are
based on the translations in the field of philosophy of reli-
gion from European languages. The accuracy of these
translations is solely the responsibility of the translators.

The arguments for the existence of the Almighty Necessary

(al-Wājib Ta‛ālā) can be divided into three categories:

1. Arguments that are defective, devoid of logical tena-

bility, and cannot yield certitude.
2. Arguments that do not lack logical tenability; never-
theless, do not lead to the existence of the Necessary either.
In fact, this category of arguments only indicates one of the
Deity’s attributes and names. In order to prove the exist-
ence of the Necessary, such arguments need be adduced by
other arguments. For instance, even if the common flaws in
some versions of the arguments of motion and hudūth are
avoided, they remain incapable of proving the Necessary.

1 17: 102
 18
3. Arguments, which are cogent and conclusive, such as
the demonstration of the veracious (burhān al-siddīqīn).

Most of theistic arguments which have been criticized are

either devoid of a valid syllogistic form or the critic has
chosen one of its weak versions. Some of them, like
Anselm’s ontological argument and the moral arguments,
are corrupt and defective. Others, such as the arguments
from motion and hudūth, even if stated in a manner
avoiding the prevalent flaws in their common expositions,
even so they fail to prove the objective.
Each chapter of this work is devoted to the analysis of a
certain argument and given that great many criticisms
leveled against theistic arguments are founded on some
epistemological perspectives that question the reliability of
knowledge, the first two chapters inquire into man’s
epistemic capacities.
Finally, it is appropriate to echo the prayer of the Sacred
Messenger of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin, “O’ God,
show us things the way they truly are,” and supplicate to
Him not to deprive us of His most beautiful theophony
(tajallī), so that in the light of His gnosis, we may know
His Prophet, in the light of whose guidance, we may know
His Hujja, and by knowing the Hujja, we may avoid
religious misguidance.
 19

Chapter One

KNOWLEDGE AND SOPHISTRY

 21

Priority of Ontology over Epistemology

There is a sort of commensurability between epistemology
and ontology; that is, every person’s view about the
reliability of knowledge has a rational relationship with his
ontological perspectives. This is due to an exchange of
some propositions between these two disciplines. That is,
on one side of the spectrum, the epistemological inquiry
presupposes some ontological propositions, while on the
other side, certain epistemological propositions are taken as
granted in ontological arguments. This mutual
interdependence, however, can be presented in a way that
avoids circularity (daur).
The ontological propositions that are presupposed at the
beginning of the epistemological inquiry—and denial or
doubt with respect to which make the study of knowledge
irrelevant and acceptance thereof is an imperative condition
of entering the epistemological inquiry—are,

 There is a reality.
 The human being is real.
 The human being’s knowledge is real.

These are ontological propositions; nevertheless,

skepticism (shakkākiyya) with regard to them makes the
epistemological inquiry irrelevant. That is, the study of the
reliability and origin of knowledge is reasonable only if the
truth of these statements is acknowledged. To an
epistemologist who doubts these premises, inquiry and non-
inquiry as well as answer and non-answer cannot make any
difference. If someone inquires about cognition, or
expresses doubt or skepticism (shakkākiyya), he does
possess a number of concepts, such as the concept of reality
and existence, and holds the truth of certain propositions,
such as the propositions that reflect his own existence and
the existence of his knowledge.
Similar to these ontological propositions that make the
study of knowledge possible, certain other ontological
 22
premises—the rejection of which entails the denial of
definite knowledge of reality—pave the way to affirm the
reliability of knowledge and discredit skepticism
(shakkākiyya).

Metaphysical Sources of Knowledge

One of the fundamental ontological questions that plays a
pivotal role in the epistemological inquiry is the question of
whether reality is entirely physical or there are incorporeal
and metaphysical entities.
From the materialist view that considers the reality solely
spatiotemporal, knowledge is a physical phenomenon that
develops in the nervous system because of human
interaction with the natural world. According to this view,
events are caused by factors which theosophers and
believers in metaphysical realities consider supplementary
causes (al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda), that is, instrumentalities
(asbāb) and conditions (sharā’it) of realization of events
and in contrast with the Divine and metaphysical agency
Who is the source of emanation (ifādha) of grace (faidh).
The materialist worldview portrays man and the world as
two natural entities with mutual influence over each other,
whereby some effects that the human being receives from
the natural elements appear before him as his perceptions.
And since the human being and the world cause the
generation of knowledge, knowledge is a third reality that is
other than the human being, “the knower,” and the world,
“the known.” In other words, this analysis entails that since
knowledge is generated because of the human being’s
interaction with the world, it is a new entity whose reality is
always different from the realities of the knower and the
known. By adding this premise to the fact that in the
process of cognition, what man directly knows is his
knowledge and he knows “the known” indirectly through
his knowledge, this constant “otherness” of knowledge and
the known makes the cognition of the external world
impossible. Thus, in the materialist worldview, knowledge
loses its epistemic worth of illustrating the reality, and the
 23
gulf of doubt and skepticism (shakkākiyya) between notion
and the known is never bridged.

Open and Latent Skepticism

Skepticism (shakkākiyya) can be divided into two kinds:
unequivocal or open, and complex or latent. Unequivocal
or open skepticism is involved when during the discourse
of conformity of knowledge to reality, the epistemologist
denies the possibility of reaching reality and declares his
unequivocal uncertainty about knowledge’s disclosure of
the reality. Complex and latent skepticism (shakkākiyya),
however, is dominant when although the epistemologist
makes efforts to avoid admitting skepticism and makes
claims of reliability of knowledge—or makes promises
thereof in an unknown or never-coming future— his
presuppositions and perspectives invite skepticism.

Incorporeality, Universality, Immutability, and Conti-

nuity of Knowledge
The above analysis makes it clear that materialist ontology
inevitably leads to a skeptic epistemology and if someone
studies knowledge from the position of a materialist, even
if he does not admit it, he is prejudiced toward a latent form
of skepticism.
Contrary to the materialist perspective, which restricts the
process of cognition to its natural phases only dismissing its
metaphysical dimensions, and holds premises that lead to a
skeptical epistemology, the metaphysical worldview
acknowledges the spiritual and incorporeal dimensions of
knowledge and holds premises that invalidate skepticism.
The study of knowledge’s qualities from the position of a
metaphysician establishes certain premises, which further
strengthen the foundations of belief in metaphysical
dimensions and incorporeal existence.
Knowledge is characterized by universality (kulliyya),
immutability (thabāt), and continuity (dawām); and these
attributes—irrespective of whether knowledge is reliable—
do not exist in physical and natural entities that are
 24
characterized by particularity (juz’iyya) and are the very
flux (taghayyur) and motion (haraka).1
Through a hypothetical syllogism (al-qiyās al-istithnā’ī) or
the second figure of the categorical syllogism (al-qiyās al-
iqtirānī), any single of these three attributes can prove the
incorporeality of knowledge. This, on its own right, is
sufficient to disprove the assertion that the reality is solely
material, and thus, to indicate the possibility of further
incorporeal beings.
The hypothetical syllogism for the affirmation of
incorporeality of knowledge can run as follows:

If knowledge is physical, then it must

have flux, motion, and particularity.
Nevertheless, the consequent is false.
Therefore, the antecedent—that is,
the physicality of knowledge—is
false as well.

The categorical syllogism for the affirmation of the above

claim can be presented in this way:

Knowledge is immutable, continual,

and universal.
Physical entities are always mutable,
changing, and particular.
Therefore, knowledge is not physi-
cal.

Since a syllogism is determined by its middle term, and the

above demonstration (burhān)—which has been elucidated

1 On the firm foundations of the principality of existence, Trans-

cendent Wisdom establishes the identity (‘aynīya) of existence and
its attributes. One of the corollaries proceeding from this position
is that finite beings do not have an essence that is characterized by
contingency (imkān), motion (al-haraka), flux and (al-taghayyur). It is
argued that these qualities are not attributed to finite beings, rather
they are identical to them. *
 25
in two ways—has three middle terms (universality,
immutability, and continuity), it can be translated into three
syllogisms, each one capable of proving the objective.
Proponents of materialistic epistemology have made tireless
efforts to deny these attributes of knowledge or to explain
them on physical and natural accounts. For instance, it has
been asserted that universality is the vagueness and
obscurity involved in the conformity of a given concept
with respect to individuals, and that the presumption of
immutability and continuity of knowledge owes to
resemblance the preceding and following parts of cognition.
We have expanded on falsity of these analyses in
Epistemology in Qur’ān.1

Corollaries of Knowledge
Rational analysis of a mental concept (al-mafhūm
al-dhehnī) reveals that knowledge (‛ilm) is a phenomenon,
which is associated with a number of notions, and wherever
there is knowledge, there are eight different notions that can
be abstracted from its various aspects. However, these
notions are not all predicated to knowledge in the same
manner and only extensions (masādīq) of some of them
have external unity (wahda). Understanding the difference
between these notions can delineate the boundaries of
discussion and define the axes of critique, which in turn can
help avoid many fallacies. These eight items—six of which
have been by our teacher Āyatullah al-Shaykh Muhammad
Taqī al-Āmulī, sanctified be his soul, in his Durar al-
Fawā’id2—are as follows:

1. The reality and existence (wujūd)

of knowledge itself.

1 Āmulī, Abdullah Jawādī.. Shinakht Shinasī dar Qur’ān. (Qum: Rejā’

Publications, 1993), 328.
2 Al-Āmulī, al-Shaykh Muhammad Taqī. Durar al-Fawā’id. (Qum:

Ismā‛iliyān Publications), 124.

 26
2. The quiddity (al-māhiyya) of
knowledge; as every finite being has an exist-
ence and a quiddity, being a finite entity,
knowledge has these two things.
3. The mental quiddity (al-māhiyya
al-dhehniyya) of the “known,” that is, the quid-
dity of the object of knowledge that is in the
mind.
4. The mental existence (al-wujūd
al-dhehnī)1 of the “known”, that is, the exist-
ence of quiddity of the “known” (al-ma‛lūm)
that is in the mind and cannot produce any ef-
fect.
5. The external quiddity
(al-māhiyya al-khārijiyya) of the known, that is,
the quiddity of the object of knowledge that ex-
ists in the external world. When looking at this
external quiddity or essence, regardless of its ex-
istence, the very same quiddity exists by the
mental mode of existence. However, it is possi-
ble that a concept lacks any extension and not be
instantiated in the external world.
6. The external existence (al-wujūd
al-khārijī) of the known quiddity or essence.
7. The existence of the knower, that
is, the agency who possesses knowledge.
8. The quiddity of the knower.

Four of these eight items are existential and the other four
are quidditative. Out of the four existential items, three
pertain to external existence and one to mental mode of

1 Mental Existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) existence is divided into two

kinds: external existence (al-wujūd al-khārijī), and mental existence.
The presence of a quiddity before the mind is its mental existence
In other words, just as quiddities exist in the external world, they
also exist, upon their conception, in the mind. *
 27
existence. Therefore, three out of the four quidditative
items have external existence; and one of them, the
quiddity of the known entity in the mind, has mental
existence.
There are a number of relationships of unity (wahda) and
otherness between these eight items. For instance, the
quiddity and existence of knowledge, which have an obvi-
ous conceptual difference, have real unity (wahda) qua
their external extension—that is, as explained in the discus-
sions of the principality of existence (asāla al-wujūd) and
respectivality of quiddity (e‛tebāriyya al-māhiyya)1, quiddi-
ty and existence are not two different things in the external
world; rather, just one thing exists externally from which
these two separate concepts are abstracted. Such a unity
(wahda) also exists between the knower and his quiddity,
and between the external existence of the known and its
quiddity.
In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known
(wahdat al-‛ālim wa al-ma‛lūm), a sort of unity (wahda)

1 Principality and Respectivality: Principality (al-asāla,) describes

something that has reality and external factuality and is real
irrespective of our perceptions. Respectivality (al-e‛tibāriyya), in its
ontological sense, is a reification or abstraction of the mind which
however devoid of any external reality, nonetheless corresponds to
factuality. An example in this regard would be to consider light
and shadow. Light is an ontological reality, it has existence and
factuality and is real even if we are not there to see it, whereas
shadow is the nonexistence of light and not a factuality on its own
right. The theory of principality of existence (asālat al-wujūd) and
respectivality of quiddity (e‛tebāriat al-māhiyya), as interpreted by the
author and the other students of the late ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī,
maintains that what has factuality in the external world is existence
and quiddities are mere reifications and abstractions of the mind,
which it attains from the limitations and boundaries (hudūd) of
finite beings, similar to how our minds discern the “existence” of
the hole by perceiving the limitations and boundaries of the
existence of a doughnut.*
 28
between the existence of the knower and knowledge
(wahda al-‛ālim wa al-‛ilm) is proved. Such a unity does
not exist between the quiddities of knowledge and the
knower, nor between the external or mental quiddity of the
known and the quiddity of the knower. Nor does it exist
between the external existences of the known and the
knower. The reason that some philosophers, such as Ibn
Sīnā in some of his books1, have rejected such unity, is
their failure to notice the axis of unity and have presumed
that the unity is suggested between quiddities of the knower
and the known.
In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known, it
also becomes clear that what is known directly and by
virtue of its essence is the existence of knowledge, which is
in unity with the existence of the knower; and the mental
quiddity is known indirectly. Therefore, the indirect
knowledge of the external entity is yet more indirect, since
the external entity is known by means of something that is
itself known indirectly.

Knowledge and Mental Existence

An important result of the analysis of knowledge is that it
magnifies the difference between knowledge and mental
existence and their attributes. Recognition of these
differences leads to the creation of two new chapters in
philosophy exclusively devoted to the inquiry of each one
of them.
When a notion is entertained, though the external extension
of this concept, if it has one, produces many effects, the
concept is devoid of these effects in the realm of conception
and knowledge. The concept, however, does produce
certain other effects, which cannot be produced by the
external existence to which it pertains. For instance, certain

1Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Commentary

by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. (Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981),
vol. 3, 292.
 29
concepts bring forth gaiety and laughter, and others evoke
sorrow, grief, and even death.
Imagine that a certain gathering learns that one of its
member’s possessions have been destroyed by fire.
Although the concept of fire in the people’s minds does not
bear the effects of external fire like heat and burning, it
does exert an external effect on everyone. For instance, the
unfortunate individual whose capital has been destroyed, is
disheartened, his jealous enemies rejoice, and other people
become alarmed and take measures to protect their own
properties against fire.
The agency that has exerted these effects on people and has
made them sad or happy is certainly not the external
existence of fire, because, first, it is possible that the news
is not true, and second, if it were the external existence of
fire that had influenced them, then other effects of external
fire like heat and burning should also be visible. Hence, it
is the existence of knowledge that has exerted these effects
over the people. And to put it more accurately, knowledge
is the quiddity that is coupled with that existence which has
exerted these effects.
Knowledge, similar to bravery, fear, and distress, is among
those notions whose external extensions (masādīq) come
into existence in man’s being as one of his attributes and
are accidents that characterize their subjects by themselves.
For instance, when someone bears the quality of bravery or
knowledge, he is designated as brave or knowledgeable.
Knowledge is, however, different from other attributes as it
represents external things.
The existence that is real within the soul and produces
numerous effects, like the ones just mentioned, is the
existence of knowledge, not the existence of the quiddity
that has become known and is present before the mind by
predication as essence (al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī).1 This

1 Predication as Essence and Predication as Extension: When a

predicate is ascribed to a certain subject—for instance, when St.
Anselm says, “That than which nothing greater can be conceived is
 30

that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” or it is stated,

“Zaid is a student”—there has to be an aspect of unity and an as-
pect of difference between the subject and the predicate. The as-
pect of unity is necessary because predication means “it-is-itness”
(hū-hūwiyya); and the aspect of difference is necessary because if the
subject and the predicate were exactly identical in every aspect, then
the proposition would be meaningless. In predication as essence
(al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī, literally meaning primary essential predica-
tion) the need for the aspect of unity is satisfied by the unity of
concepts, that is, the proposition conveys that the subject and
predicate have the same meaning; and the aspect of difference is
provided by our considerations. For instance, in the statement,
“That than which nothing greater can be conceived is that than
which nothing greater can be conceived,” it is evident that the
proposition states that the subject and the predicate have the same
meaning, and this is their aspect of unity; as for their aspect of dif-
ference, we assume a sort of difference between the subject and
the predicate. For instance, we may perceive the subject as not
fully known and the predicate as something that is known fully. In
this sort of predication, since the subject and the predicate have the
same meaning, if there is an external extension for them, they will
be instantiated in a single thing. This sort of predication is only
used when an essence is attributed to itself, such as “Animal is an-
imal.”
In predication as extension (al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī, litterally mean-
ing common technical predication), the axis of unity between the
subject and the predicate is their external extension; that is, if we
say “Zaid is a student” it means in the external world the two con-
cepts of “Zaid” and “student”—which are two different concepts,
unlike “that than which nothing greater can be conceived” and
“that than which nothing greater can be conceived” which are two
the very same notions—are instantiated in a single reality. In this
sort of predication, the subject and the predicate are two different
concepts. The most distinguishable feature of predication as ex-
tension is that its subject is always an extension (misdāq) of its pred-
icate.
 31
is because it produces the effects of knowledge, not the
effects of the known. The known is illustrated as well,
though not by its external existence, but rather by an
existence which is in the shadow (dhill) of the existence of
knowledge.
The shadowy existence (al-wujūd al-dhillī) of the known,
that is, its mental existence, is not the shadow of the
external existence of the known, since if it were so, it
would be impossible to entertain concepts or hold the truth
of propositions relating to things that are nonexistent in the
external world. The mental existence of concepts and
propositions is in the shadow of existence of knowledge.
Since mental existence is not independent of and horizontal
to the existence of knowledge and other external beings, the
quiddities or essences that exist by it do not produce the
effects of their external extensions (masādīq). In this weak

By introducing these two kinds of predication to philosophy, Sadr

al-Muta’allihīn added another condition of contradiction, making
them nine altogether. He proved that in order to contradict each
other, two propositions must also have an identical fashion of
predication.
Consider this example: Logicians say that a concept which refers to
more than one entity, like the concept of animal, is a universal
concept; and a comcept which does not apply to more than one
entity, like the concept of the specific grocery around the corner, is
a particular concept. On the other hand, because of the logical law
of identity that everything is necessarily itself, we know that
particular is particular; but at the same time we now that particular
is applicable to all particular concepts in the world and therefore is
universal. This invites a paradox, since how can particular be
particular and universal at the same time, that is, applicable to not
more than one and applicable to more than one. The answer to
this, and many other similar paradoxes, becomes clear by making
distinction between predication as essence and predication as
extension. Particular is particular, that is, applicable to not more
than one, by predication as essence. And particular is universal,
that is, applicable to more than one, by predication as extension. *
 32
presence under the auspices of its rapport with knowledge,
the quiddity is predicable to itself only as a notion and by
predication as essence, and should its relation with
knowledge cease to exist, even the predication as essence
will loose its veridicality.

Divisions of Knowledge
Dichotomy of knowledge into acquired knowledge (al-‛ilm
al-husūlī) and intuitive/presential knowledge (al-‛ilm
al-hudhūrī) is the result of certain secondary-order rational
analyses. In a further division, acquired knowledge is
divided into two kinds: concepts and judgments, both of
which are further divided into primary (al-‛ilm al--awwalī),
self-evident (al-‛ilm al-badīhī), and discursive (al-‛ilm
al-nadharī) classes.
Primary knowledge, whether a concept (tasawur) or a
judgment (tasdīq), is an epistemic unit that its
comprehension and understanding is inevitable and
necessary. That is, the human mind is compelled to know
primary cognitions and has no choice but to be aware
thereof. It should be noticed, however, that although the
mind is compelled to know primary matters, one is not
compelled to have faith and believe in them. Rather, as it
will be discussed in detail, everyone has a free will with
regard to having faith and believing in something he knows,
hence the possibility that at certain levels, faith and
knowledge separate from one another.

Knowledge, Faith, and Theoretical and Practical Rea-

sons
Faith (īmān) and knowledge are two distinct categories.
The former pertains to practical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī)
and the latter to theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī).
Practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) is the human being’s
decision-making dimension the object of which is his
actions, such as sincerity, devotion, love, and so forth.
Theoretical reason, with its various features of sensation
(al-ehsās), imagination (al-takhayul), estimation
(al-wahm), and ratiocination (al-ta‛aqul), is concerned with
 33
comprehension. Practical wisdom (al-hikma al-‛amaliyya)
is the inquiry of things that owe their existence to the
human being’s will. Conversely, theoretical wisdom (al-
hikma al-nadhariyya) studies things that exist regardless of
man’s conduct. It is worth mentioning that the scope of
theoretical reason’s inquiry is not restricted to the objects of
theoretical wisdom, and as mentioned by al-Fārābī,
practical wisdom is also its object of cognition.
Faith is a relation between a person and the object of his
knowledge, which comes into being through an act of
decision-making and thus, pertains to the practical reason
(al-‛aql al-‛amalī). One has to be reminded that this
relationship between soul and the object of its knowledge
should not be confused with the judgmental relationship
(al-nisba al-hukmiyya)1 of propositions that are expressed
by copulas. That is, if an epistemic unit is a proposition
that comprises a subject and predicate and a judgmental
relationship, the judgmental relationship pertains to the
theoretical reason (al-aql al-nadharī) and the human will is
not applicable to it.
Although in superior levels of existence—that is, in the
levels where knowledge and power have external identity—
practical and theoretical reasons are one as well, theoretical
and practical reasons are different and separate from one
another in the inferior levels of existence. By rational
differentiation between faith and knowledge in these levels,
there are four conceivable situations:
1. Knowledge with respect to a cer-
tain reality along with faith in it, as in the case of a
learned faithful.
2. Knowledge with respect to a cer-
tain reality without having faith in it, as in the case
of a learned infidel.

1 Al-Nisba al-hukmiyya is the relationship of a proposition’s subject

with its predicate and is commonly expressed in English by copulas
like is and are. *
 34
3. Faith in something that it is not
known and a false concept or proposition is held
about it, as in the case of an unreasoning pious—
because he has faith in something that he does not
positively know and merely has a conjecture about
it.
4. Absence of both faith and
knowledge with respect to a certain reality, as in the
case of an unreasoning infidel.

Self-evident and Primary Cognitions

Given the fact that the ignorance of theoretical reason (al-
‛aql al-nadharī) with respect to objects of primary
knowledge (al-‛ilm al-awwalī) is inconceivable, primary
knowledge cannot be found in the last two of the above
suppositions, where only it is the practical reason (al-‛aql
al-‛amalī) that may accept and have faith, or reject a certain
idea.
A primary concept (al-tasawwur al-badīhī) has a number of
qualities. It is clear and indubitable. It cannot be defined;
and if one is inattentive to its meaning, his attention can be
drawn towards it. It would be like a situation in which an
individual has something in his hand or is standing before
an ocean, yet is inattentive to it. In such a situation, his
attention is drawn by pointing out to what he already
knows.
Drawing one’s attention (tanbīh) does not call forth new
cognition that has been previously unknown. Rather, it
causes something to be noticed that is already known but
out of one’s attention. The concepts of existence, reality,
thing, nonexistence, and the like are primary concepts that
are intuitively known by all; and if someone does not know
them, in fact, he is inattentive towards the fact that he
knows them.
A primary proposition (al-qadhiyya al-badihiyya) is
necessarily true and the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī) cannot not know it. It is indubitable; and if it is
supposed that someone doubts it—which is an
 35
inconceivable supposition—then its veracity would be
indemonstrable.
The most prominent quality of primary knowledge can be
illuminated by its comparison with self-evident knowledge
(al-‛ilm al-badihī). Comprehension of self-evident facts
does not require any definition or proof, nevertheless, if
doubted, they can be defined and proved. Self-evidence
(badāha) of these facts is indebted to the mind’s affinity
with their essential parts1 and the premises that entail them.
An example of such knowledge is “the propositions whose
syllogisms are with them” (al-qadhāyā allatī qiasātohā
ma‛ahā). That is, the middle terms of their syllogisms are
self-evident and axiomatic properties of their major and
minor terms and are discerned so swiftly that there is no
need to put them in a syllogistic form.

Necessary Truth of Primary Propositions

Comprehension of necessity of truth or veridicality
(dharūra al-sidq) of primary knowledge is the work of
theoretical reason. This necessity of veridicality indicates
the relationship of the subject and the predicate, which is
expressed by a proposition’s copula. It must be stressed
that the difference of such necessity and certitude from
psychological necessity and certitude, which are the
attributes of the knower and are as opposed to doubt and
conjecture, must not be overlooked.
The necessity, which the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī) discerns in primary propositions (al-qadhāyā al-
awwaliyya), is cognitive necessity (al-dharūra al-‛ilmiyya).
It reflects the necessity of a predicate’s predication to its
subject in a way that one cannot find a way not to know it.
This necessity is not the necessity, which indicates the mo-

1 Essential Part (al-dhātī) is something, which is included in an

essence or quiddity as its part, like a genus or a differentia. For
instance, if man’s essence or quiddyt were “the rational animal”,
then rational (differentia) and animal (genus) are his essential parts
that together constitute his essence or quiddity. *
 36
dality (jiha) of a proposition. Being in contrast to possibil-
ity (imkān) and impossibility (imtenā‛), the latter necessity
indicates the modality of a given proposition’s copula,
whereas the former only conveys definiteness of the verity
of a proposition and reflects the connection of the subject
with the predicate without any suggestion with respect to its
modality of possibility, impossibility, or necessity.
In the case of primary propositions (al-qadhāyā al-
awwaliyya), such as the necessarily veridical principle of
non-contradiction (mabda’ ‛adam al-tanāqudh), the mind
cannot find a way to reject or express their falsehood, and if
so should be desired, every step taken for this objective will
presuppose the veridicality of the proposition, which is in-
tended to be invalidated. On the other hand, they are inde-
monstrable; that is, if someone were ignorant of them—
which is an impossible supposition—it would be impossi-
ble to prove their validity.

Difference between Epistemic Certitude and Psycholog-

ical Certitude
The above analysis and definition of primary knowledge—
which in fact calls attention to its manifest and necessary
truth—roots out many criticisms, which are perceivable in
this regard. Since this analysis, as projected by Islamic
philosophers, is not based on the psychological persuasion
and certitude of an individual or group, which are
commonly influenced by various social predilections and
cultural biases. As on one hand, it cannot be criticized on
the basis of absence of common grounds of rationality
shared by every individual and nation, on the other. It also
sidesteps the objection, which denies the rapport between
certainty about something and the truth thereof; namely, the
criticism, which questions whether universal consensus of
all human beings or the psychological certitude of one
person is adequate for the verity of a given proposition.
In social or individual convictions, conviction, as a
psychological attribute of a society or individual, can
evolve as a result of various psychological factors. But in
 37
the appraisal of theoretical reason, until a conviction or
belief is not coupled with necessity of verity, which is the
condition of every cognitive certitude, it is devoid of
epistemic respectability and as something, which is not
definitely known, can be at different levels of doubt and
conjecture, depending on its acceptability.
One need be reminded that not all propositions that are
necessarily true are considered primary propositions (al-
qadhāyā al-awwaliyya). Primary propositions are axioms
whose necessary truth becomes manifest by the mere con-
ception of their subjects and predicates; invalidation thereof
presupposes their validity; and if not known, are indemon-
strable.
Other propositions the necessary truth (dharūra al-sidq) of
which is acknowledged by the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī), yet their truth is inferential, are of two kinds. If
its middle term is manifest that it does not need to be
searched for, and arranged in a syllogism, the proposition is
a self-evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya);
otherwise, it is a discursive proposition (al-qadhiyya al-
nadhariyya).
In discursive propositions (al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya), a
cognitive journey has to be cruised from the conception of
their subjects and predicates and the discernment to their
necessity of veridicality. This journeyed distance is such
that it cannot be bridged by psychological persuasions. In
self-evident propositions (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya),
although there is no such actual gap between the two, yet it
can be conceived. In primary propositions (al-qadhāyā al-
awwaliyya), however, because a proposition that would
reflect the presence of such a distance cannot be thought of
or expressed without presupposing their very truth, a
distance as such is not even supposable. Therefore, the
separation of conceptual knowledge of primary
propositions (al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) and epistemic
certitude about their truth is not conceivable, which if
possible, it would have been justified to inquire how does
 38
their conceptual knowledge entail epistemic certitude about
them.
Although with regard to self-evident propositions (al-
qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) the named inquiry—how does their
conceptual knowledge (al-‛ilm al-tasawwurī) entail
epistemic certitude (al-yaqīn al-‛ilmi) about them—is
useless, it can be conducted. Nevertheless, as far as
discursive propositions (al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) are
concerned, this is a serious inquiry and if not adequately
answered, the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī) will
consider the given belief and conviction a figment of
fantasy and an artifact of illusion. Faith with respect to
propositions about which this inquiry has not been rendered
is solely the work of practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) and,
like the faith of the unreasoning pious, does not proceed
from rationally acceptable premises.
Often such practical and epistemic propensities—which are
strengthened by daily habits and social preferences and
changed into character traits—are confused with epistemic
certitude. However, characteristics of the theoretical reason
(al-‛aql al-nadharī) and the many differences between
psychological belief and epistemic certitude can avert this
confusion.

Epistemic Certitude, Probability, and Social Conven-

tions
Theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī) credits cognitive
worth to a knowledge that is marked by epistemic certitude
and necessity of veridicality. A proposition’s necessity of
veridicality (dharūra al-sidq) is not clear, it is evidently not
known. Other conceivable states such as doubt and
conjecture are not attributes of the proposition, or its
subject and predicate and the relationship between the two.
Rather, these are the attributes of the mind that does not
know the truth of the proposition. These states, as
instanced by the Noble Qur’ān “And surmise availeth not
 39
1
the truth at all” do not bear any epistemic worth with
regard to knowing the reality. Rather, because a
considerable portion of the human being’s activities is
undertaken in proportion to the likeliness or importance of
certain events, their only benefit is their practical use.
Likeliness or probability of an event does not, however,
open a window to reality. It narrates the ratio of practicality
of an idea entertained in the mind. Likewise, the
importance of an event does not bring forth knowledge of
the external world, since such importance is not caused by
the external reality, and is influenced by the vitality of a
certain event for an individual.
In the human being’s day-to-day activities, the practical
reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) usually pays heed to things that
have high probability and things that have great importance,
even though they may not have high probability. Similarly,
much of social conducts is based on socially popular
conventions. However, high probability or importance of
an event and social conventions do not disclose external
reality.
Probability does not determine a proposition’s truth or
falsehood, that is, whether it corresponds with reality. A
true proposition with regard to what it is true, and from the
aspect of its truth, is always true; and a false statement with
regard to what it is false, and from the aspect of its
falsehood, is always false. Probability is involved when a
given proposition’s truthful reflection of an event is not
known, and then with consideration to other instances
where truths or falsehood of the propositions are known,
the probability of the given proposition is computed. By
this measure, the unknown instance, is, for practical
purposes, assumed of the more likely instances.
An event’s probability in the future is not really an attribute
of the event or of its proposition, and in fact, it is a
presumption made through consideration of similar
situations and the truth of their propositions. By

1 53: 28
 40
computation and analogy of these propositions, a new
presumption based on the more occurring instances is
ascribed to the event at hand; and it is in that realm of
presumption that the event is characterized with probability.
Notice this reification (e‛tebār), which is created by the
practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) and is paid heed to for
its practical utility, is different from philosophical
abstractions and secondary intelligibles (al-ma‛qūlāt
al-thāniyya) which are true and the theoretical reason (al-
‛aql al-nadharī) is constrained to to abstract.
The abstraction of first probabilities may pertain to mental
concepts. Propositions have certain relations with one
another that are formed in the mind by their comparison.
For instance, when someone reports the presence of one
white marble in a sack that has five marbles of which three
are white, his statement is valid about the three white
marbles and false about the other two. It follows that if this
statements is made about every marble in the sack, the ratio
of valid to false statements will be three to five, which is a
veridical ratio inferred from the comparison of the three
true to the total five statements. The practical reason (al-
‛aql al-‛amalī), however, attributes this ratio of truth to any
proposition, which describes the color of one of the marbles
and the truth or inaccuracy thereof is not known. It also
relates this ratio to the whiteness of every marble in the
sack. To the contrary, however, any proposition with
respect to reality it is narrating is either true or false, and a
third situation between the two is inconceivable. Likewise,
external whiteness cannot be predicated to its subject but
necessarily and likeliness so forth cannot justify ascription
of an attribute to a subject.
In reality, the 3/5 ratio, which has been drawn from our
bigger picture of the exemplary set has no real and external
relationship with the color of a particular marble. It merely
reflects the extent of justifiability of an individual’s
expectation and hope for the validity of a statement the
truth of which he does not know and how should he
conform his conduct with regard to his expectations.
 41
Foundation of Discursive Propositions on Primary and
Self-Evident Propositions
With regard to their representation of reality, primary
propositions (al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya) are marked with
necessity of veridicality, which is not a hypostatization
(e‛tebār) of the practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī). Rather,
it is a factual necessity and in conformity with reality which
the mind, after conceiving the subject and predicate of a
given primary proposition, is compelled to acknowledge.
Although the necessity of veridicality of self-evident
propositions (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) is manifest like that
of primary propositions, as indicated earlier, it is possible to
doubt or prove them.
The validity of discursive propositions (al-qadhāyā al-
nadhariyya) is neither primary nor self-evident. These
propositions are attained through syllogistic arrangement of
self-evident premises and, more precisely speaking, primary
premises. Similarly, when the validity of non-primary self-
evident propositions (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) is
questioned, they can be reduced to primary propositions.
The reduction of non-primary propositions to primary
propositions requires two elements: formal (sūrī) and
material (māddī).

Primariness of the First Figure

The formal element is the arrangement of premises into a
syllogistic order, which represents the direction of
deduction of discursive propositions (al-qadhāyā al-
nadhariyya) from self-evident (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya)
and primary propositions (al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya). The
material element is the content of the premises from which
the conclusion is derived.
Argumentation (istedlāl) has three forms, since the
relationship of an argument’s conclusion with its
premises—because of which it is possible to trace the
unknown conclusion from premises that are known—is of
three kinds:
 42
 The conclusion comprises
a particular subject that is included in a uni-
versal premise. Such an argument, where a
particular is inferred from a universal, is
called syllogism (qiyās).
 The conclusion comprises
a universal subject and is inferred from par-
ticular premises. Such an argument, where
particular examples lead to a general conclu-
sion, is called induction (istiqrā’).
 The conclusion and the
premises all have particular subjects; and
since they have some sort of similarity, it is
argued that they are identical in other aspects
as well. Such an argument is called analogy
(tamthīl).

Analogy and induction cannot provide grounds for a

necessary conclusion, and thus, cannot yield to cognitive
certitude. They can produce definite conclusions only
when, with the assistance of some premises, are rearranged
into a syllogism. In other words, those analogies and
inductions lead to definite conclusions that the mind is
aware of their syllogistic forms.
Syllogism (qiyās) is of two kinds: categorical (iqtirāni) and
disjunctive (istethnā’ī). Disjunctive syllogisms are
convertible into categorical syllogisms. There are four
figures of categorical syllogisms, the conclusiveness of first
of which is primary (awwalī) and the other three are
convertible to the first figure.
The first figure is a form of argument conclusiveness of
which is primary (awwalī) and the proposition, which
recounts its conclusiveness, as it will be explained later, is
an axiomatic proposition, which on its own right, if not
primary (awwalī), is reducible to a primary proposition.
 43
The Principle of Non-Contradiction
If the premises from which discursive conclusions are
derived are not primary (awwalī), they can be reduced to
primary propositions. The primary proposition, which all
self-evident propositions (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya) and
discursive propositions (al-qadhāyā al-nadhariyya) are
eventually reduced to, is the principle of non-contradiction.
Primariness (awwaliyya) and self-evidence (badāhya) are
attributes that can mark propositions as well as concepts.
Concepts involved in a primary proposition can be primary
(awwalī), self-evident (badīhī), or discursive (nadharī).
Similarly, primary and self-evident notions may constitute
primary, self-evident, or discursive propositions.
For instance, a contingent’s need to external causal efficacy
is a self-evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya). Its
complexity, however, owes to some concepts involved
therein. If the meaning of contingency (imkān)—which is
the negation of necessity of existence and nonexistence and
equidistance (tasāwī al-nisba) towards both—and the
notion of preponderance without a preponderant factor
(tarjīh bilā murajjeh) is comprehended, the need of a
contingent being (mumkin al-wujūd) to an external cause
would take no time to be acknowledged.
The impossibility of conjunction and negation of
contradictories (istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-naqīdhain) is a
primary proposition. The Mu‛tazilite mutakellimūn who
have advanced the notion of “hāl”1, have not questioned the
impossibility of conjunction of contradictories (ijtemā‛
al-naqīdhain); rather they have questioned whether the
notions of existence and nonexistence are contradictories
(naqīdhain). However, being a discursive matter, this can
be explained by referring to self-evident and primary
concepts.

1 Hāl Some mutakallimūn believed that certain things could be in the

state of hāl, a state of neutrality between existence and
nonexistence. At that state, they maintained, something was
neither existent, nor nonexistent. *
 44
The principle of non-contradiction (mabda’ ‛adam
al-tanāqudh)1 is not only self-evident but primary; and
other propositions and cognitive principles—even the law
of identity (asl al-hū-hūwiyya)—owe their necessity of
truth to this principle.
The law of identity (asl al-hū-hūwiyya) asserts the necessity
of an entity’s being itself. If conjunction of contradictories
were possible, a thing, while it is necessarily itself, would
be subject to negation from itself and necessity and non-
necessity will be suggested in a single instance.
The evidence that substantiates the primariness
(awwaliyya) of the principle of non-contradiction is that it
is indubitable, and every effort towards expression of doubt
or denial with respect to it, presupposes its truth. If
conjunction of contradictories were possible, the existence
and nonexistence of skepticism (shakkākiyya) and the
skeptic (shakkāk) would be equal. In this case, skepticism
and the skeptic cannot be definitely said they exist, because
it cannot be ruled out there may be a conjunction of doubt
and non-doubt and skeptic and non-skeptic. Hence, what
the skeptic is claiming about the falsity of principle of non-
contradiction may coexist with its exact contradictory
statement. Thus, it is impossible to utter the falsity of the
principle of non-contradiction.
Just as when some one opens his eyes, the first thing he
sees is light, and he sees other things in its illumination,
primary and self-evident concepts and propositions are the
first things that the human being discerns when he enters
the realm of perception and knowledge. Among the
propositions that the mind cannot not know and under
whose auspices other self-evident and definite propositions
are discerned, is the principle of non-contradiction.

1 Naqīdhain, translated as contradictories, are two notions each one

of which is the negation of the other, like human and non-human,
stone and non-stone, and so forth. Ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain is the
impossible suggestion where two contradictories are instantiated in
one being, as one object be both human and non-human. *
 45
In the eighth section of the first essay of Al-Ilāhiyāt min
Kitāb al-Shifā’, Ibn Sīnā, God have mercy on him, explains
that the impossibility of negation of contradictories (irtefā‛
al-naqīdhain) is also reducible to the impossibility of
conjunction of contradictories (istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-
naqīdhain).1 That is, the impossibility of negation of
contradictories is self-evident, however, if doubted, it can
be proved by reliance on the impossibility of conjunction of
contradictories. Because, if A and non-A are
contradictories, and both are negated; with the negation of
A, non-A will be true, and due to negation of non-A, A will
be true. Consequently, because of the negation of non-A
and A the conjunction of A and non-A, which is the
conjunction of contradictories, is implied.
As in the arguments for discursive or even non-primary
self-evident propositions (al-qadhāyā al-badīhiyya), the
eventual recourse is the first figure (al-shakl al-awwal), in
the series of contents or materials of propositions (mawwād
al-qadhāyā), the arguments which lead to discursive and
non-primary self-evident propositions are finally reduced to
the principle of non-contradiction.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Validity of

the First Figure
As far as their content (mawādd) is concerned, propositions
are reducible to ones that are more axiomatic. Such
transfers from discursive to more axiomatic propositions
take place in figures that are convertible to the first figure.
However, figures cannot be reduced to content; and
therefore, the validity of the first figure is primary (awwalī).
However, a statement, which recounts its validity, is a self-
evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-badīhiyya) that can be
reduced to the principle of non-contradiction (mabda’
‛adam al-tanāqudh), which is primary (awwalī). Likewise,

1 Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ilāhiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā’. Introduc-
tion by Dr. Ibrahim Madhkur. (Qum: Āyatullah Mar‛ashī Library
Publications, 1994), 53.
 46
should the credibility of a proposition, which is the
conclusion of a first-figure syllogism be questioned, it can
be restored by taking recourse to the impossibility of
conjunction of contradictories.
The first figure can be illustrated as follows:

A is B.
B is C.
Therefore, A is C.

The conclusiveness of this conclusion and the validity of

the first figure can be proved as follows: If A is not C, then
it must be non-C. And because according to the minor
premise A is B, B is, therefore, non-C. But according to the
major premise, B is C; and “B is C”, is contradictory to “B
is non-C.”
This argument proves the validity of the first figure and the
verity of a conclusion derived thereby. But if this argument
is used to prove the validity of the first figure, in addition to
the problem of impossibility of reduction of figure to
material, it will also be open to the objection that the
argument itself is a first-figure syllogism, or in a figure,
which is reducible to it. Therefore, proving the validity of
the first figure by an argument as such would amount to
begging the question and serve no purpose other than
drawing attention to what is already known (tanbīh).

The Principle of Non-Contradiction and Multiplicity of

Definite Propositions
An interrogatory that has been addressed by our teacher,
‛Allamah Tabātabā’ī, is that if the chain of contents or
materials is reducible to only one necessarily true
proposition, namely the principle of non-contradiction, then
the necessity of veridicality (dharūra al-sidq) of other self-
evident and discursive propositions would be
indemonstrable. This is because every deduction, in
addition to self-evidence or primariness of the validity of its
figure, requires two premises, upon which rests the truth of
 47
the conclusion. It follows that if one premise is definitely
known to be true and the other is not, the conclusion will
not be definitely known to be true. Therefore, in order to
reach a definite conclusion, more than one definitely true
premise is required.
The answer to this interrogatory is that the principle of non-
contradiction is not a categorical proposition (al-qadhiyya
al-hamliyya), but rather, an exclusive disjunctive
proposition (al-munfasila al-haqīqiyya), and other
propositions discerned through sensation or other means—
which have self-evident forms but are not definitely known,
because definiteness is certitude about the affirmation of a
predicate for its subject and the impossibility of its negation
from the subject—can be given necessity of veridicality by
transference to this principle. For instance, a syllogism
about knowledge, whose existence is intuitively known, can
be outlined as follows:

Knowledge exists.
Anything either exists or it does not
exist.
Therefore, knowledge definitely ex-
ists.

By incorporation of principle of non-contradiction, other

statements that are devoid of necessity of veridicality
(dharūra al-sidq) and are not parallel to the principle of
non-contradiction can be ascertained. For instance, if it is
sensually proved that a leaf is green, or it is seen as green, it
can be argued that because conjunction of two
contradictories is impossible, the greenery of the leaf or its
being seen as green is definitely true and its opposite is
definitely false.
The principle of non-contradiction provides four things that
are critically importance in the attainment of cognitive
certitude:
 48
1. Certitude about affirmation of the
predicate for the subject.
2. Certitude about the impossibility
of negation of the predicate from the subject.
3. Perpetuity of the fist certitude.
4. Perpetuity of the second certi-
tude.

Thus, the principle of non-contradiction (mabda’ ‛adam

al-tanāqudh) brings new cognitions—which are either
sensually discerned or abstracted and predicated by the
consideration of the essences of the various subjects—into
the realm of definite cognitions, and enriches the treasure of
man’s knowledge. Thus, the paradox, which may be
conceived about the proliferation of definite cognitions, is
answered.

The Principle of Non-Contradiction in the Traditions

Al-Kulainī and al-Sadūq narrate from Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq,
Divine blessings be with him, that after proving the
existence of Almighty God, the Imam said, “There is no
distance between affirmation and negation.” This statement
reflects the impossibility of negation of contradictories
(istehāla irtefā’ al-naqīdhain).1
In his Al-Tawhīd, Al-Shaykh al-Sadūq narrates a
conversation between Imam al-Redhā, peace be with him,
and Sulayman al-Marwazī, a mutakellim from Khurāsān
regarding the hudūth2 and eternity of the Divine Will

1 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 246.
2 Literally meaning generation, hudūth in philosphy means the

generation of something, which is temporally preceded by

nonexistence, that is, the generation of something which previously
did not exist. Islamic philosophers deny that the natural world is
marked by hudūth, and claim that it is eternal and the suggestion
that there has been a time that the natural world did not exist is
 49
(al-Irāda). In this tradition, the Imam explains the
corollaries of both hudūth and eternity of the Divine Will
and says, “Choose one of the two paths, surely if a thing is
not eternal, it is hādith1; and if it is not hādith, it is
eternal.”2
The Imam, peace be with him, says further, “Don’t you
know that something that has always been cannot be hādith
and eternal at the same time?”3 That is, a hādith is
temporally preceded by nonexistence, and an eternal entity
is not preceded by nonexistence, and the instantiation of
both amounts to conjunction of contradictories (ijtemā‛ al-
naqīdhain).

Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr’s Criticism of the Use of Syl-

logism
A critic of Ibn Sīnā and one known for his disapproval of
acquired knowledge (al-‛ilm al-husūlī), Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-
Khayr questions the validity of the syllogistic method. He
considers the first figure, which substantiates all other
figures of syllogism, incapable of conveying certitude. For
instance, according to him, in the syllogism

Socrates is a human being.

Every human being is mortal.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

the major premise of the syllogism is a universal proposi-

tion (al-qadhiyya al-kulliyya) that relates the mortality of
all human beings including Socrates. Therefore, in order to
know Socrates’ mortality, it is sufficient to know the major
and there is no need to constitute a syllogism. Because if

self-contradictory, since the existence of time presupposes the

existence of the natural world. *
1 Hādith something that is marked by hudūth, that is, it did not exist,

and then it was given existence. *

2 ibid. 450.
3 ibid. 455.
 50
Socrates’ mortality is not known, then the claim of knowing
the major is not justified. Thus, according to him, the first
figure, similar to “begging the question,” is a fallacy.
The answer to this paradox is that the critic does not have a
correct understanding of universal propositions, or he is
inattentive towards them. Universal propositions are not
acquired by inductive or empirical methods, so they would
be ensembles of particular and individual (juz’ie)
propositions.
Propositions such as “Every whole is bigger than its part”
and “No nonexistent is existent,” are not attained by
experiment or induction, in which case their validity would
be subject to correction through discovery of new wholes,
new experiments, and instances of exception or
falsification. If universal propositions were obtained by
experiment and induction, they can be necessary only in
instances where all of their particulars are observed and
enumerated. In such a supposition, obviously, the universal
proposition is known through its particulars, including the
subject of its minor premise; and therefore, a syllogism
comprising a universal proposition as such is evidently
begging the question.
Universal propositions reflect the necessary relationships
between their subjects and predicates. Necessary
relationships between subjects and predicates are not
restricted to instances where an essential part (juz’ al-dhāt)
of a subject is predicated thereto. If it were the case,
cognitive necessity would be restricted to tautological
propositions. Rather, necessity is found in other
propositions as well, including propositions in which the
predicate is an essential property (al-‛aradh al-dhātī)1 of the
subject and is abstracted from, and predicated to, the

1 Essential Property (al-‛aradh al-dhātī) A quality which is not

included in an essence, nevertheless, is not separable from it either.
For instance, evenness is not included in the quiddity of the
cardinal number four, yet it never separates from it. *
 51
essence of the subject. This fact has been pointed out by
the Divine sage al-Sabzawārī:

A predicate abstracted from the

essence of the subject
Differs from a predicate which is an
external associate1

The predication of a subject’s essential property (al-‛aradh

al-dhātī) to that subject—such as the predication of
contingency to quiddity (al-māhiyya) —as opposed to the
predication of its essential part, bears new information.
Since this new universal information, which is exclusive to
its subject and predicate, has not been attained by inductive
or experimental means, and rather is self-evident (badīhī),
primary (awwalī), or reducible to self-evident and primary
propositions, it is not incompatible with inattentiveness or
ignorance with respect to its particulars. If the particular
(juz’ī) of a certain universal is identified by sensory means
(ehsās), or one of its subsets is discovered through
deduction, by incorporating this new information along
with that universal major premise, the cognition of a new
fact regarding that particular or subset is attained.
For instance, when we attain the universal knowledge
(al-‛ilm al-kullī) that every human being is mortal, given the
universality of this knowledge, is other than our knowledge
of a particular individual’s mortality. Therefore, if we
identify a particular entity as a human being, by
constructing a syllogism, we can infer his mortality.
In universal propositions, if the judgment is about the
essence (dhāt) of a subject, like “A whole is bigger than its
part,” the proposition is described as a quantified universal
proposition (al-mahsūra al-kulliyya). If the quantified
universal proposition is procured by means of experiment
and induction, it is similar to a reservoir, which is filled by

1Al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mulla Hādī. Sharh al-Mandhūma. (Qum:

Maktabat al-Mustafawī), the section on logic, 30.
 52
pumping water into it. Nevertheless, if the predicate is an
essential property (al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of the subject, which
is universally proved for it by demonstration, the
proposition is similar to a spring that gushes from within
and illustrates its truth to everyone who observes its
deduction.

Intuitive Knowledge and its Categories

Acquired knowledge pertains to notions and quiddities that
have mental existence. They begin at primary (awwalī) and
self-evident (badīhī) concepts and propositions and
eventuate at discursive (nadharī) cognitions. The mental
existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) of quiddities and essences
depends upon the existence of knowledge. The external
existence of knowledge, which bears the essence or
quiddity of knowledge, is in union with the knower’s
existence without the mediation of any concept. This unity
of the knowledge and the knower (wahda al-‛ālim wa al-
ma‛lūm), which is prior to the generation of concepts, is
associated with a sort of awareness called intuitive or
presential knowledge (al-‛ilm al-shuhūdī or al-‛ilm
al-hudhūrī).
Acquired knowledge (al-‛ilm al-husūlī) applies only to
things that appear as notions and quiddities. It cannot reach
realities that are beyond the horizon of notional
manifestations and are sheer external reality. In these
instances, only after such realities have been intuitively
witnessed, is it that certain notions that reflect them
emerge. The task of these notions is to reflect and indicate
things that have been intuitively discerned, and for this
reason, they are useless for someone who is not familiar
with shuhūd.
Of the things the human being is intuitively aware of is the
existence of the basic reality, the existence of himself, and
the existence of his knowledge. Notions that represent
these realities are primary notions.
Like acquired knowledge, which is divided into primary
(awwalī), self-evident (badihī), and discursive (nadharī)
 53
knowledge, intuitive knowledge is also divided into three
kinds: primary, self-evident, and complex.
An intuitive knowledge is primary (awwalī) if it cannot be
denied or doubted and one cannot be inattentive towards it.
Self-evident and complex intuitive knowledge are reducible
to primary intuitive knowledge. Like discursive acquired
knowledge, which is brought about by cogitation and
demonstrative efforts, complex intuitive knowledge is
acquired by purification of the soul and its emancipation
from the vices of conceit.
If inspired by the verse, “Nay! Would that ye knew it with
the knowledge of certitude, ye shall surely see the Hell,”1
should it be desired to acquire shuhūdi knowledge
respecting realities like Paradise and Hell, to reach at least
the level of individuals like Hāritha ibn Mālik—who
declared, “It is as if I am looking at the Throne (‛Arsh) of
my Lord”2—becoming a speaking witness of the Throne of
the Benevolent God, one must purify himself for long time.
Primary (awwalī) and self-evident (badihī) intuitive
knowledge (al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī) reflect all-inclusive
realities, so inclusive that the mind cannot but know them.
The notions abstracted from these realities have
universality (kulliyya), immutability (thabāt), and
continuity (dawām), and are primary or self-evident.
Complex intuitive knowledge pertains to finite (mahdūd)
and particular (juz’ī) realities, and the notions prescinded
from them are disclosed to the conceptual format by
reliance on realities that encompass these finite and
particular realities.
If by ascending up the rungs of sincerity, the wayfarer of
the shuhūdi journey succeeds in acquiring vision of
universal realities (al-haqā’iq al-kulliyya) and gaining
companionship of the Absolute Real (al-Haq al-Mutlaq),
he is protected against Satanic ambushes and interference.

1102: 5–6
2Al-Kulainī, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ya’qūb. Al-Usūl min al-
Kāfī. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islamiya, 1987), vol. 2, 54.
 54
That is because Satan cannot fly beyond the heavens of
imagination and estimation and is chased away when he
makes the intention of entering and hearing what is above
that ceiling. “But any listening now findeth a flaming dart
in wait for him.”1
Individuals who succeed in reaching this zenith on the
merit of their sincerity are safe from the mischief of doubt
(shak) and skepticism (shakkākiyya) in their shuhūd; and in
their journey, they are “the straight path (al-sirāt
al-mustaqīm) ” and “the criteria of equity (mawāzīn
al-qist).”
Such immunity to doubt and skepticism is indebted to the
fact that doubt is involved when a certain thing is one
among several items. For example, if a shelf has a number
of books and one of them is intended from a distance, this
situation is an instance where distinguishing the intended
book from the rest of the books may involve doubt.
Nonetheless, intellectual realities (al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya),
and chief among them the Absolute Real (al-Haq al-
Mutlaq), are infinite realities that are beyond numerablity.
If reached, they can never be subject to doubt and
skepticism. Likewise, if someone is enjoying universal
shuhūd in relation to the realities of the mundus imaginalis2
under the auspices of universal shuhūds, he is also secure
and immune to doubt and skepticism.
However, individuals in the rudimentary stages of
wayfaring are similar to people who, in the realm of
acquired knowledge, are gazing at the heavens and are
engrossed in the observation of the cosmos. Obviously,
external celestial bodies are known to them indirectly, and
should they suffer from weak vision, they will face doubt
and skepticism in their observation. In order to ascertain
the content of their observation, they will have to rely on
someone who has good eyesight.

1 72: 9
2 The world of imagination (‛ālam al-khiyāl, or al-‛ālam al-barzakh, or
‘ālam al-mithāl). *
 55
Someone who experiences a deranged shuhūd in the course
of wayfaring, first, his shuhūd lacks the certitude which is
the hallmark of the vision of intellectual realities (al-
haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya), and second, he is compelled to
evaluate his mystical experiences with “the criteria of
equity.” This evaluation sometimes takes place in a
mystical experience as a shuhūd, and occasionally it is
rendered by transferring the content of a certain shuhūd into
the notional format and rational assessment thereof.
A statement is considered trustworthy in rational
assessment, which has an unequivocal content and has been
narrated by a reliable chain of narrators from the Infallible
(Ma‛sūmīn) sources of mystical cognition. However, if a
tradition lacks anyone of these elements—that is, its
content is not unequivocal and clear, or it lacks the reliable
chain of narrators, or its source cannot be ascertained to be
an Infallible entity—it cannot serve as a criterion of
evaluation.
The shuhūdi evaluation of a deranged mystical discovery is
like an instance where a question rises in an
exemplification (tamāthul) in the mundus imaginalis (‛ālam
al-khiyāl), and in the same intermediate realm, in a state
similar to dream and fantasia, the wayfarer hesitates and
asks a guide who has attained that perception. The guide,
during the same mystical experience, manifests and reveals
the perplexing matter in such a way that there does not
remain any chance for doubts. Notional evaluation is
involved when the mystical experience has ended and some
of its notions have stayed in the mind; and then those
notions are evaluated by the criteria of reason, Qur’ānic
verses, and traditions narrated from the most benevolent
Prophet and the Infallible Imams—may the greetings of
Allah be unto them.

Soul and the Intuitive Knowledge thereof

Everyone’s awareness with respect to his soul is by
intuitive knowledge (al-‛ilm al-hudhūrī), because soul is
not a notion or quiddity in which case it would exist
 56
through the mental mode of existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī)
and would be known through the conceptual framework of
knowledge. What a notion can do is to indicate the soul;
and as far as quiddity is concerned, it is something that
finds reality subordinately to the existence of the individual
and is placed before comprehension and acquired
knowledge by the mediation of the mind. Like notions, it
has a secondary and indirect indication of what it is
associated or united with.
Individuals like René Descartes, who have failed this fine
point, have presumed they trace their reality from their
effects. After asserting skepticism (shakkākiyya) towards
everything, Descartes locates his self as the first reality by
using doubt as the middle term of his argument. To prove
the existence of one’s soul by using doubt and thoughts as
middle terms, in addition to placing the soul among things
that exist by mental existence and are found in the mind,
undermines the primariness (awwaliyya) of its knowledge
as well.
Ibn Sīnā, in the third chapter of Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt,
and in the Psychology of Al-Shifā’, and then Sadr al-
Muta’allihīn1 in the discussions psychology in Al-Asfār,
stress the fact that regardless of his mental or external,

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahīm Sadr al-Dīn; (980 AH/1572

CE–1050 AH/1640 CE) also known as Sadr al-Muta’Allihīn (Chief
of the theist sages) and Mulla Sadrā. Among Islamic theosophers
and ‛urafā, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn is unparalleled in many aspects.
With authoritative familiarity with kalām, Peripatetic and
Illuminationist hikmas, the works of gnostics, the Noble Qur’an,
and the narrations of the holy Imams, he was able to found the
philosophical school of Transcendent Wisdom (al-Hikma al-
Mutaāliyya). His teachings subsume the tenets of all other
philosophical schools as well as ‛irfān. Sadr al-Muta’allihīn believed
that in order to reach the reality, rational principles must be
accompanied by purification (tadhkiyya) of the soul and shuhūdi
ecstasies. This has been comsidered as a final reconciliation
between rationality, shuhūd, and the Book and Sunnah. *
 57
cognitive or practical, effects, man cannot prove his soul
through his own effects.
Ibn Sīnā’s argues in this regard that should someone doubt
his self and desire to prove it through his effects, through
his thoughts for instance, in the minor premise, he will
either mention the thoughts absolutely or as his own. If
thoughts are mentioned absolutely, that is, not mentioned as
“my thoughts”, the argument cannot prove the arguer’s
soul. At most, it will indicate that there is an agency, such
as a thinker, who is responsible for producing the thoughts.
However, if thoughts are mentioned as his—for instance, it
is stated, “I think,”—in this case “I” and its reality have
already been presupposed as the agency to whom the
thoughts pertain. Therefore, the argument cannot
demonstrate the existence of the soul as its conclusion.1
Ibn Sīnā’s demonstration illustrates that man cannot
recognize his self through rational arguments and middle
terms such as his thoughts; rather, he intuitively knows his
self before he knows any of his effects. This argument, first
of all, denies the discursiveness and even self-evidence of
the human being’s knowledge of his self; and a closer
examination can even reveal the impossibility of acquired
knowledge (al-‛ilm al-husūlī) with respect to one’s soul,
because, acquired knowledge, whether discursive, self-
evident, or primary, is acquired though thinking. And
thinking being a human action and effect, as indicated by
the demonstration, he must know his self before he knows
his effects, including include his thoughts and concepts.
Since everyone knows his self, therefore, everyone knows
his self through a cognition, which precedes acquired
knowledge, namely, through intuitive knowledge.
The soul’s intuitive knowledge of itself is primary; and the
notions that are derived from this knowledge and reflect the
self, like the notion of “I,” are primary as well.

1Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Commentary

by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. (Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981),
vol. 2, 297.
 58
In the horizon of acquired knowledge, the notion of “I”—
like the notions of existence, reality, knowledge, and like
the propositions that acknowledge the basic reality, one’s
own reality, or the existence of one’s knowledge—is
primary. Obviously, such definite primary propositions (al-
qadhāyā al-awwaliyya), for their affinity with the principle
of non-contradiction, which derives from the shuhūd of the
Absolute Reality (al-Haq al-Mutlaq) as well, have
necessity of veridicality (dharūra al-sidq) and doubt and
skepticism are irrelevant with respect to them.
Aside from Ibn Sinā’s above proof, in his Al-Mutarehāt,
Shaykh al-Ishrāq (the Master of Illumination) has
established two demonstrations to indicate that the only
medium of knowing one’s own self is intuitive knowledge
and that it is impossible to know one’s self through notional
knowledge. Having two different middle terms, these two
demonstrations, which he has received during a mystical
discovery and shuhūdi conversation with Aristotle, are
distinct and independent from one another. The middle
term of one of them is the particularity (juz’iyya) of the soul
and universality (kulliyya) of notions and quiddities and
that of the second one is the presence of the soul before
itself and the absence of concepts and quiddities from it.
His first demonstration can be outlined in a second-figure
syllogism as follows:

Everyone finds his reality as a specif-

ic and particular thing.
All concepts, including the concept
of “I”, are universal.
Therefore, everyone’s reality is other
than the concept of “I” or any other
mental concept.

The second demonstration affirms that every individual’s

reality is present before himself, whereas the notion of “I,”
by predication as essence (al-haml al-awwalī), is “he,” by
predication as extension (al-haml al-shā ). Therefore,
 59
every person’s reality is other than the notion that indicates
him and everyone intuitively discerns his reality before he
discerns the said notion. That is because in every
condition, even when expressing skepticism or ignorance,
the human being alludes to himself; and to be ignorant of
one’s own self is unawareness of the knowledge one has
about himself.1
Man’s knowledge of his own reality is one of his intuitive
and primary assets. This knowledge does not reflect
whether the soul is an accident (‛aradh) or substance
(jauhar). Therefore, it is not subject to the criticism that if
soul is intuitively known and acquired knowledge is
incapable of discerning its reality, then there is no way to
prove that it is a substance.
The discussion whether soul is an accident or a substance is
part of the inquiry regarding its quiddity; and as a
secondary-order analysis, it is rendered after soul’s
existence has been intuitively known. This analysis
belongs to the conceptual framework in which things exist
by mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) and—like unity
(wahda) of quiddity and existence and unity of concept
(mafhūm) and extension (misdāq)—have a sort of unity
with the soul. Evidently, this inquiry is open to extensive
discussions that proceed from primary and self-evident
premises towards discursive knowledge.

Abstraction and Universalization of Causation

Causation (‛illiyya) means a necessary relationship between
external events. The manner in which we discern it is
similar to how we intuitively discern our own reality and
abstract the concept of “I” or soul from it. That is, the
primary and axiomatic concept of causation is discerned
from the intuitive perception of soul’s relationship with its
faculties and actions. One ought to be reminded that since
every argument relies upon its premises’ necessary

1Al-Suhrawardī, Abu al-Fath Shahāb al-Dīn Yahyā ibn Habash. Al-

Mutarehāt. (Tehran: Anjoman-i-Falsafa-i-Iran, 1978), vol. 1, 484.
 60
entailment of its conclusion—that is, the causality of the
premises with respect with their conclusion—it is beyond
the capacity of rational arguments to prove or deny the
presence of causal relationships between external events.
In other words, if causation is doubted, just as on the one
hand it cannot be proved by relying upon itself, on the
other, without using the very principle of causation, it
would be impossible to construct an argument for its
rejection. Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, may Allah sanctify his
tomb, says, “If causation is accepted, argument is plausible;
and if it is denied, reasoning would be irrelevant.”1
Therefore, an inquiry that is dedicated to the analysis of
causation, in fact, has the role of its explanation, not that of
its proving it.
When soul gains an intuitive perception of its faculties, ac-
tions, and wills, and when it discerns the notion of causal
relationship between things, it examines the corollaries and
characteristics of this notion. In the next step, it universal-
izes causation in a syllogistic fashion—not analogically as
suggested by those not acquainted with this principle—with
respect to things that are outside its sphere of existence.
For instance, when the soul discerns quidditative concepts
and compares them with existence and nonexistence, it
acknowledges their equidistance (tasāwi al-nisba) towards
existence and nonexistence, and equates the preponderance
(tarjīh) of one of these two contradictories (naqīdhain) over
the other with the validity of both equidistance and
non-equidistance, evidently a conjunction of contradictories
(ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain). Therefore, it ascribes the
preponderance of one of the two to an external causal
efficacy and sees it as the result of a necessary relationship
between the quiddity and that cause. Further analyses,
however, transfer the causal nexus from quiddity to the
reality and being which is in union with it, and indicate that

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-Hikma al-

Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-Islamiya,
1959), vol. 3, 163.
 61
quiddity has essential nihility (al-halāka al-dhātiyyaa) in
every condition.
The inquiry of existential causes (al-‛ilal al-wujūdiyya) of
various quiddities comprises the analysis of four causes—
material (al-‛illa al-mādiyya), formal (al-‛illa al-sūriyya),
final (al-‛illa al-ghāyiyya), and efficient (al-‛illa
al-fā‛iliyya). Although the celebrated explanation of the
existence of contingents (mumkināt) is purely on the score
of material causes; many proofs, such as the arguments of
incorporeality of the soul and its various faculties, indicate
that causality is not solely restricted to material causes and
rather material causes are limited to a certain portion of the
realm of existence. Moreover, analysis of the meaning of
matter establishes the necessity of formal, final, and
efficient causes; and with the affirmation of incorporeal
entities, it is further ascertained that causality is free of need
to material and formal causes. In the series of incorporeal
entities, the precedence of final cause over efficient cause—
that is, the efficacy (fā‛iliyya) of final cause in relation to
the efficient cause—and the precedence and principality of
efficient cause over the other causes is proved.

Knowledge and Epistemology

Knowledge always reflects a “known”—something that is
its object. Considering the various categories of objects of
cognition, it is marked by a number of divisions—such as
philosophy, mathematics, and the many natural sciences.
Epistemology is a secondary-order discipline that studies
knowledge. A discipline itself, it is subject to the same
criteria and principles, which it proves for other disciplines.
Epistemology, as the inquiry of general and comprehensive
principles of knowledge, comprises certain principles,
which are valid with regard to every discipline including
itself. Some propositions that are of extreme importance in
the epistemological inquiry are as follows:

 Knowledge exists.
 62
As explained earlier, skepticism with regard to this
proposition makes inquiry and conversation irrele-
vant and its rejection invites nothing but sophism.
 Knowledge’s reflection of
the reality is infallible.
This is a direct corollary of the previous proposi-
tion; since, if it is denied that knowledge represents
reality, the only thing left is ignorance.
 If principles of
knowledge are observed, reality can be
reached.
In other words, it is possible do reach arrive at the
reality and occasionally, because of violating epis-
temic principles, one may remain ignorant and sus-
tain fallacies.

Epistemology, however, does not determine the validity or

falsity of the content of another discipline. Such an ap-
praisal has to be conducted according to the fundamental
criteria of each discipline itself. What epistemology can do
is to describe and name a veridical cognition’s attributes
such as immutability, incorporeality, continuity, and so
forth. It is an epistemologist’s task to differ or concur with
the view, which suggests that due to the intertwined and
collective evolution of the various disciplines, the entirety
of man’s knowledge is subject to evolution and change.
Likewise, to deny or affirm the immutability, or necessity
of immutability, of certain cognitions is an epistemological
inquiry. Nonetheless, which cognitions are definite and
have been acquired through acceptable measures, and
which ones are unscientific and nothing but ignorance un-
der the veil of knowledge, has to be determined in each per-
tinent discipline.
It becomes clear from this explanation that the abundance
of disagreements and errors, which is an obvious mark on
every subject, does not undermine the reliability of the
fundamental principles of cognition and it cannot justify the
 63
negation of possibility of knowledge or negation of its
accuracy and reliability.
Not only the presence of discrepancies and contradictions
in the statements of scholars of various fields does not put
in question the validity of epistemological principles,
rather, based on these contradictory remarks, an
epistemologist can infer the overall presence of valid and
false cognitions. Obviously, when two contradictory
opinions are expressed about a single object, given the
impossibility of conjunction of contradictories (istehāla
ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain), it can be stated that indubitably, one
of them is true and the other one is false. However, it is not
for epistemology to identify the valid assertion. Rather, it
is the task of the expert of each science to render such
judgments in accordance with the fundamentals of his
particular science and formal standards of logic.
Noncompliance with the logical standards results in a
myriad of flaws and errors, which further lead to incoherent
and contradictory remarks. Should mere occurrence of
mistakes or contradictory statements be a reason to negate
knowledge or question its infallibility, then this, contrary to
the popular opinion, is not exclusive to a specific discipline
such as philosophy and applies to every empirical or
discursive branch of knowledge.

Philosophy in its General and Specific Senses

Philosophy is sometimes used in a broader sense whereby it
is coterminous with knowledge. Obviously, since
knowledge encompasses every awareness that reflects
reality and has cognitive worth, in its general sense,
philosophy even comprises the empirical and natural
sciences. Therefore, in a general division, knowledge or
philosophy is divided into theoretical and practical
branches.
Theoretical wisdom (al-hikma al-nadhariyya) or
philosophy is the inquiry of things, which exist irrespective
of the human will and conduct. This section of philosophy
bears numerous divisions. Its chief sections are as follows:
 64
 The higher wisdom (al-hikma al-
‛ulyā), also called the first philosophy (al-hikma al-
ūlā). It is this branch of knowledge to which the
term philosophy is applied in its specific sense.
Since higher philosophy is also concerned with the
cognition of the Necessary (al-Wājib), it is called
theology (Ilāhiyāt).
 The middle wisdom (al-hikma al-
wustā), also called mathematics.
 The low wisdom (al-
hikma al-sufla). This section of knowledge
comprises the natural and experimental sci-
ences.

Natural sciences are concerned with the inquiry of physical

things. Mathematics studies things that have intermediate
corporeality (al-tajarrud al-barzakhī), that is, although they
lack physique, they do have quantity. The first philosophy,
the discipline to which the current applications of
philosophy and hikma is exclusive, is the inquiry of
absolute reality. Its predicates are those accidents of
absolute reality, which precede its division by the various
mathematical, natural, moral, and logical delimitations.
Practical wisdom (al-hikma al-‛amaliyya) analyzes things
that exist because of the human will. It is further divided
into three kinds: ethics, home economics, and public
administration.
This division of knowledge that al-Fārābī and other Islamic
philosophers have elucidated its details, illustrates that
philosophy, in its general sense, has never been a single
discipline. It has had a wide application by which it
subsumed many diverse disciplines. As for the first
philosophy, or philosophy in its specific sense, it is a
particular branch of knowledge that has never encompassed
other disciplines. Therefore, the much-celebrated opinion
that philosophy used to encompass every branch of
knowledge and the empirical sciences separated from
philosophy as they gradually evolved, lacks foundation. If
 65
by philosophy its general meaning is meant, it has never
been a single discipline with a specific subject of inquiry.
And if it’s specific meaning is in view, then it has never
included other disciplines. However, if it is meant that with
the empirical sciences’ advance, rational and incorporeal
methods of knowledge became obsolete and experiential
perspectives replaced metaphysical views, it is a valid
statement. Nevertheless, except for their intellectual
universals (al-kulliyāt al-‛aqliyya) that are not subject to
experiment, natural sciences were founded on experiment
from the beginning.

Philosophy and Particular Disciplines

Definition of philosophy as “a theomorphic process
towards similarity to God,” or “human transition into an
epistemic world that is identical with the external world,”
as pronounced by al-Fārābī and philosophers after him, is
respecting the first philosophy. The acknowledgement of
philosophers, among them Ibn Sīnā in his treatise Al–
Hudūd, that defining things and identifying their essential
parts and properties is extremely difficult, pertains to
natural and physical entities.1
Philosophy, mathematics, and a certain portion of ethics,
use incorporeal and intellectual notions. The possibility of
knowing these realities and identifying their essential
properties (al-‛awāridh al-dhātiyya), and thereby
establishing definite demonstrations (barāhīn) about them,
cannot be denied. Natural sciences that try to discern
quiddities and essences by sensory and experiential
methods hardly arrive at reality of things, and therefore,
they are unable to establish demonstrations.
Absence of demonstrations (barāhīn) in experimental
sciences has led these disciplines to suffice at conjectural
premises and conclusions and use results generated from
such conjectural syllogisms for practical purposes. The

1Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Hudūd. (Tehran: Intesharat Surūsh,

1988), 1.
 66
human expectation from the empirical sciences is their
wider practical application for exploitation of natural
resources. However, in the realm of propositions that are
devoid of direct practical use, anything less than certitude is
useless.
 67

Chapter Two

FAITH AND REASON

 69
s put by the Divine sage al-Sabzawārī, inquiry about

A God, the hereafter, and the path that guarantees

man’s eternal felicity and gives its elaborate details,
that is, the revelation, brings forth questions that do not
leave man, even if he should desire to ignore them, and
pique his curiosity from inside. As the existence and non-
existence of these phenomena are contradictory to each
other, they are either true or false. The branch of
knowledge that is concerned with this inquiry is the first
philosophy. Though shuhūdi ecstasies in relation to these
realities are sufficient to satisfy the fastidious curiosity of a
Gnostic, until transferred into the conceptual framework
and given the form of rational arguments, they will fail to
pass cognitive judgments to persuade others. This is be-
cause if reason does not play any role in the cognition of
central religious doctrines and mystical experiences are the
sole criterion of truth in the field, rational defense of faith
and enjoining others towards it will be out of question.
Moreover, when the criterion of rationality, which is the
common language of all humanity, is considered futile, eve-
ryone will be entitled to have his own favorite religious
claim, and consequently, as one mystical experimenter may
report the existence of many gods, the other might call oth-
ers to monotheism. The result of such agnostic or fideistic
mistrust of reason and unreliability of acquired
knowledge—as put by Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, Divine peace
be with him, in a conversation with an atheist that has been
narrated by Hishām ibn al-Hakam—is that the gateway to
theism will be closed and the call to believe in one God will
lack relevance.
Hishām narrates that an atheist inquired from Imam Ja‛far
al-Sādiq, Divine blessings be with him, about God, the
Exalted. The Imam mentioned some of His positive and
negative attributes and described Him as the Deity who
deserves absolute human devotion and worship. He said,
“My saying ‘Allah’ is not the affirmation of these letters,
‘alif, lām, hā’; rather I intend the extension (misdāq) Who
is the Creator of things and is their Crafter. These letters
 70
indicate Him, and He is the agent Who is called Allah, the
Benevolent, the Merciful, the Ever-Prevalent, and names
similar to these; He is the Deity.”
The atheist responded, “We find not a concept but it is a
creature.”
“Were it as you say,” replied the Imam, “then it would have
not been required from us to believe in one God. We have
not been obliged to believe in something non-
conceptualized, but rather, we say, everything that is
perceived by the senses is physical, therefore, what is found
and conceptualized by the senses is an artifact, and the
Crafter must be proved.”1
In the above conversation, first the Imam, peace be with
him, explains that what is meant by these names and
attributes is their real and external extension (al-misdāq
al-khārijī). In response to the Imam, the atheist tries to
block the medium of debate and dialogue and states that
concepts do not represent reality and what appear in our
minds and thoughts are our own artifacts. In response, the
Imam, peace be with him, says if this were true, then
necessity of belief in monotheism would be absurd, since
monotheism obliges man to believe in an actual, external,
and non-fantasized single God; whereas man’s thoughts are
figments of his imagination that been have created in
specific conditions and will be destroyed in the other.
Therefore, how could someone who lives in the confines of
concepts and does not view the true unity (tawhīd) of God
and His most beautiful names be obliged to believe in Him?
After pointing out the corrupt corollary of the atheist’s
assertion, the Imam presents a rational argument to prove
the existence of God and considers his rational argument,
which traces the existence of sensible crafts to an insensible
Crafter, sufficient for this purpose.
The question of God’s existence, the answer to which is of
utmost importance in the formation of human identity and

1 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 245.
 71
how he views the world, is a question that is imprinted on
man’s heart and soul and cannot be satisfied with anything
less than certitude. God and the hereafter are not things
that “do not cause loss to him who knows them not; and do
not benefit him who knows them.”1 Rather, they are
realities whose knowledge is “the mighty tiding”2 and
ignorance towards them is enormously risky. Because even
should the existence of the hereafter be improbable, the
event that is at stake here is eternal heavenly bliss or
everlasting torments. The practical reason (al-‛aql al-
‛amalī) obliges one to ensure the forestallment of an eternal
condemnation even if it is not highly probable. This call of
the practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī), as it has been used
by Imam al-Sādiq, peace be with him, against ‛Abdul Karim
ibn Abī al-‛Awjā,3 does not warrant one to dismiss these
doctrines as meaningless and reject them ahead of any kind
of cogitation.

Sophistic Impartations and the Denial of Commensura-

bility of Faith with Reason
Thinkers, who are influenced by latent sophistic
persuasions or biased by the openly skeptical contemporary
thought, remain devoid of rational cognition of
metaphysical realities and religious tenets. Moreover, in
order to defend the illegitimate and corrupt ideological
ramifications of their experiential perspectives, they hastily
evince contempt towards the philosophic and civilized
thought that is fostered in the orchard of reason and watered
from the heavens of revelation.
Ironically, while such a person himself is fully engrossed in
conceptual discussions and is dependent on things that are
not external to the realm of notions, he tries to dismiss the

1 Al-Kulainī, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ya’qūb. Al-Usūl min al-

Kāfī. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islamiya, 1987), vol. 1, 23.
2 78: 2
3 Al-Kulainī, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ya’qūb. Al-Usūl min al-

Kāfī. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islamiya, 1987), vol. 1, 78.

 72
conformity of concepts to external realities and religious
doctrines.
The denial of commensurability of faith with reason, which
is common in the western philosophy of religion, is an old
paradox. It is based on the evidence that many people, who
have scholarly and demonstrative cognition of religious
doctrines, do not have any commitment to religious faith
and exhibit atheistic and blasphemous behavior; and on the
other side of the spectrum, many devout people are
incapable of demonstrating their faith.
The implausibility of this discourse becomes clear from our
previous discussion about theoretical (al-‛aql al-nadharī)
and practical reasons (al-‛aql al-‛amalī). Propositions are
made as a result of a relationship formulated in the mind
between their subjects and predicates, which is expressed
their copulas, and it is the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī) that discerns these relationships. Faith is the
nexus of the soul with the object of its perception; and
practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) is the agency, which
establishes this relationship.
The human being’s theoretical knowledge pertains to
sensation (ehsās), memory (hāfidha), imagination (khiyāl),
estimation (wahm), and ratiocination (ta‛aqqul); and his
faith and practical inclinations, with all of their perceivable
levels, are proportional to his theoretical perceptions.
However, as explained earlier, by differentiating between
faith and knowledge—that is, in the levels in which
separation between faith and knowledge is perceivable—
four classes, each one of which may include further
subclasses, emerge. These four classes are: the learned
faithful, the learned infidel, the ignorant faithful, and the
ignorant infidel.
It can be inferred from this discourse that the separation of
faith and knowledge that occurs in certain levels of man’s
religious journey does not indicate a separation that is due
to incapacity of reason in knowing religious tenets and
metaphysical realities. Rather, from this vantage point, it
can be seen that for the people who are devoid of shuhūdi
 73
cognition of reality, reason is the only way of assessing the
veridicality of the various religious faiths. Because if the
practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) embraces perceptions the
veridicality of which has been ascertained, the religious
belief, in this case, is a faith that has cognitive
respectability. And if faith is proportioned to things the
truth of which has not been authenticated, it is blind faith.
For the same reason, if reality is well-known to an
individual, yet he still does not have faith in it, his
knowledge is associated with infidelity and corruption.
And if reality is neither known nor believed in, this
ignorance is mingled with infidelity and corruption.
Given that faith is the propensity of the human soul, it is
true when it is proportioned towards a real object and false
when directed to something unreal. Therefore, should
rational assessment of metaphysical realities and religious
doctrines be impossible, even if the perpetual dominance of
faith over human civilization is accepted, there still will be
no means of authenticating the many religious faiths the
contradictory claims of which range from the insane
lordships of diverse natural deities to the divinity of a
Single Almighty God.

The Mutual Existential Necessitation between Faith and

Reason in the Islamic Traditions
Although there is no mutual non-existential necessitation
(al-talāzum al-‛adamī) between faith and reason, because
reason has the ability to authenticate religious creeds, and
therefore, can play an instrumental role in fostering a
veridical faith, there is a mutual existential necessitation
(al-talāzum al-wujūdī) between faith and reason.
Therefore, numerous traditions narrated from the
Beneficent Prophet and his holy legatees, peace be with
them all, measure the value of piety and religious devotion
of individuals in proportion to their reasonability and
knowledge.
 74
“Verily fear God only those of His servants induced with
knowledge.”1
“One does not have faith until he makes use of reason.”2
“The ignorant worshipper is like a mill-donkey, which
circumambulates but cuts no distance.”3
“A person’s knowledge and reason denote his value.”4
“One’s religiosity is in proportion to one’s reason.”5
Likewise, in the traditions, a knowledge that is not coupled
with faith and practice is the subject of scorn.
“The hearth of the Hell in the Day of Judgment is every
wealthy who is avaricious of his wealth with respect to the
destitute, and every scholar who sells his religion for
worldly gains.”6
“The most detested of the servants before Allah, is the
corrupt scholar.”7
“How abundant are evil scholars and ignorant pious! Fear
the evil among the scholars and the ignorant among the
pious.”8
While differentiating between knowledge and faith, the last
tradition is denouncing a knowledge, which is not coupled
with faith; and condemning a faith, which is not
accompanied by knowledge; and decreeing both of them be
shunned.
In another set of traditions, knowledge has been called the
best companion of faith: “How noble a companion is
knowledge for faith.”1

1 35: 28
2 Āmidī, ‛Abd al-Wahīd ibn Muhammad al-Tamīmī. Translation
and commentary by Jamal al-Dīn Muhammad Khwānsārī. Sharh
Ghorar al-Hikam wa Dorar al-Kalim. (Tehran: Tehran University
Publications, 1986), vol. 6, 70.
3 ibid. vol. 2, 125.
4 ibid. vol. 6, 476.
5 ibid. vol. 4, 313.
6 ibid. vol. 6, 240.
7 ibid. vol. 2, 431.
8 ibid. vol. 4, 556.
 75
In some traditions, the noblest form of knowledge has been
named a knowledge that is illustrated in actions and
displayed by organs.
“The most beneficial knowledge is that which is
practiced.”2
“The best knowledge is that which is with practice”3
“The noblest knowledge is that which is manifested in the
organs and body parts.” 4
Similarly, a knowledge, which has not been put into
practice, has been regarded the worst.
“Knowledge without practice is heinousness.”5
“The curse of knowledge is to abandon its practice.”6
“The worst knowledge is the one that is not implemented.”7
“Knowledge without practice is a warrant for God against
the servant.”8
These traditions illustrate that despite the absence of a
mutual non-existential necessitation, there is a mutual
existential necessitation between faith and knowledge. It
follows that faith is veridical only when it pertains to a real
entity and is coupled with definite cognition thereof and
that faith without cognition invites nothing but mischief
and vice.
The mutual existential necessitation between faith and
reason indicates that transcendent levels of faith cannot be
attained if one does not possess superior levels of
cognition. Therefore, in the search of a veridical faith,
there is no alternative to reason and knowledge and citing
examples of the ignorant pious and blasphemous scholars
are not adequate disproof of this assertion.

1 ibid. vol. 6, 159.

2 ibid. vol. 2, 386.
3 ibid. vol. 2, 420.
4 ibid. vol. 2, 422.
5 ibid. vol. 2, 8.
6 ibid. vol. 3, 107.
7 ibid. vol. 4, 170.
8 ibid. vol. 4, 351.
 76
The putative failure of philosophers in proving the
existence of God does not justify the dismissal of
rationality and the assertion that Divine Books have called
for religious experience or mere sensation of Divine
existence, or that religious language is either meaningless
or transrational.
Although not every person who is wiser and more
knowledgeable is necessarily more faithful and pious, and
there are a good many erudite atheists, this does not
indicate that reason is satanic, worldly, and misleading,
because the examples of separation and mutual
non-existential necessitation between faith and reason do
not negate their mutual existential necessitation.

The Ignorant Devout and the Unlearned Pious

Lack of attention to the mutual existential necessitation
between faith and reason has led some to consider reason
and acquired knowledge as a defective or supplementary
way for affirming religious doctrines. They have asserted
that the use of reason—which as instanced by, “One’s
religiosity is in proportion to one’s reason,”1 is the criterion
of the veridicality of one’s faith—is inspired by fanatic and
professional impulses.
This trend reflects the position of contemporary western
theology. After submission to sensationalism bidding
rationality farewell, and turning away from the religion that
is in total commensurability with rational principles, this
theology wants to defend religion as a dimension of human
civilization.
The philosophic worth of sensory cognition of religious
tenets and metaphysical realities is not more than sophism
and skepticism (shakkākiyya). Theologians who depend on
this medium justify religious tendencies as mere
introspective propensities. Indeed, the sort of people who
are raised in this agnostic or fidiestic tradition, which
denies the nexus of faith with reason, are the ignorant

1 ibid. vol. 4, 313.

 77
devout and unlearned pious who want to have faith even if
it flies in the face of every rational principle known to
mankind. Such a person can hardly be participant of a
rational dialogue.
When reason is considered an improper medium of
reaching religious tenets, and metaphysical propositions are
regarded as equivocal and meaningless, there is little that
knowledge can do to differentiate between veridical
religious doctrines and false claims. Rather, in this case,
there is little difference between faith in God and belief in
the devil; and consequently faith remains blind and
perplexed about choosing its object of worship from among
the favorite deities of diverse religions. In the light of this,
it can be stated that the worst determent inflicted at faith is
the denial of the possibility of its rational defense.

First Knowledge is the Cognition of the Almighty

If it is admitted that reason can yield knowledge to the
Almighty God—as it has been echoed by the tradition,
“The first knowledge is the cognition of the Almighty”1—it
will follow that reason has the capacity to differentiate
veridical religious doctrines from false ones; and therefore,
the most essential discipline is the branch of knowledge,
which applies to this inquiry. Imam Ali, peace be with him,
says, “The most compulsory knowledge is the one which
leads you to the good of your faith, and illuminates its
wrong.”2
If reason, which constitutes the humanness of the human
being and of which everyone has a just share, has the capac-
ity to render judgment on the validity and invalidity of reli-
gious tenets, then its application to faith is not irreverence.

1 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 34.
2 Āmidī, Abd al-Wahīd ibn Muhammad al-Tamīmī. Translation

and commentary by Jamal al-Dīn Muhammad Khwānsārī. Sharh

Ghorar al-Hikam wa Dorar al-Kalim. (Tehran: Tehran University
Publications, 1986), vol. 1, 61.
 78
Rather, it ought to be regarded as a reliable medium to-
wards bliss, as indicated by these traditions:
“Reason is the apostle of truth.”1
“Reason is a definite friend.”2
“The friend of every individual is his reason, and his enemy
is his ignorance.”3
Reflecting on the excellences of reason, Imam Ali, peace be
with him, says, “God, the Glorified, has not distributed
among His servants anything better than reason.”4

Disparagement of Acquired Knowledge and Mistrust of

Theoretical Disciplines
An important point worth noticing here is that the
disparagement of acquired knowledge (al-‛ilm al-husūlī)
and theoretical disciplines (al-‛ulūm al-‛aqliyya), which is
ubiquitous in the works of the Gnostics (‛urafā’) who
witness the Deity and the hereafter by shuhūd, is not
identical to the mistrust of rationality in contemporary
sensationalism and western theology. The genuine
Gnosticism (‛irfān) decrees that although reason is not
sufficient, it is necessary.
In the initial phases, acquired knowledge and rational
cognition is the criterion of veridicality of religious
doctrines; because “Nothing rectifies religiosity save
reason.”5 However, in the higher phases—that is, after
having faith and performing virtuous deeds—reason yields
its place to shuhūd, where what was previously known by
the medium of concepts is exposed to shuhūdi visualization

1 ibid. vol. 1, 70.

2 ibid. vol. 1, 85.
3 Al-Kulainī, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ya’qūb. Al-Usūl min al-

Kāfī. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islamiya, 1987), vol. 1, 11.

4Āmidī, Abd al-Wahīd ibn Muhammad al-Tamīmī. Translation and

commentary by Jamal al-Dīn Muhammad Khwānsārī. Sharh

Ghorar al-Hikam wa Dorar al-Kalim. (Tehran: Tehran University
Publications, 1986), vol. 6, 80.
5 ibid. vol. 1, 353.
 79
without any mediates. This phase of cognition has some
characteristics and corollaries, which though compatible
with rational principles, are not within the radius of
reason’s reach. This fact is acknowledged by reason itself,
since the truth of shuhūdi cognition as well as the
exaltedness of God’s Essence from being reached by the
rational arguments of philosophers and mystical
experiences of Gnostics are demonstratively proved. Thus
if “Reason is the paramount human excellence,”1 the
paramount excellence of reason is not invalidating it, but
knowing its limits and realization of meta-rational realities.
“Admission of ignorance is the farthest limit of one’s
reason.”2

The Commensurability of Religious Tenets with Philo-

sophic Arguments
After pessimism with respect to the affirmation of religious
tenets and metaphysical realities through the rational
approach and considering it either futile or supplementary,
the nexus of faith and reason is rejected in another way. It
is argued that in religions generally, and in the scriptures of
the monotheistic tradition of Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam specially, the traditional rational and philosophic
proofs of theism have not been used. It is further argued
that many theologians and philosophers have demurred
from presenting rational arguments for the existence of
God, considering them useless and inconclusive, or even, as
in the case of Paul Tillich, blasphemous and irreverent to
the pious expediency.3
According to the verses of the Noble Qur’ān, the Divine
visage is evident in every atom of existence. “And God’s is
the East and the West, therefore whithersoever ye turn ye

1 ibid. vol. 4, 374.

2 ibid. vol. 4, 374.
3 Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology I (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press and Welwyn, Hertfordshire: James Nisbet & Company Ltd.,

1951), 237.
 80
1
find the face of God.” And the Divine existence as
expressed by, “What! About God is there any doubt?”2 has
been considered axiomatic and indubitable. According to
the verse, “Is it not sufficient for thy Lord that He is a
witness over all things,”3 His existence has been described
as more manifest than and antecedent to everything else.
In response to this opinion one cannot help but to say that,
indeed, it is not surprising that rationality has failed to
prove a Deity who is an anthropomorphic body of light
hidden in the unseen, or is like a griffin in a fairyland.

Rational Arguments in the Islamic Scriptures

The above argument centers on the idea that in religions in
general and in the Holy Qur’ān in particular, there has not
been any serious effort to prove the existence of God
through traditional philosophical proofs. This discourse,
however, at least with respect to Qur’ān, is untenable for
many reasons.
First, at the time when the Noble Qur’ān was revealed, it
addressed the people of the Book and polytheists
(mushrikīn). These people did not reject the Divine
existence. The fundamental challenge to the Prophet of
Islam, and rather to all of the ancient prophets, was idol-
worship, dualism, and so forth. The Noble Qur’ān
describes the people who were addressed by the Prophet
and were antagonistic towards him as acknowledging God
and the fact that He is the Creator.
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the
earth and made subservient the sun and the moon?’
Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”4
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who sendeth down from the
heaven the water, and giveth life with unto the earth after
its death?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”1

1 2: 115
2 14: 10
3 41: 53
4 29: 61
 81
“And if thou askest them ‘Who created the heavens and the
earth?’ Certainly will they say, ‘God.’”2
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created the heavens and the
earth?’ Certainly will they say, ‘Created them the All-
Mighty, the All-Knowing.’”3
“And if thou ask them, ‘Who created them?’ Certainly will
they say, ‘God.’”4
The fundamental obstacle for the idolaters of Hijāz in
accepting the new Divine religion was not the existence of
God or the fact that He is the Creator; rather their real
difficulty was in al-tawhīd al-rubūbī5. They worshipped
idols, which they believed decided their lives, gave their
sustenance, and were the means of attaining proximity to
God. The Noble Qur’ān relates their explanation of their
idolatrous conduct as follows:
“We worship them not save [in order] that they may make
us near to God.”6
“And they worship besides God, that which can neither hurt
them nor profit them and they say, ‘These are our
intercessors with God.’”7
It is obvious that when addressing such people, the Noble
Qur’ān does not need to prove the existence of God.
Rather, it calls their belief indemonstrable and presents
rational proofs for al-tawhīd al-rubūbī.
Second, it was not just these people who were addressed by
the Noble Qur’ān. On many other occasions, the Holy
Qur’ān names the belief of those who reject God and the
hereafter as indemonstrable and devoid of proof. It

1 29: 63
2 31: 25
3 43: 9
4 43: 87
5Al-Tawhīd al-Rubūbī (monotheism in administration) indicates that

the administrator of the world is the same deity that has created it.
*
6 39: 3
7 10: 18
 82
denounces them for relying on surmise and presents
demonstrations (barāhīn) for the existence of the Deity.
When the Noble Qur’ān addresses atheists who consider
their lives and deaths determined by the nature, it
introduces profound demonstrations, (barāhīn) inquiry into
which will add new chapters to philosophy.
In response to this last group—whose opinion about life
and death has been outlined in this way: “And say they, ‘It
is not save our life in this world; we die and live, and
destroys us not but time,’”1—the Qur’ān says, “For them
there is no knowledge of that; they do but merely guess.”2
That is, they do not have certainty about their claim and
they merely surmise. It can be inferred from this discourse
that the Qur’ānic criterion for the assessment of truth of
religious doctrines is nothing other than knowledge and
rationality.
In the blessed chapter of The Mountain, as an indication to
the existence of the Creator of the world, the Noble Qur’ān
says, “Or were they created by nothing? Or are they
themselves the creators? Or did they create the heavens
and the earth? Nay! They have no certainty.”3
The first verse is a demonstration (burhān) for the existence
of man’s creator, summing as, either he has a creator or he
does not. Given that the latter is an evident impossibility,
due to the impossibility of haphazardness, then he must
have a creator. It follows that his creator is either he
himself or someone else. The former—due to the obvious
impossibility of circular causation (al-‛illiyya al-dauriyya),
which yields to conjunction of contradictories (ijtemā‛ al-
naqīdhain)—is impossible. Therefore, his creator is an
agency other than himself. One need not be reminded that
the “other” that the Majestic Qur’ān introduces here is
certainly not man’s recipient cause (al-‛illa al-qābiliyya).
Since, first, the existence of the recipient cause does not

1 45: 24
2 ibid.
3 52: 35–36
 83
undermine the atheist position, as they do not demur from
acknowledging its existence, and second, it is not the Noble
Qur’ān’s objective here to prove the existence of the
recipient cause.
Just as the analysis of a single principle of the Principles of
Jurisprudence (usūl al-fiqh), “Certitude is not infringed by
doubt,”1 brings forth the detailed discussions of istishāb
and creates many long chapters in the named discipline, a
profound and meticulous investigation of this brief verse
can be the source of many new epistemic chapters about
man’s origin and his Creator. Each one of the above
propositions is divided into two propositions based on the
impossibility of conjunction of contradictories. In the first
proposition, the reason for the impossibility of man’s not
having a creator is the fact that existence is not included in
his essence, and attribution of existence to his essence
without a cause invites preponderance without a
preponderant (tarjīh bilā murajjeh). This is because an
entity that existence and nonexistence are not included in
its essence as its essential parts, is equidistant (mutasāwī al-
nisba) in relation to existence and nonexistence; and the
attribution of existence or nonexistence in this situation,
without an external cause, amounts to conjunction of
equidistance and non-equidistance. It follows that since
equidistance and non-equidistance are contradictories, the
attribution of existence to the human being without taking
into consideration the causal efficacy of an external agency
results in conjunction of contradictories, which is
impossible. Therefore, it is impossible for the human being
not to have a creator.
Furthermore, it can be proved that the suggestion of man
being his own creator is untenable, since it translates into
circularity (daur), which translates into conjunction of

1 Derived from the tradition, “It is not appropriate for you to in-
fringe certitude with doubt.” See: Al-‛Āmilī, Muhammad ibn al-
Hasan al-Hurr. Wasā’il al-Shi‛a ila Masā’il al-Shari‛ah. (Beirut: Ehia
al-Turāth al-‛Arabī), vol. 3, 466.
 84
contradictories (ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain), which is impossible.
Therefore, man is not his own creator and his creator is
someone other than himself.
Likewise, a similar argument from cosmic creation to the
existence of God can be inferred from the second verse,
which speaks about the creation of the heavens and the
earth. Thus, inquiry into the existence of human being and
the world can be pursued on the avenue of the many similar
Qur’ānic verses.
Third, there is an abundant supply of explicit
demonstrations (barāhīn) and detailed rational arguments
in the traditions. In Al-Tawhīd of al-Shaykh al-Sadūq and
Usūl al-Kāfi, a discourse similar to the above verses has
been elaborated as follows: “You did not create yourself,
nor were you created by someone similar to yourself.”1

The Legacy of Nahj al-Balāgha to the History of Islamic

Thought
The sermons of Nahj al-Balāgha are full of the riches of
rational wisdom that all along the history of Islamic thought
have inspired and enriched the works of the mutakellimūn,
philosophers, and Gnostics alike. For instance, sermon 185
declares:

Praise belongs to Allah, Who is such

that senses cannot perceive Him,
places cannot contain Him, eyes can-
not see Him, and veils cannot cover
Him. The One Who proves His eter-
nity by the hudūth of His creation;
and the hudūth of His creation indi-
cates His existence, and their analo-
gousness establishes that there is
nothing similar to Him. The One
Who is true in His promise, exalted

1 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 293.
 85
from oppressing His servants, up-
holds equity in His creation, and
practices justice in His rule. The
One Who attests by the hudūth of
things to His eternity, by their marks
of incapability to His power, and by
their powerlessness against destruc-
tion to His everlastingness.

This sermon contains rational inference of God’s existence,

eternity, and everlastingness, from the hudūth of the world.
It traces the weakness and neediness of creatures to the
omnipotence of God. Along the history of Islamic thought,
these arguments with their particular expressions have
guided and given a sense of direction to kalām, philosophy,
and Gnosticism. Later, this sermon clearly mentions the
principle of causation, cause and effect, contingency
(imkān) and necessity (wujūb), and the perfection of
creation.
Imam Ali, may the benedictions of Allah be for him, after
presenting numerous evidences for the existence of God
says,

Then woe unto them who deny the

Ordainer and reject the Ruler! They
have assumed that they are like grass
having neither any cultivator nor any
maker for the diversity of their
forms. They have not relied on ra-
tionality for their assertion, nor on
any research for what they have
heard. Can there be any structure
without a constructor? Or an offence
without an offender?

This section of the sermon, by relying on the principle of

causation and the effects’ need to the cause, traces the
existence of the various forms to the existence of the cause
that bestows these forms.
 86
Moreover, it mentions the rational theophony (al-tajallī al-
‛aqlī)—that is, the Divine manifestation in the reason—and
that reason is incapable of reaching God’s Essence and that
it has the capacity to discern this shortcoming of hers.
In sermon 186, about which the compiler of Nahj al-
Balāgha, al-Syed al-Radhī says, “[This sermon is] about
monotheism, and this sermon encompasses such principles
of gnosis that no other sermon contains”, it is stated:

Everything that is known through it-

self has been created, and everything
that exists by virtue of another thing
is an effect. He works but not with
the help of instruments; He fixes
measures but not with the activity of
cogitation; He is rich but not through
acquisition. Epochs do not keep
company with Him and implements
do not help Him. His Being pre-
cedes time. His Existence precedes
nonexistence and His eternity pre-
cedes beginning.

It will not be an overstatement to say that philosophy has

evolved along the lines of inquiry and analysis of the first
two points of the above discourse. Inquiry of causation and
usage of terms such as causation (al-‛illiyya), causal
efficacy (al-fā‛iliyya), causedness (al-ma‛lūliyya), and
scrutiny of existence and nonexistence and so forth are
central philosophical themes that have been used in this and
other sermons.
Some interpreters of Nahj al-Balāgha have considered it
likely that what al-Syed al-Radhī has narrated here is part of
sermon 179, which has been delivered in reply to the
inquisition of Dhi‛leb al-Yamānī, and al-Radhī has
separated them for literary considerations.
Dhi‛leb asks Imam Ali, peace be with him, “O’ Commander
of the Faithful, have you seen your Lord?”
“Do I worship someone I have not seen?” replies the Imam.
 87
Dhi‛leb asks again, “How have you seen Him?”
“Eyes do not see Him through sensual perception,”
responded the Imam, “but rather hearts find Him through
serenity of faith. He is close to things but not [physically]
contiguous. He is far from them but not [physically]
separate.”
Statements similar to this sermon—such as “Every manifest
thing other than Him is hidden, and every hidden thing
other than Him is invisible,”1 “Praises be to Allah, Who is
Manifest before His creatures because of His creation,”2 or
“He, the Glorified, manifested before them in His Book,”3
that have come in other sermons—and excerpts from the
chapter of Sincerity (sūra al-Ikhlās) and verses like, “He is
the Beginning and the End, and the Manifest and the
Hidden,”4 and “He is with you wherever ye may be,”5 and
words in the books of supplications, have enriched and
inspired the philosophic and Gnostic tradition of Islam in
the form poem and prose over the centuries.
In a worldview where the Divine Essence is behind the
curtain of the all-unseen so much so that “The height of
mental courage cannot appreciate Him and the profundities
of reason cannot reach Him,”6 reason and knowledge are
His first Essential manifestation7, and universal intellect
(al-‛aql al-kullī) is His first actual and factual theophony in
the external world. That is, the “immutable entities”
(al-a‛yān al-thābita) of things manifest in the Divine
cognitive presence (al-hadhra al-‛ilmiyya) through His
Essential knowledge (al-‛ilm al-dhātī) and their external

1 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 65.

2 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 108.
3 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 147.
4 57: 3
5 57: 4
6 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 1.
7 “The first thing that God created was the intellect.” See: Al-

Majlisī, Muhammad Bāqir. Bihār al-Anwār. (Tehran: Dār al-Kutub

al-Islamiyya), vol. 1, 97.
 88
beings (al-a‛yān al-khārijiyya) appear in the external world
through the emanation of grace (ifādha) by the Intellect.
“The first thing that God created is the Intellect.”1 And if it
is such that in the arc of descent (qaus al-nuzūl), the Divine
grace passes through knowledge and Intellect and reaches
the world of nature, likewise in the arc of ascent (qaus
al-su‛ūd) one can reach the Divine threshold only through
assistance of the Intellect and knowledge, since “It is the
Intellect through which the All-Merciful is worshiped and
the Paradises attained.”2
As explained earlier, in this consonant and harmonious
tradition the tenets of which support each other, the
disparagement of reason by those lost in “effacement”
(fanā’) does not indicate total and absolute rejection of
rationality. In this realm, whose dwellers have abandoned
the pleasures of this world and the hereafter for the sake of
annihilation in the Absolute Beauty, it is not only reason
that is belittled, but even the angels, for not bearing the sin
of love, are out of the circle of communion (wisāl).
Indeed, it is odd that despite expressions and texts like the
ones quoted here, rationalistic approach towards religious
tenets and Gnostic claims is denied on grounds of their
incommensurability with the demands of piety.
The reason behind all of this is the dominance of sophism
and skepticism (shakkākiyya) over the simplistic minds of
people who, prematurely and ahead of adequate familiarity
with philosophic insights, have been exposed to the
paradoxes of theologians who, in order to justify their
impure and polytheistic religiosity, have deviated from
rationality and have compromised with sensualistic
perspectives and whose corrupt and void faith cannot be
maintained except by declaring rationality blasphemous and
incompatible with faith. Obviously, the maintenance of the
superficial faith in spite of its opposition to reason, has left

1 Al-Majlisī, Muhammad Baqir. Bihār al-Anwār. (Tehran: Dār al-

Kutub al-Islamiyya), vol. 1, 97.
2 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 107.
 89
no choice for trans-rationalist theologians but to reduce
religious tenets to a minimum. Thus, as on one hand the
acceptability of antireligious ethos was maximized; on the
other, it was insured that the Excellent Religious State (al-
Madīna al-Fādhila al-Dīniyya), or the state of the people—
that is, the democratic rule—as well as individual and
social norms, be based to liberal interpretations of
permissibility and freedom.

Non-questionability of Monotheism and Indemonstra-

bility of Atheism
The verses of the Majestic Qur’ān, which declare the
existence of God as axiomatic and indubitable,1 and those
verses, which describe polytheism as indemonstrable and
without proof,2 do not suggest that the gateway of reason to
discern the Divine existence is closed and that it is
impossible to discover the necessity of God’s existence
through the rational approach, and therefore, one has to
accept His existence “as a matter of faith.”
Perhaps the non-questionability of God’s existence in these
verses owes to the fact that the proofs of Divine existence
and negation of polytheism are undeniable. For instance, it
can be inferred from the verse, “What! in God is there any
doubt, the Originator of the heavens and the earth?”3 that
since the entire cosmos bears the marks of its Creator, to
doubt His existence is nonsensical and indefensible.
In Nahj al-Balāgha, Imam Ali, Divine benedictions be with
him, expresses his astonishment at a person who observes
the creation and still doubts its Creator: “I wonder at him
who doubts God, yet he sees His creation.”4
Moreover, even if these verses were not substantiated by
these proofs, they have no indication on the epistemic

1 Such as “What! In God is there any doubt?” (14: 10)

2 For instance, “And whoever invokes another god with God, he
has no proof of it,” (23: 117)
3 14: 10
4 Nahj al-Balāgha, sayings of wisdom 126.
 90
worthlessness or futility of reason in knowing central
religious tenets like God and the hereafter. Rather, they
magnify the tenability and reliability of rational knowledge
about them, because in this case, the verses indicate that
God is a reality whose existence is not only self-evident
(badīhī), but primary (awwalī).
Primary concepts and judgments are those concepts and
judgments that the entirety of the human being’s cognition
is dependent upon them, while on the contrary their
cognitive worth is not indebted to another knowledge. It is
obvious that such independence does not indicate an
imperfection or defect on their side, but it rather enhances
their epistemic respectability. The primary knowledge of
the human being comprises concepts and propositions that
it is impossible for him not to understand and acknowledge
and he relies on their conceptual comprehension and
propositional acknowledgement in every situation—even
when he is inattentive of them or denies their primariness
(awwaliyya).
Although primary knowledge does not depend on any
knowledge antecedent to itself—and therefore, its
conception or acknowledgement is not rendered through
other cognitions, and they rather manifest on their own—
primariness (awwaliyya) is not part of their meaning and is
discerned by scrutiny of their essences. Therefore, it is
possible that their primariness be subject to inattention or
denial, as it is possible that one would clarify or draw
attention (tanbīh) towards it.
One example of such primary knowledge is the
acknowledgement of basic reality. As mentioned earlier,
the human being’s knowledge respecting the basic reality,
which is the boundary between sophistry and realism, is
primary (awwalī), since every effort to establish reality
through rational argument or to express doubt, ambiguity,
or denial about it presupposes the existence of reality.
Otherwise, the premises will not have any objective
meaning.
 91
Thus, the existence of reality is indemonstrable; and what
can be done in this regard is to draw one’s attention
(tanbīh). However, drawing attention, on its own right,
does not reveal a new proposition, and it merely calls
attention to one of its attributes, that is, its primariness
(awwaliyya). In other words, the course of drawing
attention (tanbīh) to the acknowledgement of basic reality
is not a route from not knowing to knowing; it is a route
from inattentiveness to attentiveness.
Drawing attention toward the existence of reality is drawing
attention towards an actuality that one has known from the
beginning and has simply been inattentive towards it.
Similar to the primariness (awwaliyya) of man’s knowledge
of the existence of reality—which does not undermine its
epistemic worth in the conceptual framework, but rather by
lending credence to the acquired knowledge, places it at the
zenith of this category of knowledge—the primariness
(awwaliyya) and non-questionability of man’s cognition
with regard to God is a claim that does not rest on
discrediting acquired knowledge.
The argument devoted to substantiate this claim is the
Demonstration of the Veracious (burhān al-siddiqīn),
which, as will come, is not an argument that intends to
prove the Divine existence. Rather, it calls attention
towards the fact that He is a reality Who is axiomatic in all
conditions, and “therefore, wherever you turn there is the
face of God,”1 “and He is with you wherever you be.”2 It
draws attention to the fact that although His essence is
hidden from everything, He is more evident than any other
thing in all stages and worlds, including the world of
concepts; and this theophony (tajallī) is in such an extreme
manifestation that the clarity and meaningfulness of all
other concepts owes to Him.
The journey of inquiry towards God in the demonstration of
the veracious is not a journey from ignorance towards

1 2: 115
2 57: 4
 92
knowledge; rather, it is a journey from inattentiveness to
attentiveness. This demonstration (burhān) draws attention
towards the necessity of veridicality of a proposition that
relates the existence of God and acknowledges that the
veridicality of other discursive, self-evident, or even
primary necessities is indebted to this eternal necessity.
In the light of this discourse, how is it possible to infer the
futility of acquired knowledge and exaltedness and
superiority of God from the horizon of concepts from the
verses, which as attested by the brilliant insights of the
Islamic philosophers, call toward the demonstration of the
veracious and speak of an open and manifest theophony
(tajallī) in the human being’s reasonability?

Difference between the Arguments of Divine Existence

and the Arguments of His Attributes
The difference between the notions of God’s existence and
the notions that indicate His attributes makes it possible for
His existence to be proved with arguments other than the
ones that prove His attributes such as unity (tawhīd), life
(hayāt), knowledge (‛ilm), power (qudra), wisdom (hikma),
and so forth. Additionally, it also makes it possible for the
arguments, which demonstrate the identity (‛ayniyya) of His
Essential attributes, to differ from the arguments, which
indicate the identity of His attributes and Essence.
Lack of attention to this point has led many theologians to
define God by some of His Essential and even practical
attributes; and this has further checked them from
discriminating between the arguments that prove the Divine
Essence and the ones that prove His attributes.
For instance, in the definition of God, which is of course a
lexical definition (al-ta‛rīf al-lafdhī), attributes such as
unity (tawhīd), knowledge (‛ilm), autonomy (ikhtiyār), or
even things such as good and evil that pertain to God’s
practical attributes, have been mentioned. Then without
any consideration to the arguments that bear the
responsibility of proving or negating these attributes, the
demonstrations (barāhīn) that are solely concerned with the
 93
affirmation of God’s existence and do not indicate His
attributes have been criticized for proving a deity who does
not fit their definition. This has led many to presume that
the Deity, which is proved through philosophical and
rational arguments, is not the same Deity that is the object
of religious worship.
This lack of differentiation between the notion of God’s
existence and the notions, which denote His attributes
further leads to a fresh complication: On the grounds of the
differences of various societies and faiths regarding the
attributes of the Deity, their consensus on the existence of
the Deity is negated.
If the difference between the notion of Divine existence and
notions of His Essential or practical attributes is
acknowledged, first, the common tenets shared across
diverse religious faiths can be traced; and secondly, the axis
of dialogue and argument on the issues of disagreement can
be identified. This is because it is possible that many
people have a complete consensus and a common veridical
opinion with regard to a phenomenon, while differing about
its attributes and accidents, with some of them being right
and some wrong.
Islamic philosophers demonstratively prove extensional
identity (al-‛ainiyya al-misdāqiyya) of Divine attributes and
further hold that these attributes are identical with the
Divine Essence; nevertheless, they have differentiated
between the notion of Divine Essence and the notions of
His attributes and have established specific demonstrations
(barāhīn) for each instance. Therefore, they have not
confused the differences of the various religious faiths
regarding the attributes of the Necessary with their
consensus regarding the existence of His Essence.
The philosophical and kalāmi terms, which are used to refer
to the Divine existence, have primary (awwalī) and self-
evident (badīhī) meanings. For instance, the term
Necessary Existent (al-Wājib al-Wujūd) is derived from the
words necessity and existence, which have primary
concepts; that is, they cannot be defined by words that
 94
would have more clarity than themselves, and the human
being abstracts them by the intuitive discernment (al-idrāk
al-hudhūrī) of his own reality.
The meaning of necessity is “must” which like the
meaning of existence is known to everyone, and is a
comparable dyad of possibility, which corresponds to
“perhaps”.
Something for which existence is necessary is a necessary
existent (al-wājib al-wujūd) and is in contrast to something
for which existence is not necessary. Something for which
existence is not necessary, either nonexistence (‛adam) is
necessary for it, or neither existence nor nonexistence is
necessary for it. The former is an impossible existent (al-
mumtani‛ al-wujūd), and the later is a contingent existent
(al-mumkin al-wujūd).
If the notion of the necessary existent has an external
extension, it reflects a reality which, as put by Imam Ali,
peace be with him, in Nahj al-Balāgha, is neither
dependent upon another entity nor caused by it; and
evidently, such an entity will possess numerous positive
(al-sifāt al-thubūtiyya) and negative attributes (al-sifāt
al-salbiyya), which have to be investigated in the
discussions of His attributes.
Among the first attributes, which are proved for the
Necessary (al-Wājib) after the affirmation of His existence,
is His unity (tawhīd); and a monotheist is a person who, in
addition to the acceptance of God’s existence,
acknowledges and believes in His unity.
The existence of the Necessary as an actual external entity
is proved by demonstrations, which attest to His ontological
reality; and unity (tawhīd), infinitude (lā mahdūdiyya),
omnipotence (qudra), autonomy (ikhtiyār), will (irāda), life
(hayāt), justice (‛adl), and the like are His Essential and
practical attributes which are proved through arguments
other than the arguments of His existence.
Someone who witnesses the necessary and infinite
existence of Allah through shuhūd can adjust his faith
based on his shuhūd. However, if despite the
 95
comprehensive Divine presence, he is unable to view that
expansive factuality, which realizes the reality of the world,
including his own, then in order to believe in God, he has
no option but to take recourse to the rational approach.
First, such a person has to discern the concepts of existence
(wujūd), nonexistence (‛adam), necessity (dharūra),
contingency (imkān), and so forth, and through them
conceive the notion of the Necessary, and then rationally
deduce the existence of His extension. Nevertheless,
reason will eventually disclose to him that the
acknowledgement of an entity, which has eternal necessity,
has always been with him and he has been simply
inattentive towards it. At this stage, it becomes clear to him
that these arguments played little role other than mere
elimination of inattention, and in reality, they have proved
the primariness (awwaliyya) of his cognition with respect to
a reality Whose Essence and the Essential knowledge is the
nafs al-amr1 of all knowledge, and all propositions
including the principle of non-contradiction owe their
necessity to His eternal necessity (al-dharūra al-azaliyya).2

1 Nafs al-Amr Literally meaning “the thing itself.” In order to be

veridical, a proposition has to correspond to reality; however, this
reality is sometimes the external world and sometimes the mind.
For instance, there are certain propositions—such as “The
Almighty Necessary exists” or “Brazil is in South America”, that
the realm of their truth or falsehood is the external world; and
there are other propositions that the only abode of their truth of
falsehood is the mind, such as, “Universal concepts are either
accidents or substances.” Each of these propositions, if true,
corresponds to its own specific realm of applicability, which is its
nafs al-amr. *
2 See Chapter Seven for the explanation of eternal necessity. *
 97

Chapter Three

THE DEMONSTRATION OF
CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY
 99

Notions of Contingency and Necessity and Signs of Con-

tingency

When we observe things, which exist in the external world,

including those in the nature, we notice that, by virtue of
their essence, existence and nonexistence are not necessary
for them. The truth of this claim is attested by their
generation (hudūth) and corruption (fasād), that is, the fact
that at a time, they did not exist, then they found existence;
and at a certain time, they will perish. If existence was
necessary for them, they would not have been preceded or
followed by nonexistence; and by the same token, if
nonexistence was necessary for them, they would have
never existed.
As explained earlier, an entity for which existence and
external reality is necessary is called the necessary existent
(al-wājib al-wujūd); and if nonexistence is necessary for it,
it is an impossible existent (al-mumtani‛ al-wujūd); and if
neither existence nor nonexistence is necessary for it, it is a
contingent entity (al-mumkin al-wujūd).
Though the notions of hudūth and corruption are different
from the notion of contingency (imkān), these two
attributes are found only in contingent entities. However,
this is not to say that every contingent (mumkin) is hādith,
because it is possible to conceive of a contingent, which
does not have temporal hudūth and is above temporal
changes. For instance, the Divine favor and compassion—
as instanced by, “ever-favoring to the creation,”1—is
eternal and beyond temporal limitations; the incorporeal
human soul, that even if hādith, will remain in Paradise or
Hell forever; and the Divine Face which according to the
verse, “But will remain forever the Face of thy Lord, the
Glorious and Gracious,”2 has eternal Glory and Grace.

1 Al-Qummī, Shaykh ‛Abbās. Mafātīh al-Jinān. Friday Eve Supplica-

tions.
2 55: 27
 100
Making a note of this point makes it easy to differentiate
between the demonstration of contingency and necessity
(burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb) and the demonstration of
hudūth (burhān al-hudūth). The demonstration of
contingency and necessity centers on the middle term of
contingency (imkān), outlined by the generation and
corruption of finite beings; and the demonstration of hudūth
proceeds from the hudūth of various things.
Contingency is also provable without taking hudūth and
corruption into consideration. When the essence of a
particular (juz’ī) entity, such as a tree or a human being, is
conceived, and none of the two contradictory sides of
existence and nonexistence is integral to it, it can be
inferred that although in the external world the particular
thing is either existent or nonexistent, however, by virtue of
its essence, it is without and equidistant to both sides of
contradiction. This characteristic—the vacancy of the
essence from existence and nonexistence, which is
followed by its equidistance to existence and
nonexistence—is the source of derivation of the quality of
contingency (imkān).
Further contemplation in this regard would illustrate that
any external entity the essence (dhāt) and essential parts
(dhātiyyāt) of which are conceivable by the mind and can
assume mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) is
contingent, because if the essence or essential parts of a
certain thing can exist by mental existence, given the
impossibility of the transfer of external existence (al-wujūd
al-khārijī) to the mind, existence and external reality are
not its essence, and are rather outside the boundaries of its
essence.
The essence of something to which external reality and
existence are necessary and inseparable from cannot
transfer to the mind, because real existence projects effects,
and mental existence does not produce effects; and a single
object, while being the source of many effects, cannot be
devoid of producing any effects. Therefore, the mind
cannot apprehend the essence and reality of something,
 101
which does not come into it; the only thing it can do after
its intuitive discernment, is to derive a notion from it and
through that notion, which may be at an extreme state of
self-evidence, reflect the external reality, which is in
extreme occultation. An example is the reality of existence,
the essence of which is in extreme disguise from the mind,
but the notion of which is self-evident and primary. The
Divine sage al-Sabzawārī, with regard to the reality of
existence, says,

Its notion is among things most self-

evident
While its essence is in extreme
concealment1

Even if not hādith, and rather eternal and everlasting,

something whose quiddity (māhiyya) can transfer to the
mind, and the mind can fathom the profundities of its
essence, given that it can shift from the external mode of
existence (al-wujūd al-khārijī) to its mental mode while
maintaining its essence, has to be separable from external
existence. Existence and nonexistence cannot be included
in the essence of such a thing, or say, such an essence or
quiddity is equidistant towards existence and nonexistence,
and therefore, contingent.

Argument from Contingents to the Necessary

Something that existence and nonexistence are not parts of
its essence, and has equidistance towards the two, cannot
become existent or nonexistent by virtue of its essence.
That is, if not for an external causal efficacy (al-‛illiyya al-
fā‛iliyya), which would necessitate either existence or
nonexistence for it and characterize it with one of the two
qualities, its essence can be neither existent nor
nonexistent. Otherwise, it will mean that while a thing is

1Al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mulla Hādī. Sharh al-Mandhūma. (Qum:

Maktabat al-Mustafawī), the section on Hikmah, 9.
 102
equidistant towards existence and nonexistence, it has
existence or nonexistence, and therefore, it is devoid of
equidistance towards the two. The concurrence of
equidistance and non-equidistance is conjunction of
contradictories (ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain), which is impossible.
Therefore, in order to exist or not to exist, every contingent
entity (mumkin) needs the causal efficacy of an external
agency. The agency that necessitates its existence is its
existential cause; and the agency that necessitates its
nonexistence is the cause of its nonexistence. In the
discussions of causation, however, it is proved that the
cause of something’s nonexistence is the absence of its
existential cause, and not a real and factual entity on its
own.
It follows that every contingent needs a being other than
itself and until that “other” (ghair) does not remove its
need, it does not come into existence. Therefore, wherever
there is a contingent in the external world, the other, which
has removed its need and has provided it with existence,
also exists.
As indicated earlier, this argument can be derived from
sermon 186 of Nahj al-Balāgha. At one section of the
sermon it is stated, “Everything, which is known by virtue
of its essence, is crafted; and everything, which stands in
something other than itself, is caused.” That is, something
the essence of which can come into the mind, as explained
earlier, cannot have existence as its essence; and therefore,
its existence is caused by some agency other than itself.
It should be noted that the “other” upon which the
contingent entity is dependent and which satisfies its need
cannot be another contingent. Since a contingent entity has
equidistance towards existence and nonexistence, and
something that itself has equidistance towards existence
and nonexistence, cannot impel another entity that has
equidistance towards existence and nonexistence out of the
state of equidistance. Rather, in order to depart from the
state of equidistance, every equidistant entity needs a non-
equidistant entity.
 103
Just as existence and nonexistence are not the essential
parts of contingents, and therefore, they have equidistance
towards existence and nonexistence, likewise, creation
(ījād) and annihilation (in‛edām) are not inherent in them,
and they have equidistance towards the two. Therefore, the
creation or annihilation of a contingent cannot be attributed
to another contingent. Were this possible, it would mean
that a contingent entity, which is equidistant towards
creation and annihilation, is not equidistant towards them,
which is an obvious conjunction of contradictories.
In order to enter the domain of existence, contingents
require the causal efficacy of an external agency, or say, an
“other,” which causes their existence; and the other, which
causes their existence, cannot be a contingent phenomenon.
With regard to the negation of causality of a contingent
with respect to another contingent, ‛Abd al-Razzāq al-
Lāhijī, the author of Shawāriq al-Ilhām, narrates these two
principles from Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī: “A thing is not
existent until it exists. And until it is existent, it cannot
create.” That is, since the contingent is devoid of existence,
it is not existent. And since it is not existent, it cannot
bestow existence either.
A contingent can only create when it depends on an
external “other,” which cannot be a contingent. Therefore,
existence and creation of a contingent is only conceivable
when it is established by and dependent upon “another”,
which does not have an equal relation towards existence
and nonexistence, and in other words, for which existence
is necessary.
The articulation of the demonstration (burhān) in this
fashion, without any reliance on impossibility of circular or
regressive causality, first, proves the Necessary, and then
proves the finitude of the series of contingent entities that
are mediates (wasā’it) in the act of creation. And if, as is
the case, in some of its versions, the argument proceeds
from invaldiation of circularity (daur) and regress
(tasalsul), it is not because these two are critical in the
cogency of the demonstration. Rather, it is meant to
 104
facilitate the comprehension and indoctrination of the
demonstration. Therefore, even if circularity (daur) and
regress (tasalsul) were not considered void, the
demonstration of contingency and necessity would still
maintain its tenability.
The need of contingents for the “other” is in the form of a
universal affirmative proposition (al-qadhiyya al-mūjiba al-
kulliyya). It does not pertain to the totality of the world, so
the fact that totality exists only in the mind could
undermine its cogency. Rather, it pertains to every entity
that has equidistance towards existence and nonexistence.
Given the universality of this need, the existence of these
entities, which by virtue of their essences are equidistant to
existence and nonexistence, cannot be explained on the
score of a specific contingent, since every contingent that
may be used in the answer is already included in the
universal affirmative proposition. If the existence of a
particular contingent entity were to be explained, it would
be imaginable to suggest another contingent thing as the
reason of its existence. Nevertheless, since the question
pertains to the entirety of contingent entities, it is only
answerable with an entity that is not included in the
aggregate, that is, an entity to which the quality of
contingency does not apply and existence for which is
necessary.

Instrumentality of the Mediates and the Efficacy of the

Necessary
Quidditative contingency (al-imkān al-māhuwī), which is
the middle term of the demonstration of contingency and
necessity, is a necessary and inseparable property of the
quiddity (māhiyya). That is, equidistance towards existence
and nonexistence is an essential property (al-‛aradh
al-dhātī) of quiddity, so much so that even when due to an
external causal efficacy it finds existence and is rearranged
from the position of equidistance, its essence remains
devoid of existence and nonexistence and continues to be
characterized by contingency. This is because even after
 105
creation (ījād), existence does not become the essence
(dhāt) or an essential part (juz’ al-dhāt) of the quiddity; and
therefore, its need for external causal efficacy continues.
Al-Shabistarī, in Gulshan Raz says in this regard:

God, the Exalted, is Witness to the

truth of my words
Disgrace leaves not the contingent in
the two worlds1

If a quiddity which comes into existence through the

creation of an external agency should be an instrument (āla)
for the existence of another quiddity, this mediation
(wasāta) in creation cannot pertain to its contingent
essence. It is brought by that agency, which is needless and
independent in His existence and creation. From this
vantage point, it is clear that the instrumentality
(sababiyya) and mediation (wasāta) of contingents in
relation to one another is not such that would place God,
the Free-of-Need Origin, at the top of the causal series and
the contingent intermediates one after the other in a
successive manner. Thus, no contingent is a mediate in the
transfer of grace (faidh) by virtue of its essence; and given
that they are sustained by the Necessary (al-Wājib) and
recipient of His grace, the Origin is present within the
context of their instrumentality and mediation.
The mediation of instruments in the transfer of Divine
grace is not like the mediation of pipes in transfer of water.
A tap takes water from pipelines that are instruments
between the tap and the reservoir. No contingent in the
series of contingents possesses the existence that has to be
transferred to the next contingent; rather, the Divine grace
is present within the series and nearer to each one of its
units than any other unit. “Nowhere taketh place any secret
counsel between three [persons] but He is the fourth of

1Shabistarī, Shaykh Mahmūd. Gulshan Rāz. (Tehran: Mahmudī

Books, 1981), 7.
 106
them, nor between five, but He is the sixth, nor [between]
less than that, nor [between] more but He is with them
wherever they may be.”1
If efficacy and creation of the Being, which is free of need
and dependence, that is, the Necessary Existent (al-Wājib
al-wujūd), were limited to the creation of the first
contingent entity—which would, in turn, create the second
contingent, which would, in turn, create the third, and so
on—and the series of contingents existed in a successive
fashion without any temporal distance between its units, it
would suggest that the Necessary grants existence and
creation to the essence of the contingent. It would further
follow that the contingent, by receiving the grace (faidh),
loses its state of equidistance and essential contingency.
Moreover, it would imply that the Free-of-Need Origin is at
the top of the series and is one of its many units; and His
grace is the source of the grace, which descends from the
first contingent to the second and then to other creatures.
This would translate to the view that His essence and grace
are limited to the top of the successive series. Nonetheless,
both corollaries are corrupt, since quidditative contingency
(al-imkān al-māhuwī), as explained earlier, contrary to
potentiality (al-iste‛dād), is an attribute that does not
separate from the contingent. Additionally, infinitude of
the Necessary and boundlessness of His grace, which are
proved in the discussions of His attributes, do not reconcile
with Him being confined to the first member of the putative
series.
To call the instrumentality (sababiyya) and mediation
(wasāta) of instruments (asbāb) and mediates (wasā’it)
between the first efficient cause and its effect causality is
for the sake of facilitating teaching and learning. In fact,
these mediates resemble mirrors that merely exhibit the
emanation of Divine grace and His exclusive rule, and by
virtue of their essences, none of them have any role in
creation; and thus, no mediate is a true efficient cause. In

1 58: 7
 107
other words, ascription of causal efficacy to mediates—
similar to ascription of existence to contingents—is in view
of the association of Divine grace with them, and more
accurately, in view of the manifestation of Divine grace in
them. Therefore, such ascription is figurative.

Hudūth of the Mediates and Eternity of the Divine

Grace
The demonstration of contingency and necessity (burān
al-imkān wa al-wujūb) illustrates that the need and
dependence of an effect on its cause owes to its
contingency (imkān). And since contingency is inseparable
from the contingent quiddity, as long as a contingent is
graced with existence, its intense dependence and need to
its existential cause continues. For this reason, the efficient
cause has presence and authority over all conditions of its
effect, and the effect’s need is not limited to a specific
condition, such as the moment of its hudūth.
The Sustentative Authority (al-ihāta al-qayūmiyya) of the
efficient cause over its effect negates the existence of a
horizontal relationship between the two. Causal efficacy is
not perceivable between entities that come into being one
after another in the course of time in a successive series,
because during the entire period of its existence, the effect
is needful to its existential cause. However, the temporally
successive entities follow one another, and the existence of
the following entity coincides with the nonexistence of the
preceding entity. How can something that exists now be
the effect of an efficient cause that does not exist any more?
The causality, which the non-philosophic minds assign to
temporally successive series, is not, in fact, something to
which the effect owes its existence. In philosophical
parlance, things that come into existence and events that
happen in a temporal sequence—such as parents who are
conditions of the inception of their and their children’s
children—are considered conditions and supplementary
causes (al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda); and the efficient cause of every
 108
entity is the Necessary Being Who is with the effect all its
life long. “And He is with you wherever you be.”1
It can be inferred from this discussion that the
supplementary causality (al-‘illiyya al-e‛dādiyya) of things,
which are horizontal to contingents, unlike the causality of
something that may be vertical to them, is not by virtue of
their essence. Rather, it pertains to that very infinite and
expansive Divine grace and “One Command”2, which has
manifested in the image of mediates and conditions. The
Majestic Qur’ān, in view of this reality, denies the causality
and mediation of conditions and instruments such as
parents and farmers in the generation of children and crops,
and reserves this role for the Almighty Allah: “Have ye
seen what ye emit [the life germ]? Is it ye that create or are
We the Creators? … Have ye seen what ye sow? What! Is
it ye that grow it or are We the Growers?”3
After proving the Necessary through the demonstration of
contingency and necessity (burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb),
the finitude of the vertical succession of instruments and
conditions can be established. Al-Fārābī has argued for the
finitude of vertical causes on the same grounds.4 However,
the finitude of conditions and supplementary causes that are
horizontal to each other cannot be justified on the same
account. For this reason, the infinite succession of
dependent entities along the course of eons is compatible
with the demonstration of contingency and necessity.
Because if there is an infinite succession of dependent
entities, not only it cannot suggest finitude for the Divine

1 57: 4
2 Derived from the holy verse, “Our command is but one.” 54:50
3 56: 58–63
4 Al-Fārābī, Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad. Zainūn al-

Kabīr. (Hyderabad Dakhan: The Uthmanī Encyclopedia Council

Press, 1926), 4.
 109
grace, rather it will indicate the boundlessness and eternity
of God’s grace. “And every favor of Yours is eternal.”1
Such eternity, like the everlasting life of the Paradise-
dwellers, does not pertain to the essence of contingents. It
owes to the Divine grace and benevolence and its
attribution to the world and creatures is figurative (majāzī).
Because if eternity is ascribed to the essence of the
contingent entities, contingency—which is an essential
property (al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of quiddity—gives place to
necessity. This follows that an essential property (al-‛aradh
al-dhātī), that is, contingency, is not an essential property,
which is a conjunction of contradictories.
This argument would have indicated the impossibility of
the eternity of the world, if the Divine grace were solely
availed to a single contingent entity. However, in the
infinite series of supplementary causes (al-‛ilal al-mu‛idda),
such an entity does not exist, as in the successive series,
every entity is subject to change and mutability and every
unit generates and corrupts. As far as the putative series or
whole is concerned, it is a mental concept which, as a result
of perception of multiplicities, is brought about in the mind
and does not have any external reality over and above the
units of the series. Therefore, in the course of temporally
successive hādiths, an entity the eternity of which alone
may reflect the infinite grace does not exist. For this
reason, the Divine grace and favor is eternal, but their
recipients, by virtue of their essences, are in absolute
nihility and nonexistenc; and it is by Divine grace that the
natural world, which is the world of change and flux,
generates and corrupts at every moment. With regard to
this, says al-Sabzawārī his Al-Mandhūma,

His Benevolence is eternal and

perpetual

1 Al-Qummī, Shaykh ‛Abbās. Mafātīh al-Jinān. The Supplication

for the Dawns of the Holy Month of Ramadhan.
 110
While the recipient is ever-perishing
and nihil1

Criticisms and Evaluations

The demonstration of contingency and necessity revolves
around the essential contingency of quiddities. The main
characteristic of this demonstration is the fact that it does
not depend on a specific phenomenon such as motion,
design, hudūth, and so forth. Its focal point is the relation
of essence of entities with existence and being real.
This demonstration has entered western philosophical
thought in the Middle Ages through the works of Ibn Rushd
(Averroës) and the Christian theologian Thomas Aquinas.
Later in the modern western philosophy, it became subject
to scrutiny and criticism. In addition to its western
critiques, the demonstration of contingency and necessity
has also been evaluated by Islamic philosophers.
The criticisms of the demonstration of contingency and
necessity in Islamic philosophy apply to some of its
versions, not to the exposition we presented. In some
versions of the demonstration, the impossibility of circular
and regressive causation has not been relied upon and the
series of contingent entities has been considered as a
totality. Such versions have been subject to criticism that
the series is a mental concept, and in the external world, it
does not have a reality over and above its units; in other
words, in the external world, an entity such as the series or
aggregate, the contingency of which would lead to its
existential cause, does not exist.
Some versions of the demonstration rely upon the
impossibility of circular and regressive causation. This has
encouraged the proponents of the possibility of causal
regress (al-tasalsul al-‛illī) to criticize the demonstration.
However, first, the impossibility of regressive causation is
not deniable, because although not every causal series is

1Al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mulla Hādī. Sharh al-Mandhūma. (Qum:

Maktabat al-Mustafawī), the section on Hikmah, 322.
 111
impossible, a series that is characterized by the three
qualities of infinity, causal relationship between its
members, and coexistence of its members at the same time,
is impossible for the reasons given at its appropriate place.
Second, the demonstration’s cogency does not really
depend on the impossibility of circular or regressive
causation, and its usage has a mere educational purpose.
As on the one hand criticisms of the demonstration of
contingency and necessity in contemporary western
philosophy indicate their lack of understanding of the
argument, on the other, it stands for the defective and faulty
translations of intimations that are grounds of common
consensus amongst the luminaries of Divine wisdom.
In some translations, other arguments, such as the
demonstrations (barāhīn) of motion and hudūth have been
mentioned under the title of demonstration of contingency
and necessity; and then criticisms, which may apply to
them, have been presumed to be valid with respect to the
demonstration of contingency and necessity. At other
instances, the demonstration of contingency and necessity
has been differentiated from another argument, which has
been named ‘the argument of causality’. While causation
(‛illiyya) is a common principle that is used in every
argument, including the demonstration of contingency and
necessity, and it does not constitute an independent
argument horizontal to the demonstration of contingency
and necessity and other arguments.
In addition to the fact that the tenability of most theistic
arguments, such as the demonstrations of hudūth, motion,
design, and so forth, presupposes the validity of the
principle of causation, should the very principle of
causation be disputed, the necessary relationship between
an argument’s premises and the conclusion thereof will be
subject to doubt. This would jar the path of reason and
rationality on the one hand, and make critique irrelevant as
well. This is because every argument is based on the causal
rapport between its premises and the conclusion thereof,
and every criticism must have a demonstrative form. If the
 112
principle of causation is not accepted, there will be no way,
as explained fully before, to prove or negate anything.
In order to prevent confusion between the demonstrations
of Divine Essence and those of His attributes and disallow
the expectations of proving Divine attributes from the
arguments of His essence, it is important to differentiate
between the notion of Divine Essence and notions, which
reflect His attributes. Moreover, in order to critique or
defend an argument in its own context and ensure that
different arguments are not confused with one another, the
content of every argument’s premises must be preserved.
The middle terms of the demonstrations of hudūth, motion,
and contingency and necessity are different from one
another; and, as it will come, their conclusions are not
identical either. The tenability of the demonstrations of
hudūth and motion is indebted to the demonstration of
contingency and necessity, so much so that without this
adduction they fail to prove the Necessary.

Evaluation of Hume’s Criticism

The version of the demonstration of contingency and
necessity, which has come in this work, illustrates the
corruption and invalidity of the criticism advanced by some
a western theologian and philosophizer. The criticism
asserts that if the world’s parts are equidistant towards
existence and nonexistence, and therefore are characterized
by contingency and need to an external causality, the same
does not necessarily have to be true about their ensemble,
since there is no evidence to suggest that the parts and the
ensemble are governed by the same rules. For instance, it
cannot be generalized from the fact that every human being
has a mother that the entire human race has also a mother.
The critic has presumed that the argument is based on
quidditative contingency of the totality of world’s parts,
whereas the demonstration (burhān) proceeds from the
premise that without the efficacy of an external agency, a
contingent entity cannot come into existence. This
proposition speaks of all contingent beings, not their whole,
 113
because the whole does not even exist. And since it does
not exist, it is neither necessary nor contingent, and
therefore, it does not have a need of another. This lack of
need is a negative proposition the subject of which does not
exist, what we call a negative proposition by the
nonexistence of its subject (al-sāliba bi intifā‛ al-maudhū‛).
Obviously, although the ensemble of the contingent
entities, which is a mental concept, does not exist in the
external world, it does have a mental existence under the
auspices of the existence of knowledge. In this shadowy
existence (al-wujūd al-dhillī), the title of aggregate is
predicated to it by predication as essence (al-haml
al-awwalī al-dhātī), not by predication as extension
(al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī). Therefore, on its own right,
being contingent entity, it is a member of the series of
contingent entities and an extension for the mentioned
proposition. As explained during the exposition of the
demonstration (burhān), every contingent entity the
quiddity of which is entertained, since the said proposition
is applicable to it, it is characterized by need and
dependence and can be realized only through the causal
efficacy of a reality, which is not characterized by this
quality and is, by virtue of its essence, needless and
independent.
Even if the aggregate of contingents were not a mere
mental existence and were real and external, the said
proposition will still be applicable to it. This further
strengthens the demonstration (burhān), since in this case,
the aggregate of the world is a real and a non-reified
quiddity, the existence or nonexistence of which is
conceivable without any contradiction, and therefore, is
equidistant towards existence and nonexistence. It follows
that the preponderance of either existence or nonexistence
over the other requires a preponderant that will justify the
preponderance.
This illustrates that the criticism, which is related from
Hume, is not applicable to the demonstration of
contingency and necessity. Hume contends that we have
 114
never experimented the totality of the world so the claim of
its need to an external causal efficacy could be justifiable.
This criticism can be considered valid only if the argument
were based on the contingency of the aggregate of the
contingent entities; whereas first, the aggregate lacks
external existence; and second, the aggregate of the
contingent entities has not been used in this demonstration
(burhān) as a premise; and third, even if the aggregate
existed and were used in the argument, contingency and
need would be its essential properties, and apprehension of
these properties does not require experiment.

The Denial of Philosophic Meaning of Necessity and its

Answer
Another criticism directed at the demonstration of
contingency and necessity asserts that necessity is a logical
category, and an existential proposition cannot be narrated
with logical necessity. It claims that if existence was
necessary for God, the proposition “God is nonexistent”
would be self-contradictory, and “God exists” will be
logically necessary and true, whereas we can doubt God’s
existence.
In other words, necessity is a logical concept that describes
the modality of tautological propositions, and it cannot be
used to reflect external existence of things. There is
nothing, Hume argues, the existence of which is
demonstrable and whatever we conceive of as existent, we
can conceive of as nonexistent. For instance, we can
conceive, without any contradiction, of God’s nonexistence
even if this may imply the nonexistence of the world.
Whereas, if existence had logical necessity for God, the
conception of His nonexistence would certainly entail
contradiction.
In order to answer this criticism, it has to be established
that necessity has a common meaning in logic and
philosophy. Necessity is used in philosophy with the same
meaning that describes modality of propositions in logic.
Furthermore, necessity is an axiomatic concept, which
 115
philosophy first proves its existence, and then logic
presupposes its truth as a lemma borrowed from
philosophical discussions, and explains its various types.
It was elucidated earlier that necessity, possibility, and
impossibility are axiomatic concepts and do not have real
definitions. However, because philosophy is the study of
existence, the division of existent things into necessary,
contingent, and impossible is a philosophical inquiry.
Appraisal of things in relation to existence in the form of
two exclusive disjunctive propositions (al-munfasila al-
haqīqiyya) results in the division of things into necessary,
contingent, and impossible; and the same appraisal in the
form of one exclusive disjunctive proposition results in the
dichotomy of things into necessary and contingent entities.
These entire divisions center on the principle of non-
contradiction; that is, the impossibility of conjunction and
negation of contradictories (istehāla ijtimā‛ wa irtefā‛ al-
naqīdhain). Since either existence is necessary for a thing,
or it is not; if it is not, then either nonexistence is necessary
for it or it is not. On the other hand, either existence is
necessary for an existent thing, or it is not. However, if
existence is not necessary for it, nonexistence cannot be
necessary for it, as it exists. Therefore, if an existent entity
is not necessary, since it cannot have necessity of
nonexistence, it is a contingent entity.
After philosophy depicts these divisions in a demonstrative
format and narrates the external existence of the last two
kinds, logic, in the province of its inquiry—which is the
mental concepts—identifies their extensions (masādīq) and
puts forth thirteen kinds of necessary propositions.
Some mutakellimūn, such as al-Qādhī Adhud al-Ijī in his
Al-Mawāqif, have presumed that there is a difference
between philosophical and logical necessity.1 Al-Ijī holds
that if necessity had an identical meaning in philosophy as
well as in logic, then in instances where essential parts

1Al-Jurjānī, al-Syed al-Sharīf Ali ibn Muhammad. Sharh al-Mawāqif.

(Qum: Sharif Radhī Publications, 1992), vol. 3, 121.
 116
(dhātiyyāt) or essential properties (lawāzaim al-dhat or al-
‛awāridh al-dhātiyya) of a thing are predicated to it, it
would mean that the thing is a necessary being. For
example, the proposition “Four is necessarily even” would
indicate that four has necessity of existence.
Sadr al-Din al-Shirāzī, in the discussions of modality of the
noble book of Al-Asfār, has rejected al-Iji’s presumption as
false and has made it clear that necessity has one meaning;
however, in every case it corresponds to its predicate and
subject.1 If it is stated that, for instance, four is necessarily
even, it does not imply that four is necessarily existent.
Rather it means that four is necessarily even. Therefore,
what has been implied is tenable, and what is untenable has
not been implied.
Logic’s (al-mantiq) dependence on philosophy in the
subject of necessity resembles its dependence on
philosophy in the subject of predication (haml). In the
discussions of unity (wahda) and multiplicity (kathra),
existence is divided into one and multiple. Then unity and
multiplicity are divided into various kinds. Among the
types of unity (wahda), there is individual unity (al-wahda
al-shakhsiyya), specie unity (al-wahda al-nau‛iyya), genus
unity (al-wahda alj-jinsiyya), sheer unity (al-wahda
al-mahdha), and the unity that encompasses multiplicity.
This last kind of unity is called “it-is-itness” (hū-hūwiyya).
“It-is-itness” is predication, which is either as essence (al-
haml al-awwalī) or as extension (al-haml al-shā’y ). Logic
takes predication as granted and formulates its discussions
on its basis; nonetheless, the affirmation of predication
itself is not a logical inquiry.
Not only in many of its discussions, but also in the subject
of its study, that is, acquired knowledge or concepts and
judgments, logic is indebted to philosophy, because the
existence of knowledge as well as its division into acquired

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-Hikma al-

Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-Islamiya,
1959), vol. 1, 91.
 117
and intuitive the division of acquired knowledge into
concepts and judgments are philosophical inquiries. The
fact that some of these phenomena are primary or self-
evident does not eclipse their philosophical identity, since
the criterion for including a proposition in a discipline is
the analysis of its subject; if its subject is existence, and the
predicate is assigned to it qua existence, then the
proposition pertains to philosophy.
In short, necessity is a self-evident concept, and the study of
its reality is a philosophic inquiry. Logic uses this
secondary philosophical intelligible (al-ma‛qūl al-thānī
al-falsafī) in the context of predications and copulas of
propositions that are secondary logical intelligibles
(al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-mantiqī).
Although necessity has a single meaning, as indicated
earlier, it has different rules in different instances. The said
criticism originates from the assumption that first, necessity
has a mere logical meaning and does not have a
philosophical usage that would describe external things and
realities, and second, logical necessity is restricted to
analytical propositions where the predicate is included in
the essence of the subject. The critic has presumed that
necessity exists only when a subject is predicated to itself
or to its essential parts, such as “Human is human” or
“Human is an animal.”
According to this presumption, necessity is inevitably
restricted to mental concepts and it cannot reflect the
external reality of things. The reply to this presumption is
that necessity is not exclusive to analytical and tautological
propositions and it can be literally used in the predication of
essential properties (al-a‛rādh al-dhātiyya) of a thing, a
category the scope of which is wider than essential parts.
The essential parts (al-dhātiyyāt) of an essence are things
that are included in its definition (hadd), and their
predication is considered tautology or identity-claim. On
the other hand, essential properties of things—for instance,
contingency (imkān) with respect to finite entities—are
concepts that are not included in their definitions.
 118
Contingency is a concept, which is not an essential part of
finite entities. It is abstracted and predicated to them only
after they are assessed with existence and nonexistence. In
the light of this, it becomes clear that need and dependence
on the external causal efficacy are not concepts that are the
essence or essential parts of contingents, and therefore, they
are their essential properties.
The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not
depend on the rational analysis of conceived notions and
quiddities; rather, it is based on the rational analysis of
realities that exist in the external world. It proceeds from
the assessment of the essences of existent things with
relation to existence and nonexistence. In this
demonstration, even the notion of existence qua notion of
existence is not used, and rather, the notion of existence
qua its external reality is examined.
The arguments that are dedicated to the analysis of Divine
attributes elucidate that the Necessary does not have a
quiddity in addition to His reality and existence; in other
words, His quiddity is His external factuality (al-Wājib
mahiyyatuhu inniyyatuh). Similarly, His necessity does not
have an extension separate from His reality and is nothing
but the severity and extremity of His existence. Therefore,
the usage of necessity in relation to God does not reflect the
modality of predication; it reflects severity, emphasis, and
extremity of a phenomenon that has no reality but
factuality.
Since the critic considers necessity as a mere logical
concept, the usage of which is exclusive to tautological
propositions, he presumes that should God have necessity
of existence, then external existence must be an essential
part of His concept, and its negation, like any other
proposition that takes away the essence or essential part of
a subject, would be self-contradictory.
External existence is not included in the notion of the
Necessary. The necessity, which is involved in the notion
of the Necessary, is not a necessity, which describes the
modality of propositions; it is a necessity, which is sheer
 119
external existence and factuality.1 The notion of the
necessary being, which reflects this sort of necessity, on its
own right, is devoid of such necessity, since although, by
predication as essence it is the Necessary; by predication as
extension, it is a mental phenomenon, which exists in the
sphere of human knowledge, and is a contingent and
perishable.
The demonstration of contingency and necessity does not
proceed from the premise that existence is an essential part
of the notion of the Necessary Being. Since if it were the
case, comprehension of this notion would be simultaneous
to discernment of God’s existence and negation of His

1 Since the author acknowledges that necessity has only one mean-
ing, and it is used in philosophy and logic with that same meaning,
and it is well established that the logical usage of necessity is exclu-
sive to the description of modality of propositions, it seems that
the criticism ought to be answered in the following way: It is
acknowledged that necessity can only describe the modality of
predication, however, the notion of the necessary being comprises,
in fact, a proposition, the modality of which is described by neces-
sity. The necessary being, therefore, stands for “that thing, which
necessarily exists.”
However, it is obvious that this predication is predication
as essence, not predication as extension; and when the critic says
that he can conceive God’s nonexistence without any sort of con-
tradiction, and therefore, existence cannot be necessary for Him,
he means that he can conceive God’s nonexistence by predication
as extension, not by predication as essence. Therefore, he cannot
conclude that since God’s nonexistence, by predication as exten-
sion, is conceivable without any sort of contradiction, existence
cannot be necessary for Him by predication as essence. This is
because the existence of something, which by predication as es-
sence is necessarily existent, cannot be denied by predication as
essence except through self-contradiction; and if such a thing’s
existence is denied by predication as extension, it does not under-
mine the conceptual and propositional premises of the demonstra-
tion. *
 120
existence would be self-contradictory, and there would not
be any need to prove His existence.

Evaluation of the Epistemological Criticism

Another criticism raised against the demonstration of
contingency and necessity stems from certain
epistemological perspectives. It states that the
demonstration would be tenable if it were the case that the
external reality was rationally discernable, and additionally,
rational discernments were representative of external
reality. Nonetheless, if reality is a brute phenomenon with
a complete irrational identity, the argument is not
conclusive.
For instance, the demonstration relies on an exclusive
disjunctive proposition, which divides existent things into
necessary and contingent things. This disjunctive
proposition is contingent upon the principle of non-
contradiction, which relates the impossibility of
conjunction of contradictories. However, the conjunction
of contradictories is a rational judgment about the external
world; should the external world have a brute and irrational
identity, the applicability of this judgment to the external
world, and consequently, the validity of the conclusion of
the demonstration will be subject to doubt.
The answer to this criticism becomes clear by what was
elucidated with regard to epistemic worth of knowledge.
The critic in this criticism has made the entirety of human
knowledge subject to criticism. This distrust, which
proclaims skepticism (shakkākiyya) and devaluates
knowledge, entails nothing but sophism and negation of
reality.
Although this and other similar skeptical and sophist
perspectives dominate the contemporary western thought, it
cannot so much as justify or explain itself. Like the basic
reality, knowledge is a primary phenomenon, such that
there is no way to deny or express skepticism with regard to
it. Though every kind of doubt and skepticism about
knowledge is, by predication as essence, doubt and
 121
skepticism about it, by predication as extension, it is the
undeniable acknowledgement of the reality of knowledge;
and therefore, the basic reality of knowledge cannot be
denied or doubted in any situation.
 123

Chapter Four

THE ARGUMENTS FROM MOTION

AND HUDUTH
 125

Premises of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth

Due to lack of familiarity with the central elements of the
demonstration (burhān), which proceeds from the world’s
contingency, the Judeo-Christian theologians have
considered another set of arguments—such as the argument
from motion (burhān al-haraka), which has no relationship
with the argument based on contingency—of the category
of the demonstration of contingency and necessity.
The argument from motion has been used in the works of
Plato and Socrates, and subsequently, it has been analyzed
in the books of Islamic philosophers. The argument from
hudūth has been advanced in major kalāmi works.
Motion (haraka) is an entity’s gradual transfer from
potentiality (qūwwa) to actuality (fe‛liyya). Transfer from
potentiality to actuality requires an external causal efficacy,
because actuality is an existential perfection (al-kamāl
al-wujūdī) for the mobile entity (al-mutaharrek); and a
mobile entity, which lacks an existential perfection, cannot
come to possess it without an external cause. Therefore, in
order to attain actuality, everything that is marked with
motion is in need of an agency other than itself. If the
agency that is giving motion, that is, the mover (muharrek),
to the mobile is something that itself is characterized by
being in motion, then it will need an external causal
efficacy as well. And since it has been proved that infinite
causal regress (tasalsul) is impossible, the series of
efficient causes ends at an agency, which is not itself in
motion and gives motion to others.
The proponents of the argument from hudūth argue that if
something is hādith, it requires an external efficient cause.
They consider hudūth as the criterion of need for an
external causal efficacy. They maintain that every hādith,
that is, everything that has a temporal origin, must come
into existence through an external cause, and since
regressive (tasalsul) and circular causality (daur) are
impossible, therefore, the succession of hādith entities
concludes at a non-hādith entity.
 126
The argument from hudūth revolves around the notion that
hudūth is a sufficient reason for an effect’s “causedness”
(ma‛lūliyya) or need (ehtiyāj) to external causal efficacy.
That is, the mutakellimūn not only assert that everything
that is hādith and has a temporal origin is an effect, since
this assertion is a matter of consensus by all, rather they
also contend that everything, which is an effect (ma‛lūl) is
hādith and that no effect can be eternal (azalī).

Evaluation of the Argument from Causality

Along the other arguments for the existence of the Deity,
which St. Thomas Aquinas mentions in his Summa
Theologica, he articulates an independent argument, which
proceeds from the principle of causation and the
impossibility of causal regress.1 However, as indicated
earlier, the principle of causation is relied upon in every
argument that is meant to prove God’s existence, and
without presupposing its truth, no argument can yield any
conclusion, because if the principle of causation is doubted,
the gateway of rationality, namely the certainty of attaining
a conclusion from certain premises, is closed.
Therefore, regardless of concepts such as contingency,
hudūth, and motion, which provide the grounds whereby
causation is used; causation is not an independent
philosophical argument. In addition to the reliance of every
argument on the principle of causation, most of the named
arguments further depend on another general rule of
causality, which is the impossibility of regressive and
circular causation. In certain instances in Islamic
philosophy that causation has been the axis of
argumentation, it is either in view of the fact that the
notions of contingency of impoverishment (al-imkān al-
faqrī) and “causedness” apply to an entity from the same
sense, or it is in consideration to the essential independence
or absoluteness of the Necessary. Such arguments are, in

1Taken from Summa Theologica, trans. Laurance Shapcote. (Lon-

don: O. P. Benziger Brothers, 1911).
 127
fact, reducible to the demonstration of contingency of
impoverishment (burhān al-imkān al-faqrī), which will be
discussed later.

Limitations of the Arguments from Motion and Hudūth

The arguments from motion and hudūth do not have the
cogency of the demonstration of contingency and necessity.
First, because these two arguments rely on the impossibility
of regressive and circular causation, whereas the
demonstration of contingency and necessity, as we
articulated, is above such reliance. Second, they do not
prove the Almighty Necessary, and in order to do so, they
have to be adduced by the demonstration of contingency
and necessity.
After the dismissal of causal regress, the argument from
motion entails the existence of a non-moving mover.
Likewise, the argument from hudūth indicates an eternal
creator. Nevertheless, neither of the two indicates whether
the non-moving mover or the eternal creator has necessity
of existence.
The non-moving mover, as proved in Peripatetic
philosophy, or the eternal creator, as discussed in kalāmi
books, can be a body (jism) or a physical form (al-sūra
al-jismiyya), since motion according to Peripatetic
philosophy, and hudūth according to the mutakellimūn are
found in certain accidents (‛awāridh) of physical entities.
Therefore, the arguments from motion and hudūth prove
the need for a mover or creator in accordance with these
accidents.
Hudūth is in the context of change, and if change is
restricted to some accidents of the physique, a creator is
needed only with respect to those accidents. For this
reason, rational analysis of the celebrated argument of the
mutakellimūn,

The world is changing.

Everything is changing is hādith.
Therefore, the world is hādith.
 128
would indicate, in effect, that the argument should run as
follows:

The world’s accidents are changing.

Anything the accidents of which are
changing, is hādith in its accidents.
Therefore, the world is hādith in its
accidents.

Thus, the second syllogism of the mutakellimūn,

The world is hādith.

Every hādith has a creator.
Therefore, the world has a creator.

would indicate that since the essence of the physical world

is not subject to change and hudūth, it does not require a
creator.

The world is hādith in its accidents.

Anything that is hādith in its acci-
dents has a creator for its accidents.
Therefore, the world has a creator for
its accidents.

Thus, the proponents of the arguments from motion and

hudūth cannot respond to the paradox of eternity of matter
or physical form. Given the physical body, which is made
up of form and matter, undergoes change in things that are
outside its essence, such as accidents and kind forms
(al-suwwar al-naw‛iyya), it follows that it only needs a
creator or mover with regard to them.
Kind forms can change infinitely one after another by
generation and corruption (al-kaun wa al-fasād); and
accidents, which according to the mutakellimūn are
changing, can be in motion in a successive regress
 129
1
(al-tasalsul al-ta‛āqubī) . In both instances, motion and
hudūth are outside the essence of body (jism), and
therefore, the body’s need to a mover or creator is
proportionate to the area of its need.
To extend hudūth from accidents and kind forms to the
essence of physiques, the mutakellimūn argue that anything
that bears a hādith accident is hādith. However, they have
failed to notice that if an entity bears a hādith accident, it is
only hādith with respect to that accident. And if hudūth is
ascribed to the essence of the physique, such an ascription
is figurative.
The need of a creator or mover can be proved for matter
and kind forms only from the position of substantial motion
(al-haraka al-jawhariyya), where change and hudūth are
extended from accidents and kind forms to the essence of
physiques.
Ibn Sīnā argues that if everything that bears a hādith is
hādith, as asserted by the mutakellimūn, then God, the
Exalted, must be hādith as well. That is because on the one
hand, the mutakellimūn believe that the world is hādith—
that is, there was God and nothing else and then He desired
and began creating the world—and on the other, they
maintain that the Divine will is a practical attribute, and
therefore, like the world, it is hādith. From this
perspective, God bears hādith accidents, since before
creating the world, He was not the Purposer (al-Murid), and
then He willed to create the world. Though the hādith will
is not an Essential attribute, since they maintain that it is
established by the Divine Essence and the Essence is its
recipient (mahal), the will is born by the Essence.
According to their principle that everything that bears a
hādith is hādith, the Divine Essence must be hādith, as it

1 Successive Regress (al-tasalsul al-ta‛āqubī) It is a sort of regress in

which the units of the series do not exist at the same time, but
rather the existence of the coming unit coincides with the
nonexistence of the former unit. Therefore, such regress is not
impossible. *
 130
bears a hādith phenomenon. Should the mutakellimūn
recourse to deny a mutual necessity between hudūth of the
Essence and hudūth of its will, their argument for the
hudūth of the physical world will fall apart, as they will
lose their rational grounds for tracing the hudūth of the
world to its Creator.
Therefore, the principle “Something which bears a hādith is
hādith” fails to lead to the hudūth of the essence of the
physical world.
Hudūth of the physique’s essence can only be established
through substantial motion (al-haraka al-jawhariyya).
Since according to substantial motion, motion, and hudūth
are extended from accidents and kind forms to the essence
of the physique.
With the establishment of substantial motion, Sadr al-
Muta’allihīn al-Shirāzī ascribes motion and hudūth to the
essence of the natural world. From this vantage point, the
natural world is characterized by a universal and continuous
hudūth; and thus, motion and hudūth are reflected in the
essence, as well as the accidents, of natural entities; and
this yields to the existence of a metaphysical Mover and
Creator.
Expanding the grounds these arguments proceed from,
though substantial motion enhances the tenability of the
arguments from motion and hudūth, it still does not
alleviate the main defect of these arguments on the score of
their incapacity to indicate the necessity of existence of the
First Mover or the Creator. Substantial motion emancipates
these arguments from the narrow boundaries of the natural
world and elevates them to incorporeal and metaphysical
realities; although an incorporeal origin—that bestows
existence on the natural entities or gives them motion—is
definitely an incorporeal and eternal entity, yet in the mean
time, it has not been proved that is not contingent.
Therefore, in order to indicate such mover or the creator’s
necessity of existence, one will have to resort to further
arguments such as the demonstration of contingency and
necessity.
 131
Therefore, the arguments form motion and hudūth, in
addition to the fact that their conclusiveness is indebted to
inclusion of the impossibility of regressive and circular
causality in their articulations, are associated with having
two additional defects. Substantial motion removes the
first defect, but its major defect still cannot be abolished
without assistance from the demonstration of contingency
and necessity.

Evaluation of Criticisms of the Arguments from Motion

and Hudūth
The arguments from motion and hudūth have been subject
to criticisms that either pertain to both arguments, or are
exclusively directed at one of the two. Many of these
criticisms are due to unfamiliarity with the central notions
these arguments revolve around. For instance, owing to
misunderstanding of the difference between receptive
(al-‛illa al-qābiliyya) and supplementary causes (al-‛illa
al-mu‛idda) and the efficient cause (al-‛illa al-fā‛iliyya),
some critics have questioned the impossibility of regressive
causation; and for the same reasons, some writers have
considered it possible that an inferior and weak cause
produce a higher and superior effect.
Another criticism that stems from inattentiveness to the
meanings of motion and inaction/rest (sukūn) and overlooks
the existentiality of motion and non-existentiality of
inaction, states that the argument from motion does not
treat motion and inaction/rest on equal merits and only
considers motion as dependent and needful of a cause.
The reason that the mutakellimūn have employed the
argument from hudūth is that they think if Divine grace
were eternal, then it will invite two contradictions. First,
God would be a constrained cause (al-fā‛il al-mūjab)1,

1 Autonomous Cause and Constrained Cause: If an agency is such

that it does have a choice to produce its effect, such as the human
being, it is an autonomous cause (al-fā‛il al-mukhtār). And if it does
not have a choice to produce its effect, like fire that does not have
 132
whilst His autonomy (ikhtiyār) is not deniable. Second,
Divine grace will not need an origin. These false
presumptions, however, are due to the mutakellimūn‘s lack
of understanding of why an effect needs a cause, and what
do power and autonomy mean.
Mutakellimūn hold that an autonomous cause is an agency
that has temporal precedence over its effect. In other
words, the effect of an autonomous cause does not exist in
the past, and after the cause weighs the different options
before him, he decides that the effect should exist. They
maintain that a constrained cause, like fire that produces
heat, is an agency that has no temporal separation from its
effect. An autonomous cause in the view of philosophers
and philosophy-oriented mutakellimūn is an agency, which
acts if he desires to act and does not act if he does not
desire to. From this position, should an agency, because of
his eternal knowledge and wisdom, desire the perpetual and
eternal performance of an action, this will not violate his
autonomy and would not mean that he is constrained.
Since hudūth is not the reason, which determines why an
effect is needful of its cause, the eternity of grace, contrary
to the mutakellimūn‘s assumption, does not amount to the
effect’s independence and lack of need to its cause. For
instance, the everlastingness of human beings in the
hereafter, which is a matter of consensus among many
faiths, does not imply their lack of need to their existential
cause.
Since hudūth is an attribute of existence, in rational
analysis its degree is posterior to existence. Moreover,
rational analysis indicates that existence is after creation
and creation after necessitation (ijāb) and necessitation
after needfulness. In the light of this, should hudūth be the
reason of needfulness and dependence of an effect on its
cause, it must exist a few degrees antecedent to itself.
Although this indirect circularity (daur) is not as obviously

any choice in burning and producing heat, it is a constrained cause

(al-fā‛il al-mūjab). *
 133
void as direct circularity, the corruption of its corollaries is
greater than in direct circularity. This is because supposing
that hudūth is the reason for need, after an effect comes into
existence it is not marked by hudūth, which follows that the
reason for its need to a cause does not exist. It further
follows that an entity that has become hādith has no need to
its cause in order to continue to exist.
From the Peripatetic and Illuminationist (Ishrāqiyyūn)
philosophers’ perspective, the reason and criterion of an
effect’s need to its cause is its contingency (imkān); and
since contingency never separates from the essence of the
effect, its need to its cause is inseparable from it. The
eternity and everlastingness of an effect does not imply that
it is not needy and dependent on its efficient cause; rather,
an effect’s eternity and everlastingness indicates the
continuity and everlastingness of its need to its cause.
Due to these deficiencies of the arguments from motion and
hudūth, the Peripatetic and Illuminationist philosophers
have not sufficed on them and have established the
demonstration of contingency and necessity (burhān al-
imkān wa al-wujūb), which enjoys an exceeding strength
and tenability.
 135

Chapter Five

THE DEMONSTRATION OF
CONTINGENCY OF
IMPOVERISHMENT
 137

Transition from Quidditative Contingency to Contin-

gency of Impoverishment
A closer examination of quidditative contingency (al-imkān
al-māhūwī) guides the course of inquiry to a new sort of
contingency, namely the contingency of impoverishment
(al-imkān al-faqrī). The perception of this sort of
contingency entails the construction of a superior argument
for the existence of the Necessary.
The entertainment of a quiddity’s equidistance towards
existence and nonexistence, which is an immediate
inference from its quality of lack of necessitation with
respect to existence and nonexistence, brings forth
quidditative contingency. Clearly, in order to exist, such a
finite entity requires an external causal efficacy. The
external agency that endows it with existence and extricates
it from the position of equidistance is its existential cause.
In other words, quiddity finds existence with the blessings
of creation from its existential cause.
Therefore, should it be asked, “How does quiddity lose its
equidistance?” the response is, “By the existence it receives
from its efficient cause.” However, the question can be
transferred from quiddity to existence, stating, how did an
existence, which is not self-subsistent, come to be and what
is the reason of its need for its efficient cause. Before
responding to this question, it must be borne in mind that
such an existence cannot be equidistant towards existence
and nonexistence, since according to the law of identity,
everything is necessarily itself. Therefore, existence is
necessarily existence, and is impossible to be nonexistence.
Hence, the existence of contingents does not have the
attribute of quidditative contingency, namely, equidistance
towards existence and nonexistence. On the other hand,
because of their finitude, contingents (al-mumkināt) lack
eternal necessity (al-dharūra al-azaliyya), and their
existence is restricted to specific conditions that are present
 138
only in certain levels of the gradational reality of existence
(al-haqīqa al-mushakkika lil-wujūd).1

1Gradation of Existence (tashkīk al-wujūd): After acknowledging

that there is a reality and that the world is not a mere fantasy, we
come to know that reality encompasses myriads of ostensibly
different objects, such as trees, oceans, galaxies and so forth. If we
examine whether this multiplicity, which the mind perceives in the
external world, is real or fantasized, this would be the inquiry of
multiplicity and unity of reality. If two things are different from
one another, their difference can be in one of the following four
ways:

 They differ from one another by their entire essences

(thamām al-dhawāt) and have nothing in common, such as
the difference between the Aristotelian categories.
 They differ from one another by their differentiae (fusūl).
Such difference is exclusive to quiddities that comprise a
genus and differentia and are categorized under the same
genus, like a horse and a sheep.
 They differ from one another by their individual accidents,
but both pertain to the same specie or kind—such as two
human individuals.
 They differ from one another by that which they have in
common (mā bihi al-ishterāk).

The last sort of difference was introduced to philosophy

by Sheikh al-Ishrāq al-Suhrawardī. He held that the difference of
the different sorts of light in the world is not by anything external
to light’s essence, since as he believed, light is sheer and
“uncombined.” Rather, they are different from one another by the
same thing that they have in common, and their difference is in the
severity and weakness of their realities. He argued that since
darkness is a non-existential phenomenon, one cannot argue that
weak lights are different from strong lights because the former
have darkness in them.
From the position of principality of quiddity, the answer
to the inquiry of multiplicity and unity of reality is evident; that is,
 139
The fact that contingents (mumkināt) are finite and
conditional means they are not absolute and have a need
and dependence, which is satisfied only in specific
conditions. Unlike evenness with respect to four, such need
and dependence is not an attribute or accident that would be
additional to the finite existence, since if it were additional,
the finite existence, which is the contingent’s very reality,
would be devoid of need in virtue of its essence. Because
reality always conforms to one of the two sides of
contradiction, the absence of need in the finite existence,
translates to its complement (naqīdh), namely, its lack of
need and independence, which contradicts the fact that the
finite and conditional existence is needful and contingent.
Quiddity is a mental phenomenon the essence of which and
essential parts thereof are entertained by the mind, and any
other thing, even if it is on one of the two sides of
contradiction, is outside its boundaries. For instance,
existence and nonexistence are on the two sides of
contradiction, yet the concept of human being does not
include any of the two. However, existence is not a mental
phenomenon; it is the very reality and factuality of things;
and the external world is never vacant of the two sides of
contradiction. For this reason, the need and dependence,
which is proved for contingents, is their very existence, not
their necessary accident (lāzim).

reality is nothing but multiple quiddities. However, from the per-

spective of Transcendent Wisdom, principality of existence, as in-
terpreted by the author, reality is nothing but existence, and quiddi-
ties are reifications of the mind from the boundaries of various
existences. It follows that what makes two beings different is not
something external to the reality of existence, since there is nothing
but existence; and since existence is sheer, that is, it is not a com-
pound, if two existences are different, their difference is by severity
and weakness of the reality of existence. This sort of difference is
called al-ikhtelāf al-tashkīkī lil wujūd, which has been rendered in this
work as “gradational difference of existence”. *
 140
Although quidditative need and contingency is an essential
property (al-‛aradh al-dhātī) of the quiddity’s essence, it is,
outside its essence and essential parts. That is, contingency
is not a genus or differentia for quiddities. The needfulness
that is proved for finite things is their external existence.
This sort of needfulness proves another type of
contingency, which is not additional to the existence of the
effect. Like its proportionate needfulness, such
contingency is the very reality and existence of the
contingent and needful beings, and is called the
contingency of impoverishment (al-imkān al-faqrī).
Contingency of impoverishment is the very needfulness and
destitution that brims the effect’s existence; and when the
existence of the effect is perceived, it is nothing but
existence. When this premise is added to the axiom that
existence is necessarily existence, it follows that
contingency of impoverishment, contrary to quidditative
contingency, does not require the negation of necessities of
existence and nonexistence, and in effect, is based on the
very necessity of existence.
Thus, a deeper analysis of quiddity and quidditative
contingency proves an existence and necessity that are
sheer needfulness, dependence, and the very penury to
causal efficacy. Its contrast with the assertion that there is
an essence that bears need as its accident, and therefore,
need is posterior to it, need not explanation.
In the rational analysis of external realities, first we discern
their quiddity and then their existence and reality. Then
through the assessment of quiddity with existence, we
discern the quiddity’s needfulness and contingency and
discover it is characterized by need and contingency.
However, when we observe the existence under the
auspices of which the quiddity has found reality, from that
existence’s finitude and conditionality we discern a
needfulness and contingency, which are not additional to
the essence of the needful and contingent existence, and
rather are its very reality. For this reason, this type of
contingency, which is sheer impoverishment and
 141
needfulness, is called contingency of impoverishment (al-
imkān al-faqrī).
The principality of existence (asāla al-wujūd) and
respectivality of quiddity (e‛tebāriyya al-māhiyya) is the
principle, which facilitates the transition from quiddity and
quidditative contingency to existence and contingency of
impoverishment. This is because from the position of
principality of existence quiddity does not have the capacity
to be subject to creation (ja‛l), emanation (ifādha),
causation (‛illiyya), and so forth; and is not realized except
under the auspices of existence. Existence, nonexistence,
independence, impoverishment, and the like, are not its
essence or essential parts. Rather, needfulness and
impoverishment pertain to the existence from the
limitations (hudūd) of which the quiddity is abstracted.
This impoverished existence is needful by virtue of its
essence and does not require a reason or cause external to
itself for its needfulness. However, in the case of quiddity,
just as its essence is devoid of existence and it is only under
the auspices of existence that it finds an auxiliary
manifestation (al-burūz al-taba‛ī), likewise, it is vacant of
impoverishment and independence. The attribution of
impoverishment or independence to quiddity is through
their literal attribution to the existence, which realizes the
quiddity. Therefore, what was stated regarding the reason
of a quiddity’s need for a cause does not have total
accuracy and is open to criticism.
Peripatetic philosophers believe that in order to exist, a
quiddity is in need of an external causal efficacy. They
further assert that this need is due to the quiddity’s
contingency. This view, however, is subject to the criticism
that was also forwarded against the postulation of the
mutakellimūn who maintain that hudūth is the reason for an
effect’s need for its cause. In rational analysis, as explained
earlier, hudūth, as an attribute of the effect’s existence, is
posterior (muta’akhir) to the effect’s need for its cause by
several degrees. Similarly, from the perspective of
principality of existence and as a result of antecedence of
 142
existence over quiddity, quidditative contingency—which
is a corollary of quiddity and posterior to it—is posterior to
existence; and because existence follows creation, and
creation is after necessitation, and necessitation follows
needfulness, quidditative contingency is posterior to
needfulness by several degrees. Should the posterior
contingency be the cause of needfulness, it will be posterior
to itself and antecedent to itself by several degrees. Thus, in
the view of principality of existence, though quidditative
contingency, similar to hudūth, can indicate the effect’s
need for a cause, it cannot be the reason and criterion of the
effect’s need for the cause.1

1 The demonstration of contingency of impoverishment (burhān al-

imkān al-faqrī) is one of the ingenious innovations of the founder of
Transcendent Wisdom, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn al-Shirāzī. On the
foundations of principality of existence, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn trans-
fers contingency from quiddity to existence, and this leads to the
construction of this new argument for the existence of the Neces-
sary. The logical format of the this demonstration can be elucidat-
ed as follows:

1. There is a reality.
2. There is at least one finite, contingent, entity.
3. Existence is principal.
4. The attributes of existence are identical (‛ain) to the
reality of existence, because if they were other than existence
and additional to it, then it would mean that something other
than existence has factuality and would contradict the previous
premise that asserts the principality of existence.
5. The finite and contingent entity that was mentioned in
the second premise is the very finitude and the very depend-
ence and need to external causal, which produces it, as op-
posed to being an essence that is characterized by finitude and
contingency.
6. The presence of something that is the very contingen-
cy and need to external causal efficacy is impossible without
 143
Contingency of Impoverishment and the Essential In-
dependence of the Necessary
With the elucidation of contingency of impoverishment, it
becomes evident that existence, creation, necessity,
necessitation, and needfulness are not different things,
which mutually require each other. Rather, the existence of
the effect is the single entity, which is the very
impoverishment and need, the very emanation, creation,
and necessitation. Since finite existence is
impoverishment, and its entire reality is nothing but relation
and dependence on the “other,” its necessity is also by
virtue of the other. For such a thing, it is inconceivable to
have an essence vacant of destitution and contingency, so in
addition to contingency of impoverishment it may be
characterized by the quality of quidditative contingency.
The prevalence of impoverishment in the bounds of beings,
which are conjoined with quiddities—or to be more
specific, beings the limitations of which narrate their
quiddities—negates every kind of independence from them
and illustrates their realities as prepositional notions
(al-ma‛ānī al-harfiyya), which are nothing but relation and
contingence to the other.
A prepositional notion is a notion that by virtue of itself is
devoid of any meaning. If any meaning can be discerned
from a prepositional notion, it is under the auspices of
dependence and relation to the other, and from the other
that the preposition has dependence upon. The other that
bestows a preposition with meaning must be a nounal
meaning (al-ma‛na al-ismī).
The analysis of existence of quiddities, that is, the
elucidation of contingency of impoverishment, speedily
paves the way for the foundation of a demonstration, which
has a higher tenability, more brevity, and a broader range of
usage than all of the previous arguments have. This is
because the reality of a finite existence—that is, the

the existence of a reality that is free of contingency and de-

pendence. *
 144
existence, which is devoid of any independence and is sheer
relation and dependence on the other, and is rather
something the reality of which is nothing but relation and
contingence to the other—cannot exist without the other
side of such relation and dependence. Certainly, the other
side of the relation and dependence, that is, the agency that
furnishes the needful existence of contingents, cannot be
another impoverished being, since with respect to any other
finite existence that may be suggested for this causal
efficiency, it is also true that it does not have anything from
itself and there is no perceivable essence or self for it which
would satisfy the first contingent’s need.
From this perspective, all contingent beings are signs of a
reality, which is exalted from destitution and need and has
independence. Although at a cursory glance a contingent
may seem to be the cause of another contingent, however,
even this mediation indicates the causality of an
independent source that has manifested in this sign.
Because all aspects of an entity, which is sheer need and
contingence, are the need and contingence that evoke the
other, and what it reflects is similar to a light that from a
mirror.
A light that appears in a mirror can be traced to a luminary
source, which has manifested in it, without requiring
invalidation of regress. If another mirror is a mediate in the
manifestation of the light therein, it can only reflect the
light of the luminary agency; and it cannot be suggested it
has a light of its own which it gives to the next mirror.
Signs (‛alamāt) are of two kinds: conventional signs
(al-‛alamāt al-e‛tebāriyya) and factual signs (al-‛alamāt
al-haqīqiyya). The former is like words, scripts, traffic
signals, national flags of various countries, and so forth.
Factual signs are like the image of a person who is in front
of a mirror. Factual signs are further divided into three
kinds:

 Finite Signs: Like indication of

smoke respecting fire, or prairie or wetland re-
 145
specting water. The indication of such signs
does not depend on the conventions of a specific
group of people, nonetheless, as the smoke or
prairie changes, their “signness” and indication
about fire and water changes as well.
 Permanent Signs: This kind of
sign pertains to instances in which indication is
not restricted to a particular time, and like even-
ness of four, is always with reality that is
marked with the sign.
 Essential Signs: In this case, be-
ing the sign of a reality, which is indicated by
the sign, is not a necessary property of the sign’s
essence; rather it is its very essence and reality.
In the previous kind, indication is a necessary
property of the essence of the sign, and by virtue
of its essence, it does not bear any indication
with respect to the reality, which it is reflecting.
However, in this kind, the sign’s entire reality is
the reflection of the entity, which it is represent-
ing.

An image, which appears in a mirror is a mirror by virtue of

its essence. According to simple mindsets, glass and other
physical parts constitute the mirror; however, in the ‛irfān
(Gnosticism) of the wayfarer to the unseen, mirror is
nothing but the illustrated visage. The visage, which is
illustrated in a mirror is other than the glass, frame, their
length, width, depth, light, color, angle, and the like.
Rather, it is the very narration, indication, and relation,
which it renders with respect to the real image.
Contingency of impoverishment elucidates the
“mirror-like” realities of beings, which manifest and appear
in the image of various quiddities. This method of analysis
of “causedness” (ma‛lūliyya) exhibits the world as
perceived by ‛irfān: as the various Divine splendors, which
bring about the different things and ages and eras. This
fashion of perception is inspired by the Qur’ānic teachings,
 146
which identify the heavens and the earth and whatever is
within them as a beggar and needful and recognize God as a
reality that every degree of existence is a splendor of His
infinite magnificence. “Beseech Him all those in the
heavens and the earth; everyday He is in a new splendorous
manifestation.”1
In the parlance of Qur’ānic verses, various existential
splendors are the diverse facets and dimensions of the
visage of the Lord (Wajhullah) of Glory and Grace.
“Hallowed is the name of thy Lord, the Lord of Glory and
Grace.”2 Wajhullah is the infinite Divine manifestation,
which has presence in every entity; “He is with you
wherever you be”3; and is evident in every facet,
“Therefore, wherever you turn you find the face of God.”4
Rational analysis illustrates the world like a mirror in which
different beings appear as various splendors of God.
Although someone, who is inattentive to its “mirror-like”
reality and its figurative existence, perceives it independent;
nevertheless, when the mirror is broken and reality unfolds,
the Divine visage of every entity manifests. Then when it
is asked, “Whose is the kingdom today?”5 the response,
which echoes in reality of every age and time, is heard,
“God’s, the One, the Subduer.”6
God, the One, the Subduer, is that very needless reality
Who satisfies and dispenses with the perpetual supplication
of the needful. His act of satisfying the needs is not in a
fashion, which would eliminate the need and the begging of
the impoverished, because need and dependence are present
in the response that is received from Him, and needfulness
does not vacate any dimension of contingents. For this
reason, the late Āghā Ali Hakīm, in Badā’i‛ al-Hikam,

1 55: 39
2 55: 27
3 57: 4
4 2: 115
5 40: 16
6 ibid.
 147
points out that the opposition (taqābul) of need of
contingents to the independence of the Necessary is an
opposition of affirmation and negation (al-salb wa
al-eijāb) and not an opposition of privation and possession
(al-‛adam wa al-malaka).1
In the opposition of privation and possession, the
nonexistent is devoid of the being and reality of the
opposite side, nonetheless, its individual, class, kind, or
genus, can have the opposite side. However, the finite
existence is an impoverished reality; and this
impoverishment is such that the more the benedictions from
the Necessary, the more desperate the impoverishment. It
follows that in no condition can the contingent attain the
capacity to have independence, an attribute exclusive to the
Necessary.
In other words, God is independent and everything except
Him is needful, and the opposition between His
independence and this need is not privation and possession,
since by consideration of individual, class, kind, or genus,
no finite existence can have necessary or absolute
independence. Therefore, the affirmation of the opposite
side is impossible for the finite existences; and the
opposition between the two is the opposition of affirmation
and negation, not the opposition of privation and
possession.
The presence of impoverishment in every dimension of
contingents entails that the indication and narration they
have with regard to the All-Sufficient and Independent
Essence, and also the human being’s cognition and
awareness with respect to Him, are splendors and
manifestations of that very Essence. This is the meaning of
the exalted statement, “The One who proves His essence by
His essence.”2

1 Hakīm, Āghā Ali. Badā’i‛ al-Hikam. (Tehran: lithographed print),

39.
2 Al-Qummī, Shaykh ‛Abbās. Mafātīh al-Jinān. The Supplication of

al-Sahar.
 148
Unique Qualities of the Demonstration of Contingency
of Impoverishment
The demonstration of contingency of impoverishment, by
the version expounded in this book, in addition to its purity
from the shortcomings of the previous arguments, is unique
by having a number of distinctive features. This is so
because the sole applicability of the arguments, which
proceed from motion and hudūth, even after their adduction
with substantial motion, is in the corporeal world; and the
only conclusion they lead to is an incorporeal origin for the
physical world. The argument from design—even if the
tenability of its conclusiveness is left unchallenged—is
beyond this reproach, since design or orderliness (nadhm) is
not exclusive to the physical and mobile entities and is also
perceivable among incorporeal beings; nevertheless, the
argument is based on a concatenated totality, which
functions towards a common objective. On the contrary,
the demonstration of contingency of impoverishment can
be substantiated on the basis of corporeal as well as
incorporeal entities; and its cogency does not require a
totality of things and can easily proceed from the existence
of one finite being. In addition to this, the objective of the
demonstration of contingency of impoverishment is not to
prove a mover, a muhdith, or a cosmic designer, attributes
shared by the Necessary and other subjects; rather, it is set
to prove a necessary origin.
The demonstration of contingency of impoverishment sur-
passes the demonstration of contingency and necessity in
not having some of the latter’s deficiencies. Its lack of
need to the impossibility of circular and regressive causality
is more evident than that of the latter demonstration. With
the construction of the demonstration of contingency of im-
poverishment, first, the Necessary is proved, and then the
finitude of the series of mediates, which exhibit the abso-
lute causality of the Necessary is illustrated.
The demonstration of contingency and necessity—however,
without some of its meticulous rational premises and
corollaries—found its way through the works of Peripatetic
 149
philosophers into scholastic philosophy and then through
inaccurate translations, entered the academia, which receive
their philosophical learning through such channels;
nevertheless, the demonstration of contingency of
impoverishment, which is the result of cognitive
profundities of the Imamite theosophers and has been in the
curriculum of Shiite philosophical learning for the last four
centuries, retains its novelty and bloom in its original
abode. The distraught mentality of western philosophizers
and philosophy historians—who under sway of
sensationalism have abandoned rationality and have been
subdued by apparent and latent skepticism (shakkākiyya)—
ever remains unfamiliar of this demonstration.
 151

Chapter Six

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

OF ANSELM
 153

Argument in the Form of Reductio ad Absurdum

The ontological argument devised by St. Anselm, an
eleventh-century Christian theologian and the Archbishop
of Canterbury, has excited extensive criticism and rebuttals
along the history of western philosophy. The argument
proceeds from the concept of God, which Anselm
propounds as “something than which nothing greater can be
conceived” (aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit).
God as the maximally exalted and superior perfection can
also be discerned from the statement of Allah Akbar, that is,
God is exalted from being described or comprehended, and
therefore, He is more perfect than any phenomenon
imaginable. Such a contour of God, the bequest of Divine
apostles, has also been disseminated in Judeo-Christian
theology through the inculcations of the Torah and the
Evangel.
Anselm’s argument proceeds from the above concept of
God in the form of reductio ad absurdum. In this sort of
argument, it is proved that holding the complement
(naqīdh) of the desired conclusion entails absurdity; and
thus, the desired conclusion is reached in an indirect
manner.
Anselm’s argument can be summed up this way: If “that
than which nothing greater can be conceived” does not
exist, things, which do exist, would be greater than Him. It
is clear, however, that this is self-contradictory and absurd.
Therefore, with the negation of God’s nonexistence, given
that the negation of contradictories is impossible, the
existence of God is proved.
The proof of mutual necessity between nonexistence and
not being the maximal perfection is that nonexistence is a
defect, and existent things are more perfect than
nonexistent things. Therefore, if God is nonexistent,
existent entities would be more perfect than Him; and
 154
consequently, He is not, as conceived, the maximal
perfection.1

Gaunilo’s Criticism and its Adduction

This argument was quickly critiqued by Gaunilo of
Marmoutier, a monk contemporary to Anselm. He asserted
that if Anselm’s argument were cogent, it could indicate
things, which surely don’t exist. Using the principles of
Anselm’s argument, Gaunilo sets a proof to establish the
existence of a maximally perfect island:

For example: it is said that some-

where in the ocean is an island,
which, because of the difficulty, or
rather the impossibility, of discover-
ing what does not exist, is called the
lost island. And they say that this is-
land is blessed with an inestimable
wealth of all manner of riches and
delicacies in greater abundance than
is told of the Islands of the Blest; and
that having no owner or inhabitant, it
is more excellent than all other coun-
tries, which are inhabited by man-
kind, in the abundance with which it
is stored.
If some one should tell me that there
is such an island, I should easily un-
derstand his words, in which there is
no difficulty. But suppose if he went
on to say, as if by a logical inference:
“You can no longer doubt that this
island exists somewhere, since you
have no doubt that it is in your un-
derstanding. And since it is more

1See: Anselm’s Basic Writings, translated by S. W. Deane, 2d ed. (La

Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publising Company, 1962).
 155
excellent not to be in the understand-
ing alone, but to exist both in the un-
derstanding and in reality, for this
reason it must exist. For if it does
not exist, any land which really ex-
ists will be more excellent than it;
and so the island already understood
by you to be more excellent will not
be more excellent.”
If a man should try to prove to me by
such reasoning that this island truly
exists, and that its existence should
no longer be doubted, either I should
believe that he was jesting, or I know
not which I ought to regard the great-
er fool: myself, supposing that I
should allow this proof; or him, if he
should suppose that he had estab-
lished with any certainty the exist-
ence of this island. For he ought to
show first that the hypothetical ex-
cellence of this island exists as a real
and indubitable fact, and in no wise
as any unreal object, or one whose
existence is uncertain, in my under-
standing.1

In his Responsio, Anselm refuted this criticism on the

grounds that the notion of God, that is, that than which
nothing greater can be conceived, includes every perfection
(kamāl) including existence and its necessity. Whereas the
maximally perfect island is a finite and contingent
phenomenon, the conception of whose nonexistence arises
no contradiction.
It is possible, however, to augment the tenability of
Gaunilo’s criticism. If we add the concept of existence to

1 ibid.
 156
the contour of his lost island, that is, conceive a maximally
perfect island which exists, the spoof proof will withstand
Anselm’s response. Since, although the quiddity of the
maximally perfect island is characterized by quidditative
contingency, its existence does not have quidditative
contingency and is not equidistant towards existence and
nonexistence.
An example better than Gaunilo’s lost island is the partner
of the Creator (sharīk al-Bārī). Sharing all of the
Necessary’s attributes, the notion of its nonexistence is
contradictory to the notions which are integral his essence.
If one applies Anselm’s principles here, the existence of the
partner of the Creator would be indubitable,
notwithstanding numerous demonstrations (barāhīn)
indicate the impossibility of his existence.

The Fundamental Flaw of Anselm’s Argument

Although Gaunilo’s criticism along with what was put
forward in its adduction, establish that Anselm’s argument
lacks cogency; they do not illustrate its fallacy. The many
western and Muslim scholars who have rejected Anselm’s
argument have set forth a variety of criticisms; however,
none of them seems to be devoid of questionability.
The critical fallacy of Anselm’s argument arises from his
failure to differentiate between the notion (mafhūm) of
existence and its extension (misdāq).
The notions of maximal perfection, existence, and
necessity, which are included in the notion of God,
regardless of having or lacking external extensions
(masādīq), have their meanings. In other words, the
notions of maximal perfection, existence, and necessity—
regardless of being true by predication as extension
(al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī) and being instantiated, or being
invalid by the same predication and not being
instantiated—do carry their essences and essential parts by
predication as essence (al-haml al-awwalī al-dhātī),
because predication as essence is concerned with concepts,
 157
and predication as extension reflects whether a concept has
any external extension.1

1 When a predicate is ascribed to a certain subject—for instance,

someone says, “That than which nothing greater can be conceived
is that than which nothing greater can be conceived,” or “Zaid is a
student”—there has to be an aspect of unity and an aspect of dif-
ference between the subject and the predicate. The aspect of unity
is necessary because predication means “it-is-itness” (hū-hūwiyya);
and the aspect of difference is necessary because if the subject and
predicate were exactly identical in every aspect, then the proposition
would be meaningless. In predication as essence (al-haml al-awwalī
al-dhātī, literally meaning primary essential predication) the need for
the aspect of unity is satisfied by the unity of concepts, that is, the
proposition conveys that the subject and predicate have the same
meaning; and the aspect of difference is provided by our considera-
tions. For instance, in the example, “That than which nothing
greater can be conceived is that than which nothing greater can be
conceived,” it is evident that the proposition states that the subject
and the predicate have the same meaning, and this is their aspect of
unity; as for their aspect of difference, we assume a sort of differ-
ence between the subject and the predicate, for instance, we may
perceive the subject as not fully known and the predicate as some-
thing that is known fully. In this sort of predication, since the sub-
ject and the predicate have the same meaning, if they two have an
external extension, they will be instantiated in a single thing. This
sort of predication is only used when an essence is attributed to
itself, like “Animal is animal,” or an essential part is ascribed to the
essence that comprises it, like “Animal is man.”
In predication as extension (al-haml al-shā’e‛ al-sinā‛ī,
litterally meaning common technical predication), the axis of unity
between the subject and the predicate is their external extension;
that is, if we say “Zaid is a student” it means in the external world
the two concepts of “Zaid” and “student” are instantiated in a sin-
gle reality. In this sort of predication, however, the subject and the
predicate are two different concepts. The most distinguishable
feature of predication as extension is that its subject is always an
extension of its predicate. Sometimes the subject of a proposition
 158
By paying attention to the difference between the notion of
existence and its extension, that is, existence by predication
as essence and existence by predication as extension,
Anselm’s fallacy becomes evident. The concept of “that
than which nothing greater can be conceived,” is
contradicted, and therefore, absurdity is invited, only if
existence is negated from this concept by predication as
essence. However, God’s nonexistence in the external
world, that is, His lack of existence by predication as
extension, does not entail negation of perfection from Him
by predication as essence.

that includes predication as extension is a concept, like, “Animal is

a genus.”
Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, by introducing these two
kinds of predication to philosophy, added another condi-
tion of contradiction, making them nine altogether. He
proved that in order to contradict each other, two proposi-
tions must also have an identical fashion of predication.
Consider this example: Logicians say that if a concept is
applicable to more than one entity, like the concept of an-
imal, it is a universal concept; and if it does not apply to
more than one entity, like the concept of the specific gro-
cery store that you do your shopping at, it is a particular
concept. On the other hand, because of the logical law of
identity that everything is necessarily itself, we know that
particular is particular; but at the same time we now that
particular is applicable to all particular concepts in the
world and therefore is universal. This invites a paradox,
since how can particular be particular and universal at the
same time, that is, applicable to not more than one and
applicable to more than one. The answer to this, and
many other similar paradoxes, becomes clear by making
distinction between predication as essence and predication
as extension. Particular is particular, that is, applicable to
not more than one, by predication as essence. And partic-
ular is universal, that is, applicable to more than one, by
predication as extension. *
 159
Therefore, it has to be established what Anselm means by
existence when he says, “If that than which nothing greater
can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not
that than which nothing greater can be conceived.” If he
means existence by predication as essence, it is a valid
assertion. Since, the negation of existence from the concept
of God, the most superlative perceivable perfection, is self-
contradictory. This, however, does not prove such a
concept is instantiated in reality. Nonetheless, if Anselm
means existence by predication as extension, that is,
existence in reality, then there is no mutual necessity
between the negation of existence from God by predication
as extension and negation of existence from His concept by
predication as essence. Thus, while the concept of the most
superlative perceivable perfection carries all of the
concepts, which are included in it, and therefore, no
contradiction is implied, it may not have any external
extension. On this basis, the ontological argument does not
indicate that to hold the complement (naqīdh) of its desired
conclusion is reducible to absurdity.
If the concept of the most adequate perfection lacks a real
extension, it is not contradictory, since contradictory
propositions must have an identical manner of predication.
The concept of the most adequate perfection is a concept,
which by predication as essence is the most adequate
perfection, and by predication as extension, is a mental
concept, which exists by the mental mode of existence.
Therefore, the absence of its external extension does not
make its conception an impossibility. This assertion is
supported by the fact that the partner of the Necessary is the
partner of the Necessary by predication as essence, and
possesses every sanctity and perfection that is proved or
assumed for the Necessary. Notwithstanding, he is not
instantiated in reality; and as far as reality is concerned, he
is the partner of the impossible (mumtane‛). If mere
conception sufficed to prove the Necessary, His partner,
because he is conceivable too, would be provable by
another reductio ad absurdum.
 160
In the said argument, absurdity is entailed if the premises
had an identical fashion of predication, in other words, if a
concept, which, by predication as essence, includes
perfection, loses its perfection by the same predication; and
a concept, which by predication as extension possesses a
perfection (kamāl), is devoid of it by the same predication.
However, if a concept includes some perfection by
predication as essence and is devoid of it by predication as
extension, it is not contradictory or absurd.
The difference of predication as essence and predication as
extension has gone unnoticed in western philosophy; but
Islamic theosophers have outlined it. Making distinction
between concept and extension and the two kinds of
predication, in addition to illustrating the fallacy of
Anselm’s argument, solves many paradoxes that are
considered unsolvable. It also helps identify similar
fallacies that have occurred in the works of Gnostics.

Failure to Make Distinction between Concept and Ex-

tension in the Demonstrations of Gnostics
Throughout the history of Islamic thought, some Gnostics
(‛urafā) who have failed to differentiate between concept
and extension have presented a variety of rational
arguments for the existence of the Necessary. These
arguments are far more expressive and succinct than the
argument expounded by Anselm. For example, one of
these demonstrations asserts:

Existence qua existence (al-wujūd

bi mā hūwa al-wujūd) does not ac-
cept nonexistence.
Something, which does not accept
nonexistence, is necessary.
 161
Therefore, existence qua existence is
necessary.1

The minor premise of this first-figure syllogism is based on

the impossibility of conjunction of contradictories; that is,
existence’s acceptance of nonexistence equates with
conjunction of contradictories. Although this argument
proceeds from direct view at reality and existence and
therefore proves the Necessary through a shorter route than
what Anselm has cruised, because it also fails to make
distinction between concept and extension, is untenable.
Since the concept of existence qua existence, does not
reconcile with nonexistence by predication as essence, and
the Necessary is a reality whose impossibility of
nonexistence is by predication as extension, the minor and
major premises do not have an identical method of
predication and the middle term does not repeat, hence the
inconclusiveness of the syllogism.
The affirmation of the absolute existence’s instantiation is
dependent on a number of steps that must first be secured.
In the first step, the respectivality (al-e‛tebāriyya) of
quiddity and principality (al-asāla) of existence must be
proved, because, the proponents of principality of quiddity
do not consider reality to be anything except diverse and
multiple quiddities. The abstract notion of existence,
according to them, is prescinded from quiddities and has
developed into an absolute notion through the mental
activities.
In the second step, the heterogeneous multiplicity
(al-kathra al-tabāyunī) of existence must be rejected,
because if one should maintain principality of existence and
adhere to heterogeneous multiplicity of beings, then for
him, external entities are diverse realities, which are
heterogeneous from one another. From such perspective,
each entity is peculiar to its own conditions and limitations

1 Āmulī, Ayatullah Abdullah Jawādī. Tahrīr Tamhīd al-Qawā‛id.

(Tehran: Al-Zahrā Publications, 1993), 261.
 162
and exists only within these boundaries. Therefore, their
existence is marked by essential necessity (al-dharūra
al-dhātiyya), that is, they are existent as long as their
essences exist. From this perspective as well, the absolute
and infinite existence, which is existence qua existence, is
not instantiated in reality, since according to the
heterogeneity (tabāyun) of the beings, existence qua
existence is the very heterogeneous multiplicity, which
does not have any unity (wahda) except for the mere
notional unity (al-wahda al-mafhūmiyya)—that even if the
dispute of the possibility of such notional unity with the
given extensional heterogeneity were laid aside—which
only exists in the mind.
In the third step the opinion of homonymy (al-ishterāk
al-lafdhī) of existence, which suggests the respectivality of
existence in the contingents and its principality in the
Necessary, must be evaluated.
In the fourth step, gradational multiplicity (al-kathra
al-tashkīkī) of existence must be analyzed and its
meticulous details elaborated. Since from the perspective
of gradational multiplicity of existence, though proved, the
Necessary, as the cause of other beings, is at the top of the
gradational series of existence. It is not the extension of the
unconditional existence, which is the infinite and most
supreme conceivable perfection. Since, existence qua
existence, according to gradational multiplicity of
existence, is a real multiplicity, which is associated with
real unity (wahda). Obviously, such a reality cannot be the
Necessary, since it includes the Necessary as well as the
contingents.
In the light of this, on the sole grounds that the notion of
absolute existence is absolute existence by predication as
essence, and not nonexistence, its real instantiation
(al-misdāq al-wāqi‛ī) cannot be established. The
affirmation of its external extension is contingent on
establishing other proofs and invalidating views which
challenge the Gnostics’ claims.
 163
A demonstration, which proves the extension of absolute
existence, can be organized by meticulous analysis of the
meanings of dependence and impoverishment; and its
explication can be rendered in the context of the splendors
of the Origin. Another way is the analysis of causality of
the Origin and the comprehension of His absoluteness
(itlāq) and expanse (si‛a). In the discussions of causation,
Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, after traversing these phases, says that
this amounts to the conclusion of philosophy and its
consolidation into ‛irfan—and he thanks the Exalted God in
gratitude of this profound cognitive revolution.1

The Evaluation of Kant’s Tripartite Criticism of An-

selm’s Argument
Though Anselm’s argument has excited extensive
criticisms by many western and Muslim thinkers, however,
not all such criticisms are cogent. Kant, in his Critique of
Pure Reason, delivers three criticisms against Anselm’s
ontological argument, which are considered noteworthy.
His first criticism claims the unintelligibility of the
necessary existence.2 This criticism is, nevertheless,
unjustified. Because despite the fact that the extension of
the Necessary is in extreme incognito, its pertinent concepts
are axiomatic and unambiguous. Although an entity, whose
existence is necessary and not conditional, does not have a
categorical or quidditative essence, the notion of necessary
existence is comprised of some general concepts,
comprehension of which—regardless of the fashion of
abstracting and discerning them—abundantly clear.
Kant’s second criticism suggests that though because of the
logical law of identity, a subject’s essence or essential parts
cannot be negated from it, this impossibility of negation

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-Hikma al-

Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-Islamiya,
1959), vol. 2, 291.
2 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp

Smith. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), 501.

 164
holds truth when the subject is existent. However, should
the very existence of the subject be rejected, then negation
of the essential parts from the subject does not invite
contradiction. He says,

If, in an identical proposition, I reject

the predicate while retaining the sub-
ject, contradiction results; and I
therefore say that the former belongs
necessarily to the latter. But if we
reject subject and predicate alike,
there is no contradiction; for nothing
is then left that can be contradicted.
To posit a triangle, and yet to reject
its three angles, is self-contradictory;
but there is no contradiction in re-
jecting the triangle together with its
three angles. The same holds true of
the concept of an absolutely neces-
sary being [a notion purported by
Anselm]. If its existence is rejected,
we reject the thing itself with all its
predicates; and no question of con-
tradiction can then arise. There is
nothing outside it that would then be
contradicted, since the necessity of
the thing is not supposed to be de-
rived from anything external; nor is
there anything internal that would be
contradicted, since in rejecting the
thing itself we have at the same time
rejected all its internal properties.
“God is omnipotent” is a necessary
judgment. The omnipotence cannot
be rejected if we posit a Deity, that
is, an infinite being; for the two con-
cepts are identical. But if we say,
“There is no God”, neither the om-
 165
nipotence nor any other of its predi-
cates is given; they are one and all
rejected together with the subject,
and there is therefore not the least
contradiction in such a judgment.1

This criticism is defective as well, because when a given

triangle is in the abode of existence, its essence, essential
parts, and essential properties are predicated to it by
necessity and their negation entails contradiction.
However, when the existence of the triangle is denied, the
negation of predicates does not indicate contradiction.
Rather, in this supposition, the predicates are inevitably
negated and such a negative proposition is negative because
of the nonexistence of its subject.
Contrary to a triangle or any other quidditative concept, the
negation of existence from something in the notion of
which existence is included, or existence is its very notion,
is self-contradictory. For this reason, it is impossible to
constitute a negative proposition that asserts the
nonexistence of the subject as such.
Existence can only be negated from such an entity without
evoking contradiction if the notion of existence (existence
by predication as essence) and the extension of existence
(existence by predication as extension) were differentiated
from one another; and until it is done, Anselm’s argument
maintains its tenability. It is by this differentiation that
existence by predication as extension can be negated—
either because of the nonexistence of the predicate or the
nonexistence of the subject—from a subject, which, by
predication as essence, includes existence as its integral
part. However, existence can never be negated by
predication as essence from a subject, which includes
existence as its integral part.
Therefore, if the two kinds of predication are not
differentiated, the cogency of Anselm’s argument remains

1 ibid. 502.
 166
intact; and when the differentiation is made, his fallacy,
stemming from his failure to make a distinction between
concept and extension, becomes evident.
Some other authors have tried to undermine Kant’s second
criticism on the grounds of difference between eternal and
essential necessities (al-dharūra al-azaliyya wa al-dharūra
al-dhātiyya). They have argued that the Necessary has
eternal necessity; therefore, it is impossible to negate Him
in any condition and circumstance; and finite entities have
essential necessity—hence, their negation is permissible in
certain conditions.1
Though essential and eternal necessities are different from
one another, recognition of their difference does not efface
Kant’s reservation. These two necessities, in fact, pertain
to two kinds of extension, which are perceivable for the
notion of existence. If the external reality of existence, that
is, the instantiation of the notion of existence, is finite, it
has essential necessity; and if it is infinite, it has eternal
necessity. Concepts are characterized with essential or
eternal necessity qua their narration of their extensions
(masādīq), that is, their predication as extensions.
The absurdity which Anselm intends to derive from the
nonexistence of the most adequate perceivable perfection,
and from which he concludes the existence of the Deity,
proceeds from the impossibility of negation of existence
from the notion of God. This impossibility, however,
which is on the basis of predication as essence, can be
presumed to be the case only if predication as essence is
confused with predication as extension. And if confusion
between the two sorts of predication is avoided, and
existence and its necessity is negated from God by
predication as extension, no contradiction will be involved,
as it cannot be ruled out that the notion of existence, and
even the notion of absolute existence—the extension of
which, if existent, would have eternal necessity, and from

1 Yazdī, Mahdī Hā’irī. Kawishhai ‛Aql-i-Nazarī. (Tehran: Shirkat

Sahāmī Inteshar, 1995), 222.
 167
which the notion of existence would be abstracted
irrespective of any aspect of conditionality or causation
(al-haithiyya al-taqyīdiyya wa al-haithiyya al-‛illiyya), but
rather by mere entertainment of its absoluteness
(al-haithiyya al-itlāqiyya)—are not instantiated.
The mere mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) of the
notion of absolute and infinite existence does not indicate
that it has an external extension also. Since it can also be
attained through the observation of particular and finite
beings and their combination (tarkīb) with other concepts.
For instance, existence can be derived through the
observation of particular beings, infinitude through the
entertainment of their finitude, and negation by
consideration of examples where negation is apparent.
Finally, by combining these concepts, the concept of
infinite existence can be entertained. Another way of
abstracting it is to first derive, by observation of particular
entities, the concept of a conditional and finite being, and
then to abstract from it the concept of absolute and infinite
existence. Thus, the mere conception of the notion of
absolute existence is not a proof of its abstraction from an
extension, which has eternal necessity.
Kant’s third criticism with relation to Anselm’s argument
stems from his philosophical perspective on the question of
predication. His second criticism is posed without
challenging the possibility of predicative meaning of
existence. However, in this criticism, he questions whether
existence can be a real predicate.1
Kant divides propositions into two types: analytic and
synthetic. The predicates of analytic propositions, he
maintains, are included in the essences of their subjects;
and synthetic propositions are propositions whose
predicates are concepts that are not included in their
subjects.

1Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp

Smith. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), 504.
 168
Islamic philosophers, however, have a different division of
propositions, which must not be confused with the above
division. They divide propositions on the basis of their
predicates into a variety of categories. One of their
divisions is the division of propositions into analytic (al-
tahlīlī) and incorporative (al-indhimāmī) propositions. The
Divine sage al-Sabzawārī points out the difference of the
predicates of the two types of propositions in this way:

A predicate abstracted from the

essence of a subject
Differs from a predicate which is an
external associate1

The predicates of analytic propositions are called al-khārij

al-mahmūl, that is, the predicates which are extracted from
the essence of a subject. They are also called al-mahmūl
min samīmihi, that is, predicates abstracted from the
context of a subject. This category of predicates is in
contrast with al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, that is, the
predicate by incorporation, a predicate whose abstraction
from the subject requires the attachment of an external
reality to the reality of its subject.
Al-khārij al-mahmūl, in the above meaning, is broader than
Kant’s analytic predicates. In addition to the essence and
essential parts of a given subject, it also encompasses
notions that are abstracted through the entertainment of the
subject’s essence. The main characteristic of such
predicates, like the notions of unity, particularity, existence,
and causality, is that they do not have any extension other
than the extension of their subject.
For instance, it is obvious that unity (wahda), particularity,
existence, causality, and the like, are notions whose
meanings are different from the quiddities to which they are
predicated. However, for an entity to be characterized by

1Al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mulla Hādī. Sharh al-Mandhūma. (Qum:

Maktabat al-Mustafawī), section on Hikmah, 30.
 169
these concepts, it does not need an extension and reality
other than its own extension and reality. For example,
although the concept of causality (al-‛illiyya) is other than
quiddity of the agency, which is the cause, nonetheless,
causality does not have an extension other than the
extension of that essence.
Although a thing may not exist, lack particularity, and not
be characterized with causality—and to determine these
things, to say, whether a thing has existence, particularity,
and causality requires proof—nevertheless, even before
these are affirmed, the mind is aware that their affirmation
does not require the existence of three distinct entities that
are incorporated into one another. If the extension and
reality of a notion such as unity, existence, particularity, or
causality, were other than the extension and reality of the
entity which is characterized by it, it would invite infinite
repetition and regress; and according to the principle
delivered by Shaykh al-Ishrāq in this context, its existence
would be impossible.1
Al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, in contrast, is a predicate whose
validity of predication to its subject is contingent on the
existence of an extension exclusive to the predicate and at
the mean time in unity, or one may say attached or
associated, with the subject. For instance, when a particular
physique has a certain color or size—since color is of the
category of quality and size is of the category of quantity,
and the real extensions (masādīq) of quality and quantity
cannot be identical with the real extension of a substance—
the extensions of these accidents are inevitably
incorporated and united with that physique.
If, though it is not the case, Kant’s division of propositions
into analytic and synthetic were on the grounds of unity and
oneness of predicate and subject in terms of extension and
reality, then indeed, existence does not qualify to be the
predicate of a synthetic proposition and can only be a

1Al-Suhrawardī, Abu al-Fath Shahāb al-Dīn Yahyā ibn Habash.

Al-Mutarehāt. (Tehran: Anjoman-i-Falsafa-i-Iran, 1978), vol. 1, 26.
 170
predicate of an analytic proposition. Kant’s division,
however, revolves around the axis of notional unity and
oneness of predicates and subjects. Although the notion of
existence has extensional unity (al-wahda al-misdāqiyya)
with the notions of various quiddities and secondary
intelligibles (al-ma‛qūlāt al-thāniyya) such as unity,
multiplicity, and causality, nonetheless, their notions are
not identical. Therefore, whenever existence is predicated
to anyone of these notions, the proposition is a synthetic
proposition; that is, the predicate is not included in the
subject. But if the subject that existence is predicated to
were not a quidditative concept and were instead a concept
that is not different from the concept of existence—and
therefore, it were the very concept of existence, or a
compound concept that includes the concept of existence—
the predication of the concept of existence to the subject
would be analytic; that is, the predicate would be included
in the essence of the subject.
It was imperative to present this prologue so the many
confusions and shortcomings of Kant’s analysis of
predication that have continued in the works of his heirs,
such as Russell, can be illustrated.
In his third criticism, Kant holds that existence is a
copulative being (al-wūjud al-rābit), that is, it bears the
meaning of a “transitive is” (kāna al-nāqisa), and its usage
is exclusive to connecting predicates and subjects. He
maintains that by placing the predicate on the side of the
subject, the mind expresses “is,” which is the relationship
between subject and the predicate, as “existent”
(al-maujūd). Therefore, the concept of existence does not
add anything to the subject and predicate of the previous
proposition in which it conjoins the two.
Kant substantiates his claim by the fact that there is no
difference between a real one hundred dollars the existence
of which is related and an imaginary one hundred dollars
the existence of which is not related. Since if there were
any difference between the real and imaginary hundred
dollars—that is, if the addition of the concept of existence
 171
to the concept of one hundred dollars added something to
its value—then the concept of hundred dollars would not
have any indication with regard to the real one hundred
dollars and the real one hundred dollars would not be the
extension of one hundred dollars. The conclusion he
derives from this analogy is that existence is not a
predicate, which can be used to constitute a synthetic
proposition.1
This argument, however, fails to indicate more than the fact
that when existence is predicated to a subject, existence
does not constitute a reality other than reality of the
subjects to which it is predicated. In other words, Kant’s
argument only indicates that when existence is predicated
to a certain subject, it cannot be al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma,
since it cannot have an extension other than the extension
of the subject to which it is predicated. For this reason, the
said argument fails to demonstrate that existence does not
add meaning to the proposition and that a proposition,
which includes the predication of existence to a subject is
not synthetic. Therefore, it does not follow that predication
of existence is meaningless.
Existence is one of the common and axiomatic notions.
The arguments of synonymy of existence (al-eshterāk
al-ma‛nawī lil-wujūd)2 prove that, regardless of its usage as
“transitive is” (kāna al-nāqisa) or “intransitive is” (kāna
al-thāmma), existence always has a single meaning. As far

1 Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp

Smith. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1965), 505.
2 Synonymy of Existence (al-ishterāk al-ma‛nawi lil -wujūd) In the

initial ontological inquiries of Transcendent Wisdom, it is

enunciated that the axiomatic notion of existence is always used in
the same meaning. This view refutes the position of the
mutakallimūn’s, some of whom hold that existence is used in every
instance in a different sense. Other scholars of kalām argue that
existence is used in the same meaning when referring to
contingents, but with a different meaning when used for the
Necessary. *
 172
as Kant’s argument for the negation of its predicative
meaning is concerned, it only indicates that existence does
not have any external factuality other than the factuality of
the quiddity, which is instantiated through it.
Existence, regardless of the discussions of principality of
existence, has a specific notion; and this notion, regardless
of whether it has an extension and how its extension or
extensions are recognized, by predication as essence, is
necessarily itself. For this reason, predication of existence
to itself or a subject, which comprises it, constitutes a
proposition which, by predication as essence, is necessarily
veridical. Therefore, Kant’s third criticism, contrary to
what some Muslim thinkers have presumed,1 does not
undermine the validity of Anselm’s predication of existence
to a notion which comprises existence. Rather, Anselm’s
fallacy lies in his failure to discriminate between
predication as essence and predication as extension,
because of which he ascribes the necessity, which is valid
with respect to the notion of the most adequate conceivable
perfection to its extension.

Addendum
The tenability of the so-called ontological argument of
Anselm cannot be restored by the unity of mind and reality
by saying that since mind and reality are one, hence, what is
conceived in the mind is nothing but factual reality. That is
because first of all, the unity of mind and reality has no
rational foundation, for there are numerous examples—
such as the concept of the Deity’s partner or the concept of
multiplicity of deities—that are sufficient to indicate its
incoherence. Second, Anselm does not hold such a position
and a theistic argument cannot be established on such shaky
grounds.

1Tabātabā’ī, Syed Muhammad Husain. Usūl-i-Falsafa wa Rawish-i-

Rializim. Introduction and footnotes by Murtadha Mutaharī.
(Qum: Sadra Publications), vol. 5, 125.
 173
Another point, which should be established, is that the ex-
istence of Platonic archetypes (arbāb al-anwā‛) cannot ad-
duce the putative ontological argument, either. For in-
stance, it could possibly be suggested that mental exempli-
fication (al-tamāthul al-dhehnī) emanates from the external
world and if there were not a factual reality for every men-
tal image, there would no mental image. Since the mental
image of “that than which nothing greater can be con-
ceived” is in our minds, it indicates that there is an external
reality, which conforms to this concept.
This is unjustified because although Platonic archetypes are
real—that is, though external things, in addition their
physical existence in the natural world and intermediate
existence in mundus imaginalis (‛ālam al-khiyāl), have
another existence in the world of intellects such that when
the soul finds the ability to discern intellectual universals
(al-kulliyyāt al-‛aqliyya), it ascends to the transcendent
stage of their company—mere conception of a few related
concepts does not positively indicate that they have been
derived from a single and sheer (basīt) incorporeal reality.
It cannot be ruled out that due to the influence of certain
faculties of the soul with the capacity to analyze and
connect mental notions and images, numerous concepts that
have been abstracted from various beings or have been
attained by their observation, have been connected to one
another and put as “that than which nothing greater can be
conceived.” Therefore, in order to make sure that the
faculties of estimation and imagination are not interfering
with ones comprehension, it is imperative to assess the
truth of one’s understandings with the demonstrative
reason, which relies only on primary and self-evident
concepts and notions.
 175

Chapter Seven

THE DEMONSTRATION OF THE

VERACIOUS
 177

The Demonstration of the Veracious in Ibn Sīnā’s

Works
Derived from the Noble Qur’ān, the title of “the
demonstration of the veracious” (burhān al-siddīqīn) was
used for the first time by Ibn Sīnā in the appellation of a
theistic argument he had originated. Ibn Sīnā’s argument
did not trace effects, such as motion or hudūth, as
inferential mediates to the Necessary; rather, after
refutation of sophism and acknowledging that there is a
reality, it reached the optimal conclusion of the Necessary’s
existence from the mere consideration of existence. In the
view of the argument’s unique features—that it does not
need a mediate and proceeds from the mere entertainment
of external existence through a rational division that
existence is either necessary or contingent, and if
contingent, it requires the Necessary—it was given the
elaborate title of the demonstration of the veracious.
Ibn Sīnā constructs this brilliant demonstration (burhān) in
the fourth of chapter of Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Says he
with respect to his argument’s features and appellation,

Consider how our proof of the First

and His unity and His exaltedness
from all ills did not need the concep-
tion of anything but the essence of
existence and how it did not need to
regard His creation and His deeds.
Notwithstanding, they are His proofs,
but this gateway is nobler and more
trustworthy. That is, when we con-
sider existence, existence qua exist-
ence attests to the Necessary, and
then His existence attests to His at-
tributes. With regard to the other
path, it has been indicated in the Di-
vine Book, “Soon will we show them
Our signs in the horizons and in their
souls until it becomes manifest unto
 178
them that He is the Real.”1 Indeed,
such a method of knowledge of the
Almighty God belongs to a certain
group of people. The Qur’ān then
says, “Is not sufficient for thy Lord
that He is a witness over all things.”2
This rule is exclusive for the vera-
cious, who, argue from Him to Him,
not from others to Him.3

The last fragment of the verse, that is, “He is a witness over
all things,” on the account of which Ibn Sīnā quotes the
verse, means that God is manifest in everything so much so
that even if you want to know yourself, you first witness
God and then yourself. The tradition narrated from Imam
Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be with him, which says “A creature
does not discern anything but through Allah, and cognition
of Allah cannot be attained but through Allah,”4 has the
very same meaning.

The Demonstration of the Veracious in Transcendent

Wisdom
Although in many respects Ibn Sīnā’s argument—which is
the main argument of the majority of philosophers and
mutakellimūn after him—is superior to other traditional
arguments, it relies upon a number of premises that
lengthen the course of deduction. For this reason Sadr al-
Muta’allihīn (Mullā Sadrā) tried to shorten its premises,
and articulated another version of the demonstration of the
veracious. In the prologue of his argument, with words

1 41: 53
2 ibid.
3 Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Commentary

by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. (Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981),

vol. 3, 66.
4 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 143.

 179
similar to that of Ibn Sīnā in Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt,
Sadr al-Muta’allihīn says, “People other than the veracious,
in order to attain the cognition of God and His attributes,
elicit things other than Him. For instance, the majority of
philosophers evoke contingency, physicists use motion, and
the mutakellimūn employ hudūth of the world.”1 And in
Al-Asfār he says,

The ways towards God are many, for

He is the Possessor of multiple ex-
cellences and aspects. “And for eve-
ry one is a direction to which he
turneth.”2 Nonetheless, some paths
are more reliable, nobler, and have
more illumination than the other
ones; and the strongest and noblest
of these demonstrations is the one in
which the middle term is not, in fact,
something other than Him. There-
fore, a path as such to the destination
is the destination itself; and this is
the path of the veracious, who attest
to the Almighty by witnessing Him,
and then they attest to His attributes
by witnessing His Essence, and attest
to His actions by witnessing His at-
tributes, attribute after attribute and
action after action. People other than
them, for instance, the
mutakallemūn, the physicists, and so
forth, prove the Almighty and His at-
tributes by the entertainment of
things other than Him—such as con-

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-Masha’ir.

Commentary by Mirza Imad al-Dawla. (Isfahan: Mahdawī Publi-
cations), 68.
2 2: 148
 180
tingency of quiddities, hudūth of the
world, motion of physical bodies,
and so forth. Although these are also
proofs of His Essence and evidence
of His attributes, the articulated path
is stronger and nobler, and in the Di-
vine book the former path has been
indicated by the Almighty’s saying:
“Soon will We show them Our signs
in the horizons and in their souls un-
til it becomes manifest unto them
that He is the Real,” and to the latter
path by His saying: “Is not sufficient
for thy Lord that He is a Witness
over all things.1

Sadr al-Muta’allihīn then presents a new demonstration,

which he regards an instance of the path of the veracious.
In this argument, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn does not make use of
quiddity, quidditative contingency, motion, or hudūth. This
demonstration considers reality of existence and its
exclusive rules and is founded on a few philosophical
principles such as principality (asāla), simplicity (basāta),
and gradation (tashkīk) of existence.
After him, other theosophers tried to shorten some of its
premises. For instance, by making use of contingency of
impoverishment (al-imkān al-faqrī), the Divine sage al-
Sabzawārī omitted some of its premises.2 Nevertheless,
despite all these efforts, the impoverishment and need of
finite beings of inferior levels of gradational reality of
existence (al-haqīqa al-mushakkeka lil-wujūd) were relied

1 Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-Hikma al-

Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-Islamiya,
1959), vol. 6, 12.
2 Al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mulla Hādī. Sharh al-Mandhūma. (Qum:
Maktabat al-Mustafawī), section on Hikmah, 146.
 181
upon, which disallowed a direct and intermediary-free
discernment of the Almighty Necessary.
The demonstration of the veracious, as attested by the
verse, is an argument the inference of which is not based on
any non-necessary mediate (al-hadd al-wasat); and
therefore, without proceeding from any premise, it presents
the existence of the Necessary as the first ontological
proposition. Many luminaries of Gnosticism (‛irfān)
throughout the history of Islamic thought have tried to
conduct an argument as such. The Divine sage Mirzā
Mahdī al-Āshtiyānī, in his commentary on Sharh al-
Mandhūma, mentions nineteen arguments organized for
this purpose, some of which formulated by the Gnostics1.
The demonstrations set by the Gnostics are greatly different
from one another, but they are not devoid of inconsistency.
These arguments—regardless of the criticisms applicable to
each one in particular—are open to one common criticism,
namely, the failure to make distinction between notion
(mafhūm) and extension (misdāq).

The Demonstration of the Veracious in ‛Allāmah

Tabātabā’i’s Works
In his commentary on Al-Asfār, and in the fifth volume of
Usūl-i-Falsafa wa Rawish-i-Ri'alizm, ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī,
may Allah sanctify his tomb, constructs a demonstration for
the affirmation of the Necessary. This demonstration does
not depend on any philosophic principles and proceeds
from the mere entertainment of eternal necessity of absolute
existence to the Necessary’s existence as the first
proposition of human knowledge. 2 In view of having these
unique features, the late ‛Allāmah’s proof is well worthy to

1 Al-Āshtiyānī, Mirza Mahdī. Ta‛līqa Rashīqa ‛ala Sharh al-

Mandhūma. (Qum: Maktab al-A’alam al-Islamī, 1986), 489.
2 Tabātabā’ī, Syed Muhammad Husain. Commentary on Al-Hikma

al-Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-

Islamiya, 1959), vol. 6, 14.
 182
be adorned with the elegant title of the demonstration of the
veracious.
In order to be the first proposition of human knowledge, it
is imperative to have independence from all propositional
premises (al-mabādī al-tasdīqiyya). However, such
independence is not inconsistent with reliance upon certain
conceptual fundamentals (al-mabādī al-tasawuriyya).
The chief conceptual fundamentals relied upon in the
demonstration of the veracious are the notions of existence,
essential necessity (al-dharūra al-dhātiyya), and eternal
necessity (al-dharūra al-azaliyya). These are common and
axiomatic notions and the definitions, which have been
suggested to describe them, are lexical definitions
(al-ta‛ārīf al-lafdhiyya), which merely draw attention
towards their purported meanings.
Another point worth mentioning before expounding the
demonstration is that the objective of the demonstration of
the veracious is to prove the Divine Essence. It is not
concerned with proving His attributes and actions.
The Almighty God is a reality Who has eternal necessity.
Eternal necessity is other than essential necessity
(al-dharūra al-dhātiyya), attributive necessity (al-dharūra
al-wasfiyya), conditional necessity (al-dharūra
al-shartiyya), and other similar sorts of necessities. In
attributive and conditional necessities, the affirmation of a
predicate for its subject is necessary provided the pertinent
attribute or condition is secured. Likewise, in essential
necessity, affirmation of a predicate for its subject is
restricted to the continuance of the existence of the subject;
in other words, the predicate is affirmed for the subject as
long as the subject is existent.
Eternal necessity is instantiated when the affirmation of the
predicate for its subject is not restricted by any condition or
attribute, and not even by the continuance of subject’s
existence. Therefore, in eternal necessity, the predicate is
affirmed for the subject in every state.
God’s eternal necessity means that His reality is not
stipulated by any condition and His Essence has reality in
 183
every state, and therefore, His reality is beyond the
restrictions of attributes, conditions, and time. This is what
is meant when it is stated that the notion of reality is
abstracted from the Divine Essence qua His absoluteness
(al-haithiyya al-itlāqiyya), not qua delimitation
(al-haithiyya al-taqyīdiyya) or qua causation (al-haithiyya
al-ta‛līliyya).
The demonstration of the veracious, in fact, does not intend
to prove a reality, which is unknown and must be proved in
a discursive fashion. It proves the primariness
(al-awwaliyya) of human knowledge with respect to a
proposition, which narrates the eternal necessity of God, the
Glorified. If the demonstration were designed to prove a
reality who has eternal necessity, its conclusion would not
be the first ontological proposition, because every
demonstration proceeds from certain premises to a
conclusion, and given that the premises are antecedent
(muqaddam) to the conclusion, the premises—the truth of
which substantiate the existence of the Deity—would be
propositional premises for the conclusion.
As necessary attributes of primary and self-evident
propositions, primariness (awwaliyya) and self-evidence
(badāha) are not included in them as their integral parts.
For this reason, though such propositions are never subject
to doubt—because doubt as such entails skepticism
(shakkākiyya) about every branch of knowledge and takes
away the epistemic relevance of proving or denying
anything—nevertheless, it is possible to have doubt or to be
inattentive towards their primariness and self-evidence. In
such a case, the proof of a given proposition’s primariness
or self-evidence draws attention to the proposition’s
foremost position in human knowledge and establishes the
impossibility of unawareness and ignorance with regard to
it.
The demonstration of the veracious claims that the
existence of a reality that has eternal necessity is primary
(awwalī) and it is impossible not to know Him; and that the
 184
boundary of philosophy and sophistry is the acceptance of
that reality.
Sophism is the negation of reality, and philosophy is its
acceptance. Just as the invalidity of sophistry is primary, so
is the truth of reality beyond doubt. A sophist is a person
who negates reality, and a philosopher acknowledges reality
and investigates how does reality manifest itself and how is
it represented in concepts.
According to the proponents of principality of existence, it
is the notion of existence that represents reality. The
proponents of principality of quiddity, however, view
reality as the actual extension of quiddities. In other
sections of philosophy, unity (wahda), multiplicity (kathra),
life (hayāt), power (qudra), and other qualities of the Real
are discussed. Therefore, the very first philosophical
proposition is the acknowledgement of reality, and one who
negates this proposition has abandoned the method of
reason and dialogue, and practical admonishment is the
only way of healing him.
The point towards which ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī draws
attention is that the proposition “There is a reality,” and the
proposition “Sophistry is void,” have eternal necessity.
That is, the modality of these propositions is not attributive,
conditional, or essential necessity. Acceptance of this
claim, like acceptance of reality, needs mere drawing of
one’s attention (tanbīh). In other words, just as the
entertainment of the concept of reality is sufficient to
acknowledge its truth, the conception of the notion of
eternal necessity of reality is sufficient for accepting its
validity.
A human being cannot accept sophistry in any situation or
condition, since situations and conditions are realities,
which attest to the invalidity of sophistry, which is the
negation of reality.
Should reality be annihilated in a specific condition—in a
beginning, or an end, or in any particular supposition—then
only two situations are conceivable. The first is that its
annihilation is not real, and an equivocal or false claim has
 185
been made that reality is annihilated. In this case, reality is
preserved and it has not been annihilated. The second is
that its annihilation is true; that is, reality has really been
annihilated. In this supposition, again, the affirmation of
the basic reality is acknowledged, since the supposition
asserts that reality has really been destroyed; therefore, as a
real phenomenon, the destruction of reality reflects the real
presence of reality. Therefore, the falsehood of sophistry
and veridicality of reality is well secured in every
perceivable supposition; and a single instance of reality’s
destruction is inconceivable.
A proposition, which negates reality, is a proposition, that
neither its veridicality can be related in any supposition, nor
its falsehood could ever be doubted. That is, its utterance
always presupposes its own falsity. On the other side of the
spectrum, it is impossible to doubt the meaning of the
proposition, which affirms reality, because dismissing it as
meaningless or doubting its meaning entails the affirmation
of reality.
If, like a finite being, reality lacked eternal necessity and its
necessity were conditional, say, with the continuance of its
existence (al-dharūra al-dhātiyya), sophism would have
had veridicality in the realm of reality’s destruction.
Nevertheless, the veridicality of sophistry is a reality, which
has its own specific nafs al-amr.
The realm of sophistry’s veridicality is not the abode of the
narrator’s existence, in which case its veridicality would
pertain to the reality of the narrator. Rather, its realm of
truth is that very supposition, which the proposition
reflects. When, in a given supposition, reality is negated,
real negation of philosophy and real affirmation of
sophistry is a reality that has been narrated. Thus, reality is
still manifested in the context of its very negation. For this
reason, reality cannot be denied in any supposition; and the
primary and self-evident proposition (al-qadhiyya al-
awwaliyya al-badīhiyya), which holds its truth, has eternal
necessity.
 186
Since the truth of the propositions, which relate reality of
finite and conditional beings, is subject to certain
conditions, and it is only within certain boundaries that they
are true, beyond which they are false, finite and conditional
beings cannot be the extension (misdāq) of the reality that
has eternal necessity.
Given that the aggregate of finite beings is not another
entity, which has something additional to its parts, it does
not have any reality at all. Similarly, their universals
(jāmi‛) do not have any external reality either, and they are
notions that exist in the mind by the mental mode of
existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) in such a way that if the
mind did not to exist, the universals would not even have
found the mental existence. Therefore, reality, the eternally
necessary existence of which is axiomatic and primary, is
other than the finite beings, their totality, and their
universals, as the first have finite realities, the second has
no reality, and the third has a limited mental reality.
Therefore, the first ontological proposition, which the
human being cannot not know, is the affirmation of the
basic reality, and its modality is eternal necessity. And
since, as just explained, finite entities, such as the heavens,
the earth, the cosmos, and so forth, cannot be the extension
of this proposition, its extension is only an Absolute
Reality—Who is above the restrictions of conditions, is
present with all of the finite realities, and no absence or
termination is perceivable with respect to Him.
The demonstration of the veracious, with this exposition,
sidesteps the criticism of failure of differentiation between
notion and extension. This argument is not based on the
notion of reality and its necessity of predication to itself by
predication as essence. The argument, in fact, proceeds
from the first ontological proposition, which encompasses
affirmation of the basic reality and rejection of sophistry.
The affirmation of reality is not based on its notion, which
is held in the mind; it is with respect to external factuality.
If it were on the basis of its notion and by predication as
essence (al-haml al-awwalī), then just as reality is reality,
 187
sophism is sophism. Therefore, the invalidation of
sophism, and consequently, the truth of the basic reality, is
with respect to the external world and predication as
extension (al-haml al-shā’ye‛).

Allamah Tabātabā’i’s Exposition of the Demonstration

In succinct and expressive words, and through perception
of reality, not its notion, ‛Allāmah Tabātabā’ī, Divine grace
be with him, expounds the demonstration in the fourteenth
essay of Usūl-I-Falsafa wa Rawish-i- Ri’ālizm as follows:

The reality of existence, the truth of

which is indubitable, never accepts
negation and is indestructible. In
other words, the reality of existence
is the reality of existence without any
condition or provision; and under no
condition or provision, does it be-
come non-reality. However, the
world is transient and every part
thereof accepts nonexistence. There-
fore, the world is not the undeniable
reality.1

The martyred commentator of Usūl-i-Falsafa wa Rawish-

i-Ri’alizm, sanctified be his soul, conducts the exposition of
the demonstration in the light of some ontological
principles such as the principality and unity of existence
and portrays a sketch of the argument similar to other
demonstrations, which proceed from gradation of existence
or contingency of impoverishment. However, the proof, as
exposed by its author, revolves around the axis of reality
and does not require any of these principles. It entails the
existence of the Necessary as the first ontological
proposition. Perhaps the fragment “reality of existence”

1Tabātabā’ī, Syed Muhammad Husain. Usūl-i-Falsafa wa Rawish-i-

Rializim. Introduction and footnotes by Murtadha Mutaharī. 5
vols. (Qum: Sadra Publications), vol. 5, 116.
 188
(haqīqat al-wujūd) in the ‛Allāmah’s work has led the
commentator to conduct his exposition as such. However,
‛Allāmah’s statement in his commentary on Al-Asfār is
such that it disallows any such misconception.

The reality with which we reject

sophistry and which every sensible
person is constrained to accept, by
virtue of its essence, does not accede
to nullity or nonexistence, so much
so that even the supposition of its
nullity and nonexistence presupposes
its truth and existence. If, either ab-
solutely or in a specific period, we
suppose the nullity of every reality,
then every reality will really be null,
which affirms the reality. Similarly,
if the sophist sees things as illusions,
or doubts their reality, they are really
illusions to him, and their reality is
really dubious for him. This
amounts to affirmation of reality qua
its negation.
Therefore, if reality does not accept
nonexistence and nullity by virtue of
its essence, then it is necessary by
virtue of its essence. Therefore,
there is a reality, which is necessary
by virtue of its essence; and every-
thing, which has reality, is needful to
it for its reality and is subsistent by
it.
Here, it occurs to the reasonable that
the existence of the Necessary is
primary; and the arguments for Him,
 189
in effect, draw attention to His exist-
ence.1

The Qualities of the Demonstration of the Veracious

Although the sole indication of the demonstration of the
veracious is with respect to the Necessary’s Essence and it
does not prove His attributes or actions, it still has a
number of unique qualities. In addition to its lack of need
of ontological premises, its accomplishments far exceed the
other arguments. In fact, it arrives at the infinite reality of
God in the first step, an objective the other arguments
accomplish only after going through many steps.
The arguments, which do not prove God’s attributes, do not
indicate His absoluteness (itlāq) either. In fact, due to their
dependence on premises such as gradation or multiplicity of
existence, they fail to prove the Origin’s absoluteness.
After some steps, when the imperativeness of the
Necessary’s absoluteness is established, inevitably, certain
philosophical positions are reassessed. However, the
demonstration of the veracious, as expounded by the late
‛Allāmah, may Allah bless his soul, first illustrates the
absoluteness of the Essence and then proves His necessity.
In the light of absoluteness and infinity of the Real, His
other attributes such as unity, knowledge, and the like, are
traced one after the other; and after the essential attributes,
the grades and details of God’s practical manifestations and
illuminations become evident.
In the light of Divine absoluteness and encompassment
(ihāta), multiplicity is translated into His manifestations
and splendors, and the impoverished existence attributed to
finite entities in the demonstration of contingency of
impoverishment, is effaced (fānī) and annihilated
(mostahlek) into the passion of generous Divine
benedictions. Thus, everything from Adam to the atom,

1 Tabātabā’ī, Syed Muhammad Husain. Commentary on Al-Hikma

al-Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-
Islamiya, 1959), vol. 6, 14.
 190
with all the characteristics they contain, are signs of that
Infinite Who ever remains hidden in the unseen (ghaib) of
His Essence.1

1 Note: Eternal necessity of reality is solely applicable to the Al-

mighty Necessary, since for instance, although philosophical prima
matter is particular, nonetheless it does not exist in incorporeal be-
ings. If it were the basic reality, then the incorporeal beings should
not be real. Physical matter, however, is not even an individual
being, since it is always changing into a new condition, such as mo-
tion and energy. The entity, which is immutable in every condi-
tion, is the prima matter; but it is limited to the physical world.
Therefore, neither philosophical nor physical matter can have eter-
nal necessity, as the greatest extent of necessity, which can be
proved for them, is essential-logical necessity, which is restricted to
the continuance of the essence.
 191

Chapter Eight

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN

 193

thorough assessment of the much-celebrated argu-

A ment that proceeds from the world’s orderly concat-

enation requires that three questions be carefully
analyzed:

 What is order?
 Does order exist?
 Why does order exist?

The inquiry of these key questions, in addition to ensuring

that the argument’s conclusions do not trespass beyond
what is contained in its premises, should also shed light on
some other secondary issues so their independent analysis
will not be needed.

What is Order?
Order (nadhm) is not a quiddity (māhiyya) so it could be
defined through its genus (jins) and differentia (fasl).
However, in order to insure that our inquiry proceeds from
logically solid grounds, it is prudent to clarify the meaning
of order, since if an inquiry is devoted to examining
whether a certain notion is instantiated in the external
world, then before acceptance or dismissal, it is imperative
to elucidate what does that notion stand for.
Although order is not a quiddity, in terms of being a
secondary philosophic intelligible (al-ma‛qūl al-thānī
al-falsafī), it is similar to quiddities. Order is reflected in
the regularity of things, and the meaning of regularity,
which is opposite to entropy, is evident. As will be
reiterated at the end of the chapter, it is important to retain
in mind that orderliness is opposite to entropy, not evil.
Hence, even if there is evil in the world, its operation is
orderly and it is bound by specific rules.
Regularity or orderliness can be conventional (e‛tebārī),
artificial (senā‛ī), or factual (wāqe‛ī). An example of
conventional regularity would be the regularity of words of
a sentence. The orderly arrangement of books of a library
 194
and the splendid complexities of a watch are instances of
artificial regularity. Factual order is like the configuration
of the animal body.
Although used in the analogical exposition (al-taqrīr al-
tamthīlī) of the argument from design, artificial design is
not, however, central to its inquiry and in fact analogy
(tamthīl) has little significance in demonstrative
discussions. The argument’s analogical exposition could
run, for instance, as follows: As it is justified to infer from
the labyrinth complexities of a watch that it has a designer,
likewise, it is not irrational to trace the orderliness of the
world to a cosmic orderer (al-nādhim). In brief, in these
versions the similarity of artificial design and cosmic
orderliness is extended to their similarity in being the work
of an intelligent designer.
Factual order, the grounds whereby foundations of the
argument from design is laid, is neither indebted to
conventions of the society nor to the imagination of
inventors. Its abode is the external reality and it is
apprehended from the comparison of external things.
Factual order has three kinds:

1. Causal order (al-nadhm

al-‛illī)
2. Teleological order (al-nadhm
al-ghā’ī)
3. Immanent order (al-nadhm
al-dākhilī)

Causal order reflects the cognation (musānikha) of a cause

with its effect. As instanced by the verse, “Everyone acteth
after his own mold”1 causes only produce certain effects,
and certain effects are produced only by certain causes.
Teleological order represents the relationship of an effect
with its final cause. It means that events advance towards
specific goals and not every event can produce every

1 17: 84
 195
outcome. The denial of the former and this kind of order
amounts to the denial of the principle of causation, which
would indicate the rule of entropy and chaos over the world
and that anything could be produced by anything.
Immanent order reflects the regularity of internal parts of a
configuration. It is exclusive to things, which have prima
matter (al-mādda al-ūlā) and form (sūra), genus and
differentia, or are totalities of subordinate parts. Immanent
order is inconceivable for something that is externally
sheer, that is, is not made of extraneous parts.
On numerous occasions, the Noble Qur’ān alludes to these
tripartite regularities of things; and in some verses, like the
verse “Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything its form,
and then guided it,”1 the Divine Book mentions all three
together. This verse speaks of God as the efficient cause of
all things Who has furnished them with an impeccable
“form” or regularity and guided them towards their goals.
In the light of this, it is fair to state that the regularity of
members of a concatenation—on which the argument from
design is based—is only conceivable between a series of
things, which function towards a common objective.
Therefore, the argument from design, contrary to other
arguments such as the arguments from hudūth, motion, and
contingency, cannot be organized with consideration to just
one entity. Rather, it requires an ensemble, which is
perceived in the context of its members and in relation to a
common objective.

Does Order Exist?

At the threshold of inquiry into the existence of factual
order, it should be kept in mind that the presence of factual
order is perceivable in three spheres: the natural world
(‛ālam al-mādda), the mundus imaginalis (‛ālam al-khiyāl),
and the world of intellects (‛ālam al-‛uqūl). The first
category of order is discerned by the empirical sciences; the
second is studied by the mathematical sciences, logic, and

1 20: 50
 196
philosophy; and Gnosticism inquires into the orderliness of
intellectual realities. However, the sole field of critique and
apology in the context of the argument from design is the
orderliness of the natural world.
The minor premise of the argument from design is not a
purely empirical premise. Design and orderliness is not a
sensible quality, which can be apprehended by sensation. It
is similar to the principle of causation, which is not
sensually discerned, since the maximum sensory perception
with respect to causation is the observation of constant
succession and concurrence of changes in physical beings.
In the case of natural order, however, we do not perceive
something as palpably sensible as succession and
concurrence of events. Order is an elaborate regularity and
concatenation between two or more things; and sensation
(ehsās) cannot detect such regularity and concatenation. In
fact, it is our reason that discerns the presence of
orderliness and design in natural entities from our
experiential and sensual perceptions. Occasionally, if
natural order is mentioned as a sensory object, it is because
reason detects it with the assistance of the senses, as it is
held that reason apprehends motion with the help of
sensation. Therefore, individuals, who deny the epistemic
worth of the rational approach and consider sensation
(ehsās) the sole means of knowledge, can never have
definite knowledge with respect to the presence of order.
One need be reminded that if the argument’s minor premise
is conjectural, the conclusion of the argument will be
conjectural as well, because a syllogism’s conclusion is
always defined by its weakest premise. Furthermore, if the
argument’s minor premise relates the presence of order and
design at a cosmic scale, given that the argument is valid, a
cosmic orderer (al-nādhim) and designer will be proved.
But if the argument is founded on an order of a rather
limited scope, the argument’s conclusion will be in
proportion to the limited order included in its premise.
The presence of order in the world can be affirmed by two
different approaches: the purely rational approach and the
 197
rational-sensual approach, which was just indicated.
Difference between the two is important to notice. In brief,
through syllogism du pourqoi (al-burhān al-limmī)—that
is, arguing from transcendental sources and using the
Divine names of beauty and glory as middle terms to the
existence of order in the world—reason has the capacity to
not only infer the universal orderliness of the world, but
also to establish its perfection. For instance, through
syllogism du pourqoi, al-Ghazzālī traces certain Divine
attributes such as the Creator, the All-Knowledgeable, the
Generous, Omnipotent, and so forth, to the perfection of the
world, which He has created. Shaykh al-Ishrāq approves
al-Ghazzālī’s method of inferring world’s perfection from
the attributes of its efficient cause. However, one who is
arguing from the attributes of the cosmic Creator to cosmic
orderliness and perfection cannot lend his knowledge of the
cosmic Creator to a syllogism, which intends to prove Him.
The affirmation of this sort of expansive and universal
order, which dominates the entire realm of existence, is far
beyond the scope of empiricism, which can only relate the
limited portion of the cosmos, which is within the sphere of
human sensation.
Although empiricism cannot indicate a universal cosmic
regularity, nevertheless, an overall order is conveniently
provable. This is indebted to the evident immanent and
teleological regularities of things discernable to man—
whether they pertain to nature, the mundus imaginalis, or
the intellectual world. For instance, the Peripatetic
philosophers infer the presence of plant and animal souls
from the many coordinated activities of faunae and florae,
which are not because of their body; and Shaykh al-Ishrāq1
argues for the existence of their archetypes (arbāb al-

1 Al-Suhrawardī, Abu al-Fath Shahāb al-Dīn Yahyā ibn Habash.

Al-Mutarehāt. (Tehran: Anjoman-i-Falsafa-i-Iran, 1978), vol. 1, 453.
See also: Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn. Al-
Hikma al-Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a. (Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-
Islamiya, 1959), vol. 2, 53.
 198
anwā‛) on the basis of their intelligent and wise orderliness.
Moreover, if the inquiry of how certain objectives are
realized by certain behaviors of the natural elements leads
to the creation of various branches of empirical sciences,
then these behaviors are marked by knowledge and
contrivance. In light of this observation, the presence of
design, at least on a limited scale, is not deniable. Hence,
the tenability of the argument from design lies with the
veridicality of its major premise.

Why does Order Exist?

The inquiry of the major premise of the argument from
design is devoted to establishing whether the presence of
order in the world can be traced to an intelligent designer.
In other words, it assesses the veridicality of a universal
major premise, which assigns every order to an orderer (al-
nādhim) and rules out the possibility of haphazardness.
That is because if some orders are brought about by
intelligent causal efficacy and some may be haphazard,
then—given that the argument is in the form of a first-
figure syllogism, which in order to be conclusive, must
include a universal major premise—the existence of an
orderer cannot be concluded.
It is important to notice that in demonstrative reasoning, it
is only epistemic certitude, which can provide logical
grounds of inference. Although psychological certitude,
which is mostly the result of individual habits and social
predilections, is beneficial to religious faith; it cannot
withstand rational critique and cannot relay cognitive
judgments to others.
Among the methods tried to prove the major premise of the
argument is probability. It has been argued that since the
likeliness of haphazard occurrence of the natural world’s
splendid regularity is almost zero, therefore, it cannot be by
chance and is indebted to a knowledgeable causal efficacy.
However, there are some points, which undermine the tena-
bility of this perspective:
 199
First: Probability approximates the likelihood of haphazard
and desultory occurrence of an orderly arrangement of ele-
ments to zero, nonetheless, it never reduces it to zero.
Therefore, it may be able to deliver a sort of simplistic con-
fidence and psychological certitude; however, it can never
entail cognitive certitude.
Second: The need of contingents with respect to the Neces-
sary and the impossibility of chance are based on definite
demonstrations (barāhīn), nevertheless as far as the ar-
rangement of the natural elements, regardless of their con-
tingency and equidistance to existence and nonexistence, is
concerned, chance and haphazardness cannot be easily
ruled out. This is because all conceivable arrangements of
natural elements have equal probability with one another.
For instance, the proponent of the probability argument
may analogize the orderly nature of the world to a series of
one thousand coins, which are marked from one to one
thousand. The chances of haphazard arrangement of such a
series of coins in a away that coin number one be placed
first and coin number two second, and so on until coin one
number thousand thousandth, is almost zero. Therefore, if
an arrangement as such is rendered, it is not irrational to
infer that the arranger is an intelligent agency. However, if
this example is carefully analyzed, it becomes clear that all
of the other conceivable scenarios have an equally weak
probability. Even if coins were arranged in a different or-
der, for instance, if they were arranged from one thousand
to one, the odd coins were placed ahead of the even coins,
or vice versa, or they were arranged in the most disorderly
fashion perceivable, all of the arrangements would have an
equal probability in comparison with one another.
If the existence of an all-knowledgeable designer is not al-
ready established through rational deduction and the possi-
bility of haphazard occurrence of the present concatenation
is not ruled out, the present or even the most perfect con-
catenation will have an equal likelihood in comparison with
any other perceivable concatenation—including the worst
and the ugliest. In other words, should each one of the per-
 200
ceivable concatenations be compared with one another,
none of them will have more or less probability than anoth-
er one.
Likelihood is involved when the probability of the present
or most perfect concatenation is compared with the sum of
the probabilities of other perceivable concatenations. It is
in such a situation that it is legitimate to assert that the
probability of the present ensemble’s desultory arrangement
is close to zero; therefore, the probability of the opposite
side, which is the totality of all other perceivable
concatenations, is close to one. However, notice that the
external reality is always one of the perceivable
arrangements and the totality that encompasses some or all
of the non-perfect concatenations is a mental phenomenon.
Reality always bears one of the perceivable arrangements,
and whatever arrangement it may be, it has an equal
probability against the present or most perfect
concatenation.
Third: As explained earlier, probability—even if it is re-
garded with respect to a specific instance and not a mental
totality—is not a real attribute of a thing. As a mental and
practical reification (e‛tebār), it only indicates the reasona-
ble extent of expectation and hope a person should have
about something. However, as far as the external world is
concerned, probability does not relate anything about it.
Probability can be helpful for the practical reason (al-‛aql
al-‛amalī). In fact, its valuable applications in the coordina-
tion of individual and social acts are not deniable. This is
the reason why in disciplines where the overriding objec-
tive is practical solution of problems and in whereby com-
prehension of reality is not critically important, the usage of
probability is very popular and even imperative. However,
with respect to philosophical and theological doctrines,
where truth is the highest consideration and the inquiry
does not acquiesce to anything less than certitude, applica-
tion of probability is futile and erroneous.
To authenticate the cogency of a given argument, as ex-
plained earlier, it is important that the truth of its premises
 201
and their entailment of the sought conclusion be assessed.
We found that the minor premise of the argument from de-
sign was by and large acceptable, while its major premise
does not have rational foundations.
However, even if the disputability of the universality of its
major premise were set aside, the problem of an argument,
which proceeds from the intelligent coordination of a cer-
tain concatenation, is that, even if conclusive, it does not
prove a first efficient cause. It merely demonstrates an
agency responsible for a particular design and knowledgea-
ble thereof. However, whether it is above contingency,
hudūth, and flux, is entirely open to question. Even if the
argument were based on the orderliness of the entire world,
it would indicate that its orderer is an all-powerful, knowl-
edgeable, and incorporeal being, which is not included in
the harmonious totality, nonetheless, it would not establish
that his existence is necessary. Therefore, in order to prove
the necessity of the designer, further arguments, such as the
demonstration of contingency and necessity, would have to
be elicited.
In short, if the weakness of the major premise were to be
overlooked, the presence of order could be traced to an
orderer, and since order is a knowledgeable act, the
orderer’s attribute of knowledge would be affirmed as well.
However, this still does not indicate whether the orderer
has necessity or unity. For these limitations of the argu-
ment from design, the sages of the Islamic philosophical
schools of Illumination (hikma al-ishrāq), Peripatetic
(hikma al-mashā’), and Transcendent Wisdom (al-Hikma
al-Muta‛āliyya) have demurred from it. Certain references
to the orderly nature of the world in some of their works are
in the context of arguments of Divine attributes such as uni-
ty, knowledge, and wisdom. Again, this is because the es-
sential attributes of the necessary are identical with His Es-
sence, however, given their conceptual difference, it is pos-
sible to conduct independent analysis and inquiry with re-
spect to each one of them.
 202
The Argument from Design and the Noble Qur’ān
It is deemed prudent to indicate, though in brief, that if the
premises of an argument are purely rational, the argument
is a demonstration (burhān). If the premises comprise
rational as well as generally-accepted subjects
(musallamāt), but the argument relies mostly on the
generally-accepted subjects, such an argument is decent
contention or kindly exhortation (al-jidāl al-ahsan). But if
the premises are generally accepted subjects, which lack
rational foundations, the argument is a fallacy and void
contention.
The demonstrative shortcoming of the argument from
design in indicating the Deity’s existence does not imply
that it has no exhortative value. The argument, in fact, can
conveniently inspire consent of certain individuals—
namely the ones who admit that the world is marked with
orderliness and believe in the Necessary’s unity and
“Creatorness” (khāliqiyya)—to acknowledge to al-tawhīd
al-rūbūbī and after that al-tawhīd al-‛ibādi.1 For this
reason, the Noble Qur’ān resorts to kindly exhortation of
the polytheists and idolaters of Hijāz, a group that
constituted a considerable portion of population at the time
of revelation.
At the early period of Islam’s rise, idolatry was the chief
social force, which opposed Islam. Idolaters were those
infidels who had faith in a single God but believed that
idols were their archetypes (arbāb al-anwā‛), which
mediated between God and His creatures. The people of
Hijāz offered sacrifices before idols and worshipped them
in order to achieve their wishes through their intercession.
Another social group was the People of the Book. These
people were mostly the Jewry of Medina and Christians
whose presence was felt primarily in the southern parts of
the peninsula. In addition to these two groups, the Qur’ān

1Al-Tawhīd al-‛Ibādī (monotheism in worshipping) states that only

the Lord that has created the world and administers it, is the
worthy object of worship. *
 203
mentions another group of people who ascribed their affairs
to time (dahr) and considered it the factor, which
determined their lives and deaths. After the rise of Islam
and establishment of its political domination, these
dogmatic patterns were altered; and as it appears from the
conversations and debates narrated from the Shiite Imams,
ideological opposition to Islam mostly manifested in the
form of schools, which negated the very essence of the
Necessary.
The Noble Qur’ān, as the book of guidance for the entire
human race, satisfies the needs of the gentry of sages as
well as the commonality. In some verses—such as the
chapter of Monotheism (Sūra al-Tawhīd) and the first
verses of the chapter of Iron (Sūra al-Hadīd)—one can see
the profundity, which, over the many ages, has inspired
Islamic theosophy and Gnosticism with a sense of
direction. On the other hand, the kindly exhortation of
some other verses addresses those people who have been
inflicted by polytheism and have been led astray with
respect to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī and al-tawhīd al-ibādī. As
God, the Exalted, decrees enjoinment by wisdom,
admonishment, and kindly exhortation—“And call those
unto way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation
and dispute with them in the manner which is the best”1—
the apostles in general, and their last and greatest in
particular, were heedful of their audience’s capacity of
comprehension. They exemplified the creed “We the
congregation of prophets converse to people according to
the capacity of their intellects.”2
In a lengthy tradition in Al-Ihtejāj, when Imam Ja‛far al-
Sādiq, peace be with him, was asked about the jadals of the
Prophet, he answered that God had obliged him to use jadal

116: 125
2Al-Majlisī, Muhammad Bāqir. Bihār al-Anwār. (Tehran: Dār al-
Kutub al-Islamiyya), vol. 2, 69.
 204
and the Noble Qur’ān, on occasions, uses it as well.1 On
many issues, which the Shiite Imams, peace be with them,
have propounded with demonstrations (barāhīn), they have,
on certain appropriate occasions, taken recourse to
admonition and kindly exhortation (al-jadal al-ahsan).
In his Al-Tawhīd, al-Shaykh al-Sadūq, blessings be with
him, narrates that two different individuals asked Imam
Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be with him, whether God has the
power to place the earth in an egg-sized tiny container in a
way that neither the earth loses its size nor the container
expands. The Imam, peace be with him, gives one of them
a rhetorical (jadalī) answer and the other a demonstrative
one.
In response to the first inquisitor, the Imam, peace be with
him, says “Open your eyes, do not you see the expansive
heavens and the earth? How God has placed something
which is bigger than the earth in your eyes which are
smaller than an egg.” This answer was sufficient to satisfy
the inquisitor.2
In his answer to the second individual, while stressing that
by His infinite power, God can do everything, the Imam
says “What you have asked is impossible and nothing (lā
shai’).”3 That is, although God is powerful to do
everything, however, you have not asked about a “thing”;
therefore, what you have inquired about is not an exception
to the Divine omnipotence; rather, it is excluded from the
domain of power. This response of the holy Imam, peace
be with him, comprises a profound philosophical analysis
about impossible phenomena that an impossible thing has a
notion the extension (misdāq) of which is “nothing”.
The argument from design has been used in the Noble
Qur’ān in a rhetorical manner. It addresses those

1 Al-Tabrasī, Abu Mansūr Ahamad ibn Ali ibn Abi Tālib. Al-
Ehtijāj. (Mashhad: Murtadha Publications, 1983), vol. 1, 23.
2 Al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Muhammad ibn Ali ibn Husain ibn

Bābawaih. Al-Tawhid. (Tehran: Maktabat al-Sadūq, 1969), 122.

3 ibid. 130.
 205
polytheists whose behavior and belief God, the Exalted,
describes thus: “And if thou asketh them who created the
heavens and the earth, certainly will they say, ‘God.’”1
“And worship they besides God, what can neither hurt them
nor profit them, and say they: ‘These are our intercessors
with God.’”2
The Qur’ān is addressing a congregation, which on the one
hand believes in God’s unity and acknowledges that the
world is ruled by an intelligent administration and
orderliness, and on the other, holds that this administration
and orderliness pertain to archetypes (arbāb al-anwā‛),
which are intercessors between God and His creatures. In
this situation, where the premises of the argument from
design are grounds of mutual consensus, the Noble Qur’ān
resorts to kindly exhortation and, in a rhetorical argument,
traces God’s creatorness to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī and al-
tawhīd al-‛ibādī.
In theism’s course of descent (al-qaus al-nuzūlī), every
higher level substantiates the truth of its lower level. In
brief, the Essential unity (al-tawhīd al-dhātī) indicates the
Creator’s unity (al-tawhīd fi al-khāliqiyya), the Creator’s
unity is sufficient evidence to yield knowledge to Lord’s
(Rabb) unity (al-tawhīd al-rubūbī), which in its own right,
establishes al-tawhīd al-‛ibādī. Similarly, in its course of
ascent (al-qaus al-su‛ūdī), al-tawhīd al-‛ibādī can be traced
to al-tawhīd al-rubūbī, and the fact that He is the Lord
(Rabb) and is indicated by His creatorness; and His
creatorness is proved by His Essential Necessity.

The Argument from Design and the Problem of Evil

The question whether evil exists in the world or not is an
independent inquiry. However, even if the dispute of evil’s
existence is laid aside, the fact is that the argument from
design, in whatever form constructed, is immune to the
problem of evil. This is because as long as a given

1 31: 25
2 10: 18
 206
concatenation is harmoniously functioning towards its
objective, it can be asserted that it has design and
orderliness; and there is no mutual necessity between
having design and regularity and having a virtuous
objective.
If the world is orderly, then evil, if existent at all, functions
within the structure of the world’s order. An animal, which
produces poison, does not change any and every food into
poison. Rather, he too behaves within the organized
network of relations and produces poison and destruction
within the boundaries of the existent order.
The argument from design can be rendered defective only if
either the present design’s purposefulness is denied or it is
not ascribed to an orderer (nādhim). However, the
argument’s tenability is not subject to absence or presence
of evil in the world.
 207

Chapter Nine

THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES

 209

M
iraculous acts—such as the unusual incidents,
which occur after invocations and prayers; succor
from unseen sources in individuals’ lives like
heeling of the ill; uncontrollable and unpredictable inci-
dents, which lead to solutions of social predicaments; or
flashes of thoughts, which suddenly solve scholarly and
scientific problems—have been used in the west’s Judeo-
Christian theology as premises of an argument for the ex-
istence of the Necessary. It has been asserted that such in-
cidents are true and do not have any physical or natural
cause, therefore, their cause, which is not physical, exists.
This contention, if not adduced further by some other
argument, such as the demonstration of contingency and
necessity, is not able to prove the Necessary and is subject
to many objections.
First, individuals who have not experienced such
extraordinary incidents, and to whom these experiences
have not been narrated in an ascertaining manner, can have
doubts about the very occurrence of such incidents.
Second, suppose such incidents do occur, their attribution
to the Necessary and the consequent affirmation of the
Necessary’s existence is open to question. Attribution of
these incidents to the Necessary can held valid only if three
conditions are satisfied: First, the principle of causation is
accepted and the “causedness” (al-ma‛lūliyya) of these
incidents is established. Second, all of the natural and
metaphysical factors, which can generate these incidents,
are taken into account. Third, the causality of all of these
conceivable factors, except for the causality of the
Almighty Necessary, is invalidated.
The argument in the form presented above is subject to the
criticism by people who are skeptical about the principle of
causation. Moreover, even if causation is acknowledged,
since other factors, which can explain these incidents have
not been conceived and ruled out, the argument does not
entail the existence of the Necessary.
 210
Extraordinary and unexpected incidents, which occur in the
realm of soul—such as the sudden solutions of scientific
and scholarly questions or practical virtues, which are
instantaneously attained through passionate spiritual
experiences—can be rooted in the past life of the person
blessed with such cognitive or practical benedictions.
Our teacher, ‛Allāmah Sha‛rānī, Paradise of Allah be for
him, used to say that sometimes a catechumen hears
something from his teacher or sees it in a book and
chronicles it in a corner of his memory. Then after twenty
or thirty years when he assumes the post of teaching, during
scholarly analyses, once again that previously heard or read
matter appears in his mind. Inattentive towards the reason
of such detection, he presumes that this is a flash of his own
thought and assumes, No one has preceded me in this
discovery. One such instance has occurred in the Al-
Makāsib of our grand shaykh, al-Ansārī—may Allah bless
his soul.
As profound a book as it is, Al-Makāsib is not a work to
have been completed in a short time. Rather, the several
years it has been written in have been a good portion of the
life of our late Shaykh—may God bless his soul. This
renowned jurisprudent, in one section of Al-Makāsib,
quotes a discussion from the late ‛Allāmah al-Hillī; and
then in another section that has been written perhaps a
decade later, when that intimation reappears from his noble
subconscious mind, and neither seeing it in the limited
number of books he had nor recalling it in his recent
readings, he assumes this is one of his own innovations and
credits himself for it. Just as unknown factors exercise
influence in the inward matters of the human being, they
can prevail in his external matters as well.
The skeptic atheist can always maintain that the splitting of
the sea by Moses, the Interlocutor, or his splitting the earth
to swallow Korah, or the split of the moon by the signal of
the Seal of Prophets, and incidents like the return of the
sun, are all certainly extraordinary events, nonetheless, each
 211
one may have an unknown cause that, however not yet
discovered, is possible to be identified one day.
Such extraordinary events of help from invisible sources
can be instrumental in producing psychological certitudes.
However, such certitude—which is actually a sort of
confidence and practical satisfaction—does not bear
cognitive certitude; and it is well established that in rational
demonstrations (barāhīn), nothing less than cognitive
certitude is satisfactory.

Miracles in the View of Islamic Philosophers and West-

ern Theologians
According to the Majestic Qur’ān, a miracle is a
sign, which attests to the particular prophethood
(al-nubūwa al-khāssa) of a person who has claimed
prophethood. Islamic philosophers and
mutakellimūn argue from the miracles of the most
benevolent Prophet to his particular prophethood;
and when a particular prophethood is proved, gen-
eral prophethood (al-nubūwa al-‛āmma)1 is proved
as well, since no particular can exist without a uni-
versal, and no conditional without an absolute.
Nevertheless, no Islamic philosopher or mutakellem
has ever established an argument to prove the Nec-
essary Essence based on miracles.
For certain individuals, miracles do not have any
sort of indication with respect to religious doctrines.
For instance, someone who does not accept the ex-
istence of God or some of His names and attributes

1 General Prophethood (al-nubuwwa al-ā‛mma) In kalām, the

principle which states that since the human being is needful of
guidance with respect to how he should live his life, and since God
is All-Merciful, He will provide guidance to the mankind how to
live through His prophets, as it will contradict His mercy not ot
answer man’s need to guidance.
Particular Prophethood (al-nubuwwa al-khāssa) indicates the
prophethood of a specific individual. *
 212
such as the Guide (al-Hādī), the Administrator
(al-Mudabbir), and so forth, or a person who does
not believe in the general prophethood, or someone
who doubts the principle of causation and considers
chance and haphazardness possible, cannot infer the
truth of religious tenets from an extraordinary event,
which cannot be explained on the score of the
known physical grounds.
If certain religious doctrines, such as the existence
of God and the necessity of apostleship and reli-
gious guidance for people who do not have direct
guidance from the Deity, are accepted, miracles can
rationally indicate the prophethood of a specific
person. From this perspective, miracles do not con-
tradict the principle of causation and are not incom-
patible with natural laws; rather, their occurrence is
an imperative law of existence.
If miracles were to contradict the principle of causa-
tion, then haphazardness and chance would be per-
missible, which in turn would make the inquiry of
the existence of God irrelevant.

Extraordinary Events: Mu‛jiza, Karāma, I‛āna, and

Ihāna
In kalāmi parlance there is a technical difference between
different extraordinary acts. A mu‛jiza1 is an extraordinary
event, which is associated with a challenge to prove a
certain prophethood. Being associated with a challenge is
the hallmark, which distinguishes a mu‛jiza from other
extraordinary events. If an extraordinary event takes place
because of the will or the sacred soul of a saint, it is called
karāma. If it happens because of the supplication of a
righteous servant of God, it is called i‛āna2. Extraordinary
events may occur as a result of causes, which are attained
through learning and meditation such as sorcery. It is also

1 Usually translated into English as “miracle.”

2 Literally meaning assistance.
 213
possible that they take place to falsify someone who has
falsely claimed prophethood and has challenged others. In
the last case, an extraordinary event is called ihāna1. For
instance, when al-Musaylama al-Kadhdhāb spat into a well
to show to people that he has blessed it and that its water
will increase, what happened was that even the little water,
which was in the well dried. Although the exsiccation of
the well in this manner was an extraordinary event,
nevertheless, it was not what the perverted claimant had
hoped and it led to his debasement.
The most unique characteristic of a mu‛jiza is that it
illustrates God’s omnipotence. A prophet, who claims to
have a message from the Absolute Origin, as his
prophethood is extraordinary and does not come from finite
and conditional sources, exhibits an extraordinary sign that
attests to his connection to the Source of existence.
Because God, the Exalted—Who undertakes the creation
and guidance of all entities including the human beings—is
not subject to sensual vision, His guidance is not
effectuated in a direct manner with them. Rather, it is
carried out by the few chosen servants, who with the
chastity of their tongues and serenity of their hearts have
the aptitude of Divine interlocution and vision. Thus, as
instanced by the Qur’ān, His apostles appear with signs that
testify to their connection to the Source of creation: “And
We have sent thee [O Our Apostle Muhammad] unto
mankind as [Our] Apostle, and God is sufficient a witness
[thereof].”2 The witness and attestation of God is that He
manifests His extraordinary signs on the hands of His
prophets.

Miracles as Rational Proofs

Miracles are proofs of particular prophethood; however,
only people who are availed of reason can benefit from
them. Someone who perceives miracles with physical eyes

1 Literally meaning to insult.

2 4: 79
 214
only and does not fathom what lies behind the appearance,
may evince astonishment and wonder and even succumb to
them, nevertheless, he is far from attaining a certitude,
which is free of doubts and reservations.
In order to be able to ascertain a given prophethood, first, a
reasonable person should be able to differentiate between
an extraordinary act and an act, which is performed through
artificial means. Second, he should recognize the mutual
necessity between the claim’s veridicality and the miracle.
In the scene of challenge and defiance by Moses, the
Interlocutor, since the magicians were better aware of
sorcery’s limitations than other people, they instantaneously
realized that the extraordinary act was beyond the means of
sorcery; and already believing in God as the true Guide,
they immediately embraced the Lord of Moses and stood
firm in their faith. However, as for the people who merely
saw a stick become a serpent and failed to apprehend its
rational implications, just as they pinned their faith to
Moses by watching a stick become a dragon, they crowded
around the Samaritan by seeing the speech of a calf. While
the Samaritan’s work was sorcery, and his call to the
divinity of a calf, a dogma that reason testifies to its
falsehood.
Ibn Sīnā in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, and Nasīr al-Din al-
Tūsī in his commentary on the same book, divide miracles
into two classes: practical miracles (al-mu‛jiza al-fe‛lī) and
verbal miracles (al-mu‛jiza al-qaulī). They hold that verbal
miracles are more beneficial for the gentry of people
afforded with erudition, whereas practical miracles are
more befitting for the commonality.1
The Seal of the Prophets had many practical miracles,
which mostly satisfied the commonalty. However, the
gentry of the companions, well-aware of the profound
meanings and exalted stature of the Noble Qur’ān, sufficed

1Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Commentary

by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. (Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981),
vol. 3, 372.
 215
on the Qur’ān and never made any demands for practical
miracles. The Majestic Qur’ān, the verbal miracle of the
Seal of the Prophets, is an eternal miracle that with a clean
and vociferous challenge attests to the prophethood of that
Hadhrat, bliss be for him and his kin, for anyone who
believes in God and His attributes.

Rational Possibility and Ordinary Impossibility of Mir-

acles
It is sometimes presumed that miracles are rational
impossibilities (al-muhālāt al-‛aqliyya) executed by God.
However, just as miracles do not violate causation, they are
not rationally impossible events either. A miracle is merely
an ordinary impossibility (al-muhāl al-‛āddī); that is, it
cannot be carried out by the finite and conditional
implements; however, God’s omnipotence can perform
what may be ordinarily impossible for others. An event
that is beyond and inaccessible to the ordinary human
capabilities and is not attainable by acts of meditation, is
not in the capacity of anyone but God.
A stick’s becoming a serpent, or running water’s coming to
a halt and other miracles are not rational impossibilities.
For instance, it is not impossible that wood, with the
progress of time and decomposition of its elements, become
the food of a snake and be assimilated into its body, and
then transform into sperm and become a snake. Similarly, a
strong storm or dam can hinder the flow of water and
deviate it or bring it to a halt. Nonetheless, the
metamorphosis of a stick into a dragon or the halt in the
flow of Nile—in the way done by Moses, the Interlocutor—
or splitting the moon by the signal of the Beneficent
Prophet, can neither be carried out by the finite implements,
which are at man’s disposal nor by meditation and sorcery.
A rationally impossible thing cannot have an external
extension. Therefore, when Imam Ja‛far al-Sādiq, peace be
with him, was asked about God’s power to place the world
 216
in an egg-shell, he responded, “Although God’s power is
infinite, nevertheless, what you are asking is a nothing.”
“Nothing” (lā shai), like non-existence or conjunction of
contradictories, is a concept, which does not narrate an
external extension. Therefore, because it is nothing, it is
not subject to the infinite power of God.
The Qur’ān, a Divine book revealed over twenty-three years
upon the pure and holy heart of the Benevolent Messenger
of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin, and free of
contradictions and discrepancies, is not a rational
impossibility. Rather the production of a work parallel to it
is an ordinary impossibility (al-muhāl al-‛āddī). Al-Shaykh
al-Tūsī in al-Tibyān, and after him Amīn al-Islam al-
Tabarsī in Majma‛ al-Bayān and many interpreters from the
commonality of the Muslims, who consider miracles
rational impossibilities, have tried to answer what they
consider the criticism that Qur’ān is not a rational
impossibility, and have tried to prove the rational
impossibility of bringing a work parallel to the Noble
Qur’ān. However, the fact is that neither are miracles
rational impossibilities, nor is the Noble Qur’ān an
extension of a rational impossibility.
The Noble Qur’ān’s purity from any discrepancey and its
harmony and consistency, despite the fact that it was
compiled in different circumstances during twenty-three
years, is a reality, which is not attainable by ordinary
means. God, the Exalted, says on this matter: “And if it
had been from any other than God, they surely would have
found in it much discrepancy.”1 Similarly, the eloquence of
the Majestic Qur’ān is not a rational impossibility. Instead,
it is an ordinary impossibility that is coupled with a
challenge from the Prophet—a challenge which does not
seek to prove God or the general prophethood, but rather,

1 4: 82
 217
proves the particular prophethood of the Benevolent
Messenger of Allah, bliss be for him and his kin.
 219

Chapter Ten

THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS

EXPERIENCE
 221

Religious Experience and Demonstrative Reasoning

Absence of ratiocination and weak fundamentals of
philosophical thinking have led the Judeo-Christian
theological tradition to some delirious admonitions and
discourses, which are devoid of demonstrative tenability.
Later, along the history of western philosophy, this set of
demagoguery has invited a series of disorderly and
confused pro and con debates.
Among the arguments, which lack philosophical and
demonstrative form, is an argument, which has been called
the argument from religious experience. It proceeds from
the inward experiences, discoveries, and visions with
respect to a reality, which has an intrinsic sanctity and
value.1
Though rational argument supports the possibility of
shuhūdi cognition of the reality of existence, nevertheless,
two points have to be established here. First, shuhūd has
several levels and it is only in its certain levels whereby
certitude about the content of a given shuhūd can be held.
Particular and convulsive (mutazalzil) shuhūds are not
ascertaining even during the experience and vision.
Second, though a person who is not familiar with shuhūdi
experiences cannot establish a definite argument to reject or
invalidate the shuhūds of a Gnostic, on the other hand, the
Gnostic’s shuhūds cannot bring forth certitude for him
either.
The only way that a person who has not been in the realm
of shuhūd can gain knowledge and certitude regarding the
content of another person’s shuhūd is to have convincing
proof about its truth. Such proof is either established
directly on the experienced reality such as the

1 For instance, see: Schleiermarcher, Friedrich. Über die Religion.

Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern. Translated as On Reli-
gion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers. (Gloucester, Mass.: 1958).
 222
demonstrations for the existence of God, or through
proving the infallibility of the individual who has
experienced such shuhūds in the three stages of revelation,
reception, and conveyance.
Some western theologians have suggested an argument for
the existence of God on the grounds of religious
experiences of individuals. This argument can be summed
up as follows:

Experience in relation to a sacred

and transcendent reality exists.
Such experiences are not the works
of natural causes.
Therefore, a supernatural reality,
which is God, exists.

Even if the skeptic agnostic who has not undergone any

such inward experience overlooks what he views as the
disputability of the first premise, the argument is still
untenable because its second premise is evidently on shaky
grounds, since according to some psychological theories,
religious experience has been explained on purely natural
accounts. For instance, they have been ascribed to the
psychological and social factors, which cause other mental
phenomena. Moreover, even if the veridicality of the
second premise were laid aside unchallenged, the argument
would only indicate a supernatural entity. However,
whether this supernatural entity has unity or necessity of
existence is wide open to question.
The fact of the matter is that religious experiences, simply
because they are inward and conscious experiences, do not
bring about any cognitive certitude (al-yaqīn al-‛ilmī) for
the person who undergoes them or for others for that
matter. In order to have certitude regarding the content and
truth of one’s shuhūd, one must have “truth of certainty”1
during his shuhūd; otherwise, after his shuhūd, he must

1 102:7
 223
rationally establish that his experience was not influenced
by psychological factors and it really reflected reality.

Definite and Indefinite Shuhūds

Some people think that during the actual course of mystical
or religious experiences, one cannot have doubts and
doubts arise only after ecstasies cease and one returns to the
realm of acquired knowledge. This is a false presumption.
Many shuhūds and mystical experiences are devoid of
certitude and are coupled with doubt and uncertainty. This
is similar to when you observe a group discussion in a
dream and hear contradictory remarks; in this state, you
analyze some of the remarks and experience doubt and
uncertainty about them, and finally, you may be convinced
of a different opinion.
Definite shuhūds are devoid of delirium and incoherence;
they have immutability and universality. The universality
of shuhūdi realities is not conceptual; rather, it is
expansive. Therefore, shuhūdi certitude is attained by
reaching intellectual (al-haqā’iq al-‛aqliyya) and meta-
intellectual realities (al-haqā’iq fauq al-‛aqliyya), not by
accumulating concepts. The certitude secured from these
realities is not psychological certitude, which might be
regarded as a dyad of fantasy or surmise, and consequently,
it would be justified to inquire whether this certitude is
brought about by unscientific means. Such certitude is
epistemic certitude. As factual external realities, the
necessity of veridicality of shuhūdi realities encompasses
the comprehension in a way that there remains no chance
for doubt or uncertainty regarding them. Epistemic
certitude—which is the necessity of veridicality as in the
necessity of the basic reality, for instance—encompasses
human comprehension in a way that it becomes impossible
to doubt it. When a person encounters a necessity as such,
he has no choice but to accept it.
Once the shuhūd of intellectual and meta-intellectual
realities attained, one finds the infinite presence of these
 224
realities from every direction; and consequently, doubt and
uncertainty becomes impossible.
Particular shuhūds, which take place in the inferior levels
of existence and pertain to the natural world and the
mundus imaginalis (‛ālam al-khiyāl), due to the flux of their
subjects, are subject to change; and due to their finitude, the
faculties of imagination (khiyāl) and estimation (wahm)
cause deceit and trickery and transfuse the qualities and
effects of finite realities from one realm to the other. Thus,
a reality that is witnessed in the mundus imaginalis (‛ālam
al-khiyāl) is not reflected in the image that develops after
the involvement of imagination and estimation, and
therefore, the individual is overwhelmed by doubt and
uncertainty.
If the wayfarer lets the star of reason illuminate his soul, the
fooleries of imagination and estimation will be diminished;
and then, imagination and estimation shall follow the
command of reason and illustrate the realities of nature and
mundus imaginalis as they are observed by intellects.
Then, once again, the mundus imaginalis becomes
commensurable to perception, and with the absence of
nonconformity, doubt and skepticism are supplanted and
light of certitude shines through to the lowest levels of
shuhūd. At this state, at every direction that the Gnostic
looks, he sees nothing but the Real, and he does not have
the slightest doubt or skepticism about Him. The Master of
the Monotheists and the Commander of the Faithful, Imam
Ali, bliss be for him, says, “I have not doubted the Real,
since I have seen Him.”1
Thus, skepticism, delirium, and disorientation can
sometimes be found in the content of shuhūd as well and
they cannot be avoided but through shuhūd of intellectual
realities. If during the journey, the wayfarer finds the
ability to communicate with intellectual realities or with
people who have reached them, he discovers the falsity of
experiences that are influenced by the fooleries of

1 Nahj al-Balāgha, sermon 4.

 225
imagination and estimation and are rooted in his terrestrial
and earthly past. This in turn facilitates his familiarity with
realities of the mundus imaginalis (‛ālam al-khiyāl).
However, if he fails to achieve this benevolence, he strays
in shuhūd, and in brief, he is a person astray in the state of
shuhūd who cannot differentiate between the way and the
non-way.
If there is any succor for such a person, it can be given only
after cessation of the passion and after his emancipation
from the evil of the Satan who dominates him. In this state,
he can judge his experiences on the basis of rational
concepts, which are attained from distant visions of
intellectual realities, and gain certitude about that portion of
his experience only which is supported by rational proof.
This certitude, however, is not because of his mystical
experiences, but rather owes to the rational proof, which
authenticates its truth. He must reject experiences, which
the rational approach attests to its falsity, and regard
experiences that have neither been authenticated nor
rejected by reason with doubt and uncertainty. Then, in the
light of reason, should he succeed in discerning the
necessity of the presence of Divine guidance in creation—
that is, the necessity of prophethood—and furthermore,
through miracles and the like, should he be successful in
identifying its instantiation, he can also rely on the sayings
of the prophets and their legatees. This will further enable
him to exercise judgment with respect to those
observations, which the rational arguments were incapable
of authenticating. Thus, he can be certain of any shuhūd,
which is in accordance with the authenticated and reliable
traditions of the prophets and their successors, and thank
and praise God for observing them, and rebuff any
discovery, which is not compatible with the veracious
sayings, and seek refuge with the Benevolent God from
their evil.
 226
Deviation from Rational Cognition and Decline into
Open and Latent Skepticism
The evaluation of inner experiences through rational
arguments, the Noble Qur’ān, and the traditions of the
Infallibles, peace be with them, is feasible only for a person
who trusts acquired knowledge, that is to say, he does not
consider the affirmation of central religious doctrines, such
as the existence of God, prophethood, the hereafter, and so
forth, beyond the capacity of reason. But consider a person
whose shuhūd does not reach the intellectual and meta-
intellectual realities, when not in the state of shuhūd, he is
not afforded acquired knowledge, whose conceptual
cognition is limited to sensual perceptions, and what he
considers knowledge is hypothesis and theories which are
not only indemonstrable but cannot be definitely
invalidated either, in short a person who is inflicted by open
or disguised skepticism (shakkākiyya). Even supposing
such a person is having inward experiences, his experiences
are devoid of cognitive worth and he has no criterion for
their cognitive evaluation.
Such experiences, besides their nonconformity with each
other and with the experiences of other people, are delirious
and confused perceptions, which only provide hypotheses
and theory-subjects for psychologists who can only regard
them as objects of knowledge, not as a form of knowledge.
If a person receives an intimation in a dream or he thinks he
is witnessing the visage of an infallible entity while awake,
this mere exemplification cannot bring cognitive certitude.
It is possible that visage has been exemplified by the
foolery of his ego and assistance of Satan. As for the
traditions stating that Satan does not appear in form of
infallible entities, even supposing that such a person has
affirmed monotheism and prophethood by acquired
knowledge and has paved the way for himself to receive
guidance from the infallibles, these traditions do not
provide him with sufficient grounds to argue for the
validity of his experience. As Mulla Muhsin al-Faydh al-
Kāshānī says in his Al-Mahajja al-Baydhā’, if a person has
 227
not seen God’s chosen servants, Satan can falsely attribute
to the Benevolent Prophet or his successors an image the
appearance of which has been occasioned by his ego. If
Satan is able to attribute an image or statement to God or
His Prophet at the hands of forfeiters of traditions in
wakefulness, is he unable to accomplish that in stupor?
In short, the inner experiences of people who do not have
intellectual and meta-intellectual shuhūd have no cognitive
worth. Therefore, central religious tenets such as the
existence of God and His names of beauty cannot be based
on such uncertain grounds. It is only if the person trusts the
conceptual format of knowledge that he can evaluate these
experiences through the criterion of reason. Therefore,
inner experiences, which are not substantiated by reason,
are devoid of any cognitive reflection about reality. If such
experiences have any reflection at all, it is of the sort of
narration that any natural phenomenon would have about its
causes. Such experiences are like nightmares, which reflect
the psychological conditions and past deeds of individuals.
Therefore, such experiences are rather more useful to
psychologists who study phenomena like the causes and
nature of nightmares.
Indeed, the inner experiences of such people do have
another sort of reflection regarding their efficient causes.
Nonetheless, their sound interpretation is solely in the
capacity of people who are aware of the clandestine
mysteries of the worlds, recognize the manifestations of the
Divine beauties and majesties, know the stages of Paradise
and Hell, and identify the signs of benevolence and wrath
of the Benevolent and Avenging God.
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Chapter Eleven

THE MORAL ARGUMENTS

 231

Discursive Arguments based on Moral Commands

Moral arguments have a variety of expositions. In some of
its versions, the existence of an immutable and absolute
authority and mentor has been argued on the basis of the
immutability and absoluteness of moral codes. In some
others the existence of a non-human source whose will
overrules the human will has been substantiated by feeling
the magnitude of moral commands in circumstances in
which man’s will is tempted by other choices at his
disposal. Other expositions use the mutual necessity
between law and a lawgiver to prove a legislative source; or
the presence of moral codes common across diverse
cultures has been used to support the supposition of a god
who has inscribed these codes on human hearts.
Sensing the voice of conscience or the moral command and
the resultant feeling of guilt and contrition or the sense of
worry and fear during or before an immoral act is the
common element and shared premise of these arguments.
The common weakness of all of them also stems from this
premise, because only after confirmation of its accuracy is
it possible—with an exposition however different from the
ones mentioned—to argue for the existence of a source and
cause, which it may imply. Still, this will not prove this
causes’ existential and eternal necessity.
If the fundamental premise of the argument, which claims
the universality of moral codes, is accepted, the argument
can lead to the non-human source of these codes. In other
words, if it is authenticated that every person, before acting
in non-compliance with meritorious moral behavior, feels
fear and unease, and afterwards, he experiences shame and
regret, and the universality of these laws and rules are such
that everybody—regardless of social class, race, culture,
and support or ostracism from the society—undergoes the
sense of sinfulness and fear, it can be inferred that the
source of these codes is none of these situations, and rather
they spring from a source beyond them.
 232
The Common Criticism of the Moral Arguments
The focal point of criticism is the first premise, since there
is no way to prove it. The premise could be affirmed
through either induction or deduction. Induction can bring
certainty only if it is complete, and we can never attain a
complete induction of the consciences of all individuals.
And as far as the deductive method is concerned, the
relationship between the subjects and predicates of its
premises, which is expressed by the copulas, must be
necessary in order for the deductive method to bring
certainty. Relationships are necessary when the predicate is
an essential part or an essential property (al-‛aradh
al-dhātī) of the subject. In the first case, the proposition
will have an analytical form, and in the latter, if it is not
axiomatic, it must be made so by using axiomatic middle
terms.
The universality of moral commands in a way that they are
acknowledged by everyone is disputable. In order to
adequately justify the existence of God on the grounds of
the universality of moral commands, the argument must
first prove the said premise in an ascertaining manner, since
in philosophic matters, nothing less than certitude is
satisfactory.
Because disciplines, which are dedicated to the inquiry of
natural phenomena are meant to advance practical
purposes, they can make due with conjectural information
also. Rather, in many instances, because of the difficulty of
attaining certitude, the natural scientist does not have a
choice but to suffice on uncertain hypotheses.
A science dependent on experiment and induction, such as
medicine, cannot abandon patients struggling between life
and death and wait for the attainment of certitude. Rather,
it is forced to try to solve the imperative issues of life by
making use of theories with an acceptable probability of
success.
While mathematical sciences depend upon natural
premises, or are used with regard to natural phenomena,
 233
they also face the dilemmas faced in the natural sciences,
and consequently, lose their syllogistic quality.
Should the existence of surface, which is used in most
geometric figures, be doubted on the basis of theories such
as the atomic theory of Democritus, it will entail
uncertainty about the natural and external existence of any
figure that an architect may draw for a building.
Nevertheless, the architect—despite his doubts, but with a
decent probability of the validity of his view, or even
without regard to its validity or invalidity—uses the sketch
because of the confidence he has in its practical
applications.
Cognition of God as a reality, which is the foundation of
faith and bastion of true belief can neither be based on
hypotheses that have solely practical use and lack
ontological veridicality, nor can it be founded upon
conjectural information. This is because conjecture has no
use in a field where the criterion is certitude, and where the
claimants are not satisfied with anything less than certitude.
“Verily conjecture availeth not the truth at all.”1 “Say [O’
Our apostle Muhammad], ‘Bring forth your proof if ye be
truthful.’”2The validity of the moral arguments depends on
proving the minor premise. And until it is proved, the
argument remains subject to doubt, since doubt does not
depend on disproving the claim; the inability to prove the
claim is enough to cast doubt. In addition to that, since the
said premise is in the form of universal affirmative, it
cannot be proved by presenting particular examples.
If, as is actually the case, the arguer holds that the
immutable and universal moral commands are not brought
about by any particular cultural, political, economical, or
psychological condition, given it is a universal and all-
encompassing assertion, its truth must be proved for every
situation; and until it is proved, its universality remains
subject to skepticism. Rather, the discovery of even one

1 53: 28
2 2:111
 234
example contradicting the held universal affirmative is
sufficient to explicitly illustrate its falsehood. Moreover, if
in the absence of one of these conditions, even if one
individual dismisses these moral commands, the influence
of that absent condition in the formation of moral
commands can be inferred. For these reasons and the ones
to come, the affirmation of the Necessary as the only
authority who is the source and cause of moral principles,
on the basis of moral commands, is questionable.

The Affirmation of Incorporeal Existence through

Analysis of Reason
Through analysis of the activities of both practical and
theoretical reasons, Islamic philosophers have argued for
metaphysical and supernatural existence. However, their
approach is different from the moral arguments above,
where God’s existence has been used to explain the
prevalence of universal moral codes shared across different
social and natural conditions.
In the fourth chapter of Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, Ibn
Sīnā, may God bless his tomb, conducts an exceptional
analysis of the psyche. On the grounds that the activities of
the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī) and other inner
conditions such as love, sincerity, will, and the like, are not
marked by any physical and material characteristics, he
argues for the incorporeality of soul.1 Ibn Sīnā’s argument
can unquestionably proceed even from a single universal
concept, will, or sincerity of a single human being, in a
specific condition. However, this argument does not prove
the Necessary. It merely proves incorporeal existence; and
even the incorporeal being, which it proves is not outside or
beyond the soul. Its conclusion is limited to the
incorporeality of the soul and some of its theoretical and
practical features.

1Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt. Commentary

by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī. (Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981),
vol. 3, 8.
 235
Kant’s Moral Arguments
Emmanuel Kant does not intend to theoretically analyze
moral commands and explain them on theistic accounts;
rather, he holds that the acknowledgement of moral
commands presupposes the existence of God, the
everlastingness of soul, and some other issues that he views
the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-nadharī) incapable of
discerning. He believes that after the practical reason (al-
‛aql al-‛amalī) discerns moral commands, which are
necessarily true, the mind inevitably acknowledges their
corollary, namely the existence of God and the
everlastingness of the human soul. Therefore, from Kant’s
perspective, faith in God is founded on moral
consciousness as opposed to the moral codes being based
upon belief in God.1
Notice that Kant’s argument from the truth of moral
commands, which are aimed to promote summum bonum,
that is, the highest good, to the external existence of the
highest good and everlastingness of the soul does not rely
on the induction of moral commands in every human being.
Moreover, it does not endeavor to trace the presence of
these principles to their source. And finally, it only
depends on the discernment of these commands by people
who can discern them. Notwithstanding, his argument is
open to two fundamental criticisms. These criticisms
undermine the tenability of his argument even if one does
not dispute Kant’s position that the practical reason (al-‛aql
al-‛amalī) acknowledges these commands.

The First Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument

The first criticism states that Kant’s argument cannot
indicate the existence of the Necessary, soul, free will, and
so forth, since in Kant’s view, if mental concepts are not
associated with sensual perception, they cannot narrate
about the external world or bear any meaning with respect

1Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Translated by L.

W. Beck. (Chicago, 1949), .
 236
to reality. Therefore, the mutual necessity he suggested
between principles of the practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī)
and the acknowledgement of God and human will and so
on, has only moral value, and does not open a window to
the external world.
Kant’s moral argument does not demonstrate God’s
existence as an external reality, nor does it satisfy any
doubts a person may have about God. It merely says that if
one wants to think morally, he must embrace these
presuppositions. In other words, if the moral principles,
which are embedded in the practical reason, are
acknowledged, the existence of will, free choice, soul,
everlastingness thereof, and the existence of the highest
good must be acknowledged as well. One need not be
reminded that such acknowledgement, as far as the
narration of reality is concerned, is devoid of any
credibility. Therefore, his moral argument does not prove
the existence of God, a reality Who calls forth the ascent of
humans towards Himself as claimed by the Divine religion.

The Second Criticism of Kant’s Moral Argument

The second criticism questions whether any moral
command can yield knowledge of a proposition, such as the
existence of God or the everlastingness of human soul,
which is pertinent to the theoretical reason. Moral
commands pertain to the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī) and have specific subjects and predicates, and
some of these propositions, as stated by Kant, are self-
evident to the practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī). However,
regardless of which propositions are self-evident, a
proposition, which belongs to the theoretical reason (al-‛aql
al-nadharī), cannot be reasonably deduced from
propositions, which pertain to the practical reason.
Therefore, moral commands do not lead to theoretical
propositions. This is not to deny that new propositions
pertinent to the practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) can be
inferred from syllogistic arrangement of propositions
 237
pertinent to the practical reason with propositions pertinent
to the theoretical reason. That is, when a principle of the
practical reason is added as a major premise to a
proposition pertinent to the theoretical reason, this addition
forms a syllogism the conclusion of which—in terms of
being affirmative or negative, universal or particular, and
likewise in being theoretical or practical—like all
syllogisms, is determined by its inferior premise. And since
in this sort of syllogism the major premise is a practical
proposition, the conclusion will be a practical proposition
as well. For instance:

A teacher educates a pupil.

Anyone who educates someone else
deserves his respect.
Therefore, the teacher deserves to be
respected by the pupil.

In the example above, the first proposition narrates an

external reality. The second proposition is related to the
practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī), and the syllogism’s
conclusion is a practical and moral principle.
Practical principles, before reaching the stage of
implementation, and before appearing before human will
and choice in the form of a particular duty, inevitably
depend upon particular and specific theoretical premises,
which relate to external individuals and realities.
Therefore, in order to be applicable, moral commands make
use of some theoretical and ontological propositions that
convey the existence of numerous particular realities, like
the propositions “The highest good exists,” “A being with
free will is real,” and “The needy and the free of need exist
in the external world.” Hence, if the highest good does not
exist, the moral command “One must endeavor to reach the
highest good” can never come into effect and can never
oblige anyone to do anything. Similarly, if free will does
not exist, none of the moral propositions can be applicable.
 238
Likewise, if there are no needy, no duty can confront those
free of need.
To conclude, none of the presuppositions of the practical
reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī) can prove the realities that bring
about the existence of their subjects or accommodate the
conditions of their coming into effect. Doubts about free
will or the existence of the highest good, concepts included
in moral commands, cannot be effaced by relying on moral
commands themselves. Instead, it is the discursive
affirmation of these realities that lends credence to moral
commands. Similarly, the said concepts satisfy the
necessary condition of the abstraction of self-evident
concepts and formulation of self-evident moral commands.
In other words, the mind, through conception of goodness,
the highest good, its short-comings, and the free will it has,
conceives the moral obligation of trying to obtain that
conceived good and then decides to procure it. Therefore,
contrary to what Kant presumes, despite the mutual
necessity, which exists between the truth of moral
commands and some theoretical propositions, the necessity
does not spring from moral commands; rather, theoretical
premises necessitate moral propositions. In short, certain
theoretical concepts and judgments about man and the
world necessitate the fundamental moral commands.
If the naturalistic perspective were valid—that is, as the
verse of the Noble Qur’ān narrates the position of the
sensualist people, “There is nothing but our life in this
world; we die and we live and we shall not be raised
again,”1 should human life be restricted to this world and
should the human soul not be everlasting, or the human
soul, as in Kant’s philosophy, be doubted, or God as the
highest good, the one Who is desired by virtue of His
Essence (al-matlūb bi al-dhāt) be a mere concept without
any external extension—though when the practical reason
(al-‛aql al-‛amalī) conceives the subjects and predicates of
the moral propositions, it may acknowledge their validity,

1 23: 37
 239
however, one is justified in wondering what relevance such
moral commands have. In a world where there is no God,
no absolute virtue, and the human being is a mere body,
moral commands cannot oblige anyone to do anything, and
thus, they cannot call forth sacrifice as a moral obligation,
when vanity tempts the soul towards other considerations.
 241

Chapter Twelve

THE DEMONSTRATION OF
PRIMORDIAL NATURE
 243
ince the validity of moral arguments has been widely

S questioned in Islamic philosophy and the sages of Di-

vine wisdom have demurred from them, this should
not be confused with another set of arguments, which have
been called the demonstration of primordial nature (burhān
al-fitra). The demonstration of primordial nature does not
claim that the truth of certain principles pertinent to the
practical reason (al-‛aql al-‛amalī), that is, the moral codes,
presupposes the truth of ontological propositions pertinent
to the theoretical reason. In other words, it is not its objec-
tive to justify theism by discursive analysis of moral codes
and their commonality across diverse cultures or to trace
moral laws to a lawgiver, and so forth. In the light of this,
the demonstration of primordial nature or burhān al-fitra is
in no way identical to the moral arguments.
The human being is characterized by two dimensions,
namely, the practical dimension and the epistemic
dimension. It is his practical dimension, which is the focal
point of the demonstration of primordial nature. It reaches
the Necessary by rational analysis of man’s factual
propensities.

Usage of Reciprocity in the Demonstration of Primordi-

al Nature
The demonstration of primordial nature focuses on a
reciprocal (mutadhā’if) portion of the human being’s
reality. That is, on the basis of reciprocity (tadhā’uf) of his
certain reciprocal attributes, it traces the existence of one
side of reciprocity to the existence of its other side.
Two reciprocal things, such as highness and lowness, being
a parent and being an offspring, being a lover and being a
beloved, are realities the mutual of which relationship is
governed by comparative necessity (al-dharūra bi
al-qiyās). In these instances, the existence of one side of
reciprocity is always sufficient evidence for the existence of
the other side.
Highness and lowness, two qualities abstracted from the
comparison of external objects, are reciprocal realities.
 244
This means that whenever highness is actualized, its other
reciprocal side, lowness, becomes actual as well; and when
highness has potential existence, lowness is potential as
well. The reciprocity between highness and lowness is real
reciprocity (al-tadhāyf al-haqiqī), and the objects, which
are described by the qualities of highness or lowness, have
figurative reciprocity (al-tadhāyuf al-mashhūrī).
Being a parent and being an offspring are also two
reciprocal qualities. That is, if being an offspring is
potential, paternity is potential as well, and when being an
offspring is actualized, paternity becomes actual too.
Although the essence of a parent may exist before the
actualization of the quality of paternity, nevertheless, his
characterization by the attribute of paternity is subject to
actualization of the quality of being an offspring. Likewise,
the actual attribution of being an offspring to someone is
subject to the truth of an actual attribution of paternity to a
parent’s essence.
Love is also a real reciprocal reality. Its two sides are
“belovedness” and “loverness.” Similar to paternity and
highness, which are not actual without the actuality of
being an offspring and lowness, belovedness is not
actualized without the actual existence of loverness.
Similarly, being a lover does not have any meaning if the
existence of a beloved is not established.
Another instance in which the relationship of two things is
dominated by reciprocity is gravitation. If one entity is
being gravitated, it indicates that another entity, which is its
gravitater exists, because being gravitater and being
gravitated are two reciprocal qualities, and the gravitater
and the gravitated simultaneously become characterized
with these two qualities.
For instance, when a celestial body is observed to be
gravitated by something, it does not take enormous mental
effort to deduce the actual existence of the center of its
gravitation. Moreover, even the force of gravitation of the
gravitater can be measured from the extent of how much
gravitation has been exerted on the gravitated body. In this
 245
fashion, astronomy proves certain stars, which thanks to
their enormous mass and gravity that do not allow light to
escape are invisible.
The demonstration of primordial nature, on the basis of
reciprocity, a justified grounds of inference employed in
every dimension of human life, demonstrates a reality that
is the other side of the human being’s many reciprocal
attributes. For instance, by making use of attributes such as
love and hope, the argument traces these reciprocal
attributes to the absolute recipient of love and the
compassionate bastion of hope.

Two Expositions of the Demonstration of Primordial

Nature
Imagine a storm-ravaged sailor whose ship, caught in the
terrifying waves of the sea, has broken; and it is obvious to
him that the ostensible and natural implements of succor
cannot be availed to him. While on the verge of drowning,
such a person cannot even think, yet he feels the hope of
succor in the depths of his being and does not lose the
prospect of rescue. This optimism, which is manifested as
his invocations, is a reciprocal reality, and therefore, its
other side is existent. This is so because, in the said
supposition, it is none of the ordinary implements of
succor, and rather, none of the finite realities, which is the
object of his hope and the addressee of his prayers. Hope
and prayers are directed towards a reality that is not finite
and, as the beacon of hope, answers the supplications of the
hopeful when all of the finite and conditional instruments
are beyond one’s reach. Such an absolute reality, whose
power and authority is not subject to any condition, is God.
Another reciprocal reality that can also serve as the middle
term of the demonstration of primordial nature is love.
Love is an existential attribute and its reality presupposes
the existence of the entity, which is its object, namely the
beloved.
The human being’s perpetual struggle to attain maximal
and absolute happiness, wealth, power, beauty, and other
 246
perfections such as wisdom, knowledge, fame, glory, life,
and so forth, is an undeniable dimension of his personality,
and an indication of his intense love for them. In the light
of this, it is fair to ask what is the real extension of the
other side of the reciprocal reality of the love, which
permeates the human being’s existence, and who is its
object.
This question cannot be answered in terms of worldly
perfections, because worldly perfections are finite, whereas
the human being is in love with the absolute. He does not
struggle to reach the finite and conditional. Rather, he is in
pursuit of the infinite, the unlimited, the absolute. The
tangible evidence of this is the fact that no matter how
happy he is, he wants to be happier; no matter how wealthy
he is, he desires to accumulate more wealth; no matter how
powerful he is, he still longs for more power; and no matter
how beautiful he is, he yearns to be more beautiful. This
principle of love for the superlative and the maximum is
true with regard to every perfection.
Asking and interviewing different individuals is not a
method that can lead to a single or a set of definite and
satisfactory answers. Everyone depicts a different sketch of
his beloved entity and many people despise something,
which they once loved. Few are not the thirsty who fall in
love with mirage and chase it until their deaths. However,
despite all this, people’s hearts are caught in the mystical
cords of a beloved whom they many times fail to identify.
And if people pursue finite perfections, it is due to the
marks, either true or false, that these finite entities bear
from that Infinite Reality.
Just as the human being’s heart and soul is an external
reality, the entity for whom the heart yearns and for whom
the soul craves is also an external reality. The human life is
not driven by the conception of love. It is the external
reality of love and affection, which gives it energy and
pushes it forward. Man is gravitated by love, and
undoubtedly, this practical propensity has a real gravitater.
When people feel the passion of love and receive energy
 247
and motivation from it, they choose the direction of their
lives according to their interpretation and understanding of
the object of their love. If their interpretation were correct,
it is fair to assume that they come by happiness and
satisfaction when they reach their beloved. However, if
their interpretation is false, they spend their lives in the
pursuit of a beloved that is simply not.
If man should see the Divine visage in finite entities—that
is, they do not attract him towards themselves but rather
lead him to God—and love them, given it is because of his
love for the Infinite Reality, this love is a figurative love
(al-‛ishq al-majāzī). As a figurative thing, it does not have
any objectivity by virtue of its essence, and is a passage or
medium1 toward another thing. However, if the finite
entities do not illustrate for him the way to God and inspire
the individual’s greed to acquire them for their own sake,
their love, like the love of a mirage, is a false love. In view
of the difference between majāz or a passage, and
falsehood, false and erroneous things cannot be the passage
to truth and veracity.

The Minor Premise of the Demonstration of Primordial

Nature
As far as its major premise is concerned, the cogency of the
demonstration of primordial nature, whether based on hope
or love, is well secured. It can hardly be disputed that the
reciprocal realities of hope and love require two sides. The
argument’s difficulty lies in its minor premise, as its
tenability rests on proving that the human being, from the
depths of his reality, not in his thoughts and surmises, is
hopeful of and in love with an absolute and eternal being.
When someone whose ship has been wrecked in a virulent
whirlpool in a dark night and whom the roaring waves of
the sea have filled with terror places his hope in a reality,
which is independent from all instruments, he finds Him.
Such a person reaches the argument’s conclusion, the

1 Majāz means a place of passing through.

 248
Almighty God, before its minor premise. This is because at
that instant, from the window of his urgency and need, he
attains shuhūd of the absolute reality, and therefore, his
knowledge—which is intuitive, and not conceptual—is
antecedent to his hope. That is, in proportion to his
existential capacity (al-si‛a al-wujūdiyya), he first attains the
shuhūd of absolute reality and then becomes hopeful and
optimistic. It is similar to what occurs when one sees
something with the physical eye. He first sees it and then
develops a craving for it. Obviously, after being rescued
from drowning, when he describes his experience in the
conceptual framework, he places his experiential
observation as the minor premise of the syllogism. For
someone, however, who lives through the vanities of his
ego and whose sight has been blinded by worldly comforts,
the cogency of this demonstration is dubious.
Likewise, someone who witnesses his own reality and
observes his love for God by shuhūd, sees the infinite
visage of his beloved before or during his shuhūd. For him
also, in the phase of interpretation and notional
understanding, the demonstration is tenable. For people,
however, who have pledged their hearts to finite and
conditional beings and who waste their lives in the fantasy
of reaching them, or who lack any such fantasy and call the
world ruined and decrepit, and view themselves as desolate
wanderers, this demonstration is not easily comprehensible.
Such individuals are inattentive to their hope and love for
the Almighty God and deny the hope and love of other
people.
Notwithstanding the fact that the Divine hope and love
genuinely permeates the primordial nature of every
individual, the tenability of this demonstration does not rest
on the presence of hope or love in every individual. A
single instance in which hope or love is held with respect to
an absolute reality is sufficient to substantiate the argument.
In other words, just as the argument retains its cogency if
the arguer intuitively feels the passion and love of an
infinite reality inside himself, likewise it is tenable if he
 249
observes it in another individual who speaks of its blazing
flames in such fiery and brilliant terms as, “So if Thou were
to place me for my sins with Thy enemies and put me in the
congregation of those who deserve Thy punishment and
separate me from Thy lovers and friends, then O’ my Lord,
my Master, my Ruler, even if I endure your punishment,
how would I endure separation from Thee; and even if I
endure the blazes of Thy fire, how would I endure not being
able to see Thy benediction.”1
Because love is a reciprocal reality and the existence of a
lover presupposes the existence of a beloved, the presence
of love in relation to the infinite and unconditional reality,
even in one individual, proves the existence of an infinite
Divine beloved. However, if the existence of such love is
doubted, it can be established by drawing attention (tanbīh),
observation, and rational argument. For instance, the
existence of love for the finite and conditional entities can
be illustrated by introspection or observation of others; and
then absence of happiness in vanity-driven lives, and the
plenitude of malice and spite towards the putative beloved
entities after they have been reached, can explain the falsity
of such forms of love.
The glitters of the world, despite their attraction for the
followers of the dūnya, are a saltwater, which does not
quench thirst, but rather increases it. Lives of individuals
whose most adequate object of love and devotion is the
worldly life do not have tranquility. Rather, their vexation,
discontent, parsimony, and most importantly, the feeling of
being separated from the real beloved, ever increase. The
more the seeker of wealth comes closer to it, and the more
he accumulates, the more his avarice for what he does not
have and the worse his fear of losing what he has.
It is not difficult to prove that the human being is in love
and that finite things like the world are not the real object
of his love and devotion. In view of these premises and the

1Al-Qummī, Shaykh ‛Abbās. Mafātīh al-Jinān. The Supplication of

Kumail.
 250
reciprocity of a lover and a beloved’s relationship, the
everlastingness of soul and the existence of incorporeal
realities can easily be established. And when the falsity of
the affections with respect to finite and conditional things,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, is proved, it becomes
clear that the real object of the human being’s love is the
infinite God.

A Criticism and Its Evaluation

It may be objected that the reciprocity of hope and love is
acknowledged, and a hopeful individual or a lover, because
of reciprocity between the two sides of hope and love, must
have hope or love in relation to something. This, however,
fails to prove the external existence of the thing, which is
the object of hope or love, as it cannot be ruled out that the
individual is hopeful, or in love with something, which is
merely in his mind and has solely mental existence. It
follows that the object of hope and love does not have to be
an external object; rather the reciprocal nexus may also
exist between the individual and an artifact of his own
imagination. In other words, hope or love may be held with
respect to an external reality or may be extended to
something, which does not exist except in an individual’s
fantasy. Therefore, the inference of an external existence
from this mere reciprocity is unjustifiable.
The response to this important criticism is that the
demonstration of primordial nature revolves around the
reality of hope and love and proceeds from their external
reciprocity. It is not founded on people’s conceptual
surmise or knowledge or the description they give about the
objects of their hope or love.
In the version based on hope, the person who is pessimistic
of every finite and conditional implement does not entertain
any concept or notion. At the emergency scene of, an
earthquake, he bumps against the wall instead of using the
exit. What he finds his being imbued with is the reality of
hope, not its concept. This hope, because it is an external
reciprocal reality, requires two sides that exist in the
 251
external world. Certainly, its other side cannot be a finite
and conditional thing that the individual is pessimistic
about.
In the case of love as well, the argument is not based on
how individuals describe their object of affection so that
their beloved entities could be the artifacts of their
fantasies.
The love that permeates the human being’s reality and gives
motivation and energy to his life is not directed to a mental
image. By pinpointing that finite entities are not what the
human being is in love with, or by direct shuhūd, reason
identifies the true object of man’s love, irrespective of what
people think who their beloved is.

The Demonstration of Primordial Nature in The Noble

Qur’ān
The Noble Qur’ān is not a mere book of philosophy, which
comprises abstract notions and discursive arguments. In
addition to impartation of wisdom, the Noble Qur’ān
describes its duty as the purification of souls. In Qur’ānic
verses, its two features of education and purification are not
separated from one another. Purification being the
objective, and thus, antecedent to education, it mentions
purification before education. In the few cases that
education has been mentioned before purification, it is
because education is a prerequisite of purification. For this
reason, the Qur’ān mentions educational and moral
guidance side by side and its epistemic expositions are
coupled with real-life examples. For instance, while
explaining virtue, it speaks of its epitome, that is, the
virtuous man:

Virtue (birr) is not that ye turn your

faces to the East or the West; virtue
is rather the person who believeth in
God and the Last Day and the angels
and the Book and the Prophets and
giveth his wealth out of love for Him
to the kinsmen and the orphans and
 252
the poor and the traveler and the
needy and for those in bondage [to
ransom slaves]; and established
prayer and payeth the alms; and
those who fulfill their promise when
they make a promise and the patient
ones in distress and affliction and in
the time of war; these are they who
are truthful and these are they who
are the God-fearing.1

A book that is solely concerned with theorizing about

topics such as ethics, home economics, and so forth, when
it explains virtue, it mentions values like faith, justice, and
piety. However, when the Majestic Qur’ān explains virtue
and righteousness, it mentions the virtuous men. The
commentators who have failed to notice this fine point have
had trouble in this and similar verses, and some have
suggested that “birr” (virtue) should be read “barr”
(virtuous)—as has been recited by some narrators of
Qur’ānic recitations—and some have assumed an annexed
noun in meaning, that is, “the people of virtue”.
Given the demonstration of primordial nature can have a
remarkably positive influence on the moral excellence of
individuals, and its first premise is attainable by self-
purification and shuhūd on an individual basis, it is one of
the arguments, some of which were mentioned, that can be
derived from verses of the Noble Qur’ān.
In the chapter of Luqmān, the Noble Qur’ān says,

Has thou not seen that the ships sail

on the sea by the blessing of God,
that He may show you some of His
signs? Surely in this are signs for
every steadfast, grateful [person].
And when covereth them a wave like

12: 177
 253
mountains they call upon God in
sincere devotion unto Him, but when
He bringeth them safe to land, some
of them are lukewarm, and none
disputes Our signs except every
ungrateful traitor.1

In the chapter of Spider it says: And when they embark on

ships, they call on God sincerely, vowing worship [only]
unto Him, but when He delivereth them safe to the land,
behold! They associate [others with Him].2
This and other similar verses indicate that the hope of a
person who is pessimistic of every finite entity is a
reciprocal reality the other side of which cannot be a finite
entity. The reality of the object of hope, in the
life-and-death situation of someone whose ship is about to
be swallowed by a storm, is witnessed by shuhūd; and later,
after being saved, this shuhūd becomes the premise of a
discursive argument for the Necessary.
In some other verses, the demonstration of primordial
nature has been explained by making use of love towards
God.

And thus We were showing Abraham

the Kingdom of the heavens and the
earth, and that he may be of those
who are sure. When the night
overshadowed him, he saw a star
and said, “This is my Lord.” But
when it set he said, “I love not the
setters.” When he saw the moon
rising, he said, “This is my Lord.”
But when it set, he said, “If my Lord
does not guide me, I would certainly
be of the people gone astray.” When

1 31: 32
2 29: 65
 254
he saw the sum rising, he said, “This
is my Lord; this is greater.” But
when it set, he said, “O’ my people!
I am clear of what ye associate. I
have turned my face to Him who
originated the heavens and the earth,
being upright, I am not of the
associators.”1

In the first of the above verses, God points out, We showed

the Kingdom of the heavens and the earth to Abraham; and
for its reason, He suffices to say, “and that he may be of
those who are sure.” A statement such as this indicates
that showing the Kingdom to Abraham, peace be with him,
had many reasons, and one of them was to secure certitude.
Interpreters have presented a great variety of opinions
regarding the nature of Abraham’s reasoning. Some
consider these verses reflect the demonstrations of motion,
hudūth, and contingency and necessity. However,
Abraham’s, peace be with him, discourse includes no
indication to these arguments.
The middle term of Abraham’s demonstration, peace be
with him, is love and affection. The Deity, which it proves,
is a Deity that is loved and adored. Abraham, peace be
with him, negates the divinity of celestial bodies on the
grounds that love cannot be proportioned to something that
is finite. He argues from his love and affection for an
infinite and eternal Deity who is the Creator of the heavens
and the earth.
All praise belongs to God, the Lord of the worlds.

1 6: 75–79
 255
Āmidī, ‛Abd al-Wahīd ibn
Index Muhammad al-Tamīmī,
al-a‛rādh al-dhātiyya, 114 71, 75, 76
al-a‛yān al-thābita, 85 Āmul, 5
Abraham, peace be with Āmulī, Ayatullah
him, the Messenger of ‛Abdullah Jawādī, 5, 25,
Allah, 239, 240 154
abstraction, see also al-Āmulī, al-Shaykh
reification, 27, 39, 160, 161, Muhammad Taqī, 5, 25
225 analogy, 38, 41, 163, 184
Abu Sa‛eed Abu al-Khayr, analytic propositions, 160,
10, 47, 48 161
accidents, 29, 62, 90, 92, annihilated (mostahlek), 181
123, 124, 125, 126, 134, al-Ansārī, our Grand
162 Shaykh Murtadhā, may he
acquired knowledge, 31, rest in peace, 200
47, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 67, Anselm, St., 12, 17, 29,
74, 76, 88, 89, 114, 211, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150,
213, 214 152, 153, 154, 156, 157,
actuality, 88, 121, 230 158, 159, 160, 165
Administrator, 201 apostleship, see also
Āghā Ali, 142 prophethood, 202
agnostic, 67, 74, 210 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 107,
Ākhūnd al-Khurāsānī, 5 122
Ali, the Master of the arbāb al-anwā‛, 165, 187,
Monotheists and the 192, 194
Commander of the arc of ascent, 85
Faithful Imam, 75, 82, 84, arc of descent, 85
87, 91, 212, 84, 212 archetypes, 187, 192, 194
Allah, 5, 7, 53, 58, 67, 72, argument from motion,
82, 84, 92, 105, 147, 170, 121, 123, 127
173, 180, 200, 206 Aristotle, 56
All-Knowledgeable, 187 asāla, 27, 136, 155, 172
All-Sufficient, 143 asāla al-wujūd, 27, 136
al-Redhā, Imam Ali ibn asbāb, 22, 104
Mūsā, peace be with him al-Asfār, 5, 54, 58, 113,
and his holy forefathers, 156, 171, 172, 173, 179,
47 180, 187
asl al-hū-hūwiyya, 42, 43
atheist, 67, 68, 80, 200
 256
atheistic, 70 causality, 57, 59, 101, 104,
atomic theory of 105, 108, 110, 122, 140,
Democritus, 221 144, 156, 161, 162, 163,
attributive necessity, 174 199
autonomy, 90, 92, 127, causation, 57, 58, 82, 83,
128 84, 100, 108, 109, 122,
Averroës, 107 127, 137, 156, 160, 174,
awwaliyya, 37, 41, 43, 54, 184, 186, 199, 201, 202,
87, 88, 92, 174, 175, 177 205
azalī, 122 causedness, 84, 121, 122,
badāha, 34, 175 141, 199
basāta, 172 circular causality, 80, 121–
Benevolent, 51, 67, 205, 123, 126,
206, 213, 214, 215 circularity, 21, 81, 101, 128
Bihār al-Anwār, 15, 85, 193 cogitation, 51, 69, 83
body, 72, 77, 123, 124, cognation, 184
184, 187, 205, 226, 230 cognitive certitude, 36, 41,
burān al-imkān wa al-wujūb, 46, 188, 201, 210, 214
98, 104, 106 combination, 160
burhān, 17, 24, 80, 88, 89, comparative necessity, 229
98, 101, 110, 111, 121, complement, see also
122, 129, 138, 169, 186, contradicotry, 135, 147, 152
191, 229 conceptual and
burhān al-fitra, 229 propositional foundations,
burhān al-hudūth, 98 15
burhān al-limmī, 186 conceptual fundamentals,
burhān al-siddiqīn, 88 173
Burūjerdī, Grand āyatullah conditional necessity, 174
Syed Husain, 5 constrained cause, 127
Canterbury, 147 contingency, 24, 42, 49,
categorical syllogism, 24, 82, 92, 97, 98, 102, 104,
(four figures of), 41 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
causal efficacy, 42, 58, 81, 111, 115, 121, 122, 123,
84, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 128, 133, 135, 136, 137,
110, 111, 115, 121, 122, 138, 139, 143, 144, 149,
133, 136, 137, 138, 188 171, 172, 179, 181, 185,
Causal order, 184 188, 190, 239
causal regress, 108, 121, contingency of
122, 123 impoverishment, 122, 133,
 257
136, 137, 138, 139, 143, dawām, 23, 51
144, 172, 179, 181 decent contention, see also
contingent being, 42, 110, al-jadal al-ahsan, 191
140 Deity, 7, 15, 17, 67, 76, 77,
contingent existent, 91 79, 90, 122, 158, 159, 165,
contingents, 58, 100, 101, 175, 191, 202, 240
103, 104, 105, 106, 110, delimitation (al-haithiyya
115, 133, 135, 139, 142, al-taqyīdiyya), 160, 174
143, 155, 156, 164, 188 Democritus, 221
continuity, 23, 25, 51, 60, demonstration, 17, 24, 50,
128 55, 56, 80, 89, 98, 101,
contradictories, 42, 43, 46, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108,
47, 58, 81, 147; 109, 110, 111, 115, 116,
conjunction of, 43, 44, 47, 117, 121, 122, 123, 126,
58, 80, 81, 99, 101, 106, 129, 138, 139, 143, 144,
117, 154, 205; 156, 169, 170, 172, 173,
impossibility of 174, 175, 178, 179, 180,
conjunction of, 42, 43, 44, 181, 191, 199, 229, 231,
60, 80, 117, 154; 233, 234, 236, 238, 239,
impossibility of 240; demonstration of
conjunction and negation contingency and necessity
of, 42, 112 (burhān al-imkān wa al-
copula, 34, 35 wujūb), 96–118, 98, 101,
copulative being, 163 102, 104, 106, 107, 108,
corollary, 59, 68, 137, 223 109, 111, 115, 116, 117,
course of descent, 194 121, 123, 126, 129, 144,
Crafter, 67, 68 191, 199; demonstration
creation, 28, 81, 82, 84, 87, of primordial nature, 229,
97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 231, 233, 236, 238, 239;
104, 128, 133, 137, 138, demonstration of the
169, 187, 203, 213 veracious, 12, 13, 17, 88,
Creator, 67, 78, 80, 87, 89, 167, 169, 170, 172,
125, 126, 149, 186, 194, 173, 174, 175, 178, 180
240 design, see nadhm and order
Creatorness, 191 design, the argument from,
dahr, 192 143, 182, 184, 185, 187, 188,
al-Dāmād, Āyatullah al- 190, 191, 194,
Muhaqqiq, 5 designer, 144, 184, 186,
daur, see also circularity, 21, 188, 189, 191
81, 101, 121, 128 devil, 74
 258
al-dharūra (necessity), 34, 35, effect, 26, 28, 55, 82, 83,
36, 37, 45, 46, 56, 92, 133, 104, 105, 121, 123, 127,
155, 159, 173, 174, 177, 128, 136, 137, 138, 180,
229; al-dharūra al-azaliyya 184, 225
(eternal necessity), 93, 133, efficient cause, 58, 59,
159, 173; al-dharūra 104, 105, 121, 127, 128,
al-dhātiyya (essential necessity), 133, 185, 187, 190, 215
155, 159, 173, 174, 177; al- ehsās, 15, 32, 49, 70, 186
dharūra al-shartiyya ehtiyāj, 122
(conditional necessity), 174; al- emanation, 22, 85, 104,
dharūra al-sidq (necessity of 137, 139
truth), 34, 36, 37, 45, 46, empiricism, 187
56; al-dharūra al-wasfiyya encompassment (ihāta),
(attributive necessity), 174; al- 181
dharūra bi al-qiyās epistemology, 9, 10, 11,
(comparative necessity) , 229 18, 21, 22, 25, 59, 60, 117;
dhāt (essence), 48, 50, 98, materialistic epistemology,
102, 226 25
dhātī (essential part), 34, 49, Epistemology in Qur’ān, 25
50, 85, 102, 106, 135, 194, equidistance (tasāwī al-
220 nisba), 42, 58, 81, 98, 99,
dhātiyyāt (essential parts), 98, 100, 102, 103, 133, 188
113, 114 eshterāk al-ma‛nawī lil-wujūd
differentia, 34, 134, 136, (synonymy of existence), 164
183, 185 essence, 24, 26, 28, 29, 30,
differentiae, 134 31, 34, 49, 50, 56, 80, 89,
Disjunctive syllogisms, see 97, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103,
also al-qiyās al-istethnā'ī, 41 105, 106, 107, 109, 110,
Divine Essence, 85, 90, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117,
109, 125, 174 124, 125, 126, 128, 134,
Divine existence, 73, 77, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
78, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91 140, 141, 143, 149, 150,
Divine will, 47, 125, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157,
dualism, 78 158, 159, 161, 162, 163,
Durar al-Fawā’id, 25 165, 169, 178, 179, 180,
e‛tebār, 27, 39, 40, 136, 140, 181, 192, 230, 233
154, 183, 190 Essential knowledge (of
effaced (fānī), 181, 225 God), 85, 92
effacement, 85 (fanā')
 259
essential necessity, see also 50, 51, 54, 55, 57, 58, 67,
al-dharūra al-dhātiyya, 155, 68, 73, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81,
159, 173, 174, 176 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89,
essential nihility (al-halāka 90, 91, 92, 97, 98, 99, 100,
al-dhātiyyaa), 58 101, 102, 103, 104, 105,
essential part, see also dhātī, 107, 110, 111, 112, 113,
34, 48, 49, 63, 81, 98, 100, 114, 115, 116, 121, 122,
102, 113, 114, 115, 116, 123, 124, 126, 128, 133,
135, 137, 150, 151, 157, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139,
158, 161, 220 141, 142, 143, 144, 147,
essential property, see also 148, 149, 150, 152, 154,
al-‛aradh al-dhātī, 49, 50, 63, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,
102, 106, 111, 113, 114, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164,
115, 135, 158, 220 165, 166, 169, 172, 173,
Essential unity (al-wahda 174, 175, 177, 178, 179,
al-dhātiyya), 194 180, 181, 185, 186, 187,
estimation, see also al-wahm, 188, 189, 191, 195, 199,
32, 52, 70, 166, 212 201, 202, 203, 205, 209,
eternal (azalī), 47, 67, 69, 210, 211, 213, 214, 219,
89, 92, 93, 97, 99, 106, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225,
107, 122, 123, 126, 127, 229, 230, 231, 234, 235,
128, 133, 159, 160, 173, 236
174, 175, 176, 177, 181, existential capacity, see also
204, 219, 233, 240 al-si‛a al-wujūdiyya, 233
eternal necessity, see also al- existential causes, 58
dharūra al-azaliyya, 89, 92, existential perfection
93, 133, 159, 160, 173, (kamāl al-wujūdī), 121
174, 175, 176, 177, 181, extension (misdāq), 25, 26,
219 30, 31, 57, 67, 92, 110,
Evangel, 147 112, 113, 115, 116, 150,
Ever-Prevalent, 67 151, 152, 153, 154, 155,
evil, the problem of, 13, 195 156, 158–164, 173, 175,
Excellent Religious State 177, 178, 194, 206, 231
(al-madīna al-diniyya al- extensional identity (al-
fādhila), 86 ‛ayiniyya al-misdāqiyya), 90
exemplification extensional unity(al-wahda
(thamāthul), 53, 214 al-misdāqiyya), 162
existence, 7, 15, 17, 21, 23, external cause (al-‛illa al-
24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, khārijiyya), 42, 81, 121
32, 33, 34, 42, 43, 46, 47,
 260
external existence (al-wujūd generally-accepted
al-khārijī), 26, 27, 28, 31, subjects (al-musallamāt),
50, 98, 99, 111, 112, 115, 191
116, 136, 169, 221, 223, generation (kaun), 22, 47,
235 50, 97, 98, 105, 124
external unity (al-wahda al- generation and corruption
khārijiyya), 25 (al-kaun wa al-fasād), 98,
al-fā‛il al-mūjab, 127 124
al-fā‛iliyya, 58, 84, 99, 127 Generous, 187
al-faidh, 22, 103 genus (jins), 34, 113, 134,
faith, 9, 10, 32, 33, 37, 65, 136, 142, 143, 151, 183,
69, 70, 71 185
fānī (effaced), 181 genus unity (al-wahda al-
al-Fārābī, Abu Nasr Mu- jinsiyya), 113
hammad ibn Muhammad , ghaib, 181
32, 62, 106 Ghazzālī, 186
fasād (corruption), 97 Gnostic, see also ‛ārif and
fasl, see also differentia, 134, ‛urafā', 12, 67, 76, 82, 85,
183 86, 153, 154, 156, 173,
al-Faydh al-Kāshānī, Mullā 209, 212
Muhsin, 214 Gnosticism, see also ‛irfān,
Fayyādhī, ‛Allāmah 76, 82, 141, 172, 185, 192
Ghulam Redhā, 7 God, 3, 15, 16, 18, 43, 47,
al-fe‛liyya (factuality), 121 51, 62, 67, 68, 71, 73, 74,
fideistic, 67 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82,
figurative (majāzī), 104, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90,
106, 125, 142, 230, 233 91, 92, 102, 103, 106, 111,
finite (mahdūd), 24, 25, 27, 115, 116, 122, 125, 127,
51, 98, 115, 133, 135, 136, 141, 142, 143, 147, 149,
138, 139, 142, 143, 144, 150, 152, 156, 157, 159,
149, 159, 160, 172, 177, 170, 171, 174, 180, 181,
181, 203, 205, 212, 231, 185, 192, 193, 194, 200,
232, 234, 235, 236, 238, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205,
240 206, 209, 210, 213, 214,
fiqh, 5 215, 220, 221, 222, 223,
flux (taghayyur), 24, 107, 224, 226, 231, 232, 233,
190, 211 234, 235, 237, 238, 239,
Gaunilo, 12, 148, 149, 150 240
 261
grace (faydh), 22, 85, 103, heterogeneous
104, 105, 106, 127, 128, multiplicity, 155
178 highest good, 223, 224,
gradation (tahkīk), 172, 225, 226
179, 180 Hijāz, 15, 78, 192
gradational multiplicity (al- hikma, 32, 61, 62, 89, 191
kathra al-mushakkeka) , 155 al-hikma al-‛amaliyya, 32, 62
gradational reality of al-hikma al-‛ulyā, 61
existence, 134, 172 al-hikma al-ishrāq, 191
Guide, 201, 204 al-hikma al-mashā’, 191
Gulshan Raz, 102 al-hikma al-muta‛āliyya, 7,
Hādī, 49, 99, 107, 161, 191
172, 201 al-hikma al-nadhariyya, 32,
hādith, 5, 47, 97, 99, 121, 61
122, 123, 124, 125, 128 al-hikma al-sufla, 61
hāfidha, 70 al-hikma al-ūlā, 61
al-haithiyya al-itlāqiyya, 160, al-hikma al-wustā, 61
174 al-Hillī, ‛Allāmah, 200
al-haithiyya al-ta‛līliyya, 174 homonymy, 155
al-haithiyya al-taqyīdiyya, hudūth, 17, (defined) 47, 82,
160, 174 97, 98, 104, 107–109, 121–
al-Hakam, Hishām ibn, 67 126, 128, 137, 143, 169,
Hakīm, Āghā Ali, 142 171, 172, 185, 190, 239;
hāl, 42 the demonstration of, 98,
al-halāka al-dhātiyya, 58 109, 119–130
al-haml, 29, 30, 56, 110, hū-hūwiyya, 29, 113, 150
113, 150, 151, 178; al-haml Hujja, 18
al-awwalī al-dhātī, 29, 110, human being, 21, 22, 32,
150; al-haml al-shā’e‛ al- 36, 38, 43, 48, 49, 51, 55,
sinā‛ī, 30, 110, 150, 151 56, 70, 75, 81, 87, 88, 89,
haphazardness, 80, 188, 91, 98, 110, 127, 128, 135,
201, 202 143, 176, 177, 200, 201,
al-haqīqa al-mushakkika 203, 222, 223, 226, 229,
lil-wujūd, 134 231, 232, 233, 235, 236
al-haraka, 24, 121, 125 Hume, 11, 109, 111
al-haraka al-jawhariyya, 125, hypostatization, 40
126 hypothetical syllogism, 24
al-hayāt, 89, 92, 175 i‛āna, 202
heterogeneity, 155 Ibn Rushd, 107
 262
Ibn Sīnā, 12, 27, 43, 47, in‛edām, 100
54, 55, 62, 63, 125, 169, inaction, 127
170, 204, 222 incorporative, 161
identity, 16, 24, 33, 68, 89, indhimāmī, 161
114, 117 individual unity, 113
idol, 78 induction, 41, 48, 50, 220,
idolaters, 15, 78, 192 223
idol-worship, 78 Infallible, 53
ifādha, 22, 85, 137 infinitude, 92, 104, 160
ihāna, 202 instrumentalities, 22
ihāta, 105, 181 instrumentality, 103, 104
al-ihāta al-qayūmiyya, 105 instruments, 83, 103, 104,
al-Ihtejāj, 193 105, 106, 231, 233
ījād, 100, 102 Intellect, 85
al-Ijī, 112 intellectual realities, 52, 53,
ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain, 42, 47, 185, 212, 213
58, 80, 81, 99 intellectual universals, 62,
ikhtiyār, 90, 92, 127 166
Ilāhī Qumsha’ī, 5 intermediate corporeality,
Ilāhiyāt, 43, 61 61
Ilāhiyāt min Kitāb al-Shifā’, intuitive/presential
43 knowledge, 31
Illuminationist, 54, 128 iqtirāni, al-qiyās, 41
imagination, 32, 52, 68, irāda, 47, 92
70, 166, 184, 212, 236 Iran, 5, 57, 162, 187
Imam Khomeini Research Iron, chapter of, 192
Institute of Qum, 7 al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, 5,
īmān, 32 27, 54, 55, 169, 170, 204,
imkān, 24, 35, 42, 82, 92, 222
97, 98, 102, 104, 115, 122, Ishrāqiyyūn, 128
128, 129, 133, 136, 138, ishterāk al-lafdhī, 155
172 Islamic philosophers, 35,
imkān al-faqrī, 122, 133, 47, 62, 89, 90, 107, 121,
136, 138, 172 161, 201, 222
imkān al-māhūwī, 133 iste‛dād, 104
immanent order, 184 istehāla ijtemā‛ al-naqīdhain,
immutability, 23, 24, 25, see also contradictories, 60
51, 60, 211, 219 istishāb, 80
immutable entities, 85 it-is-itness, 29, 113, 150
impossible existent, 91, 97
 263
Ja‛far, Imam al-Sādiq, Khurāsān, 47
peace be with him and his Kifāyat al-Usūl, 5
holy forefathers, 46, 67, kind forms, 124, 125, 126
170, 193, 205 kindly exhortation, 191,
ja‛l, 137 192, 193, 194
jadal, 193 knower, 15, 22, 26, 27, 28,
jadal al-ahsan, 193 35, 50
jadalī, 193 knowledge, 5, 15, 18, 21,
jadals, 193 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,
jāmi, 177 29, (divisions of) 31, 32, 33,
jauhar, 57 34, 37, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51,
jidāl al-ahsan, 191 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 60,
jins, 183 61, 62, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72,
jism, 123, 124 73, 74, 75, 79, 85, 87, 88,
Judeo-Christian theology, 89, 90, 92, 110, 114, 116,
147, 199 117, 128, 170, 173, 174,
judgmental relationship, 175, 180, 186, 187, 191,
32 194, 209, 213, 214, 224,
Jurjānī, al-Syed al-Sharīf 231, 233, 236
Ali ibn Muhammad, 113 Korah, 200
justice, 82, 92, 237 Kulainī, Abu Ja‛far Mu-
kalām, 54, 82, 164, 201 hammad ibn Ya’qūb, 46,
kalāmi, 91, 121, 123, 202 51, 69, 75
kamāl al-wujūdī, 121 kulliyya, 23, 51, 52, 56, 101
Kant, Emmanuel, 12, 14, al-kulliyyāt al-‛aqliyya, 166
156, 157, 159, 160, 161, lā shai’, 194
162, 163, 164, 165, 222, al-Lāhijī, 101
223, 224, 226 Latent Skepticism, 9, 14,
karāma, 202 23, 213
kathra, 113, 155, 175 law of identity, 30, 42, 43,
al-kathra al-tabāyunī, 155 133, 151, 157
al-kathra al-tashkīkī, 155 lawāzaim al-dhat, 113
al-kaun wa al-fasād, 124 lāzim, 135
al-khāliqiyya, 192, 194 Legenhausen, Dr.
khārij al-mahmūl, 161 Muhammad, 7
khiyāl, 52, 53, 70, 166, 185, lexical definition, 90, 174
211, 212 life, see hayāt
Khomeini, Imam, the logic, 17, 30, 61, 62, 111,
founder of the Islamic 113–116, 138, 148, 151,
Republic of Iran, 5 157, 181, 188
 264
low wisdom, 61 manifestation, 15, 83, 85,
Luqmān, chapter of, 238 89, 104, 137, 140, 141
al-ma‛ānī al-harfiyya, 139 mantiq, 113
ma‛lūl, 84, 122, 141, 199 Marmoutier, 148
ma‛lūliyya, 84, 122, 141, al-Marwazī, Sulaymān, 47
199 masādīq, 25, 29, 31, 112,
ma‛lūm, 26, 50 150, 159, 162
al-ma‛na al-ismī, 139 materialist, 16, 22, 23
al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-falsafī, materials of propositions,
114, 183 44
al-ma‛qūl al-thānī al-mantiqī, mathematics, 59, 61, 63
114 Mawāqif, 112, 113
al-ma‛qūlāt al-thāniyya, 39, mawwād al-qadhāyā, 44
163 mediates, 76, 101, 104,
Ma‛sūmīn, 53 105, 144, 169
al-mabādī al-tasawuriyya, 15, mediation, 50, 54, 103,
173 104, 105, 140
al-mabādī al-tasdīqiyya, 173 memory, 70, 200
māddī, 40 mental exemplification,
al-Madīna al-Fādhila al- 165
Dīniyya, 86 mental existence, 26, 28,
Mafātīh al-Jinān, 97 31, 50, 54, 57, 98, 110,
al-mafhūm al-dhehnī, 25 160, 177, 236
Mahajja al-Baydhā’, 214 mental mode of existence,
mahal, 125 26, 54, 153, 177
mahdūd, 51 mental quiddity, 26, 27, 28
māhiyya, 25, 26, 27, 49, 99, Merciful, 3, 67, 85, 201
102, 136, 183 Messenger of Allah, see
al-māhiyya al-dhehniyya, 26 also Muhammad, bliss be for
al-māhiyya al-khārijiyya, 26 him and his kin, 18, 206
al-mahmūl bi al-dhamīma, meta-intellectual realities,
161, 162, 164 211, 213
al-mahmūl min samīmihi, 161 metaphysical, 9, 22;
al-mahsūra al-kulliyya, 50 metaphysical propositions,
majāzī, 106, 233 74
al-Majlisī, Muhammad metaphysician, 23
Bāqir, 15, 85, 193 middle term, 24, 34, 36,
Majma‛ al-Bayān, 206 54, 55, 56, 98, 102, 109,
Makāsib, 200 154, 171, 186, 220, 231,
240
 265
middle wisdom, 61 mumtani‛, 153
miracles, 13, 197, 201, al-mumtani‛ al-wujūd, 91, 97
203, 205; verbal miracles, mundus imaginalis, 52, 53,
204 166, 185, 187, 211, 212
mobile entity, 121 Murid, 125
Monotheism, 11, 86 al-musallamāt, 191
Monotheism, chapter of, musānikha, 184
192 al-Musaylama al-
monotheist, 91 Kadhdhāb, 202
moral arguments, 17, 219, mushrikīn, 78
221, 222, 229 mutaharrek, 121
Moses, 15, 16, 200, 204, mutakellimūn, 16, 42, 82,
205 112, 122, 123, 124, 125,
mostahlek, 181 127, 128, 137, 170, 201
motion, 17, 24, 107, 108, al-Mutarehāt, 56, 57, 162,
109, 121, 122, 123, 124, 187
126, 127, 128, 143, 169, mutual existential
171, 172, 181, 185, 186, necessitation, 71, 73, 74
239 mystical experiences, 53,
mover, 121, 123, 124, 125, 67, 76, 211, 213
126, 144 nādhim, 184, 186, 188, 195
Muhammad, the Seal of nadhm, 143, 183, 184
the Messengers, bliss be al-nadhm al-‛illī, 184
for him and his kin, see also al-nadhm al-dākhilī, 184
Messenger of Allah, 221 al-nadhm al-ghā’ī, 184
mu‛jiza, 202, 203, 204 nafs al-amr, 92, 177
al-mu‛jiza al-fe‛lī, 204 Nahj al-Balāgha, 11, 82, 83,
al-mu‛jiza al-qaulī, 204 84, 85, 87, 91, 100, 212
al-Mudabbir, 201 naqīdh, 135, 147, 152
al-muhāl al-‛āddī, 205, 206 naqīdhain, 42, 43, 47, 58,
al-muhālāt al-‛aqliyya, 205 112
muharrek, 121 natural sciences, 61, 63
Mullā Sadrā, see Sadr al- natural world, 22, 47, 107,
Muta’allihīn 126, 166, 185, 188, 211
multiplicity, 113, 134, 155, naturalism, 16, 226
163, 165, 175, 180, 181 necessary accident, 135
mumkin, 42, 91, 97, 100 Necessary Existent, 91,
al-mumkin al-wujūd, 42, 91, 103
97 necessary truth, 35, 36
mumkināt, 58, 133, 135
 266
necessity of existence, 42, 140, 151, 160, 162, 173,
113, 115, 123, 126, 136, 176, 181, 190, 193, 201,
210 203, 206, 221, 224, 225
necessity of truth, 34, 42 particularity, 24, 56, 161,
negative attributes, 67, 91 162
al-nisba al-hukmiyya, 32 Peripatetic, 54, 123, 128,
nonexistence, 27, 34, 42, 137, 144, 187, 191
43, 47, 58, 67, 81, 83, 84, philosophy, 5, 7, 17, 28,
91, 92, 97, 98, 99, 100, 30, 59, 61, (defined) 62, 79,
101, 102, 105, 110, 111, 82, 83, 107, 112, 113, 114,
112, 115, 116, 124, 133, 116, 122, 123, 127, 134,
135, 136, 137, 147, 149, 144, 151, 156, 175, 177,
152, 154, 156, 158, 159, 185, 226, 229, 236;
179, 180, 188 western philosophy, 69,
notional unity, 155, 162 107, 108, 147, 153, 209;
nounal meaning, 139 first philosophy, 61, 62, 67
al-nubūwwa al-‛āmma, 201 physical form, 123, 124
al-nubūwwa al-khāssa, 201 Plato, 121, 165, 166
omnipotence, 82, 92, 158, Platonic archetypes, 165,
194, 203, 205 166
Omnipotent, 187 polytheism, 86, 87, 192
ontological argument, 17, polytheists, 78, 192, 194
21, 147, 152, 156, 165 positive, 67, 91, 238
ontology, 21, 23 potentiality, 104, 121
open skepticism, 23 power, 33, 82, 89, 127,
opposition, 86, 142, 143, 175, 193, 194, 205, 231,
192 232
Ordainer, 83 practical miracles, 204
order, 13, 183, 185, 186, practical reason, 32, 33,
188 37, 38, 39, 40, 69, 70, 190,
orderer, 184, 186, 188, 223, 224, 225, 226, 229
190, 191, 195 practical wisdom, 32
ordinary impossibility, predication, 29, 30, 31, 35,
205, 206 49, 56, 110, 113, 114, 115,
Paradise, 51, 97, 106, 200, 116, 117, 150, 151, 152,
215 153, 154, 156, 158, 159,
Pārsāniyā, Hamīd, 17 160, 162, 163, 164, 165,
particular, 7, 24, 30, 39, 178
40, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, Predication as Essence,
61, 62, 77, 82, 98, 102, (defined) 29, 30, 31, 56, 110,
 267
116, 117, 150, 152,–154, psychological necessity, 35
158, 159, 165, 178 Psychology of Al-Shifā’, 54
predication as extension, purify, 51
29, 30, 56, 110, 116, 117, Purposer, 125
150, 151, 152, 153, 154, al-qadhāyā al-awwaliyya, 35,
158, 159, 165, 178 36, 39, 40, 56
preponderance, 42, 58, 81, al-qadhiyya al-badihiyya, 34
111 al-qadhiyya al-kulliyya, 48
preponderance without a al-qadhiyya al-nadhariyya, 36
preponderant, 42, 81 qaus al-nuzūl, 85, 194
prepositional notions, 139 al-qaus al-nuzūlī, 194
presential, 50 qaus al-su‛ūd, 85, 195
primariness, 10, 40, 41 qiyās, 24, 40, 41
43, 45, 54, 87, 88, 92, 174, al-qiyās al-iqtirānī, 24
175 al-qiyās al-istithnā’ī, 24
primary concept, 33, 34, quantified universal
42, 91 proposition, 50
primary knowledge, 33, qudra, 89, 92, 175
34, 35, 87, 88 quidditative contingency,
primary proposition, 34– 102, 104, 110, 133, 136,
36, 39, 40–42, 49, 56 137, 139, 149, 172
principality, 24, 27, 59, quiddity, 25, 26, 27, 29,
134, 136, 137, 138, 155, 31, 34, 49, 50, 53, 57, 58,
164, 172, 175, 179 99, 102, 103, 104, 106,
principality of existence, 110, 111, 115, 133, 134,
24, 27, 135, 136, 137, 138, 135, 136, 137, 138, 149,
155, 164, 175 154, 162, 164, 172, 175,
principles of 183
jurisprudence, 80 Qum, 5, 7, 8, 17, 25, 43,
probability, 9, 37, 38, 188, 49, 99, 107, 113, 161, 165,
189, 190, 220, 221 172, 173, 179
Prophet, 18, 53, 71, 78, al-Qummī, al-Shaykh
193, 201, 205, 206, 214 ‛Abbās, 97, 106, 143, 234
prophethood, 201, 202, qūwwa, 121
203, 204, 213, 214; general al-Radhī, al-Syed, 83, 84,
prophethood, 201, 206; 113
particular prophethood, ratiocination, 32, 70, 209
201, 203, 206 rational, 21, 31, 33, 34, 53,
propositional premises, 54, 55, 57, 62, 67, 68, 69,
116, 173, 175 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81,
 268
82, 83, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, regressive and circular
115, 117, 123, 125, 128, causation, 122, 123
136, 137, 144, 154, 165, reification, see also
169, 186, 188, 189, 190, abstraction and e‛tebār, 27,
191, 201, 204, 205, 206, 39, 190
209, 213, 229, 235 religious experience, 73,
rational impossibilities, 209, 210, 211
205, 206 respectivality of quiddity,
rational theophony, 83 see also principality of quiddity,
reality, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 27, 136
24, 25, 27, 30, 33, 34, 38, Responsio, 149
39, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, rest, 52, 88, 127, 234
58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 68, revelation, 15, 17, 67, 69,
70, 87, 88, 91, 92, 97, 98, 192, 210
105, 107, 108, 110, 114, rhetorical, 193, 194
115, 117, 134, 135, 136, al-sababiyya, 103, 104
138, 139, 140, 141, 142, al-Sabzawārī, Hāj Mullā
148, 151, 152, 153, 154, Hādī, 49, 67, 99, 107, 161,
155, 159, 161, 162, 164, 172
165, 166, 169, 172, 174, Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, Mu-
175, 176, 177, 178, 179, hammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr
180, 181, 184, 189, 190, al-Dīn al-Shirāzī, 30, 54,
206, 209, 210, 211, 212, 58, 113, 126, 138, 151,
214, 221, 223, 225, 229, 156, 170–172, 187
230, 231, 232, 233, 234, al-Sadūq, Abu Ja‛far Mu-
236, 238 hammad ibn Ali ibn Hu-
receptive, 127 sain ibn Bābawaih, 46, 47,
recipient, 80, 103, 107, 68, 75, 81, 170, 193
125, 231 Satan, 52, 213, 214
recipient cause, 80 Schleiermarcher,
reciprocal, 229, 230, 231, Friedrich, 209
233, 234, 236, 238 secondary intelligibles, 39,
reciprocity, 229, 230, 231, 163; secondary logical
235, 236 intelligibles, 114;
reductio ad absurdum, 147, secondary philosophic
153 intelligible, 114, 183,
regress, 101, 108, 121– self-evidence, 41, 45, 55,
124, 126, 127, 140, 144, 99, 175
162 self-evident knowledge, 34
seminary, 5, 7, 17
 269
sensation , 15, 32, 45, 70, simplicity, 172
73, 185, 187 Sincerity, chapter of, 84
sensationalism, 74, 76, 144 skeptic, 23, 43, 200, 210
al-Sha‛rānī, al-‛Allāmah, 5, skepticism, 21, 22, 23, 43,
200 52, 54, 56, 59, 74, 86, 117,
al-Shabistarī, al-Shaykh 144, 175, 212, 214, 221
Mahmūd, 102 Socrates, 48, 121
shadowy existence, 31, sophism, 59, 74, 86, 117,
110 169, 177, 178
shak, 52 sophistry, 88, 175, 176,
shakkāk, 43 177, 178, 179
shakkākiyya, see also Soul, 7, 10, 53
skepticism, 21, 22, 23, 43, specie unity, 113
52, 54, 74, 86, 117, 144, Spider, chapter of, 238
175, 214 spiritual and incorporeal
Sharh al-Mandhūma, 5, 49, dimensions of knowledge,
99, 107, 161, 172, 173 23
al-sharīk al-Bārī, 149 Subduer, 142
Shawāriq al-Ilhām, 101 substance, 57, 162
Shaykh al-Ishrāq, (the substantial motion, 125,
master of illumination), Abu 126, 143
al-Fath Shahāb al-Dīn successive regress, 124
Yahyā ibn Habash al- sukūn, 127
Suhrawardī, 56, 57, 134, Summa Theologica, 122
162, 187 summum bonum, see also
sheer unity, 113 highest good, 223
Shinākht Shināsī dar Qur’ān, supplementary causes, 22,
25 105, 106, 127
shuhūd, 50, 52, 53, 54, 56, Sūra al-Hadīd, 192
76, 92, 209, 210, 211, 212, sūra al-Ikhlās, 84
213, 214, 233, 234, 236, Sūra al-Tawhīd, 192
238; definite shuhūd, 211; Sustentative Authority,
universal shuhūds, 52 105
shuhūdi, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, suwwar al-naw‛iyya, 124
67, 70, 76, 209, 211 syllogism, 17, 24, 34, 36,
shuhūdi cognition, 70, 76, 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50,
209 56, 58, 124, 154, 186, 188,
shuhūdi visualization, 76 220, 224, 225, 234;
si‛a al-wujūdiyya, 15, 233 syllogism du pourqoi, 186
sifāt al-thubūtiyya, 91
 270
synonymy of existence, theology, 61, 74; western
164 theologians, 13, 201;
ta‛aqqul, 32, 70 western theology, 74, 76
al-ta‛rīf al-lafdhī, 90, 174 theophony, 18, 85, 89
al-Tabarsī, Amīn al-Islam, theoretical disciplines, 76
206 theoretical reason, 32, 33,
tabāyun, 155 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 70, 222,
tafsīr, 5 224, 229
taghayyur, 24 theoretical wisdom, 32
tahlīlī, 161 theosophers, 16, 22, 54,
tajallī, 18, 83, 89 144, 153, 172
al-tajallī al-‛aqlī, 83 al-Tibyān, 206
al-tajarrud al-barzakhī, 61 Tillich, Paul, 77
al-talāzum al-wujūdī, 71 Torah, 147
tamāthul, 53, 165 Transcendent Wisdom, 7,
al-tamāthul al-dhehnī, 165 13, 24, 54, 135, 138, 164,
tamthīl, 41, 184 170, 191
taqābul, 142 al-Tūsī, Nasīr al-Din, 204
al-taqrīr al-tamthīlī, 184 al-Tūsī, al-Shaykh, 206
tarjīh, 42, 58, 81 unity, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30,
tarjīh bilā murajjeh, 42, 81 50, 57, 68, 89, 90, 91, 92,
tarkīb, 160 113, 134, 150, 151, 155,
tasalsul, 101, 108, 121, 124 161, 162, 165, 169, 175,
al-tasalsul al-‛illī, 108 179, 180, 191, 194, 210;
al-tasalsul al-ta‛āqubī, 124 unity of the knower and
tasāwi al-nisba, 58 the known, 27, 28
al-tasawwur al-badīhī, 33 universal intellect, 85
tawhīd, 47, 68, 78, 79, 81, universal proposition, 48
89, 90, 91, 92, 192–194; al- universal realities, 52
tawhīd al-rūbūbī, 192 universality, 23, 24, 25, 49,
Tehran, 5, 15, 27, 47, 51, 51, 56, 102, 190, 211, 219,
55, 57, 58, 63, 68, 69, 71, 220, 221
75, 76, 81, 85, 102, 113, universals, see also al-
142, 154, 156, 159, 162, kulliyyāt, 177
170, 172, 173, 180, 187, unseen, 77, 85, 141, 181,
193, 204, 222 199
teleological order, 184 usūl al-fiqh, 5, 80
thabāt, 23, 51 wahda, 25, 26, 27, 50, 57,
113, 155, 161, 163, 175;
wahda alj-jinsiyya, 113;
 271
wahda al-mafhūmiyya, 155;
wahda al-mahdha, 113;
wahda al-misdāqiyya, 163;
wahda al-nau‛iyya, 113;
wahda al-shakhsiyya, 113;
wahdat al-‛ālim wa al-ma‛lūm,
27
wahm, 32, 70, 212
Wajhullah, 141
Wājib, 17, 61, 91, 103, 115
Wājib al-Wujūd, 91
wasāta, 103, 104
wayfaring, 52, 53
wisāl, 85
wisdom, 32, 61, 62, 82, 87,
89, 108, 128, 191, 193,
229, 231, 236
world of intellects, 166,
185
wujūb, 82, 129
wujūd, 25, 26, 31, 50, 54,
57, 91, 92, 97, 98, 99, 103,
110, 134, 135, 154, 160,
164, 172, 177, 179
al-wujūd al-dhehnī, 26, 50,
54, 57, 98, 160, 177
al-wujūd al-dhillī, 31, 110
al-wujūd al-khārijī, 26, 98,
99
al-wūjud al-rābit, 163
al-yaqīn al-‛ilmī, 210
Yazdī, Mahdī Hā’irī, 159