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Projecting Strategic
Land Combat Power
By G O R D O N R. S U L L I V A N

Twenty-nine thousand tanks, thirty-nine thousand infantry fighting

vehicles, over four thousand tactical aircraft, seven hundred bombers,
six carriers and guided missile aviation cruisers, one hundred and
five principal surface combatants, one hundred and twenty ballistic
and attack submarines, and thirteen hundred naval aircraft. 1

T
he relevance of those statistics— with the other services—to ensure that our
found in the last edition of Soviet Nation’s enduring interests remain secure
Military Power—has altered dra- well into the 21st century.
matically. A wide variety of politi-
A Changing World
cal, military, social, and economic events il-
Soviet military capabilities shaped the
lustrates the changes in the global strategic
Army’s perspective on joint warfare through-
situation over the last four years. The Army
out the Cold War. From 1945 to 1990 we
understands the scope and depth of these
faced a numerically superior, disciplined, of-
changes and their implications for the future
fensively oriented political and military ad-
of U.S. national security. It is taking advan-
versary. The tremendous quantity of Soviet
tage of, and responding to, international
equipment, coupled with Moscow’s drive to
and domestic realities which condition the
achieve technological parity with the West,
development and use of force. As an institu-
threatened our interests around the globe,
tion, the Army is innovating—in concert
with the primary focus on Central Europe.
Euphemistically characterized as a “target-
rich environment,” massed-armor warfare
preoccupied American military thought and
action for much of the last forty-five years—
two generations of military leaders. Infantry,
tank, and artillery units along with battal-
ions, brigades, and divisions rightly had
their minds and hands occupied with the
job of defeating superior numbers of similar
U.S. Army photo by William U. Rosenmund

equipment arrayed in a dense combat area.

With the notable exception of tactical air
support, thoroughly integrated on the World
War II pattern established by Pete Quesada
and George Patton, 2 joint operations and
considerations were, in the minds of many
Army commanders, consigned to echelons
above corps.
Members of the 2d Armored Division The demise of the Soviet Union has
inside an infantry fighting vehicle. presented challenges that the Army is over-
coming, and opportunities that it is seizing.

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International issues require a broader appre- Second, future threats require that joint op-
ciation of the threat—from the unitary and erations be the norm at every level of com-
relatively predictable adversary we knew in mand. Relegating the expertise and ability to
the Cold War, to the diverse, ambiguous, conduct joint operations to only “higher”
and dynamic threats that we confront today. levels is a recipe for missed opportunities,
Ethnic and religious conflict, weapons pro- longer and more difficult operations, riskier
liferation, thrusts for regional hegemony, ir- outcomes, greater numbers of casualties, and
redentism, terrorism, and drug trafficking increased expenditures of resources.
are the most prominent elements of this Joint capabilities provide decisive over-
dangerous new world. To successfully meet match on every level of warfare from the
the challenges which these trends indicate, strategic, where national objectives are de-
we are retaining and developing capabilities termined, priorities assigned, and resources
to secure our national interests. We continue allocated, through the operational level,
to base these capabilities on the sound foun- where campaigns are constructed to achieve
dation of the American people and leverag- national objectives, to the tactical, where en-
ing U.S. technological advantages in train- gagements and battles cumulate in victory.
ing, developing, deploying, and employing The U.S. Army demonstrates an ability to
the force.3 dominate land combat. Working with the
The Army also faces the challenges Air Force, Navy, and
posed by a national agenda with a priority Marine Corps will the Army’s view
on domestic rebuilding of the physical and ensure victory and of service to the
intellectual assets of the country. While the success in any con-
Army will shrink to its smallest end strength flict environment. Nation is broad
since just before World War II, and as the Operations Just and embraces
Nation devotes resources to other programs, Cause and Desert the concept of
the Army budget will approach that of the Shield/Desert Storm
post-World War II service in percentage of are clear examples of joint operations
gross domestic product. The challenge is to the benefits of joint as a cardinal
seize opportunities to apply our limited re- operations. Just Cause tenet
sources in a manner that best serves the illustrated the im-
country. In the past some observers may mense power gener-
have portrayed a “circle the wagons” picture ated by a simultaneous application of unique,
in which the Army attempts to preserve its complementary service capabilities. By land,
capabilities at the expense of working with sea, and air the Armed Forces assaulted and
the other services. Today, the world situation secured 27 objectives between midnight and
and expectations of the American people sunrise on the first day. That complex, syn-
will not tolerate such short-sightedness. The chronized application of combat power, pro-
Army’s view of service to the Nation is broad jected from the continental United States, its
and embraces the concept of joint opera- coastal waters, and within the region, elimi-
tions as a cardinal tenet of defending the nated resistance by the Panamanian Defense
United States now and in the 21st century. Force. We neutralized assets that could have
Our recent experience bears this out. been used to continue the struggle—commu-
nications, ready forces, logistics, and reserves.
The Joint Experience
Precise power projection and joint principles
The last four years have taught us two
applied in a compressed timeframe illustrate
things. First, joint operations work and they
the need for rapid response forces trained in
work more efficiently than single-service op-
joint operations. Forces participating in Just
erations. There is unmatched power in the
Cause led the way in expanding the joint per-
synergistic capabilities of joint operations.
spective on warfare. Seven months later,
America received another decisive return on
its investment in forces that can operate to-
General Gordon R. Sullivan is the thirty-second Chief of gether in any environment and against any
Staff, U.S. Army. An armor officer, he has commanded at the adversary while elevating warfare to a level
platoon through division levels, and was Vice Chief of Staff unmatched in the world today. Operations
prior to assuming his current position. Desert Shield/Desert Storm required an imme-

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diate defense and a show of force which ma-

tured and evolved into a potent offensive ca-
that are tailorable, more versatile, and more
precise than even those that we employed in
pability. Throughout the fall and winter of Southwest Asia or Panama. The range of em-
1990–91 the services conducted joint and ployment scenarios has burgeoned recently,
combined training at all levels. The heavy and we can see evidence of this trend in
force that defeated Iraq’s Republican Guards joint operations in Somalia, Bosnia-Herze-
was comprised of units that had stood watch govina, Guantanamo, Southwest Asia, and
in Central Europe for four decades, trained domestically in disaster relief and the coun-
and ready to meet an armored thrust that ternarcotics missions. Because such contin-
never came. Within days of taking up posi- gencies may not require application of force
tions in the desert these units were conduct- in the same magnitude or manner as Just
ing joint and combined operations at battal- Cause or Desert Storm, commanders of units
ion and brigade level. This of all types and sizes must work and succeed
disaster relief and cooperation, based on sound in the joint environment. The 212 th Mobile
principles and doctrine, paid Army Surgical Hospital in Zagreb and the
overseas humanitarian
huge dividends and gave us a 10th Mountain Division in Florida, and sub-
operations have window into the future of sequently in Somalia, are prime examples.
reinforced the necessity warfare. Additionally, our recent domestic disas-
For example, during one ter relief and overseas humanitarian opera-
to work with civilian
phase of the VII Corps opera- tions have reinforced the necessity to work
agencies tion, a SAM–2 site in the vi- with civilian agencies. Even before Opera-
cinity of Basra activated its tion Desert Storm was over, Army elements
radar and began to paint coalition aircraft. were coordinating reconstruction efforts
Since the only asset in striking distance due with the host government and U.S. agencies
to the pace of operations was an artillery in Kuwait. In Los Angeles, Florida, Louisiana,
brigade operating with the 1st Armored Divi- Hawaii, and Guam, Total Army units worked
sion, VII Corps relied on an Air Force closely with private relief organizations and
EC–130H, Airborne Battle Command and state and Federal agencies to restore order
Control Center, to relay the fire mission to and assist civil authorities in restoring ser-
the artillery unit and clear the airspace. vices to devastated neighborhoods. 5 That
Within three hours of the SAM–2 site acti- pattern of support to civil authority contin-
vating its radar two Army tactical missiles ued in Somalia.
fired from a multiple-launch rocket system In the future the Army’s forward pres-
were on the way to destroy the target.4 Air ence and crisis response capabilities will be
Force operations continued without threat needed and integrated into every phase of
of SAM interruption, and VII Corps bene- operations. The breadth and scope of single-
fited from continued air strikes against Iraqi service capabilities militate against making a
reserves and command and control targets. solitary transition from forward presence,
Replicated across the battlefield, from through crisis response, to conflict resolu-
varied service platforms operating on and tion. The capabilities of the Army to domi-
above the desert floor and positions at sea, nate maneuver, conduct precision strikes,
such actions decimated the Iraqi military, re- sustain land combat power, and protect the
solved the conflict on the ground in 100 force are essential and necessary for the pros-
hours, and kept our casualties to a mini- ecution of successful campaigns, but only a
mum. Conduct of joint warfare at that level combination of multiservice capabilities will
has become the unique province of the ensure success.
Armed Forces, and one that we are striving The Army recognizes this need for forces
to maintain in order to overmatch any po- trained and ready to operate with other ser-
tential adversary. vices and ad hoc coalitions, at all unit and
command levels. We are on the right path,
The Future of Joint Operations
both conceptually and materially, to achieve
The strategic landscape that the Nation
our goals of integration, synergy, and over-
faces will require power projection forces
whelming effectiveness.
The Army has revised its doctrine to re-
flect changing circumstances that surround

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ground combat. Our doctrinal capstone, FM replace a sister battalion on U.N. peacekeep-
100–5 (Operations), was published this ing duty in Cambodia. The scenario used
spring. The concepts and tenets in this man- real-time intelligence reports from satellite
ual are the result of serious study of lessons links with Cambodia to structure daily situa-
learned and future possibilities, and the ex- tional training exercises. The technological
change of a range of ideas among military capabilities exist to link command posts
professionals, scholars, and policy analysts. with subordinates performing a wide range
It will guide our efforts of simultaneous missions—search, combat,
to reshape the Army for check point, surveillance, crowd control,
the world in which we etc.—through real-time intelligence files
will be operating.6 drawn from central and remote data banks.
We are working This ability to process and exploit informa-
closely with the Navy tion is the next step in producing a truly in-
and Air Force on imple- tegrated battlefield.
U.S. Army photo

menting the recommen- The thrust of Army exploitation of the

dations of the Mobility microchip is to improve battlefield aware-
Requirements Study.7 The ness through horizontal integration and in-
General Sullivan in
study requires the Army sertion of digital technology. We have begun
Somalia. to be able to close a three division force (two to link individual weapons systems (both
heavy and one light) to a theater 7,500 miles fielded and future platforms) through auto-
away in 30 days, and to close a five division mated communications channels to provide
corps with its associated components and instantaneous updates on operational and
support within 75 days. This is true power logistical status and enemy information.
projection, beginning on the first day of a This will provide commanders and their
crisis, and it is not possible to accomplish teams with the precise knowledge needed to
these objectives without close cooperation wage warfare at the decisive level on which
from the other services. America expects to fight. Map displays and
Of course, getting to a crisis theater is not operational graphics can be updated to give
enough. We must be prepared to fight from subordinate units complete knowledge of
day one in conjunction with other services, the enemy situation and the commander’s
and the Army is prepared to do that, through intent, allowing units to take advantage of
a rigorous training program that builds on fleeting enemy weaknesses and to bring de-
our mature Combat Training Centers. Forced cisive combat power to bear. Other services
entry and contingency operations combining are exploiting similar capabilities. The next
heavy deployments and airborne insertions logical step is to take the groundwork laid by
are the norm. Operations combining heavy, such systems as J–STARS and work toward a
light, Air Force, and Marine units take place truly integrated battlefield. The Army looks
at Fort Irwin in California. forward to exploiting this advantage with
The Joint Readiness Training Center at the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force.
Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, has a long record of Additionally, within the context of joint
innovation when integrating the services. operations, there is room for achieving
Navy SEALs routinely operate in local rivers. economies of scale and consolidating func-
The threat can be varied and includes refugees tions. Some training and many logistics and
and terrorists as well as a world-class opposing support functions are already consolidated,
force. Recently, joint operations demonstrated and we are looking for ways to expand such
the ability of the 24th Infantry Division’s programs. However, not all redundancy con-
ready company team and the 82d Airborne sists of unnecessary overlap. Centralization
Division to deploy rapidly and engage in of some functions into single service capabil-
combat operations within hours. This effort ities can provide economies and efficiencies,
will continue when the Joint Readiness Train- but carried to an extreme can unravel proven
ing Center is moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana. jointness. America does not need a military
Recently, the Combat Maneuver Train- establishment of eaches, wherein the services
ing Center at Hohenfels, Germany, trained a
Royal Dutch Marine unit that was enroute to

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become customer-oriented purveyors of narrow

capabilities rather than combat-oriented or-
NOTES
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power,
ganizations with a broad focus and an under- 9th edition (Washington: Government Printing Office,
standing of all the facets of war. 1990). Figures compiled from theater of military opera-
The U.S. Army has a tions (TVD) and major subordinate command weapons
proud record of working systems totals.
2 Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, in The
with the other services in
United States Army in World War II (Washington: Office
joint operations. Indeed, of the Chief of Military History, 1961), pp. 208, 231–40,
almost every conflict in 333–34. Also, Headquarters, Department of the Army,
American military his- FM 100–5, Operations, 1986, pp. 25, 47–53, 161–72.
tory is replete with exam- 3 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Confirmation Hear-

ples of the services inte- ings, Committee on Armed Services, United States Sen-
ate, Washington, January 7, 1993.
grating their capabilities
DOD photo

4 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, “Loui-

to defend our national siana Maneuvers: First Board of Directors Meeting,” Octo-
interests. From the Amer- ber 27, 1992 [“Jayhawk Thunder” sequence], videotape
ican Revolution, through presentation produced by the Training and Doctrine
Scott’s march on Mexico City, the Vicksburg Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 1992.
5 The Total Army response is described by the author
campaign of Grant and Porter, the Spanish- in “Hurricane Andrew: An After-Action Report” which
American War, World Wars I and II, and the appeared in Army Magazine, vol. 43, no. 1 (January 1993).
long list of conflicts that punctuated the 6 For a discussion of the Army’s doctrinal base, and

Cold War and its aftermath, the services have how doctrine serves as the foundation for innovation in
had much more in common than that which personnel recruitment and retention, training, leader-
ship development, organizational design, and modern-
separates them. Americans should be confi- ization requirements, see Paul H. Herbert, “Deciding
dent that the Army will be a full partner in What Has to be Done: General William E. DePuy and
joint operations in the future. the 1976 Edition of FM 100–5, Operations,” Combat
The next chapter in our history will Studies Institute, Leavenworth Papers no. 16 (Fort Leav-
record an even greater degree of integration, enworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, 1988). The joint approach to warfare in Army
as we respond to a new range of threats with doctrine flows directly from the Joint Staff doctrine
tailored, multiservice force packages both found in Joint Pubs 1 and 3.0.
oriented on and trained for crisis response 7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Mobility Requirements Study,”

and power projection, and as we employ the vol. 1, Joint Staff Publication (1992). This study was man-
power that comes from simultaneous appli- dated by Congress to determine airlift and sealift assets
necessary to support the national military strategy.
cation of unique, complementary capabili-
ties. We will seize those opportunities pro-
vided by technology and the support of the
American people to protect the enduring,
global security interests of the Nation. JFQ

12 JFQ / Summer 1993