AC2147 - Flight Test Safety
AC2147 - Flight Test Safety
AC2147 - Flight Test Safety
CR
Circular
AC 21-47(0) APRIL 2012
FLIGHT TEST SAFETY
CONTENTS 1. REFERENCES
1. References 1 Part 21 of CASR 1998, Certification
2. Purpose 2 and Airworthiness Requirements for
Aircraft and Parts.
3. Status of this advisory circular 2
CASA Type Certification Procedures
4. Acronyms 2 Manual, Version 1.1, November 2001.
5. Definitions 2 AC 21-10(2) – Experimental
6. Background 2 Certificates, July 2011.
7. Resources 3 AC 21-13(0) – Australian Designed
Aircraft – Type Certification,
8. Flight test planning and preparation 8
September 1999.
9. Hazard analysis / risk management 10 CAAP SMS-1(0) – Safety Management
10. Flight test operations 11 Systems for Regular Public Transport
11. Summary 14 Operations, January 2009.
Appendix A - Terms and abbreviations 15 CAAP SMS-2(0) – Integration of
Human Factors into Safety
Appendix B - Spin recovery parachutes for
Management Systems, January 2009.
light aeroplanes 17
CAAP SMS-3(1) – Non-Technical
Appendix C - Generic flight test plan Skills Training and Assessment for
contents 21 Regular Public Transport Operations,
Appendix D - Flight test hazard analysis / risk April 2011.
management 25 ‘Emergency Bailout Procedures’ by
Appendix E - Experimental certificate - flight Allen Silver; published in ‘Soaring’ and
test - risk assessment 37 ‘Sport Aerobatics’ magazines, June to
August 1992, revised May 2003.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Order 4040.26A – Aircraft Certification
Service Flight Safety Program, January
2001.
Advisory Circulars are intended to provide advice and guidance to illustrate a means, but not necessarily the only
means, of complying with the Regulations, or to explain certain regulatory requirements by providing
informative, interpretative and explanatory material.
Where an AC is referred to in a ‘Note’ below the regulation, the AC remains as guidance material.
ACs should always be read in conjunction with the referenced regulations.
This AC has been approved for release by the Executive Manager Standards Development and Future
Technology Division.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 2
2. PURPOSE
2.1 This Advisory Circular (AC) provides general safety information for those Civil Aviation
Safety Authority (CASA) staff, aircraft industry participants and amateur aircraft builders
involved with any of the flight testing requirements of Part 21 of the Civil Aviation Safety
Regulations 1998 (CASR 1998).
2.2 This AC applies to:
people responsible for, or participating in, the flight testing of aircraft certificated or
manufactured under Part 21 of CASR 1998;
applicants for, or authorised persons and CASA officers issuing, Experimental
Certificates under Regulation 21.191 of CASR 1998; and
amateur aircraft builders and their flight test pilots.
4. ACRONYMS
4.1 Terms and abbreviations are listed at Appendix A of this AC.
5. DEFINITIONS
5.1 For the purposes of this document:
Crew Resource Management (CRM) means a team training and operational philosophy with the
objective of ensuring the effective use of all available resources to achieve safe and efficient
flight operations.
Certification Flight Testing means those flight tests conducted for the purpose of demonstrating,
or verifying, compliance with the applicable airworthiness standard.
Experimental/Developmental Flight Testing means those flight tests conducted for the purpose
of defining or expanding an aircraft’s flight envelope.
Flight Test means the process of developing and gathering data during operation and flight of an
aircraft and then analysing that data to evaluate the flight characteristics of the aircraft
(Subregulation 21.35 of CASR 1998 refers). In this AC flight test does not mean a practical test
of a person’s knowledge and practical flying skill (as per Part 1 of CAR 1988).
Production Flight Testing means those flight tests conducted for the purpose of ensuring each
individual aircraft conforms with its Type Design and is in a condition for safe operation.
6. BACKGROUND
6.1 A variety of flight test operations are conducted by sectors of the aviation industry in
Australia. These range from the experimental, developmental and certification flight testing of
new aircraft types, or of any modification to older types, to the post-production testing of newly
manufactured aircraft. Regular flight test activity is also being undertaken by members of
Australian amateur aircraft-building associations. Flight testing can involve varying levels of risk.
While, in many cases risk levels will be low, and possibly no more than encountered during the
normal operations of certificated aircraft, in other instances significant hazards may be present.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 3
Also some phases of many test programs, like evaluating stall handling, spinning or flutter
characteristics, should always be approached with an extra measure of caution. Since the majority
of Australian civilian flight test operations are performed under the auspices of one or more of the
subparts to Part 21 of CASR 1998 CASA has an obligation to provide advice regarding reducing
the risks involved. This AC offers some such advice.
6.2 The AC will cover, in general, the provision of resources for an efficient but safety-
conscious flight test and evaluation (FT&E) organisation, test planning principles, hazard
analysis and risk management procedures and some ideas that may be applicable during actual
flight test operations. It also provides references to other relevant publications and websites.
6.3 While the information in this AC may be applicable to the flight testing of all aircraft
types it is focussed more toward the test operations of those at the lighter-weight and lower-speed
ends of the scale, principally those in the primary, normal, utility, acrobatic or amateur-built
categories.
7. RESOURCES
7.1 Engineering or operational organisations involved with flight testing, be they
multinational corporations or individual consultancies, should be properly resourced. Access to
qualified personnel, functional equipment and appropriate services facilitates safe operations and
allows for efficiency in project progression. Resourcing considerations are best set out in an
organisational procedures manual as outlined at paragraph 7.2 of this AC. Selected aspects are
discussed in more detail at paragraphs 7.3 to 7.7 of this AC.
Procedures Manual
7.2 Describing and documenting the procedures used by an organisation is always a sound
idea and is also required, in some circumstances, by the regulations (for example, companies
manufacturing aircraft under Subpart 21.G of CASR 1998 are expected to do so in accordance
with a quality system procedures manual). Flight test resourcing, procedural and safety aspects
can be integrated within an organisation’s wider procedures manual however they are more suited
to inclusion in a sub-manual, or volume, on their own as such an arrangement affords ready and
easy reference to all information that may be needed in preparation for or during operations. A
flight test procedures manual would probably include sections detailing:
an overview of the types of flight test operation to be conducted;
organisational structure;
management responsibilities and authorities;
personnel qualification, experience, currency and training requirements;
operational policies and limitations;
test planning procedures and reporting formats;
flight test technique and reference publications;
aircraft modification procedures and restrictions;
test instrumentation;
ground support facilities;
use of safety and photographic chase aircraft;
airspace, test area and range definitions;
safety equipment;
emergency services; and
hazard analysis and risk management policies and procedures.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 4
Professional flight test crew normally gain their qualifications through completing a 12 month course of formal
training at a recognised Test Pilot School. Shorter courses followed by focussed ‘on-the-job’ experience in an active
flight test organisation may also be used.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 5
○ CASA Test Pilot, Airworthiness Engineering Branch, GPO Box 2005, ACT, 2601,
Telephone 131 757; and/or
○ Flight Test Society of Australia: www.ftsa.org.au.
*
In the case of the modification of some large multi-crew aircraft the TP may not necessarily be the command pilot
but should occupy an appropriate control seat and be the flying pilot for the test sequences.
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Instrumentation
7.5 The provision of flight test instrumentation can entail the use of simple tools like hand-
held force gauges, flight control position measuring tapes and the aircraft’s installed flight and
engine instruments, or sophisticated suites built in to the systems onboard prototype aircraft and
monitoring multiple measurands. The design, installation and use of such instrumentation is a
multifaceted topic in its own right and beyond the scope of this AC. Many authoritative
references are available. Nevertheless, the provision of test instrumentation tools or systems that
are simple and easy to use will improve flight test efficiency and thereby enhance flight safety.
The less time the test aircrew have to spend setting up and manipulating instrumentation or
directly recording data while airborne the more time they have for accurately flying the test
points, monitoring results and maintaining operational situational awareness.
Safety Equipment
7.6 Some flight test operations, for instance those in support of an innocuous modification of
an established aircraft type, may be safely conducted in the shirtsleeve environment of an
everyday cockpit. However any test program or sortie that entails elevated levels of risk will
justify the use of safety equipment additional to that normally used in or fitted to an aircraft under
a standard Certificate of Airworthiness (CoA). Some considerations are as follows:
Flying Clothing: Various items of specialised flying clothing are recommended. Flying
suits and jackets, particularly those made from Nomex or any similar flame retardant
material provide sensible covering of exposed skin areas. Suitable flying gloves and
sturdy boots afford additional protection. For the early flights of an experimental or major
developmental program, and for any flight in which there is a chance that the aircraft may
be subject to a loss of control near or on the ground, or may have to be abandoned while
airborne, a protective helmet should also be worn.
Escape Assistance: Subregulation 21.35 (4) of CASR 1998 gives the following
requirement in relation to certification flight testing: ‘Each applicant must show CASA for
each flight test…that adequate provision is made for the flight test crew for emergency
egress and the use of parachutes.’ A number of modifications or additions can be made to
an experimental aircraft that will facilitate the ability of the aircrew to escape from it
should they need to. For emergency exit from an aircraft while it is still on, or has
returned to, the ground standard exit provisions can be supplemented by supplying the
crew with crash axes or canopy breakers. Large aircraft should be provided with escape
ropes at all exits. Abandoning an aircraft while airborne entails additional exit
considerations especially since, in an emergency situation, there will probably not be
much time available and the aircraft may be gyrating out of control. Doors and canopies
should be modified to allow for quick, easy opening and jettison (for example, in small
aeroplanes, hinges can be removed and replaced with temporary fastenings that enable the
door to be simply pushed or kicked open and clear of the airframe). More than one way
out should be available and cleared. In larger aircraft, knotted escape ropes, ladders or
nets set up along the walls of each compartment, which enable the crew to reach the
exit(s) in a dark, tumbling cabin, are simple and inexpensive additions. Harnesses should
be easily releasable as should any other attachments between the crew and the aircraft
(e.g. intercom leads). Consideration to providing a ‘weak link’ to such attachments may
be worthwhile. Aircrew, when kitted out in boots, helmet, personal parachute and any
other survival equipment, should ensure that they are still able to fit easily through all
emergency exits.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 7
Personal Parachutes: The type of personal parachute – pack, harness and canopy – most
suitable for flight test projects will depend on the size and configuration of the aircraft
under test and the size and weight of the individual crewmembers. The TP, when wearing
the parachute and strapped in to his/her seat, must retain full freedom of movement and
access to all controls. The slim-pack chute designs favoured by glider pilots are often also
the most suitable for use during flight test operations. Regardless, any parachute must be
personally fitted and adjusted to its wearer and must be serviceable (inspected and
repacked within the previous six months by a qualified rigger). Additionally, flight test
personnel will be wearing and, maybe, using personal parachutes as emergency
equipment. As such, they will probably not be experienced or trained parachutists and
advice from a professional parachuting organisation or authority should be sought. The
Australian Parachute Federation (www.apf.asn.au) may be able to provide information
directly or supply contact details for the nearest qualified specialist. See also the
References at paragraph 1 of this AC.
Ancillary Equipment: Depending on the normal equipment fit-out of the test aircraft,
and the area over which the test operations are to be conducted, the provision of additional
safety equipment may be warranted. Items to consider are fire extinguishers, emergency
oxygen systems and smoke hoods, survival packs, emergency beacons and radios, knives,
lifejackets and dinghies.
Spin Recovery Systems: Prudent program managers will have a prototype or certification
aircraft subject to spin testing, or to any testing at high angles of attack where there is a
danger of departure from controlled flight, fitted with a system that can assist with
recovery from a spin should normal flight control inputs prove ineffective. Various spin
recovery systems have been developed or tried over the years. By far the most successful,
especially in relation to the flight testing of small aeroplanes, is the tail mounted, anti-spin
parachute. Information that may assist in developing such parachute systems is provided
at Appendix B of this AC. Alternative methods, generally more complex, expensive and
less reliable, include rockets, wing and nose mounted parachutes, and moveable or
jettisonable ballast systems. As per Section 6.4 of the Type Certification Procedures
Manual, CASA personnel will not conduct any spin testing required during an aircraft
type certification program unless a spin recovery system, preferably an anti-spin
parachute, has been fitted to the test aircraft.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 8
Airfield and Airspace: Factors affecting the choice of airfield from which flight test
operations are to be conducted can vary with the type of testing being undertaken.
Generally the ideal airfield will be one equipped with long, wide, sealed runways
bordered by unobstructed and level surrounds. The availability of suitable forced landing
areas off the airfield itself is also important. Flight testing is best conducted away from
urban or populated areas and such will be a restriction placed on the applicable
experimental certificate when issued by CASA or an authorised person (see paragraph 9.5
of this AC). These considerations usually mean that major city airfields are unsuitable,
especially if the test program involves a new or substantially modified aircraft. Similar
factors are applicable when considering the airspace in which the test exercises will be
conducted. Preference should be to operate away from busy air-traffic centres or air-
routes, although in some circumstance, for example systems testing in transport category
aircraft, the protection afforded through using controlled airspace and the positive
separation or traffic advice provided therein may be appropriate.
Emergency Services: Ideally, the airfield from which test operations are conducted will
be supported by certified rescue and fire fighting services, although these are normally
only provided for major airports with a significantly large number of daily aircraft
movements. For test flights out of smaller or regional airfields, especially for any first or
high risk flights, the local fire station and ambulance service should be advised of the
details of the times and areas of operation. In some cases local members of the State
Emergency Service, or similar organisations, may be able to make themselves available to
act as dedicated rescue crew. Whether emergency service personnel are assigned or casual
they should be provided with relevant information such as the location of airfield entry
gates and the layout of the surrounding road network. A map or satellite photo of the local
area, overlaid with crash locater gridlines, will be a worthwhile supplementary aid.
Emergency crews must also be specifically briefed regarding the test aircraft – for
example, manipulation of normal and emergency exits or access points, fuel, engine and
electrical controls and how to operate them, the location of any hazardous stores, cargo,
systems or fixtures.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 9
Associated sub-principles are, firstly, that test point increments should be small, especially as the
edges of an envelope predicted by the design engineer are approached, and secondly, testing
should be discontinued if, as these small increments are applied, unpredicted or unsafe trends are
encountered. Any unexpected or marginal behaviours encountered during this process of stepping
toward the design limit should cause a halt until the unforeseen phenomena are properly
analysed. Unsatisfactory characteristics may warrant engineering modifications or the application
of operational limits (i.e. the edge(s) of the envelope forecast at the design stage are truncated
prior to the aircraft being cleared for operational service).
Preparation
8.4 Besides compilation of the test plan there are other preparatory issues that will require
consideration, for example engineering, resource and budgetary matters will vary with the size of
individual projects. In regards to flight test safety, there are additional preliminary aspects that
can be addressed:
General and Safety Training: The overall competency status of personnel who will be
involved in the flight test program can be enhanced through general safety training. Many
course options such as first aid, Occupational Health and Safety and accident
investigation are available and can be of benefit. Survival training is advisable, especially
where test operations will be conducted over water or in remote locations. Specific
training, depending on the nature of the flight test program, may also be required. For
example; teams involved in flutter testing should have a good knowledge of the principles
of aeroelasticity, while upset recovery training is highly recommended for all high speed
test participants. Helicopter underwater escape training is well worth consideration and
could be treated as a prerequisite for any crew involved in testing rotary-wing aircraft
over water (shipboard landings, oil rig platform operations, etc.).
Work-Up Training: Focussed work-up training is advisable prior to embarking on actual
project test flying. This would also entail aircraft or type related crew familiarisation,
endorsement or refresher training. The test specific work-up program, which may best be
flown in either an engineering flight simulator, an example of the test aircraft or a
similarly configured type, should cover practice in the individual flight test techniques to
be used. This is particularly relevant to any testing that involves elevated risk profiles.
Familiarity with, and practice at, loss of control (LOC) procedures is especially
recommended. Rehearsal of test sortie profiles, during which the most efficient and safest
sequence for flying the test points is developed, may also be of benefit. Planning and risk
management practices should be applied to work-up training programs in the same
manner as they are applied to the actual testing.
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Safety Review and Authorisation: A process whereby test plans and preparations are
reviewed prior to implementation is well worthwhile. Reviews within test and project
teams are part of normal procedure but value is often added by having independent
specialists carry out an appraisal as well. A final review and formal authorisation process
on the part of the appropriate manager or chief test pilot provides another layer of
protection. Also, as per paragraph 8.3 of this AC, CASA review of certification flight test
plans is available.
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Briefings
10.3 Pre-briefings, during which team members are made aware of details for the planned
operation, should be conducted prior to the various overall flight test phases and then prior to
each individual flight. All participants, or at least the principal representatives from support
functionaries, should attend pre-flight briefings as should the relevant manager or authorising
officer. Post-flight briefings, whereby the success or otherwise of the mission and any safety
lessons are drawn out while still fresh in the group’s memory are also worthwhile. A good ‘Flight
Test Briefing Guide’ is available in FAA Order 4040.26A.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 12
*
Most Test Pilot Schools offer short courses relating to CRM in the flight test environment and any of these are
recommended.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 13
Chase Aircraft
10.6 As well as the use of ground based flight following support services particularly helpful
input can be gained through having the test aircraft accompanied by a dedicated
safety/photographic chase aircraft. This is especially relevant to any sortie involving elevated risk
or high intensity testing. Chase aircraft can provide wide-ranging contributions to the testing
through external and direct observation of the test aircraft during and after each test (including
assessment of damage should that occur), assisting or directing operations, monitoring and
clearance of surrounding airspace, taking charge of air-traffic communications, controlling
emergency or rescue operations (if required) and generally watching and verifying the progress of
the testing. Nevertheless, there is potential for the chase aircraft to become a hindrance or a
hazard in itself. Chase flying is a particular skill involving not just basic close and loose
formation techniques but the ability to position the chase aircraft appropriately during dynamic
test events. It should only be conducted by trained, experienced and operationally mature crews.
Altitude
10.7 The adage, ‘altitude above you is like a runway behind you – useless’, is well worthy of
consideration when conducting test point sequences. Flight testing with plenty of space between
the aircraft and the ground is normally the safest option. A couple of related concepts are as
follows:
While certain tests will require operations at low level (e.g. handling tests, like VMCA, that
depend on engines developing maximum power, or systems tests, like enhanced ground
proximity warning system (EGPWS), where proximity to the ground is a prerequisite) a
cautious tester will fly the profiles at a safe altitude in the first instance. Then, when the
tests are reflown at the lower levels an understanding of the expected performance and
handling characteristics of the aircraft will have already been acquired.
For dynamic or rapid-manoeuvre testing the definition of a ‘hard-deck’ minimum altitude
is sensible.
The hard-deck principle can be further refined through delineation of a series of critical
altitudes. For example, during spin testing of a small, single engine aeroplane the critical
altitudes may be something like – minimum entry altitude - 8000 ft (AO) – anti-spin chute
deployment altitude - 6000 ft – abandonment altitude - 4000 ft.
Basic Airmanship
10.8 Flight testing is often an interesting and challenging exercise and there is an occasional
tendency to become so engrossed in the detail of the tests that the overarching concepts of
airmanship fade into the background. Lookout, listen-out, airspace awareness, basic aircraft
limitations, fuel consciousness, etc. are all just as important during a flight test sortie as they are
during other forms of flying. In addition, especially if a tense test profile is to be flown, there can
be an inclination to relax after the actual test points have been achieved – remember, the sortie is
not over until the engines have stopped and the pins are in.
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Perceived Pressures
10.9 The flight test stage normally comes toward the end of an aircraft development or
certification project. More often than not, by the time this phase begins, most of the contingency
scheduling and funding that was added when the initial project planning took place has already
been used up. Progress slows, milestones slide to the right and the increasing, undue, financial
and program pressure is placed right where, safety-wise, it should not be i.e. the flight test phase
is squashed up against an ‘immovable’ end-date. Project and senior managers must be aware of
this tendency and realise that any such pressure is, in reality, perceived pressure. The job needs to
be completed, but not at the expense of the aircraft. Often the safest option of a few more days or
weeks is, on balance, also the cheapest and best choice. Notwithstanding, flight test crews should
also understand that the ultimate decision regarding whether it is safe to fly or not rests with
them.
11. SUMMARY
11.1 Flight testing can, by its very nature, involve varying levels of risk. To try and pass
specific safety advice relating to the multitude of potential flight test scenarios is not practicable;
however this AC is presented in an attempt to provide some background flight test safety
information. As such it may, or may not, be relevant to a particular project. Additionally though,
the concept of safety itself cannot always be isolated from common operational principles and
some of what has been presented relates to the broader aspects of running a proficient flight test
organisation. The AC covers, in general, the provision of resources for a safety-conscious flight
test and evaluation office, test planning principles, hazard analysis and risk management
procedures, and some ideas that may be pertinent during the conduct of flight test operations. Not
all relevant information is necessarily presented and the recommendation is that the References
and other authoritative publications should also be consulted for a fuller understanding of the
topic.
Executive Manager
Standards Development and Future Technology
April 2012
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 15
APPENDIX A
Symbol/Term Definition
AC Advisory Circular
AFM Aircraft Flight Manual
Aft After
AO Above Obstacles
α Angle of Attack
β Angle of Sideslip
CAAP Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
CAO Civil Aviation Order
CAR Civil Aviation Regulations 1988
CASA Civil Aviation Safety Authority
CASR Civil Aviation Safety Regulations 1998
CG Centre of Gravity
CoA Certificate of Airworthiness
CRM Crew Resource Management
EGPWS Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration (of the USA)
FTCM Flight Type Compliance Matrix
FT&E Flight Test and Evaluation
FTE Flight Test Engineer
FTP Flight Test Plan
FTT Flight Test Technique
GPS Global Positioning System
GPWS Ground Proximity Warning System
H/V Height / Velocity
KIO Knock-It-Off
LAME Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineer
LOC Loss of Control
MMO Maximum Operating Limit Mach Number
NASA The National Aeronautics and Space Administration
PFL Practice (or Precautionary) Forced Landing
PPL Private Pilot Licence
RTO Rejected Take-Off
SHSS Steady Heading Sideslip
TP Test Pilot
V1 Take-Off Decision Speed
VA Design Manoeuvring Speed
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Symbol/Term Definition
VD Design Diving Speed
VFE Maximum Flap Extended Speed
VMCA Minimum Control Speed
VMCG Minimum Control Speed on the Ground
VMO Maximum Operating Limit Speed
VMU Minimum Unstick Speed
VNE Never Exceed Speed
VS Stalling Speed
WAT Weight Altitude Temperature
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 17
APPENDIX B
Design Information
Since there are so many factors involved in the configurations, dimensions, weights, aerodynamic
characteristics and consequent spinning behaviours of different aircraft there are going to be as
many more intricacies associated with designing a suitable spin recovery parachute system for
each of those different aircraft. Consequently there will not be a one-size-fits-all solution and
specialist design advice should be sought. Some established authoritative information is available
in the References given at the end of this Appendix. In Australia a small number of individuals
and companies have specific experience with the design and installation of anti-spin parachute
systems and contact information for these experts can be obtained from the CASA Test Pilot,
Airworthiness & Engineering Branch, CASA, GPO Box 2005, Canberra ACT 2601, telephone
131 757.
Critical design considerations with respect to the actual anti-spin effectiveness of the parachute
include:
the dimensions and planform of the canopy;
the porosity of the canopy material;
the stability of the trailing canopy and its distance behind the spinning aircraft; and
the efficiency with which the canopy deploys.
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General advice, derived from the References, indicates that the best anti-spin parachute systems
will incorporate the following characteristics:
Reliability: Confidence that the parachute will deploy clear of the aircraft and its wake
and provide positive spin recovery action, and that such will be a consistent outcome if
the device has to be used on more than one occasion. Confidence that the chute will not
deploy inadvertently during other critical phases of flight and that if it does it will break
free from the aircraft of its own accord.
Simplicity: Such that installation complexity, hardware costs and special maintenance
procedures are minimised. Deployment and jettison controls are obviously identifiable,
easily reached and are simple and unambiguous in their modes of operation.
Redundancy: Consideration should be given to providing backup to both the deployment
and jettison functions. Visual indication that the system is armed or safe, locked or
unlatched should be provided and, preferably, these indications should be available both
in the cockpit for the pilot and for support crew external to the test aircraft.
Safety: A number of additional safety features can be incorporated. The ability to arm the
device only for the specific testing environment is worthwhile. The danger of accidental
functioning would then be reduced. Additionally, the system should be designed such that
if the parachute accidentally deploys it will break free from the aircraft – i.e. the attaching
mechanism could be secured by breakaway devices or weak links so that only during the
test period would the chute be locked to the aircraft. A further safety feature can be
designed into the control system by ensuring that, when the system is armed, jettison
cannot be initiated prior to deployment. The safety of ground crew, especially if the
system includes any pyrotechnic devices, must be considered.
Unobtrusiveness: The parachute system, its container and mounting structure should
have minimal effect on the moments of inertia and aerodynamics, and consequently the
spin characteristics, of the aeroplane under test.
Operational Considerations
A few aspects of operating an aircraft fitted with an anti-spin parachute system should be
considered, for example:
System Set Up: The test pilot should be consulted, during the design of the system, with
respect to operational requirements, especially regarding the preferred location of cockpit
controls. Ideally the primary controls, for deployment and subsequent jettison of the
chute, will have differently coloured handles and be located, while both within easy reach
of the pilot, in positions far enough apart to minimise the possibility that the jettison
handle will be activated prior to that for deployment – i.e. the deployment control should
be the more prominently placed such that it can be located instinctively during the heat of
the moment in an unresponsive spin.
Functional Testing: Before declaring the equipment suitable for use during the extended
spin test program it ought to be subject to its own clearance testing. This functional
checking itself has the potential to be dangerous and should be approached with proper
caution. Airborne testing would normally be preceded by a series of ground tests where
the deployment and jettison mechanisms are checked. This could occur, in the first
instance, from the back of a vehicle but should also be undertaken during high speed taxi
tests with the system rigged in the aircraft itself. Any airborne testing of parachute
deployment and release should be conducted at a safe height and in a build-up sequence.
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The first deployments would best be from the aircraft under controlled low speed flight. If
warranted, deployments when the aircraft is stalled and then, maybe, after a one or two
turn spin could follow. The use of a photo and safety chase aircraft is recommended, and
this chase aircraft can then be used to track the jettisoned parachute to ensure its
subsequent recovery.
Procedures, Preparation and Practice: Spin-chute testing as well as the spin program
proper or any other testing that warrants fitting of the anti-spin system should be subject
to separate and rigorous hazard analysis/risk management exercises. Plans can be drawn
up for scenarios such as the chute failing to deploy correctly or unsuccessful jettison. The
test pilot is advised to familiarise herself thoroughly with the system, and practise using it,
prior to any sortie wherein its service may be required.
References
NASA Technical Note D-6866, ‘Summary of Design Considerations for Airplane Spin-
Recovery Parachute Systems’ by Sanger M. Burk Jr., August 1972.
NASA Technical Paper 1076, ‘Spin Tunnel Investigation of the Spinning Characteristics
of Typical Single-Engine General Aviation Airplane Designs – Tail Parachute Diameter
and Canopy Distance for Emergency Spin Recovery’ by Sanger M. Burk Jr., James S.
Bowman Jr., and William L. White, November 1977.
NASA Technical Memorandum 80237, ‘A Spin-Recovery Parachute System for Light
General-Aviation Airplanes’ by Charles F. Bradshaw, dated April 1980.
AIAA-90-1317-CP, ‘A Summary of Spin-Recovery Parachute Experience on Light
Airplanes’ by H. Paul Stough, III, dated 1990.
Flight Test Society of Australia, ‘Spin Recovery Parachutes for GA Aircraft – The
Australian Experience’ by Dafydd Llewellyn and Keith Engelsman, March 2009.
Flight Test Society of Australia, ‘Spin Recovery Parachute Installations for Small
Aeroplanes’ by Dafydd Llewellyn, dated 2009.
Flight Test Society of Australia, ‘A Drogue Gun for Small Spin-Recovery Parachutes’ by
Dafydd Llewellyn, dated 2009.
FAA Action Notice – Implementation of Guidance on the Use of Spin Recovery
Parachutes on Aircraft Requiring Spin Testing or Other High Angle of Attack Testing for
Certification; Manager, Aircraft Engineering Division, AWS-100; dated February 12,
1989.
‘Emergency Spin Recovery Devices’ from ‘The Pilot’s Handbook for Critical and
Exploratory Flight Testing’, Society of Experimental Test Pilots, dated 1972.
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APPENDIX C
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Instrumentation and Test This subsection should describe all instrumentation and other test
Equipment equipment to be utilised. Calibration information would form part
of this description. Detailed listings of the parameters to be
measured, the measurement characteristics, and their expected
ranges may be included.
Data Reduction Data processing support requirements and/or the officer to be
responsible for processing and analysis can be nominated. Any
requirement for special application software can be outlined.
SCOPE OF TESTS A SCOPE OF TESTS section can be used to outline the range of
tests to be conducted and general related limitations,
configurations, loadings and standards, etc., which will influence
the validity of the results of test activity. Depending on the nature
of the task, some or all of the following subsections could be
included.
Tests and Test Conditions A statement as to the nature of the testing.
Flight Type Compliance A FTCM, which details all those clauses of the applicable
Matrix Certification Basis that are subject to flight test or to assessment
by the flight test team, can be generated and referred to at this
subsection. Normally, since this can be quite a substantial
document in itself, the FTCM should be included as an annex or
as a soft copy link to a related electronic file.
Sortie Plan and Test A summary of the test program, stating the number of phases,
Progression tests, flights (including each required take-off weight and balance
condition), flight hours and general scheduling. Normally
presented as an annex.
Test Matrix If not included as part of the annexure associated with the
preceding subsections, a matrix of the actual tests to be
conducted should be detailed.
Test Limitations A summary of the test limitations, stating the test envelope or test
limits for the tests and their sources. Special attention is normally
paid to areas which expand or differ from previously cleared
limitations or restrictions.
Test Configurations Configurations in which the aircraft is to be tested can be defined.
Weight and Balance Reference to loading information and procedures. Variables
which may have a significant effect on the aircraft weight and
balance (e.g., crew, stores, fuel, ballast), and how these variables
will be controlled to meet each required take-off condition, should
be included.
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APPENDIX D
Concepts
Risk management is the process by which:
hazards are identified;
an assessment is made of the risks involved;
mitigating procedures are established to reduce or eliminate the risks; and
a conscious decision is made, at the appropriate level, to accept residual risks.
In the flight test environment risk management is normally conducted through a safety review
process in which a flight test plan, and its ongoing application, is examined by project and non-
project personnel in order to draw out potential hazards and recommend mitigating (or
minimising) procedures. Applicable conceptual definitions could be as follows:
Hazard – A condition, event, or circumstance which could lead to an unplanned or
undesired event (injury to personnel, damage to equipment, loss of material, or loss of
function).
Risk – Expression of the impact of an undesired event in terms of event severity and
probability.
Hazard Analysis – The process of identifying hazards and systematically quantifying or
qualifying the degree of risk they pose for exposed individuals or equipment.
Risk Management – The process of reducing vulnerability to the identified risks through
eliminating, mitigating, minimising or controlling them and then making a conscious
decision to accept the residual risk.
A flight test organisation should define some underlying risk management principles to which it
will operate. Some suggestions are outlined below:
Unnecessary risks should not be accepted. An ‘unnecessary risk’ is any risk that, if taken,
will not contribute meaningfully to task outcomes.
Risks should be reduced to an acceptable level. Risk is part of flight test but by applying
risk management principles flight testing can be accomplished in a safe and efficient
manner.
Hazard analysis/risk management occurs at the planning stage of the project and should
then be ongoing, with regular reviews and updates taking place throughout any program.
Risk decisions should be taken at the appropriate level. The higher the risk the higher the
level of management that must be involved in task authorisation.
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Factors Affecting Flight Test Risk Ratings: Some factors which may be worth taking into
consideration when assigning flight test risk ratings are as follows:
The test team’s proficiency with, currency on and familiarity with the test aircraft and the
type of tests being conducted.
The existence of any previous test program, the thoroughness thereof and the relevant
results.
Test techniques and workloads.
Altitude and airspeed in relation to terrain and/or aircraft recovery systems.
Gross weight and centre of gravity.
Environment (weather, air traffic control, airfield conditions, darkness, turbulence etc.).
Aircraft internal environment (temperature, pressurisation level etc.).
Design maturity.
Test condition sequencing.
Adverse system or software effects.
Specific aircraft limitations.
Consequence of failure in technique, system or structure.
Intentional multiple failure conditions.
Risk Alleviation: Risk alleviation procedures are actions taken, or factors assessed, in order to
understand, respond to and minimise identified risks. They should be conditions over which the
test team has control or events that the crew can confirm have occurred (e.g. simulator
evaluations). Some considerations and examples, by no means all inclusive, are:
Is the test condition in its present form really needed? Can results be determined or
compliance recommendations made based on other testing or information?
How long has it been since the conformity on the test aircraft configuration was
conducted? Has anything changed since the design was reviewed?
Review test techniques and specify steps to reduce risks.
Design the test sequence with a conservative build-up of speed and manoeuvre.
Design the test sequence with a conservative build-up of weight/CG. Review weight and
balance computations. Weigh the loaded aircraft if possible. This is particularly important
for critical handling qualities tests at the extremes of the weight/CG envelope and on
weight altitude temperature (WAT) limited performance tests.
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Review the test environment and specify steps to reduce risks (e.g. Specify limits with
respect to temperature, wind, visibility etc.).
Specify minimum test altitudes to allow for anti-spin chute deployment, then aircraft
abandonment if necessary.
Provide predictions and expectations to prepare participants. Update performance
predictions with flight test data when possible.
Run test sequences in simulators.
Provide special training and consultation.
Specific training with equipment (helmets, goggles, masks, oxygen, escape provisions,
parachutes, fire extinguishers etc.). All personnel should be briefed on egress procedures.
For high altitude tests all crewmembers must be briefed on oxygen use and equipment
location. For overwater flights all crewmembers must be briefed on survival equipment
use and location.
Use of chase aircraft to provide visual data and safety support.
Use of photo/video recording.
Use of telemetry to monitor tests in ‘real time’.
Use of ground support monitoring test comms frequencies.
Install hardware to protect structure and personnel (e.g. Anti-spin chute, door/canopy
jettison, VMU tailskid).
Limit personnel onboard to the absolute minimum required to safely conduct the test (do
not arbitrarily set a limit on the number of personnel, take the right number to safely
conduct the test).
For build-up tests utilise the right personnel to evaluate the data and plan for subsequent
tests. Allow adequate time to evaluate the build-up test points.
Request a thorough briefing on previous testing, techniques and results. On tests that are
highly dependent on pilot technique, allow the practised pilot to conduct the initial tests
and observe his/her performance before conducting independent tests.
On potentially hazardous ground tests (e.g. high energy rejected take-offs (RTO))
experienced ground crews should be briefed during the pre-flight briefing and be
immediately available to support the tests if necessary (e.g. cooling fans, fire trucks,
aircraft-jacks, tow-motors etc.). The ground crews should be advised as to who is in
charge regarding their participation.
Minimise the number of actual engine cuts during runway performance testing if spool-
down thrust can be properly accounted for by analysis and related systems failures can be
simulated accurately.
Test personnel involved with hot/cold weather testing should be briefed on appropriate
survival skills and be properly equipped to endure the anticipated environment.
Risk Level Examples: Examples of tests which could be considered to carry different risk levels,
initially and unmitigated, are grouped below. These are typical examples only and are provided
for general guidance. The actual risk category for each test condition must be evaluated on a
case-by-case basis.
High Risk: Tests that could be considered to involve high risk factors are as follows:
○ Stall Characteristics:
Aft CG accelerated stalls with rapidly changing dynamic conditions.
On aeroplanes equipped with unproved pusher systems that are masking potential
deep stalls.
High altitude stalls on aeroplanes with potential engine flameout problems.
With critical ice shapes.
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
1 SHSS Structural Catastrophic/ Medium Confirm aircraft β limit with If β limit exceeded Probability reduced Low
failure due to Unlikely applicant and observe this statically, release pedal to remote.
excessive limit during tests. slowly and smoothly.
sideslip Apply and remove pedal
loads. deflection in slow, smooth
manner.
2 Roll Rate Structural Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss roll characteristics Loss of Control (LOC) Probability of Low
failure after Unlikely with applicant test pilot prior recovery technique: aircraft damage
exceeding to tests. Simultaneously; reduced to remote.
aircraft limits. Centralise skid ball during Select engine to Idle,
testing. Centralise controls,
Knock-it-off (KIO) if control Maintain neutral aileron
reversal or significant stick until Vs+5kts,
force lightening Retract flaps at pilot’s
experienced. discretion,
Buildup by Recover from dive.
Half then Full Aileron
Clean then Takeoff then
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
Landing configuration.
VA or VFE – 20%
Minimum altitude during roll
testing 2000 ft AO.
3 Static Airframe Marginal/ Medium All appropriate airspeeds Decelerate to below Probability of Low
Stability damage after Unlikely will be briefed/reviewed by VNE or VNO in 1-g flight. aircraft damage
and Flight exceeding crewmembers and adhered Accelerate to Vs+5kts. reduced to remote.
Path aircraft limits to.
Stability High and low speed data
points will be reviewed and
correlated to the
appropriate high or low
speed aircraft limits.
4 1G Wings Stall Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss stall characteristics Loss of Control (LOC) Probability of Low
Level Stalls departure, Uncertain with applicant test pilot prior recovery technique: violent loss of
loss of to tests. Simultaneously; control reduced to
control Centralise skid ball during Select engine to Idle, remote.
leading to approach to stall. Oppose yaw/roll with
ground Target speed bleed rate 1 rudder, Probability of
impact. kt/sec. Lower pitch attitude to inability to regain
Knock-it-off if control accelerate, control reduced to
reversal or significant stick Maintain neutral aileron remote.
force lightening until Vs+5kts,
experienced. Retract flaps at pilots
Buildup by discretion,
Heavy to light weight, Recover from dive.
Forward to Aft C.G., and
Clean then Takeoff then
Landing configuration.
Minimum altitude during
stall testing 4000 ft AO.
Aircraft Critical/ Medium Brief aircraft limits for test Crew to monitor speed Probability reduced Low
overstress or Uncertain configuration prior to test and G during recovery. to remote.
overspeed conduct.
during stall
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
recovery.
5 Engine Off Engine fails Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss glide / PFL Do not conduct tests if Probability of Low
Stalls to restart Uncertain characteristics with discussions/review/practi inability to recover
leading to applicant test pilot prior to ce suggest unacceptable aircraft reduced to
forced tests. characteristics. unlikely.
landing. Practise PFL profiles before
engine off sorties.
Study AFM and practise
engine restart procedures.
Crew to wear helmet / flying
suits / gloves.
Minimum altitude during
stall testing 4000 ft AO.
Minimum altitude for engine
off 3000 ft AO.
Testing to be conducted
only within gliding range of
the airfield.
6 Accelerate As per Serial Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss stall characteristics Do not conduct tests if Probability of Low
d Stalls 4. Uncertain with applicant test pilot prior discussions/review violent loss of
to tests. suggest unacceptable control reduced to
Review 1G stall characteristics. remote.
characteristics prior to Release G at point of
accelerated stall tests. departure then employ Probability of
Enter stall from balanced LOC recovery technique. inability to regain
turn. Crew to monitor speed control reduced to
Knock-it-off if control and G during recovery. remote
reversal or significant stick
force lightening
experienced.
Brief aircraft limits for test
configuration prior to test
conduct.
Minimum altitude during
stall testing 4000 ft AO.
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
7 Spin Malfunction Catastrophic Medium Discuss spin chute Do not conduct tests if Probability of Medium
Preparation during / Uncertain mechanism and discussions/review inability to regain
antispin characteristics with suggest unacceptable control reduced to
chute check. applicant test pilot and characteristics. unlikely.
review applicant test report If chute does not deploy
prior to tests. properly jettison Probability of
Ensure fail safe facilities in immediately. inability to recover
place. If chute does not jettison aircraft and/or pilot
Check deployment and conduct slow speed reduced to remote.
jettison on ground. handling check, consider
Independent pre-flight recovery options – if any
check by knowledgeable doubt, abandon aircraft
LAME. preferably from height
Minimum crew (TP only). and over clear area.
Pilot to wear parachute.
Critical heights to be
employed
Deploy not below 3000 ft
AO
Abandon not below 1500 ft
AO.
Flight following to be
provided by FTE and
applicant with binos on
ground and safety chase
(also for chute recovery
tracking).
Emergency services to be
available.
8 Spins Development Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss spin characteristics Do not conduct tests if Probability of Medium
of Uncertain with applicant test pilot and discussions/review inability to regain
unrecoverabl review applicant test report suggest unacceptable control reduced to
e spin prior to tests. characteristics. unlikely.
characteristic Review stall characteristics Standard spin recovery
s leading to prior to spin tests. technique: Probability of
ground Standard spin recovery Select engine to Idle, inability to recover
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
impact. techniques to be used. Ailerons neutralised, aircraft and/or pilot
Antispin chute to be Full opposite rudder, reduced to remote.
installed for all spin testing. Forward elevator control
Minimum crew (TP only) for as required to unstall
spin sorties. wing,
Pilot to wear parachute. Retract flaps as briefed
Buildup by but not until rotation
Light to heavy weight, ceased,
Forward to Aft C.G., and Maintain neutral aileron
Clean then Flap and Power until Vs+5kts,
configurations. Recover from dive.
Critical heights to be
employed
Entry not below 8000 ft AO
Antispin chute at 6000 ft AO
Abandon not below 4000 ft
AO.
Flight following to be
provided by FTE and
applicant on ground and
safety chase.
Emergency services to be
available.
9 Aircraft Critical/ Medium Brief aircraft limits for test Crew to monitor speed Probability reduced Low
overstress or Uncertain configuration prior to test and G during recovery. to remote.
overspeed conduct.
during spin
recovery.
10 Vibration Structural Catastrophic/ Medium Discuss vibration If abnormal vibration or Probability of Low
and failure due to Uncertain characteristics with buffet levels are violent loss of
Buffeting violent applicant test pilot and encountered recovery control reduced to
vibration review applicant test report technique will consist of: remote.
build up. prior to tests. . Power reduced
Buildup progressively from Reduce speed using
low speed to high speed. minimal G.
Minimum altitude during
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Ser. Event Hazard Worst Initial Risk Minimisation Procedures Corrective Action Minimisation / Residual
Effect/ Level Corrective Effect Risk
Probability Level
high speed testing 2000 ft
AO.
No attempts will be made to
excite flutter and flutter
requirements are already to
have been checked.
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APPENDIX E
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RATING
FACTOR Mitigating or Amplifying Comments (If
1 2 3 Allocation
Required)
Established Established engineering Organisation or individual
aeronautical and/or aviation with no flight test
engineering organisation but with experience.
Applicant
organisation employing limited flight test
experienced design experience.
office and flight test staff
Conventional Developmental program Development of
modification or with some completely new or
developmental program. unconventional substantially modified
Predictable outcomes challenges. Particular aircraft or major
are expected. unusual or untried subsystem. Novel or
features may affect untested experimental
Program outcomes. features or concepts may
be involved.
No commercial or Some commercial or Significant commercial or
external imperatives. external imperatives. external imperatives.
Delays acceptable. Delays create pressure. Delays create substantial
pressure.
Complete and thorough Some deficiencies in Poorly or incompletely
planning has been planning or it is lacking planned.
conducted in reference to published
Test Planning
accordance with guidance material.
published guidance
material.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 39
RATING
FACTOR Mitigating or Amplifying Comments (If
1 2 3 Allocation
Required)
Certificated type Certificated type Non-certificated
involving minor involving major systems developmental or
modifications or modifications or experimental aircraft.
modifications not modifications affecting
affecting flight flight performance or
performance or handling.
handling.
Aircraft Normal (or similar) Normal (or similar) Acrobatic (or similar)
category aircraft of category aircraft with category aircraft with
conventional some ‘non-conventional’ novel or ‘non-
configuration. configuration features conventional’
(e.g. tailwheel, float or configuration features.
ski landing gear;
unmatched powerplant,
etc).
Qualified and Qualified and Low time pilot and/or
experienced Test Pilot experienced pilot with inexperienced in flight
and/or Flight Test some flight test test operations.
Engineer. experience and/or a
conservative and
flexible nature.
Flight Crew Current and Current and Not current or
experienced on type. experienced on similar experienced on type or
types. similar types.
Practised at specific test Practised at general test Unpractised at test
techniques and sortie techniques but not at techniques and
profiles. specific sortie profiles. unexposed to sortie
profiles.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 40
RATING
FACTOR Mitigating or Amplifying Comments (If
1 2 3 Allocation
Required)
Relevant, complete and Incomplete suite of No relevant safety
tested suite of safety relevant safety equipment provided.
equipment provided equipment provided or
Safety (e.g. antispin chute or some items untested.
Equipment recovery and escape
features, personal
protective equipment for
test crewmembers).
Licensed airfield with Unlicensed airfield with Unlicensed or poorly
appropriate runways, appropriate runways maintained airfield with
facilities and operating and operating inappropriate operating
environment. environment. environment.
Minimal or no air-traffic Some air-traffic Significant air-traffic
problems. Few or no problems or other problems or busy
other airspace users. airspace users. airspace environment.
No built-up or Some built-up or Substantially built-up or
Airfield / significantly populated populated areas near populated areas near
Airspace areas near airfield or airfield or under airfield or under intended
under designated flight designated flight test flight test area.
test area. area.
Clear approach and Limited approach and No clear approach and
departure lanes departure lanes or departure lanes between
between airfield and approach and departure airfield and flight test
flight test area. lanes require area.
complicated
navigational procedures
to negotiate.
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AC 21-47(0): Flight Test Safety 41
RATING
FACTOR Mitigating or Amplifying Comments (If
1 2 3 Allocation
Required)
Flight test support Some flight test support No flight test support or
facilities (e.g. telemetry) or flight following flight following available.
and flight following in available.
place.
Ground
Support Emergency, crash Some or limited No emergency, crash
recovery, fire fighting emergency, crash recovery, fire fighting and
and medical services recovery, fire fighting medical services
available and on stand- and medical services available.
by. available.
Any Other
Aspects
TOTAL
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Overall risk level, to both the aircraft and The Applicant can be advised to go ahead with the flight testing using extant
flight test crews themselves, and to planning and risk management procedures.
Low Risk people on the ground or water and other Experimental Certificate can be issued with standard or minimal operating <25
airspace users, is low and / or conditions, limitations and directions as per AC 21.10.
manageable.
Overall risk level, to both the aircraft and The Applicant should be advised to consider further risk reduction procedures
flight test crews themselves, and to before going ahead with the flight testing.
Medium Risk people on the ground or water and other Experimental Certificate can be issued however restrictive operating conditions, 25-35
airspace users, is elevated and / or limitations and directions as per AC 21.10 should be imposed in the interests of
deserving of further mitigation. the safety of people on the ground or water and other airspace users..
The Applicant should be advised that the flight testing is assessed as involving
Overall risk level, to either the aircraft and
a high level of risk to both the aircraft and flight test crews themselves, and / or
flight test crews themselves, or to people
to people on the ground or water and other airspace users. He or she should be
on the ground or water and other
strongly urged to introduce risk reduction procedures or to reconsider the intent
High Risk airspace users, is high and / or >35
or scope of the proposed flight test operation.
unmanageable.
Experimental Certificate should not be issued unless severe operating
conditions, limitations and directions are imposed in the interests of the safety of
people on the ground or water and other airspace users.
April 2012