Liechtenstein v. Guatemala
Liechtenstein v. Guatemala
Liechtenstein v. Guatemala
AFFAIRE NOTTEBOHM
(LIECHTENSTEIN c. GUATEMALA)
DEUXIÈME PHASE
REPORTS O F JUDGMENTS,
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND ORDERS
NOTTEBOHM CASE
(LIECHTENSTEIN 2). GUATEMALA)
SECOND PHASE
No cie vente :
Sales number
131 1
INTERNATIONAL COURT O F JUSTICE
1955
YEAR 1955 April 6th
General List :
No. 18
April ilth, 1955
NOTTEBOHM CASE
(LIECHTENSTEIN v. GUATEMALA)
SECOND PHASE
JUDGMENT
Present : President HACKWORTH; Vice-President BADAWI; Judges
BASDEVANT,ZORICIC, KLAESTAD,READ, HSU MO,
ARMAND-UGON, KOJEVNIKOV, Sir Muhammad ZAFRULLA
KHAN,MORENOQUINTANA, CORDOVA ; M. GUGGENHEIM
and M. GARC~ABAUER,Judges ad hoc ; Registrar LOPEZ
OLIVAN.
4
In the Nottebohm Case,
between
the Principality of Liechtenstein,
represented by :
Dr. Erwin H. Loewenfeld, LL.B., Solicitor of the Supreme Court,
as Agent,
assisted by :
Professor Georges Sauser-Hall, Honorary Professor at the
Universities of Geneva and of Neuchâtel,
Mr. James E. S. Fawcett, D.S.C., of the English Bar,
Mr. Kurt Lipstein, Ph.D., of the English Bar,
as Counsel,
and
the Republic of Guatemala,
represented by :
M. V. S. Pinto J., Minister Plenipotentiary,
as Agent,
assisted by :
Me. Henri Rolin, Professor of Law at the Free University of
Brussels,
M. Adolfo Molina Orantes, Dean of the Fatulty of Jurisprudence
of the University of Guatemala,
as Counsel,
and by
Me. A. Dupont-Willemin, of the Geneva Bar,
as Secretary,
composed as above,
delivers the following Judgment :
By its Judgment of November 18th, 1953, the Court rejected
the Preliminary Objection raised by the Govemment of the Repub-
lic of Guatemala to the Application of the Govemment of the
Principality of Liechtenstein. At the same time it fixed time-limits
for the further pleadings on the inerits. These time-limits were
subsequently extended by Orders of January 15th, May 8th and
September 13th, 1954. The second phase of the case was ready
5
NOTTEBOHM CASE (JUDGMENT O F 6 IV 55) 6
for hearing on November znd, 1954, when the Rejoinder of the
Government of Guatemala was filed.
Public hearings were held on February ~ o t h m , th, 14th to ~ g t h ,
21st to 24th and on March and, y d , 4th, 7th and 8th, 1955. The
Court included on the Bench M. Paul Guggenheim, Professor at the
Graduate 1nstitute.of International Studies of Geneva and a Member
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, chosen as Judge ad hoc
by the Government of Liechtenstein, and M. Carlos Garcia Bauer,
Professor of the University of San Carlos, former Chairman of the
Guatemalan Delegation to the General Assembly of the United
Nations, chosen as Judge ad hoc by the Government of Guatemala.
The Agent for the Government of Guatemala having filed a
number of new documents, after the closure of the written proceed-
ings, without the consent of the other Party, the Court, in accord-
ance with the provisions of Article 48, paragraph 2, of its Rules,
had, after hearing the Parties, to give its decision. Dr. Loewenfeld
and Mr. Fawcett, on behalf of the Government of Liechtenstein,
and M. Rolin, on behalf of the Government of Guatemala, addressed
the Court on this question at the hearings on February 10th and
th, 1955. The decision of the Court was given at the opening of
the hearing on February 14th, 1955. Having taken note of the fact
that during the course of the hearings the Agent of the Government
-of Liechtenstein had given his consent to the production of certain
of the new documents ; taking into account the special circum-
stances in connection with the search for, and classification and
presentation of, the documents in respect of which consent had
been refused, the Court permitted the production of al1 the docu-
ments and reserved to the Agent of the Government of Liechten-
stein the right, if he so desired, to avail himself of the opportunity
provided for in the second paragraph of Article 48 of the Rules
of Court, after having heard the contentions of the Agent of the
Government of Guatemala based on these documents, and after
such lapse of time as the Court might, on his request, deem just.
The Agent of the Government of Liechtenstein, availing himself
of this right, filed a number of documents on February 26th, 1955.
At the hearings on February q t h , 1955, and at the subsequent
hearings, the Court heard the oral arguments and replies of Dr.
Loewenfeld, Professor Sauser-Hall, Mr. Fawcett and Mr. Lipstein,
on behalf of the Government of Liechtenstein, and of M. Pinto,
M. Rolin and M. Molina, on behalf of the Government of Guatemala.
The following Submissions were presented by the Parties :
O n behalf of the Government of Liechtenstein:
in the Memorial :
"The Government of Liechtenstein submit that the Court should
adjudge and declare that :
I. The Government of Guatemala in arresting, detaining, expelling
and refusing to readmit Mr. Nottebohm and in seizing and
6
retaining his property without compensation acted in breach of
their obligations under international law and consequently in
a manner requiring the payrnent of reparation.
2. In respect of the wrongful arrest, detention, expulsion and
refusal to readrnit Mr. Nottebohm the Govemment of Guatemala
should pay to the Government of Liechtenstein :
(i) special damages amounting, according to the data received
so far, to not less than 20,000 Swiss francs ;
(ii) general damages to the amount of 645,000 Swiss francs.
(4) that in any event Mr. Nottebohm exhausted al1 the local
remedies in Guatemala which he was able or required to exhaust
under the municipal law of Guatemala and under international
law.
As to the merits of its claim, the Govemment of Liechtenstein
repeats the Final Conclusions set out in its Memorial a t p. 51 and
with reference to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of those Final Conclusions,
will further ask the Court to order, under Article 50 of the Statute,
such inquiry as may be necessary into the account of profits and
quantification of damages."
in the Rejoinder :
"May it please the Court,
subject to all reservations and without prejudice as to admis-
sibilitv
-- . --- :
to declare that the claim of the Principality of Liechtenstein is
inadmissible
(1) on the ground of the absence of any prior diplomatic negotia-
tions.
I n the alternative, on this point :
to declare it inadmissible on this ground a t least in so far as it
relates to reparation for injury allegedly caused to the person of
Friedrich Nottebohm
(2) on the ground that Nottebohm is not of Liechtenstein national-
ity.
In the alternative on this point :
to order the production by Liechtenstein of the original documents
in the archives of the central administration and the communal
administration of Mauren, together with the records of the Diet
relating to the naturalization of Nottebohm
(3) on the ground of the failure previously to exhaust the local
remedies. .
In the alternative on this point :
to declare that this contention is well founded at least in respect
of reparation for injury allegedly caused to the person of Nottebohm
and for the expropriation of property other than his immovable
property and his interests in the immovable property held in the
name of the firm of Nottebohm Hermanos.
In the alternative, on the Merits :
to hold that the laws of Guatemala applied to M. Nottebohm
have violated no rule of international law and that no fault has
been established on the part of the Guatemalan authorities in
their conduct in relation t o him such as to involve the responsibility
of the Respondent State ;
consequently, to dismiss the claim of Liechtenstein.
In the further alternative, in the event of the ordering of an
expert opinion to determine the quantum of damages :
to hold that the amount of damages to be awarded should be
calculated in accordance with the Guatemalan law, namely, Decree
529 and, in respect of certain immovable property, the Agrarian
Reform Law."
But the issue which the Court must decide is not one which
pertains to the legal system of Liechtenstein. I t does not depend
on the law or on the decision of Liechtenstein whether that State
is entitled to exercise its protection, in the case under considera-
tion. To exercise protection, to apply to the Court, is to place one-
2O
self on the plane of international law. It is international law which
determines whether a State is entitled to exercise protection and
to seise the Court.
The naturalization of Nottebohm was an act performed by
Liechtenstein in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction. The
question to be decided is whether that act has the international
effect here under consideration.
International practice provides many examples of acts per-
formed by States in the exercise of their domestic jurisdiction
which do not necessarily or automatically have international effect,
which are not necessarily and automatically binding on other
States or which are binding on them only subject to certain condi-
tions : this is the case, for instance, of a judgment given by the
competent court of a State which it is sought to invoke in another
State.
In the present case it is necessary to determine whether the
naturalization conferred on Nottebohm can be successfully invoked
against Guatemala, whether, as has already been stated, it can
be relied upon as against that State, so that Liechtenstein is
thereby entitled to exercise its protection in favour of Nottebohm
against Guatemala.
When one State has conferred its nationality upon an individual
and another State has conferred its own nationality on the same
person, it may occur that each of these States, considering itself to
have acted in the exercise of its domestic jurisdiction, adheres to its
own view and bases itself thereon in so far as its own actions are
concerned. In so doing, each State remains within the limits of its
domestic jurisdiction.
This situation may arise on the international plane and faIl to be
considered by international arbitrators or by the courts of a third
State. If the arbitrators or the courts of such a State should confine
themselves to the view that nationality is exclusively within the
domestic jurisdiction of the State, it would be necessary for them
to find that they were confronted by two contradictory assertions
made by two sovereign States, assertions which they would conse-
quently have to regard as of equal weight, which would oblige them
to allow the contradiction to subsist and thus fail to resolve the
conflict submitted t o them.
In most cases arbitrators have not strictly speaking had to
decide a conflict of nationality as between States, but rather to
determine whether the nationality invoked by the applicant
State was one which could be relied upon as against the respon-
dent State, that is to Say, whether it entitled the applicant State
to exercise protection. International arbitrators, having before
them allegations of nationality by the applicant State which
were contested by the respondent State, have sought to ascertain
whether nationality had been conferred by the applicant State in
circumstances such as to give rise to an obligation on the part
of the respondent State to recognize the effect of that nationality.
In order to decide this question arbitrators have evolved certain
principles for determining whether full international effect was
to be attributed to the nationality invoked. The same issue is
now before the Court: it must be resolved by applying the
same principles.
The courts of third States, when confronted by a similar situation,
have dealt with it in the same way. They have done so not in
connection with the exercise of protection, which did not arise
before them, but where two different nationalities have been
invoked before them they have had, not indeed to decide such
a dispute as between the two States concerned, but to determine
whether a given foreign nationality which had been invoked
before them was one which they ought to recognize.
International arbitrators have decided in the same way numerous
casés of dual nationality, where the question arose with regard to
the exercise of protection. They have given their preference to the
real and effective nationality, that which accorded with the facts,
that based on stronger factual ties between the person concerned
and one of the States whose nationaIity is involved. Different
factors are taken into consideration, and their importance will
Vary from one case to the next: the habitua1 residence of the
individual concerned is an important factor, but there are other
factors such as the centre of his interests, his family ties, his
participation in public life, attachment shown by him for a given
country and inculcated in his children, etc.
Similarly, the courts of third States, when they have before them
an individual whom two other States hold to be their national, seek
to resolve the conflict by having recourse to international criteria
and their prevailing tendency is to prefer the real and effective
nationality.
The same tendency prevails in the writings of publicists and in
practice. This notion is inherent in the provisions of Article 3,
paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court. National laws reflect this
tendency when, inter alia, they make naturalization dependent
on conditions indicating the existence of a link, which may Vary in
their purpose or in their nature but which are essentially concerned
with this idea. The Liechtenstein Law of January 4th, 1934, is a
good example.
The practice of certain States which refrain from exercising
protection in favour of a naturalized person when the latter has
in fact, by his prolonged absence, severed his links with what is
no longer for him anything but his nominal country, manifests
the view of these States that, in order to be capable of being
invoked against another State, nationality must correspond with
the factual situation. A similar view is manifested in the relevant
provisions of the bilateral nationality treaties concluded between
the United States of America and other States since 1868, such as
those sometimes referred to as the Bancroft Treaties, and in the
Pan-American Convention, signed a t Rio de Janeiro on August 13th,
1906, on the status of naturalized citizens who resume residence
in their country of origin.
The character thus recognized on the international level as per-
taining to nationality is in no way inconsistent with the fact that
international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules
governing the grant of its own nationality. The reason for this is
that the diversity of demographic conditions has thus far made
it impossible for any general agreement to be reached on the
rules relating to nationality, although the latter by its very nature
affects international relations. I t has been considered that the best
way of making such rules accord with the varying demographic
conditions in different countries is to leave the fixing of such
rules to the competence of each State. On the other hand, a State
cannot claim that the ruIes it has thus laid down are entitled to
recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity
with this general aim of making the legal bond of nationality
accord with the individual's genuine connection with the State
which assumes the defence of its citizens by means of protection
as against other States.
Thii requirement that such a concordance must exist is to be
found in the studies carried on in the course of the last thirty
years upon the initiative and under the(auspices of the League of
Nations and the United Nations. I t explains the provision which
the Conference for the Codification of International Law, held at
The Hague in 1930, inserted in Article I of the Convention relating
to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, laying down that the law
enacted by a State for the purpose of determining who are its
nationals "shall be recognized by other States in so far as it is
consistent with .... international custom, and the principles of law
generally recognized with regard to nationality". In the same spirit,
Article 5 of the Convention refers to criteria of the individual's
genuine connections for the purpose of resolving questions of dual
nationality which arise in third States.
According to the practice of States, to arbitral and judicial
decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal
bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the
existence of reciprocal rights and duties. I t may be said to consti-
tute the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon
whom it is confel~ed,either directly by the law or as the result of
an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the
population of the State conferring nationality than with that of
any other State. Conferred by a State, it only entitles that State
to exercise protection vis-à-vis another State, if it constitutes a
translation into juridical terms of the indiyidual's connection with
the State which has made him its national.
Diplomatic protection and protection by means of international
judicial proceedings constitute measures for the defence of the
rights of the State. As the Permanent Court of International
Justice has said and. has repeated, "by taking up the case of one
of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or inter-
national judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality
asserting its own rights-its right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law" (P.C.I.J., Series
A, No. 2, p. 12, and Series A/B, Nos. 20-21, p. 17).
(Signed) J. LOPEZOI.IVAN,
Registrar.