RVH - Obli Con (Art. 1161)
RVH - Obli Con (Art. 1161)
RVH - Obli Con (Art. 1161)
MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor consider the exact nature of
NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, actively participated in the trial and presented criminal and civil negligence.
ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 The former is a violation of the
PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their criminal law, while the latter is a
VIRATA, petitioners, right to institute a separate civil action; that on 'culpa aquiliana' or quasi-delict,
vs. July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata, of ancient origin, having always
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in had its own foundation and
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, individuality, separate from
7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict criminal negligence. Such
stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents. against the driver Maximo Borilla and the distinction between criminal
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; negligence and 'culpa extra-
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private contractual' or quasi-delito has
respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the been sustained by decision of
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents. ground that there is another action, Criminal Case the Supreme Court of Spain and
No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties maintained as clear, sound and
for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 perfectly tenable by Maura, an
the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City outstanding Spanish jurist.
a decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting Therefore, under the proposed
FERNANDEZ, J.: the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he Article 2177, acquittal from an
caused an injury by name accident; and that on accusation of criminal
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of negligence, whether on
the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to Civil Case reasonable doubt or not, shall
Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the No. B-134 for damages. 2 not be a bar to a subsequent civil
defendants to dismiss the complaint on the action, not for civil liability arising
ground that there is another action pending The principal issue is weather or not the of the from criminal negligence, but for
between the same parties for the same cause. 1 Arsenio Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages due to a quasi-delict or
damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner, forestalls a double recovery.
one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been respectively on the passenger jeepney that (Report of the Code
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay bumped Arsenio Virata. Commission, p. 162.)
City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved Although, again, this Article 2177
Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that parties may choose between an action under the does seem to literally refer to
for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under only acts of negligence, the
homicide through reckless imprudence was Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. same argument of Justice
instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Bocobo about construction that
Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the upholds 'the spirit that given life'
Pasay City, docketed as C Case No. 3162-P of same negligent act. rather than that which is literal
said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal that killeth the intent of the
case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio lawmaker should be observed in
The Supreme Court has held that:
Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a applying the same. And
reservation to file a separate civil action for considering that the preliminary
According to the Code chapter on human relations of
damages against the driver on his criminal
Commission: 'The foregoing the new Civil Code definitely
liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio
Francisco filed a motion in said c case to provision (Article 2177) though at establishes the separability and
first sight startling, is not so novel
independence of liability in a civil that the criminal act charged has
action for acts criminal in not happened or has not been
character (under Articles 29 to committed by the accused. Brief
32) from the civil responsibility stated, We hold, in reitration of
arising from crime fixed by Article Garcia, that culpa aquilina
100 of the Penal Code, and, in a includes voluntary and negligent
sense, the Rules of Court, under acts which may be punishable by
Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, law. 3
contemplate also the same
separability, it is 'more The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice
congruent' with the spirit of law, for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case
equity and justice, and more in No. 3162-P was decided, they manifested in said
harmony with modern progress', criminal case that they were filing a separate civil
to borrow the felicitous language action for damages against the owner and driver
in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hod delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla,
as We do hold, that Article 2176, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-
where it refers to 'fault covers not P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No.
only acts 'not punishable by law' B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict The
but also criminal in character, source of the obligation sought to be enforced in
whether intentional and Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or
voluntary or consequently, a omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157
separate civil action lies against of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict
the in a criminal act, whether or and an act or omission punishable by law are two
not he is criminally prosecuted different sources of obligation.
and found guilty and acquitted,
provided that the offended party
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the
is not allowed, if he is actually
action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they
charged also criminally, to
have only to establish their cause of action by
recover damages on both
preponderance of the evidence.
scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the, two WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed
assuming the awards made in from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134
the two cases vary. In other is reinstated and remanded to the lower court for
words the extinction of civil further proceedings, with costs against the private
liability refereed to in Par. (c) of respondents.
Section 13, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability SO ORDERED.
founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff- In two Amended Informations, both dated Penal Code as the alleged molestation took place
Appellee, December 3, 2002, Assistant Provincial in April 1997 and RA 8353 took effect only on
vs. Prosecutor Daniel M. Salvadora charged October 22, 1997;
DOMINGO PANITERCE, Accused-Appellant. Paniterce with two counts of rape of his other
daughter BBB. Aside from the dates5 of the In Criminal Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and
RESOLUTION commission of the rapes, the Informations 6081, he is hereby sentenced to suffer in each
similarly state: every case the penalty of imprisonment ranging
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: from FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and
Criminal Case Nos. 6080 and 6081 ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum
to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
Before Us is an appeal filed by Domingo
That on or about 6:00 o’clock in the morning of mayor as maximum and to pay AAA and BBB
Paniterce y Martinez (Paniterce) assailing the
August 26, 2000 x x x Philippines, and within the Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) each as
Decision1 dated August 22, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001, entitled jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- moral damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
People of the Philippines v. Domingo Paniterce," named accused, with grave abuse of confidence (₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages;
which affirmed with modification the Decision being the father of the offended party with lewd
dated March 2, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court designs by means of force and intimidation, did In Criminal Case No. 6079, he is hereby
(RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37, in Criminal Case then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH and to
Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078, 6079, 6080 and committed RAPE upon his 12- year old daughter pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos
6081.2 The RTC found Paniterce guilty beyond BBB by then and there, caressing and inserting (₱50,000.00) as moral damages and Fifty
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Rape and Acts his finger inside her vagina against her will and Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as exemplary
of Lasciviousness. without her consent, to her damage and prejudice damages.7
in such amount as may be awarded by the
Honorable Court.6 On June 4, 2005, Paniterce was committed to the
In four Informations, all dated February 11, 2002,
4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Hedy S. Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City.
Aganan charged Paniterce with four counts of When arraigned, Paniterce pleaded not guilty to
rape of his daughter AAA. Except for the dates3 of all the charges. Paniterce filed an appeal with the Court of
the commission of the rapes, the four Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-
Informations identically read: After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a H.C. No. 01001. The appellate court rendered a
Decision on March 2, 2005, with the following Decision on August 22, 2008 affirming the RTC
Criminal Case Nos. 6076, 6077, 6078 and 6079 dispositive portion: judgment with modifications, to wit:
That sometime in the year 1997 in x x x WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this prosecution having proved the guilt of accused convicting DOMINGO PANITERCE is hereby
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Domingo Paniterce of the crimes of Rape as AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
with grave abuse of confidence being the father charged in the aforementioned Informations, he
of the offended party with lewd designs by means is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalties of 1. For Acts of Lasciviousness, in Criminal
of force and intimidation, did then and there imprisonment, to wit: Cases Nos. 6077, 6078, 6080 and 6081,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer in
having carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, In Criminal Case No. 6076, he is hereby each [and] every case an indeterminate
a 10 year-old minor, against her will and without sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment prison term of six (6) months of arresto
her consent, to her damage and prejudice in such ranging from FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years
amount as may be awarded by the Honorable DAY of arresto mayor as minimum to FOUR (4) of prision correccional, as maximum and
Court.4 YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY to pay AAA and BBB Fifty Thousand
of prision correccional as maximum for Acts of Pesos (₱50,000.00) each as moral
Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00) as exemplary damages; the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. Paniterce’s may arise as a result of the same act or
and Death Certificate was attached to said letter. omission:
2. For Rape, in Criminal Case No. 6079, Given Paniterce’s death, we are now faced with a) Law
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the question of the effect of such death on the
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to present appeal. b) Contracts
pay AAA the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral damages Paniterce’s death on August 22, 2009, during the c) Quasi-contracts
and Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his
as exemplary damages. criminal liabilities for the rape and acts of
xxxx
lasciviousness committed against his daughters,
The decision of the trial court finding appellant but also his civil liabilities solely arising from or
guilty for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case based on said crimes.1awphi1 e) Quasi-delicts
No. 6076 is AFFIRMED without any
modification.8 According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal 3. Where the civil liability survives, as
Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished: explained in Number 2 above, an action
On 16 September 2008, Paniterce, through for recovery therefor may be pursued but
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of only by way of filing a separate civil
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal
Appeals conveying his intention to appeal to us action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
the aforementioned Decision dated August 22, of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
therefor is extinguished only when the death of
2008 of the appellate court. The Court of Appeals as amended. This separate civil action
the offender occurs before final judgment.
gave due course to Paniterce’s Notice of Appeal may be enforced either against the
on September 23, 2008,9 and directed its Judicial executor/administrator or the estate of
Applying the foregoing provision, we laid down the accused, depending on the source of
Records Division to elevate to us the original the following guidelines in People v. Bayotas13:
records in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01001. obligation upon which the same is based
as explained above.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal
On 15 April 2009, we required10 the parties to file
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal 4. Finally, the private offended party need
their supplemental briefs, and the Director of the liability as well as the civil liability based
Bureau of Corrections to confirm the commitment not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
solely thereon. As opined by Justice separate civil action by prescription, in
of Paniterce at the Bureau of Corrections and
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the cases where during the prosecution of
submit his report thereon within 10 days from
accused prior to final judgment the criminal action and prior to its
notice.
terminates his criminal liability and only extinction, the private-offended party
the civil liability directly arising from and instituted together therewith the civil
Paniterce filed his Supplemental Brief11 on June based solely on the offense committed, action. In such case, the statute of
16, 2009, while the Office of the Solicitor General i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso limitations on the civil liability is deemed
filed a Manifestation12 on June 18, 2009 stating strictiore." interrupted during the pendency of the
that it would no longer file a supplemental brief
criminal case, conformably with the
considering that Paniterce did not raise any new 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
issue in his appeal. On July 22, 2009, we survives notwithstanding the death of Code that should thereby avoid any
submitted G.R. No. 186382 for resolution.
(the) accused, if the same may also be apprehension on a possible privation of
predicated on a source of obligation other right by prescription.14
However, in a letter dated October 12, 2009, Julio than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
A. Arciaga, the Assistant Director for Prisons and enumerates these other sources of Clearly, it is unnecessary for the Court to rule on
Security of the Bureau of Corrections, informed obligation from which the civil liability Paniterce’s appeal. Whether or not he was guilty
us that Paniterce had died on August 22, 2009 at
of the crimes charged has become irrelevant
since, following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal
Code and our disquisition in Bayotas, even
assuming Paniterce had incurred criminal
liabilities, they were totally extinguished by his
death. Moreover, because Paniterce’s appeal
was still pending and no final judgment of
conviction had been rendered against him when
he died, his civil liabilities arising from the crimes,
being civil liabilities ex delicto, were likewise
extinguished by his death.
SO ORDERED.
PAZ T. BERNARDO v. PEOPLE FEBTC No.Php
June 8, 1992
391034 100,000.00 Following Bernardo's cross-examination, the
FEBTC No.Php June 15, RTC reset the hearing for redirect examination to
BRION, J.: 391035 100,000.00 1992 September 4, 1996.[6] That hearing, however,
We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari FEBTC No.Php June 22, was again reset to April 3, 1997, in view of the
filed by accused petitioner Paz T. Bernardo 391036 100,000.00 1992 absence of Bernardo's counsel. When Bernardo
(Bernardo) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, FEBTC No. June 29, and her counsel again failed to appear during the
Php 60,000.00
assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) August 31, 391037 1992 April 3, 1997 hearing, and in view of the
2007 decision[1] and the March 14, 2008 In September 1992, Bumanglag deposited these numerous previous postponements the defense
resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CR 28721, entitled checks to Bernardo's account but they were had asked for, the RTC considered her right to
"People of the Philippines v. Paz T. Bernardo." dishonored; the reason given was "Account present additional evidence waived.
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the Closed." Bumanglag thus sent Bernardo a notice
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, Makati informing her of the dishonor of the checks. The Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the RTC
City, finding Bernardo guilty beyond reasonable demand went unheeded, prompting Bumanglag denied her motion. The RTC, however, gave her
doubt of five (5) counts of violation of Batas to initiate a criminal complaint against Bernardo ten (10) days within which to submit her formal
Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22). with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati for offer of evidence, which she failed to do. As a
five (5) counts of violation of B.P. 22. result, the RTC declared that Bernardo had
waived her right to submit her formal offer of
The Factual Antecedents After the requisite preliminary investigation, the evidence.
Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City found
In June 1991, Bernardo obtained a loan from the probable cause to indict Bernardo for the
private complainant Carmencita C. Bumanglag offenses charged. Bernardo entered a not guilty RTC Ruling
(Bumanglag) in the amount of P460,000.00 plea on arraignment.
payable on or before its maturity on November On May 28, 2003, the RTC issued its ruling
30, 1991. That loan was evidenced by a The prosecution rested its case on September finding Bernardo guilty of five counts of violation
promissory note[3] Bernardo and her husband 21, 1994. Bernardo took the witness stand only of B.P. 22.[7] The RTC held that Bernardo failed
had executed, whereby the couple solidarity on May 9, 1996, to present her defense evidence. to substantiate her claim of payment. The RTC
bound themselves to pay the loan with further ruled that it is not the nonpayment of the
corresponding interest at 12% per annum In her testimony, Bernardo argued that she could obligation but the issuance of a worthless check
payable upon default.[4] As additional security, not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because that B.P. 22 punishes.
Bernardo gave Bumanglag the owner's duplicate the questioned checks were presented beyond
copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-1034) the 90-day period provided under the law. She The RTC sentenced Bernardo to one (1) year
151841. also denied having received any notice of imprisonment for each count of the offense
dishonor, which she insisted was essential to charged and ordered her to indemnify Bumanglag
Prior to the loan's maturity, Bernardo took back prove the material element of knowledge of the amount of P460,000.00, plus 12% interest
the title from Bumanglag to use as a collateral in insufficiency of funds. and 5% penalty charges, from December 1, 1991,
another transaction. In place of the title, Bernardo until full payment.[8]
issued to Bumanglag the following five (5) Far In any case, she maintained that the checks were
East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC) never meant to be presented as she had always
checks,[5] posted on different dates in June 1992, paid her loans in cash, which she claimed to have CA Ruling
covering the loan's aggregate amount: done in the aggregate amount of P717,000.00.
According to Bernardo, although Bumanglag On appeal, the CA affirmed Bernardo's conviction
returned to her the title to the property after but deleted the penalty of imprisonment and in
Check No. Amount Date payment, Bumanglag never bothered to issue her lieu thereof, imposed a P460,000.00 fine.[9] The
FEBTC No.Php receipts. Bumanglag did not return the checks CA also retained the civil indemnity of
June 1, 1992 either. P460,000.00 that the lower court imposed, plus
391033 100,000.00
12% interest from the time of the institution of the Bumanglags to file a separate civil action.
criminal charges until full payment.[10] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits
in its Comment that Bernardo was given the
In denying Bernardo's appeal, the CA noted that opportunity to present her defense The Court's Ruling
Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient evidence of evidence.[16] Citing Wong v. CA,[17] the OSG
payment. The CA further held that the 90-day further points out that the 90-day period provided We deny the petition for lack of merit.
period within which to present a check under B.P. in the law is not an element of the offense;[18] it is Preliminary Matters
22 is not an element of the crime. simply one of the conditions to establish a prima
facie presumption of knowledge of lack of Classes of Civil Liabilities
The CA also did not recognize any merit in funds.[19]
Bernardo's claim that she had been denied due An act or omission causing damage to another
process, in view of the RTC's order waiving her The OSG also claims that Bumanglag failed to may give rise to several distinct civil liabilities on
right to present additional evidence.[11] To the CA, substantiate her claim that she had settled the the part of the offender.[23] If the conduct
Bernardo had sufficient opportunity to present her obligation.[20] In any event, the OSG asserted constitutes a felony, the accused may be held
defense but did not avail of these opportunities. B.P. 22 penalizes the act of making and issuing a civilly liable under Article 100 of the Revised
Instead, she and her counsel moved for worthless check, not the nonpayment of the Penal Code (ex delicto).[24] This particular civil
postponement at least nine (9) times, not to obligation.[21] liability due the offended party is rooted on facts
mention their subsequent failure to appear four that constitute a crime.[25] Otherwise stated, civil
(4) times despite due notice of the scheduled liability arises from the offense charged.[26] It
hearings. These developments led the RTC to Subsequent Developments is not required that the accused be convicted to
consider Bernardo's right to present additional be entitled to civil liability based on delict. As long
evidence waived.[12] On March 14, 2011, Bernardo's counsel informed as the facts constituting the offense charged are
the Court of the petitioner's death on February 3, established by preponderance of evidence, civil
Bernardo moved for reconsideration but the CA 2011, and provided, as well, the names of her liability may be awarded.[27] Moreover, the civil
denied her motion;[13] hence, the present heirs (her widower, Mapalad Bernardo, and liability based on delict is deemed instituted with
petition.[14] children: Emilie B. Ko, Marilou B. Valdez, Edwin the criminal action unless the offended party
T. Bernardo, and Gervy B. Santos), and their waives the civil action, reserves the right to
address (26 Magdiwang St., Real Village 2, institute it separately, or institutes the civil action
The Petition and Comment Tandang Sora, Quezon City). In due course, in prior to the criminal action.[28]
our March 7, 2012 Resolution,[22] we required
Bernardo insists in her present petition[15] that the Bernardo's heirs to appear as substitutes for the The same act or omission, however, may also
CA erred in finding that she had been accorded deceased Bernardo in the present petition for give rise to independent civil liabilities based
due process; she was denied the full opportunity purposes of Bernardo's civil liability. on other sources of obligation. Article 1157 of the
to present her defense and was thus deprived of Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
the chance to prove her innocence of the crime Bernardo's heirs moved to reconsider our March obligation from which the civil liability may arise
charged. 7, 2012 resolution. They argued that Bernardo's as a result of the same act or omission: (a) law
death extinguished her civil liability. In the (b) contracts; (c) quasi-contracts, and (d) quasi-
She likewise avers that the CA erred in affirming alternative, they contended that any civil liability delicts. Among these are the civil liabilities for
her criminal and civil liabilities because the should be settled in a separate civil case. intentional torts under Articles 32[29] and 34[30] of
prosecution failed to prove her knowledge of the Civil Code and for quasi-delicts under Article
insufficiency of funds. According to Bernardo, We denied the heirs' motion in our June 27, 2012 2176 of Civil Code.[31] For conduct constituting
there was no violation of B.P. 22 because the resolution. We explained that Bernardo's civil defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, the Civil
checks were presented beyond the mandatory liability survived her death as it is based on Code likewise grants the offended party the right
90-day period. Moreover, Bernardo claimed that contract. Moreover, we observed that it would be to institute a civil action independently of the
these subject checks were issued without costly, burdensome, and time-consuming to criminal action under Article-33 of the Civil Code.
consideration as she had already paid the loan. dismiss the present case and require the
Thus, it is entirely possible for one to be free from the courts as collectors. As we observed in Hyatt To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a
civil ability directly arising from a violation of the v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp.:[41] case to allow the presentation of evidence is a
penal law and to still be liable civilly based on matter that lies with the discretion of the trial
contract or by laws other than the criminal court; but it is a discretion that must be exercised
law.[32] Such civil actions may proceed Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances of
independently of the criminal proceedings and criminal cases for actual damages, the payee each case and with a view to doing substantial
regardless of the result of the criminal uses the intimidating effect of a criminal charge to justice.[42] In the present case, the records show
action,[33] subject however, to the caveat that the collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon that the RTC took all the steps necessary to
offended party cannot recover damages twice for being paid, the trial court is not even informed safeguard Bernardo's rights and to accord her the
the same act or omission.[34] thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the opportunity to present whatever evidence she
criminal case is expected to significantly lower the had in her defense.
Bernardo's civil liability may be enforced in the number of cases filed before the courts for
present case despite her death. collection based on dishonored checks. It is also In particular, the prosecution formally rested its
expected to expedite the disposition of these case on September 21, 1994. Bernardo, through
As a general rule, the death of an accused cases. Instead of instituting two separate cases, counsel, thereupon moved for leave to file a
pending appeal extinguishes her criminal liability one for criminal and another for civil, only a single demurrer to evidence prompting the RTC to reset
and the corresponding civil liability based solely suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed the hearing for initial presentation of defense
on the offense (delict). The death amounts to an that the policy laid down by the Rules is to evidence to December 15 and 20,
acquittal of the accused based on the discourage the separate filing of the civil action. 1994.[43] Bernardo filed her demurrer to evidence
constitutionally mandated presumption of on November 10, 1994,[44] after previously
innocence in her favor, which can be overcome requesting the RTC for a 10-day extension.
only by a finding of guilt - something that death As a necessary consequence of this special rule,
prevents the court from making.[35] In a sense, the civil liabilities arising from the issuance of a The pendency of the demurrer to evidence
death absolves the accused from any earthly worthless check are deemed instituted in a case prompted several resettings until the RTC finally
responsibility arising from the offense — a for violation of B.P. 22; the death of Bernardo did denied it on March 30, 1995.[45] The RTC then set
divine act that no human court can reverse, not automatically extinguish the action. The the initial presentation of defense evidence on
qualify, much less disregard.[36] The intervention independent civil liability based on contract, April 11, 18, and 25, 1995,[46] but these were reset
of death of the accused in any case is an which was deemed instituted in the criminal to May 9, 18, and 25, 1995,[47]at the motion of
injunction by fate itself so that no criminal liability action for B.P. 22, may still be enforced against Bernardo's counsel who expressed his desire to
and the corresponding civil liability arising from her estate in the present case. We thus rule on seek relief from the CA for the denial of the
the offense should be imposed on him.[37] the present action to determine Bumanglag's civil demurrer.
liability.
The independent civil liabilities, however, survive Despite the RTC's accommodation, Bernardo's
death and an action for recovery therefore may Substantive Aspect counsel failed to appear during the May 9,
be generally pursued but only by filing a 1995 hearing as he was busy attending to the
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Bernardo was not denied due process. canvassing of votes in Quezon
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure as City.[48] Eventually, the initial presentation of
amended.[38] This separate civil action may be We meticulously went over the entire record, and defense evidence was reset to July 20, 1995, and
enforced against the estate of the accused.[39] confirmed that Bernardo had not at all been August 3, 1995.[49]
deprived of her day in court. She was afforded
In B.P. 22 cases, the criminal action shall be ample opportunity to present evidence in her Notably, during the July 20, 1995 hearing,
deemed to include the corresponding civil defense but she did not give this case the serious Bernardo's counsel again moved for another
actions. Instead of instituting two separate cases, attention it deserved. For good reason - i.e., the resetting as he was not prepared to conduct a
only a single suit is filed and tried.[40] This rule was repeated absences of Bernardo and her counsel direct examination.[50] Despite this flimsy
enacted to help declog court dockets, which had - the trial court eventually considered her right to ground, the RTC granted the request and allowed
been packed with B.P. 22 because creditors used present defense evidence waived. Bernardo to testify on August 3, 1995.
had to attend another hearing in a different sala. Bernardo failed to adduce sufficient
Bernardo and her counsel, however, failed to Why Bernardo's counsel accepted another evidence of payment; thus she is civilly
appear during the August 3, 1995 hearing engagement on the same day, which was in liable.
despite due notice, prompting the RTC to waive conflict with the RTC's hearing dates, was never
their right to present defense properly explained. Nonetheless, the RTC Bernardo's death pending appeal converted the
evidence.[51] Bernardo moved for reconsideration granted the motion to give her the last present action to purely an enforcement of the
and the RTC granted her motion in the interest of chanceto complete the presentation of civil liability incurred. In particular, the focal
substantial justice.[52] Thus, the hearing for the evidence on April 3, 17, and 22, 1997.[63] issue in the present petition is no longer
presentation of defense evidence was reset to Bernardo's criminal liability for violation of
November 28, 1995.[53] Despite the RTC's warning, Bernardo and her B.P. 22 but her civil liability, which is
counsel again failed to appear at the April principally based on contract and the
Bernardo and her counsel again failed to 3,1997 hearing.[64] Instead, they filed a motion to corresponding damage Bumanglag suffered
appear during the November 28, 1995 hearing, reset because Bernardo's counsel was to attend due to Bernardo's failure to pay. Under these
despite due notice, prompting the RTC again to a wedding in the United States of circumstances, Bernardo's B.P. 22 defense (that
consider that Bernardo had waived her right to America.[65] This time, the RTC, mindful that there the checks were presented beyond the 90-day
present defense evidence.[54] should be a limit to postponements, ordered the period and that she never received a notice of
case submitted for decision sans the presentation dishonor) were no longer relevant.
Bernardo again moved for reconsideration on of evidence from the defense.[66]
the ground that it was the first time she and Jurisprudence tells us that one who pleads
her counsel were absent at the same Under these facts, the RTC was clearly driven by payment carries the burden of proving
time.[55] Despite this hollow excuse, the RTC Bernardo and her counsel's repeated failure, it.[70] Indeed, once the existence of an
granted the motion in the spirit of compassionate without justifiable reason, to appear at the indebtedness is established by evidence, the
justice and gave Bernardo the final scheduled hearing dates.[67] The order burden of showing with legal certainty that the
opportunity to present her defense considering Bernardo's right to present evidence obligation has been discharged by payment rests
evidence.[56] The parties mutually agreed to set waived, followed as a necessary and unavoidable with the debtor.[71] After the debtor introduces
the hearing for initial presentation of defense consequence. As we held in People v. Angco:[68] evidence of payment, the burden of going forward
evidence on April 18, 1996.[57] with the evidence - as distinct from the general
burden of proof - again shifts to the creditor, who
Bernardo again failed to appear during the His failure to appear with counsel of his choice at then labors under a duty to produce evidence to
scheduled April 18, 1996 hearing.58 Although the hearing of the case, notwithstanding repeated show nonpayment.[72]
Bernardo did not offer any excuse for this postponements and warnings that failure to so
absence,[59] RTC exercised compassion and appear would be deemed a waiver to present In the present case, the existence of the
permitted Bernardo to testify, as she did in fact evidence in his defense, and that the case would obligation to pay has sufficiently been established
testify, on May 9, 1996,[60] - one (1) year and eight be deemed submitted for judgment upon the through the promissory note[73] and the
(8) months after the prosecution had rested its evidence presented by the prosecution, was checks[74] submitted in evidence. Notably,
case. At the conclusion of the cross- sufficient legal justification for the trial court to Bernardo even confirmed due execution of these
examination, the parties mutually agreed to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence instruments during her testimony. During the offer
adjourn the hearing for September 4, 1996, for before it. of Bernardo's testimony, her counsel stated:
redirect examination.[61]
Bernardo's counsel, however, failed to appear The records show that the RTC leniently granted ATTY. MIRAVITE:
during the scheduled September 4, 1996 hearing, repeated continuances to safeguard Bernardo's
prompting the RTC to consider her failure as a rights as an accused. But Bernardo obviously did With the court's permission. Your Honor, we are
waiver on her part to present additional not recognize the need for expeditious handling presenting the witness for the following purposes:
evidence.[62] Bernardo moved for of her case and was already trifling with judicial to x x x show that she borrowed money from
reconsideration; she claimed that her counsel process.[69] [Bumanglag] x x x and that in 1991 her total
obligation reached Php460,000.000; x x x that Bumanglag, who had to demand the satisfaction
all the checks issued by the accused were Bernardo's principal defense rests on the of Bernardo's obligation when the checks
only as proof of her obligation to the private supposition that she had settled the obligation, became due and were subsequently dishonored
complainant x x x.[75] [emphasis supplied] which settlement led Bumanglag to return to her by the drawee bank. Bumanglag's possession of
the title to the property.[77] A meticulous review, of the promissory note, coupled with the dishonored
the records, however, firmly dissuades us from checks, strongly buttresses her claim that
In the course of Bernardo's testimony, she even believing Bernardo's bare allegation. Bernardo's obligation had not been
confirmed the issuance of the checks and extinguished.[81]
promissory note. In particular, she stated: At the outset, the handwritten note[78] evidencing
that transaction, which was submitted by the We thus find that the weight of evidence
prosecution in evidence, states that: preponderates in favor of Bumanglag's position
ATTY. MIRAVITE: that Bernardo has not yet settled her
obligation.[82]
Q: I am showing to you this promissory note
marked as Exhibit H for the prosecution and 10/28/91 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August
Exhibit 2 for the defense. There appears a Received original copy of Title No. T-151841 in 31, 2007 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
signature over the name Paz T. Bernardo at the the name of Mapalad Bernardo for loan purposes G.R.' CR No. 28721
middle portion thereof, do you know whose to pay Mrs. Carmencita Bumanglag is AFFIRMEDwith MODIFICATION. The heirs of
signature is that? Paz T. Bernardo are ordered to pay the amount
of P460,000.00, with interest at 12% per annum
A: It is mine sir. Sgd from the time of the institution of criminal charges
in court.
xxxx Paz T. Bernardo
The total amount adjudged shall earn interest at
Q: This document, Madame Witness, mentions of 10/28/91 the rate of 6% per annum on the balance and
your loan obligations of Php 460,000.00. Can you interest due, from the finality of this Decision until
tell us, Madame Witness, what is covered by this fully paid.
promissory note? The document evidencing this transaction
strongly suggests that she asked for the title from The fine in the amount of P460,000.00
xxxx Bumanglag to obtain another loan whose is DELETED.
proceeds she would use to pay Bumanglag.
A: The promissory note covers the principal loan, Notably, the defense even admitted the SO ORDERED.
plus interest and penalties, sir. genuineness of Bernardo's signature in this
document.[79] When Bernardo therefore failed to
Q: So, are you saying that this promissory note of fulfill her promise to pay, Bumanglag had to
Php 460,000.00 was your total obligation as of request for checks to secure the obligation, which
June 1991 and includes all other charges? checks were eventually dishonored upon
presentment.
A: Yes, sir.
Under the circumstances, we find that Bernardo's
x xxx claim of payment was nothing more than an
allegation unsupported by adequate proof. If
Q: Madam Witness, can you remember when you indeed there had been payment, she should have
issued the checks subject of these cases? redeemed or taken back the checks and the
promissory note, in the ordinary course of
A: It was on June 20, 1991, sir.[76] business.[80] Instead, the checks and the
promissory note remained in the possession of
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR motor vehicles, either by way of parking spaces purposes: (1) to inquire into the legality of the
GENERAL, Petitioner, inside the mall buildings or in separate buildings prevalent practice of shopping malls of charging
vs. and/or adjacent lots that are solely devoted for parking fees; (2) assuming arguendo that the
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED, ROBINSON'S use as parking spaces. Respondents Ayala Land, collection of parking fees was legally authorized,
LAND CORPORATION, SHANGRI-LA PLAZA Robinsons, and SM Prime spent for the to find out the basis and reasonableness of the
CORPORATION and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, construction of their own parking facilities. parking rates charged by shopping malls; and (3)
INC., Respondents. Respondent Shangri-la is renting its parking to determine the legality of the policy of shopping
facilities, consisting of land and building malls of denying liability in cases of theft, robbery,
DECISION specifically used as parking spaces, which were or carnapping, by invoking the waiver clause at
constructed for the lessor’s account. the back of the parking tickets. Said Senate
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Committees invited the top executives of
Respondents expend for the maintenance and respondents, who operate the major malls in the
administration of their respective parking country; the officials from the Department of
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Trade and Industry (DTI), Department of Public
Certiorari,1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of facilities. They provide security personnel to
protect the vehicles parked in their parking Works and Highways (DPWH), Metro Manila
Court, filed by petitioner Office of the Solicitor Development Authority (MMDA), and other local
facilities and maintain order within the area. In
General (OSG), seeking the reversal and setting government officials; and the Philippine Motorists
turn, they collect the following parking fees from
aside of the Decision2 dated 25 January 2007 of Association (PMA) as representative of the
the persons making use of their parking facilities,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76298, consumers’ group.
which affirmed in toto the Joint Decision3 dated regardless of whether said persons are mall
29 May 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of patrons or not:
After three public hearings held on 30 September,
Makati City, Branch 138, in Civil Cases No. 00-
3 November, and 1 December 1999, the afore-
1208 and No. 00-1210; and (2) the Respondent Parking Fees
mentioned Senate Committees jointly issued
Resolution4 dated 14 March 2007 of the appellate
Ayala Land On weekdays, ₱25.00 Senate Committee
for the first four hours Report No. 2255 on 2 May
and ₱10.00
court in the same case which denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the OSG. The RTC 2000, in which they concluded:
for every succeeding hour; on weekends, flat rate of
adjudged that respondents Ayala Land ₱25.00 per day
Incorporated (Ayala Land), Robinsons Land In view of the foregoing, the Committees find that
Robinsons ₱20.00 for the first three hours and
the collection ₱10.00fees
of parking for by
every
shopping malls is
Corporation (Robinsons), Shangri-la Plaza succeeding hour
Corporation (Shangri-la), and SM Prime contrary to the National Building Code and is
Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) could not be obliged to Shangri-la Flat rate of ₱30.00 per therefor
day [sic] illegal. While it is true that the Code
provide free parking spaces in their malls to their merely requires malls to provide parking spaces,
patrons and the general public. SM Prime ₱10.00 to ₱20.00 (depending on whether
without specifying the parking
whether it is free or not, both
space is outdoors or indoors)
Committeesfor thebelieve
first three
thathours
the and
reasonable and
59 minutes, and ₱10.00 for interpretation
logical every succeeding of thehour or is that the
Code
Respondents Ayala Land, Robinsons, and
fraction thereof parking spaces are for free. This interpretation is
Shangri-la maintain and operate shopping malls
in various locations in Metro Manila. Respondent not only reasonable and logical but finds support
in the actual practice in other countries like the
SM Prime constructs, operates, and leases out The parking tickets or cards issued by
United States of America where parking spaces
commercial buildings and other structures, respondents to vehicle owners contain the
owned and operated by mall owners are free of
among which, are SM City, Manila; SM stipulation that respondents shall not be
charge.
Centerpoint, Sta. Mesa, Manila; SM City, North responsible for any loss or damage to the
Avenue, Quezon City; and SM Southmall, Las vehicles parked in respondents’ parking facilities.
Piñas. Figuratively speaking, the Code has
"expropriated" the land for parking – something
In 1999, the Senate Committees on Trade and
similar to the subdivision law which require
The shopping malls operated or leased out by Commerce and on Justice and Human Rights
developers to devote so much of the land area for
respondents have parking facilities for all kinds of conducted a joint investigation for the following
parks.
Moreover, Article II of R.A. No. 9734 (Consumer 1. The Office of the Solicitor General respondent SM Prime filed, on 3 October 2000, a
Act of the Philippines) provides that "it is the should institute the necessary action to Petition for Declaratory Relief8 under Rule 63 of
policy of the State to protect the interest of the enjoin the collection of parking fees as the Revised Rules of Court, against the DPWH
consumers, promote the general welfare and well as to enforce the penal sanction Secretary and local building officials of Manila,
establish standards of conduct for business and provisions of the National Building Code. Quezon City, and Las Piñas. Said Petition was
industry." Obviously, a contrary interpretation The Office of the Solicitor General should docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1208 and
(i.e., justifying the collection of parking fees) likewise study how refund can be assigned to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138,
would be going against the declared policy of exacted from mall owners who continue presided over by Judge Sixto Marella, Jr. (Judge
R.A. 7394. to collect parking fees. Marella). In its Petition, respondent SM Prime
prayed for judgment:
Section 201 of the National Building Code gives 2. The Department of Trade and Industry
the responsibility for the administration and pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. a) Declaring Rule XIX of the
enforcement of the provisions of the Code, 7394, otherwise known as the Consumer Implementing Rules and Regulations of
including the imposition of penalties for Act of the Philippines should enforce the the National Building Code as ultra vires,
administrative violations thereof to the Secretary provisions of the Code relative to parking. hence, unconstitutional and void;
of Public Works. This set up, however, is not Towards this end, the DTI should
being carried out in reality. formulate the necessary implementing b) Declaring [herein respondent SM
rules and regulations on parking in Prime]’s clear legal right to lease parking
In the position paper submitted by the shopping malls, with prior consultations spaces appurtenant to its department
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority with the local government units where stores, malls, shopping centers and other
(MMDA), its chairman, Jejomar C. Binay, these are located. Furthermore, the DTI, commercial establishments; and
accurately pointed out that the Secretary of the in coordination with the DPWH, should
DPWH is responsible for the be empowered to regulate and supervise
c) Declaring the National Building Code
implementation/enforcement of the National the construction and maintenance of
of the Philippines Implementing Rules
Building Code. After the enactment of the Local parking establishments. and Regulations as ineffective, not
Government Code of 1991, the local government having been published once a week for
units (LGU’s) were tasked to discharge the 3. Finally, Congress should amend and three (3) consecutive weeks in a
regulatory powers of the DPWH. Hence, in the update the National Building Code to newspaper of general circulation, as
local level, the Building Officials enforce all rules/ expressly prohibit shopping malls from prescribed by Section 211 of Presidential
regulations formulated by the DPWH relative to collecting parking fees by at the same Decree No. 1096.
all building plans, specifications and designs time, prohibit them from invoking the
including parking space requirements. There is, waiver of liability.7
[Respondent SM Prime] further prays for such
however, no single national department or
other reliefs as may be deemed just and equitable
agency directly tasked to supervise the Respondent SM Prime thereafter received under the premises.9
enforcement of the provisions of the Code on information that, pursuant to Senate Committee
parking, notwithstanding the national character of Report No. 225, the DPWH Secretary and the
the law.6 The very next day, 4 October 2000, the OSG filed
local building officials of Manila, Quezon City, and
a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction
Las Piñas intended to institute, through the OSG,
(with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Senate Committee Report No. 225, thus, an action to enjoin respondent SM Prime and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction)10 against
contained the following recommendations: similar establishments from collecting parking respondents. This Petition was docketed as Civil
fees, and to impose upon said establishments Case No. 00-1210 and raffled to the RTC of
In light of the foregoing, the Committees on Trade penal sanctions under Presidential Decree No.
Makati, Branch 135, presided over by Judge
and Commerce and Justice and Human Rights 1096, otherwise known as the National Building
Francisco B. Ibay (Judge Ibay). Petitioner prayed
hereby recommend the following: Code of the Philippines (National Building Code),
that the RTC:
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR). With the threatened action against it,
1. After summary hearing, a temporary 4. Entitlement of the parties of [sic] award them for free. Article 1158 of the Civil Code is
restraining order and a writ of preliminary of damages.13 clear:
injunction be issued restraining
respondents from collecting parking fees On 29 May 2002, the RTC rendered its Joint "Obligations derived from law are not presumed.
from their customers; and Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00- Only those expressly determined in this Code or
1210. in special laws are demandable and shall be
2. After hearing, judgment be rendered regulated by the precepts of the law which
declaring that the practice of respondents The RTC resolved the first two issues establishes them; and as to what has not been
in charging parking fees is violative of the affirmatively. It ruled that the OSG can initiate foreseen, by the provisions of this Book (1090).["]
National Building Code and its Civil Case No. 00-1210 under Presidential
Implementing Rules and Regulations Decree No. 478 and the Administrative Code of xxxx
and is therefore invalid, and making 1987.14 It also found that all the requisites for an
permanent any injunctive writ issued in action for declaratory relief were present, to wit: The provision on ratios of parking slots to several
this case. variables, like shopping floor area or customer
The requisites for an action for declaratory relief area found in Rule XIX of the Implementing Rules
Other reliefs just and equitable under the are: (a) there is a justiciable controversy; (b) the and Regulations cannot be construed as a
premises are likewise prayed for.11 controversy is between persons whose interests directive to provide free parking spaces, because
are adverse; (c) the party seeking the relief has a the enabling law, the Building Code does not so
On 23 October 2000, Judge Ibay of the RTC of legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue provide. x x x.
Makati City, Branch 135, issued an Order involved is ripe for judicial determination.
consolidating Civil Case No. 00-1210 with Civil To compel Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-La
Case No. 00-1208 pending before Judge Marella SM, the petitioner in Civil Case No. 001-1208 [sic] and SM [Prime] to provide parking spaces for free
of RTC of Makati, Branch 138. is a mall operator who stands to be affected can be considered as an unlawful taking of
directly by the position taken by the government property right without just compensation.
As a result of the pre-trial conference held on the officials sued namely the Secretary of Public
morning of 8 August 2001, the RTC issued a Pre- Highways and the Building Officials of the local Parking spaces in shopping malls are privately
Trial Order12 of even date which limited the issues government units where it operates shopping owned and for their use, the mall operators collect
to be resolved in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. malls. The OSG on the other hand acts on a fees. The legal relationship could be either lease
00-1210 to the following: matter of public interest and has taken a position or deposit. In either case[,] the mall owners have
adverse to that of the mall owners whom it sued. the right to collect money which translates into
1. Capacity of the plaintiff [OSG] in Civil The construction of new and bigger malls has income. Should parking spaces be made free,
Case No. 00-1210 to institute the present been announced, a matter which the Court can this right of mall owners shall be gone. This,
proceedings and relative thereto whether take judicial notice and the unsettled issue of without just compensation. Further, loss of
the controversy in the collection of whether mall operators should provide parking effective control over their property will ensue
parking fees by mall owners is a matter facilities, free of charge needs to be resolved.15 which is frowned upon by law.
of public welfare.
As to the third and most contentious issue, the The presence of parking spaces can be viewed in
2. Whether declaratory relief is proper. RTC pronounced that: another light. They can be looked at as necessary
facilities to entice the public to increase
3. Whether respondent Ayala Land, The Building Code, which is the enabling law and patronage of their malls because without parking
Robinsons, Shangri-La and SM Prime the Implementing Rules and Regulations do not spaces, going to their malls will be inconvenient.
are obligated to provide parking spaces impose that parking spaces shall be provided by These are[,] however[,] business considerations
in their malls for the use of their patrons the mall owners free of charge. Absent such which mall operators will have to decide for
or the public in general, free of charge. directive[,] Ayala Land, Robinsons, Shangri-la themselves. They are not sufficient to justify a
and SM [Prime] are under no obligation to provide legal conclusion, as the OSG would like the Court
to adopt that it is the obligation of the mall owners II In its Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
to provide parking spaces for free.16 capacity of the OSG to initiate Civil Case No. 00-
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 1210 before the RTC as the legal representative
The RTC then held that there was no sufficient DECLARE THE IMPLEMENTING RULES of the government,22 and as the one deputized by
evidence to justify any award for damages. INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT HAVING BEEN the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
PUBLISHED AS REQUIRED BY LAW. through Senate Committee Report No. 225.
The RTC finally decreed in its 29 May 2002 Joint
Decision in Civil Cases No. 00-1208 and No. 00- III The Court of Appeals rejected the contention of
1210 that: respondent SM Prime that the OSG failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The appellate
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
court explained that an administrative review is
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the Court declares DISMISS THE OSG’S PETITION FOR
not a condition precedent to judicial relief where
that Ayala Land[,] Inc., Robinsons Land DECLARATORY RELIEF AND INJUNCTION
Corporation, Shangri-la Plaza Corporation and FOR FAILURE TO EXHAUST the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and
SM Prime Holdings[,] Inc. are not obligated to ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can
be done.
provide parking spaces in their malls for the use
of their patrons or public in general, free of IV
charge. The Court of Appeals likewise refused to rule on
the validity of the IRR of the National Building
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO Code, as such issue was not among those the
All counterclaims in Civil Case No. 00-1210 are DECLARE THAT THE OSG HAS NO LEGAL parties had agreed to be resolved by the RTC
dismissed. CAPACITY TO SUE AND/OR THAT IT IS NOT A during the pre-trial conference for Civil Cases No.
REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST IN THE INSTANT 00-1208 and No. 00-1210. Issues cannot be
No pronouncement as to costs.17 CASE.21 raised for the first time on appeal. Furthermore,
the appellate court found that the controversy
CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 involved the separate Respondent Robinsons filed a Motion to Dismiss could be settled on other grounds, without
appeals of the OSG18 and respondent SM Appeal of the OSG on the ground that the lone touching on the issue of the validity of the IRR. It
Prime19 filed with the Court of Appeals. The sole issue raised therein involved a pure question of referred to the settled rule that courts should
assignment of error of the OSG in its Appellant’s law, not reviewable by the Court of Appeals. refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of
Brief was: a law or implementing rules, because of the
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision in principle that bars judicial inquiry into a
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 on 25 January 2007. The constitutional question, unless the resolution
THE NATIONAL BUILDING CODE DID NOT appellate court agreed with respondent thereof is indispensable to the determination of
INTEND MALL PARKING SPACES TO BE FREE Robinsons that the appeal of the OSG should the case.
OF CHARGE[;]20 suffer the fate of dismissal, since "the issue on
whether or not the National Building Code and its Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that Section
while the four errors assigned by respondent SM implementing rules require shopping mall 803 of the National Building Code and Rule XIX
Prime in its Appellant’s Brief were: operators to provide parking facilities to the public of the IRR were clear and needed no further
for free" was evidently a question of law. Even so, construction. Said provisions were only intended
since CA-G.R. CV No. 76298 also included the to control the occupancy or congestion of areas
I
appeal of respondent SM Prime, which raised and structures. In the absence of any express
issues worthy of consideration, and in order to and clear provision of law, respondents could not
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO satisfy the demands of substantial justice, the be obliged and expected to provide parking slots
DECLARE RULE XIX OF THE IMPLEMENTING Court of Appeals proceeded to rule on the merits free of charge.
RULES AS HAVING BEEN ENACTED ULTRA of the case.
VIRES, HENCE, UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
VOID. The fallo of the 25 January 2007 Decision of the
Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant RULE XIX – PARKING AND LOADING SPACE location, site, design, quality of materials,
appeals are DENIED. Accordingly, appealed REQUIREMENTS construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance.
Decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.23
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building The requirement of free-of-charge parking, the
In its Resolution issued on 14 March 2007, the Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site OSG argues, greatly contributes to the aim of
Court of Appeals denied the Motion for occupancy, the following provisions on parking safeguarding "life, health, property, and public
Reconsideration of the OSG, finding that the and loading space requirements shall be welfare, consistent with the principles of sound
grounds relied upon by the latter had already observed: environmental management and control."
been carefully considered, evaluated, and Adequate parking spaces would contribute
passed upon by the appellate court, and there 1. The parking space ratings listed below are greatly to alleviating traffic congestion when
was no strong and cogent reason to modify much minimum off-street requirements for specific complemented by quick and easy access thereto
less reverse the assailed judgment. uses/occupancies for buildings/structures: because of free-charge parking. Moreover, the
power to regulate and control the use,
The OSG now comes before this Court, via the 1.1 The size of an average automobile parking occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and
instant Petition for Review, with a single structures carries with it the power to impose fees
slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00
assignment of error: and, conversely, to control -- partially or, as in this
meters for perpendicular or diagonal parking,
case, absolutely -- the imposition of such fees.
2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for parallel parking. A
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY truck or bus parking/loading slot shall be
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE computed at a minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 The Court finds no merit in the present Petition.
LOWER COURT THAT RESPONDENTS ARE meters. The parking slot shall be drawn to scale
NOT OBLIGED TO PROVIDE FREE PARKING and the total number of which shall be indicated The explicit directive of the afore-quoted statutory
SPACES TO THEIR CUSTOMERS OR THE on the plans and specified whether or not parking and regulatory provisions, garnered from a plain
PUBLIC.24 accommodations, are attendant-managed. (See reading thereof, is that respondents, as
Section 2 for computation of parking operators/lessors of neighborhood shopping
The OSG argues that respondents are mandated requirements). centers, should provide parking and loading
to provide free parking by Section 803 of the spaces, in accordance with the minimum ratio of
National Building Code and Rule XIX of the IRR. xxxx one slot per 100 square meters of shopping floor
area. There is nothing therein pertaining to the
According to Section 803 of the National Building 1.7 Neighborhood shopping center – 1 slot/100 collection (or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term "parking fees"
Code: sq. m. of shopping floor area
cannot even be found at all in the entire National
Building Code and its IRR.
SECTION 803. Percentage of Site Occupancy The OSG avers that the aforequoted provisions
should be read together with Section 102 of the
National Building Code, which declares: Statutory construction has it that if a statute is
(a) Maximum site occupancy shall be clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal
governed by the use, type of meaning and applied without any attempt at
construction, and height of the building SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy interpretation.26 Since Section 803 of the National
and the use, area, nature, and location of Building Code and Rule XIX of its IRR do not
the site; and subject to the provisions of It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State mention parking fees, then simply, said
the local zoning requirements and in to safeguard life, health, property, and public provisions do not regulate the collection of the
accordance with the rules and welfare, consistent with the principles of sound same. The RTC and the Court of Appeals
regulations promulgated by the environmental management and control; and to correctly applied Article 1158 of the New Civil
Secretary. this end, make it the purpose of this Code to Code, which states:
provide for all buildings and structures, a
In connection therewith, Rule XIX of the old framework of minimum standards and
IRR,25 provides: requirements to regulate and control their
Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in widening streets and providing adequate parking
presumed. Only those expressly determined in addition to fixing the minimum requirements for areas.
this Code or in special laws are demandable, and parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR
shall be regulated by the precepts of the law also mandates that such parking spaces be The Court, in City of Ozamis, declared that the
which establishes them; and as to what has not provided by building owners free of charge. If City had been clothed with full power to control
been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book. Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law, then and regulate its streets for the purpose of
(Emphasis ours.) it cannot be added to or included in the promoting public health, safety and welfare. The
implementing rules. The rule-making power of City can regulate the time, place, and manner of
Hence, in order to bring the matter of parking fees administrative agencies must be confined to parking in the streets and public places; and
within the ambit of the National Building Code and details for regulating the mode or proceedings to charge minimal fees for the street parking to
its IRR, the OSG had to resort to specious and carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, cover the expenses for supervision, inspection
feeble argumentation, in which the Court cannot and it cannot be extended to amend or expand and control, to ensure the smooth flow of traffic in
concur. the statutory requirements or to embrace matters the environs of the public market, and for the
not covered by the statute. Administrative safety and convenience of the public.
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting
National Building Code to expand the coverage Republic and City of Ozamis involved parking in
discrepancy between the two will always be
of Section 803 of the same Code and Rule XIX of the local streets; in contrast, the present case
resolved in favor of the basic law.27
the IRR, so as to include the regulation of parking deals with privately owned parking facilities
fees. The OSG limits its citation to the first part of available for use by the general public. In
Section 102 of the National Building Code From the RTC all the way to this Court, the OSG Republic and City of Ozamis, the concerned local
declaring the policy of the State "to safeguard life, repeatedly referred to Republic v. governments regulated parking pursuant to their
health, property, and public welfare, consistent Gonzales28 and City of Ozamis v. Lumapas29 to power to control and regulate their streets; in the
with the principles of sound environmental support its position that the State has the power instant case, the DPWH Secretary and local
management and control"; but totally ignores the to regulate parking spaces to promote the health, building officials regulate parking pursuant to their
second part of said provision, which reads, "and safety, and welfare of the public; and it is by virtue authority to ensure compliance with the minimum
to this end, make it the purpose of this Code to of said power that respondents may be required standards and requirements under the National
provide for all buildings and structures, a to provide free parking facilities. The OSG, Building Code and its IRR. With the difference in
framework of minimum standards and though, failed to consider the substantial subject matters and the bases for the regulatory
requirements to regulate and control their differences in the factual and legal backgrounds powers being invoked, Republic and City of
location, site, design, quality of materials, of these two cases from those of the Petition at Ozamis do not constitute precedents for this
construction, use, occupancy, and maintenance." bar. case.
While the first part of Section 102 of the National
Building Code lays down the State policy, it is the In Republic, the Municipality of Malabon sought Indeed, Republic and City of Ozamis both contain
second part thereof that explains how said policy to eject the occupants of two parcels of land of pronouncements that weaken the position of the
shall be carried out in the Code. Section 102 of the public domain to give way to a road-widening OSG in the case at bar. In Republic, the Court,
the National Building Code is not an all- project. It was in this context that the Court instead of placing the burden on private persons
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the pronounced: to provide parking facilities to the general public,
DPWH Secretary and local building officials in the mentioned the trend in other jurisdictions wherein
name of life, health, property, and public welfare. Indiscriminate parking along F. Sevilla Boulevard the municipal governments themselves took the
On the contrary, it limits the regulatory power of and other main thoroughfares was prevalent; this, initiative to make more parking spaces available
said officials to ensuring that the minimum of course, caused the build up of traffic in the so as to alleviate the traffic problems, thus:
standards and requirements for all buildings and surrounding area to the great discomfort and
structures, as set forth in the National Building inconvenience of the public who use the streets. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
Code, are complied with. Traffic congestion constitutes a threat to the parking in designated areas along public streets
health, welfare, safety and convenience of the or highways is allowed which clearly indicates
people and it can only be substantially relieved by that provision for parking spaces serves a useful
purpose. In other jurisdictions where traffic is at agencies have the power to impose regulatory Under Section 803 of the National Building Code,
least as voluminous as here, the provision by fees, then conversely, they also have the power complimentary parking spaces are required to
municipal governments of parking space is not to remove the same. Even so, it is worthy to note enhance light and ventilation, that is, to avoid
limited to parking along public streets or that the present case does not involve the traffic congestion in areas surrounding the
highways. There has been a marked trend to imposition by the DPWH Secretary and local building, which certainly affects the ventilation
build off-street parking facilities with the view to building officials of regulatory fees upon within the building itself, which otherwise, the
removing parked cars from the streets. While the respondents; but the collection by respondents of annexed parking spaces would have served.
provision of off-street parking facilities or carparks parking fees from persons who use the mall Free-of-charge parking avoids traffic congestion
has been commonly undertaken by private parking facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo by ensuring quick and easy access of legitimate
enterprise, municipal governments have been that the DPWH Secretary and local building shoppers to off-street parking spaces annexed to
constrained to put up carparks in response to officials do have regulatory powers over the the malls, and thereby removing the vehicles of
public necessity where private enterprise had collection of parking fees for the use of privately these legitimate shoppers off the busy streets
failed to keep up with the growing public demand. owned parking facilities, they cannot allow or near the commercial establishments.33
American courts have upheld the right of prohibit such collection arbitrarily or whimsically.
municipal governments to construct off-street Whether allowing or prohibiting the collection of The Court is unconvinced. The National Building
parking facilities as clearly redounding to the such parking fees, the action of the DPWH Code regulates buildings, by setting the minimum
public benefit.30 Secretary and local building officials must pass specifications and requirements for the same. It
the test of classic reasonableness and propriety does not concern itself with traffic congestion in
In City of Ozamis, the Court authorized the of the measures or means in the promotion of the areas surrounding the building. It is already a
collection by the City of minimal fees for the ends sought to be accomplished.32 stretch to say that the National Building Code and
parking of vehicles along the streets: so why then its IRR also intend to solve the problem of traffic
should the Court now preclude respondents from Keeping in mind the aforementioned test of congestion around the buildings so as to ensure
collecting from the public a fee for the use of the reasonableness and propriety of measures or that the said buildings shall have adequate
mall parking facilities? Undoubtedly, respondents means, the Court notes that Section 803 of the lighting and ventilation. Moreover, the Court
also incur expenses in the maintenance and National Building Code falls under Chapter 8 on cannot simply assume, as the OSG has
operation of the mall parking facilities, such as Light and Ventilation. Evidently, the Code deems apparently done, that the traffic congestion in
electric consumption, compensation for parking it necessary to regulate site occupancy to ensure areas around the malls is due to the fact that
attendants and security, and upkeep of the that there is proper lighting and ventilation in respondents charge for their parking facilities,
physical structures. every building. Pursuant thereto, Rule XIX of the thus, forcing vehicle owners to just park in the
IRR requires that a building, depending on its streets. The Court notes that despite the fees
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that "the specific use and/or floor area, should provide a charged by respondents, vehicle owners still use
power to regulate and control the use, minimum number of parking spaces. The Court, the mall parking facilities, which are even fully
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and however, fails to see the connection between occupied on some days. Vehicle owners may be
structures carries with it the power to impose fees regulating site occupancy to ensure proper light parking in the streets only because there are not
and, conversely, to control, partially or, as in this and ventilation in every building vis-à-vis enough parking spaces in the malls, and not
case, absolutely, the imposition of such fees." regulating the collection by building owners of because they are deterred by the parking fees
Firstly, the fees within the power of regulatory fees for the use of their parking spaces. Contrary charged by respondents. Free parking spaces at
agencies to impose are regulatory fees. It has to the averment of the OSG, the former does not the malls may even have the opposite effect from
been settled law in this jurisdiction that this broad necessarily include or imply the latter. It totally what the OSG envisioned: more people may be
and all-compassing governmental competence to escapes this Court how lighting and ventilation encouraged by the free parking to bring their own
restrict rights of liberty and property carries with it conditions at the malls could be affected by the vehicles, instead of taking public transport, to the
the undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. fact that parking facilities thereat are free or paid malls; as a result, the parking facilities would
It looks to the enactment of specific measures for. become full sooner, leaving more vehicles
that govern the relations not only as between without parking spaces in the malls and parked in
individuals but also as between private parties The OSG attempts to provide the missing link by the streets instead, causing even more traffic
and the political society.31 True, if the regulatory arguing that: congestion.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is where title remains with the private owner that area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
actually invoking police power to justify the inquiry should be made to determine whether the grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion
regulation by the State, through the DPWH impairment of a property is merely regulated or of' health, morals, good order, safety, or the
Secretary and local building officials, of privately amounts to a compensable taking. A regulation general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
owned parking facilities, including the collection that deprives any person of the profitable use of actually a taking without compensation of a
by the owners/operators of such facilities of his property constitutes a taking and entitles him certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
parking fees from the public for the use thereof. to compensation, unless the invasion of rights is paupers who are charges of the municipal
The Court finds, however, that in totally so slight as to permit the regulation to be justified corporation. Instead of' building or maintaining a
prohibiting respondents from collecting parking under the police power. Similarly, a police public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
fees from the public for the use of the mall parking regulation that unreasonably restricts the right to the burden to private cemeteries.
facilities, the State would be acting beyond the use business property for business purposes
bounds of police power. amounts to a taking of private property, and the 'The expropriation without compensation of a
owner may recover therefor.371avvphi1 portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Police power is the power of promoting the public Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of Although in the present case, title to and/or Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order possession of the parking facilities remain/s with council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the
to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the respondents, the prohibition against their center of population of the city and to provide for
property of the owner. The power to regulate, collection of parking fees from the public, for the their burial in a proper place subject to the
however, does not include the power to prohibit. use of said facilities, is already tantamount to a provisions of general law regulating burial
A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include taking or confiscation of their properties. The grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
the power to confiscate. Police power does not State is not only requiring that respondents Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
involve the taking or confiscation of property, with devote a portion of the latter’s properties for use provides in Section 177(q) that a sangguniang
the exception of a few cases where there is a as parking spaces, but is also mandating that panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the
necessity to confiscate private property in order they give the public access to said parking dead in such place and in such manner as
to destroy it for the purpose of protecting peace spaces for free. Such is already an excessive prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply
and order and of promoting the general welfare; intrusion into the property rights of respondents. authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
for instance, the confiscation of an illegally Not only are they being deprived of the right to land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
possessed article, such as opium and firearms. 34 use a portion of their properties as they wish, they construct public cemeteries. This has been the
are further prohibited from profiting from its use or law, and practise in the past. It continues to the
When there is a taking or confiscation of private even just recovering therefrom the expenses for present. Expropriation, however, requires
property for public use, the State is no longer the maintenance and operation of the required payment of just compensation. The questioned
exercising police power, but another of its parking facilities. ordinance is different from laws and regulations
inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside
Eminent domain enables the State to forcibly The ruling of this Court in City Government of certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
acquire private lands intended for public use upon Quezon City v. Judge Ericta38 is edifying. other public facilities from the land they sell to
payment of just compensation to the owner.35 Therein, the City Government of Quezon City buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of
passed an ordinance obliging private cemeteries public safety, health, and convenience are very
within its jurisdiction to set aside at least six clear from said requirements which are intended
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain
percent of their total area for charity, that is, for to insure the development of communities with
results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and
burial grounds of deceased paupers. According salubrious and wholesome environments. The
possession of, the expropriated property; but no
to the Court, the ordinance in question was null beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made
cogent reason appears why the said power may
not be availed of only to impose a burden upon and void, for it authorized the taking of private to pay by the subdivision developer when
property without just compensation: individual lots are sold to homeowners.
the owner of condemned property, without loss of
title and possession.36 It is a settled rule that
neither acquisition of title nor total destruction of There is no reasonable relation between the In conclusion, the total prohibition against the
value is essential to taking. It is usually in cases setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has no
basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power,
since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just
compensation.
SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES INOCENCIO AND ADORACION Before the one-year redemption period expired, TCT No. 29832, Blk. 4, Lot No. 3
SAN ANTONIO, petitioners, private respondents filed a complaint for consisting of 135 square meters;
vs. annulment of extra-judicial foreclosure with
COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO preliminary mandatory injunction, docketed as b. That lot situated in Brgy.
AND GREGORIO GERONIMO, respondents. Civil Case No. 233-M-92, with the Regional Trial Tuctucan, Municipality of
Court of Bulacan, Branch 22. After the parties Guiguinto, Bulcan covered by
QUISUMBING, J.: presented their respective evidence, they TCT No. 30078, Blk. 9, Lot 27
submitted to the court on September 16, 1993, a consisting of 78 square meters;
This is a petition for review seeking the reversal compromise agreement dated August 25, 1993,
the terms and conditions of which are quoted as
of the decision1 dated April 28, 1995, of the Court c. Another lot situated in Brgy.
follows:
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35271 affirming the Tuctucan, Municipality of
orders dated May 5, 1994,2 July 12, 19943 and Guiguinto, Bulcan, covered by
September 1, 1994,4 respectively, of the COME NOW parties assisted by their TCT No. 30079, Blk. No. 38
Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan, Branch respective counsels and before the consisting of 75 square meters.
22, granting the motion for execution of Honorable Court most respectfully
compromise judgment dated September 22, submit this compromise agreement, the
Within six (6) months from signing of this
1993 in Civil Case No. 233-M-92. terms and conditions of which are:
compromise agreement simultaneous to
which delivery of the title to the afore-
The facts, as culled from the records, are as 1. For a consideration of TWO MILLION mentioned properties in the names of the
follows: PESOS (P2,000,000.00) Philippine defendants San Antonio, the defendants
Currency in hand received today by the San Antonio will execute the
defendants spouses Inocencio and corresponding instrument of
Private respondents spouses Mario and Gregoria
Adoracion San Antonio from the resale/reconveyance/redemption over
Geronimo obtained a loan in the amount of One
Million Twenty Eight Thousand Pesos plaintiffs, defendants San Antonio will that properly together with its
execute a deed of improvements covered by TCT No. RT-
(P1,028,000) from petitioners, the spouses
resale/reconveyance/redemption of that 6652 (T-296744), for the purpose of the
Inocencio and Adoracion San Antonio. To secure
subject property covered by TCT No. RT- cancellation of the annulment of the sale
the loan, private respondents mortgaged two
6653 (T-209250) of the Registry of in the title subject to the condition that
parcels of land covered by TCT No. RT-6653 with
an area of 10,390 square meters and TCT No. Deeds of Bulacan including its should plaintiffs fail to deliver the titles to
RT-6652 with an area of 2,556 square meters, improvements; the three lots heretofore mentioned to the
both situated in Barrio Tabe, Guiguinto, Bulacan. defendants San Antonio, the said
Subsequently, private respondents obtained an 2. For the release/resale/reconveyance plaintiffs shall be deemed to have waived
additional loan of Nine Hundred Fifty Nine Pesos of the other property involved in the case and renounced any all rights, claims and
(P991,859) with an interest of 3.33% per month, described in TCT No. RT-6652 (T- demands whatsoever they may have
thus making their total obligation in the amount of 296744) of the other property involved in over that property covered by TCT No.
Two Million Nineteen Thousand Eight Hundred the case described in TCT No. RT-6652 RT-6652 (T-296744) including its
Fifty Nine Pesos (P2,019,859), payable on or (T-296744) of the Registry of Deeds of improvements and thenceforth bind
before February 15, 1991. Private respondents Bulacan together with its improvements, themselves to respect the right of
failed to pay the loan and the interest on the due plaintiffs obligate themselves to transfer ownership, and possession of the
date, hence, the mortgage was extra-judicially the ownership of the following to the defendants San Antonio over said
foreclosed. During the auction sale, petitioners, defendants San Antonio. property, or to pay Two Million Pesos
being the highest bidder bought the two parcels (P2,000,000.00) within the same period;
of land. a. That lot including its
improvements situated in Brgy. 3. That the parties further agree to set
Tuctucan, Municipality of aside any claim, damages and counter-
Guiguinto, Bulcan, covered by claims they may have against each other;
4. That in the meantime, the possession pay 2 Million Pesos within the six-month period RENDERED BASED ON A
of the plaintiffs of the subject property from August 25, 1993. It was only on March 4, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.
covering TCT No. 6652 (T-296744) and 1994, after the lapse of six months that private
TCT No. RT-6653 (T-209250) shall it be respondents delivered the three titles to II. …RULING THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF
respect; (SIC) petitioners. As the delivery was beyond the EQUITY IS A GROUND TO JUSTIFY
agreed six-month period, petitioners refused to THE AMENDMENT OF A FINAL AND
5. This compromise agreement shall be accept the same or execute an instrument for the EXECUTORY JUDGMENT.
in full settlement of the obligations of the resale, reconveyance or redemption of the
plaintiffs with respect to Kasulatan ng property covered by TCT No. RT-6652. III. …RULING THAT THE DELAY IN
Sanglaan dated February 14, 1989 and Consequently, TCT No. RT-6652 was cancelled
THE DELIVERY OF THE TITLES IS
the Susog ng Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-47229 was issued
ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REGISTER
dated July 16, 1990, subject matter of the in the names of petitioners.
OF DEEDS OF BULACAN.
complaint, and those related there.
Private respondents filed a motion for execution IV. …APPLYING ARTICLE 1191 OF
6. This compromise agreement of the September 22, 1993 order with the trial
THE NEW CIVIL CODE.
is immediately executory (underscoring court. This was granted on May 5, 1994.
supplied).5 Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but
this was denied on July 12, 1994. A second V. …NOT RULING THAT THE
motion for reconsideration by petitioners was COMPROMISE AGREEMENT IS
Finding the above to be in order, the trial court IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY AS
approved the same in its order dated September likewise denied in an order dated September 1,
1994. PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH 6
22, 1993, thus: THEREOF.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with
A careful perusal of the Compromise VI. … NOT RULING THAT
Agreement dated August 25, 1993 application for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the PETITIONERS HAVE ALREADY
reveals that the terms and conditions COMPLIED WITH PARAGRAPH 1 OF
Court of Appeals. As said earlier, the Court of
thereof are not contrary to law, morals THE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT.8
Appeals denied the petition on April 28, 1995,
and public policy.
thus:
In sum, petitioners raise the following issues for
ACCORDINGLY, the compromise our resolution:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari
agreement dated August 25, 1993 is
is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and is
hereby APPROVED. The parties are
DISMISSED. The Orders of respondent 1. Did the trial court err in granting the writ
enjoined to comply faithfully with their to execute the compromise judgment?
court dated May 1[5], July 12, and
obligation under said agreement.
September 1, 1994 are AFFIRMED.
2. Is Article 1191 of the New Civil Code
SO ORDERED.6
SO ORDERED.7 applicable in this case?
In accordance with the stipulations in paragraph On the first issue, did the trial court err in granting
1 of the Compromise Agreement, petitioners Hence this petition for review wherein petitioners
aver that the Court of Appeals erred in: the writ to execute the compromise judgment?
executed a Certificate of Redemption and
Petitioners claim that the trial court did. The
Cancellation of Sale covering TCT No. RT-6653
I. …RULING THAT THE ORDER DATED compromise agreement approved by the trial
after private respondents paid them Two Million
MAY 5, 1994 DID NOT court in its order dated September 22, 1993,
Pesos (P2,000,000). Private respondents, provided that private respondents had six months
however, failed to transfer the ownership and SUBSTANTIALLY AMEND THE FINAL
AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT within which to deliver the titles. If they failed,
deliver the titles of the three parcels of land
ownership of the land covered by TCT No. RT-
described in paragraph 2 of the agreement or to
6652 would be transferred to petitioners.
Petitioners contend that judgement based on a made demand and as they have not yet Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
compromise is conclusive upon the parties and is performed their part of the agreement, which was attributed to the Register of Deeds private
immediately executory. It has the force and effect the execution of the deed of reconveyance, delay respondents' delay in the delivery of the three
of res judicata, hence it cannot be modified. The by private respondents has not yet occurred. titles. But as shown in their decisions, private
trial court therefore, cannot compel petitioners, respondents submitted to the Register of Deeds
via a writ of execution, to accept the three titles We find petitioners' petition impressed with merit. the pertinent documents for registration of the
beyond the six-month period, because it is in three titles in petitioners' name only on March 2,
effect an amendment to the compromise A compromise agreement, once approved by 1994, beyond the six-month period.12 Private
agreement, petitioners said. They explain that final order of the court, has the force of res respondents could have done so earlier, but they
even on equitable considerations this was not judicata between the parties and should not be did not. This only shows that private respondents
allowed because once a decision becomes final, did not intend to truly comply with their
disturbed except for vices of consent or
the court which rendered it loses jurisdiction over obligations.
forgery.9 In this case, the compromise agreement
the case and it can no longer be modified except
clearly provided private respondents six months,
for clerical errors. i.e., from August 25, 1993 to February 25, 1994, As to the alleged delay on the part of petitioners
to deliver the titles to the three parcels of land in executing the Deed of Resale and
Petitioners also contend that private respondents described in the agreement. If after the lapse of Reconveyance, we find that this point serves only
should not blame the Register of Deeds for the the said period and no delivery is yet made by to confuse the Court on the real facts of the case.
delay in the delivery of the three titles since private respondents, ownership over the land Despite the fact that the compromise agreement
private respondents submitted the registration covered by TCT No. RT-6652 would be involved two parcels of land up for redemption,
documents to the Register of Deeds only on transferred to petitioners. As the facts of this case private respondents did not indicate as to which
March 2, 1994, beyond the six-month period show, private respondents failed to deliver the parcel of land petitioners did not execute a deed
deadline. titles on February 25, 1994, as it was only on of resale.13 Nevertheless, private respondents
March 4, 1994, when they gave the titles to admitted that petitioners already executed a
Further, petitioners deny that they are guilty of petitioners. Hence, pursuant to the terms of the Certificate of Redemption.14 For us, this was
delay for not executing the deed of resale, compromise agreement, petitioners could sufficient compliance of petitioners' duty under
reconveyance or redemption despite their receipt rightfully refuse acceptance of the titles. It was the Compromise Agreement.
of two million pesos. They said that as early as error therefore for the trial court to grant the writ
August 25, 1993, they already executed a of execution in favor of private respondents Lastly, is Article 1191 of the New Civil
Certificate of Redemption and Cancellation of because it effectively compelled petitioners to Code15 applicable in this case? According to
Sale of the land covered by TCT No. RT-6653. accept delivery of the three titles in exchange for petitioners, the Court of Appeals erred when it
the release of the land covered by TCT No. RT- found that private respondents' delay did not
Private respondents counter that there has been 6652 even after the lapse of the six-month period. constitute substantial breach to warrant
no modification of the final judgment when the rescission of the compromise agreement. They
trial judge issued the writ of execution, as the Private respondents claim that the trial court, in assert that they were not seeking rescission of
judge issued the writ of execution, as the judge issuing the writ, was merely performing a the compromise agreement but its full
was merely performing a ministerial duty. Also, ministerial duty. While it becomes the trial court's enforcement regardless of whether the delay is
private respondents deny that they delivered the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution may slight or substantial.
three titles late and if ever the delivery was be refused on equitable grounds.10 In this case, it
delayed it was the Register of Deeds who was to will be unjust to petitioners if we compel them to While indeed private respondents did not meet
blame. Private respondents additionally point out accept the three titles despite the lapse of the head on this issue, we find that it should be
that in reciprocal obligations, like the ones in this agreed period. Contractual obligations between properly addressed. In filing the petition before
case, delay sets in only when one part fulfills his parties have the force of law between them and the Court of Appeals, petitioners sought the
obligation and the other is unable to perform his absent any allegation that the same are contrary appellate court's declaration that the trial court
part of the obligation. Likewise, a person to law, morals, good customs, public order or committed grave abuse of discretion. In their
obligated to deliver something incurs in delay only public policy, they must be complied with in good view, the trial court should have enforced the
after demand. As herein petitioners have not yet faith.11 compromise agreement instead of rescinding it.
Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
apply Article 1191 of the New Civil Code which
concerns rescission of contract. Applicable here
is Article 1159 which enjoins compliance in good
faith by the parties who entered into a valid
contract.16 Compromise agreements are
contracts, whereby the parties undertake
reciprocal obligations to avoid litigation, or put an
end to one already commenced.17
SO ORDERED.
WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION PCIB filed a request for arbitration with the rectifying any defect in the work which appears
CORPORATION, Petitioner, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission within the period mentioned above, the OWNER
vs. (CIAC) for the reimbursement of its expenses for and the ENGINEER may, at their own discretion,
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL the repairs made by another contractor. It using the Guarantee Bond amount for
BANK*, Respondent complained of WGCC’s alleged non-compliance corrections, have the work done by another
with their contractual terms on materials and contractor at the expense of the CONTRACTOR
DECISION workmanship. WGCC interposed a counterclaim or his bondsmen.
for P5,777,157.84 for material cost adjustment.
CORONA, J.: However, nothing in this section shall in any way
The CIAC declared WGCC liable for the affect or relieve the CONTRACTOR’S
construction defects in the project.5 WGCC filed responsibility to the OWNER. On the completion
The facts of this case are straightforward.1
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals of the [w]orks, the CONTRACTOR shall clear
(CA) which dismissed it for lack of merit.6 Its away and remove from the site all constructional
William Golangco Construction Corporation plant, surplus materials, rubbish and temporary
(WGCC) and the Philippine Commercial motion for reconsideration was similarly denied.7
works of every kind, and leave the whole of the
International Bank (PCIB) entered into a contract [s]ite and [w]orks clean and in a workmanlike
for the construction of the extension of PCIB In this petition for review on certiorari, WGCC condition to the satisfaction of the ENGINEER
Tower II (denominated as PCIB Tower II, raises this main question of law: whether or not and OWNER.9 (emphasis ours)
Extension Project [project])2 on October 20, petitioner WGCC is liable for defects in the
1989. The project included, among others, the granitite wash-out finish that occurred after the
application of a granitite wash-out finish3 on the lapse of the one-year defects liability period Although both parties based their arguments on
exterior walls of the building. the same stipulations, they reached conflicting
provided in Art. XI of the construction contract.8
conclusions. A careful reading of the stipulations,
however, leads us to the conclusion that WGCC’s
PCIB, with the concurrence of its consultant TCGI We rule in favor of WGCC. arguments are more tenable.
Engineers (TCGI), accepted the turnover of the
completed work by WGCC in a letter dated June
1, 1992. To answer for any defect arising within a The controversy pivots on a provision in the Autonomy of contracts
period of one year, WGCC submitted a guarantee construction contract referred to as the defects
bond dated July 1, 1992 issued by Malayan liability period: The autonomous nature of contracts is
Insurance Company, Inc. in compliance with the enunciated in Article 1306 of the Civil Code.
construction contract.4 ARTICLE XI – GUARANTEE
Article 1306. The contracting parties may
The controversy arose when portions of the Unless otherwise specified for specific works, and establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
granitite wash-out finish of the exterior of the without prejudice to the rights and causes of conditions as they may deem convenient,
building began peeling off and falling from the action of the OWNER under Article 1723 of the provided they are not contrary to law, morals,
walls in 1993. WGCC made minor repairs after Civil Code, the CONTRACTOR hereby good customs, public order, or public policy.
PCIB requested it to rectify the construction guarantees the work stipulated in this Contract,
defects. In 1994, PCIB entered into another and shall make good any defect in materials and Obligations arising from contracts have the force
contract with Brains and Brawn Construction and workmanship which [becomes] evident within one of law between the parties and should be
Development Corporation to re-do the entire (1) year after the final acceptance of the
complied with in good faith.10 In characterizing
granitite wash-out finish after WGCC manifested work. The CONTRACTOR shall leave the work in
perfect order upon completion and present the the contract as having the force of law between
that it was "not in a position to do the new the parties, the law stresses the obligatory nature
finishing work," though it was willing to share part final certificate to the ENGINEER promptly.
of a binding and valid agreement.
of the cost. PCIB incurred expenses amounting
to P11,665,000 for the repair work. If in the opinion of the OWNER and ENGINEER,
the CONTRACTOR has failed to act promptly in The provision in the construction contract
providing for a defects liability period was not
shown as contrary to law, morals, good customs, Notwithstanding the issue of the Defects Liability on) supervised WGCC’s workmanship. Second,
pubic order or public policy. By the nature of the Certificate[,] the Contractor and the Owner shall WGCC regularly submitted progress reports and
obligation in such contract, the provision limiting remain liable for the fulfillment of any obligation[,] photographs. Third, WGCC worked under fair
liability for defects and fixing specific guaranty incurred under the provisions of the Contract prior and transparent circumstances. PCIB had access
periods was not only fair and equitable; it was to the issue of the Defects Liability Certificate[,] to the site and it exercised reasonable
also necessary. Without such limitation, the which remains unperformed at the time such supervision over WGCC’s work. Fourth, PCIB
contractor would be expected to make a Defects Liability Certificate is issued[. And] for the issued several "punch lists" for WGCC’s
perpetual guarantee on all materials and purpose of determining the nature and extent of compliance before the issuance of PCIB’s final
workmanship. any such obligation, the Contract shall be certificate of acceptance. Fifth, PCIB supplied the
deemed to remain in force between the parties of materials for the granitite wash-out finish. And
The adoption of a one-year guarantee, as done the Contract. (emphasis ours) finally, PCIB’s team of experts gave their
by WGCC and PCIB, is established usage in the concurrence to the turnover of the project.
Philippines for private and government The defects in the granitite wash-out finish were
construction contracts.11 The contract did not not the "obligation" contemplated in Article 62.2. The purpose of the defects liability period was
specify a different period for defects in the It was not an obligation that remained precisely to give PCIB additional, albeit limited,
granitite wash-out finish; hence, any defect unperformed or unfulfilled at the time the defects opportunity to oblige WGCC to make good any
therein should have been brought to WGCC’s liability certificate was issued. The alleged defect, hidden or otherwise, discovered within
attention within the one-year defects liability defects occurred more than a year from the final one year.
period in the contract. acceptance by PCIB.
Contrary to the CA’s conclusion, the first
We cannot countenance an interpretation that An examination of Article 1719 of the Civil Code sentence of the third paragraph of Article XI on
undermines a contractual stipulation freely and is enlightening: guarantee previously quoted did not operate as a
validly agreed upon. The courts will not relieve a blanket exception to the one-year guarantee
party from the effects of an unwise or unfavorable Art. 1719. Acceptance of the work by the period under the first paragraph. Neither did it
contract freely entered into.12 employer relieves the contractor of liability for any modify, extend, nullify or supersede the
defect in the work, unless: categorical terms of the defects liability period.
[T]he inclusion in a written contract for a piece of
work [,] such as the one in question, of a provision (1) The defect is hidden and the Under the circumstances, there were no hidden
defining a warranty period against defects, is not employer is not, by his special defects for which WGCC could be held liable.
uncommon. This kind of a stipulation is of knowledge, expected to recognize the Neither was there any other defect for which
particular importance to the contractor, for as a same; or PCIB made any express reservation of its rights
general rule, after the lapse of the period agreed against WGCC. Indeed, the contract should not
upon therein, he may no longer be held be interpreted to favor the one who caused the
(2) The employer expressly reserves his
accountable for whatever defects, deficiencies or rights against the contractor by reason of confusion, if any. The contract was prepared by
imperfections that may be discovered in the work the defect. TCGI for PCIB.15
executed by him.13
The lower courts conjectured that the peeling off WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
Interpretation of contracts of the granitite wash-out finish was probably due The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
to "defective materials and workmanship." This SP No. 41152 is ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
To challenge the guarantee period provided in they characterized as hidden or latent defects.
Article XI of the contract, PCIB calls our attention We, however, do not agree with the conclusion SO ORDERED.
to Article 62.2 which provides: that the alleged defects were hidden.