NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM IN WEIMAR

GERMANY
AllianceofPoliticalExtremesAgainstDemocracy

BY ABRAHAM ASCHER AND

GUENTER LEWY

JLhe sharewhichboththenationalist rightand theCommunist

lefthad in bringingabout the downfallof Weimardemocracy
hasbeengenerally recognized bystudents ofGermanhistory.But
the equallycommonview thattheseforcesof extremism inde-
pendently carried on their the
agitationagainst Republic needs
revision.Whilethesemovements seemingly represented thetwo
poles of the in
politicalspectrum, actualitythey had consider-
able attractionforeach other. As a matterof fact,at certain
crucialmoments duringthe 1920sthisattraction culminatedin
seriousattempts to achievea working allianceand an ideological
synthesis.This startling rapprochement betweenrightand left,
knownin Germanyas NationalBolshevism, was facilitatedby
thefriendly relationsbetweendemocratic Germany and Commu-
nistRussiaafterWorldWar I.
SinceNationalBolshevism had adherents amongbothextremes
of the Germanpoliticalscene,it neverreallyemergedas one
welldefined doctrine withthesamemeaningforall itsadvocates.
It alwaysremaineda seriesof nebulousgeneralities to which
each side gave its own interpretation,designed to serve its par-
ticularinterests.The Communists resortedto National Bol-
to
shevismin order exploit the sentiment
nationalistic so wide-
spreadin Germany; nationalistsespousedit to enlistthesocialist
massesfortheirprogram of liberationfromVersaillesand impe-
rialistexpansion.The commongroundwastheirconviction that
each stoodto benefitfroman alliance between the two "pro-
letariannations,"RussiaandGermany, the
against capitalist West.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 451
i

The senseofoutrageagainstthetermsoftheTreatyofVersailles
gaveriseto thefirstphaseof NationalBolshevism.It appeared
withinCommunistranksprimarily because of Soviet Russia's
fear that the Versaillessettlement would enable the West to
extenditssupremacy overGermany.In Moscowin March1919
theFirstCongress oftheCommunist Internationaldenouncedthe
Alliesforplanningto turntheGermansinto"miserable starving
slavesofEntentecapital." The designofthe"alliedimperialists,"
the Comintern announced,was to forceGermanyinto "a kind
of Holy Allianceof capitalistsagainstthe workers'revolution."
To arousemasssentiment againsttheseplans,the Communist
International coinedthe slogans: "Long live the revoltof the
workers againsttheiroppressors!DownwiththeVersailles peace,
downwiththenewBrest!"1 In Germany thisvehement rejection
of Versaillesformedthe cornerstone of the Communist party's
struggleagainstthe West and its advocacyof an alliancewith
Soviet Russia- a constantthemethroughoutthe life of the
WeimarRepublic.
A small groupof militantswithinthe GermanCommunist
Party(KPD) soon expressedthe anti-Western line in distinctly
nationalistic
terms.The leadingspokesmen forthisfactionwere
twoHamburgintellectuals, HeinrichLaufenberg and FritzWolff-
heim(bothweresubsequently expelledfromthepartyfortheir
views,
syndicalist and in April1920wereinstrumental in forming
the GermanCommunist WorkersParty,or KAPD). In a pam-
phlet written in November19192 theyheld "blatanttreason"
responsibleforGermany's disaster.Resorting to the"stabin the
back"charge,latera prominent featureofNazi propaganda, they
argued that Germany had not really been completely crushed
on thebattlefield.Rather,Germany's defeathad been sealedby
who,fearful
"politicians" aboveall of an armedproletariat, had
iT/ie Communist vol. i (1919)pp. 118,121,162.
International,
2 Heinrich Laufenbergand Fritz Wolffheim, RevolutionärerVolkskriegoder
konterrevolutionärer (Hamburg1920).
Bürgerkrieg?
452 SOCIAL RESEARCH
succumbedto the West. Traitorshad acceptedthe dishonorable
termsof the Allies, surrenderedGerman territory to the "merci-
less imperialists/'and broughtabout the death of hundredsof
thousandsof innocentvictimsby starvation. Germany'seconomy
now faced the danger of being transformedinto an object of
exploitationby internationalfinancecapital. Her workerswere
on the verge of being convertedinto coolies and slaves.
Germanycould be extricatedfromher overpoweringmisery,
thoughtLaufenbergand Wolffheim,only if throughrevolution
she wereconvertedinto a proletarianstate- forbourgeoissociety
had proveditselfincapable of copingwiththe national question.
"The smashingof the capitaliststate and its ruling class is the
preconditionfor the marshalingof all national energiesagainst
'
theimperialismof theforeignenemy*(p. 10). Such a totalmobil-
ization of the German people, adopted earlier,mightwell have
enabled Germanyto resistthe impositionof theVersaillesTreaty.
Now it would result in national solidarity,the necessarycondi-
tion for "the breakingof Germany'schains and the creationof
a new society. Only the proletariandictatorship,the sovietrule
... can achieve thisgoal" (p. 9). In addition,the workers'state
would need an alliance with Russia to wage a successfulstruggle
of liberation against Western imperialism. Such collaboration
theyconsideredeminentlyfeasible,since Russia needed German
technicalskills to establishsocialismfully.
For the purpose of defendingthe victoriousrevolution,of
regainingthe lost territories, and of eliminatingall "imperialist
bufferstates,"Germany,theyurged,oughtto createa new People's
Army. "The classlessnation has no interestin imperialistcon-
quest,sinceit cannottoleratetheexploitationofforeigncountries.
Politicallyit will thereforealwaysremain on the defensive,but,
of course,this does not rule out the use of a militaryoffensive
forpurposesof protection."8
The officialCommunistleadershiprejected the National Bol-
« Otto Lindemann,with the collaborationof HeinrichLaufenbergand Fritz
Wolffheim, Heer (Hamburg1920)p. 27.
Das revolutionäre
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 453
shevism of Laufenberg and Wolffheim. In an ambiguously
4
phrased statementLenin, writingon "left-wingCommunism,"
referredto theirviews as "preposterousabsurdities,"and called
it "stupidityand not revolutionäriness" to advocate "absolutely,
unconditionallyand immediately. . . liberationfromthe Ver-
sailles Peace." The demands of the world revolutionmust be
the primaryconsiderationin determiningthe strategyagainst
Westernimperialism. In view of Germany'smilitarycollapse,
actual warfareagainst the Ententewould endangernot only the
revolutionin Germanybut also the "internationalSoviet move-
ment." It was a crime to "accept battle at a time when it is
obviouslyadvantageousto the enemyand not to us." Implicit
in his argumentwas the fear that a furtherdefeat of Germany
would bring "the imperialistsof France, England, etc." to the
verybordersof Russia.
Karl Radek, Russia'sforemostexperton Germanaffairs, leveled
a more forthright attack on the two Hamburg National Bol-
sheviks.5 He bluntlyadmittedthat the securityof Soviet Russia
had to be the paramountconcern in the formulationof Com-
munistforeignpolicy. As a devastatedcountry,Russia, the iso-
lated bastion of socialism,had to be given a breathingspell.
Furthermore, both Germanyand Russia had a vital interestin
initiatingtrade relationswith the Anglo-Saxoncountries,rather
thanin wagingwaragainstthem. Should warbreakout,however,
the German workers,Radek argued, would surelybe betrayed
by theirown ruling class. The German bourgeoisie,interested
primarilyin maintainingits class privileges,undoubtedlypre-
ferredoccupation by the Entente to a soviet dictatorship. The
invaders might confiscatepart of their profits,the revolution
everything.The successfulconductof hostilitieswould therefore
require the completesuppressionof the treacherousbourgeoisie
insteadof the proclamationof a Burgfrieden(suspensionof party
* V. I. Lenin," 'LeftWing'Communism, an InfantileDisorder,"in SelectedWorks,
vol.2 (Moscow1947)p. 614.
ßKarl Radek,Die auswärtige Politikdes deutschenKommunismus und der Ham-
burgerNationaleBolschewismus (Viennan.d.).
454 SOCIAL RESEARCH
strife),as Laufenbergand Wolffheimso naivelyadvocated. The
Germanworkingclass would have to fightagainst"Ententecap-
ital" in alliance with the internationalproletariatand not with
the Germanbourgeoisie. In thesecircumstances, Radek thought,
the demand for a "revolutionary war" emanated not fromcon-
siderationsof genuine radicalismbut from "nationalisticimpa-
tience"- to him a characteristicfeature of petty-bourgeois
thinking.
Radek's sharp attack on Laufenbergand Wolffheimdid not
constitutea categoricalrejectionof theirviews. He insistedthat
the party could not tolerate elements with "petty-bourgeois
prejudices" withinits ranks. "But under certainfuturecondi-
tions," said Radek (p. 3), "the CommunistParty can establish
contact with National Bolshevism." It was the party'sduty to
"proffer a hand" to thosesincerebourgeoiselements,intellectuals
and officers who had the courage to forgotheir class privileges
and turn to the KPD to save the nation. "Concern for the
national question can also be one of the paths leading to
Communism"(p. 2).
Radek's hesitationto close the door on all cooperationwith
the nationalistswas well grounded. In 1919, while in a Berlin
prison for alleged participationin the Januaryuprisingof the
GermanCommunists,Radek had actuallycome into contactwith
severalsuch "sincerenationalists." One of them,General Eugen
Freiherrvon Reibnitz,Radek describedas the "firstrepresenta-
"
tive of the specieslabeled 'National Bolsheviks/ 6 This former
intimateof Ludendorffagitatedwithinthe officer corpsnot only
foran alliance with SovietRussia but also fora so-called"peace-
ful revolution." For a revival of Germany'seconomyReibnitz
consideredit essentialto give the workersa dominantposition
by nationalizing industryand setting up factorycommittees.
Similar ideas were voiced by Rear Admiral Hintze who, deeply
e Edward Hallett Carr, "Radek's 'Political Salon' in Berlin 1919," in Soviet Studies,
vol. 3 (1952) p. 427. This article is a partial translationof Radek's reminiscences,
which appeared in Krasnaya Nov of October 1926.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 455
shakenby Germany'sfate,insistedon "a changeof regime'*as the
sine qua non of her restorationto greatness.
A more comprehensivetheoryof National Bolshevism,devel-
oped on the right,was that of Paul Eltzbacher,professorof eco-
nomicsin Berlin.7 So distressedwas he by Germany'ssad plight
thathe was willingto throwhimselfinto the armsof Bolshevism.
The Bolshevizationof Germanyseemed to him the only course
of action that could save the countryfroman infinitelyworse
calamity,dominationby "Americanand Englishcapital." "Even
if the dictatorshipof the proletariatwere farmore dreadfulthan
it is in reality,"he wrote(p. 28), "it means at least thatGermany
will be ruled by Germans. Who would not preferto submitto
the dictationof his German brothersratherthan let himselfbe
enslavedand exploitedby cold-bloodedEnglishmenand vengeful
Frenchmen?"
Eltzbacherdid not suggestthatin adoptingthe dictatorshipof
the proletariatthe German people should blindly imitate the
Russian example, particularlythe violent formit had assumed
there. At the same time he could not but be fascinatedby the
energyand ruthlessness displayedby Bolshevism. It was entirely
free from"exaggeratedregard for the libertyof the individual
and sentimentaltenderness,"and fullyrecognizedthat the "state
representscoercion" (p. 21). Animated by "powerfulidealistic
ardor,"it constituteda comforting contrastto Social Democracy
and democracyin general. "With mercilessdetermination[Bol-
shevism]compels the individual to subordinatehis intereststo
thoseof the community. It has the courage to act and therefore
possessescreativepower" (p. 38).
Eltzbacher believed that the adoption of Bolshevismwould
pave thewayfora Russo-Germanalliance,thussecuringGermany
againstthe Polish dangerand enablingher to keep the leftbank
of the Rhine. Since, accordingto Article VI of the firstSov-
iet Constitution,Bolshevismopposed the exploitationof weak
nations,he deemed completelyunfounded the fear that "once
7 Paul Eltzbacher, Der Bolschewismus und die deutsche Zukunft (Jena 1919).
456 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Germanyhas accepted BolshevismRussia will attemptto domi-
nate her" (p. 26). Indeed, onlyprosperouscapitalistnationshad
to fearBolshevism;Germany"had nothingto lose but herchains."
Perhaps even more desperatein its tone and in its hostility
to Westerninstitutionsand ideals was the "German Manifesto,"
whichresultedfromdiscussionsbetweenseveralsmall nationalist
groups. It denouncedpoliticalpartiesas "hotbedsof professional
quarrelsomeness"importedfromFrance. Democracy,the legacy
of Versailles,should be replaced, it stated,by a systemof gov-
ernmentin which "the decisive voice is exercisednot by votes,
money,and idle talk,but by vigorousaction." Germanycould
be saved only if her youthjoined the ranks of a radical labor
movementand stood ready to attack Germany'sand Russia's
mortalenemy,Frenchcapitalismand militarism. To succeed in
this programthe anonymousauthor urged: "We must adopt
any and all meanswhichservethe struggleforliberation. And I
insist: all means!"8
Despite these rousingcalls to action, National Bolshevismin
thisfirstphase essentiallyremaineda movementof leaderswith-
out followers. Weary of war and preoccupied with satisfying
their most elementaryneeds, the mass of German people were
unwillingto riskanotherholocaust. The isolationof thosewho
propoundedNational Bolshevikviewswas intensifiedby the sus-
picion with which both Communists and many nationalists
regardedthisnew doctrine. By September1920 Laufenbergand
Wolffheimhad been expelled from both the KPD and the
KAPD; a monthearlierGeneral Weygandhad defeatedthe Red
ArmybeforeWarsaw,and its decliningprestigeresultedin dis-
illusionmentin nationalistcircleswithRussia as a potentialsavior.

1923 was a criticalyear for the Weimar Republic. Germany's

while
veryexistenceas a sovereignpower seemed to be at stake,
8 See Karl Otto Paetel, ed., SozialrevolutionärerNationalismus (Flarchheim 1930)
pp. 28, 27.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 457
internallythe countryfaced economic collapse. On January11
French and Belgian troopshad begun to occupy the Ruhr, the
heart of industrialGermany,in order to collect the reparations
that had not been fully forthcoming.Too weak to meet the
invasion with force,the German governmentsupportedpassive
resistance. Productionin the Ruhr came to a standstill,violence
flaredup sporadically. In addition, inflationshook the entire
nation,ruining the middle class and throwingthe workersinto
a destitutestate. The reactionin Germanyto these eventswas
threefold:strongpatrioticprotestagainstthe seizureof German
territoryswept the country;within the workingclass growing
numbersturnedto radicalismon the left; and for the firsttime
extremismon the rightassumed the characterof a mass move-
ment. This coincidence of a national and a social emergency
producedthe second phase of National Bolshevism.
To exploitthe criticalsituationthe KPD, despitehesitationon
the part of some leaders,joined the "strugglefornational libera-
tion," a policy it had shunned only three years earlier. A few
daysafterthe occupationof the Ruhr the Communistsappealed
to the Germanproletariatto "fightagainstthe Frenchimperialist
invasion."9 Parrotingtherightists, the partycalled for"the over-
throwof the governmentof national dishonor and treason/'10
The change in attitudewas motivatedby a desire to capitalize
on the deep-seatednationalisticfeeling. "It is essential/'urged
the theoreticalorganof the KPD, "thatwe exploit thissentiment
to avoid it being used againstus/' 11
The partyalso hoped to weaken the growingVölkischemove-
ment,consistingof numerous,widelyscatteredextremistgroups
whose political views were rather nebulous and whose actual
strengthit is difficultaccuratelyto ascertain. Basically, they
espousedvehementnationalismand racial antisemitism, and were
» Internationale
Presse-Korrespondenz,vol. 3 (1923) p« 153«
10Berichtüberdie Verhandlungen des IX. ParteitagsderKommunistischen
Partei
Deutschlands, a.M., April j-10, 1924 (Berlin1924)p. 42.
Frankfurt
11Leonid and A. Friedrich,"Der Mittelstand,Nationalbolschewismusund die
Partei,"in Die Internationale,
vol. 6 (1923) p. 115.
458 SOCIAL RESEARCH
thereforeideologicallycloselylinkedto theyoungNational Social-
ist movement,which most of them ultimatelyjoined. For the
Communiststhe new line assumedparticularimportancein view
of the growingsupport that the partywas gaining among the
workersduring the firsthalf of 1923; 12 the KPD thereforefelt
thatif only it could win over the pettybourgeoiselementsswell-
ing the ranks of the nationalists,or at the veryleast neutralize
them, its chances in the strugglefor power would improve
considerably.
Such a coursefittedin well withRussian foreignpolicy,which
ever since 1918 had counted on Germanyto serve as a bulwark
againstthe West. The Sovietleadershad alwaysregardedFrance
as one of their most dangerousenemies,and the specterof a
French advance into Germanyheightenedtheir fears. Izvestia
gave expressionto this alarm when it declared on January21:
"The complete domination of Germanyis a serious threat to
Soviet Russia. It would make French imperialismour immedi-
ate neighbor." The Russians even opposed any attemptat a
Communistrevolution in Germany,since such a disturbance
mightweakenthatcountry'sabilityto resistFrance.13 The Com-
internthereforedecided that Germany'sstruggleagainst France
was that of an "enslaved country" defending herself against
"Westernimperialism,"and deservedthe wholeheartedsupport
of the revolutionaryinternationalproletariat. "Our sympathy,"
said Litvinovon January27, "is with Germany,as it is with any
14
oppressednation."
In developingthe thesisof Germany's"progressiverole" the
CommunistsmanipulatedtraditionalMarxistcategories.15The
12ArthurRosenberg,A History of the German Republic, tr. by Jan F. D. Morrow
and Marie Sieveking(London 1936) p. 194.
is See W. G. Krivitsky,In Stalin's Secret Service (New York and London 1939)
Soviet Docu-
p. 43, and Trotsky'scommentson March 1, 1923, in Jane Degras, ed.,
ments on Foreign Policy, vol. 1, 1917-24 (London 1951) p. 376.
14Quoted in Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs,vol. 1 (New York 1930)
p. 450.
15 Quotations in this and the two following paragraphs are from Internattonale
Presse-Korrespondenz,vol. 3 (1923), as follows: E. Varga, "Wirtschaft und Wirt-
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 459
conceptof the class strugglewas transposedto the level of inter-
nationalconflict. At its Second Congressin 1920 the Comintern
had already drawn a distinctionbetween two types of states,
"exploiters"and "exploitednations/' The worldproletariat,the
Congresshad urged,mustconclude a united frontwith the sub-
jugated peoples in order to destroy"internationalimperialism."
As a resultof the impositionof the VersaillesTreaty, Germany
now was classifiedan exploited nation, and the same tacticwas
thereforeemployedin her case. The noted Russian economic
analyst,Eugen Varga, pointed out that Germany'seconomyhad
become so weak and fallen so completelyunder the domination
of England and France that Germanycould "no longercontinue
to existas an independentpower"; in fact,she had been reduced
to the statusof a colony. The occupation of the Ruhr seemed
finalproofof Germany'splightas "an object of Frenchimperialist
policy."
The Frenchinvasion,argued the Communists,not merelyrep-
resenteda simpleact of aggressionbut, as Frölichwrote,pointed
up France's role as the "most powerfulagent of the counter-
revolution." Still thriving,Frenchcapitalismhad at its disposal
a highlyefficientand reliable stateapparatusand a mightyarmy
with which it aimed to subjugate the entirecontinent. France
had organized and financednumerous expeditionsin order to
crushthe Bolsheviks,and had takenthe lead in the establishment
of the Cordon Sanitaire surroundingRussia. France therefore
constitutedthe greatestdangerto the world revolutionarymove-
ment,greatereven than Mussolini and Noske, the "butcherof
the German proletariat."
In thesecircumstances, declaredthe KPD, the party'shistorical
taskwas to assume leadershipin Germany's"social and national
struggle for liberation." "Poincaré's threat to the German
Schaftspolitikim vierten Vierteljahr 1922," p. 129; Paul Frölich, "Der Ruhrkrieg
und die deutschen Kommunisten," p. 214; Karl Radek, "Das machtlose Deutsch-
land," p. 389, and "Der Faschismus,wir und die deutsche Sozialdemokratie,"p. 649;
Neurath, "FünfterVerhandlungstagder ErweitertenExekutive der Kommunistischen
Internationale,"p. 900.
46o SOCIAL RESEARCH
nation," warned Radek, "is in effecta threat to the German
revolution." The workingclass musttherefore have the courage,
he said, "to put itselfat the head of the nation, to accept the
burdenand honorof leadingthepeople and fusetheclassstruggle
withthequest fornationalemancipation";a workers'government
would not even shrinkfromwaging war against the Versailles
victors. In short, exhorted Neurath, a leading Communist,
instead of "intransigentinternationalismwe need flexible
internationalism."
The situation in 1923, the CommunisttheoristThalheimer
asserted,mustnot be confusedwith that of 1914. At that time
the German lefthad rightlycondemnedthe Social Democrats-
- forparticipationin an imperialist
the so-called"Social patriots"
war foughtin the interestof a reactionarybourgeoisie. The war
on the Ruhr, on the otherhand, was "objectivelyrevolutionary,"
despite the leading role played by such capitalistsas Cuno and
Stinnes. "The German bourgeoisie,howevercounterrevolution-
aryit maybe internally, has, owingto the cowardiceof the petty-
bourgeoisdemocrats(above all the Social Democrats)takenup a
position which makes it appear externallyrevolutionary. Like
Bismarckin 1864-70 and for similar historicalreasons, it has
assumed this external revolutionarycharacteragainst its own
will." 16
Troubled lestthesestrangepronouncements give theimpression
that nationalismhad been unquestioninglyembraced and had
made superfluousthe class war against the internalenemy,the
partyhastenedto affirm its oppositionto the Germanbourgeoisie.
It issued the double-edgedslogan: "Beat Poincaré in the Ruhr
and Cuno at the Spree." The proletariathad to maintain the
vigorous fightagainst the ruling circles, which continued to
exploit the workersand which could not be trustedto remain
faithfulto the nationalcause. Only afterthe defeatof the bour-
geoisie could genuine national liberationbe attained. In theory
i« AugustThalheimer,"Some Tactical Problemsof the War in the Ruhr," in
The Communist no. 25 (n.d.)p. 101.
International,
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 461
such a "war on two fronts"was possible; in practice,however,
the party,by so stronglyemphasizingresistanceto France,could
not but moderatesomewhatits traditionally fiercehostilitytoward
its own governmentand the bourgeoisie. Increasingly,in party
pronouncements,the term Volk appeared alongside that of
17
"proletariat."
By midyear 1923 Russia's world position had deterioratedto
such an extentthatthe Communistscould no longeraffordtheir
moderation. The sharpeningtensionsbetweenSovietRussia and
England over influencein the Near East and India had brought
the two countriesto the brink of diplomaticrupture. Fearful
of the Kremlin'sdesignson the Dardanelles, Turkey had aban-
doned her hithertofriendlyattitudetowardRussia and aligned
herselfwith Britain. In Persia, Afghanistan,and India British
authoritiesclaimed to have discovereda networkof Soviet agents
fomentingrevolutionary activities. The seriesof crisesin Anglo-
Russian relationsculminatedin May in the Curzon ultimatum,
which threatenedthe cancelationof all trade agreementsunless
the Communistsceased their "pernicious activities." Russia's
fearsof the West now gave way to panic. Already frightened
by France'sadvance into Germany,the Sovietgovernment viewed
the English ultimatumas anothermove towarda new interven-
tion.18 "Soviet Russia and the Germanworkers,"warnedInpre-
korr(vol. 3, p. 682), "are to be strangledtogether. A new world
war is beingprepared." The formationof a Russian-Germanbloc
seemed imperative. At the initiativeof the Comintern,there-
fore,the KPD's coy flirtation withnationalismturnedinto ardent
wooing of nationalist extremists.
The inaugurationof thiscampaignwas assignedto Karl Radek,
who enjoyeda reputationfor ideological versatility.As already
mentioned,Radek had toyedwith National Bolshevikideas for
a numberof years,and he was convincedthatsuch a positiondid
it Heinz Schürer,Die politischeArbeiterbewegung Deutschlandsin der Nach-
(Leipzig1933)p. 60.
kriegszeit
is Louis Fischer(citedabove,note 14) vol. 1, p. 443.
462 SOCIAL RESEARCH
not implya concessionto nationalism. In fact,on June 16 he
noted to the Enlarged Executive of the Cominternin Moscow
thatCommunists"mustcondemnnationalismin all its forms."19
Four days later the same Radek, again addressingthat group,
delivered a startlingspeech, glorifyingthe heroism of Leo
Schlageter,who had been executedin May by the Frenchforacts
of sabotage in the Ruhr.20 A memberof the Freikorpsand an
organizerfor the Nazi party,he had gone to the Ruhr early in
1923 to fightthe invaders. Friendsbetrayedhim to the French
authorities,and during his trial he in turn revealed the names
of severalof his accomplices.21The condemnationof Schlageter
created a stir throughoutGermany;rightistsraised him to the
statusof a national hero, and the Nazis reveredhim as one of
their early martyrs. It was this man who inspired Radek to
tenderan olive branch to the nationalistsby invitingthem to
coordinatetheirefforts with those of the Communists.
Schlageter,Radek contended in this speech (p. 153), was a
"martyr ofGermannationalism"whomCommunistsoughtto hold
in highregard:as "a courageoussoldierof the counter-revolution,
he deservesto be sincerelyhonored by us, the soldiers of the
revolution." True, Schlageterhad firedon Germanworkers,but,
as Radek hastenedto add, he had not acted "fromselfishmotives";
he had been "convincedhe was servingthe German people." 22
19Internationale Presse-Korrespondenz,vol. 3 (1923) P- 902.
20Karl Radek, "Leo Schlageter- The Wanderer into the Void," in Labour
Monthly (London) vol. 5 (1923) pp. 152-57. Der Wanderer ins Nichts (The Wan-
derer into the Void) was a novel that appeared in 1920, relating the story of a
Freikorps officerwho died fightingagainst Spartakus.
21Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in
Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) pp. 236-37.
22In answer to a reproach for these compliments,Radek later offeredan explana-
tion: "I always have high regard for those who are willing to risk their lives
for their ideals, even though they are class enemies against whom I shall fight to
the limit. On the other hand, I have nothing but scorn for people who dare not
put themselvesinto jeopardy for either the revolutionor the counter-revolutionand
who can do nothing but wail like old women." See Karl Radek, "Der Faschismus,
wir und die deutschen Sozialdemokraten,"in Schlageter: Eine Auseinandersetzung
zwischen Karl Radek, Paul Frölich, Graf Ernst Reventlow, Moeller van den Brück
(Berlin n.d.) p. 6, hereaftercited as SchlageterAuseinandersetzung.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 463
Idealisticnationalistssuch as Schlageterhad to be givencreditfor
realizingthatdeep social cleavageswithinGermanypreventedthe
attainmentof national emancipation. They appreciatedthe fact
thatan exploited,wretchedworkingclass could not be relied on
to defendthe nation. Yet, Radek pointedout, theyfailed to per-
ceive the only effective remedy. Justas the emancipationof the
peasantshad been necessaryin order to win the battle against
Napoleon afterPrussia's shatteringdefeat at Jena, so now the
workershad to be freedonce more fromtheirfettersin order to
expel theFrenchinvaders.
Perhapsthemostseriousshortcoming of the nationalists,Radek
maintainedin thisspeech,was theirfailureto detectthe betrayal
of thosewho posed as the championsof the national cause. Sin-
cere patriotsmust break with the profiteers, speculators,and in-
dustrialmagnateswho were enslavingthe German people and
'
sending 'securitiesabroad so that theymay be enrichedand the
"
countryimpoverished. They must make common cause with
thevastmajorityoftheGermanpeople,they"mustcreatea united
frontof brain and hand workers. . . Only old prejudicesstand in
the way." Thus united,"Germanywill be able to draw upon a
vast potentialof resistancewhich in turn will overcomeall ob-
stacles. If thecause of the people is made the cause of the nation,
thenthe cause of the nationwill become the cause of the people"
(p. 156). Then Germanywill findthewaytowardan alliance with
the "Russian workersand peasantsin orderto throwoffthe yoke
ofEntentecapital."
Radek concludedhis speechwithan emotionalappeal (p. 157):
". . . we believe thatthe greatmajorityof the nationalist-minded
massesbelongnot to thecamp of thecapitalistsbut to the camp of
theworkers. We wantto find,and we shall find,the path to those
masses. We shall see to it thatmen like Schlageter,who are pre-
pared to die fora commoncause, will become not wanderersinto
thevoid,but wanderersinto a betterfutureforthewhole of man-
kind; we shall make sure that theywill not spill theirblood for
theprofitof thecoal and ironbarons,but in thecause of thegreat
464 SOCIAL RESEARCH
toilingGerman people, who are a part of the familyof peoples
fighting fortheiremancipation. . . Schlageterhimselfcannotnow
hear this declaration,but we are convincedthat there are hun-
dredsof Schlageterswho will hear it and understandit."
Radek's "SchlageterSpeech" was publicized throughoutGer-
many. As the statementof a leading figureof the Communist
International,it clearlyrevealed that National Bolshevismhad
finallywon the officialendorsementof the Communistleadership.
The Politburoof the Russian Bolshevikpartyhad concurredin
the enunciationof the Schlageterline, and Zinoviev,as head of
the Comintern,had givenhis writtenconsentto the speech,after
its deliverydescribingit as "correctand good." 23 Though the
National Bolshevismin the Schlageterspeech did not constitute
a radical innovation,the factthatit bore this stampof approval
indicatedthe seriousnessof the Communists'intentions. Russia's
plight,it seemed,requireddaringremedies. In pronouncements
still permeatedwith Marxistterminology the partynow declared
thatit mustwelcomeaid fromany quarter. "Whoeveris sincere
in his intentionsof marchingwith us part of the way (ein Stück
Wegs) will findus willing,"said Paul Frölich in the Schlageter
Auseinandersetzung (p. 23). By mid-1923,then,the KPD's "flexi-
bility" had reached a point wherethe partycould call forrevolu-
tionaryaction againstthe class enemyand at the same time eulo-
gize a man who had takenpride in massacringproletarians.
The clarion call of Radek strucka responsivechord among
rightistelements. In JulyRote Fahne, the KPD's leading daily
newspaper,broughtout a special issue entitled"Germany'sWay."
It carriedthe Schlageterspeech on the frontpage. On Radek's
suggestiontwonationalists, GrafErnstReventlowand Moellervan
den Brück,submittedtheirrepliesto theCommunistpaper,which
23See Zinoviev,Addressto the ThirteenthPartyConference,in Pravda,January
25, 1924,quotedin SeymourRotter,Sovietand Comintern PolicytowardGermany,
1919-1923: A Case Studyof Strategyand Tactics,unpublisheddissertation(Col-
umbia, 1954) pp. 374-75; also Protokoll:FünfterKongressder Kommunistischen
quoted in EdwardHallettCarr,The Interregnum,
Internationale, 1923-1924(New
York 1954) p. 180.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 465
displayedthem prominentlyin the same issue. Both were im-
portantright-wing publicistswithconsiderableinfluence. Revent-
low, editorof the notoriouslyantisemiticweeklyReichswart,later
became a full-fledged Nazi; Moeller van den Brückardentlyadvo-
cated imperialistexpansionand is regardedas a precursorof Na-
tional Socialism.24 Like all nationalists,they were deeply con-
cerned with the eliminationof class antagonisms. It was their
fearthata divided nation precludedthe pursuitof an aggressive
foreignpolicy by Germany. They were thereforeparticularly
pleased to witnessthe Communists'apparentconversionfromde-
fendersof the proletariatto championsof the nation. Eager to
establish contact with these potential allies, Reventlow and
Moeller clasped the hand Radek extended. To write in Rote
Fahne appeared to them a unique opportunity"to disseminate
völkisch-sozialeideas among young Communistidealists and to
enlisttheirsupport."25 Could it be thatRadek, the archmanipu-
lator,wasbeingmanipulated?
The admirationRadek had expressedforthe "heroicnational-
ists"foundits counterpartin the respectReventlowand Moeller
feltforthe dynamicqualities supposedlydisplayedby the Com-
munists. They regardedthemas determinedidealistswho "pos-
sess genuine patrioticfeelings." Furthermore,Reventlow con-
tended,Völkischeand Communistsweredrawntogetherbycertain
commoninterests. Both held the new democracyresponsiblefor
an inept,vacillating,and spinelessforeignpolicy. Both Völkische
and Communistsstroveforradical changeby recourseto extreme
measures,and shared an eagernessto destroythe "Weimar sys-
tem." All other parties,committedto parliamentarism, wasted
theirtime talkingin the Reichstagand "promotingtheirselfish
interests." Conservativeand Communistrevolutionaries, on the
other hand, loathed democracyand liberalism,which emanated
24For an excellent exposition of Moeller's ideas see Fritz R. Stern, Cultural
Despair and the Politics of Discontent: A Study of the Rise of the "Germanic"
Ideology, unpublished dissertation(Columbia, 1953) pp. 147-200.
25Graf Ernst Reventlow, "'Ein Stück Wegs'?" in Die Tat, vol.
23 (1931-32) p.
991-
466 SOCIAL RESEARCH
froman individualisticand egotisticalconceptionof life.26 They
shareda bitterhatredforcapitalism,whichwas characterizedby
values,and classconflict.They
exploitation,stresson materialistic
sought"an abandonmentof the institutionsof privateproperty,
the nationalizationof banks, trustsand state control over land
etc."27 Finally,Reventlowand Moeller argued,both Völkische
and Communistsput theirtrustin Russia,which,as an oppressed
and "proletariannation," was the natural ally of "proletarian
Germany"againstthe West and all it stoodfor.
Despite theseaffinities,Reventlowand Moeller also saw serious
obstaclesin the wayof any real cooperation. Importantideologi-
cal barriersstill separatedthe two groups. The Völkische,they
counseled,must insiston a German type of socialism,one free
fromthe destructive notionsof class struggle,proletariandictator-
ship, and an enervatinginternationalism.Germanyhad to create
her own socialism,based on the idea of the Volksgemeinschaft
(people's community),which would lead to an "organic unity"
28
groundedon the "cooperationof all estates." Such a new order,
theymaintained,could be realizedonlywiththeeliminationof all
Jewishinfluence,a step that the Communists,both in Germany
and in Russia, would have to take to prove themselvesacceptable
allies. Vituperativeattackson the Völkischeby the Communists
mustcease. And, of course,Russia would have to forgoany at-
tempt to dominate Germany. If these conditions were met,
Reventlowconcluded,the Völkischewould not be averse to the
proposalto marchtogetherein Stück Wegs. As he put it in the
Schlageter Auseinandersetzung(p. 19): "Should Mr. Radek and
the CommunistInternational,for which he spoke, be ready for
such cooperation,let themfollowwordsby deeds. We Völkische
are not prejudiced,and are willingto acceptsupportfromanyone.
26Arthur Moeller van den Brück, Das dritte Reich, 3rd ed.
(Hamburg 1931) p.
201.
27Graf Ernst Reventlow, Völkisch-kommunistische
Einigung? (Leipzig 1924) pp.
43-44-
28Arthur Moeller van den Brück, Das Recht der jungen Völker:
Sammlung
politischerAufsätze (Berlin 1932) p. 66.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 467
Butwewillnotconsider the'substance'
sacrificing ofourvölkische
idealsorhavingtheminfringed upon."
Fromitsveryinceptionearlyin 1923NationalBolshevism was
notlimitedto meretheoretical disputations on thehighestlevels.
Frequentdiscussions tookplacebetweenindividualVölkische and
Communists, andsometimes evenbetweenNazisand Communists,
abouttheneedfora unitedfrontagainstFrance. Speakersfrom
all thesemovements sharedthesameplatforms and carefully ad-
justedthecontents of theiraddressesso as to win applausefrom
mixedaudiences.29 The Communists asserted thatfascism- a term
used by themindiscriminately to describeall extremerightist
-
groups was a politicalmovement witha definite socialcontent
thathadtobe fought notsimplybyforcebutprimarily withideas.
The crucialtaskofthepartywastoweantheMittelstand fromthe
clutchesoffascists.This couldbe accomplished onlyby putting
"thestrongest emphasis on nationalismin our propaganda." 30 It
couldnotbe done"if,as hitherto, ourpressrestricts itselfto rant-
ing about storm
fascist troopers,aboutheroes of therubber cudgel,
theirstoresofarmsand thefinancial backingof theNationalSo-
cialists[bybig business]."31 In fact,as a KPD circularforor-
ganizersamongnationalist officers
exhorted:"One has to speak
withofficersverycourteously and amiably,to addressthembythe
titleTour Excellency.'References to Marxand partyjargonare
tobe avoided."32
29See Carr,Interregnum (citedabove,note 23) p. 182. The Communists, clamor-
ing fornationalist support,are said to have resortedto antisemitism.Ruth Fischer,
in particular,has been chargedwith attacking"Jewishcapitalists." She herself
deniesthatthisimpliedantisemitism.In a letterof May 30, 1955,she pointedout
to the presentwritersthatshe "triedto explain to National Socialiststudentsthe
need to fightnot onlyJewishbut also Gentilecapitalists."See also Ruth Fischer,
Stalin and German Communism:A Study in the Originsof the State Party
(Cambridge, Mass.,1948)p. 283.
30Paul Böttcher,"Der Weg und Wille zur Macht:
Ergebnisseder Erweiterten
Exekutiveder Kommunistischen Internationale,"in Die Internationale,
vol. 6 (1923)
p. 426.
si Friedrich
(citedabove,note11) p. 118.
32Reportedin Vorwärts, eveninged., August8, 1923. See also Ruth Fischer
(citedabove,note29) p. 282. In the lightof suchpronouncements one readswith
468 SOCIAL RESEARCH
When the Nazi partyinviteda Communistspeakerto a public
debate,thepartysentHermannRemmele,who triedto minimize
the differencesbetweenthe two groupsby the followingremarks:
"At theverybeginning,I wishto make one thingclear. The Na-
tional Socialist Party,like all other socialist organizations,has
withinitsranksa numberof convincedand honestpeople. Dedi-
cated to a cause we reject,theypledge to it theirlives. This cour-
age and braverywe honor and respect."33 AnotherCommunist
speakerat a politicalrallyorganizedby Reventlowdeclared that
"The timeis not faroffwhen Völkischeand Communistswill be
able to unite" (Berliner Tageblatt, February9, 1924). And a
Nazi agitatorpublicly expressedthe hope that "despite deep-
seated differences it will be possible to act togetheragainst the
commonenemy" (Die Rote Fahne, August4, 1923).
There is evidenceof actual militarycooperationbetween Völk-
ischeand Communistsduringthe criticalyear 1923. They aided
each otherin the procurementof arms; in numerousacts of sabo-
tage,committedin the Ruhr againstthe French,membersof the
two groups workedhand in hand; theyfoughttogetheragainst
separatistsin the Rhineland,and were usually"led by nationalist
Prussianofficers."34 Völkischeand Communistsalso
joined hands
in Upper Silesia, the scene of protractedfightingbetween Poles
and Germansover the dispositionof that area, and of repeated
strikewaves.
ExtensiveCommunistagitationamongFreikorpsunits,veiled in
nationalisticterminology, succeededin persuadingsome of them
to supporta Communist-led strike. Freikorpsmen marchedat the
head of demonstrations and participatedin attackson the police.
amazement Mr. Carr's statementin Interregnum (cited above, note 23) that "the
'Schlageter line' representedno sort of compromise with Fascist doctrine or Fascist
policy" (p. 184).
33"Rede des Genossen Remmele in der Faschistenversammlungin
Stuttgart,"
in Die Rote Fahne (Berlin), August 10, 1923.
34Erich Müller, "Zur Geschichte des Nationalbolschewismus," in Deutsches
Volkstum,vol. 34 (1932) p. 788. See also Erwin Barth, "Die Abwehrkämpfean der
Ruhr," in Die Neue Zeit,'vöi. 41, part 1 (1923) p. 464. On armament aid see Ruth
Fischer (cited above, note 29) p. 286.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 469
In theviewofone Communist writer,thefactthatboththeparty
oftheproletariat and theFreikorps nowwereconcerned withthe
fateof thenationopenedthewayto theconversion of theFrei-
korps"fromsupporters and defenders of capitalism. . . intode-
fendersof the workingclass."35 A Freikorpsleaderin Upper
SilesiarelatesthatmanyCommunists usedto greethimas "Herr
Chef." Whenapprisedoftheerror, theywouldretort:"Oncethe
bulletsstartflying, we willfight together."Repeatedly, he points
out, Communists expressedthe wishto "join forcesundermy
leadership."36 From theseincidents it is not to be inferred that
theFreikorps as a wholeacceptedNationalBolshevism.Yet there
can be littledoubtthatthereexisteda strongmutualattraction.
To manyof theFreebooters Bolshevism had becomethesymbol
of activismand of oppositionto liberalismand bourgeoiscom-
placency.37 This fascination withthe Bolshevikmentality led a
Freikorps officer to refer to his men as Rechtsbolschewisten (Bol-
sheviksoftheright).38
Neitherthetheory northepracticeof NationalBolshevism in
itssecondphasefounduniversal approvalwithintheranksof the
GermanCommunist party or the campof thenationalists.The
Communist leftwingfearedthattheSchlageter linewoulddivert
thepartyfromitsrevolutionary roleand weakenitsresistance to
fascism.The rightwingfavoreda unitedfrontwiththe Social
Democrats ratherthanwiththenationalists.Pressured fromboth
sidesandembarrassed the
by appearance of KPD on which
posters
theSovietstarfounditselfnextto theswastika, theKPD stepped
up itsantifascist
agitation, which had never been fullyabandoned.39
The CentralCommittee calledforantifascist demonstrations on
July29. When the police forbade publicmeetings, theKPD ex-
35Felix Schmidt, "Betrachtungen zum oberschlesischen
Streik," in Die Interna-
tionale,vol. 6 (1923) p. 411.
36Peter von Heydebreck,Wir
Wehr-Wölfe:Erinnerungen eines Freikorps-Führers
(Leipzig 1931) pp. 189-Q0.
37Waite (cited above, note 21) pp. 271-72.
38 Manfred von Killinger,Kampf um OberschiestenCLeiozit?iqza' n <m
39 Ossip K. Flechtheim,Die KommunistischePartei Deutschlands
in der Weimarer
Republik (Offenbach1948) p. 89.
470 SOCIAL RESEARCH
ecutiveasked Moscowforadvice. In the absenceof Zinovievand
Bukharin,Radek, fearfulfor the Schlageterpolicy,was able to
persuade the Cominternto advise against the demonstration.40
Still,the"antifascistday" tookplace. Althoughtherewas no mass
response, the incident clearly signifieda turningpoint in the
KPD's attitudetowardNational Bolshevism.
Communistenthusiasmfor National Bolshevismwas now on
the wane. By September 1923 the objective situation too no
longerfavoredsucha program. With theabandonmentof passive
resistancein the Ruhr by Stresemann,extremenationalismhad
lost much of its attraction.41In actualitythe Schlageterline had
neverhad a chance to succeed. Firm and lastingcooperationbe-
tween Völkischeand Communistswas ruled out by the former's
reluctance. The right,politicallyon the rise,considereditselfso
strongthatany real concessionsto the leftto gain additionalmass
supportseemed unnecessary. Furthermore,the Völkischestood
on certainprinciplestheywere unwillingto compromisein any
circumstances.42They would not give up theirwar against"the
Jewishdanger,"would not submit to proletarianleadershipin
any form,and would not risk Russian domination. Indeed, on
August 14 the Nazis had alreadydecided to ban any furtherco-
operation.43
The Communists,on the otherhand, had been less squeamish.
They had takentheinitiativeand, anxiousfora favorableresponse
to theirovertures,had exhibitedfewerscruplesin tryingto effectu-
ate an alliancewiththe Völkische. That the KPD had in factgone
too farin trimming itsideologicaltenetsto ensnarethefascistswas
admittedby the 1924 PartyCongress. In its view the movement
had committed"extraordinarily dangerousdeviations." The party
had relied "far too heavilyon nationalisticphraseology,and had
committedthe grave and perilous errorof assertingthat Com-
40 Edward Hallett Carr, German-SovietRelations between the two World Wars,
1919-1939 (Baltimore 1951) p. 72.
41 Erich Müller, Nationalbolschewismus (Hamburg 1933) p. 22.
42See Franz Borkenau, The CommunistInternational (London
1938) pp. 246-48.
43 Carr, Interregnum(cited above, note 23) p. 183.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 471
"
munistscould marchtogetherwithVölkische'ein StückWegs/ 44
With national tensionssubsidingand the countryon the road to
economicprosperity, it seemedjudicious to shelvethe programof
National Bolshevism.
m
The period of stabilityduringthe mid-twenties was but the calm
beforethestorm. The worldwidedepressionwhichbegan in 1929
deeply affectedGermany. Unemploymentrose to spectacular
heights;theplightof thelowermiddleclassbecame desperate,and
agriculturetoo founditselfin direstraits. The problemofrepara-
tionshad once more become acute; the Young Plan of 1929 did
not impresslargesegmentsof the Germanpeople as a viable solu-
tion. Unable adequately to cope with these difficulties, the re-
publican regime increasingly lost the confidenceof the masses.
The rampantdiscontentbredpoliticalextremism.Both Nazis and
Communistsnow scoredphenomenalelectoralvictories,and the
destinyof Germanyseemed to lie in the hands of one of these
movements.
Under the stressof domesticand foreigncrisesNational Bol-
shevismappeared for the thirdtime. Among the nationalistsit
was born out of a virulenthatredforthe ailing capitalistsystem,
and intensifiedhostilitytowardthe Versaillespowers. The Com-
munistsreturnedto National Bolshevismin an attemptto stave
offthe rapidlygaining National Socialists,and to preventany
rapprochementbetween Germanyand the West, which Russia
considereda threatto hersecurity.
The prevailinghostileattitudetowardtheYoung Plan provided
the KPD with an incentiveto play the nationalisticcard once
more. The partycondemnedthe new reparationssettlementon
the ground that it exposed the workersto exploitationof the
harshestkind. Accordingto the Communistsit constituteda be-
trayalof the German toilingmassesby the German bourgeoisie
and the Social Democracyto internationalcapital. ErnstThael-
44Verhandlungen
des IX. Parteitagsder KPD (cited above,note 10) p. 375.
472 SOCIAL RESEARCH
mann,theunquestionedleaderof the party,tookpride in the fact
that Communistswentfurthereven than the Nazis. The latter,
he said, acknowledgedthat once in power theywould pay those
reparationsGermanycould afford,while the KPD unequivocally
rejectedall reparations.45Furthermore, reflectingthe ever-pres-
ent anxietiesof the Sovietleaders,who scentedin the Young Plan
anotherconspiracyagainst Russia, Thaelmann insistedthat the
agreement"is not onlyof importanceforGermany,but represents
a plotoftheinternational 4(5
bourgeoisieagainsttheSovietUnion."
In preparationforthe crucial Reichstagelectionsin September
1930 the Cominternorderedthe KPD to lay even more stresson
the nationalistictheme. To take the wind out of thé sails of the
Nazis, the Central Committeeannounced its "Program of Na-
tionaland Social Liberation"to a startledelectorateon August24.
Denouncing the nationalisticslogans of the Hitleritesas dema-
gogic, the partysolemnlypromised to tear up "the predatory
VersaillesTreaty" and the Young Plan. "Only social revolution
by the workingclass will be able to solve the national problems
facingGermany." The programcalled on the toilersto break
with the deceitfulfascistsand abandon the "treacherousSocial
Democracy,"the partyof the VersaillesTreaty.47
The resortto nationalismmayhave aided the Communists,but
the Nazis proved infinitely more skillfulin the use of the same
weapon (from1928 to 1930 the former'ssharein the totalvote in-
creased by 24 percent,the latter'sby 604 percent - though na-
tionalismwas not,ofcourse,the onlyfactorinvolved). Seemingly
unperturbed,the KPD persistedin espousingthis line. Indeed,
as the Nazis stepped up their nationalisticcampaign,the Com-
munistsdid theirutmostto outdo them. In an Inprekorrarticle
theychided the Nazis for theirmeekness:"What demands does
^Verhandlungen des Reichstags, vol. 426 (Berlin 1930) February 11, 1930, p.
3938.
46Ernst Thaelmann, "Die Probleme der KPD auf der Sitzung des Erweiterten
Praesidiums des EKKI," in Die KommunistischeInternationale,vol. 11 (1930) p. 528.
47The complete program may be found in Flechtheim (cited above, note 39) pp.
281-84.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 473
HitlermakeuponFrance[inMein Kampf]? Does he wantto re-
gain the territories lost in 1918? No. He condemnsthe . . .
demandforrestoration ofthe1914boundaries. . . Thus Hitlerat
once surrenders the Germanpopulationof Alsace,Eupen, and
Malmedy, whichwentto Belgium,and probablyevenDanzigand
thepartsofUpperSilesiawhichfellto Poland." On thequestion
of "regaining thelostcolonies"the articleaccusedthe Nazis of
ambiguity, "willingness tobargain,"andappeasement oftheWest-
ernimperialists.There could be onlyone explanationforthis
timidity: "It is treason!Those betrayed and cheatedwill be the
Germanmasses,whoexpectreal nationalliberationfromHitler.
Insteadan evenmoreshameful enslavementawaitsthem! Hitler,
'theliberator/ thusendsup at thepointwheretheservilepolicy
of thepast 13 yearshas held us: in subservience to Frenchim-
perialism." In conclusion the articlestrongly urgedtheKPD to
bringhometo themassestheessentialtruththatGermany's sole
real friendwas theSovietUnion. The Nazis were the "mortal
enemies"ofGermany's struggle fornationalliberation,and "only
Communism will breakthechainof Versailles!" 48
The KPD's protestations ofpatriotism failedto accomplish the
desiredend. The Nazirisetopowercouldnotbe stopped, at least
notbythesemeans.EvenaftertheNationalSocialists had proved
theirenergyand ruthlessness by smashingthe tradeunionsand
crushing all politicalopposition, theCommunists continued, from
exile,to tauntthemfortheirsupposedinsincerity on thenational
question. Whathadhappened, askeda KPD appealin May 1933,
to Hitler'sboast thathe would tear up the VersaillesTreaty?
Hitler,thedeclaration assured,wouldneveraccomplish thatfeat,
forhe "recognizes Versailles andpaysinterest on thetribute!That
is theplaintruth, just as it is indisputable he abandonsthe
that
Germansin Alsace,Danzig,theCorridorand UpperSilesia,and
SouthernTyrolwhoweretornawayfromtheirfatherland.He
48T. Neubauer, "Die auswärtigePolitik des deutschenNationalsozialismus;
in Internationale
Hitlerund Frankreich," vol. 12 (1932);quota-
Presse-Korrespondenz,
tionsfrompp. 1253,1255,1256.
474 SOCIAL RESEARCH
leaves them under the terrorof the Versailles victorswithout
49
puttingup any resistance." Hitler was not long in provinghis
"sincerity." The Communiststauntedno more.
The Communistsalwaysmaintainedthat the adoption of na-
tionalism did not involve any ideological compromise. They
spoke of "tacticalmanoeuvres"withinthe framework of "revolu-
tionaryinternationalism."On theright,however,the thirdphase
of National Bolshevismwas characterized by a genuineideological
reorientation. Overwhelmedby the disintegrationof German
society on every level, many nationalistsreacted vehemently
againstboth capitalismand democracy,whichtheyheld responsi-
ble for the country'scalamity. Eager to overcomea "decadent
parliamentarism," theyshunnedall formalorganization. Instead,
theydrewtogetherin numeroussmall literarycircles,as devotees
of certainperiodicals,in secretsocietiesand illicit semi-military
formations(Kampfbünde).50None of thesehad a clearlydefined
politicalprogram,but all were inspiredby one absorbingaim, to
findan immediateand radical solutionto Germany'sills.
A National Bolshevikstrandappeared even within the Nazi
party,and was responsiblefora split in thatorganization. With
Hitler'srefusalto acceptOtto Strasser'sferventanticapitalismand
Easternorientationin foreignpolicy,the latter,on July4, 1930,
led his followersout of the movement,with the slogan "The So-
cialistsleave the NSDAP." He thenfoundedthe "Black Front,"
a secretiveloose union of several anti-Naziright-wing organiza-
tions. Acknowledging itsindebtednessto Moellervan den Brück,
the coalitiondefinedits positionas follows:"The Black Front is
nationalisticand socialisticin spirit,martialand rusticin form,
and völkischin essence."51
49"Kämpftfür Arbeit,Brot, Freiheit,Sozialismus,"Ein Aufrufder KPD, in
Rundschauüber Politik,Wirtschaft und Arbeiterbewegung
(Basel), vol. 2 (1933)
P- 391-
soFor an excellentsurveyof thesevariousgroupssee ArminMohler,Die Kon-
servativeRevolutionin Deutschland,1918-1932:Grundriss
ihrerWeltanschauungen
(Stuttgart1950).
si RichardSchapke,Die SchwarzeFront:Von den Zielenund Aufgabenund vom
Kampfeder deutschenRevolution(Leipzig 1933) p. 76. Leading positionin the
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 475
The most forcefulstatementof rightistNational Bolshevism
during the early 1930s is to be found in the writingsof Karl O.
Paetel and ErnstNiekisch. The formerled the "Gruppe Sozial-
revolutionärerNationalisten* '
(Organizationof Social-Revolution-
aryNationalists), which derivedmostof itssupportfromtheYouth
Movement (BündischeJugend). In the traditionof the World
War I and Freikorpsgenerations, thesegroupsexhibitedan almost
mystical reverenceforthe nation. But forthefollowersof Paetel 52
nationalliberationpresupposedsocial regeneration. They hoped
to build "a Reich of true justice,honor,liberty,and dignityfor
all its people" (Wulf),a Germanythatwould enjoy freedomand
genuine organic unity. A state based on such principles,the
Paetel circlebelieved,could be establishedonlywhen the capital-
isticorderhad been overthrown.Capitalismwas tearingthe na-
tion apart into warringfactions. The German bourgeoisiemade
commoncause withthe Westernexploiters. The way out of this
morasslay in supportof the oppressedrevolutionaryproletariat,
whichby meansof a successfulclass strugglewould put an end to
fraternalstrifeand achieve a true Volksgemeinschaft.Both the
NSDAP and the KPD wereessentiallyproletarianparties,thought
Paetel,and the social-revolutionarynationalistsoughtthereforeto
heal theriftbetweenthem.
The Paetel group also sharplyattackedWesternculturewhich,
theyalleged, was corruptingand ruining Germany. Urbanism,
liberalism,and parliamentarism were the elementsof decay to be
rootedout, fortheykept the nation divided and in constanttur-
moil. Against these foreignvalues they posited those of the

"Black Front" was held by Strasser'sown circle, the "Kampfgenossenschaftrevolu-

tionärer Nationalsozialisten." Some of the other units were the "Bund Oberland,"
the "Tat-Kreis," and the "Wehrwolf" group. For a full discussion see Adolf Ehrt,
Totale Krise- Totale Revolution? Die "Schwarze Front" des völkischen National-
ismus (Berlin 1933) pp. 49-75. For a summary exposition of Otto Strasser'sviews
see his Aufbau des deutschen Sozialismus (Leipzig 1932) .
52Subsequent quotations of Wulf, Becker, and Paetel himself are from
the work
edited by Paetel (cited above, note 8), as follows: Friedrich Wulf, "Sozialismus
und Nation," p. 42; Rolf Becker, "Bauer und soziale Revolution,"
p. 69; Karl
O. Paetel, "Standort,"p. 78.
476 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Germanpeasantrootedin native soil. "Born out of the deepest
Germanicblood and anti-Romanand anti-Western sentiment,the
peasant represents for us the pivot of the social revolution"
(Becker). The existinginstitutions overthrown,a "Germansoviet
state"was to be founded "which would make possiblethe self-gov-
ernmentof the toilingmasses." The waywould thenbe open for
an alliance withSovietRussia,also an "oppressednation."
A forcecapable of attainingthe new order,argued Paetel him-
self,was in the processof formation. This "German front"be-
longed neitherto the rightnor to the left. It stood above the
quibbling parties,it was independentof partybureaucratsand
dogma: "Anyone fromeither extremewho is concernedabout
Germanyand socialismbelongs to us. We are not interestedin
hispartylabel."
Paetel's intellectualdevelopment,it has been said with some
justification,had reached "an advanced stage of Bolshevization,"
and "nationalismwas merelyused by him to attainBolshevism."5S
Ernst Niekisch shared most of Paetel's ideas, but differedin
puttingprimaryemphasison the ideals of Prussianism. He may
therefore be characterizedas a "PrussianBolshevik." The slogan
of the circlehe headed, the "Widerstandsbewegung," was, appro-
- -
priatelyenough, "Sparta Potsdam Moscow," and its emblem
consistedofa Prussianeagle,a sword,and thehammerand sickle.54
Niekischbemoaned the factthat Germanyhad forsakenthe tra-
ditionsof Potsdam,and admiredSovietRussia forhavingadopted
them. The Easterncolossushad achieved stabilityand strength
because it had cultivatedan ethos of revolutionaryactivism,of
work and dedication to the community. He commended the
Bolsheviksfornot toleratinginternaldiscord,a "babbling parlia-
ment," and for introducingorder and authoritariandiscipline.
In his Entscheidung,publishedin Berlin in 1930,he declared (p.
53Ehrt(citedabove,note51) p. 56.
54Klemensvon Klemperer,The ConservativeRevolution in Germany,1913
throughthe Early Yearsof the Republic,unpublisheddissertation
(Harvard,1949)
p. 305.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 477
134): "The ruthlessbraveryand roughnessof Communismreveal
a hardymilitaryspirit; it containsmore Prussian severitythan
Communistsrealize or Prussiansthemselvessuspect."
If Germanywas once again to be imbued with the spirit of
Prussianism,Niekisch maintained,all Westerninfluenceswould
have to be weeded out. The nation would have to break irrevoc-
ablywiththeideals of humanitarianism, rationalism,and all other
liberalvalues. Insteadof livingin large,teemingcities,whichen-
courage "cringingdocility,"Germansought to returnto the soil,
to a rusticand primitivewayof life,to self-imposedpovertywhich
alone produceswarlikevirtues. They mustfreethemselvesfrom
theshacklesof "Christianity whichstuntstheirheroismand makes
themsusceptibleto enslavementby Rome" (Entscheidung,p. 153).
In short,Germanyhad to tear herselfaway from Europe and
enterthe mainstreamof "Germanic-Slaviccivilization."
In Niekisch'sview no means could be spared to liberate Ger-
many from foreign oppression. "For an enslaved people no
weaponsare forbidden." Germanymighthave to wagewaragainst
the enemy'scivilian population. "Fortunatelythe progressof
technologyand science- airplanes, advances in chemistryand
bacteriology- makesit possibleto conductsucha war"
(Entscheid-
ung,p. 149). When applied forthepurposeof nationalemancipa-
tion the mostbarbaricmeasureswere justified.
The Communistswerenot slow in perceivingthe opportunities
offeredby these tendenciesin the nationalistcamp. One alert
observerin Moscow noted that in theirtheoreticalformulations
some of the rightistswere "approachingMarxism."55 And the
KPD, respondingto the signal fromMoscow,once again decided
to fightfascismwithan "ideologicaloffensive."Anxious to stem
the Nazi tide not merelywith the stickbut also with the carrot,
Heinz Neumann,a daringyoungpartyleader,attendedNazi meet-
ings. At a rally chaired by Goebbels, Neumann is said to have
offeredthe servicesof his partyand the mightof the Red Army
55Otto Pohl, "DeutscherNationalradikalismusund die Ostrichtung
der Politik,"
in MoskauerRundschau,vol. 1, no. 27-28 (1929)p. 1.
478 SOCIAL RESEARCH
foran assaultagainstWesterncapitalism. He is quoted as having
pled with the stormtroopers not to reject his offer:"Young So-
cialists! Brave fightersfor the nation: the Communistsdo not
want to engagein fraternalstrifewith the National Socialists."56
The KPD's agitationsucceededin convertinga numberof Na-
tional Bolshevikofficers and intellectuals,such as Captain Beppo
Römer, the head of the FreikorpsBund Oberland, which had a
long recordofcollaborationwiththe Communists.57Junkerslike
Ludwig Renn (pseudonymforArnold Vieth von Gollsenau) and
Count Alexander Stenbock-Fermor also joined the Communists.
One of the converts,the writerBodo Uhse, had run the gamutin
his membership,from the Freikorps,the NSDAP, the Strasser
circle,to the KPD. The party'sattemptsto induce nationaliststo
join its ranksis knownas the "ScheringerCourse," so called be-
cause of the widely publicized case of Lieutenant Scheringer.
Early in 1931, while servinga prison sentencefor carryingon
Nazi propaganda in the Reichswehr,Scheringerhad yielded to
the enticements of the Communists,acceptingtheirassertionthat
theyrepresentedthe only true nationalistforce.58He became a
Communistorganizer,and claimed to have succeededin "produc-
ing a healthynucleus for Communism"among the rank-and-file
and the leadershipof the Nazi StormTroops.59 There is some
evidenceto indicatethatone of the aims of Hitler's blood purge
of June 30, 1934, was to eliminate National Bolshevismwithin
theNazi party.60
With the consolidationof the Nazi regime in June 1934 any
open manifestationof National Bolshevismbecame impossible.
The Communistshad by now realized that the nationalismthey
se Quoted in Georg Schwarz, Völker höret die Zentrale: KPD bankerott
(Berlin
1933) P- 206.
57 Müller (cited above, note 41) p. 36; Ehrt (cited above, note 51) p. 44.
ss See Spartakus, German Communists (London 1Q44) p. 67.
59See Scheringer's letter of June 14, 1934, in Manchester Guardian,
July 20,
1934-
«o Lionel Kochan, Russia and the Weimar Republic
(Cambridge, Eng., 1954) p.
174. See also Hitler's speech of July 13, 1934, in Norman H. Baynes, ed., The
Speeches of Hitler, vol. 1 (London 1942) p. 315.
 NATIONAL BOLSHEVISM 479
had so ardentlyencouragedhad backfired.61It had turnedinto
a monstrousforcethat could not be controlled. Indeed, Hitler
began to put into effecthis programof expansion,which endan-
gerednot only the "capitalistWest" but also the "socialistEast."
The National Bolshevikline had to be discarded. Russia needed
theWest.

IV

In National Bolshevismthe two extremesof Germanpoliticallife

met. This does not implythatall ideologicaldifferences between
themdisappeared. The Communistsremainedcommittedto their
basicallyrationalisticapproach, to the idea of transitoryprole-
tarianhegemony,and to the ultimategoal of a classlesssociety.
The thinkingof the rightists continuedto reflecttheirmysticism;
theystill clung to racism,to the leadershipprinciple,and to the
ideal of a hierarchically
orderedcommunity.Furthermore, it must
not be assumedthatNational Bolshevismwas of equal significance
forboth rightand left. For the Communistsit was basicallyan
aspect of theiroverall strategy. They embracednationalismin
orderto woo thosesocial strataamong whom the Völkische,and
laterthe Nazis,weremakingthe greatestheadway. The right,on
the otherhand, had a real ideological commitmentto National
Bolshevism. They ardentlyespoused aggressivenationalismas
well as somekindof programof social and economicamelioration.
Despite thesedifferences, rightand leftwere broughttogetherby
certain affinitiesof temperamentand, above all, by common
hatreds. Both loathed the "Weimar System"and both were ob-
sessedwithbitterhostilitytowardtheWest.
The inabilityof the Germangovernments from1919 to 1932 to
solveeitherthenationalor thesocial problemsbesettingGermany
providedfertilesoil forsuch extremism. Nationalismwas largely
abandoned to the enemies of the Republic; as a result of wide-
spreadeconomicmisery,socialismbecame a manipulativetool of
6i See WilhelmPieck,Zur Geschichteder Kommunistischen
ParteiDeutschlands:
30 JahreKampf(Berlin1949)pp. 25-26.
48o SOCIAL RESEARCH
demagogues. Whenevertheseforeign-policy and domesticissues
reached the criticalpoint at the same time,National Bolshevism
came to the fore. This curiousamalgamwas then advanced as a
solutionto bothproblems.
Since it appearedto manyGermansthatthe onlydynamicsolu-
tionswereofferedby extremists who rejectedthe entiresocial and
politicalframework, democracycould not but suffer.The simul-
taneousonslaughtfromthe rightand the leftincreasinglyunder-
mined the young, fragile Republic. The traditionalpolitical
divisionsbecameblurred. Communistsadoptednationalism.Na-
tionalistsadvocated socialism. The KPD hailed former"fascist
hoodlums'' as "gallant heroes." Arch-conservatives clamoredfor
the Bolshevizationof Germany. In thisclimateof confusionand
politicaldemoralizationthereal issueswerelost,makingit possible
forthatpartymostadept at manipulatingthe frustrations of the
Germanpeople finallytowinout.
For the rightthis denouementwas essentiallywelcome. The
Communistshad intendedit to be different.Obsessed with the
securityof the Soviet Union, theyhad fannedthe flamesof na-
tionalismin orderto buttressthewall againsttheWest. They also
hoped that the general turmoilwould enable them to ride into
power. They scornedan alliance withthe democraticforces,the
lasthope forthe preservation of the Republic. Instead,the Com-
munistscenteredtheirfireon theSocial Democrats. They deluded
themselvesinto believing that a shortperiod even of Nazi rule
would be but a prelude to theirfinaltriumph. In subordinating
their policies to the national interestsof the Soviet Union, the
Communistsfailed to advance eithertheirown or Russia's cause.
In fact,thisstrategy cost Germanyand Russia dearly.