Tanada vs. Angara
Tanada vs. Angara
Tanada vs. Angara
SYLLABUS
PANGANIBAN , J : p
The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the
membership thereto of the vast majority of countries, has revolutionized international
business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new
borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls.
Finding market niches and becoming the best in speci c industries in a market-driven and
export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies that
unilaterally protect weak and ine cient domestic producers of goods and services. In the
words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, "Increased participation in the
world economy has become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity." prll
On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August
11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, 3 stating among others that "the Uruguay
Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section
21, Article VII of the Constitution." cdta
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter from the
President of the Philippines 4 likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated among others
that "the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
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Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution."
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certi ed the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled "Concurring in the Rati cation of the
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization." 5
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which "Resolved,
as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the rati cation by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization." 6 The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of Volume
I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and includes various
agreements and associated legal instruments (identi ed in the said Agreement as
Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral Trade Agreements,
for brevity) as follows:
"ANNEX I
On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed 7 the Instrument of
Ratification, declaring:
"NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic
of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on
15 April 1994, do hereby ratify and con rm the same and every Article and Clause
thereof."
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was led. After careful deliberation on
respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12,
1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter led their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a historical background
of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
"(a)the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in
controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and
(b)the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to le (1) a list of Philippine
treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
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derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible."
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor General
submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
"bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated
January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as
follows:
"A.Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.
B.Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the
deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity or of the concurrence.
C.Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10
and 12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
D.Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
speci cally the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is 'vested in the Congress of the Philippines';
On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents "synthesized the
several issues raised by petitioners into the following": 1 0
"1.Whether or not the provisions of the 'Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement' cited by petitioners
directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II
and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners, the
Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition presents a
political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the
Senate (Wigberto E. Tañada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this
suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of
discretion when they voted for concurrence in the rati cation of the WTO Agreement. The
foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with these three issues thus: cdt
(1)The "political question" issue — being very fundamental and vital, and being a matter
that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case — was
deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;
(2)The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and the
respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings; in any
event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal
as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the defense
of estoppel; and
(3)The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent senators
will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised by the
Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not question
the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived the bene t of
such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public
funds and serious international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met head on and
decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by procedural matters. 11
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1)DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY?
OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A POLITICAL
QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2)DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE
ANNEXES CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12,
ARTICLE XII, OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3)DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT,
RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
CONGRESS?
(4)DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE
EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING
RULES ON EVIDENCE?
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(5)WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT
AND ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT
IT DID NOT INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS
AND DECISIONS, AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN
FINANCIAL SERVICES?
The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld." 12 Once a "controversy as to the application or
interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide." 13
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters 14 raised in the petition is clearly
set out in the 1987 Constitution, 15 as follows:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government."
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down
grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government
including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. 1 6 As explained by former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, 1 7 "the judiciary is the nal arbiter on the question of whether
or not a branch of government or any of its o cials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature."
As this Court has repeatedly and rmly emphasized in many cases, 18 it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government. LibLex
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in holding that
this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised therein ruled upon
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this, we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court will not
review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting the country
into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said
international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy
of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and other
import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional duty "to determine
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whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three
annexes.
Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the Constitution mandating
"economic nationalism" are violated by the so-called "parity provisions" and "national
treatment" clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its
annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Speci cally, the " agship" constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II, and
Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:
"Article II
Sec. 19.The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Sec. 10. . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.
Sec. 12.The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive."
Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the following
WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum: 1 9
"a)In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for
brevity):
"Article 2
National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.
1.Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. No Member
shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III or
Article XI of GATT 1994.
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2.An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general
elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of Article
XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this Agreement." (Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round, Legal
Instruments, p. 22121, emphasis supplied).
The Annex referred to reads as follows:
"ANNEX
Illustrative List
1.TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment provided
for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those which are
mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under administrative
rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage, and
which require:
(a)the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic
origin or from any domestic source, whether speci ed in
terms of particular products, in terms of volume or value of
products, or in terms of proportion of volume or value of its
local production; or
(b)that an enterprise's purchases or use of imported products be
limited to an amount related to the volume or value of local
products that it exports.LLjur
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic
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operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying
Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1 (a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis
supplied).
"b)In the area of trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for
brevity):
Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no
less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the
protection of intellectual property . . . (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspect of Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments, p. 25432 (emphasis supplied)
"(c)In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:
National Treatment
1.In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and
quali cations set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.
2.A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to services
and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical
treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its own like
services and service suppliers.
It is petitioners' position that the foregoing "national treatment" and "parity provisions" of
the WTO Agreement "place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products," in contravention of the "Filipino First" policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase "effectively controlled by
Filipinos." The constitutional con ict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context
of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the conformity
of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in
the annexed agreements. 20 Petitioners further argue that these provisions contravene
constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development and negate the
preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such Charter
provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that these
nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read in
isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1
and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not con ict with the
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Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains su cient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade liberalization.
LLphil
'In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were
rather directives addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the
executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the article, the
available remedy was not judicial but political. The electorate could
express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the
legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)."
'Section 1.. . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.' (Emphases supplied)
When substantive standards as general as 'the right to a balanced and healthy
ecology' and 'the right to health' are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as 'a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction,' the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the
uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the
vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim
to special technical competence and experience and professional quali cation.
Where no speci c, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the
policy making departments — the legislative and executive departments — must
be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms
and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene." cdasia
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and e cient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the
country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . .
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national
economic development, as follows:
1.A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2.A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the
nation for the benefit of the people; and
3.An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all
especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of quali ed Filipinos "in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony" 2 7 and in
the use of "Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by
mandating the State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 2 8 and (3) by
requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos." 2 9 In similar language, the Constitution takes into account the
realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the
general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of
equality and reciprocity"; 3 0 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino enterprises against
unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., 3 1 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further
guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in
regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony" and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather
than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-
executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing
provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the Philippine concurrence in the
WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 3 2
In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not
shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine
economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods,
services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows
an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition
that is unfair.
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
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Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast majority
of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign
equality, with each member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council. aisadc
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the
WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO,
developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda more
decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical alliances
but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO
Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." These basic principles are found in the preamble 34 of the WTO Agreement
as follows:
"The Parties to this Agreement,
Recognizing that their relations in the eld of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance
with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner
consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of
economic development,
Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development,
Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and
mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international trade relations,
Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral
trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
results of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
The WTO reliance on "most favored nation," "national treatment," and "trade without
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discrimination" cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on "equality and reciprocity," 37 the fundamental law encourages industries
that are "competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.
Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any speci c pronouncement that Filipino companies should
be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand,
respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the
best goods and services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general
welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to
reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos' general welfare because it will — as
promised by its promoters — expand the country's exports and generate more
employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at the
most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve "judgment calls" by our policy makers, for which
they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such questions
and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on grave abuse
of discretion.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was drafted
and rati ed in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily awed in
the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of
business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then Constitution might
not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of sovereignty when the
Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively surrendering part of its control over
its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
It is not di cult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only the
vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future and
unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can withstand
the assaults of bigots and in dels but at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of
change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political law writer and
respected jurist 38 explains:
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international pacts
— both bilateral and multilateral — that involve limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These
are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as
follows:
"(a)Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where
the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received
in the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
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wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees
or o cials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the
Philippines.
(b)Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c)Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double
taxation.
(d)Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation.
(e)Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and
supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f)Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other
similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular
equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.
(g)Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted
Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and
Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h)Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where the
Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59
days.
(i)Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not
exceeding 59 days.
(j)Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that
premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its
agents can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties,
taxes and related charges.
(k)Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the
Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
(l)Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of
a treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which,
if established, would constitute a breach of international obligation."
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its
sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
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its o cials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.
"International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the
environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in
international relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that
the bene ts of the reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated
with any loss of political sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by
reference to durable, well-de ned substantive norms and objective dispute
resolution procedures reduce the risks of larger countries exploiting raw economic
power to bully smaller countries, by subjecting power relations to some form of
legal ordering. In addition, smaller countries typically stand to gain
disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is due to the simple fact that
liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential new trading
relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success to the
smaller country's market." 4 8
The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may be
waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
"adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and adheres to the policy of . . . cooperation and amity with all nations." casia
2.Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is ful lled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph
(b) is fulfilled.
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3.In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants
in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into
account."
From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note the words
"in the absence of proof to the contrary") presumption that a product shown to be identical
to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to have been
obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such product obtained
by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is "substantial likelihood" that the
identical product was made with the use of the said patented process but the owner of the
patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining such identical product.
Hence, the "burden of proof" contemplated by Article 34 should actually be understood as
the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such presumption. Such burden,
properly understood, actually refers to the "burden of evidence" (burden of going forward)
placed on the producer of the identical (or fake) product to show that his product was
produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of proof" since,
regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still
has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that it
is "identical" to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
"newness" of the genuine product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as the
present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as the
Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented design or
utility model, thus:
"SEC. 60.Infringement. — Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility
model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility
model for the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the
making, using or selling of the article or product copying the patented design or
utility model. Identity or substantial identity with the patented design or utility
model shall constitute evidence of copying." (emphasis supplied)
Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a disputable
presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process is NEW or
(2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the process and
the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to determine the process
used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain, members shall be free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within their
own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third issue
— derogation of legislative power — will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to say that
the reciprocity clause more than justi es such intrusion, if any actually exists. Besides,
Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process
and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on patents,
trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure will not be
substantial. 5 2
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Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other Documents
Contained in the Final Act
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its annexes —
but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the Ministerial
Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services —
is defective and insu cient and thus constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that
such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is awed because it is in effect a rejection
of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in
representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They contend that the
second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which enumerated what constitutes the
Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence of the Senate. cdt
"A final act, sometimes called protocol de clôture, is an instrument which records
the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually
includes a reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations
and other acts agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the
conference." 54 It is not the treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings
of a protracted conference which may have taken place over several years. The
text of the "Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations" is contained in just one page 55 in Vol. I of the 36-volume
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations . By signing said Final Act,
Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the Philippines undertook:
"(a)to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and
(b)to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."
The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
rati cation. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT which
provides that representatives of the members can meet "to give effect to those provisions
of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to facilitating the
operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement." 5 6
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in Marrakesh
does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which "have
indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing nancial service suppliers, temporary entry
of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment with
respect to access to payment, clearing systems and re nancing available in the normal
course of business." 5 7
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral agreements are
deemed included as its integral parts, 5 8 as follows:
"Article II
It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown
by the members' deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of President
Ramos dated August 11, 1994, 5 9 the senators of the Republic minutely dissected what
the Senate was concurring in, as follows: 6 0
"THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came
up in the rst day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation
made by Senator Tañada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the
agreement on establishing the World Trade Organization by the nal act of the
Uruguay Round which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order
which, however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion
for an alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to
treat the proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of brie ngs for
Senators until the question of the submission could be clarified.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr . Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually
transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with
the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself . The Constitution
does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement
which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself speci es what is going to be
submitted to with the governments of the participants. prcd
SEN. GONZALES . Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately re ected in the journal of yesterday's
session and I don't see any need for repeating the same.
Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to
make any comment on this?
SEN. LINA, Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator
Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I
believe, stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make."
Epilogue
In praying for the nulli cation of the Philippine rati cation of the WTO Agreement,
petitioners are invoking this Court's constitutionally imposed duty "to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction" on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of discretion
may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is amply shown that
petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 6 1 Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must
be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
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manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as
to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 6 2 Failure on the part of the petitioner to
show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the petition. 6 3
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is under
review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great respect in
its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and thus its
actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and
persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will
resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted de nition of grave
abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's processes, this Court
cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the Senate's exercise
of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of
the Constitution. 6 4
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State to
develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to
protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative
guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other
equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the
pursuit of a "trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity" and the promotion of
industries "which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets," thereby justifying
its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise
of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and the adherence of the
Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations. cdasia
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it "a part of the law of the land" is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We nd no "patent and gross"
arbitrariness or despotism "by reason of passion or personal hostility" in such exercise. It
is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse
in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate did was a
valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, bene cial or viable is
outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy
makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward
trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter that our people should
determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal
of membership, should this be the political desire of a member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an Asian
Renaissance 6 5 where "the East will become the dominant region of the world
economically, politically and culturally in the next century." He refers to the "free market"
espoused by WTO as the "catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present
about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for membership in
the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on national sovereignty,
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the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable
forum for the development of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation,
stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its on-line
experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines now straddles the
crossroads of an international strategy for economic prosperity and stability in the new
millennium. Let the people, through their duly authorized elected o cers, make their free
choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. cda
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., concur in the result.
Footnotes
1.In Annex "A" of her Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by this Court on August 12,
1996, Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, World Trade Organization and other
international organizations Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper")
submitted a "46-year Chronology" of GATT as follows:
"1947The birth of GATT . On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in the rst multilateral
trade negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these concessions
from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures.
The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the Preparatory Committee
established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft
the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was
envisaged as the nal leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other
two were the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for
Reconstruction — later the World Bank).
In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to negotiate tariff
concessions among themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants
completed some 123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing the
tariff reductions and bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These
schedules resulting from the rst Round covered some 45,000 tariff
concessions and about $10 billion in trade.
GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the commercial-policy
provisions of the ITO. In November, delegations from 56 countries met in
Havana, Cuba, to consider the ITO draft as a whole. After long and di cult
negotiations, some 53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of
the Havana Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from
governments to rati cation and, in the end, the ITO was stillborn, leaving GATT
as the only international instrument governing the conduct of world trade.
1994"GATT 1994 " is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes into account the
substantive and institutional changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round. GATT
1994 is an integral part of the World Trade Organization established on 1
January 1995. It is agreed that there be a one year transition period during
which certain GATT 1947 bodies and commitments would co-exist with those of
the World Trade Organization."
2.The Final Act was signed by representatives of 125 entities, namely Algeria, Angola, Antigua
and Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia, Republic of Austria, State of Bahrain,
People's Republic of Bangladesh, Barbados, The Kingdom of Belgium, Belize, Republic
of Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, People's Republic of China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Republic of Cote d' Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican Republic, Arab Republic
of Egypt, El Salvador, European Communities, Republic of Fiji, Finland, French Republic,
Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Hellenic Republic,
Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic,
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of
Liechtenstein, Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau, Republic of Madagascar, Republic
of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic of Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic
Republic of Mauritania, Republic of Mauritius, United Mexican States, Kingdom of
Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Union of Myanmar, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom
of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Republic of Niger, Federal Republic of
Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Rwandese Republic, Saint Kitts
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of Surinam, Kingdom of Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden,
Swiss Confederation, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese
Republic, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Venezuela, Republic of Zaire, Republic of Zambia,
Republic of Zimbabwe; see pp. 6-25, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations.
3.
11 August 1994
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid
Agreement is enclosed.
4.
11 August 1994
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines, through Secretary
Navarro, agreed:
(a)To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization to the
Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the
Constitution; and
(b)To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and
strengthen the interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth
and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its
major trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly
agricultural and industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the
Philippines, only if it is a member of the World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates,
the Philippines can acquire additional export revenues from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion
annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the normal increase in the
exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such
areas as the movement of personnel, (e.g. professional services and construction
services), cross-border supply (e.g. computer-related services), consumption abroad
(e.g. tourism, convention services, etc.) and commercial presence.
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions,
and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as embodied in the
Uruguay Round Final Act and forming an integral part thereof are hereby submitted to
the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
Senate, Manila
6.Attached as Annex A, Petition; Rollo, p. 52, P.S. 1083 is the forerunner of assailed Senate
Resolution No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee of the Whole on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade chaired by Sen. Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen.
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Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; see Annex C, Compliance of petitioners dated January 28,
1997.
7.The Philippines is thus considered an original or founding member of WTO, which as of July
26, 1996 had 123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d' Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European
Community, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hongkong, Hungary, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali,
Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia,
Netherlands — for the Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe. See Annex A, Bautista Paper, infra.
11.CF Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995 for a discussion on
locus standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in
Tatad vs. Garcia, Jr. , 243 SCRA 473, April 6, 1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386, 414, December 23, 1994.
12.Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile , 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974, cited in Bondoc vs.
Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991.
13.Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.
14.See Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al. , 103 Phil. 1051 for a discussion on the scope
of "political question."
15.Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2).
16.In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled "Supreme Court — Potential Tyrant?" Senator
Arturo Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives the Supreme Court a duty "to
intrude into the jurisdiction of the Congress or the President."
17.I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436.
18.Cf . Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.
19Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; Rollo, pp. 204-206.
20.Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1,
p. 146.
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21.Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical
with that in the 1987's.
22.Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
23.Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary , Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very
recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS , G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it
was held that "A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in
Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing."
24.246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance , G.R. No.
115455 and consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
39.Par. 4, Article XVI (Miscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p. 146, Vol. 1, Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
40.Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; Rollo, p. 219.
41.Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution.
42.Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article VI, Constitution.
"Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1.Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
representatives of the governments and of the European Communities, members of the
Trade Negotiations Committee, agree that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (referred to in the Final Act as the "WTO Agreement"), the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of their negotiations and form an
integral part of this Final Act.
3.The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the WTO Agreement by all
participants in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter
referred to as "participants") with a view to its entry into force by 1 January 1995, or as
early as possible thereafter. Not later than late 1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance
with the nal paragraph of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declarations, to decide on the
international implementation of the results, including the timing of their entry into force.
4.The representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be open for acceptance as a whole,
by signature or otherwise, by all participants pursuant to Article XIV thereof. The
acceptance and entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement included in Annex 4 of
the WTO Agreement shall be governed by the provisions of that Plurilateral Trade
Agreement.
5.Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants which are not contracting parties to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must rst have concluded negotiations for their
accession to the General Agreement and become contracting parties thereto. For
participants which are not contracting parties to the general Agreement as of the date of
the Final Act, the Schedules are not de nitive and shall be subsequently completed for
the purpose of their accession to the General Agreement and acceptance of the WTO
Agreement.
6.This Final Act and the texts annexed hereto shall be deposited with the Director-General to the
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CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade who shall
promptly furnish to each participant a certified copy thereof.
DONE at Marrakesh this fteenth day of April one thousand nine hundred and ninety-four, in a
single copy, in the English, French and Spanish languages, each text being authentic."
64."Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
65.Reader's Digest, December 1996 issue, p. 28.