15 People V Mendoza JIMENEZ

CRIMPRO RULE 116 SEC.
5 Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty

Title G.R. No. L-58678-80
PEOPLE VS MENDOZA Date: July 20, 1982
Ponente: AQUINO, J.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES – Petitioner JUDGE IRINEO V. MENDOZA of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Mauban Branch V and ANDY DE LOS SANTOS, JR.,
Respondents
FACTS
 Andy de los Santos, Jr. was charged on July 29, 1981 with estafa in three informations all dated May 28, 1981 for having
issued postdated checks drawn against the Quezon City branch of the Pacific Banking Corporation as payment for lumber
purchased from Rafael Ayuste.
 In the three cases, De los Santos pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. Then, at the hearing on September 7, 1981, his
counsel de oficio manifested that the accused was withdrawing his plea of not guilty and substituting it with a plea of
guilty. De los Santos was rearraigned. Upon interrogation by respondent judge, De los Santos declared that he
understood the consequences of his plea of guilty, that he knew that he would receive imprisonment sentences, that
he conferred with his lawyer regarding the plea of guilty and that he changed his plea voluntarily. On the same day,
the trial court rendered three separate decisions.
 Presumably, the said decisions were promulgated on the said date. The record does not disclose whether De los Santos
started serving sentence after the promulgation of the said decisions.
 On September 10, 1981, his counsel filed a "petition" (motion) to set aside the judgments of conviction. It contains the
following brief allegations: (1) That the accused has entered a plea of guilty to all these criminal cases captioned above;
(2) That the accused intends to substitute the same with a plea of not guilty in accordance with Sec. 6, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court of the Philippines. (Now Rule 116, Sec. 5 Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty)
 The trial court in its order of September 14, 1981, after noting that the judgments of conviction had not yet become
final, set them aside, granted the prayer of the accused that a plea of not guilty be entered for him.
 Two motions for reconsideration were filed by the fiscal, praying to set aside the judgement of conviction was not based
on any ground and was not set for hearing, were denied by the trial court.
 When the fiscal did not present his witnesses after the defense counsel invoked the right of the accused to a speedy trial,
the court dismissed the cases and ordered the release of De los Santos.
ISSUE/S
The issue is whether the trial court gravely abused its discretion in setting aside the judgments of conviction and later dismissing cases. - YES
RATIO
 The Court held that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in setting
aside the three judgments of conviction on the basis of De los Santos' flimsy and whimsical "petition" which does not
contain any reason as to why he wanted to change his plea of guilty to that of not guilty.
 The exercise of that power should be justified by some compelling reason such as error, fraud, illegality or manifest
injustice. The trial court is not invested with unbridled discretion to set aside a judgment of conviction based on a plea
of guilty just because it has not yet become final. Furthermore, the prosecution should be heard on that motion. The trial
court should state the reasons for setting aside the judgment of conviction and for permitting the accused to substitute
a plea of not guilty for his plea of guilty
 It is not the ministerial or routinary duty of the trial court, on a mere request or petition of the accused, to allow him to
substitute a plea of not guilty for his prior plea of guilty and to set aside the judgment of conviction already rendered in
the case
 It disregard the settled rule that "where (as in the instant case) the record conclusively shows that the accused freely,
voluntarily and spontaneously entered the plea of guilty with a full and complete realization of the meaning and
consequences of that plea, after the same had been clearly explained to him by the court, he shall not be allowed to
withdraw that plea and substitute therefor the plea of not guilty."
RULING
WHEREFORE, the trial court's orders of September 14 and 21 and October 5, 1981, setting aside the judgments of conviction, allowing the accused to withdraw his plea of guilty and substituting
it with a plea of not guilty, scheduling the cases for trial and later dismissing them because of the prosecution's failure to present its evidence, are reversed and set aside.
The judgments of conviction against the accused are reinstated and hereby declared final and executory. Costs against the accused.
2S 2016-17 (JIMENEZ)

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CRIMPRO RULE 116 SEC.

5 Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty

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