Cretan Muslims
Cretan Muslims
Cretan Muslims
Chapter Two
Crete and Muslim Cretans throughout the nineteenth century
2.1 The turbulent nineteenth century
From a historical perspective, one can argue that revolts have been an integral part of
Cretan history so much that as Şenışık argues: “Crete and revolt became almost synonymous”
(Şenışık, 73). The inhabitants of Crete had always been thriving for political independence.
During Venetian rule the island witnessed many revolts, among them the revolt of St. Tito in
1363, where the Latin colonists of Crete allying with the Greeks of the island fought for
political independence (Şenışık, 73).
Although co-existence between Muslims and Christians on the island was mostly
peaceful until the eighteenth century, the following hundred years were full of violent revolts
and subject to turmoil, with indeed a very painful impact on the relations between the
inhabitants of the island. Adıyeke argues that the rise of nationalist trends and the Greek War
of Independence effected Crete and the “altered” identity definitions of the two societies
became more distinctive (Adıyeke, A.N, 216). The two communities went far beyond than
just drifting away and in many cases there was a large gap between the Muslims, who held the
power, and the Christian reaya subjects, at least until 1821, where the balances on the island
began to change (Dimitriadis, 206).
During the Ottoman rule, one of the most notable revolts was ‘Daskaloyiannis revolt’
that took place in western Crete, in Sfakia, an inaccessible and hard to subdue mountainous
village. In the spring of 1770 a Cretan notable and ship-owner from Sfakia named Yiannis
Vlachos and known as Daskaloyiannis, led a band of 2.000 well armed men out of the
mountains and down into the plains of western Crete. This revolt, the first significant one
before the nineteenth century, was part of a wider movement, known as ‘Orloff Uprising’ in
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Greek historiography (Greene, 206). The uprisings occurred as part of the Russo-Ottoman
War (1768-1774) which shook the eastern Mediterranean in 1770 (Greene, 206).
Daskaloyiannis, who had good relations with the Russians, turned to his co-religionists in the
hope that Orthodox Russia would replace the Ottoman sovereignty in Istanbul and in the east
in general (Şenışık, 74). As Detorakis points out, Daskaloyiannis’ plans for political
independence fit in the general political atmosphere and the prevailing visions of the time
(Detorakis, 308). Greene argues that Daskaloyiannis’ vision was not a national one but rather
a vision in which Christian-Orthodox Russia would prevail on the East (Greene, 208). The
revolt was harshly suppressed by the Ottomans. The Russian fleet never appeared in the port
of Chania as promised and the Ottomans moved decisively against the insurgents. Villages in
Sfakia were burned, and the Sfakiot merchant ships were destroyed by the Ottomans who
furthermore forbade the Sfakiots to have any further contact with Christian ships (Şenışık,
74). Toward the end of 1770, Daskaloyiannis decided to give himself up and the rebellion
came to an end. Despite promises of amnesty, Daskaloyiannis was executed by the pasha of
Candia in 1771 (Greene, 206; Peponakis, 41).
This failed revolt of Sfakia activated a period of turbulence on the island which lasted
until 1821 and as Peponakis mentions it was the period of dominance of the Cretan Muslims
(Peponakis, 41). Beside the frequent military riots (the janissaries number on the island was
increased after the failed revolt of Sfakia) the local Muslims were encouraged by the
janissaries to treat their Christian neighbors with contempt and cruelty despite the fact that
sometimes they were even relatives (Peponakis, 41; Dimitriadis, 206). Furthermore the active
participation of the Muslim Cretans to the suppression of the revolt of Sfakia in 1770 led to
the deterioration of the relations between Muslims and Christians on the island.
Peponakis argues that the dominance of the Cretan Muslims caused a new wave of
conversion to Islam during the period of 1790-1821, which led to the increase of the Muslim
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population. The Muslim population constituted the 1/3 of the population by 1790. However,
before the Greek War of Independence in 1821, it was equal to the Christian population or
according to some sources was even higher (Peponakis, 51).
In Chania, Rethymno and Candia the janissaries were very influential in the
administration. The janissary agas in Crete had gradually increased both in number and in
power, they controlled the tax-farms and played a significant role in the artisan and trade life
of the cities. Especially the local janissaries of Crete (yerli) had a clear advantage vis-à-vis the
non-Muslims and did not hesitate to show their military strength in everyday life. They were
aware of their power and they were also aware of the weakness of the Sublime Porte to
impose any order upon them (Peponakis, 42). Indeed, Detorakis argues that janissaries’
savagery was fabled; the corps of the janissaries had degenerated to a source of unruly and
increasingly criminal terror, harmful for the society (Detorakis, 300). In 1812, the Sublime
Porte decided to intervene by appointing Haci Osman Pasha the Kurd as the Governor of the
island. Haci Osman Pasha, with the help of Sfakiots and some others, had strangled a number
of agas in Western Crete and had earned the nickname ‘the Strangler’ (gr. Πνιγάρης). He
fought the janissaries with such intensity that as Dedes argues, the local Muslims who were
not pleased with his rule, used to call him also Papa-Yanni, “This is no Pasha Osmanis, this is
Papas Yannis” [‘Αυτός δεν είναι πασά Οσμάνης, παρά’ναι παππά-Γιάννης’] (Dedes, 337).
The abolition of the janissaries in 1826 was coupled with the confiscation of Bektashi pious
properties -foundations controlled by the local janissaries- and the transfer of their revenues
from their provincial holdings to the central treasury.
The abolition of janissaries deprived Cretans of a mechanism that allowed them to gain
some privileges by claiming a Muslim identity in order to join the local troops, the access to
which was quite open to every Muslim that wished to join them, especially from the
seventeen century onwards (Revisiting Hellenic-Ottoman History, Kostopoulou, 6).
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As Kostopoulou, explains “it is easy to imagine how traumatic this development would
have been for the survival of the Muslim identity in Crete, an island where Islam was mainly
represented by the all-powerful janissary networks”. Indeed the abolition of the janissaries
curtailed extremely the Muslim local tradition of war, which has been functioning as an
engine driving Cretan conversions to Islam (Revisiting Hellenic-Ottoman History,
Kostopoulou, 5). While the janissaries’ corps was annihilated in 1826, from 1836 onwards
Greek consulates established throughout the Ottoman Empire encouraging and supporting the
Christians (Şenışık, 47).
This chapter focuses on the bibliography related to the Ottoman period in Crete and to
the Muslims Cretans known as Turko-Cretans. Through this period the Muslims of the island
became culturally “foreign occupiers” representing a dynasty on ancient Hellenic lands (The
Minoans, the Ottomans, and the British, Kostopoulou, 294). As Elektra Kostopoulou
maintains “it seemed to be commonly accepted that only the Christian Cretans were true
locals and had descended from the ancient Cretans. As for the Muslims of the island, they
were viewed as a case of cultural minority, with no continuity in time before the Ottoman
conquest of Crete” (The Minoans, the Ottomans, and the British Kostopoulou, 294).
Through the nineteenth century the formation of national consciousness that took place,
transformed the system of millet into nations (Tsitselikis, 31). As Konstantinos Tsitselikis
argues ethnicity and religion were closely linked in the phase of ‘national awakening’ and
nation -and state- building process (Tsitselikis, 29). This means, that pre-modern cultural
diversity, the millets began to fade once the region became exposed to European notions of
ethno-national purity and millets were seen as ‘nationalities’ (Tsitselikis, 30). The idea of ‘us’
against the ‘others’, was enforced among the Muslims. This is due to the fact that the Muslims
of Crete lived on an island where the Christian sought the union with Greece (The Art of
Being Replaced, Kostopoulou, 133).
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The clashes that occurred on the island during the nineteenth century were not just
nationalist revolts. The revolts and clashes of the nineteenth century underlined that the two
populations of the island differed firstly through religion and eventually through ethnicity
(Adıyeke, A.N., 216). By the end of the 19th century, the Classical world had become an
inspiration for movements that called for political change and revolution against the “old
regime” (The Minoans, the Ottomans, and the British, Kostopoulou, 293).
As Molly Greene argues the survival of the Cretan society “depended on its ability to
exclude the world beyond the sea. When that was no longer possible, the end was only a
matter of time” (Greene, 209).
2.2 The Greek War of Independence and the Egyptian Rule (1821-1841)
During the nineteenth century in Ottoman Crete, the first revolt broke out about the
same time as the Greek War of Independence in 1821 (Şenışık, 74). In mid-June 1821, Sfakia
engaged in open hostilities with the Ottomans. According to David Barchard, throughout the
nineteenth century, the timing of the outbreaks of violence was in many cases linked to
religious festivals. The outbreak of the 1821 revolt coincided with the end of Ramadan, the
Islamic month of fasting and the ‘Ramadan Bayramı’ (Barchard, 14).
The Greek War of Independence spread quickly to Crete. The Christian population
rebelled in all regions, starting even from the most isolated mountainous areas (Dimitriadis,
206). In the beginning of the revolt (1821-1822) the rebels had some early successes which
were put to an end with the intervention of the Egyptians who landed on Crete in 1822 and
1823 (Kallivretakis, 11).
The 1821- 1828 revolt in Crete, resulted not only in the radical decrease of the
population, both Muslim and Christian; it also resulted in a change in the population’s
ethnoreligious
composition (Perakis, 136). Beginning from 1821, the population of the island and
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the ratio of the Muslims decreased heavily. In approximately ten years from the beginning of
the Greek War of Independence the population of the island decreased from 260.000 to
200.000 and the Cretan Muslim population shrank between fifty to sixty thousand (Adıyeke,
A.N, 211). It is estimated that more than 20.000 Christians lost their lives only in the villages
of Eastern Crete (Dimitriadis, Daskalou, 45). Of course the losses were equally distributed for
both Muslims and Christians. Many decided to abandon the island for a safer refuge
(Andriotis, 66).
The international treaties of 1829, 1830 and 1832 excluded Crete from the newly
established Kingdom of Greece and brought to an end the revolt on the island (Andriotis, 65;
Kallivretakis, 11). According to the Protocol of London which was signed on February 3,
1830, the administration of Crete was granted to Mehmet Ali Pasha (ruler of Egypt) as a
compensation for his help to the Ottomans in 1821 (Şenışık, 74).
During the Egyptian rule (1830-1840) the administration of the island was assigned to
Mustafa Pasha who had been on the island since 1822 and had run the pashalik of Chania
since 1824 (Kallivretakis,12). The Egyptian forces even though they tried a two-pronged
approach, making a conciliatory approach to the locals, were not popular especially among
the Muslim Cretans as they imposed new taxes on agricultural products, increased the poll-tax
and auctioned off monopolies on imported goods through a system of binding (Şenışık, 75;
Dedes, 339). For instance the tax for wine and raki which until 1833 was subdued only by
Christians, who still had to pay the poll-tax, beginning from 1833 was obligatory for Muslims
too.
Under the Egyptian rule, the already destroyed in 1826 Janissaries corps, was replaced
by Albanians and Egyptian forces in order to keep the public order. Also the Muslim Cretans
were replaced by Albanians in the administration of the provinces. In January 21, 1831,
Mustafa Pasha ruled that no Muslim had the right to enter a Christian’s house without the
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permission of the authorities. In the same order it was decreed that the Muslims could no
longer settle in the rural areas unless they had properties on them. The last measure led many
Muslims to seek a permanent residency in the cities leaving the countryside, where the
Christians enjoyed numeric dominance (Peponakis, 75; Perakis, 137). Indeed, during the
course of the nineteenth century, the countryside gradually was transferred from Muslim to
Christian owners. Muslims abandoned the countryside and moved to city-fortresses such as
Chania, Rethymno and Heraklion, while the Christians made the reverse movement,
abandoning the cities for the countryside (Perakis, 137).
It is worth mentioning Elektra Kostopoulou remarks regarding the Egyptian rule
“while the Christians continued to be ideologically and materially supported by both Greek
and European forces, those of the Cretan Muslims who decided not to obey the will of Egypt,
were left to their own devices” (Revisiting Hellenic-Ottoman History, Kostopoulou, 6).
In 1840, following Egypt’s defeat in the Ottoman Egyptian War, the island returned to
Ottoman sovereignty and remained under the control of the Ottomans until 1898, despite the
numerous protests and revolts of the Christian population (Perakis, 135). The end of the
Egyptian rule found the Christian Cretans to not only outnumbering the Muslim Cretans but
also to exceeding them in the fields of economy and organization (Peponakis, 108).
On the morrow of the revolt, the Cretan Muslim community was not only decimated
but as Kallivretakis argues its access to the machinery of power was reduced, and at the same
time the ruling class was deprived of its ability to exploit big estates (Kallivretakis, 13).
The 1821 revolt affected the Cretan society in many ways but mostly negatively. It was
the first severe revolt of many more to come throughout the nineteenth century. During the
nineteenth century in all Cretan uprisings or local conflicts, instances of tolerant interreligious
behavior are rare. Desecrations of places of worship, uprooting of the graves,
36
stealing of relics and general assaults on the religious symbols central to the identity of the
other side were not uncommon (Barchard, 2).
The immigration of the Cretans both Muslims and Christians to other provinces of the
Ottoman Empire and Greece, as well as the plague that struck the island, resulted in the
decrease of the population and mostly left the Muslim community fragmented (Peponakis,
70). Meanwhile, the abolition of janissaries in 1826 had crucial outcome: the Muslim element
on Crete lost its primacy in leading the revolution against the state which was the case before.
This became a Christian operation (Local Autonomy and the Tanzimat, Kostopoulou).
As Peponakis argues the Muslim Cretans seemed “like a body without a soul”
(Peponakis, 75). The following fifteen years after the Egyptian Rule, beginning from 1841
was for the island the most peaceful period through the nineteenth century, during which the
practice of conversion to Christianity was not a peculiar phenomenon (Peponakis, 71).
2.3 Conversion back to Christianity and the reactions from the Muslim community
The revolt of 1821 in Crete did not only help to strengthen the Christian community, it
also put an end to the wide spread phenomenon of conversion to Islam. Between 1834 and
1881 the percentile increase of the Christian community was two times more than the Muslim
community. As Kallivretakis argues, an increase of this scale in the Christian community can
hardly be interpreted as the result only of internal demographic growth (Kallivretakis, 14).
Regarding the number of the Muslim community on the island, very interesting is the position
of Peponakis according to whom “population census right after the revolution of 1821 prevent
us from ascertaining the exact percentage of Muslims and Christians since there was a
“deliberate decrease” in the censuses of the number of Muslims with the aim to ease the
unification of Crete with the Greek Kingdom” (Peponakis, 70).
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It remains however true that a lot of Muslims converted back to Christianity and that
religious identities were quite fluid in early nineteenth century. Right after the revolution of
1821 one can notice the intensified frequency of the phenomenon of Crypto-Christianity,
where a great number of Cretan Christians who used to keep their Christianity hidden, with
the opportunity of the 1821 returned openly to it.
One can argue that all the Muslims who converted cannot have been Crypto-Christians
and indeed as Peponakis mentions many of those who declared themselves Crypto-Christians
had no previous Christian religious activity even if the latter was hidden. It is also noteworthy
that the new-Christians in their effort to show their religious zeal were taking names referring
to Holy Mary and Jesus, “Maria” and “Manolis”. However, they ended up being called with
the modifying word Turk, for example Turko-Maria, Turko-Manolis in an attempt to show
their reversion and their religious past (Peponakis, 105).
The reasons behind a conversion or a reversion were mainly financial. The newChristians
could assert their rights to paternal property although this procedure met numerous
obstacles due to the reaction of the Muslim community. Another factor of someone claiming
to be Crypto-Christian was the fear of being accused that he/she rejected Islam (Peponakis,
102). One cannot also exclude the possibility that these conversions may have occurred out of
fear of the constantly growing in power of the Christian community despite the rhetoric of the
Greek historiography implying otherwise.
As mentioned before there was a wave of conversion to Islam during the period of
1790-1821 and the newly converted Muslims to Christianity may have been from this group
of people, since the new-Christians should have been those who knew about their recent
Christian past (Peponakis, 101). They were families or individuals who lived in the towns and
the villages and came from different social classes.
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Officially switching religions was prohibited and according to Islamic law apostasy,
was punishable by death. The administration of the island during the Egyptian rule, kept
reminding the inhabitants of Crete that interference in other’s religious matters was not
tolerable. During the Egyptian rule, circumcision and baptisms of people who belonged to
another religion were prohibited as well as mixed marriages (Peponakis, 82).
Gulhane Hatt-i Sherif of 1839 and Hatt-i Humayun of 1856, established ideas and
reforms concerning the political and social spheres of the Ottoman Empire but foremost
showed that Islam could no longer be the answer to the problems that the Empire was
addressing. These measures known also as the “Tanzimat” (Reforms) deprived the Cretan
Islam of many tools that kept the Muslim identity of Crete alive (Local Autonomy and the
Tanzimat, Kostopoulou). According to the Imperial edicts “All forms of religion are and shall
be freely professed in my dominions, no subject of my Empire shall be hindered in the
exercise of the religion that he professes, nor shall be in any way annoyed on this account. No
one shall be compelled to change their religion”.
Hatt-i Humayun of 1856 created a new wave of conversions to Christianity and
revelations of Crypto-Christians. Noteworthy is the fact that in the village of Episkopi near
the province of Heraklion, out of eighty Muslim families, seventy-six converted to
Christianity (Peponakis, 88).
Watching their community shrinking dramatically set the alarm bells ringing for the
Cretan Muslims. Until the proclamation of the Hatt-i Humayun, one could argue that the
Cretan Muslims were not entirely assimilated to their new religion. In at least some villages
the Muslim call to prayer was carried out in Greek rather than Arabic and as mentioned before
Cretan Muslims were consumers of wine, even of pork (Barchard, 9). After the proclamation
of Hatt-i Humayun, the phenomenon of religious fanaticism surfaced. Especially in the cities,
in the early 1860s the phenomenon of religious extremism was observed more frequently, on
39
the contrary in the rural area the disputes over religious fanaticism were not observed with the
same frequency due to the family relations among the inhabitants (Peponakis, 110).
Another parameter of the Hatt-i Humayun was that all commercial political and legal
differences between Muslims and non-Muslims were to be referred to joint courts, and
freedom of representation on provincial and community councils was to be secured for the
religious communities. Also the principle of equal taxation for all was accepted (Kallivretakis,
18).
During the revolt of 1866-1869 where 30.000 inhabitants of the island lost their lives,
the gap between the two communities had been widened even more and mutual tolerance was
undermined and destroyed (Şenisik, 77). The distinguishing difference of this revolt was its
religious character. It also had a national character for the Christian Cretans (Andriotis, 67).
Churches and mosques, religious symbols of both communities were systematically attacked.
As Andriotis mentions, the reaction of the Muslims to the revolt became more stronger
(Andriotis, 67). The presence of dervishes and dervish tekkes (religious brotherhoods) it is
certainly not a coincidence. The missionary action of dervishes was widely spread on Crete,
and especially after the 1866 they were trying to bolster the religiosity of the Cretan Muslims.
In 1876 only in Chania, 300 Cretan Muslims, the majority of whom were from the upper
class, became dervishes (Peponakis, 111). Electra Kostopoulou maintains that amidst the
ideological and material marginalization of Ottoman Islam in Crete, the localized community
on the island had managed to survive attached to its local pious foundations (The Art of Being
Replaced, Kostopoulou, 146).
The Cretan Muslims also tried to invest in the education of their community. Although
there were Muslim schools in the cities, in the rural area most of the Cretan Muslims used to
send their children, until 1866, to Greek schools (Peponakis, 111). This was partially one of
40
the reasons that the literacy rate of the population in the countryside was low (Adıyeke, A. N.,
214).
The Muslim aristocracy’s property (land owned by agas and beys) throughout the
nineteenth century and especially after the second half of the century was fragmented. As the
population dynamics in the cities and the villages changed, the land ownership was also
equally transformed. In many cases after a violent revolt, the Muslim population had no other
choice but to stay in the much safer cities. Indeed, Kallivretakis mentions the writings of
George Perrot who in 1867 argues that “Agas and beys, stripped of their estates…for a cheap
price, inundate the towns, seeking to survive by renting some of the land that the Turkish
administration is wasting, though it is unable to satisfy all the idlers that implore it” (Perakis,
136).
2.4 The Organic Act and the Halepa Pact (1868-1878)
Following the revolt of 1866, in an attempt to undermine the insurrections, the
Ottoman government announced through the grand vizier Ali Pasha, who was sent to Crete
for this purpose, a curtain number of administrative privileges to the Christian inhabitants of
the island. These privileges were the essence of the so-called Organic Act or Statute by which
the island was to be ruled until 1878. According to the Organic Act, the island was divided
into five provinces (Chania, Rethymnon, Herakleion, Sfakia and Lasithi) and subdivided into
19 districts. In addition the Organic Act provided for the involvement of Christians at every
level of the administration and in the compositions of the courts. On the basis of this Act a
local bank was established and the elections for a General Assembly with legislative
competence at local level were organized. Finally, Turkish and Greek were recognized as
official languages (Şenışık, 78; Kallivretakis, 21).
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With a mixed membership drawn from both ethnic groups on the island, the Assembly
was to meet forty days each year, to pass measures relating to local issues and so on, through
its decisions had to be ratified by the Governor General and the Ottoman government
(Kallivratakis, 21). Şenışık mentions that the Christian representatives of the General
Assembly believed that the Organic Act had not granted equal privileges to all inhabitants,
since the Christians had 38 members and the Muslims had 36. In her work, she also mentions
that Christians complained about the biased decision of the courts of law against them
(Şenışık, 78).
A revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1875, after which the Russo-Ottoman War broke
out in the spring of 1877, created a highly charged atmosphere in Crete. A number of
committees were established because livestock theft and murders increased. In 1878, Crete
went through another revolt. The pattern was similar to the previous experiences. The main
desire of the Cretan Christians remained enosis (union) with Greece (Şenışık, 79). After the
Ottoman Empire’s defeat by Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano obliged the Ottoman Empire to
comply with the terms of the Organic Act (Şenışık, 78). The Treaty of Berlin in July 1878
decreed that ‘the Sublime Porte is obliged to implement in the island of Crete, the Organic
Act of 1868, after such amendments as may be judged necessary’ (Kallivretakis, 24). In
October 1878, the Halepa Pact was signed and ratified on 9 November by imperial decree.
According to the Halepa Pact, the Governor General of Crete could be a Christian and the
General Assembly should be composed of 49 Christian and 31 Muslim deputies. A local
gendarmerie was created, in which both communities participated. Administrative
correspondence and judicial decisions were to be composed in both languages, while Greek
was to be the only official language for sessions of the courts and the General Assembly
(Kallivretakis, 24).
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Most of the measures and administrative projects that the Ottoman regime continued
to implement throughout the century challenged directly the local Muslim establishment.
Especially in the cases of the Organic Act and the Halepa Pact, the Ottoman Empire started to
enforce a program of reforms that fostered equality between Muslims and non-Muslims. As
Kostopoulou argues, the most important aspect of this process was ‘that the last ideological
bridges between the capital city and local Islam, that is the Muslim apparatuses of
administration and justice, were shaken to the point of no return’. Indeed, the Christian legal
networks gradually replaced the old imperial system of law, a development that had
significant importance for the future of the Cretan Muslims (Revisiting Hellenic-Ottoman
History, Kostopoulou, 5).
2.5 The revolutionary period of 1896-1898 and the Muslim migration
Revolts on the island as seen throughout the whole chapter were not a peculiar
phenomenon. On the contrary one can argue that revolts were part of the norm on the island.
The submission of the Halepa Pact on October 1878 introduced a new circle of violence in the
rebellious nineteenth century. The experiment of the “parliamentary system” of Crete under
the Ottoman rule, introduced a decade of division of Cretan society into two political groups,
the Liberals or “barefooted” and the Conservatives or “karavanades” (Kallivretakis, 25).
The animosity and rivalry between the two political parties had reached to the point to
‘split the people’ and paved the way for acts of murders and further violence (Şenışık, 80). At
the end of the 1880s, animosity between the two Christian parties reached its peak. In the
elections of 1889, the electoral outcome was in favor of the Liberals, which complicated
matters even more on the island. The politically charged atmosphere between the two
Christian parties led to a revolt which did not last long but it was decisive for the parts of the
Muslim community which remained in the rural areas to leave those lands. As Şenışık
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mentions, in addition to the clashes between the partisans of both parties, Christians began to
attack Muslims, who in their effort to save their lives took refuge in the big cities. Muslims
from Rethymno, Chania and Heraklion were also compelled to migrate (Şenışık, 82).
As Andriotis argues, this revolt was different from the other revolts that occurred in
the past regarding the determination of the Cretan Christians to not allow the resettlement of
the Cretan Muslim back to their residences. Andriotis also cited the remarks by the Consul of
Britain in Chania, Billioti, regarding the tensions between Christians and Muslims in the town
of Chania “in my opinion Muslims and not Christians are in danger” (Andriotis, 68, 70).
In an attempt to suppress the Cretan revolt of 1889, the Ottoman government issued
an edict, according to which the privileges granted by the Halepa Pact, were restricted and the
number of deputies in the General Assembly was reduced to 35 Christians and 22 Muslims
(Şenışık, 104). From the end of the revolt of 1889 until the revolutionary period of 1895-
1898, acts of violence were constant among Muslims and Christians (Andriotis, 71)
Towards the May of 1896 and while financially the island was not in a good state, the
tension in Crete escalated for once more. The revolt of 1896, which was followed by repeated
requests from some of the Cretan Christians for the revival of Halepa Pact, was one of the
most severe that the nineteenth century had experienced. Many people from both communities
were killed within a short period of time, houses were burned and plundered, tree plantations
had been destroyed by either the Muslims or the Christians and mosques and churches were
demolished. Every single shop in the bazaar was closed and no one was to be seen on the
streets (Şenışık, 114; Andriotis 72; Perakis, 139). One of the consequences of the revolt was
the disruption in the agricultural production that the tree destruction caused and had a long
lasting impact in the development of the rural economy of the island (Andriotis, 73).
During the summer of 1896, in only one day 22 Muslim settlements were burned.
Until September 1896, 105 Muslim settlements were burned or destroyed by the Cretan
44
Christians in the periphery of Heraklion (Andriotis 72). 5,180 Muslim families were left
homeless. On the other hand due to the reactions of the Muslims, 3,099 Christian families also
left without shelter (Şenışık, 137).
The clashes between the populations on the island continued and the year of 1897 and
spread quickly across the island. The province of Sitia, near Heraklion, remained
uninfluenced from the violent clashes between Christians and Muslims until the 1897. During
1897 some of the Christian insurgents attacked Muslim villages in Sitia and massacred men,
women and children. The number of Muslims killed in Sitia amounted to 2,500 of whom only
25 managed to escape (Şenışık, 156). At the same time in the western districts the situation
was getting worse. In several districts of Chania, the Muslim inhabitants were blockaded and
begged to be rescued. With the intervention of the European forces, about 3,000 Cretan
Muslims including 600 Ottoman troops found refuge in various places (Şenışık, 158).
During the years of 1896 to 1898, there was a great mobility of population within the
island. The last Muslims living in the interior parts of the island began to flee to the cities and
as the population of the cities increased, they began to suffer from hunger and diseases
(Şenışık, 158; Andriotis, 74). The demographic map of the cities and the rural areas changed
radically. The Muslim population on Crete from 1881 to 1900 reduced to the half, specifically
it was reduced by 55,7% and the percentage to the total population was from 25,9% in 1881 to
11% in 1900 (Andriotis, 74).
The majority of the Cretan Muslims emigrated to Heraklion, where 25 square miles of
military cordon was established by the British forces in order to prevent anymore conflicts
between the Christians and the Muslims. As Şenışık mentions, it was estimated that 49,500
Muslims civilians were assembled in Heraklion and within the cordon area (Şenışık, 168).
As the Cretan Muslims were gathered in the cities and while the departure of nearly
8,000 Ottoman troops on 28 October 1898 was decided by the European forces and the
45
Sublime Porte, large numbers of Cretan Muslims found themselves under the pressure of
“forced migration” to the mainland of the Ottoman Empire, despite the assurances they had
received from the administrative authorities and the European Powers’ representatives
regarding their personal safety and the protection of their property (Perakis, 137; The Art of
Being Replaced, Kostopoulou, 131; Andriotis, 75). During the years of 1898 and 1899, the
destinations of the Cretan Muslims were the coast of the Asia Minor, Rhodes and Kos, Syria
and North Africa (Andriotis, 75; Kara-Çelik, 91). As Kostopoulou mentions, according to a
variety of oral and archival sources, the massive Muslim emigration from Crete continued
during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the First World War (1914-1918).
In November 1898, the Greeks were defeated in the Greek-Ottoman war. However, the
Ottoman province of Crete became autonomous. The entire Ottoman contingent was gone and
the Ottoman flag was hauled down (Şenışık, 228). Although the Ottoman Empire was
politically retreating from the island, in the urban centers of Herakleion and Rethymnon, the
Cretan Muslims were still the majority (The Art of Being Replaced, Kostopoulou, 137).
The much desired autonomy of the island was the outcome of a century of Christian
revolts and of continuous Ottoman administrative reforms. (The Art of Being Replaced,
Kostopoulou, 131).
2.6 The Muslim Cretans during the Autonomous Crete (1898-1913)
Christian insurrection against Ottoman power led to the intervention of French,
English, Italian and Russian troops, definitely setting the ‘Cretan question’ (Tsitselikis, 36).
The European forces authorized a regime of autonomy for the island under Ottoman
suzerainty. That meant that autonomy was granted to Cretans as a temporary experiment, one
of the most important preconditions of which was the cooperation of both communities with
the new regime (Revisiting Hellenic-Ottoman History, Kostopoulou, 7). The Muslim
46
community during the Autonomy period was not deprived of physical protection and political
representation. The status of Autonomy prevailed under the supervision of the European
forces, who until 1908 kept an International Occupation Force on the island responsible for
assuring the guarantees given to the Muslims (Perakis, 138).
Prince George, the son of king of Greece Konstantinos, arrived at Suda bay, at Chania
on 9 December 1898. In the government house, the French admiral handed official control of
the island over to him. The Cretan flag was raised and the Ottoman flag was left only on the
fort at Suda as a last symbol of Ottoman suzerainty in Crete (Şenışık, 229).
As Tsitselikis argues, the legal status of the Muslim community in the Cretan state was
one of the most elaborate ever applied by a Christian Greek administration. On 24 January
1899, a new Cretan Assembly was elected consisting 138 Christians and 50 Muslims and in
April, the first government was formed. Among others, Eleftherios Venizelos, known for his
support for an “absolute equality of the Christians and Muslims”, was appointed as the
Minister of Justice. The Muslim Hasan Skilianakis was appointed Minister of Transport and
Public Security (Şenışık, 229; Perakis, 138; Tsistselikis, 37).
One can argue that the idea of cooperation and co-administration was not unfamiliar to
the Cretans, in fact the legal status that was applied for the Muslim community can be
considered in the framework of the Halepa Pact according to which the autonomous Cretan
state was established adopting a balanced treatment of Christians and Muslims (Tsitselikis,
37). On the other hand one should not forget that Cretan Christians were making an effort to
respect Muslim rights often against their own will, since the Christians were forced by the
European Powers to guarantee the protection of Muslims and to cooperate with them for the
restoration of peace and prosperity (Hellenic-Ottoman History, Kostopoulou, 8). Indeed
between the years 1898-1912 the educated Muslim Cretans, who were referred to as ‘effendi’,
actively participated in the administration of the autonomous Crete, occupying some of the
47
most prestigious administrative offices (Tzedaki-Apostolaki, 154; Hellenic-Ottoman History,
Kostopoulou, 7).
The official language of the Cretan state was proclaimed Greek, however this did not
constituted a problem for the Muslim community for whom as mentioned before, Greek was
their native language. Muslims’ language rights were mainly implemented in the field of
education where according to the general education law, the state provided Muslims the right
to have special education in religion and linguistic matters. In Chania, Rethymno and
Heraklion, elementary public schools were established for Muslim pupils. The supervision of
Muslim educational institutions was the responsibility of the High Directorate of Education
and the Counselor of Education of the Cretan state was a Muslim (Tsitselikis, 41).
The Islamic religious foundations were granted legal personality similar to the status
that enjoyed under Ottoman law. As Tsitselikis mentions “according to the article 16, Act
145/1900, the foundations included the mosques, and the convents of religious brotherhoods
(tekke), buildings for religious or educational use, the seminaries (medrese) and the libraries,
the water reserves (sebilhane), the fountains and the cemeteries” (Tsitselikis, 39). It is worth
mentioning that the institution of the Evkaf (foundations) survived on the island more than the
Ottoman Empire did and even after the unification with Greece in 1913 (The Art of Being
Replaced, Kostopoulou, 138; Tsitselikis; 39).
The experiment of autonomous coexistence between Muslims and Christians, colored
by both rivalry and cooperation and from 1901 until the departure of the Muslim Cretans from
Crete one can argue that there was generally a diverse path of conflict and cooperation. The
League of Christian-Muslim Women is a representative example of cooperation between the
two communities. The League was a mixed association with a social activity, who placed
particular importance on the rehabilitation of excluded and poor women from both
communities and sought to secure them jobs (Tsitselikis, 44; Andriotis, 78).
48
Despite the ‘protected’ legal status of the Muslims, as the Cretan state became
increasingly oriented towards political union with the independent Greek state, political
tension and renewed violent inter-ethnic clashes led Muslims to gradually flee the island and
from the majority in the cities of Heraklion and Rethymno, to became minority (Tsitselikis,
38). Between the years 1900 and 1911 the Muslim population of the island decreased from
33,496 to 27,852 (Perakis, 138). Decisive to the migration of the Muslim community was the
‘boykotaj’ (boycotts) from the Cretan Christians to the shops owned by Muslims (Adιyeke,
A.N., 219; Andriotis, 79).
Eventually the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) marked the end of the Cretan autonomy and
the integration of Crete into Greece. The Greek state appeared less concerned than before
about the Muslim communal rights while at the same time, the Muslims that remained on the
island appeared increasingly more concerned to prove their loyalty to Greece (The Art of
Being Replaced, Kostopoulou, 142).
The siding of the Ottoman State with Germany during the First World War according
to A.N. Adıyeke ‘obliterated the factional harmony on the island’ (Adıyeke, A.,N.,219). In
1914, one year after Crete’s annexation to the state of Greece, tension rose again between the
two communities. From 1914 to 1917 Christian refugees from Asia Minor arrived in the
island seeking shelter in schools and mosques, adding more tension to the already deteriorated
relations. Still, an important Muslim community remained on the island until 1923. On 24 of
July 1923, Greece and Turkey signed the Lausanne Treaty, according to which all Muslims
had to leave the island.
The status of the Muslim Cretans throughout the turbulent 19th century was strongly
challenged and the Muslim community began to be perceived as a minority. Cretan Islam
throughout the nineteenth century gradually turned into a subculture. The “decisive element”
of religion transformed "a group of people" into "a community", the Cretan Muslims.
49
Conversion and reversion to and from Islam eventually shaped the communal identity of
Cretan Muslims. Even the fluidity in the choice of the religion throughout the nineteenth
century, underlines the importance of the religion. The switching of religion was widely used
as “a tool” serving a variety of reasons, such as better economic purposes or better social
status. After all one should not forget that the most significant criterion taken into
consideration, in the population exchange of 1923, was religion
Chapter Three
The community of Cretan Muslims in Turkey
3.1 The Population Exchange
The Population Exchange ended the presence of the Muslim community in Crete. As
Aytek Soner Alpan mentions, the Population Exchange constituted a historic turning point in
the process of nation-/state- building both in Greece and in Turkey, affecting directly not only
more that 1.5 million people but also both nations collectively (Alpan, 200).
The Treaty defined who were to be included in the exchange and who were to be
exempted from it, as well as the conditions for transferring property and compensation and the
creation of a Mixed Commission to supervise the emigration and to oversee the liquidation of
property (Hirschon, 8). Article 1, of the Convention regarding the population exchange
between Greece and Turkey, stated:
As from the 1st May, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish
nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek
nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not
return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish
Government or of the Greek Government respectively
3
.
As the Population Exchange implemented under the auspices of the League of
Nations, its impact transcended the boundaries of Turkey and Greece and while the
conventional view in both countries holds that the exchange constituted the final act that
completed nation-building in the two countries, many are the voices, especially the last two
decades, who argue that the exchange was a form of “ethnic cleansing” (Kitromilides, 2008:
266; Alpan, 200). As Kitromilides explains “the exchange may be seen as a form of ‘ethnic
cleansing’, masquerading behind the respectability of international law and sanctioned by the
51
blessings of the League of Nations and the great powers of civilized Europe who were present
and parties to the Lausanne negotiations” (Kitromilides, 2008: 266). Indeed after the signing
of the Treaty of Ankara between Greece and Turkey, Raymond Hare, an American diplomat,
proposed an answer regarding the Population Exchange: “We can summarize the situation
like this; Venizelos can be considered as the ‘father’ of the Population Exchange, while Dr.
Nansen engaged to fulfill it. As for Hamid Bey, representative of the Ankara’s government,
he suggested to have a compulsory character” (Aktar, 2006:138; Collins, 203).
As a result of the Population Exchange, at least four hundred thousand Muslims were
forced to leave Greece and settle in Turkey, among them 23.821 Cretan Muslims (Andriotis,
84). On the other hand it is estimated that about one million and two hundred Christians fled
to Greece before the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, without protection or supervision
(Hirschon, 14). As Kitromilides argues ‘relocation’ and ‘resettlement’ “sound quite mild and
neutral terms when they are used to describe the massive upheaval brought into the lives of
individual families and communities by the process of uprooting and deportation involved in
the exchange of populations” (Kitromilides, 2008: 262). Indeed the Population Exchange was
in no sense repatriation for either the Muslims of Greece or the Christians of Turkey
(Hirschon, 8).
As is quite natural, the news of the Population Exchange came as a shock to the
remaining communities both in Greece and in Turkey. Regarding the Muslim community in
Crete, one can argue that the final deportation of the community could be viewed as the
natural outcome of long linear conflicts. A closer look, though, on the data of investments and
real estate decisions of the Cretan Muslims as well as the data of the censuses of the
population of the Muslim community, where the massive emigration waves of the Muslim
population had been reduced from the beginning of the twentieth century, surely indicates the
52
inability of Cretan Muslims, not to mention all of the population that has been exchanged, to
foresee the future (The Art of Being Replaced, Kostopoulou, 130; Tzedaki-Apostolaki, 165).
Some of the Cretan Muslims tried to be excluded from the Population Exchange
sometimes with success but mostly without any. Indeed some of them managed to avoid it,
permanently or temporarily by obtaining another citizenship, mostly the Italian citizenship.
Few of them managed to be excluded permanently from the Exchange due to the offer of their
services to the Greek state during the past. There were also some of the Cretan Muslims, who
remained temporarily owing to their expertise in fields where they could not be replaced. For
instance Mustafa Pasakakis was one of the few, whose residence permit was extended due to
the fact that he was the only one who manufactured the light bulbs “Lux” in Chania
(TzedakiApostolaki,
149). Upon the news of the Population Exchange, many Cretan Muslims
attempted to convert to Christianity but without any success (Clark, 51). Despite the efforts of
the Cretan Muslims to remain on the island, according to the population census of 1928 there
were no Muslims remaining in Crete (Tzedaki- Apostolaki, 149).
The departure of the Cretan Muslims officially began on August 1923 and completed
one year later (Andriotis, 84). The departure of individuals, with the exception of men who
could be called for military services between the ages of 18-50, was not prohibited. However
that was rarely the case since individual departure required economic wealth. As
TzedakiApostolaki
mentions, the first organized group of Cretan Muslims was composed by one
thousand twenty nine Muslims of Heraklion and nine hundred Muslims of Rethymno, who
boarded consecutively in the steamship “Kerasous”4
having as destination the port of Ayvalik
of Asia Minor (Kydonies), on December 3, 1923. The last group of Cretan Muslims left Crete,
in the middle of July 1924. As many others before them, the last 300 hundred Cretans
Muslims, departed from Heraklion to Ayvalik, this time with the steamship “Antigoni”
(Tzedaki-Apostolaki, 148). The journey from Crete to Ayvalik lasted 6 days, during which the
53
exchangees were obligated to ensure their survival with their own means (TzedakiApostolaki,
148). In Greece the ‘mapping’ of the refugee memory was undertaken by the
Centre for Asia Minor Studies. Indeed the Greek public memory benefited from the action of
the not state-sponsored Centre for Asia Minor Studies which produced a massive collection of
archival materials regarding the population exchange from the 1930s, unfortunately, the
collection of the Centre was concentrated to the arriving Orthodox community rather than of
the departing Muslims (Iğsız, 455; Alpan, 214).
The identity of the Cretan Muslims but also the identities of all those who were
relocated and resettled, were far less clear cut than the Convention implied. The Lausanne
Treaty evaded addressing the issue of the ethno-national identity of the minorities that have
been exchanged (Alexandris, 117). Religion and not language or ethnicity, was the ‘defining
criterion of identity’ in the Population Exchange (Hirschon, 8). The exchanged Muslims who
were affected of the Population Exchange were linguistically and culturally a heterogeneous
population, having a variety of individual and community memories (Bayındır-Goularas,
119). Yet the people that were affected from the Population Exchange, after the Exchange,
where as Bayındır-Goularas argues, the formation of a collective memory occurs, they
obtained a new attribute on their identity, the attribute of the ‘refugee’ and the ‘exchangee’ (or
‘exchangeable’) (Bayındır-Goularas, 119).
For the Cretan community the ‘identity of the exchangee’, was emphasized from the
start. As Sophia Koufopoulou argues, unlike the majority of Muslims who were expelled from
Greek territory, the Cretans do not refer to themselves as ‘muhacirs’ (in Turkish immigrants,
refugees) but as ‘mübadils’ (exchangees) since the term ‘muhacir’ was not only associated
with poverty but also with various other ethnic groups in Turkey (Koufopoulou, 210). There
should also be noted that in some cases, the ‘mübadils’ distinguish themselves even from the
Cretan immigrants who left Crete during the turbulent nineteenth century, although not in the
54
same degree. Above all, however the Cretan exchangees identify themselves as Cretans
before anything else.
“There are two groups of Cretans in Turkey, those who left during the nineteenth century and
those who came with the Population Exchange, the latter group came with order (düzenli
göç). Sometimes the two groups are even related, a fact that prevents the alienation of the two
groups.” Mehmet G.
The term ‘mübadil’ allowed the Cretans to differentiate themselves not only regarding their
ethnic identity but also their social status. The Cretans did not choose to leave Crete but they
were forced to do so according to an interstate decision (Bayındır-Goularas, 119). The term
‘mübadil’ is a reminder that they left behind some remarkable property of which they
received the 1/3, they were exchanged by another population, emphasizing in that way their
feeling of superiority towards other displaced Muslims. Similar is the distinction of the terms
‘refugee’ and ‘exchangee’ among the Asia Minor Greeks in Greece (Balta, 24).
The presence of the thousands of Muslims that had fled- or who were eventually
deported- to Anatolia from the “lost” Ottoman lands brought stories in the newly founded
state of Turkey, that did not really fit with the dominant historiography of victory. The Cretan,
the Bosnian, the Macedonian populations of Turkey, had managed to maintain aspects of their
particularity together with a collective remembering of their origins for years, despite the fact
that this was not the official ideology of the state (Memories of Conflict, Kostopoulou, 39).
3.2 The ‘fatherland’ and the Turkification measures of the state
“At first, life was really hard, although my father was very rich. I saw a lot of rich
people becoming poor. What can I say? A hut in your place is better than a manor in a
foreign place. ” Ali O.
During the first years of their settlement in Turkey, and after the painful experience of
the Population Exchange, the Cretans faced several problems in their new homeland. The new
55
society and culture the Cretans found, certainly must have seemed strange to them. Although
Tzunda had external and geographical similarities with Crete the most important of which
were the large areas that were given for the cultivation of olive trees, was still remaining a
strange and alien place for the Cretans (Koufopoulou, 212). On the other hand as
Koufopoulou mentions, “given the recurrent visual reminders of their former residence and
the similarity in landscape between their old and new communities, Cretans did not have to
change their attitudes as dramatically as they would have done if they had been relocated to a
completely different environment. This similarity allowed them to live and identify
themselves much as they had done in the past” (Koufopoulou, 212).
When the Cretan immigrants first arrived on the Aegean coastal towns and cities, very
few of them knew Turkish. Not being able to communicate with the locals naturally resulted
in the isolation of the Cretans in their own communities. One cannot help but noticing that the
common feeling among them, is that they were strangers in a foreign land, despite the
economic status that each of them may had or even the not so unfamiliar place they had to
live.
“When we first came here, my father took my mother and my siblings and brought
them to Patritsa5
, they were afraid of the “Turks”. They thought that they were going to go
back to Crete and so 1 year passed, 2 years, 10 years…” Hasan K.
One must not forget the social background of the Cretan exchangees. Muslim Cretans
were coming from an island that had a total population of 370.000 people, among whom the
Muslim Cretans actively participated in the administration and they enjoyed a high status in
urban areas. On the contrary the new reality was much different. As Keyder argues, “the
Muslims who arrived in Turkey represented less than four percent of the population, were
dispersed in a much bigger land, were mostly settled in the countryside, and generally did not
have much impact on the political and social development of the country” (Keyder, 43).
56
Moreover, although the common religion had played a fundamental role in the
formation of a common identity among the Cretan Muslims during their presence in Crete,
one can argue that Cretan Islam was itself a distinct case, which in a larger scale, as in the
case of Turkey, was no longer the “decisive element” that hold the community together.
“When I was in the army, a soldier called yarı gavur accusing me that he had to serve
in the military for two and a half years because of ‘us’. We got into a fight but the ‘albays’6
took my side. But that’s who we were, we were yarı gavur. My parents were Cretans. As for
me, well I am both Cretan and Turk. I drink my wine and enjoy the music and the dance.”
Hasan K.
As mentioned above Cretan Muslims had adopted in their religious practices, elements
of their pre-Lausanne life which distinguished them from the total Muslim population in their
new homeland. Therefore, they had to face many times the experience of rejection and in
many occasions they were stigmatized as ‘half infidels’ (yarı gavur) from the local Turks.
Unlike the Christian refugees in Greece, any assertion of a distinctive identity would not have
been welcome in the prevailing Kemalist ideology of nation-state building (Hirschon, 20).
“The rest of the Turks differentiated us, my grandmother had a distinct Cretan accent, she
was using a lot tse and tse7
, and therefore they treated us as like Greeks. We left our old
neighborhood like thieves. Those who experienced the worst discrimination were those who
had heavy Cretan accent, like my grandmother” Leyla S.
By contrast to the Greek state, Turkey had not the experience of being a nation-state,
in fact the Turkish nation formed through the process of ‘ethnic unmixing’ (Keyder, 43). In
addition, it was “unfortunate” for the Cretan Muslims that the Turkish nationalism, unlike
most formulations for national identity, emphasized in cultural and linguistic criteria for
membership of the ‘national community’ (Homogenizing the Nation, Aktar; 93). As Keyder
57
mentions, “the national body was supposed to express homogeneity deriving from ethnic
unity, which would then be made concrete through speaking in a single voice” (Keyder, 47).
In the aftermath of the Population Exchange the nascent Turkish state was called to
assure the unity of a nation within its borders. Nevertheless the young Turkish Republic was
hardly homogenous. Even though the Muslim exchangees were directly and formally
recognized as Turks, they were almost immediately granted the Turkish citizenship and
without any doubt, still they were people who had different origins and were coming from
several regions with various cultural and ethnic identities. As, Alpan characteristically argues,
the Turkish state “was quite determined to sweep the Population Exchange underneath the
rug, and this required silencing the refugees of the Population Exchange and orchestrating
collective silence about this event” (Alpan, 209).
Indeed the new Republic yearned to create a homogeneous nation-state whose citizens
were Muslims, were speaking Turkish and had a Turkish culture (Ince, 49). Within this
framework emphasis was given on the Turkish language, and one of the most well known
campaigns, “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!) was launched a few years
after the Population Exchange. As Ince mentions, there was even an attempt to pass a law in
the Parliament making Turkish compulsory and not speaking it punishable by fine. Some
municipalities in Bursa, Balikesir (Tzunda and Ayvalik are districts of Balikesir province) and
Bergama in 1927 took the initiative to impose fines to those who were not speaking Turkish
in public areas (Ince, 60). Both Bergama and Balikesir were places of resettlement for large
groups of the exchangees who came from Greece, namely at Balikesir were settled the 15% of
the total Muslim exchangees (Iğsız, 456). The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign was at
first met with negative reactions and as Iğsız mentions “some people would seat under the
signs reading “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” and speak their own language or simply tear down
58
the signs” (Iğsız, 456). Around this period, according to the article 159 of the Turkish
Criminal Code, insulting “Turkishness” constituted a crime (Iğsız, 456).
In that context, all the Greek place-names were Turkified, among these places Tzunda
was renamed after the Turkish general who conquered the island in 1922 during the war
between Greece and Turkey, Alibey, which remains the official name of the island
(Koufopoulou, 210).
“Now we can live and speak freely, in the past we could not speak Greek. The people who
came here in the beginning were not allowed to speak Greek because they thought we were
Rum and the police (zantarmades) would beat us”, Hasan K.
On 21 June, 1934 the “Law on Surnames” passed in the Parliament with the aim to
‘abolish differences that do not really exist’ (Ince, 61). According to the articles 7 and 8 of the
Law, all names that implied rank, tribe, foreign race or nationality and the names that were
considered funny, rude or even disgusting, were forbidden. The new surnames should be also
in Turkish according to article 5 (Ince, 61). Following these changes, the Cretans gave up
their surnames with the characteristic suffix –akis and adopted new ones. Reactions, demands
and other activities that were expressed by some refugee organizations were perceived as
schismatic and annoyed the state. After all, refugee organizations did not have the similar fate
as the refugee organizations in Greece (Hirschon, 19). In the case of Turkey refugee
organizations were closed and banned already from the 1924 since it was a clear policy of the
state to suppress and impose silence on the Population Exchange (Alpan, 209).
Remarkable is also the fact that during the first years of the Turkish Republic, there
was hardly any discussion in the school text-books, of the ethnic composition of Anatolia and
the Population Exchange. According to Alpan “the Turkish state’s approach still is rooted in
purposeful neglect” (Keyder, 48; Alpan, 217). The same absence of reference on Population
Exchange can also be noted in the Turkish literature until 1980. Since 1980 though, one can
59
notice a growing interest, where a number of publications on the Population Exchange have
started to attract the public’s attention (Millas, 2004: 224).
The Turkification policies were aimed mostly for the non-Muslims citizens of Turkey
who supposedly had a status of protection according to the Lausanne Treaty, however were
also imposed on the Muslim exchangees. As Ayhan Aktar argues, “there is no doubt that the
policies of Turkification were responsible for the hemorrhaging of non-Muslims communities
from Istanbul” (Homogenizing the nation, Aktar, 93). On the other hand regarding the Cretan
exchangees, there was never an “option” of leaving the country. As for those who once
dreamt that they could return to their homes, the Lausanne Treaty specified that they “shall
not return to live in Greece” forcing them in a way, not only to realize that they were not
going back to Crete but also to recognize that the adjustment in the new reality was crucial.
3.3 The Cretans of Turkey
The assimilation policies the Turkish state implemented following the Population
Exchange, created an environment where anything other than the Turkish national identity
and Turkish culture, was not welcomed. Within this framework, everything that constituted a
reminder of the pre-Lausanne era had to be reconstructed.
The example of the language is quite telling. In order to avoid to be characterized as
yarı gavur or gavur fındanı (infidel saplings) due to the fact that Cretans were speaking
Greek, the usage of Cretan dialect was restricted at home. It seems though that the language is
of key importance for the preservation of the Cretan identity. Although the Cretans avoided
speaking any other language besides Turkish in public, one can argue that the Cretan dialect
was and still is in a way the core of the identity of the Cretans. Indeed, almost all Cretan
participants in this research stated that they had to learn Turkish at school as their second
language and until the age of five or six, they all grew up hearing and speaking the Cretan
dialect.
60
“I have learned the Cretan dialect from my grandmother and from her aunt. Until the age of
five, I didn’t know any Turkish. At home we were speaking only in Greek, especially between
us, when we didn’t want others to understand what we were saying” Leyla S.
“My aunt and all my relatives spoke only in Greek, I forgot, but I am going to attend a course
with my two sons” Eyyüp B.
The same applied for religion as well. In their effort to be accepted from the other
Turks, they became more religious. As discussed before, many of the Cretans Muslims who
had been exchanged were Bektashi and Alevi Muslim, religious practices that they had to
abandon and ‘convert’ to Sunni Islam, a conversion thought that it was going to ensure
“greater acceptance and equality with other Turks” (Koufopoulou, 215). The majority of the
Cretans however preserved the religious practices and customs of the pre-Lausanne life, that
is the interaction of religious practices and customs from both Islam and Christianity.
Koufopoulou mentions, that during the Muslim Hidrellez celebration of the Prophet Ilias, the
Cretans in Tzunda, dye eggs red and make tsoureki like the Christians do during the Easter
(Koufopoulou, 215). Although it was not one of the purposes of this study, during the
interviews I determined that almost all the Cretans that took part in the study were secular
with an individual religiosity.
One concept that seems that remained intact, not only from the Population Exchange
but also from the assimilation policies of the Turkish state is the institution of the Cretan
family.
“The Cretans love their family [είναι «σπιτιάριδες»], they are noble and they read a lot. My
grandmother used to translate books. Even the Cretans who haven’t had formal education are
different from the other Turks, they are more attached to their families, they have different
culture, and the bond between them is very strong.” Leyla S.
61
Certainly, the institution of the Cretan family played and still plays a significant role in
preserving the common identity. Furthermore as mentioned above, the role of Cretan women
in the family, was anything but conventional. As Koufopoulou argues the Cretan women are
still the “gatekeepers of the Cretan identity”.
“Cretan women are strong. I myself married a Cretan woman, because they are different
from the others. You see, they had freedom already from their houses so you cannot impose
anything that they don’t want to them” Emre P.
During their presence in Crete, the Cretan women were engaged to “regular contact with the
Christian Orthodox and Europeans in general, especially in urban areas, which led to the
increasing secularization and modernization of their traditional Muslim way of life”
(Koufopoulou, 215). It can be argued therefore, that one of the main elements of the Cretan
culture, the characteristic Cretan diet was preserved by the Cretan women8
.
“We used to eat kalitsounia9
in our home, fennel, and wild greens. We didn’t eat lamb; we
used to eat veal, Cretan pasty and dolmathes (dolma). My parents are long gone, but I
continue to make these foods.” Leyla S.
One of the various anecdotes, heard by Cretans regarding their diet is: “do not let a Cretan and
a cow in the same field, because the cow will starve”, joking in that way about their fondness
for herbs and vegetables. Indeed, the Cretans became well known throughout Turkey for their
“culinary expertise, variety and innovation” (Koufopoulou, 216). Similarly to the Asia Minor
refugees in Greece, the Cretans contributed to the local cuisine of their host country. They are
the ones that introduced to the Turkish cuisine, the broad beans, artichokes, escargot
(hohlious), various edible wild greens and the use of olive oil in almost every dish
(Koufopoulou, 216).
“We do have a different cuisine from the rest of the Turks. We love wild greens and escargot,
artichokes and olive oil, although it is difficult to find these things in Istanbul” Eyyüp B.
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As mentioned previously, Muslim Cretans had a tradition on music and folk poetry,
namely the tradition of “mantinades”. A very well known mantinada among the Cretans is:
“Girl, if you go to Crete, give greetings to Crete; give also greetings to the mountain
Psiloritis”
[Αν πας στην Κρήτη κοπελιά, χαιρέτα μου την Κρήτη, χαιρέτα μου και το βουνό που λένε
Ψηλορείτη]
The tradition of mantinades is still surviving among the Cretan families, even in the second
and the third generation of the Cretans and even among those Cretans who cannot speak
Greek anymore. However, the music tradition did not survive in the same degree. Some of the
participants in this study could sing several songs of Ksilouris10 and they all knew him and his
songs but on the other hand one can observe a justified confusion about what is Cretan and
what is Greek in general. The traditional song “Samiotisa” for instance was viewed from the
third generation of Cretan exchangees as a Cretan song, while in fact is a traditional song of
the Greek island Samos.
Admittedly, one can argue that the assimilation policies of the Turkish state were quite
effective but at the end unsuccessful in disavowing the Cretan identity which did not fit into
the picture of the homogeneous nation.
“All my relatives were from Chania. I was born and grow up in Istanbul but I feel Cretan, I
grow up with the Cretan culture” Leyla S.
Despite the efforts of the Turkish state to assimilate the “newcomers” to the country, the
Cretans managed to maintain their particularities and identity. In opposition to many scholars’
beliefs the Cretan exchangee identity is not a newly established identity; it is rather an identity
that is being rediscovered from the later generations of Cretan exchangees. It should be noted
however that the “Cretan exchangee identity” was never in conflict with the “Turkishness” of
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the Cretans; on the contrary the evolution of the “identity of the exchangee” was completed
simultaneously with their “Turkishness”.
3.4 The “re-discovery” of the Population Exchange and the Cretan community
From the 1980’s onwards one can notice a shift in the relations between Greece and
Turkey, which had immediate consequences in both countries. As Kostopoulou argues “the
end of the Cold War, the Greek entry to European Union, the rise of political Islam in
Turkey” and the deconstruction of “Kemalism”, signaled the end of an era (Memories of
Conflict, Kostopoulou, 40). In Turkey, the past began to be challenged publicly and policies
and ruptures were increasingly probed (Iğsız, 458). Although it seems that the Turkish state
was not as ready as the Turkish public to be re-introduced with its recent history and to the
subject of Population Exchange, one can argue that in the end of the twentieth century, there
was a shift in the way that people engaged with their past and their families’ history.
A typical example which portrays this change is the publication of a novel by Kemal
Yalçin in 1998, entitled: The Entrusted Trousseau: Peoples of the Exchange (“Emanet
Cengiz”). The book concerns the story of a Turkish citizen who visits Greece and tries to find
the Greek Orthodox family that entrusted to his father their daughter’s wedding trousseau,
during their deportation from Asia Minor, believing that they would eventually come back.
Although, it has been argued that the novel broke a 65 years Turkish silence surrounding the
Population Exchange, one can help but wonder about the book of Ekmel Molla “What I saw
in Greece in 1950”, a book of a Cretan Muslim exchangee who describes his journey back to
Crete in 1950 and his experience of the Population Exchange. Unfortunately, Ekmel Molla’s
book was never translated to Turkish despite the fact that it was printed in Istanbul. In 1998
“The Entrusted Trousseau: Peoples of the Exchange” was honored with the Ministry of
Culture’s 1998 Novel Success Prize while a few years later, in 2002 other state officials filled
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a complaint and prosecuted the book and the author, on the grounds that it offended and
insulted the Turkish national pride and identity (Iğsız, 452).
Moreover in 1999 an earthquake in Turkey and another one a month later in Greece
led to the diplomatic rapprochement of the two countries. Meanwhile some months later, a
group of second generation exchangees from Greece, established the “Lozan Mübadilleri
Vakfı” (The “Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants”). The Foundation began collecting
oral history accounts from all kinds of exchangees and their descendants who live in Turkey,
arranged return visits to Greece, and among others published, for the first time in Turkish, the
popular poem Erotokritos, which still survives in the oral tradition of the Cretans.
The trips that the “Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants” organized, gave the
opportunity to many of the exchangees and their descendants to visit the towns and the
villages of their ancestors. Namely one of the participants of this study during one of these
trips went to the town that her ancestors used to live before the Exchange: Chania. She was
fascinated by the fact that her family’s descriptions about the house they were used to live,
were taking form in front of her eyes. She was not of course the first, many others either
joining the trips of the Foundation or individually, visited Crete and established friendly
relations with the locals. Almost all of the participants of this study, at some point visited
Crete. The younger generations cannot give a specific answer in the question why they
decided to travel to Crete.
“I think it is because of my grandfather, I really don’t know why I went to Crete. My
uncle drew me a map and I went to see our house, my grandfathers’ house.”Kivanç K.
While some of them cannot detect exactly the reasons behind their trip to Crete, others
are quite conscious of their visit to Crete.
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“It was my dream to visit the house of my grandparents. When I found it, I closed my
eyes and imagined them living there. As I was leaving from Crete, I was really moved. I
promised myself to visit Crete every year.” Neslihan B.
Regarding this aspect, worth mentioning is the movie of Çağan Irmak, “My
grandfather’s people” (Dedemin insanları) which depicts the desire of a Cretan exchangee to
visit the city of his origins; Rethymno.
Along with the contribution of the “Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants” one
can notice a change in the way that people began to conceptualize their past and their
families’ history. This change led to an appropriation of their history not only in a personal
but also in a public way. Documentaries, literature, films began to give prominence to stories
of people who experienced the Exchange and as Iğsız argues, stories that have been
instrumental in bringing “plurality” and “polyphony” to the public domain (Iğsız, 459). The
“rediscovery” of the memory of the exchangees through foundations and other initiatives as
well as the contribution of the Turkish academia, generated a narrative of the past and helped
consolidate the identity of the exchangees.
Currently, there seems to be more intense the need the descendants of the exchangees
feel to keep the unity of their community and honor the past of their families. Especially the
third generation of the exchangees started to become more involved in discovering the
identity of their ancestors and they were ‘favored’ in their effort not only by technology but
also from the positive political atmosphere between the Greece and Turkey. Within this
framework the third and the fourth generations of the Cretan exchangees decided to create a
separate foundation focused on the Cretan exchangees and immigrants, the Cretan’s
Association of Culture, Friendship and Cooperation (Giritliler Kültür Dostluk ve
Yardımlaşma Derneği). The only requirement for someone to join the Association is to be of a
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Cretan origin. Having as a central focus the Cretan community, the Association arranges
annual “Cretan festivals” and invites musicians from Crete.
A few months earlier, in April 2014, the Association published a 95 pages TurkishCretan
language guide, in an effort to revive the Cretan dialect. In the prologue of the
language guide is mentioned that “One of the most important factors for the survival of the
Cretan culture is the preservation of the language…” (Türkçe-Giritçe Konuşma Kılavuzu, 4)
The Turkish-Cretan language guide contains phrases that nowadays most probably are not
used even in Crete, for instance the phrase “taşteru ti taşini” which means “tomorrow
morning” is a phrase that only older generations of Cretans can recall, it is however part of the
Cretan dialect. The Turkish-Cretan language guide also contains phrases that one can use if
decides to visit Crete.
The Associations’ newspaper, “Kritikos” (Giritli) numbers now 8 issues and is being
distributed in 13 cities of Turkey and two countries, Greece and Lebanon (In Lebanon there
also exists a Muslim Cretan community). The newspaper is published consistently on a 4
month basis. In the newspaper, besides the activities of the Association, one can find
traditional Cretan recipes, mantinades, personal stories and news regarding the Cretan
community.
As Koufopoulou characteristically underlines, the Cretans, like many refugee groups,
“recreated their past by retaining certain key elements of their culture” (Koufopoulou, 217).
While other parts of their tradition have vanished or diminished in importance, for instance
the music, the key elements of their cultural continuity, elements such as the language, the
food, the institution of the family, the tradition of mantinades, the family stories, the
establishment of associations and foundations, reveals the desire of the Cretan community not
only to keep the memory of the community alive but also to pass it on to the next generations
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as well. The Cretans of Turkey, through the concrete symbols of their community, managed to
keep a unity despite the difficulties the community faced.
A walk in the streets of Tzunda, during the winter can be quite enlightening as one can
make a distinction between the locals and the tourists. The elderly gather at traditional cafes
in the evenings talking in the Cretan dialect, while the next day keeping their weekly routine,
they go for shopping to the street market, the benches of which have only vegetables and wild
greens. People who are not used to the Cretan culture may find this sight peculiar, to a Cretan
though it is not, on the contrary, this scenery strongly reminds of the villages of Crete.
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Conclusions
The formation of the Muslim Cretan community coincided with the conquest of Crete
by the Ottomans in 1669. By the end of the 17th century the island’s social structure
experienced a drastic ethnic transformation and a significant proportion of the population
converted to Islam. Conversion did not automatically create a fierce and brutal division
between the Christians and the Muslims. In fact the Muslim and Christian communities were
interconnected in various ways. Mixed marriages between the two communities were not
uncommon nor were the active interference in religious matters. The Cretan Muslims often
had blood ties with the Christians and shared with them not only the same language, but also
the villages, the towns, professions, and other cultural elements such as music, dances,
traditions and customs.
During the 19th century, the rise of nationalist movement trends, the Greek War of
Independence as well as reforms and policies implemented by the Ottoman rule on the island,
affected Crete and challenged the Muslim Cretan community. Progressively, in the nineteenth
century the Cretan Muslim community decreased and its access to the machinery of power
was reduced. A massive Muslim emigration from Crete which started at the end of the
nineteenth century, continued during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and the First World War
(1914-1918). In 1898 autonomy was granted to Cretans as a temporary experiment. One of
the most important preconditions of this autonomy was the cooperation of both communities
with the new regime. The experiment of autonomous co-existence between Muslims and
Christians from 1901 until the exodus of the Muslim Cretans from Crete was colored by both
rivalry and cooperation. Eventually, the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) marked the end of the
Cretan autonomy and the integration of Crete into Greece. The status of the Muslim Cretans
throughout the turbulent 19th century was strongly challenged and the Muslim community
began to be perceived as a minority. Cretan Islam throughout the nineteenth century gradually
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turned into a subculture. The “decisive element” of religion transformed "a group of people"
into "a community", the Cretan Muslims.
Indeed religion played a fundamental role in the formation of a collective identity in
Crete and defined the distinctive line between the Cretan Muslim community and the Cretan
Christian community. On the other hand, the element of religion lost its importance upon the
news of the Population Exchange and the arrival of the Muslim Cretans in Turkey.
For the Muslim Cretan community the “identity of the exchangee” was emphasized
from the beginning. The Cretans began to identify themselves as “mübadil” (exchangees) in
order to distinguish themselves from various other ethnic groups in Turkey, not only
regarding their ethnic identity but also their social status. But above all, their prior
identification is the ‘Cretan’ one.
The stories brought by thousands of Muslims that had fled -or who were eventually
deported- to Anatolia from the “lost” Ottoman lands into the newly founded state of Turkey,
that were not in line with the dominant historiography of victory. The Cretan and other
exchanged communities of Turkey had managed to maintain aspects of their particularity
together with a collective memory of their origins until today. Despite the efforts of the
Turkish state to assimilate the “newcomers” to the country, the Cretans managed to maintain
their particularity and to preserve their identity.
This study attempted to analyze the characteristics of the community of the Muslim
Cretans from its formation until today. This study was based on the following aim: to take a
closer look at the community of the Muslim Cretans and to examine how the community has
evolved since its formation until today. More specifically ‘how do the members of the Cretan
community in Turkey and especially the second and the third generation of the refugees
describe themselves as “Cretans”, even though most of them have never been to Crete?’.
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In this study is argued that the Cretan origin is the most significant facet of the
identity of the Muslim Cretans. It matters little, to most of the Cretan community in Turkey
that they never visited Crete. Crete constitutes their ‘imagined homeland’. The Cretan
community shares a special relationship not only with its past but also has an emotional
attachment with Crete; elements that helps the community maintain an identity that unites the
members. The collective memory and identity of the Muslim Cretans remains vivid from the
formation of the community on the island of Crete until today.
The Cretan identity is not an invention of the modern times nor is the Cretan
community a group of people without a past; it is rather an identity that has continuity through
time and the community’s past is crucial in understanding the formation of the Cretan
identity. By constantly perpetuating the key elements of their cultural continuity and through
concrete symbols of their community, such as their language, their story telling, their
mantinades and their food, the Cretans managed to keep a unity despite the difficulties their
community experienced in the past.
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1
The sign in “Firka Fortress” in Chania (Fırka= barracks)
2
κουμπαριά= to baptize someone’s child or to wed a couple is called koumparia
3 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available from: <http://goo.gl/KTWYLB>
4
In Greek Κερασούντα and in Turkish Giresun
5
Patrıça (in Turkish) is a village in Tzunda
6 Albay (in Turkish)=the colonel
7
The Cretan accent is characterized by the sound ts instead of k.
8
Indeed the street market in Tzunda is impressing. In almost every bench, one can find herbs
that are not easily found in Istanbul and people who talk to the clients or between them in the
Cretan dialect
9
Kalitsounia is pastry that were made during the celebration of Christian Easter on Crete
10 Nikos Ksilouris was a Cretan singer and composer