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LADD, J.:
The defendants have been convicted upon a complaint charging them with the
offense of writing, publishing, and circulating a scurrilous libel against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the Philippine
Islands. The complaint is based upon section 8 of Act No. 292 of the
Commission, which is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish,
or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, or which tend to
disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, or which
tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes,
or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or which tend
to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the
peace of the community, the safety and order of the Government, or who
shall knowingly conceal such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine
not exceeding two thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding
two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
The alleged libel was published as an editorial in the issue of the "Manila
Freedom" of April 6, 1902, under the caption of "A few hard facts."
The Attorney-General in his brief indicates the following passages of the article
as those upon which he relies to sustain the conviction:
"It is a strong thing to say, but nevertheless true, that the Civil
Commission, through its ex-insurgent office holders, and by its
continual disregard for the records of natives obtained during the
military rule of the Islands, has, in its distribution of offices,
constituted a protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail
or deported. . . . [Reference is then made to the appointment of one
Tecson as justice of the peace.] This is the kind of foolish work that
the Commission is doing all over the Islands, reinstating
insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have during
the struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans."
There is no doubt but that the Filipino office holders of the Islands are in
a good many instances rascals.
Editor Valdez, of "Miau," made serious charges against two of the native
Commissioners — charges against Trinidad H. Pardo de Tavera, which, if true,
would brand the man as a coward and a rascal, and with what result? . . .
[Reference is then made to the prosecution and conviction of Valdez for libel
"under a law which specifies that the greater the truth the greater the libel."] Is
it the desire of the people of the United States that the natives against whom
these charges have been made (which, if true, absolutely vilify their personal
characters) be permitted to retain their seats on the Civil Commission, the
executive body of the Philippine Government, without an investigation?
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in
that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2) the writing,
publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the
writing, publishing, or circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct
any lawful officer in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the people against
the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and
order of the Government; (7) knowingly concealing such evil practices.
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing, in order to
be punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a scurrilous nature and
directed against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, and must, in addition, tend to some one
of the results enumerated in the section. The article in question is described in
the complaint as "a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United
States and the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends to
obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which tends to
instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes, and which
suggests and incites rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and order
of the Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands." But it is "a well-settled rule in considering indictments that
where an offense may be committed in any of several different modes, and the
offense, in any particular instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or
more modes specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one
of them, provided that it be such as to constitute the substantive offense"
(Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., Mass., 206, 215), and the defendants may,
therefore, be convicted if any one of the substantive charges into which the
complaint may be separated has been made out.
We are all, however, agreed upon the proposition that the article in question
has no appreciable tendency to "disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office," or to "instigate" any person or class of persons "to cabal or
meet together for unlawful purposes," or to "suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots," or to "stir up the people against the lawful authorities or
to disturb the peace of the community, the safety and order of the
Government." All these various tendencies, which are described in section 8 of
Act No. 292, each one of which is made an element of a certain form of libel,
may be characterized in general terms as seditious tendencies. This is
recognized in the description of the offenses punished by this section, which is
found in the title of the act, where they are defined as the crimes of the
"seditious utterances, whether written or spoken."
We find no decisions construing the Tennessee statute (Code, sec. 6663), which
is apparently the only existing American statute of a similar character to that
in question, and from which much of the phraseology of then latter appears to
have been taken, though with some essential modifications.
In the act of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly known as the "Sedition Act,"
it is made an offense to "write, print, utter, or published," or to "knowingly and
willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering, or publishing any false,
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the Government of the
United States, or either House of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said Government, or
either House of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them or either
or any of them the hatred of the good people of the United States," etc. The
term "government" would appear to be used here in the abstract sense of the
existing political system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the
Government — the Houses of Congress and the Executive — which are also
specially mentioned.
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that this is the sense in which the term
is used in the enactment under consideration.
It may be said that there can be no such thing as a scurrilous libel, or any sort
of a libel, upon an abstraction like the Government in the sense of the laws and
institutions of a country, but we think an answer to this suggestion is that the
expression "scurrilous libel" is not used in section 8 of Act No. 292 in the sense
in which it is used in the general libel law (Act No. 277) — that is, in the sense
of written defamation of individuals — but in the wider sense, in which it is
applied in the common law to blasphemous, obscene, or seditious publications
in which there may be no element of defamation whatever. "The word 'libel' as
popularly used, seems to mean only defamatory words; but words written, if
obscene, blasphemous, or seditious, are technically called libels, and the
publication of them is, by the law of England, an indictable offense."
(Bradlaugh vs. The Queen, 3 Q. B. D., 607, 627, per Bramwell L. J. See
Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick., 206, 211.)
The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendants are acquitted, with
costs de oficio.
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L-2044
Paredes, Diaz and Poblador, Jesus G. Barrera, Vicente Hilado, and Araneta and
Araneta for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Assistant Solicitor General
Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., Solicitor Martiniano P. Vico and Assistant City Fiscal Julio
Villamor for respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Padilla, Carlos and Fernando as amici curiae.
L-2756
Araneta and Araneta and Jesus G. Barrera for petitioners.
Assistant City Fiscal Luis B. Reyes for respondent.
Claro M. Recto as amici curiae.
L-3054
Claro M. Recto, Ramon Diokno, Jose O. Vera, Alejo Mabanag, Jose B. Laurel, Jr.
and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondent.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill and Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R.
Navarro as amici curiae.
Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon Sunico, and Francisco A. Rodrigo
also as amici curiae.
L-3055
Claro M. Recto and Leon Ma. Guerrero for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
V. G. Bunuan, Administrator, Sugar Quota Office.
Jesus G. Barrera, Felixberto M. Serrano, Enrique; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and
Emiliano R. Navarro as amici curiae.
L-3056
Claro M. Recto and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo for respondents.
Vicente de Vera, Chairman, Commission on Elections.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Alva J. Hill, Jesus G. Barrera, Enrique M. Fernando, Ramon
Sunico and Francisco A. Rodrigo; Honorio Poblador, Jr. and Emiliano R. Navarro
as amici curiae.
TUASON, J.:
Three of these cases were consolidated for argument and the other two were
argued separately on other dates. Inasmuch as all of them present the same
fundamental question which, in our view, is decisive, they will be disposed of
jointly. For the same reason we will pass up the objection to the personality or
sufficiency of interest of the petitioners in case G. R. No. L-3054 and case G. R.
No. L-3056 and the question whether prohibition lies in cases Nos. L-2044 and
L-2756. No practical benefit can be gained from a discussion of the procedural
matters since the decision in the cases wherein the petitioners' cause of action
or the propriety of the procedure followed is not in dispute, will be controlling
authority on the others. Above all, the transcendental importance to the public
of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G. R. No. L-
2821.) The petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President
avowedly issued in virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 671. Involved in cases Nos.
L-2044 and L-2756 is Executive Order No. 62, which regulates rentals for
houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, J. Antonio Araneta, is
under prosecution in the Court of First Instance of Manila for violation of the
provisions of this Executive Order, and prays for the issuance of the writ of
prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal. Involved in case L-3055 is Executive
Order No. 192, which aims to control exports from the Philippines. In this case,
Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Administrator of
the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the
exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Both official refuse to issue the required
export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines
is forbidden by this Executive Order. Case No. L-3054 relates to Executive
Order No. 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines during the period from July 1, 1949 to June
30, 1950, and for other purposes. The petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a
tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ
of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing this
Executive Order. Affected in case No. L-3056 is Executive Order No. 226, which
appropriates P6,000,000 to defray the expenses in connection with, and
incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in November,
1949. The petitioner, Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter, asks
this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise
disposing of that amount or any part of it."
SECTION 1. The existence of war between the United States and other
countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it
necessary to invest the President with extraordinary powers in order to
meet the resulting emergency.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and
regulations promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the
Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
Commonwealth Act No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its
effectiveness. The intention of the Act has to be sought for in its nature, the
object to be accomplish, the purpose to be subserved, and its relation to the
Constitution. The consequences of the various constructions offered will also
be resorted to as additional aid to interpretation. We test a rule by its results.
Article VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof
should be "for a limited period." "Limited" has been defined to mean "restricted;
bounded; prescribed; confined within positive bounds; restrictive in duration,
extent or scope." (Encyclopedia Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., 669; Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1120.) The words "limited period" as used in the
Constitution are beyond question intended to mean restrictive in duration.
Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, "must be
temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency." (First Trust Joint Stock
Land Bank of Chicago vs. Adolph P. Arp, et al., 120 A. L. R., 937, 938.).
It is to be presumed that Commonwealth Act No. 671 was approved with this
limitation in view. The opposite theory would make the law repugnant to the
Constitution, and is contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to
have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that
new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the
Constitution either. If a new and different law were necessary to terminate the
delegation, the period for the delegation, it has been correctly pointed out,
would be unlimited, indefinite, negative and uncertain; "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become permanent law,"
(Peck vs. Fink, 2 Fed. [2d], 912); for Congress might not enact the repeal, and
even if it would, the repeal might not meet the approval of the President, and
the Congress might not be able to override the veto. Furthermore, this would
create the anomaly that, while Congress might delegate its powers by simple
majority, it might not be able to recall them except by a two-third vote. In other
words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them
back. This is not right and is not, and ought not to be, the law. Corwin,
President: Office and Powers, 1948 ed., p. 160, says:
It is generally agreed that the maxim that the legislature may not
delegate its powers signifies at the very least that the legislature may not
abdicate its powers: Yet how, in view of the scope that legislative
delegations take nowadays, is the line between delegation and abdication
to be maintained? Only, I urge, by rendering the delegated powers
recoverable without the consent of the delegate; . . . .
Section 4 goes far to settle the legislative intention of this phase of Act No. 671.
Section 4 stipulates that "the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
shall be in full force and effect until the Congress of the Philippines shall
otherwise provide." The silence of the law regarding the repeal of the authority
itself, in the face of the express provision for the repeal of the rules and
regulations issued in pursuance of it, a clear manifestation of the belief held by
the National Assembly that there was no necessity to provide for the former. It
would be strange if having no idea about the time the Emergency Powers Act
was to be effective the National Assemble failed to make a provision for this
termination in the same way that it did for the termination of the effects and
incidents of the delegation. There would be no point in repealing or annulling
the rules and regulations promulgated under a law if the law itself was to
remain in force, since, in that case, the President could not only make new
rules and regulations but he could restore the ones already annulled by the
legislature.
More anomalous than the exercise of legislative function by the Executive when
Congress is in the unobstructed exercise of its authority is the fact that there
would be two legislative bodies operating over the same field, legislating
concurrently and simultaneously, mutually nullifying each other's actions.
Even if the emergency powers of the President, as suggested, be suspended
while Congress was in session and be revived after each adjournment, the
anomaly would not be limited. Congress by a two-third vote could repeal
executive orders promulgated by the President during congressional recess,
and the President in turn could treat in the same manner, between sessions of
Congress, laws enacted by the latter. This is not a fantastic apprehension; in
two instances it materialized. In entire good faith, and inspired only by the best
interests of the country as they saw them, a former President promulgated an
executive order regulating house rentals after he had vetoed a bill on the
subject enacted by Congress, and the present Chief Executive issued an
executive order on export control after Congress had refused to approve the
measure.
Quiet apart from these anomalies, there is good basis in the language of Act
No. 671 for the inference that the National Assembly restricted the life of the
emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented
from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the
war. Section 3 provides:
The clear tenor of this provision is that there was to be only one meeting of
Congress at which the President was to give an account of his trusteeship. The
section did not say each meeting, which it could very well have said if that had
been the intention. If the National Assembly did not think that the report in
section 3 was to be the first and last Congress Act No. 671 would lapsed, what
reason could there be for its failure to provide in appropriate and clear terms
for the filing of subsequent reports? Such reports, if the President was expected
to continue making laws in the forms of rules, regulations and executive
orders, were as important, of as unimportant, as the initial one.
What then was the contemplated period? President Quezon in the same
paragraph of his autobiography furnished part of the answer. He said he issued
the call for a special session of the National Assembly "when it became evident
that we were completely helpless against air attack, and that it was most
unlikely the Philippine Legislature would hold its next regular session which
was to open on January 1, 1942." (Emphasis ours.) It can easily be discerned
in this statement that the conferring of enormous powers upon the President
was decided upon with specific view to the inability of the National Assembly to
meet. Indeed no other factor than this inability could have motivated the
delegation of powers so vast as to amount to an abdication by the National
Assembly of its authority. The enactment and continuation of a law so
destructive of the foundations of democratic institutions could not have been
conceived under any circumstance short of a complete disruption and
dislocation of the normal processes of government. Anyway, if we are to uphold
the constitutionality of the act on the basis of its duration, we must start with
the premise that it fixed a definite, limited period. As we have indicated, the
period that best comports with constitutional requirements and limitations,
with the general context of the law and with what we believe to be the main if
not the sole raison d'etre for its enactment, was a period coextensive with the
inability of Congress to function, a period ending with the conventing of that
body.
It is our considered opinion, and we so hold, that Commonwealth Act No. 671
became inoperative when Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946,
and that Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without
authority of law. In setting the session of Congress instead of the first special
session preceded it as the point of expiration of the Act, we think giving effect
to the purpose and intention of the National Assembly. In a special session, the
Congress may "consider general legislation or only such as he (President) may
designate." (Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution.) In a regular session, the
power Congress to legislate is not circumscribed except by the limitations
imposed by the organic law.
Act No. 671, as we have stressed, ended ex proprio vigore with the opening of
the regular session of Congress on May 25, 1946. Acts Nos. 600 and 620
contain stronger if not conclusive indication that they were self-liquidating. By
express provision the rules and regulations to be eventually made in pursuance
of Acts Nos. 600 and 620, respectively approved on August 19, 1940 and June
6, 1941, were to be good only up to the corresponding dates of adjournment of
the following sessions of the Legislature, "unless sooner amended or repealed
by the National Assembly." The logical deduction to be drawn from this
provision is that in the mind of the lawmakers the idea was fixed that the Acts
themselves would lapse not latter than the rules and regulations. The design to
provide for the automatic repeal of those rules and regulations necessarily was
predicated on the consciousness of a prior or at best simultaneous repeal of
their source. Were not this the case, there would arise the curious spectacle,
already painted, and easily foreseen, of the Legislature amending or repealing
rules and regulations of the President while the latter was empowered to keep
or return them into force and to issue new ones independently of the National
Assembly. For the rest, the reasoning heretofore adduced against the asserted
indefinite continuance of the operation of Act No. 671 equally applies to Acts
Nos. 600 and 620.
The other corollary of the opinion we have reached is that the question whether
war, in law or in fact, continues, is irrelevant. If we were to that actual
hostilities between the original belligerents are still raging, the elusion would
not be altered. After the convening of Congress new legislation had to be
approved if the continuation of the emergency powers, or some of them, was
desired. In the light of the conditions surrounding the approval of the
Emergency Power Act, we are of the opinion that the "state of total emergency
as a result of war" envisaged in the preamble referred to the impending
invasion and occupation of the Philippines by the enemy and the consequent
total disorganization of the Government, principally the impossibility for the
National Assembly to act. The state of affairs was one which called for
immediate action and with which the National Assembly would would not be
able to cope. The war itself and its attendant chaos and calamities could not
have necessitated the delegation had the National Assembly been in a position
to operate.
After all the criticism that have been made against the efficiency of the system
of the separation of powers, the fact remains that the Constitution has set up
this form of government, with all its defects and shortcomings, in preference to
the commingling of powers in one man or group of men. The Filipino people by
adopting parliamentary government have given notice that they share the faith
of other democracy-loving people in this system, with all its faults, as the ideal.
The point is, under this framework of government, legislation is preserved for
Congress all the time, not expecting periods of crisis no matter how serious.
Never in the history of the United States, the basic features of whose
Constitution have been copied in ours, have the specific functions of the
legislative branch of enacting laws been surrendered to another department —
unless we regard as legislating the carrying out of a legislative policy according
to prescribed standards; no, not even when that Republic was fighting a total
war, or when it was engaged in a life-and-death struggle to preserve the Union.
The truth is that under our concept of constitutional government, in times of
extreme perils more than in normal circumstances "the various branches,
executive, legislative, and judicial," given the ability to act, are called upon "to
the duties and discharge the responsibilities committed to them respectively."
TUASON, J.:
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and
Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First Instance of Rizal from proceeding
with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining
lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated
in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila boundary, on the
main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced in
support of the petition, to wit:
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid
contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and expropriation
would impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the
land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent RPA.
We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case
will make superfluous a decision on the other questions raised.
What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands
regardless of their location, nature and area? The answer is to be found in the
explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno, member of the
Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted
provision. In this speech, which was entitled "Large Estates and Trust in
Perpetuity" and is transcribed in full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said:
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of
section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a
restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of the
Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual
rights and the time-honored constitutional guarantee that no private property
of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due process for
public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions
(paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for private use relieves the owner of his property
without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property should
not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2],
Article III, of the Constitution) forbids necessary implication the appropriation
of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly said that
the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of
and citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full compensation, when the
public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic power, and one
inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a free
government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the
former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state"
created to secure to the Filipino people "the blessings of independence under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined
in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of
conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness.
Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom and freedom of
enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the
way for the breaking up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism,
and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or
undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to
authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to
another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property, the
Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has
occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life
in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the Constitution. The
Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the
stimulation to economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle
class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every
progressive and happy country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply
paramount basis for untrammeled expropriation of private land by the Rural
Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social
justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status;
what it and the Constitution do guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality
of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values given and
received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to
metropolitan centers, especially Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a
command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means for the
elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated,
overcrowded, without ventilation. light and sanitation facilities, and for the
construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the destitute.
As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct
relation to public safety health, and/or morals, and is legal.
In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the
Bill of Rights. Without that provision the right of eminent domain, inherent in
the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means
reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr.
Aruego says "the primary reason" for Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to
remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriation the then
existing landed estates to be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof
in the event that in the future it would seem such expropriation necessary to
the solution of agrarian problems therein."
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is
not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its peculiar
circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case
under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public
convenience or public use. It is patterned upon an ideology far removed from
that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the majority of
the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more
oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no
reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be expropriated and
subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the
analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could
not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000
square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those
who want to build thereon.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to
prosecute perceived transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the
innate value of human liberty, which can hardly be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former
Senator Jovito R. Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has
been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against
him."1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before
us, this time as counsel pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he
claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve (12) years ago.
He postulates that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is
worse is that no bail is recommended.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement
dated 16 September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of
the Philippine Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged
kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German
national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his
companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M
the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an
international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after
placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman
Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino
abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the
Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a "safe
house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over
their quarry. After four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to
the "safe house" together with petitioners and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to
Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest,
pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The
following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after
which Antonino stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later
burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires. Umbal
could not recall the exact date when the incident happened, but he was certain
it was about a year ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the
PACC, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 11, 3separately raided the two (2) dwellings
of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the other, along
Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Parañaque. The raiders
recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and
placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also
arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their
possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier
sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt.
Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the
Department of Justice for the institution of criminal proceedings against
AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-
policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty.
Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder,
and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17
September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that —
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner
Mendoza moved for the production of other documents for examination and
copying to enable him to fully prepare for his defense and to submit an
intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was interested in
(a) the "several documents transferring ownership of several properties
amounting to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from
the victim's bank account," as stated in the complaint; (b) the complete records
of the PACC's investigation, including investigations on other suspects and
their disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such
other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other
documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the
inhibition of the members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to
conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were members
of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with impartiality.
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of
SPO2 Bato, petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a
resolution finding a prima facie case against them and that an information
had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of
Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet
ready for release, but later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the
information for kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page
undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of
prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force recommending approval
thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge
Roberto C. Diokno.
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge who is merely
required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him that the
accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself
that based on the evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof.
In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is expressly stated
that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and
rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be
issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such
ruling. We have painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any
support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of reasons
why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of
probable cause against petitioners.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts
were exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged
cremation. 31 Could it be that the government investigators did to the place of
cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they did not go at all
because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took place?
To allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in
an open field with the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock
interrogation of Van Twest who thereafter signed various documents upon
being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory questioning, however,
Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe
house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van
Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the
"safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to
comply with the order of the prosecutors to produce them during the
preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to the P2.5M that was
supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest?
These and more remain unanswered.
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly
triggered off by Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the application of
the PACC operatives for a search warrant to be served in the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila on 15 September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn
statement. In support of the application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal
had been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly, although he
was said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never
interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle
Verde V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also
considered in filing the charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as
its probative value has tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged
counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after the panel had
considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could
refute this counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground
that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare
allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are
insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter.
More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the
dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that
according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded
the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these
do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on
the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there
probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be
deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately
exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest — facts and
circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are
guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate
the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial
judge subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith
is not enough. If subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional
protection would be demeaned and the people would be "secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the
judge.44 On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in
order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such
as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the
accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. 45 This, as we
said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the
trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached
thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either call for the
complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is
no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and
public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly
misappropriated, if not abused, their discretion. If they really believed that
petitioners were probably guilty, they should have armed themselves with facts
and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not enough. They
should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the
existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative
not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense
the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor — indeed, he
should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike
foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated
to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about a just one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the
inordinate interest of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of
evidence until the termination of the preliminary investigation, it appears that
the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a warrant for
the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's
sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's
counter-affidavit was considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to
refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence appears to have had a
hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the
undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was
also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then
petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and
the information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to
jail in the hope that they will in the future reform and be productive members
of the community rests both on the judiciousness of judges and the prudence
of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary investigation by the prosecutor,
which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a preliminary
inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue,
the bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence
of probable cause, i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and cautious man to believe that the
accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and
prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate
legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Paño 47 finds application —
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming
immensity of government power which when unchecked becomes tyrannical
and oppressive. Hence the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines
the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state actions. But on occasion, for
one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In consequence,
individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be
illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by
government agents is not reflective of responsible government. Judges and law
enforcers are not, by reason of their high and prestigious office, relieved of the
common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from
vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the
State has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is
essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not
confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to
prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and disregard
the rights of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of
duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution.
Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor balancing test" which
requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the
right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances
attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to order the
detention of petitioners.48
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and
discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security
against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities.
Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over
the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the
scales of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop
the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for
an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the
law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection
to constitutional rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were
ordinary people submissive to the dictates of government. They would have
been illegally arrested and detained without bail. Then we would not have the
opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are
lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom
not otherwise available to those who cower in fear and subjection.
SO ORDERED
DECISION
THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the
airline company.
He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that
he was illegally dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his
dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing
adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide
occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other
overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined.
After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con, We uphold the
legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is so because
his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
character.
The Facts
The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised
him to go on an extended vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4,
1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the
company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March
5, 1985 to November 1985.
After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But
petitioner’s weight problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal
weight. In line with company policy, he was removed from flight duty effective
May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formally requested to trim down to his
ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates. He was also told
that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to
do so. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.2
On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited
petitioner at his residence to check on the progress of his effort to lose weight.
Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight.
After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter
addressed to Cabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full,
reads:
Dear Sir:
Respectfully Yours,
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight,
petitioner remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the
PAL decision for him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily
complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks.
Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one
more month to comply with the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to
report for weight check on different dates. He was reminded that his grounding
would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards.5
Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen
submitting his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to
report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another
set of weight check dates.6 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not
report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain
his refusal to undergo weight checks.7
When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds.
Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.
From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case
requesting for leniency on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219
pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, "and considering the utmost leniency"
extended to him "which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years," his services were considered terminated "effective immediately."11
On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled13 that petitioner
was illegally dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as
follows:
SO ORDERED.14
The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view
of the nature of the job of petitioner.15 However, the weight standards need not
be complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.16 Assuming that it did, petitioner could be
transferred to other positions where his weight would not be a negative
factor.17 Notably, other overweight employees, i.e., Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and
Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined.18
On October 8, 1999, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the
reinstatement of petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits.20
On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiter denied21 the Motion to Quash Writ of
Execution22 of PAL.
On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of its motion to quash to the
NLRC.23
On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgment24 in the following tenor:
Like the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be
reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiter holding that
petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward
despite being overweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have
limited himself to the issue of whether the failure of petitioner to attain his
ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL.28
PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail.29 Thus, PAL elevated the matter to
the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.30
SO ORDERED.32
The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC
because it "looked at wrong and irrelevant considerations"33 in evaluating the
evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC ruling, the weight standards of
PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employee’s
position.34 The failure to adhere to the weight standards is an analogous
cause for the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code
in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed
to suggest.35 Said the CA, "the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision
cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at a conclusion on whether the
dismissal is legally proper."36 In other words, "the relevant question to ask is
not one of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether
or not the employee qualifies or continues to qualify under this standard."37
Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight
standards of PAL are reasonable.38Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed
because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards.39 It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.40
On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.41 Elaborating on its earlier ruling, the CA held that the weight
standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in case of
violation, "justifies an employee’s separation from the service."42
Issues
In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Our Ruling
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioner’s claims
that obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to
1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper
attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory
hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that "[t]he issue is
could I bring my weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is
yes. I can do it now."49
True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him "a lot of
expenses."50 However, petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice of
PAL.51 He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report
when required to undergo weight checks, without offering a valid explanation.
Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpower rather than an
illness.
The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability
under the Rehabilitation Act and that respondent discriminated against Cook
based on "perceived" disability. The evidence included expert testimony that
morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the
metabolic system and the neurological appetite – suppressing signal system,
which is capable of causing adverse effects within the musculoskeletal,
respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that
"mutability is relevant only in determining the substantiality of the limitation
flowing from a given impairment," thus "mutability only precludes those
conditions that an individual can easily and quickly reverse by behavioral
alteration."
Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the
District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978
"at least one hundred pounds more than what is considered appropriate of her
height." According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed "over 320 pounds" in
1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less
than 50 pounds over his ideal weight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his
work as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of
the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may
not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,
"[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the
employee without any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks the element of
intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d)."54
II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense.
Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there
is no statute providing for it.57 Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that
could justify his dismissal.58
First, the Constitution,59 the Labor Code,60 and RA No. 727761 or the Magna
Carta for Disabled Persons62 contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has
no supporting statute. Too, the Labor Arbiter,71 NLRC,72 and CA73 are one in
holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to
observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it
transports.74 It is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all the circumstances.75
The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common
carrier. Thus, it is only logical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show
its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposed upon it by law by
virtue of being a common carrier.
In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin
attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspire passenger
confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes
wrong. It is not farfetched to say that airline companies, just like all common
carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safety records. People,
especially the riding public, expect no less than that airline companies
transport their passengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly.
A lesser performance is unacceptable.
The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or
attending to the whims and caprices of the passengers. The most important
activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety of passengers and the
evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to
the core of the job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants
who have the necessary strength to open emergency doors, the agility to attend
to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina to withstand
grueling flight schedules.
On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are
important factors to consider in case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted
cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, the arguments of
respondent that "[w]hether the airline’s flight attendants are overweight or not
has no direct relation to its mission of transporting passengers to their
destination"; and that the weight standards "has nothing to do with
airworthiness of respondent’s airlines," must fail.
The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswell76 relied upon by petitioner cannot
apply to his case. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were
denied reassignment as flight engineers upon reaching the age of 60, and a
flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airline
company, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being
overweight are not the same. The case of overweight cabin attendants is
another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and
emergency exit doors of the airplane, any overweight cabin attendant would
certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.
Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of
PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to
know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times.78 In fact, never did he
question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his
weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is
agreed upon shall be done. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang
napagkasunduan.
Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based
on height and body frame for both male and female cabin attendants. A
progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliant cabin attendants
sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules
obviate any possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the
part of PAL.
Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative
allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is
nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory
treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the
supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him.
Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated
and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of
his situation with other employees.
Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin
attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights;
weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite
their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the
discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could
have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the
words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to
meet."82
We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, are accorded respect, even finality.83 The reason is
simple: administrative agencies are experts in matters within their specific and
specialized jurisdiction.84 But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only
applies if the findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it
can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of
such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings of facts
must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do
not have infallibility and must be set aside when they fail the test of
arbitrariness.85
Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence.
We thus annul their findings.
To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection
clause guaranty86 of the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked.87 Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against
acts of private individuals.88 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment,89 which is the source of our equal
protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no
shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.90 Private
actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection
guarantee.91
IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot.
As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims for reinstatement and
wages have not been mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full
backwages, "from the time he was illegally dismissed" up to the time that the
NLRC was reversed by the CA.92
Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL "did everything under the sun"
to frustrate his "immediate return to his previous position,"94 there is evidence
that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to a substantially equivalent position
in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter.95 In fact, petitioner duly
received the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his
signature.96
SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed
as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her
custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper
authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."5 Trial on the merits ensued.
During trial, the prosecution presented two witnesses: Senior Police Officer
(SPO)2 Antonio Disuanco (Disuanco) of the Criminal Investigation Division of
the Central Police District Command; and Epifanio Deriquito (Deriquito),
Records Verifier of the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame. Their
testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order
from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other policemen to serve a
Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a
case of kidnapping with ransom.6
Valeroso was then brought to the police station for questioning. Upon
verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito
presented a certification8 that the subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso,
but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
Sampaloc, Manila.9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian
Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are summarized as follows:
On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house
of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He
was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their
guns at him and pulled him out of the room.10 The raiding team tied his hands
and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went back inside,
searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the
room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"11
Disuanco informed Valeroso that there was a standing warrant for his arrest.
However, the raiding team was not armed with a search warrant.12
On May 6, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 97, Quezon City,
convicted Valeroso as charged and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6)
years, as maximum. The gun subject of the case was further ordered
confiscated in favor of the government.15
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed16 the RTC decision but the
minimum term of the indeterminate penalty was lowered to four (4) years and
two (2) months.
Meanwhile, as the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to timely file its
Comment on Valeroso’s Motion for Reconsideration, it instead filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Comment.22
In its Manifestation, the OSG changed its previous position and now
recommends Valeroso’s acquittal. After a second look at the evidence
presented, the OSG considers the testimonies of the witnesses for the defense
more credible and thus concludes that Valeroso was arrested in a boarding
house. More importantly, the OSG agrees with Valeroso that the subject
firearm was obtained by the police officers in violation of Valeroso’s
constitutional right against illegal search and seizure, and should thus be
excluded from the evidence for the prosecution. Lastly, assuming that the
subject firearm was admissible in evidence, still, Valeroso could not be
convicted of the crime, since he was able to establish his authority to possess
the gun through the Memorandum Receipt issued by his superiors.
This is not the first time that this Court is suspending its own rules or
excepting a particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,25 despite the denial of De Guzman’s motion for
reconsideration, we still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a
second motion for reconsideration. Eventually, we reconsidered our earlier
decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner’s evidence. In that case, we said that if we would not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities, petitioner would
surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he
might not have committed after all.26 Also in Astorga v. People,27on a second
motion for reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the
records of the case, then finally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention on the ground of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Amante,28 by virtue of the January 13, 2004 En
Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First Division to suspend
the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent’s second motion
for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After a re-
examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision.
Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re-
examination of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not
without basis.
We would like to stress that rules of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to
effectively aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to
or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice,
courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the
norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights,
and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend
to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it would always be within our power
to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its operation.29
The Court notes that the version of the prosecution, as to where Valeroso was
arrested, is different from the version of the defense. The prosecution claims
that Valeroso was arrested near the INP Central Police Station in Culiat,
Quezon City, while he was about to board a tricycle. After placing Valeroso
under arrest, the arresting officers bodily searched him, and they found the
subject firearm and ammunition. The defense, on the other hand, insists that
he was arrested inside the boarding house of his children. After serving the
warrant of arrest (allegedly for kidnapping with ransom), some of the police
officers searched the boarding house and forcibly opened a cabinet where they
discovered the subject firearm.
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The above proscription is not, however, absolute. The following are the well-
recognized instances where searches and seizures are allowed even without a
valid warrant:
5. Customs search;
For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful
arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section
13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. – A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.
We would like to stress that the scope of the warrantless search is not without
limitations. In People v. Leangsiri,35 People v. Cubcubin, Jr.,36 and People v.
Estella,37 we had the occasion to lay down the parameters of a valid
warrantless search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the
person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in
order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely
reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee’s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction.38
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person
of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the latter’s
reach.39 Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area
of his immediate control.40 The phrase "within the area of his immediate
control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.41A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of
one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one
concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.42
From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the
arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from
Valeroso. They placed him immediately under their control by pulling him out
of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with his hands tied. To be sure,
the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be
considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way
for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used
against him.
The arresting officers would have been justified in searching the person of
Valeroso, as well as the tables or drawers in front of him, for any concealed
weapon that might be used against the former. But under the circumstances
obtaining, there was no comparable justification to search through all the desk
drawers and cabinets or the other closed or concealed areas in that room
itself.46
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the "plain view
doctrine."
The "plain view doctrine" may not be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to
find evidence of defendant’s guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a
police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.49
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of
them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which[,] he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant
for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other
legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against
the accused – and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of
the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to
the police that they have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may
not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another
until something incriminating at last emerges.52
Indeed, the police officers were inside the boarding house of Valeroso’s
children, because they were supposed to serve a warrant of arrest issued
against Valeroso. In other words, the police officers had a prior justification for
the intrusion. Consequently, any evidence that they would inadvertently
discover may be used against Valeroso. However, in this case, the police
officers did not just accidentally discover the subject firearm and ammunition;
they actually searched for evidence against Valeroso.
Clearly, the search made was illegal, a violation of Valeroso’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the evidence obtained in
violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him.1avvphi1
Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the
constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and
seize may at times be necessary for public welfare, still it may be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens,
for no enforcement of any statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to
enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of an individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty.53
Without the illegally seized firearm, Valeroso’s conviction cannot stand. There
is simply no sufficient evidence to convict him.56 All told, the guilt of Valeroso
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required moral
certainty for conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not
enough to overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained.
Indeed, it would be better to set free ten men who might probably be guilty of
the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit.57
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no more need to discuss the other
issues raised by Valeroso.
One final note. The Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non against
the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.58
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and
June 30, 2008 Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp.
Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition.
SO ORDERED.