Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 92143 February 26, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

PONCIANO AGCAOILI, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Julio G. Baldres for accused-appellant.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the decision in

Criminal Case No. 972-17 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
IV in Batac, Ilocos Norte, finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him
to serve the penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P30,000.00. 1

In an information filed on August 20, 1981, appellant

Ponciano Agcaoili was charged with murder for having killed
a certain Rodrigo Sado with treachery and evident
premeditation, attended by the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime. 2 Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged. Trial on the merits ensued, after
which the court below rendered the assailed judgment.

The alleged killing took place on the night of December 15,

1977 at Paoay, Ilocos Norte. The moon was then shining
brightly. Rodrigo Sado and a certain Florentino Gamul were
walking together, with the latter about two (2) meters ahead
of the former, on their way to a house where they would
attend evening prayers. Gamul passed by appellant Agcaoili
who was then standing at the left side of the path they were
following. Thereafter, he heard a gunshot and, when he
looked back, he saw his companion slumped on the ground.
He immediately ran away for fear of his own life but, while
on his way, he heard two (2) more shots from behind. 3
Upon reaching the place where the evening prayers were to
be held, he asked the people who were already there to go
to the place where Sado was shot and to check if he was still
alive. He was later informed that Sado was already dead. 4

Meanwhile, the police authorities received the information in

their headquarters at Paoay, Ilocos Norte, that one Rodrigo
Sado was shot and killed in Barangay No. 6 of the said place.
Pfc. Padayao, together with then Lt. Florentino Dumlao, Pat.
Antonio Arcayna and Pat. Jose Eclipse, went to the scene of
the crime and examined the body of the victim. The cadaver
was also autopsied and was found to have sustained several
gunshot wounds. 5

After being, informed that the victim was with Florentino

Gamul when the killing occurred, the police officers
investigated him and learned that Sado was shot by one
Ponciano Agcaoili. The officers then secured a search
warrant and searched the house of said Agcaoili. In the
course of the search, they were able to recover eight (8)
live .45 caliber bullets and one (1) complete adjustable
cleaning rod with cloth used in cleaning a gun. These items
were turned over to Camp Juan in Laoag City. Appellant
Agcaoili was apprehended later on that day, December 16,
1977 and was committed in the same camp. 6

In his testimony, appellant denied the accusation against

him. He averred that at around the same time when the
killing occurred, he was sleeping in their house located at
Madanay, Ilocos Norte. He was awakened only the following
day when he was apprehended by two (2) police officers. He
was brought to the municipal building and was detained
inside the stockade. 7

In this appeal, appellant assails the decision of the trial court

(1) holding him guilty because of the irregularity of the
waiver made by him while he was under custodial
investigation; (2) finding that the evidence of the
prosecution reveals that he was the one who shot Rodrigo
Sado; and (3) finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 8
Aside from these arguments, he further contends that,
assuming he killed Sado, he cannot be found guilty of
murder for failure of the prosecution to prove the attendance
of treachery and evident premeditation in the commission of
the crime.

The first submission of appellant does not deserve any

consideration. It is true that the present Constitution
mandates that any person under custodial investigation shall
have the right to remain silent and to have a counsel. Any
waiver shall be made in writing and with the assistance of a
counsel. 9 Appellant, however, loses sight of the fact that his
sworn statement was not presented in evidence against him
by the prosecution. Even the defense counsel admitted this
fact, as shown in the following testimony:

Atty. Baldres �

xxx xxx xxx

Q At this investigation, was your

statement taken by Pat. Ventura?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was your statement reduced into

writing?

A Yes, sir.

Q At the time of the investigation and at

the time when your statement was
taken, were you assisted by a counsel?

A No, sir.

Q Did Pat. Ventura tell you that you

would be assisted by a counsel?

Court �

Was the statement marked as exhibit?

Fiscal �

It is not marked as exhibit, your Honor.

So may I know what is the purpose? We
did not use that as evidence, your
Honor.

Atty. Baldres �
10
I withdraw my question.

With regard to the second and the third contentions of the

appellant, the same are apparently premised on the failure
of the prosecution to prove the motive of Agcaoili and to
present the weapon used in the alleged killing. We are not,
however, persuaded by appellant's invocation of and
reliance thereon.

Appellant clearly relies on the discredited defense of alibi

cum denial. Time and again, the Court has consistently ruled
that alibi, as a defense, is weak because it can easily be
manufactured and fabricated. 11 This is especially so if said
defense is contradicted by an eyewitness' testimony. 12 In
the case at bar, appellant was positively identified by
witness Gamul as the one who shot Rodrigo Sado. There
could not have been any mistake in his identification
because the light coming from the moon was bright enough
to enable Gamul to recognize appellant and the place was
clear of obstructions. 13

In fact, when this witness was first investigated by the police

the day after the killing, he readily and categorically
declared as follows:

Q Was it a bright night when Rodrigo

Sado was shot?

A Yes, sir. It was a moonlight (sic) night,

and was too bright that's why I was able
to recognize without any doubt that it
was PONCIANO AGCAOILI who made
(sic) the shooting.

xxx xxx xxx

Q From where you were when you saw

Ponciano Agcaoili shot (sic) Rodrigo
Sado, was there not anything that
obstructed your view?
14
A None, sir.

This is not to forget the fact that Gamul and appellant knew
each other well enough to enable the former to recognize
Agcaoili who was only a few meters away from him during
the shooting incident. Their houses are situated near each
other and they often worked together in the farm. 15

To consider alibi, it must be shown that it was physically

impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time it was committed. 16 Applying the rule in
the case at bar, appellant failed to establish the same. It was
even shown by the prosecution that the place where his
house is located is just approximately eight hundred (800)
meters away from the scene of the crime. Being less than a
kilometer away, the situs of the offense can easily be
reached in a matter of minutes from his house where
admittedly was about that time.

As regards the issue of motive, suffice it to say that,

generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is
immaterial and, not being an essential element of a crime, it
does not have to be proved. 17 However, in some instances,
this Court has ruled on the significance and relevance of the
motive of the accused in the commission of an offense. Thus,
when there is no eyewitness and suspicion is likely to fall on
a considerable number of persons; 18 when there is doubt as
to whether the accused is or is not the person who
committed the offense; 19 where it is necessary to determine
the sanity of the accused or the voluntariness of the criminal
act, 20 the specific nature of the crime
committed, 21 or whether the shooting was intentional or
accidental; 22 or when the accused invokes self-defense or
defense of strangers, 23 motive plays an important role in the
prosecution of the accused.

The facts obtaining in the case at bar, nonetheless, show

that the same falls under the general rule. The motive of
appellant in killing Rodrigo Sado does not, therefore, have to
be proved by the People. There was an eyewitness to the
killing who positively and satisfactorily identified appellant
Agcaoili as the assailant.

The fact that appellant was not subjected to paraffin tests is

of no moment because the same is not conclusive as to his
complicity in the crime committed. The same rule goes for
the failure of the prosecution to present the murder weapon
as evidence during the trial of the case. This Court, in the
case of People vs. Gupo, et al., 24 had the occasion to rule
that such failure does not defeat the cause of the
prosecution considering that, as in this case, the post
mortem examination report 25 established that the wounds
sustained by the victim were caused by gunshots, thus:
"Diagnosis: Multiple gunshot wounds, secondary to profuse
hemorrhages and destruction of vital organs."

The case for the prosecution was further bolstered by the

fact that the police authorities were able to recover eight (8)
live .45 caliber bullets and other paraphernalia for firearms
from the residence of appellant when they conducted the
search therein. The ownership of these recovered items was
never refuted by appellant. Accordingly, the presumption
that the things which a person possesses or exercises acts of
ownership over are owned by him, 26 squarely applies in the
case at bar. More importantly, they are indicative of the fact
that appellant must have been in possession of a firearm.

We do not agree with appellant's alternative assumption

that, at most, he could be convicted only of homicide and
not of murder. The proven circumstances of and the weight
of evidence in this case show beyond cavil that treachery
attended the killing of the victim.

With appellant pretending to be merely standing by the trail

as the victim and his companion passed by at close range,
with no prior belligerent move or any act committed by
appellant as would give away his murderous intent, the
victim was completely without any premonition of an
intended assault upon his person. Then, all of a sudden, as
the victim passed abreast, appellant let loose with a firearm,
followed rapidly thereafter with two (2) more successive
shots. Definitely, the victim was never in a position to defend
himself; he was not even able to run away or take any
evasive action as, instead, he was felled and died on the
spot. It would be the height of naivete to assume that,
considering his antecedent, coetaneous, and subsequent
actuations vis-a-vis the shooting of the victim, appellant did
not consciously and deliberately adopt the particular means,
methods or form of attack to ensure the consummation of
his objective with impunity. The attack against the victim
could not have been the product of a moment of impulse,
since it clearly revealed a pattern of precogitation.

The parts of the victim's anatomy to which appellant

directed the lethal shots 27 further ineluctably reveal and
confirm his perfidious and murderous intent and conduct.
The autopsy report 28 reveals the postmortem findings on the
multiple gunshot wounds which resulted in profuse
hemorrhages and destruction of the vital organs of the
victim, viz:

1. Gunshot wound �

Entered at an intersectional line �

Anterior axilla and a horizontal line more than an

inch above the umbilicus. Penetrated the whole
abdomen, perforating a few loops of small
intestines, the peritoneum which was bulging out,
to exit at a similar point at the right side and
included the right forearm at its upper third,
 making a thru and thru wound where it made an
exit.

2. Entered at a point, 2 inches at the lateral side of

right arm, above the anticubital fossa, fractured
the posterior side of the elbow joint to make its
exit at the elbow tip.

3. Entered at the left side of the left scapula to the

left shoulder near the base of the neck, where it
entered its lateral side at the level of the chin �
scouring the base of the skull and brain, fractured
the left frontal vault to exit outside, An H-shaped
slit breakage was produced at the base of the
nose.

4. Entered at the left scapula, at its inferior angle,

directed upwards at the interior border of the
achromial process, where it made an exit.

5. A semi-linear cut wound, 2 inches long; at the

base of the neck, left side. It (is)directed
somewhat upwards and corresponding muscle
partially cut.

Despite the foregoing established facts, doubt was

expressed during the deliberations in this case as to whether
alevosia was proved by the prosecution to sustain the
conviction of appellant for murder. This doubt was
subsequently raised in a separate opinion and appears to
have been engendered by the commentaries and the case of
People vs. Torejas, etc., et al. 29 discussed therein.

On the rudimental doctrine that a qualifying circumstance

must be proven as conclusively as the act which it qualifies,
there is no quarrel. This is not to say, however, that such
quantum of proof can be obtained only from an eyewitness
who "actually saw how the appellant shot the deceased."
Such a stricture would seriously impair, if not render inutile,
the validity and utility of circumstantial evidence as a
species of proof. We do not have to cite the plethora of cases
wherein this Court has considered facts drawn from
circumstantial evidence as conclusive and sufficient for
conviction even in capital offenses. In fact, the very
commentary cited hastens to add that the need to prove the
manner in which the victim was attacked, is called for
"(w)here no particulars are known as to the manner in which
the aggression was made nor how the act which resulted in
the death of the deceased began and developed." That is not
the situation here.

In the preceding discussion, the attendant details

immediately before, during and after the murderous assault
are fully explained. The only fault attributed in the separate
opinion is that at the precise moment when appellant was
shot, the eyewitness had just passed by appellant and the
victim was two (2) meters behind the witness when suddenly
fired upon, hence, the witness could not have seen that split-
second occurrence which was completely unexpected by
both the eyewitness and the victim. In view of what will
hereafter be contrasted with this case, we emphasize the
fact that no bellicose demeanor was exhibited by appellant
and no exchange of words transpired between him and the
victim at any time before the first and obviously fatal shot
was fired. Otherwise, such conduct or statements would
have been observed or heard by the eyewitness and testified
to by him.

Immediately after the shot, the witness turned around and

saw the victim slumped on the ground. There was no other
person at or around the scene of the crime, nor has the
defense even intimated otherwise. The eyewitness then fled
therefrom as two more shots rang out. Now, we believe that
an eyewitness account of the appellant in the very act of
shooting the victim under these circumstances is a virtual
impossibility. To require such eyewitness evidence would be
to completely disregard the unrefuted circumstantial
evidence that can but point to only one conclusion, which is
definitely not a mere assumption or conjecture.

The discussion in Torejas on whether treachery was present

therein actually turned on the issue of credibility of the
eyewitness. Also, as earlier prefaced, the facts in said case
are at variance with those in the case at bar, thus:

On what was the finding by the lower court of the

qualifying circumstance of alevosia predicated? All
that appears from the testimony of the lone
eyewitness presented, a certain Federico Rivera,
was that while the deceased Dasalla was lighting a
cigarette at the New Life Store, he saw "Bonifacio
Torejas hit the bead of Artemio Dasalla with a
bottle." The lower court was able to elicit from him
that at that time he was lifting a sack of palay at
the adjacent store of a certain Julio Marquez,
where he was a laborer. It cannot be certain, then,
that all the while he was fully aware of what
 transpired between the appellant Bonifacio Torejas
and the deceased. While the lower court's finding
that there was no unlawful aggression from the
deceased, it being shown that he was unarmed,
could be given credence, it does not exclude the
probability that there must have been some
exchange of words between the two before
appellant Torejas hit the victim with a bottle. The
eyewitness might have seen what was happening,
but it does not follow that he was likewise in a
position to hear what was uttered by either
participant on such an occasion. The evidence of
alevosia was indeed tenuous. (Emphasis ours.)

After the victim in said case had been initially assaulted with
the bottle and, therefore, duly warned and aware of the
felonious intent of the accused, he ran away but was
pursued by the accused who, with his bolo, stabbed the
victim to death. That is why, on the foregoing sequence of
facts, the Court held that "considering the last words of the
conversation between the accused and the deceased, (it) is
not sufficient to hold, with reasonable certainty that the
latter was completely unaware of the attack that might have
come from the defendant." Invoking a series of doctrines,
the Court reiterated that "(o)nly then, if the victim were
caught "completely unaware and deprived of any chance to
ward off the assault", would it be proper to consider the
existence of alevosia." This last stated rule applies to the
present case in light of the facts thereof as earlier presented.

On the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove

treachery, we have, on a similar set of facts and figuratively
closer to home, the case of People vs. Jose Madriaga IV, et al.
30
where the Court, through the present Second Division,
affirmed the conviction of appellant therein for murder
qualified by treachery. In said case, the victim, Atty. Antonio
G. Tabora, was inside a cockpit in Rosario, La Union at
around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, after the cockfights were
over, when gunshots were suddenly heard and the victim fell
wounded. He later expired in the hospital from severe
intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to a gunshot wound.
Nobody even saw who fired the shot and other successive
shots, nor was the direction from which they came ever
established with certitude. Hence, as in the present case,
nobody "actually saw how the appellant shot the deceased"
much less was there proof of the "manner in which the
victim was attacked." Additionally, the firearm used therein
was likewise neither recovered nor identified.
Worse, and this time differing from the case under
consideration, in Madriaga there was the need to establish
the identity of the killer or killers since there was no
evidence that the appellant therein was inside or in the
vicinity of the cockpit when the shots were fired. Here, there
is the identification of the assailant by the witness who was
only two (2) meters away from both the appellant and the
victim when the latter was shot. In fact, the only putative
doubt is on the mode or manner by which the victim was
shot by appellant.

In convicting Madriaga for the treacherous killing, although

we had perforce to also enumerate other circumstances to
establish his identity as the killer, not the presence of
treachery, we held that "(o)ur review and ratiocination based
on the entire records and proven facts of this case yield the
inescapable conclusion that the prosecution's evidence,
albeit circumstantial, is of a sufficient quantum to establish
the guilt of the accused. The catena of circumstances proven
by uncontradicted evidence . . . cannot but convince Us that,
in justice to the victim, a conviction should be decreed." We
feel that the same evidentiary appreciation should equally
apply to the present case and dissipate any doubt on the
conclusion reached therein.

We agree, however, that the prosecution failed to prove

evident premeditation. There was insufficient evidence to
establish the time when appellant determined to commit the
crime, or any act manifestly indicating that he clung to his
determination, and that sufficient time intervened between
the determination and the execution to enable him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act. 31

For that matter, neither can we appreciate nocturnity, not

only because there is no evidence that appellant purposely
sought the same or benefited therefrom 32 in the absence of
the darkness which is the essence and rationale of this
aggravating circumstance, but because, if at all, it is deemed
absorbed in treachery. The net result is that appellant is
guilty of murder, qualified by treachery and without any
other modifying circumstance.

WHEREFORE, with the MODIFICATIONS, which we hereby

direct, that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant should
be reclusion perpetua and not "life imprisonment" which is
an incorrect designation of the penalty, and the increase of
the death indemnity to P50,000.00 in accordance with
present case law, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is my view that treachery should not be appreciated in the

case at bar.

In considering treachery as attendant to the killing, the

majority reasons out as follows:

We do not agree with appellant's alternative

assumption that, at most, he could be convicted
only of homicide and not of murder. The proven
circumstances of and the weight of evidence in
this case show beyond cavil that treachery
attended the killing of the victim.

With appellant pretending to be merely standing

by the trial as the victim and his companion
passed by at close range, with no prior belligerent
move or any act committed by appellant as would
give away his murderous intent, the victim was
completely without any premonition of an
intended assault upon his person. Then, all of a
sudden, as the victim passed abreast, appellant let
loose with a firearm, followed rapidly thereafter
with two (2) more successive shots. Definitely, the
victim was never in a position to defend himself;
he was not even able to run away or take any
evasive action as, instead, he was felled and died
on the spot. It would be the height of naivete to
assume that, considering his antecedent,
coetaneous and subsequent actuations vis-a-vis
the shooting of the victim, appellant did not
consciously and deliberately adopt the particular
means, methods or form of attack to ensure the
consummation of the objective with impunity. The
attack against the victim could not have been the
 product of a moment of impulse, since it clearly
revealed a pattern of precogitation.

In People vs. Torejas, G.R. No. L-29935, 31 January 1972, 43

SCRA 158, the Court held that alevosia or treachery "is not to
be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act
which it qualifies." It "can not be held to be present from
mere conclusions or inferences."

In other words, in order that treachery may be appreciated,

it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was
attacked. Where no particulars are known as to the manner
in which the aggression was made nor how the act which
resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed,
it can in no way be established from mere suppositions,
drawn from circumstances prior to the very moment of the
aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with
alevosia (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 ed., Vol. I, pp.
359-360).

In the present case, the evidence for the prosecution shows

that Rodrigo Sado and a certain Florentino Gamul were
walking together, with the latter about two (2) meters ahead
of the former, on their way to a house where they would
attend evening prayers; Gamul passed by appellant Agcaoili
who was standing at the left side of the path they were
following; thereafter, he heard a gunshot and, when he
looked back, he was his companion (Sado) slumped on the
ground; he immediately ran away for fear of his own life.
While on his way, he heard two (2) more shots from behind.

It is thus clear that the alleged eyewitness (Gamul) did not

actually see how the appellant shot the deceased. Where the
manner of the attack was not proven, the accused should be
given the benefit of the doubt and the crime should be
considered homicide only (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I,
1976 ed., p. 360).

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

It is my view that treachery should not be appreciated in the

case at bar.
In considering treachery as attendant to the killing, the
majority reasons out as follows:

We do not agree with appellant's alternative

assumption that, at most, he could be convicted
only of homicide and not of murder. The proven
circumstances of and the weight of evidence in
this case show beyond cavil that treachery
attended the killing of the victim.

With appellant pretending to be merely standing

by the trial as the victim and his companion
passed by at close range, with no prior belligerent
move or any act committed by appellant as would
give away his murderous intent, the victim was
completely without any premonition of an
intended assault upon his person. Then, all of a
sudden, as the victim passed abreast, appellant let
loose with a firearm, followed rapidly thereafter
with two (2) more successive shots. Definitely, the
victim was never in a position to defend himself;
he was not even able to run away or take any
evasive action as, instead, he was felled and died
on the spot. It would be the height of naivete to
assume that, considering his antecedent,
coetaneous and subsequent actuations vis-a-vis
the shooting of the victim, appellant did not
consciously and deliberately adopt the particular
means, methods or form of attack to ensure the
consummation of the objective with impunity. The
attack against the victim could not have been the
product of a moment of impulse, since it clearly
revealed a pattern of precogitation.

In People vs. Torejas, G.R. No. L-29935, 31 January 1972, 43

SCRA 158, the Court held that alevosia or treachery "is not to
be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act
which it qualifies." It "can not be held to be present from
mere conclusions or inferences."

In other words, in order that treachery may be appreciated,

it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was
attacked. Where no particulars are known as to the manner
in which the aggression was made nor how the act which
resulted in the death of the deceased began and developed,
it can in no way be established from mere suppositions,
drawn from circumstances prior to the very moment of the
aggression, that the accused perpetrated the killing with
alevosia (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 ed., Vol. I, pp.
359-360).

In the present case, the evidence for the prosecution shows

that Rodrigo Sado and a certain Florentino Gamul were
walking together, with the latter about two (2) meters ahead
of the former, on their way to a house where they would
attend evening prayers; Gamul passed by appellant Agcaoili
who was standing at the left side of the path they were
following; thereafter, he heard a gunshot and, when he
looked back, he was his companion (Sado) slumped on the
ground; he immediately ran away for fear of his own life.
While on his way, he heard two (2) more shots from behind.

It is thus clear that the alleged eyewitness (Gamul) did not

actually see how the appellant shot the deceased. Where the
manner of the attack was not proven, the accused should be
given the benefit of the doubt and the crime should be
considered homicide only (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, Vol. I,
1976 ed., p. 360).

Footnotes

1 Original Record, 122.

2 Ibid., 1.

3 TSN, July 11, 1988, 3-7.

4 Ibid., Id., 8.

5 TSN, September 27, 1988, 1-16.

6 Ibid., Id., 16-21; Exhibit "B", Folder of Exhibits, 8.

7 TSN, June 20, 1989, 9-13.

8 Brief for Appellant, 5.

9 Art. III, Sec. 12 par. (1), 1987 Constitution.

10 TSN, June 26, 1989, 3.

11 People vs. Eswan, et al., 186 SCRA 174 (1990);

People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47 (1990).

12 People vs. Francisco, et al., 182 SCRA 305

(1990).

13 TSN, July 12, 1988, 4-5.

 14 Exhibit "A-2"; Folder of Exhibits, 101.

15 TSN, July 12, 1988, 3-4.

16 People vs. Cantuba; et al,, 183 SCRA 289

(1990); People vs. Tamayo, 183 SCRA 375 (1990);
People vs. Bicog, et al., 187 SCRA 556 (1990).

17 People vs. Taneo, 58 Phil. 255 (1933); People

vs. Tiengco, et al.; 133 SCRA 290 (1984).

18 People vs. Melgar, et al., 157 SCRA 718 (1988).

19 U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil. 561 (1905); People vs.

Aliocod; et al., 167 SCRA 665 (1988).

20 People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204 (1922); People

vs. Taneo, supra.

21 People vs. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 (1957).

22 People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597 (1959).

23 U.S. vs. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252 (1912); Borquilla

vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 147 SCRA 9 (1987).

24 190 SCRA 7 (1990).

25 Exhibit "D", Folder of Exhibits, 10.

26 Sec. 3(j), Rule 131; Rules of Court.

27 Exhibits "A" and "C", Ibid., 6-7, 9.

28 Exhibit "D", Ibid., 10.

29 43 SCRA 158 (1972).

30 171 SCRA 103 (1989).

31 People vs. Quintos, 186 SCRA 14 (1990); People

vs. Nabayra, G.R. Nos. 96368-69, Oct. 17, 1991.

32 People vs. Undong, 66 SCRA 386 (1975); People

vs. Coderes, et al., 104 SCRA 255 (1981); People
vs. Palon, 127 SCRA 529 (1984).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation