Indo-Russian Strategic Cooperation:

Implications for the Deterrence

Masood Ur Rehman Khattak
Stability of South Asia

Masood Ur Rehman Khattak *

Abstract
The Indo-Russian strategic collaboration is unique.
Both states have had strong diplomatic, economic,
and strategic ties since the 1950s. Their defence
trade includes enhancing India‟s armoured, naval,
nuclear and air strike capabilities as well as
counterterrorism and surveillance exchange. Close
collaboration in the nuclear field is also vivid. This
overwhelming strategic partnership has long-term
implications for South Asia. The induction of force
multipliers by India would create conventional
disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan, which may lead to an
arms race, endanger conventional deterrence and
create room for a limited war in the region. This
article investigates the Indo-Russian strategic
partnership from evolution to apex and how it would
tilt the balance of power in favour of India, putting
nuclear deterrence at risk in South Asia.

Key words: Deterrence, South Asia, Security Dilemma, India-Russia

Defence Collaboration.

*
The author teaches International Relations at the Department of Politics and International
Relations, International Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan. He is also pursuing
his doctoral studies with a focus on „The Indian Military‟s Strategic Thinking since
2001 and its Implications on Deterrence Stability in South Asia.‟
________________________________

@2018 by the Islamabad Policy Research Institute.

IPRI Journal XVIII (1): 120-153.

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 Indo-Russian Strategic Cooperation:
Implications for the Deterrence Stability of South Asia

Introduction
ndia and Russia are strategic allies with significant defence

I collaboration, intelligence sharing and diplomatic ties. Both countries

share a deep-rooted and time-tested friendship which has grown
manifold over the last few years. After independence, India cultivated its
diplomatic ties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The
USSR always supported the Indian stance over Kashmir at the United
Nations. Both countries developed strategic ties and started joint
manufacturing of defence technologies, mainly weapons and related
equipment. As of today, India imports most of its weapons and equipment
from Russia for instance, aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines,
surveillance and reconnaissance aircrafts/helicopters, joint manufacturing
of SU-30 MKI aircrafts, upgradation of Sukhoi aircrafts, T-90 Main Battle
Tanks (MBTs) and refurbishment of different weapon systems. This study
is divided in two sections of equal importance. The first part analyses
Indo-Russian strategic ties and defence collaboration, emphasising joint
development and induction of modern weapons and equipment by the
Indian military. The latter part discusses the implications of this strategic
collaboration for South Asian deterrence stability.

Historical Overview of the Relationship between India and

Russia
After its independence in 1947, India‟s relationship with Russia began to
grow. It took a concrete turn in 1953 with the signing of their first trade
agreement, followed a few years later by the 1958 bilateral trade
agreement1 which paved the way towards forging a synergistic

1
Agreement Between the Government of India and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Delivery as a Gift to India from the Soviet Union of Equipment
for the Indian Institute of Technology, Bombay, and on Rendering of Assistance by the
Soviet Union to India in the Training of Engineers, India-USSR, December 12, 1958,
http://www.commonlii.org/in/other/treaties/INTSer/1958/15.html.

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 Masood Ur Rehman Khattak

defence and military-technical cooperative relationship.2 The first

trade pact had a clause in which both states agreed to exchange their
scientists and technical know-how with each other.
Since then, the relationship has seen upward trajectory with
Moscow providing entire production lines on military platforms –
from aircrafts to tanks to New Delhi. India‟s first Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru (1947-64) was keen to strengthen trust with the USSR
and to achieve this goal he appointed his sister V. Pandit as the first
ambassador to the Soviet Union in order to expand political and strategic
ties.3 In June 1955, Nehru visited the USSR on a three-week long official
visit, and to reciprocate Soviet leaders Nikita S. Khrushchev4 and Nikolai
A. Bulganin5 visited India in November 1955.6 These historic visits not
only connected India with the technologically superior country, but also
consolidated Nehru‟s political standing.
Soon after, the Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and
Cooperation was signed in August 1971.7 The Soviets aligned themselves
with the Indians and not only supported the latter‟s position on East
Pakistan (now Bangladesh), but also prevented any Chinese interference
in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan.8 Prime Minister of Pakistan
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‟s visit to China on November 07, 1971,9 was
misperceived by Moscow – the latter supported India with moral and
material resources which contributed to the dismemberment of Pakistan.
During the war of 1971, the Soviet Union sent a force of six vessels to the
Indian Ocean to counter the United States (US) support to Pakistan, but

2
Paul M. McGarr, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian
Subcontinent, 1945-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 63.
3
Hafeez Malik, Soviet-Pakistan Relations and Post-Soviet Dynamics, 1947–92 (London:
Palgrave Macmillan, 1994), 32.
4
Editor‟s Note: First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1953-64),
and Chairman of the Council of Ministers or Premier (1958-64).
5
Editor‟s Note: Minister of Defence (1953–55) and Premier of the Soviet Union (1955–
58).
6
Benjamin Zachariah, Nehru (New York: Routledge, 2004), 60.
7
Editor‟s Note: A new treaty was signed in 1993.
8
Santosh K. Mehrotra, India and the Soviet Union: Trade and Technology Transfer (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 20.
9
Eric J. Ladley, Balancing Act: How Nixon Went to China and Remained a Conservative
(Lincoln: iUniverse, 2007), 149.

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 Indo-Russian Strategic Cooperation:
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before the US or Soviets could engage each other, Dhaka fell, and
Pakistani forces surrendered. After the war, the Soviet Union also
supported India‟s stance at the United Nations (UN) and vetoed all the
resolutions against Indian involvement in the East Pakistan conflict.10 This
political and military backing played a crucial role in consolidating India‟s
position in the regional and global arena.
The Indo-Russian strategic partnership derives strength from many
factors. First, both countries respect each other‟s territorial integrity and
sovereignty. Second, Russia has been an able ally since the 1960s,
providing uninterrupted supplies of crucial weapons and equipment to
fulfill the requirements of the Indian Armed Forces. Third, both share a
long history of diplomatic and strategic ties and have supported each other
at global forums on many occasions. Russia and India are on the same
page when it comes to the issue of militancy in Kashmir. Both states
allegedly view that Pakistan is sponsoring militancy in the Indian
Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IOJ&K). In 2002, the Russian Foreign
Minister during his visit to India said that „Pakistan must dismantle
terrorists‟ infrastructure on the territory under its control.‟11 Such views
clearly show the Russian position on the Kashmir issue which considers
the legitimate freedom struggle of the Kashmiris as militancy and takes a
biased approach towards Pakistan in this regard. Fourth, both view each
other as trusted allies and believe in their „time-tested‟ friendship which
despite its few differences (e.g. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in
the 1970s and differing views about the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 12 continues to evolve, especially
after President Putin signed the Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic
Partnership during his state visit to India in October 2000. Reciprocally,

10
Sangeeta Thapliyal, “Indo-Pak Conflict and the Role of External Powers,” Strategic
Analysis 22, no. 7(1998), https://www.idsa-india.org/an-oct8-8.html.
11
Ibid., 14.
12
Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (London:
Routledge, 2010), 96.

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the Indian PM Atal Bihari Vajpai also carried out a visit to Moscow in
2001 to foment their political and strategic ties.13
To improve regional connectivity, India, Russia, and Iran signed a
deal in September 2000 (ratified by all three in May 2002) to develop the
International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).14 The Corridor is
going to connect India‟s economy with those of Russia, Central Asia and
beyond.15 India is also taking part in Russian oil and gas field exploration
projects on the island of Sakhalin in the North Pacific Ocean. The Indian
oil company ONGC Videsh Ltd., invested about USD 2 billion to get 20
per cent share in Russian far eastern offshore oil project.16

Indo-Russia Defence Collaboration

Russia has re-emerged as a great power with strong economy and military
muscle. In 2008, it launched a massive modernisation plan to revamp its
overall military machine and induct latest technologies to be at par with
the US.17 Although, on some fronts India and Russia are not on the same
page, for instance India‟s increasing strategic ties with the US and other

13
V.D. Chopra, ed., New Trends in Indo-Russian Relations (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publi-
cations, 2003), 144.
14
Editor‟s Note: The main ITC route begins on the west coast of India, passes along the
sea to the Iranian ports of Chabahar and Bandar Abbas, and from there by land to Iran‟s
Caspian Sea coast and beyond to Russia and northern Europe. Subsequently, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Syria, Tajikistan,
Turkey and Ukraine also joined the project.
15
R. Sidda Goud and Manisha Mookherjee, eds., India and Iran in Contemporary
Relations (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 2014), 142; Boris Volkhonsky, “North-
South Transport Corridor Begins Functioning,” Russia Beyond, December 12,
2016, https://www.rbth.com/blogs/the_outsiders_insight/2016/12/12/long-awaited-
north-south-corridor-close-to-launch_655489; and “What the North-South Transport
Corridor Means for Russia‟s Transport & Logistics Sector,” ITE Transport & Logistics,
May 12, 2017, http://www.transport-exhibitions.com/Market-Insights/Russia/What-the-
NSTC-means-for-Russian-transport-sector.
16
Andreas Wenger, Robert Orttung and Jeronim Perovic, eds., Russian Business Power:
The Role of Russian Business in Foreign and Security Relations (New York: Routledge,
2006), 145.
17
Richard Sokolsky “The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European
Security” (paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.,
2017), http://carnegieendowment.org/files/3-8-
17_Richard_Sokolsky_Russia_Military_Balance.pdf.

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European countries and improving economic ties with China,18 despite all
these developments, the defence collaboration between India and Russia
has no parallel (Figure 1). Russia is still the largest arms supplier to the
Indian military:

Figure-1
Indo-Russian Defence Collaboration

Source: Author‟s own.

18
Tanvi Madan, “Intertwined and Interacting: The Latest in India‟s Great Power
Relationships,” Order from Chaos Blog, October 28, 2016,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/10/28/intertwined-and-
interacting-the-latest-in-indias-great-power-relationships/.

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India-Russia military technical cooperation has evolved from a

buyer-seller framework to one involving joint research, development and
production of advanced defence technologies and systems. BrahMos
Missile System as well as the licensed production in India of SU-30
aircraft and T-90 tanks, are examples of such flagship cooperation.19

Procurement of T-90 MBTs

It is noteworthy that the Indian Army is relying on the Russian T-90
MBTs20 than on its indigenous Arjun Tank. This is because of the latter‟s
greater manoeuverability and superior firepower. Being lightweight, it
ensures mobility in the desert (like Rajasthan) and plain areas (like
Punjab). Moreover, the ability to fight without any time barrier and
cheaper than homemade MBTs makes it an ideal choice for the Indian
Army.21 Similarly, Russia has also agreed to transfer the technology and
under licensed production of the T-90 Tanks.22 This partnership would
improve India‟s indigenous defence industry and fill the gap in their
armour capabilities. According to an agreement in 2001, India will have
310 T-90 tanks by 2020 to replace its ageing ones adding an offensive
punch in the Indian Army.23 In 2005 another deal worth USD 800 million
was inked for the procurement of more T-90s.24 The T-90 is one of the
best tanks in the world with max speed of 65km per hour, 650km range,
advanced features, night vision and lethal firepower.25
The Indian Army currently operates about 900 T-90 Tanks and most
of them are deployed along the Pakistan border. India has recently

19
Saumitra Mohan, Indian Policy and Development (Chennai: McGraw-Hill Education,
2017).
20
The most modern tank in service with the Indian Ground Forces.
21
Swarna Rajagopalan, Security and South Asia: Ideas, Institutions and Initiatives (New
Delhi: Routledge, 2014), 117.
22
Kerry Bolton, Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific: Emerging Conflicts, New Alliances
(London: Black House Publishing, 2013), 89.
23
Erich Reiter and Peter Hazdra, eds., The Impact of Asian Powers on Global
Developments (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, 2004), 187.
24
Andrew T. H. Tan, ed., The Global Arms Trade: A Handbook (New York: Routledge,
2014), 68.
25
Robert Jackson, ed., 101 Great Tanks, The 101 Greatest Weapons of all Times (New
York: Rosen Publishing Group, 2010), 105.

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concluded a deal with the Russians to import upgraded version of T-90

Tanks, which can fight at night with greater manoeuverability and
superior weaponry.26 Such capabilities are clearly in line with the Indian
Army‟s offensive Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). The Indian Chief of Army
Staff, General Bipin Rawat, recently confessed publicly that the CSD still
exists.27 Highly advanced tanks, with greater flexibility and destructive
firepower would be the backbone of swift military operations under CSD
or „proactive military operations‟ against Pakistan.
The Indian Army is in a close liaison with Russia to equip all its T-
90 Tanks with night vision capabilities to enable them to carry out
operations without any time barrier. India has placed an order for the
procurement of about 1,400 uncooled thermal imager-based driver‟s night
sight (DNS) for its T-90 MBTs.28 These capabilities would fill operational
level gaps and enable the Indian Army to carry out operations even at
night to achieve the element of surprise. Currently, only 50 per cent of the
Indian MBTs are equipped with night vision capabilities.29
At present, India operates 2,500 T-72 MBTs which are meant to
retire by 2020. With 1,600 more T-90 MBTs ready for induction by
then,30 the Indian Army will be able to operationalise its aggressive
limited war doctrine against Pakistan. To counter such an eventuality,

26
“India to Deploy Hundreds of Main Battle Tanks along Border with Pakistan,” RT
World News, January 22, 2017, https://www.rt.com/news/374532-india-tanks-pakistan-
border/. The Indian Army has plans to arm its T-90 MBTs with a third generation
missile system in order to achieve depth of penetration of 800-850 mm, with the
capability of hitting targets up to a range of 8 km day or night using pre-flight
programmed manoeuvres. “Army to Add more Teeth to T-90 Battle Tanks,” Economic
Times, August 20, 2017,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/army-to-add-more-teeth-to-t-90-
battle-tanks/articleshow/60142736.cms.
27
Bipin Rawat, “We Will Cross Again,” interview by Sandeep Unnithan, India Today,
January 4, 2017,
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/interview/story/20170116-lt-general-bipin-rawat-
surgical-strikes-indian-army-985527-2017-01-04.
28
“Indian Army to Equip T-90 Tanks for Night Fighting,” Russia Beyond, December 7,
2016, https://www.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/12/07/indian-army-to-equip-t-90-
tanks-for-night-fighting_654231.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.

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Pakistan must upgrade its own MBTs and equip them with advance
features, night vision capabilities, greater manoeuverability, speed, and
superior armaments along with advanced safety features. Pakistan Army
must also add highly sophisticated anti-tank missile systems to offset the
T-90‟s safety system to neutralise this threat in the battlefield.

The S-400 Air Defence System

Putin signed a deal for 16 defence projects with the Indian PM on October
15, 2016. The most important part of the deal was the S-400 Missile Air
Defence System31 which is considered a game changer in the region. It
can simultaneously engage 36 targets and provide full protection from
airborne threats.32 India plans to buy five of these sophisticated systems
for USD 5 billion - three to be deployed against Pakistan and the other
two against China. The system would detect aircrafts, missiles, or drones
at about 600 km and destroy them at 400km range, which means
Pakistan‟s Air Force would be vulnerable against such a highly advanced
air defence system.33 Such a system would not only add offensive
capabilities to the Indian military, but also protect sensitive civil or
military installations, major cities, missile sites, nuclear facilities, and
command and control centres (CCCs). Each S-400 battalion would be
equipped with eight launchers, a control centre, radar and 16 missiles
available as reloads. It would be close to impossible for an aircraft to
evade the S-400 missile travelling at 17,000 kmh.34 The induction of S-

31
Kallol Bhattacherjee and Suhasini Haider, “India to Buy S-400 Missiles from Russia,”
Hindu, December 1, 2016,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-to-buy-S-400-missiles-from-Russia/
article16072929.ece.
32
“India to Buy Game Changer S-400 Air Defence System from Russia,” Economic
Times, October 15, 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-to-
buy-gamechanger-s-400-air-defence-system-from-russia/printarticle/54866386.cms.
33
Pranab Dhal Samanta, “Russian S-400 Triumph Gives India an Edge against Pakistan,
China,” Economic Times, October 17, 2016,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/russian-s-400-gives-india-an-edge-
against-pakistan-china/printarticle/54893457.cms.
34
Naveed Ahmad, “Analysis: Will India‟s S-400 Missiles Checkmate Pakistan?” Express
Tribune, April 29, 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1094168/analysis-will-indias-s-
400-missiles-checkmate-pakistan/.

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400 means that India would have advantage even in the air space of
Pakistan35 and any aircraft, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), missile, or
helicopter would be on its radar. Similarly, an early detection would give
the Indian military adequate time for countermeasures. This new weapon
would seriously challenge the balance of power in this region, especially
vis-à-vis Pakistan.

The BrahMos Cruise Missile

India and Russia are jointly developing the medium-range anti-ship
BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. BrahMos is a highly sophisticated
cruise missile with greater manoeuverability, reliability, accuracy,
formidable speed, and minimal cost of maintenance. BrahMos could be
launched from a submarine, ship, aircraft, and land-based mobile
launchers. It is considered as an anti-ship missile, but it could also be used
against land-based targets. BrahMos has a speed of Mach 2.8 and can take
out targets with greater precision and accuracy.36 It is also a stealth cruise
missile with the capability to evade radars. The successful tests of
BrahMos suggest that this missile is very precise and works on a principle
of „fire and forget‟ which means once it is launched, it would destroy the
intended target. It has the potential to carry a payload of 200kg which
makes it one of the most lethal and fastest weapons in the world. In March
2017, the Indian military carried out a successful test of the advance
version of BrahMos-II cruise missile, with an effective range of about
450km which makes it a real threat for the security of Pakistan. The
managing director and CEO of the BrahMos programme, Sudhir Mishra
was quoted as saying:

35
Petr Topychkanov, “Where Does Pakistan Fit in Russia‟s South Asia Strategy?”
(Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2017), http://carnegie.ru/2017/01/16/where-does-
pakistan-fit-in-russia-s-south-asia-strategy-pub-67696.
36
Ashok Kumar Singh, Science & Technology for Civil Services Examinations (New
Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill Education, 2007), 530.

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With this new version, all three forces, Army, Navy and IAF
will have the capability to strike deep into the enemy‟s
territory… This is a first for the world – a supersonic cruise
missile with such a high range.37

Subsequently, on November 22, 2017, India test fired the nuclear-

capable cruise missile:

The Indian Air Force successfully fired the BrahMos air

version anti-shipping missile from its frontline Su-30 MKI
fighter aircraft off the Eastern Coast. 38

India is also working on the advance hypersonic version of

BrahMos which would have a range of about 800km and a formidable
speed of Mach 7 or 8,575km per hour.39 Such capabilities would augment
the Indian military‟s strike options against Pakistan‟s underground
defence- related facilities, arms depots, and other strategic installations.

Overhaul of the IAF

The IAF is largely dependent on the Russian Su-30 MKI aircraft, which is
a multi-mission fighter jet with competency to deliver different types and
sizes of nuclear warheads. The Indo-Russian defence collaboration has
played a great role in the refurbishment of the IAF. On December 28,

37
Smriti Jain, “BrahMos: India-Russia Create History with Successful Test of Longer
Range 450-km Version of Supersonic Cruise Missile,” Financial Express, March 11,
2017, http://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/brahmos-india-russia-create-history-
with-successful-test-of-longer-range-450-km-version-of-supersonic-cruise-
missile/583856/.
38
Franz-Stefan Gady, “India Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile from Fighter Jet,”
Diplomat, November 22, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/india-test-fires-nuclear-
capable-cruise-missile-from-fighter-jet/; and Franz-Stefan Gady, “India-Russia 5th
Generation Fighter Jet Program: Road to Nowhere?” Diplomat, January 30, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/india-russia-5th-generation-fighter-jet-program-road-
to-nowhere/.
39
Rahul Singh, “India Successfully Test-Fires BrahMos Supersonic Cruise Missile,”
Hindustan Times, March 11, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-
successfully-test-fires-brahmos-supersonic-cruise-missile/story-
B3ERwFWxKpQAasgOxmho7I.html.

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2000, Russia and India signed a landmark deal to jointly manufacture 140
Su-30 aircrafts to fulfill the requirements of the IAF.40 Both countries also
decided co-development and production of the Sukhoi/HAL Fifth
Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), also known as the Perspective Multi-
role Fighter (PMF) in 2007, although a final contract is yet to be
finalised41 to overcome future challenges of Indian military
modernisation.42
Between 2002 and 2004, India received 72 Su-30 MKI aircrafts
from Russia which are the main workhorses of the IAF. Many of the
Russia-designed jets are built locally now, with many of the initially
purchased planes getting continuous upgrades given improvements Russia
has made. The level of defence partnership between the two states could
be ascertained by the fact that Russia not only transferred technology, but
also gave India license to produce 140 Su-30MKI aircrafts in India by
2014.43 As of 2017, the IAF has 200 Su-30MKI aircrafts,44 which is a
multirole aircraft with lethal fire power, advanced avionics, and superior
manoeuverability. This aircraft is equipped with a 30mm Gsh-30-1
cannon with 1500-1800 rounds per minute of ammunition. The Su-30MKI
will also be equipped with the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile test
fired in November 2017.45 In addition, this is an air-superiority aircraft
with an effective range of about 3,000km, but with refueling option, it
could cover an area of about 8,000km.46 While the IAF is still negotiating

40
Jeanne Wilson, Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese Relations in the Post-Soviet Era
(New York: Routledge, 2004), 107.
41
“India Wants Out of 5th Generation Fighter Jet Program with Russia,” Diplomat,
October 23, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/10/india-wants-out-of-5th-generation-
fighter-jet-program-with-russia/.
42
Sumit K. Majumdar, India’s Late, Late Industrial Revolution: Democratizing
Entrepreneurship (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 156.
43
Richard Weitz, Global Security Watch--Russia: A Reference Handbook, Praeger
Security International (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2010), 26.
44
Zachary Keck, “India could Become a Military Powerhouse Thanks to Russia and
Israel,” The National Interest Blog, January 6, 2018, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/india-could-become-military-powerhouse-thanks-russia-israel-23959.
45
Gady, “India Test Fires Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile from Fighter Jet.”
46
“Su-30MKI Multirole Fighter Aircraft,” Airforce-Technology, accessed February 13,
2018,
http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/su-30mki-multirole-fighter-aircraft-india/.

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with Russia for a fifth-generation aircraft as discussed earlier, the IAF is

in dire need of replacing the Soviet era MiG-21s and refurbish other
aircrafts.

Surveillance and Reconnaissance Capabilities

The Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AEWACS) is
considered an eye in the sky for a country. It detects incoming aerial
threats and provides adequate time to decision-makers for appropriate
response and countermeasures. A major defence deal was marked in 2004
for the supply of three Phalcon Radars and Il-76 transport aircrafts from
Israel and Russia, respectively.47 The Russian Il-76 transport aircraft was
used as a platform to place the Israeli Phalcon Radars for surveillance and
reconnaissance at long range.48 The induction of the AEWACS boosted
the Indian military‟s surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities vis-à-vis
Pakistan. In the same year, the military introduced a limited war doctrine
called CSD in case any terrorist attack occurs in India.49 The timing of the
procurement of this force multiplier is very important. The Indian military
required such capabilities to detect any potential incoming Pakistani
missiles, aircrafts or UAVs to take countermeasures. As far as this system
is concerned, the Indian military is weaker as compared to Pakistan and
China. The Chinese military possesses more than 20 AEWACS, whereas
Pakistan has eight Chinese and Swedish AEWACS for surveillance and
reconnaissance.50 In lieu of this, India‟s Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS) approved the purchase of two more aircrafts from the same
suppliers in 2016.51 The IAF can use these surveillance aircrafts to detect

47
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2005: Armaments,
Disarmament, and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005),
426.
48
Chandra Rekha, India-Russia Post Cold War Relations: A New Epoch of Cooperation
(New York: Routledge, 2017), 37.
49
Stephen P. Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta, Arming without Aiming: India’s Military
Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 61.
50
Rajat Pandit, “India Trails Pakistan on AWACS Front, as Delays Plague Projects,” July
25, 2016, Times of India, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-trails-Pakistan-
on-AWACS-front-as-delays-plague-projects/articleshow/53371140.cms.
51
“CCS Clears Acquisition of Two more AWACS,” Business Standard, March 1, 2016,
http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/ccs-clears-acquisition-of-two-

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Pakistani (and even Chinese) aircrafts, missiles, drones and be able to

keep a close watch on troop movement near the International Border, Line
of Control, strategic installations and deployment patterns.

Naval Cooperation: Dominance at Sea

The Indian Navy is in close partnership with Russia for the procurement
of aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines, stealth frigates, surveillance, and
reconnaissance helicopters, along with other modern technologies
necessary to maintain hegemony in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal, and
the Arabian Sea.

Induction of Russian Aircraft Carrier: INS Vikramaditya

The most important collaboration between Russia and India is the transfer
of aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov (later renamed INS Vikramaditya).
Both countries signed an agreement in 2004 for the transfer of INS
Vikramaditya and after many years of refurbishment, the aircraft carrier
finally joined the Indian Navy in 2014.52 It carries 26 MiG-29 fighters
and ten helicopters. The Indian Navy is working on its first indigenously
built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant with the help of Russian defence
companies. This aircraft carrier is likely to be commissioned by 2020,53
while its proposal for a third full-size carrier, INS Vishal is also on the
radar for the next decade with 57 twin-engine fighter planes for which

more-awacs-116030100750_1.html; Anagha Unnikrishnan, “India Approves Purchase

of Two Phalcon Warning System from Israel,” Air-Force Technology, March 6, 2016,
http://www.airforce-technology.com/news/newsindia-approves-purchase-of-two-
phalcon-warning-system-form-israel-4831275/.
52
Abhijit Singh, “INS Vikramaditya – Deployment Options for India” (brief, Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, 2014),
https://idsa.in/system/files/IB_INSVikramaditya.pdf.
53
“India‟s first indigenous aircraft carrier Vikrant to be ready by 2020,” India TV, January
19, 2018, https://www.indiatvnews.com/news/india-india-s-first-indigenous-aircraft-
carrier-vikrant-to-be-ready-by-2020-423151. However, it will reportedly not be combat
ready until 2023. Rajat Pandit, “India without Aircraft Carrier for 8 Months,” Times of
India, July 27, 2016, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-without-aircraft-
carrier-for-8-months/articleshow/53407213.cms.

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American F-18 and French Dassault Rafales are in the race.54 With these
capabilities as envisioned in its Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime
Security Strategy (IMSS-2015),55 the Indian Navy would emerge as an
assertive force in the region, controlling crucial maritime trade routes,
choke points and seriously threatening Pakistan‟s maritime interests in the
Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.56 However, it has also been pointed out
that:

The decision to opt for indigenous construction of both the

new Vikrant and a third carrier ….suggests India places a
higher priority on enhancing domestic shipbuilding capacity
than immediately acquiring naval airpower projection
capability. 57

Nuclear Submarines: Second Strike Capability

The strategic significance of a nuclear submarine cannot be ignored. A
nuclear submarine can spend more time under water than a diesel
submarine which provides assured second strike capability, greater
outreach and manoeuverability.
The real strength of the Indo-Russian relationship lies in the
depth of trust between Moscow and New Delhi which can be gauged by
the lease of a nuclear-powered submarine by the Soviet Union to India
during 1988-91 under Project 670 Shchuka-B (Skat-class) K-43. It was
later renamed as INS Chakra-I in the Indian Navy with the purpose of

54
Ajit Kumar Dubey, “Indian Navy Plans to Acquire its Third Aircraft Carrier for a
Whopping Rs 1.6 Lakh Crore,” India Today, January 15, 2018,
https://www.indiatoday.in/mail-today/story/indian-navy-plans-to-acquire-its-third-
aircraft-carrier-for-a-whopping-rs-1-6-lakh-crore-1144836-2018-01-15.
55
NS, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (New Delhi: Naval
Strategic Publication, 2015).
56
Ben Wan Beng Ho, “The Aircraft Carrier in Indian Naval Doctrine Assessing the Likely
Usefulness of the Flattop in an Indo-Pakistani War Scenario,” Naval War College
Review 71, no. 1 (2018), https://usnwc2.usnwc.edu/getattachment/26f57eb3-42ae-49b7-
9fbb-3b33a9e4bcc1/The-Aircraft-Carrier-in-Indian-Naval-Doctrine--Ass.aspx.
57
Walter C. Ladwig III, “Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion,” in The Rise of the Indian
Navy: Internal Vulnerabilities, External Challenges, ed. Harsh V. Pant, Corbett Centre
for Maritime Policy Studies Series (London: Routledge, 2016), 16-17, 33–34,
.

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sharing expertise in the design, manufacture, and handling of a nuclear

submarine.58 The Indian Navy leased another nuclear submarine known as
INS Chakra-II (an Akula-class submarine previously known as K-152
Nerpa) in 2011. India leased this submarine for a period of ten years for
training purposes.59 It was formally commissioned into Indian service in
April 2012. It has been reported that India may lease another nuclear
submarine from Russia – a second Project 971 Shchuka-B (Akula-class)
nuclear attack submarine:

The two sides signed the deal - along with a host of other
weapons purchase agreements - on the sidelines of the BRICS
summit in the Indian state of Goa where Russian President
Vladimir Putin met with his Indian counterpart Prime Minister
Narendra Modi on Oct 15, 2017.60

The purpose of the third nuclear submarine would be training Indian

naval officers and sailors for operations and maintenance at sea.61 The
Indian Navy‟s nuclear submarines are stationed at Visakhapatnam,
covering the Bay of Bengal on the eastern side, and in Mumbai keeping
close watch on Pakistan in the Arabian Sea on the western front. The
Indian Navy is also deliberating on a new naval base at Karwar which is
650km south of Mumbai.62 These naval bases are at striking distance from

58
G. M. Hiranandani, Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975 (New
Delhi: Lancer Publishers, 2000), 259.
59
Gurmeet Kanwal, “India‟s Nuclear Force Structure 2025” (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2016),
http://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-force-structure-2025-pub-
63988.
60
Dave Majumdar, “Double Trouble: India to Lease Second Russian Nuclear Attack
Submarine,” The National Interest Blog, October 18, 2016,
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/double-trouble-india-lease-second-russian-
nuclear-attack-18094.
61
A. P. Revi, “India‟s Nuclear Submarine Programme,” Indian Defence Review 31, no. 1
(2016),
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/indias-nuclear-submarine-programme/.
62
NTI, “India Submarine Capabilities” (Washington, D.C.: Nuclear Threat Initiative,
2015),
http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/india-submarine-capabilities/.

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Pakistan‟s Gwadar port which is 1,687 kms away from Karwar and 1, 290
kms away from Mumbai (Figures 2 and 3).

Figure-2
Distance from Gwadar to Karwar Naval Base

Distance from Gwadar to

Karwar Naval Base: 1,687
km.

Source: “Gwadar, Pakistan to Karwar, Karnataka, India,” Google Maps,

accessed February 14, 2018, http://bit.ly/2hQwAXF.

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 Indo-Russian Strategic Cooperation:
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Figure-3
Distance from Gwadar to Mumbai Naval Base

Distance from Gawadar to

Mumbai Naval Base:
1,290.km

Source: “Mumbai, Maharashtra, India,” Google Maps, accessed February 14,

2018, http://bit.ly/2fRc1Gz.

In 2009, the Indian government started work on its first indigenous

nuclear armed submarine INS Arihant code named S-2 at Vishakhapatnam
Building Centre. This is the first nuclear submarine which provides the
Indian Navy with assured second strike capability at sea:

With the commissioning of INS Arihant in August 2016, India

joined a select group of countries (USA, Russia, China, France
and the UK) which builds and operates Ship Submersible
Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN). The second SSBN under the
project, INS Aridhaman, is undergoing sea trials. 63

63
“India‟s Nuclear Submarine INS Arihant Back in Service after Repairs,” Sputnik
International, January 8, 2018, https://sputniknews.com/military/201801081060593821-

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India is planning to add more nuclear submarines under this

programme with the help of Russian defence firms. Two other submarines
of Arihant-class known as S-3 and S-4 will be built at Vadodara. These
nuclear submarines are designed to be equipped with 12 Sagarika (K-15)
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) with an effective range of
about 700kms. In addition, the INS Arihant is also capable of carrying
long-range (3, 500km) SLBMs, torpedoes and submarine launched cruise
missiles (SLCM).64 With these capabilities, the Indian Navy would be able
to control strategic positions in the Indian Ocean, Bay of Bengal, and
Arabian Sea. This is likely to put additional pressure on the Pakistan
Navy, especially its maritime interests in Gwadar Port.

The Kamov Ka-226T Transport Helicopters

The Kamov-226-T (or Ka-226T) is a multipurpose, highly sophisticated
machine. Due to its modular construction, it can be adjusted for specific
needs by adding special components, perfect for use in fields such as
personnel and cargo transportation by means of an internal or external
sling; medical aid and evacuation; police and patrol missions; and rescue
and search operations:65

The helicopter‟s controllability, combined with its outstanding

maximum rate of climb (11m/s), service ceiling (6,500
meters), the skill of operating in temperatures ranging from -
50°C to +50°C and a host of other features make it
indispensable for tackling the outcomes of natural and
technogenic disasters. The durable and compact Ka-226T is
ready for missions in adverse weather conditions, densely
built-up urban areas, mountainous terrain and does not require
hangar storage.66

india-damaged-submarine-repaired/. Both the Russian leased Chakra II and the INS

Arihant have reportedly undergone critical repairs following serious accidents in 2016
and 2017. Li Jie, “Mismanagement Hits Indian Navy‟s Ambitions,” Global Times,
February 6, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1088479.shtml.
64
NTI, “India Submarine Capabilities.”
65
Vasiliy Raksha, “Ka-226T: Shining Mirror of Russian Helicopters‟ Bright Future,”
December 6, 2017, Sputnik International,
https://sputniknews.com/military/201712021059633166-russian-helicopter-ka226t/.
66
Ibid.

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This light helicopter can carry six people on board with their gear,67
as well about one tonne of cargo with a maximum speed of 220km/per
hour which makes it a critical induction in the Indian Navy, 68 especially
since it can now be built completely using digital technology:

In a deal worth around USD 1 billion, India and Russia had

signed an intergovernmental agreement (IGA) earlier this
year, under which New Delhi will buy 60 choppers off the
shelf – 40 will be assembled in India and the remaining 100
will be fully built in India. 69

This deal is also part of Modi‟s „Make in India‟ venture.70 Such

collaboration would boost India‟s indigenous defence industry, improve
technical expertise and know-how in this field through technology
transfer, and help overcome its deficiencies in multipurpose surveillance,
logistics and transport helicopters. It could also be used for rescue
missions and special operations. Since India will buy the multirole
military version, the helicopter would improve the Indian military‟s ability
to operate in mountainous regions, carry men, fuel, food, weapons and
equipment to soldiers deployed at the Line of Control with Pakistan and
the Line of Actual Control with China.

67
Shaurya Karanbir Gurung, “Explained: Kamov Helicopter Deal between India and
Russia,” Economic Times, October 17, 2016,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/explained-kamov-helicopter-deal-
between-india-and-russia/printarticle/54868679.cms.
68
Ibid.
69
Nayanima Basu, “India to Buy 60 Digitally Designed Kamov-226T Helicopters from
Russia,” Hindu, December 1, 2017,
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/india-to-buy-60-digitally-designed-
kamov226t-helicopters-from-russia/article9979501.ece.
70
Gurung, “Explained: Kamov Helicopter Deal between India and Russia”; and Vivek
Raghuvanshi, “India, Russia to Iron Out Defence Projects Worth $10B,” Defence News,
June 22, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/global/2017/06/22/india-russia-to-iron-
out-defense-projects-worth-10b/.

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Induction of Krivak-III Class: Stealth Frigates and Conventional

Submarines
In 2003, the Indian Navy added three modified Krivak-III stealth frigates
(INS Talwar, INS Trishul and INS Tabar) built in Russia worth USD 931
million. Given the use of stealth technologies and a special hull design,
these frigates are equipped with thermal imaging attributes and a
protective shield to safeguard from heat-seeking missiles. They are armed
with anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare missiles, and can take out a
wide range of targets in air, land, and sea.71
According to a 2006 agreement (worth USD 1.5 billion), three
additional frigates, INS Teg, INS Tarkash, and INS Trikand were
provided to India by Russia. The latter is equipped with eight BrahMos
supersonic cruise missiles, advanced Kashtan Air Defence system and
highly sophisticated torpedoes. These frigates are also equipped with anti-
submarine missiles.72 Similarly, in another deal worth USD four billion
signed during Russian President Vladimir Putin‟s visit to the country in
October 2016, two frigates will be constructed at the Goa Shipyard, and
equipped with the BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, while two would
be transferred by Russia.73 It is expected that the delivery of these frigates
would take place in the next six-eight years. These frigates are among
India‟s most versatile and heavily-armed frontline warships. With these
attributes, this frigate is a force multiplier in the Indian Navy and a serious
threat not only to the Pakistani naval ships operating in the Arabian Sea
and Indian Ocean Region, but also China. The Indian Navy‟s plan:

71
Anjali Ghosh, Tridib Chakraborti, Anindyo Jyoti Majumdar and Shibashis Chatterjee,
eds., India’s Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Pearson, 2009), 78.
72
“India‟s Final Talwar-Class Frigate Completes Contractor Sea Trials,” Naval-
Technology, March 20, 2013, http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsindias-final-
talwar-class-frigate-completes-contractor-sea-trials/.
73
Newton Sequeira, “GSL Eyes Guided Missile Frigate Deal,” Times of India, March 7,
2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/goa/gsl-eyes-guided-missile-frigate-
deal/articleshow/57503484.cms.

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…. is to deploy „mission-ready warships‟ and aircraft along

critical sea lanes of communications as well as „choke points‟
ranging from the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden to the
Malacca Strait and Sunda Strait.. on a 24x7 basis round the
year, with the warships being sustained and turned around on
station.74

Russia has also supplied conventional submarines to the Indian

Navy to augment its subsurface war fighting capabilities and improve its
defence in high seas. In this regard, the Indian Navy received Sindhuvir,
Sindhughos and Sindhuratna submarines, which have subsequently been
modernised by the Russians.75

Nuclear Cooperation
India is expanding its nuclear programme which is going to create huge
gaps between India and Pakistan in the field of nuclear energy, technical
expertise, quality, and quantity of nuclear warheads. Russia played
significant role in the development of nuclear installations and related
infrastructure in India. Both countries carried out a deal for the
construction of Kundankulam nuclear reactor in 1988.76 Later, during the
visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov in March 2006, both
states started discussion about Russian assistance in the construction of
the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu and
supply of nuclear fuel for the Tarapur nuclear reactor.77 In 2008, Russia
and India signed a deal worth USD 700 million for the supply of nuclear

74
Rajat Pandit, “Eye on China, India Expands Naval Footprint in Indian Ocean,” Times of
India, October 25, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-expands-naval-
footprint-in-indian-ocean-as-a-net-security-provider-with-an-eye-on-
china/articleshow/61210011.cms.
75
“Russian Shipyard Repairs Indian Sub, in India,” Russia Beyond, April 6, 2016,
https://www.rbth.com/economics/defence/2016/04/06/russian-shipyard-repairs-indian-
sub-in-india_582423.
76
Ian Anthony, Christer Ahlström and Vitaly Fedchenko, Reforming Nuclear Export
Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, report no. 22 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007), 43.
77
Nilofar Suhrawardy, “No Violation over N-Fuel to India, Russia Says,” Arab News,
March 17, 2006, http://www.arabnews.com/node/281902?quicktabs_stat2=1.

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fuel. Russia ended India‟s nuclear blockade after it got the nod from the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) for future nuclear related cooperation.78 This laid the foundation
of the Indo-Russian nuclear partnership, and motivated the US and other
Western powers to change their non-proliferation commitments/laws and
open the gates for India to transfer nuclear fuel and technical know-how.79
India‟s first nuclear reactor at Tamil Nadu was successfully
installed in 2013, with the first and second Russian units generating full
power output of 1,000 MWe each from February 22, 2013 and late 2016,
respectively. Work on reactor units three and four of 1,000 MWe each is
also underway, while a deal for units five and six is also expected soon:80

Under a sovereign agreement, Russia will supply the fuel,

enriched uranium, for the six units for their lifetime. The
VVER units are Light Water Reactors (LWRs) that use
slightly enriched uranium as fuel and light water as coolant.
Kudankulam 1 and 2 have opened the line for the development
of the LWR technology in India.81

This project is considered a landmark initiative between both states.

It would not only develop India‟s civil nuclear capacity, but also help
overcome its energy woes. The surplus nuclear fuel would be diverted to
develop more nuclear warheads which may improve India‟s nuclear
arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively. Such a development would
78
Reetika Sharma, Ramvir Goria and Vivek Mishra, India and the Dynamics of World
Politics: A Book on Indian Foreign Policy, Related Events and International
Organizations (New Delhi: Pearson, 2010), 182.
79
Bharat Bhushan, “Russia Fuel as Bush Winks- Deal with Moscow before US Pact,”
Telegraph India, March 16, 2006.
80
“Kudankulam nuclear reactors generated 22,800 million units,” Hindu, January 28,
2018, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-national/tp-tamilnadu/kudankulam-nu
clear-reactors-generated-22800-million-units/article22539654.ece; Jayant Singh, “The
Indo-Russian Defence Partnership: A Framework for the 21st Century” (paper no. 224,
Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore, 2016),
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195773/ISAS%20Working%20Paper%20No.%20224%20-
%20The%20Indo-
Russian%20Defence%20Partnership.%20A%20Framework%20for%20the%2021st%20
Century.pdf.
81
T. S. Subramanian, “Kudankulam Ready for More,” Front Line, November 11, 2016,
http://www.frontline.in/the-nation/kudankulam-ready-for-more/article9266675.ece.

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compel Pakistan to develop and test more nuclear warheads to maintain

nuclear deterrence in South Asia. In 2010, during the visit of Prime
Minister Putin, another pact was signed for the construction of nuclear
power plants in the West Bengal region.82 However, this project has yet to
get underway.83

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing

Like many other countries, India and Russia are also facing the menace of
terrorism and violent insurgencies, which has brought both allies closer to
each other to explore ways to eradicate the same in their respective
countries. India considers the Kashmir freedom struggle „militancy‟ and
takes it as a serious challenge for her national security.84 In January 1948,
when India took the issue to the UN, Moscow decided to remain neutral in
view of its strategic and geopolitical compulsions; however, from 1955
onwards, its stance changed when the two Premiers visited each other and
Prime Minister Khrushchev declared that „Kashmir is one of the states of
Republic of India which has been decided by the people of Kashmir‟ – a
statement which has remained a cornerstone of the relationship. So much
so that Russia‟s 100th veto in the UN Security Council (SC) was in
support of India‟s position on this issue. To curb the so-called
„insurgency‟ in IOJ&K, India and Russia are closely cooperating in the
field of intelligence sharing and counterterrorism.

82
Satish Kumar, ed., India’s National Security: Annual Review 2010 (New Delhi:
Routledge, 2010), 271.
83
Sachin Parashar, “Russia Wants West Bengal Nuclear Plant Relocated,” Times of India,
September 9, 2011, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Russia-wants-West-
Bengal-nuclear-plant-relocated/articleshow/9917196.cms; “”Nuclear Power Corp Wants
to Renegotiate Haripur Plant with Mamata Bannerjee Government,” Hindustan Times,
April 3, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/kolkata/nuclear-power-corp-wants-to-
renegotiate-haripur-plant-with-mamata-banerjee-government/story-
mGRujjuFNXcO4YjqTx5NaK.html.
84
James J. F. Forest, ed., Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century:
International Perspectives, vol. 3, Praeger Security International (London: Praeger
Security International, 2007), 517.

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Apart from Kashmir, the common threat of terrorism emanates from

the emergence of the Islamic State (IS). Many Russian85 and Indian
nationals86 joined the IS and pose a serious threat to these countries.
Secondly, the rise of Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-KP) in
Afghanistan has also threatened their interests in this region. With both
countries having geopolitical interests in Afghanistan, any spillover
effects of the IS militancy could destabilise Afghanistan and neighbouring
states of Central Asia which may have direct impact on Indo-Russian
security.
The strategic alliance between Russia and India to counter
terrorism, extremism and armed insurgencies is not new. In 2000, both
countries signed a declaration on strategic collaboration, which mainly
focused on counterterrorism and extremism in the region and beyond.87
Later in 2001, the Moscow Declaration was signed on fighting
international terrorism,88 in which, it was asserted that violent terrorist acts
are taking place in both states under the name of self-determination.89
Russia termed the freedom struggle in Kashmir as terrorism, which is a
serious concern for Pakistan and the legitimate freedom struggle of the
people of Kashmir. After 9/11, the Kashmir freedom struggle has faced
huge setbacks. According to Brigadier (R) Feroz Hassan Khan:

On 9/11, 2001, when the twin towers fell, buried under the
twin towers was Pakistan‟s Kashmir position. 90

After 9/11, the US pressurised Pakistan to end its alleged support

to IOJ&K.91 In 2002, the Delhi Declaration directly blamed Pakistan for

85
Juri Rescheto, “Chechnya: Islamic State‟s Fertile Russian Recruiting Ground,” Deutsche
Welle, January 25, 2018, http://www.dw.com/en/chechnya-islamic-states-fertile-russian-
recruiting-ground/a-42311816.
86
Natalie Tecimer, “India and the Fight against Islamic State,” June 14, 2017,
https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/india-and-the-fight-against-islamic-state/.
87
Amit Gupta, Global Security Watch-India, Praeger Security International (California:
Praeger, 2012), 86.
88
Keshav Mishra, Rapprochement across the Himalayas: Emerging India-China Relations
Post Cold War Period (1947-2003) (New Delhi: Kalpaz Publications, 2004), 313.
89
Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia, 92.
90
Feroz Hassan Khan (research professor, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval
Post Graduate School, Monterey), in discussion with the author, October 16, 2017.

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alleged terrorist safe havens, with India and Russia forming a joint
working group on combating terrorism.92 This aspect of the Indo-Russian
strategic partnership mainly focuses on three main areas:

 framework for intelligence sharing,

 training of the security forces for counterterror operations, and,
 capacity building of security forces involved in counterterror
operations.

Both states are also part of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF)93 at the UN to implement measures to freeze terrorist funds and
stop terrorist financing.94 The National Security Advisor and architect of
India‟s counterterrorism strategies, Ajit Doval visited Russia on January
30-31, 2017 and held talks with the Secretary of Russia‟s Security Council
for better cooperation and teamwork to counter terrorism and extremism.95
Subsequently, in March 27, 2017, the Indian Home Minister Rajnath
Singh held talks with Alexander Bortnikov, head of Russia‟s intelligence
agency Federal Security Service (FSB) and discussed the issue of
terrorism and agreed on joint action on counterterror efforts.96
India and Russia have also decided to organise a counterterrorism
conference annually to share information, devise counterterror strategies
and techniques in tackling terrorism and extremism in their respective

91
Mary Buckley and Rick Fawn, eds., Global Responses to Terrorism: 9/11, Afghanistan
and Beyond (New York: Routledge, 2003), 198.
92
Ibid.
93
FATF, “Countries” (Paris: Financial Action Task Force), accessed February 14, 2018,
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/#FATF.
94
FATF, “FATF Action on Terrorist Finance” (Paris: Financial Action Task Force, 2015),
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/documents/news/fatf-action-on-terrorist-finance.html; and
Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Russia Working to Put in Place Extensive Counter-
Terror Cooperation Pact,” Economic Times, December 21, 2015,
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-russia-working-to-put-in-
place-extensive-counter-terror-cooperation-pact/articleshow/50261706.cms.
95
Ibid.
96
Mikhail Nekrasov, “India, Russia Agree to Jointly Counter Terrorism” Russia Beyond,
March 27, 2017, https://www.rbth.com/politics/2017/03/27/india-russia-agree-to-jointly-
counter-terrorism_728283.

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countries.97 This platform would provide opportunities to both to learn

from the expertise of officials, police officers, intelligence personnel and
armed forces involved in counterterrorism operations. The Indian Security
Forces (ISF) lack Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) or Communications
Intelligence (COMINT) capabilities to intercept signals or
communications between alleged militants.98 The Russian military is
equipped with these modern technologies.
Both carried out a counterterrorism exercise Indra in 2016, and
practiced guerrilla warfare tactics in hilly, rugged and jungle terrain.99 The
exercise focused on securing assembly area, axis clearance, occupation of
hindering location, segregation and lastly nullification of militants.100
These exercises are significant because India is fighting what it claims are
„armed insurgencies‟ in IOJ&K which is mountainous, and in its Eastern
parts where Naxalites are challenging its writ in jungles. These military
exercises would revamp India‟s irregular warfare capabilities and enable
the ISF to meet these challenges with greater ease and efficiency.

Implications for the Deterrence Stability of South Asia

While security interests drive Russia‟s policy in South Asia, its defence
collaboration with India will have far-reaching implications for the
strategic stability of South Asia, especially Pakistan. Although Moscow
concluded a 2015 deal with Islamabad and supplied four Mi-35
helicopters in 2017101 paving the way for broader military ties;102 and both

97
“Indo-Russian Counter-Terrorism Conference” Global Powers Blog, April 8, 2017,
https://www.reddit.com/r/GlobalPowers/comments/64910x/diplomacy_indorussian_co
unterterrorism_conference/.
98
Ibid.
99
“Indo-Russian Military Exercise in Counter-Terrorism Concludes after 11 Days,” ndian
Express, October 1, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/indo-
russian-military-exercise-in-counter-terrorism-concludes-after-11-days-3060350/.
100
Ibid.
101
“Islamabad Moscow Sign Helicopter Deal,” Nation, August 19, 2015,
https://nation.com.pk/19-Aug-2015/islamabad-moscow-sign-helicopter-deal; “Pakistan
Receives 4 Military Helicopters from Russia, Talks for Purchase of S-400 Missile
Defence System: Foreign Media,” Times of Islamabad, August 31, 2017,
https://timesofislamabad.com/31-Aug-2017/pakistan-receives-4-military-helicopters-
from-russia-talks-for-purchase-of-s-400-missile-defence-system-foreign-media.

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had their first-ever joint special drills in 2016 and 2017, the military-
technical cooperation between India and Russia continues to expand, with
even greater cooperation in science and technology, and is unlikely to be
impacted by any strategic Pak-Russian partnership.103 It is pertinent to
point out that in an article by Vladimir Putin, published in February 2012,
on Russian policy in South Asia, he describes Russia‟s policy on China,
discusses India, but there is no mention of Pakistan:

South Asia is viewed as a region whose „integrational‟

processes are of interest to Russia and its economy. India is
considered the main engine of growth in the region and seen
as a „privileged strategic partner‟.104

Conventional Disparity in South Asia

The strategic balance in South Asia suddenly shifted on January 18, 2018,
after India successfully tested its Agni 5 ICBM, demonstrating that it
could hit targets along the densely populated East Chinese seaboard in the
event of a military confrontation with the People‟s Republic, to say
nothing of what it could potentially do to Pakistan.105
As stated by Andrew Korybko, the Indo-Russian defence
collaboration would have negative consequences for the conventional
balance of power between India and Pakistan given their adversarial
relationship permanently changing the „strategic landscape in South Asia
102
“Pakistan Considers Expanding Mi-35 Contract With Russia - Military Official,”
Sputnik International, February 15, 2017,
https://sputniknews.com/world/201702151050693154-pakistan-russia-mi-35/.
103
Petr Topychkanov, “Pakistan cannot Influence Russia‟s Strategic Partnership with
India” (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2016),
http://carnegie.ru/2016/05/25/pakistan-cannot-influence-russia-s-strategic-partnership-
with-india-pub-63668.
104
Petr Topychkanov, “Russia‟s Interests and Potential to Contribute towards Peace and
Reconciliation in Afghanistan,” in Evolving Situation in Afghanistan: Role of Major
Powers and Regional Countries, ed. Sarah Siddiq Aneel (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy
Research Institute, 2016),
http://www.ipripak.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/es2792016.pdf.
105
Andrew Korybko, “3 Reasons Why Russia Should Sell S-400 Missiles to Pakistan,”
Regional Rapport, January 21, 2018, http://regionalrapport.com/2018/01/21/three-
reasons-russia-sell-s-400-missiles-pakistan/.

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 Masood Ur Rehman Khattak

and heralding „an offensive and defense missile race.‟106 There is strategic
stability in South Asia right now because of Pakistan‟s nuclear capability.
The concern here is that if conventional deterrence continues to erode in
coming years because of enhanced Indo-Russian defence collaboration,
what options will Pakistan be left with to counter any misadventure by the
Indian military. According to Ashley Tellis, Pakistan would counter
Indian military modernisation, „with more nuclear weapons.‟107 So it
could be argued that such defence collaboration would have direct bearing
on conventional deterrence in South Asia108 or what Tellis coined „ugly
stability‟ between India and Pakistan,109 and invite countermeasures by
the latter, which may include realignments with major powers, expansion
of its nuclear arsenal or conventional arms race:
Indeed, a number of researchers at Washington DC think
tanks, including the Carnegie Endowment, the Congressional
Research Service, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the
Hudson Institute appear to share the beliefs of the Stimson
Center‟s Michael Krepon that Pakistan‟s recent embrace of the
utility of tactical nuclear weapons and broader Pakistani
efforts to enhance the quality and quantity of their nuclear
arsenal is a result of „India‟s growing conventional capabilities
and its more proactive military plans.‟110

106
Ibid.
107
Ashley J. Tellis (senior fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C.), in discussion with the author, November 4, 2017.
108
Malik Qasim Mustafa, “Pakistan‟s Military Security and Conventional Balance of
Power,” Strategic Studies 29, no. 1 (2009): 35-44; and Rodney W. Jones,
“Conventional Military Imbalance and Strategic Stability in South Asia” (paper no. 1,
University of Bradford, South Asian Strategic Stability Unit, Bradford, 2005),
http://www.policyarchitects.org/pdf/Conventional_imbalance_RJones.pdf.
109
Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), 5.
110
Michael Krepon, „Tac Nukes in South Asia,‟ Arms Control Wonk, April 18, 2012,
quoted in Walter C. Ladwig III, “Indian Military Modernization and Conventional
Deterrence in South Asia,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 729-772,
http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional%20Deterrence%20in%20South%
20Asia.pdf.

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Renewed Arms Race in the Region

The presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia means total war is no
longer a possibility. 111 Conventional deterrence, on the other hand, makes
it costly and prevents a state from any aggressive manoeuvers, surgical
strikes, or limited conflict against another country. Walter Ladwig points
out at length that:

Indian strategic planners cannot have a high degree of

confidence that their forces possess sufficient skill advantages
over their opponents that they could leverage advanced
military technology to overcome [other] disadvantages
structural and environmental factors [such as the terrain, lack
of strategic surprise, and the relative military prowess].112

However, in the future, the conventional balance would tilt in

favour of India creating serious challenges for Pakistan‟s security:

The result of this growing divergence in the two states‟

conventional capabilities will be either a regional arms race -
as Pakistan desperately attempts to keep pace with India so as
to deter a preventive strike from India - and/or a lowering of
the nuclear threshold for Pakistan. 113

Former Ambassador Ashraf Jahangir Qazi opines:

111
Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan‟s Nuclear Postures and South Asian
Stability,” International Security 34, no. 3 (2009/10): 38-78 (64),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/Narang.pdf.
112
Walter C. Ladwig III, “Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in
South Asia,” The Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 5 (2015): 729-772,
http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional%20Deterrence%20in%20South%
20Asia.pdf.
113
Peter R. Lavoy, “Islamabad‟s Nuclear Posture: Its Premises and Implementation,” in
Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries beyond War (Carlisle:
Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 129-165 (158-159).

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India can sustain conventional war more easily than

Pakistan because of its geographical and economic size.
It also carries more diplomatic weight.114

Jumping into an arms race with an economically powerful India

would mean diverting funds from socio-economic development to defence
related procurement. Such a situation would not only hurt Pakistan‟s
socio-economic scenario, it would prevent this region from regional
connectivity and economic development. Hostilities would flare-up
further at the border, putting regional security at greater risk.

Risks of a Limited War: CSD, Surgical Strikes by India

India is adding offensive weapons and equipment to operationalise pro-
active military operations or CSD against Pakistan. Both states have
strategic parity as far as nuclear deterrence is concerned, but the
possibility of a limited war cannot be overruled. Professor Pant, in an
answer to a question affirmed the possibility of a limited war under CSD,
surgical strikes or proactive military operations in South Asia.115 On the
same question another expert on South Asia, Professor Rajesh Basrur also
opines that limited war is possible. „Arguably, it has already occurred in
1999 (Kargil). More correctly, I would call it “marginal war.”‟116
In case of any major terrorist attack on the Indian soil or IOK, the
Indian military may carry out limited attack under CSD, proactive military
operations or surgical strikes on Pakistani soil. Pakistan‟s reaction would
be uncertain - if the Pakistan military responds in the same fashion,
hostilities may break out and a limited war may escalate. Bharat Karnad
argues that „should conventional deterrence fail, Pakistan will have to
deliver on its threat of first use on TNWs, and that will be an impossibly

114
Ashraf Jahangir Qazi (former ambassador to India, China, and United States), in
discussion with the author, October 13, 2017.
115
Harsh V. Pant (professor, International Relations, Defence Studies Department and
India Institute, Kings College, London), in discussion with the author, October 11,
2017.
116
Rajesh Basrur (professor, International Relations, Coordinator, South Asia Programme,
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore), in discussion with the author, October 13, 2017.

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difficult decision for the General Headquarters to make considering the

consequences for Pakistan.‟117 Any nuclear exchange in South Asia would
have far-reaching implications not only for regional states, but also for the
US, Europe, and Middle Eastern economies, it is, therefore, advisable for
the Indian and Pakistani policymakers to show restraint and resolve all
outstanding issues in an amicable way. The route of confrontation would
lead this region to further mayhem and turmoil which is not in the
interests of either party.

Development and Deployment of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The conventional asymmetry between India and Pakistan and costly arms
race has compelled Pakistan to develop tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
to dissuade the Indian armed forces from any aggressive move under the
nuclear umbrella. Former Chief of General Staff and Corps Commander
of a Strike Corps/Commander Central Command, Lieutenant General (R)
Muhammad Mustafa Khan rationalises the induction of TNWs by
Pakistan:

India thinks they can fight a short-term/ limited war under the
nuclear umbrella. But we say we have developed TNWs and
conveyed to the Indians if you impose conventional war on us
or cross the border, we will use TNWs. I think TNWs are a
stabilising factor in South Asia with the sole purpose to deter a
conventional war.118

The Indian military is aggressively practicing its offensive designs

in military exercises close to the border with Pakistan. India is also
modernising its overall war fighting capabilities and adding new force
multipliers. Another senior Army officer, Lt. General (R) Naeem Khalid
Lodhi, former Corps Commander of the XXXI Corps is of the view that:

117
Bharat Karnad (research professor, Center for Policy Research, New Delhi, national
security expert), in discussion with the author, October 10, 2017.
118
Muhammad Mustafa Khan (former chief, General Staff; corps commander, Strike
Corps/ Central Command), in discussion with the author, October 25, 2017.

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 Masood Ur Rehman Khattak

The Indians have been developing their doctrines and we have

been developing answers to their doctrines. Since then, there
has been no all-out war between the two countries, which
means that our answers have been appropriate, and they have
been a stabilising factor. In proactive military operations, there
was a fear that they will opt for shallow manoeuvers. So,
Pakistan forces developed TNWs in response to that. Their
mere existence will inhibit Indian designs of going for shallow
manoeuvers or limited objectives as we will use all resources
at our disposal which means that we will not hesitate to use
anything we have. So, the development of TNWs, in this
context, has been a stabilising rather than destabilising
factor.119

Over the past two decades, Pakistan lost billions of dollars in the
War against Terror. After years of setbacks, the country‟s economy is
growing slowly. Such a fragile economic situation does not allow for
continuous arms race with India, ultimately, there would be a strategic
disparity in the region compelling Pakistan to rely on its nuclear weapons
to deter any limited aggression or major incursions by the Indian military
under CSD or proactive military operations. The induction and
deployment of TNWs in the region is a dangerous development because
the Indian nuclear doctrine does not differentiate between a tactical or
strategic nuclear weapon. Such a scenario is threatening for regional peace
and security. Pakistani strategic thinkers believe that TNWs are a source
of stability because they have deterred India from any conventional attack.
On the other hand, according to Indian expert Gurmeet Kanwal, „TNWs
are inherently destabilising.‟ But at the same time, he holds the view that
„In India, we believe there is space for conventional conflict below the
nuclear threshold.‟120 Such a scenario is dangerous and any nuclear
exchange in this region would be devastating.

119
Naeem Khalid Lodhi (former corps commander, XXXI Corps; former defence
secretary), in discussion with the author, October 22, 2017.
120
Gurmeet Kanwal (fellow, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi), in
discussion with the author, October 11, 2017.

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Conclusion
The defence collaboration between India and Russia is deep-rooted and
increasing with the passage of time - from refurbishment and military
modernisation to counterterrorism, surveillance and reconnaissance,
transportation and logistical capabilities. This collaboration would revamp
the overall capabilities of India‟s military and help them to operationalise
their aggressive doctrines against Pakistan. Partnership in the latest MBTs
would not only add offensive punch to the IAF, but also help them to
operationalise the CSD. The air and naval defence uplift could also create
serious challenges for Pakistan‟s military. In the nuclear arena, Russia is
helping India overcome its nuclear fuel needs and uninterrupted supplies,
material and technology transfer to revamp its nuclear industry, which
may bring a huge qualitative and quantitative change in its nuclear
weapons‟ programme. The induction of Russian nuclear submarines
would help India to achieve assured second strike capability and greater
outreach in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea taxing Pakistan‟s maritime
installations, economic and strategic interests. In all likelihood, this
defence collaboration would create serious strategic disparity vis-à-vis
Pakistan. The failure of conventional deterrence may invite the weaker
party (Pakistan) to rely on its nuclear weapons to deter any aggressive
moves by India. Consequently, India‟s military modernisation along with
aggressive doctrines and overwhelming reliance on nuclear weapons by
Pakistan would create serious security problems for the peace and security
of South Asia. It is imperative for both nuclear states to avoid
confrontation, refrain from aggressive doctrines and resolve all
outstanding issues (including Kashmir) through amicable negotiations,
only then can there be long-term peace and stability in the region.

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