Rule 84: General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators 7.

7. Hence this petition for certiorari, alleging that appeal would not be speedy
G.R. No. L-28214 — Jaroda v. Cusi and adequate as the respondent Tan continued to sell lots of lands from the
Reyes, J. subdivision, to the detriment of Jaroda and the other heirs.

The special administrator of the decedent’s estate filed two petitions in the special ISSUE with HOLDING
proceeding, which the lower court duly granted. One petition asked for permission to
withdraw cash from the decedent’s bank account, while the other prayed for the WoN the lower court acted in GAOD in granting both orders? Yes. The Court
granting of a power of attorney to allow the special administrator to act as an agent in found that the lower court committed GAOD in granting both orders.
selling the decedent’s property. The petitioner moved to nullify such orders.
1. Re: power to withdraw bank deposits for the co-owners.
a. The Court found that the lower court committed GAOD in granting
DOCTRINE the order allowing the respondent to withdraw the bank deposits
standing the name of the decedent.
It is highly undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and administrator, in b. Such withdrawal, according to the Court, is foreign to the duties and
dealing with property under his administration, should have to look to the wishes of powers of a special administrator. This was provided in Section 2,
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed him. A judicial administrator Rule 80, which states that a special administrator can:
should be at all times subject to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one i. “take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
else. credits and estate of the decease and preserve the same
for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed,
and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
FACTS administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator
1. The decedent Carlos Villa Abrille died intestate, leaving: shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless
a. An estate consisting of real and personal property, including: so ordered by the court.”
i. A share in the co-ownership of Juna Subdivision c. Also, the order was issued without notice to and hearing of the
ii. Cash deposited in several bank accounts heirs of the deceased.
b. Forced heirs such as: i. The Court specifically mentioned here that while the
i. His surviving spouse withdrawal of the bank deposits may be viewed as a
ii. Nine children (including the petitioner Natividad Jaroda) taking of possession and charge of the credits of the
iii. Four grandchildren (including the respondent Antonio Tan) estate (which is within the powers of a special
2. The respondent Tan commenced the intestate special proceedings by filing administrator), such withdrawal is a waiver by the special
a petition for administration in CFI Davao. He was first appointed as special administrator of a prima facie exclusive right of the estate
administrator and subsequently as the regular administrator. to the bank deposits in favor of the co-owners. Such an
3. Tan filed an ex-parte petition for the withdrawal of cash from PNB, which action required notice to the heirs.
sums were actually not listed in his petition.
a. He alleged that these sums were held in trust for the decedent’s co- 2. Re: power to act as attorney-in-fact.
owners in the subdivision. a. The Court also found that the lower court committed GAOD in
b. This was granted by the lower court. granting the order allowing the respondent to act as attorney-in-fact
4. Tan also filed a petition with lower the court, praying for the approval of the in selling the decedent’s share in the subdivision.
court of a power of attorney which appointed Tan as an attorney-in-fact to b. The order approving the power of attorney is void for want of notice
sell the decedent’s share in the subdivision. and for approving an improper contract.
a. This was also granted by the lower court. c. More importantly, the Court noted that an administrator is not
5. The petitioner Jaroda moved to nullify the two orders. However, this was permitted to deal with himself as an individual in any
denied by the CFI for lack of merit. transaction concerning trust property.
6. Jaroda appealed from this, but the court dismissed the appeal on the ground i. The opinion of some commentators that, as a general rule,
that the order appealed from was interlocutory. Jaroda then filed before the auto-contracts are permissible if not expressly prohibited,
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus but the SC and that there is no express provision of law prohibiting an
dismissed the petition, adding in its resolution that appeal in due time is the administrator from appointing himself as his own agent,
remedy. even if correct, cannot and should not apply to
administrator of decedent's estates, in view of the
 fiduciary relationship that they occupy with respect to
the heirs of the deceased and their responsibilities
toward the probate court.
ii. The court below also failed to notice that after the death of
Carlos Villa Abrille, the administrator Tan had replaced
said deceased as manager of the Juna Subdivision by
authority of the other co-owners.
iii. By the court's questioned order of 3 September 1965
empowering him to represent the interest of the deceased
in the management of the subdivision, the administrator
Tan came to be the agent or attorney-in-fact of two
different principals: the court and the heirs of the
deceased on the one hand, and the majority co-owners of
the subdivision on the other, in managing and disposing of
the lots of the subdivision.
iv. This dual agency of the respondent Tan rendered him
incapable of independent defense of the estate's interests
against those of the majority co-owners. It is highly
undesirable, if not improper, that a court officer and
administrator, in dealing with property under his
administration, should have to look to the wishes of
strangers as well as to those of the court that appointed
him. A judicial administrator should be at all times subject
to the orders of the appointing Tribunal and of no one else.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the order of 5 May 1965 and 3 September 1965
of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, in its Special Proceeding No. 1391,
are hereby set aside and declared null and void. The preliminary injunction heretofore
issued is hereby made permanent. Costs against the respondent, Antonio V. A. Tan,
in his personal capacity.

DIGESTER: Jose Ranulfo R. Mendoza