SECOND DIVISION

GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166863

INSURANCE SYSTEM, Present:
Petitioner,
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,*
BRION,
PERALTA,** and
-versus- PEREZ, JJ.

Promulgated:

JUM ANGEL, July 20, 2011

Respondent.
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal by certiorari[1] from the Decision[2] of the First Division of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61304 dated 31 May 2004, granting the
Petition of Jum Angel (respondent) to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
Decision[3] and Order of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC)
denying payment of death benefits due to private respondent as widow of Sergeant
Benjamin Angel (Sgt. Angel) under Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known
as Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund.

The relevant factual antecedents of the case, as gathered by the court, are the
following:

The late Sgt. Angel started his military training on 1 July 1974. On 7
October 1977, he was admitted into active service. He was later promoted to the
rank of Corporal in December 1982 and to the rank of Sergeant in July 1986. He
was in active service until his death on 3 March 1998.

On 3 March 1998, Sgt. Angel was fetched/invited from his post by a certain
Capt. Fabie M. Lamerez (Capt. Lamerez) of the Intelligence Service Group of the
Philippine Army to shed light on his alleged involvement in a pilferage/gunrunning
case being investigated by the Philippine Army.[4]

On or about 2 p.m. of the same day, he was placed inside a detention cell to
await further investigation.

The following day, the lifeless body of Sgt. Angel was found hanging inside
his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck. According to the Autopsy
Report conducted by the Crime Laboratory of the Philippine National Police
(PNP), the cause of death was asphyxia by strangulation.

Respondent, the wife of the late Sgt. Angel, filed a complaint before the
PNP Criminal Investigation Command, alleging that her husband was murdered
and named the elements of Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as
suspects.
On 8 April 1998, upon investigation, the Office of the Provost Marshal
reported that Sgt. Angel died under suspicious circumstance while in line of
duty. The Provost Marshal found it incredible that Sgt. Angel would take his life,
in view of his impending retirement and being a father to four (4) children. The
Provost Marshal concluded that foul play may have been committed against Sgt.
Angel and recommended that the case be tried by a court martial.

On 25 April 1998, the Inspector General, upon referral of the case, held that
there is no evidence suggesting foul play in the death of Sgt. Angel and maintained
that the detention of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused
him to hang himself.

The case was referred to a Judge Advocate General, to determine whether or

not Sgt. Angel died while in line of duty. On 3 December 1999, Judge Advocate
General Honorio Capulong in his report recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared
to have died in line of duty.

On 15 March 2000, the Philippine Army through Chief of Staff Brig.

General Pedro V. Atienza, Jr., issued General Order No. 270 declaring the line of
duty status in favor of Sgt. Angel. Section 1 of the Order states:
 I. Declaration of in Line of Duty Status the death of the late Sgt. Benjamin
R. Angel 633863, Philippine Army formerly assigned with SBTM, ASCOM who
died on March 3, 1998 at ISG, Fort Bonifacio, Makati is declared IN LINE OF
DUTY STATUS.[5] (Emphasis ours)

By reason thereof, respondent, as widow of Sgt. Angel, filed a claim for death
benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.
On 29 September 1999, the GSIS denied the respondents claim on the ground that
Sgt. Angels death did not arise out of and in the course of employment. A motion
for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied by the GSIS.

On appeal before the ECC, the ECC in its Decision[6] dated 13 April 2000 likewise
denied the claim for want of merit. The relevant portion of the decision states that:

After careful deliberation of the facts attendant to this case, this Commission
believes that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as amended, cannot be
granted. It has been stressed time and again that the thrust of Employees
Compensation Law is to secure adequate and prompt benefits to the employee and
his dependents in the event of a work-related disability or death. In this
connection, Rule III, Section 1(a) of the Implementing Rules of PD 626, as
amended, defines when an injury or death is considered compensable, to wit: For
the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must
be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The
circumstances surrounding this case do not meet the aforementioned
conditions. Clearly, the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time
of the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell,
an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus,
the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents
appear bereft of any showing to justify a casual connection between his death and
his employment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the respondent System

appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and this case DISMISSED for want of
merit.[7]
Respondent appealed the case before the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Before the appellate court, she raised the issue
that the ECC erred:
 1. In declaring that the death benefits prayed for under P.D. 626, as
amended, cannot be granted, as the deceased was not performing his
official duties at the time of the incident.
2. In declaring that the subject matter of the investigation, during which he
was found dead in his cell, is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a
soldier.
3. In declaring that the mantle of the law cannot be extended to the deceased
as the documents appear bereft of any showing to justify a causal
connection between his death and his employment.[8]

On 31 May 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the ECC ruling. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed

decision dated April 13, 2000 of respondent ECC is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the GSIS [is] ORDERED to pay the
death benefits due the petitioner as widow of Sgt. Angel under Presidential
Decree No. 626, as amended.[9]
The appellate court in its decision pointed out that Sgt. Angel was manning his
post at the Army Support Command when invited by Capt. Lamerez of the
Intelligence Service Group to undergo an investigation concerning a
gunrunning/pilferage case in the Philippine Army. Sgt. Angel was never arrested;
he went with Capt. Lamerez to shed light on the investigation.[10] It was never
shown that Sgt. Angels subsequent detention was a punishment for any wrong
doing.[11] Furthermore, the appellate court recognized the peculiar nature of a
soldiers job as decided by the Supreme Court. To quote:

x x x a soldier on active duty status is really on a 24 hours a day official duty

status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is
subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, seven (7) days
a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status. Thus, a soldier
should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and
unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by going on an
approved vacation leave.[12]
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Petitioner GSIS raises the issue whether or not the Court of Appeals disregarded
the law and jurisprudence when it set aside the ECC Decision dated 13 April 2000
that for the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of
employment.

Courts Ruling
GSIS contends that the death of Sgt. Angel did not arise out of in the course of
employment as provided by Section 1, Rule III of the Implementing Rules of
Presidential Decree No. 626, otherwise known as the Employees Compensation
and State Insurance Fund. The widow, on the other hand, counters that her husband
died in line of duty so that such death is compensable under the Fund.

The contentions bring out the issue whether or not the declaration by the Philippine
Army that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status confers compensability
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626 otherwise known
as Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund.

We rule in favor of petitioner GSIS.

For the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the law provides:

Implementing Rules of P.D. 626,[13] RULE III COMPENSABILITY, Section

1. Grounds.

(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
injury must be the result of accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment. (Underscoring supplied)

Pertinent jurisprudence outline that the injury must be the result of an

employment accident satisfying all of the following: 1) the employee must have
been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; 2) the employee must
have been performing his official functions; and 3) if the injury is sustained
elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.[14]

It is important to note, however, that the requirement that the injury must arise out
of and in the course of employment proceeds from the limiting premise that the
injury must be the result of an accident.

The term accident has been defined in an insurance case.[15] We find the definition
applicable to the present case. Thus:

The words accident and accidental have never acquired any technical signification in
law, and when used in an insurance contract are to be construed and considered
according to the ordinaryunderstanding and common usage and speech of people
generally. In substance, the courts are practically agreed that the words accident and
accidental mean that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or
 design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. The definition that has
usually been adopted by the courts is that an accident is an event that takes place
without ones foresight or expectation an event that proceeds from an unknown cause,
or is an unusual effect of a known case, and therefore not expected.

An accident is an event which happens without any human agency or, if happening
through human agency, an event which, under the circumstances, is unusual to and
not expected by the person to whom it happens. It has also been defined as an injury
which happens by reason of some violence or casualty to the insured without his
design, consent, or voluntary cooperation.
Significantly, an accident excludes that which happens with intention or design,
with ones foresight or expectation or that which under the circumstances is
expected by the person to whom it happens.

The exclusion of an intentional or designed act which exclusion refines the

definition of accident that we find applicable to the provisions of the implementing
rules of the law is specifically provided for in Article 172 of the law, Presidential
Decree No. 626. Thus:

Art. 172. Limitation of liability The State Insurance Fund shall be liable for
compensation to the employee or his dependents, except when the disability or
death was occasioned by the employees intoxication, willful intention to injure or
kill himself or another, notorious negligence or otherwise provided under this
title. (Underscoring supplied)

The factual foundation of respondents claim is that on the day following Sgt.
Angels detention for investigation of his alleged involvement in a
pilferage/gunrunning case, his lifeless body was found hanging inside his cell with
an electric cord tied around his neck. The autopsy report stated that the cause of
death as asphyxia by strangulation.

With the law upon the facts, we conclude that the death of Sgt. Angel did not result
from an accident which is compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626. It was
on the contrary occasioned by an intentional or designed act which removes the
resulting death from the coverage of the State Insurance Fund. It is unexpected that
the discussion below by the GSIS, the ECC and the Court of Appeals, veered away
from the indispensible antecedent that the death must be caused by accident and,
instead, focused on the requirement that the death must arise out of or in the course
of employment. Such that, the ECC denied compensability because:
 Clearly the deceased was not performing his official duties at the time of
the incident. On the contrary, he was being investigated regarding his alleged
involvement on a pilferage/gunrunning case when he was found dead in his cell,
an activity which is foreign and unrelated to his employment as a soldier. Thus,
the protective mantle of the law cannot be extended to him as the documents
appear bereft of any showing to justify causal connection between his death and
his employment.[16]

Led into a confined debate, the Court of Appeals merely met the ECCs reasons and
said that even during the investigation, Sgt. Angel was still in the performance of
his duties.The Court of Appeals alluded to the ruling that a soldier is on active duty
status 24-hours a day and concluded that the ECC should not have ignored the
official findings of the military that the deceased sergeant died while in the
performance of his duties.

We should undo the reversal by the Court of Appeals of the ECC ruling.

1. The finding of the military authorities that Sgt. Angel died while in the line of
duty is not binding on the ECC. This is not a new ECC doctrine. Apropos is the
case of Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,[17] even if the
case concerns the PNP and not the AFP. Thus:

x x x the proceedings before the PNP Board and the ECC are separate and
distinct, treating of two (2) totally different subjects; moreover, the PNP Boards
conclusions here may not be used as basis to find that private respondent is
entitled to compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended. The presumption
afforded by the Order relied upon by the PNP Board concerns itself merely with
the query as to whether one died in the line of duty, while P.D. No. 626 addressed
the issue of whether a causal relation existed between a claimants ailment and his
working conditions.Plainly, these are different issues calling for differing forms of
proof or evidence, thus accounting for the existence of a favorable presumption in
favor of a claimant under the Defense Department Order, but not under P.D. No.
626 when the disease is not listed under Annex A of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.

Paraphrasing the above ruling, we find that the proceedings before the Philippine
Army which finally resulted in the issuance by the Chief of Staff of General Order
No. 270 that the death of Sgt. Angel was in line of duty status may not be used as
basis for the finding that the widow of Sgt. Angel is entitled to compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Death in line of duty is not equivalent to
a finding that the death resulted from an accident and was not occasioned by the
sergeants willful intention to kill himself. It is not enough, as erroneously pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, that there is evidence to support the conclusion that
the sergeant died while in the performance of his duties since he was not arrested
but was merely invited to shed light on the investigation which was part of xxx
official duties to cooperate with the inquiry being conducted by the Philippine
Army. There must be evidence that the sergeant did not take his own life
considering the fact that he was found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord
tied around his neck.
2. The scene and setting of apparent suicide was contested by herein respondent,
wife of the sergeant through a complaint before the PNP Criminal Investigation
Command alleging that her husband was murdered and named the elements of
Intelligence Service Group led by Capt. Lamerez as suspects. The alleged murder
vis--vis the apparent suicide is precisely the determinant of compensability, with
death in line of duty as a given factor. The sergeant was fetched from his post for
investigation and he died in a detention cell while awaiting further
investigation. The findings regarding his death provided by the Provost Marshall
and the Inspector General are conflicting. The former found it incredible that the
deceased would take his life in view of his impending retirement and being a father
to four children and concluded that foul play may have been committed. The latter
held that there was no evidence suggesting foul play maintaining that the detention
of Sgt. Angel could have triggered a mental block that caused him to hang
himself. The conflict was not resolved by subsequent official actions. The Judge
Advocate General recommended that Sgt. Angel be declared to have died while in
line of duty which declaration was done by the Chief of Staff of the Philippine
Army. Noticeably, the declaration went no further than state that Sgt. Angel died
on March 3, 1998 at ISG, FortBonifacio, Makati. There was no mention about the
cause of death. There was nothing in the declaration that would resolve the
contradiction between the conclusion of foul play reached by the Provost Marshall
and the finding of the Inspector General that there is no evidence suggesting foul
play. The senior officers merely declared the fact that death occurred
inside Fort Bonifacio.

From what is extant in the records, though, we rule in favor of the positive finding
that there is no evidence of foul play over the inference that foul play may have
been committed. The circumstances of Sgt. Angels death his lifeless body was
found hanging inside his cell with an electric cord tied around his neck − taken
together with the unrebutted finding that there is no evidence of foul play negate
respondents claim of murder of her husband and of compensability of such
death. It was not accidental death that is covered by Presidential Decree No. 626.
 3. We are not unmindful of the fact that liberality of the law in favor of the
working man and woman prevails in light of the Constitution and social
justice.[18] But, as stated in Government Service Insurance System v. Court of
Appeals, it is now the trust fund and not the employer which suffers if benefits are
paid to claimants who are not entitled under the law. There is now an intention to
restore a sensible equilibrium between the employers obligation to pay workmens
compensation and the employees right to receive separation for work connected
death or disability.[19]

There is a competing, yet equally vital interest to heed in passing upon

undeserving claims for compensation. It is well to remember that if diseases or
death not intended by the law to be compensated are inadvertently or recklessly
included, the integrity of the State Insurance Fund is endangered. Compassion for
the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater
concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their
families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and
deaths occur.[20]

This Court sympathizes with the sad predicament of respondent, the widow
of Sgt. Angel. Such, however has already been considered in fixing the equilibrium
between obligation and right in employees compensation cases. It can no longer tilt
the balance in respondents favor.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated 13 April 2000 of
the Employees Compensation Commission is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

SE PORTUGAL PEREZ
ociate Justice
 CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

RESITA J. LEONARDO DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

ociate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

test that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

TONIO T. CARPIO
ociate Justice
airperson
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I cer
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
ter of the opinion of the Courts Division.

NATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
* Per Special Order No. 1006.
** Per Special Order No. 1040.
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Penned by Presiding Justice Cancio C. Garcia (former Supreme Court Associate Justice) with Associate Justices
Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of this Court), concurring. Rollo, pp. 57-63.
[3]
Dated 13 April 2000.
[4]
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[5]
Id. at 59.
[6]
Id. at 60.
[7]
Decision of the ECC. Id. at 70-71.
[8]
Decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. at 61.
[9]
Id. at 63.
[10]
Id. at 61.
[11]
Id. at 62.
[12]
Nitura v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 89217, 4 September 1991, 201 SCRA 278, 284.
[13]
ECC Resolution No. 2799, 25 July 1984.
[14]
Government Service Insurance System v. Mecayer, G.R. No. 156182, 13 April 2007, 521 SCRA 100, 108.
[15]
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92383, 17 July 1992, 211 SCRA 554, 556 citing 43
Am. Jur. 2d 267.
[16]
Rollo, pp. 70-71.
[17]
G.R. No. 128523, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 514, 534-535.
[18]
Id. at 531 citing Employees Compensation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121545, 14 November
1996, 264 SCRA 248, 256.
[19]
Id. citing Tria v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 96787, 8 May 1992, 280 SCRA 834, 841-842.
[20]
Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17; Raro v. Employees' Compensation
Commission, G.R. No