Perspectives on Political Science, 44:18–25, 2015

Copyright C Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1045-7097 print / 1930-5478 online
DOI: 10.1080/10457097.2014.921489

Theory and Akrasia in Aristotle’s

Ethics
ANN WARD

Abstract: In book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle Like self-restraint, akrasia, or the lack of self-restraint, in-
argues that vice, lack of self-restraint (akrasia), and brutish- volves the experience of excessive and idiosyncratic desires.
ness are to be avoided. While the opposite of vice is virtue, the Unlike the self-restrained, however, those lacking in self-
opposite of akrasia is self-restraint, and of brutishness a form restraint give in to these desires; the unrestrained person
of divinity. This article explores Aristotle’s analysis of self- knows the good but does the opposite nonetheless. Aristo-
restraint and its lack, akrasia, focusing on the phenomenon tle discusses various possible causes of akrasia. One is the
of akrasia and its causes. Self-restraint is the experience of overpowering of reason by desire common among the young
excessive and idiosyncratic desires that are nevertheless re- who lack habituation to virtue. Another cause is the effemi-
sisted. Like self-restraint, akrasia, or lack of self-restraint, nacy or softness characteristic of women and womanly men.
involves the experience of excessive and idiosyncratic de- I argue, however, that the most interesting cause of akrasia
sires. However, those lacking in self-restraint give in to these in Aristotle’s account is theoretical thinking. The relation-
desires; the unrestrained person knows the good but does ship between theory and akrasia makes akrasia an important
the opposite nonetheless. Possible causes of akrasia are the subject of study in Aristotle’s ethical theory.
overpowering of reason by desire among the young and the In her recent book Aristotle’s Dialogue with Socrates: On
effeminacy of some women and womanly men. This article the Nicomachean Ethics, Ronna Burger argues that book 7 of
argues, however, that the most interesting cause of akrasia the Ethics is a descent from the height of the preceding dis-
in Aristotle’s account is theoretical thinking. cussion of philosophy in book 6, much like the philosopher’s
descent back into the cave in book 7 of Plato’s Republic
Keywords: Aristotle, self-restraint, lack of self-restraint, (Burger 2008, 132). Yet book 7 of the Ethics, according to
prudence, theoretical, Eudoxus Burger, also represents the discovery of nature and contains
Aristotle’s endorsement of the Socratic teaching that virtue is
knowledge (Burger 2008, 134, 136−37, 151). In accord with

I
n book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle ar-
this teaching, Aristotle argues that Socrates “used to battle
gues that three character traits are to be avoided by
against this argument in its entirety [that a person may know
the morally serious person: vice, lack of self-restraint
what is right but do what is wrong], on the grounds that no
(akrasia), and brutishness. While the opposite of vice
such thing as lack of self-restraint [akrasia] exists: nobody
is virtue, the opposite of akrasia is self-restraint, and
acts contrary to what is best while supposing that he is so act-
of brutishness a form of divinity. This article explores
ing; he acts instead through ignorance” (NE 1145b25−27).1
Aristotle’s analysis of self-restraint and its lack, akrasia, fo-
Burger argues that a careful reading of Aristotle’s analysis
cusing on the phenomenon of akrasia and its causes.
of the causes of lack of self-restraint shows that he does not
Self-restraint is the experience of excessive and idiosyn-
in fact refute this Socratic position but rather reaffirms it;
cratic desires that are nevertheless resisted; the self-restrained
knowledge in the “strict” or authoritative sense, that which is
person knows the good and masters their desires accordingly.
derived from the intellectual virtue of prudence, is never over-
come in akrasia (Burger 2008, 142, 151; also see Bartlett and
Ann Ward is an Associate Professor in the Departments of Collins 2011, 285−86; Destree 2007, 141−42, 147; Broadie
Philosophy and Politics & International Studies, Campion 2002, 392−93; Bostock 2000, 124−25, 130; Reeve 1992,
College, University of Regina. 41−42; Urmson 1988, 90, 94; and Wiggins 1980, 247−48,
18
January–March 2015, Volume 44, Number 1 19

250). Moreover, Burger points out that for knowledge in the not intellectual; the person does what is wrong “in the pres-
secondary, nonauthoritative sense, that which Aristotle says ence of full knowledge” of what is right (Henry 2002, 261;
has not grown to be part of us but which is mouthed much also see McDowell 1980, 361). Despite possessing prudence
as an actor speaks his lines, neither is this overcome in akra- the genuinely akratic individual, in other words, acts on their
sia (NE 1147a23). Rather, at the moment we are acting with imprudent desire for base pleasures (also see Rorty 1980,
lack of self-restraint, according to Aristotle, we are acting 274−75). However, to understand the reason why the gen-
in a temporary ignorance much like persons who are asleep, uinely akratic individual acts against their prudential knowl-
mad, or drunk (NE 1147a17, 1147b6−7) (Burger 2008, 138). edge of right and wrong, we must, Henry argues, look beyond
Thus, only when we temporarily lose our knowledge of what book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics to Aristotle’s theory of
is right do we do what is wrong. proper pleasures in book 10 and his treatment of akrasia
Aristide Tessitore, in Reading Aristotle’s Ethics: Virtue, in the Eudemian Ethics. Considering these two sources to-
Rhetoric, and Political Philosophy, like Burger argues that gether, Henry concludes that for Aristotle genuine akrasia
book 7 is a descent. In Tessitore’s view, it is a descent from can occur when a person’s knowledge of virtue, specifically
the height of the discussion of ethical virtue to the lower the virtue of moderation, is not supplemented by the expe-
but more accessible target of self-restraint (Tessitore 1996, rience of or desire for the proper pleasure that accompanies
52). Tessitore also agrees that in Aristotle’s account the unre- the activity of this virtue (also see Charles 2007, 205−07).
strained person does not act against what they actually know Unlike Burger and Tessitore, I argue that book 7 of the
to be right but rather acts in ignorance of knowledge that is Nicomachean Ethics is a natural progression from the discus-
possessed in potential only (Tessitore 1996, 56). Thus, in Tes- sion of the intellectual virtues in book 6 rather than a descent.
sitore’s view Aristotle does not refute Socrates in the strict The phenomenon of self-restraint but especially of akrasia or
sense but rather vindicates his claim concerning the unas- the lack of self-restraint, I argue, arises after the emergence
sailable character of a certain kind of knowledge resembling of theoretical thinking because, as Aristotle suggests, this
prudence (Tessitore 1996, 57). Nevertheless, according to intellectual activity can be a cause of this problematic moral
Tessitore Aristotle preserves the phenomenon of akrasia by condition. Moreover, although I agree that in the lack of self-
focusing on the overcoming of knowledge in the secondary restraint caused by uncontrollable passion it is not prudence
sense, largely through habit that forms an unrestrained char- but rather knowledge in some secondary sense that is over-
acter (Tessitore 1996, 57, 60). come, I argue that when theoretical thinking is acting as cause
Leah Bradshaw argues, like Burger and Tessitore, that it is precisely prudence that is overcome in akrasia. Thus, al-
those lacking in self-restraint in Aristotle’s view are inca- though passion or desire on its own may never overwhelm
pable of the intellectual virtue of prudence (Bradshaw 1991, prudence as Burger, Tessitore, and Bradshaw maintain, I ar-
564). Yet Bradshaw points out that the condition of akrasia gue that perhaps when liberated by theoretical thinking it
described by Aristotle in book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics can. Therefore, like Henry, I believe that despite what may
resembles the condition of women described in book 1 of appear to be an initial agreement with Socrates, Aristotle ac-
the Politics (Bradshaw 1991, 566). In the Politics, Aristo- tually critiques and progresses beyond the Socratic denial of
tle claims that women are to be ruled by men in a politi- the genuine possibility of akrasia. Henry argues, however,
cal fashion—as equals—because women possess the delib- that we must look beyond book 7 of the Nicomachean Ethics
erative faculty (Pol 1259a40).2 Yet rule is not to alternate to discover Aristotle’s understanding of genuine akrasia. I
between men and women but remain permanently in men argue, on the other hand, that the position of genuine akra-
because women’s deliberative faculty “lacks authority” (Pol sia comes to the surface within book 7 in the discussion of
1260a12−13) (Bradshaw 1991, 564). Thus, deliberating cor- the syllogism, especially when this is considered in light of
rectly but apparently lacking authority over their own pas- Aristotle’s discussion of the intellectual virtues of prudence
sions, women, like the unrestrained, must be ruled by others and philosophy in book 6. Yet I agree that book 10, and in
(Bradshaw 1991, 566). Bradshaw concludes, however, that particular Aristotle’s treatment of the case of Eudoxus, which
nothing in Aristotle’s corpus shows that he viewed women’s I discuss at the end of the article, helps us to see Aristotle’s
lack of self-restraint as natural or biological rather than cul- concept of genuine akrasia.
tural (Bradshaw 1991, 572). The focus of this article, moreover, is not the weakness of
In an alternative reading of Aristotle’s treatment of akra- women, as it is for Bradshaw, but the potential philosopher. In
sia, Devin Henry argues that Aristotle does in fact critique suggesting that lack of self-restraint is something that besets
and advance on Socrates’ position toward the knowledge of the beginning student of philosophy, I share an insight similar
virtue. According to Henry, Aristotle’s concept of akrasia to Henry’s that genuine lack of self-restraint can be traced to
can be divided into two forms: “drunk akrasia” and “gen- an incomplete education in the proper pleasures.
uine akrasia” (Henry 2002, 260−61). Drunk akrasia, much According to Aristotle, self-restraint and lack of self-
like Burger’s, Tessitore’s, and Bradshaw’s understanding of restraint operate in the same situations as virtue and vice (NE
akrasia, occurs when a person, “intoxicated” by the desire for 1146b20, 1148a6−11, 1148b10−12). He nevertheless distin-
physical pleasures, temporarily fails to exercise their knowl- guishes these phenomena and against the backdrop of moral
edge of what is right and thus acts on the desire to do wrong; virtue and vice, self-restraint and its absence are brought to
they suffer from a “culpable ignorance induced by passion” light. We thus begin with a brief overview of moral virtue
(Henry 2002, 260−61). In genuine akrasia, the problem is and vice before returning to self-restraint and its lack.
20 Perspectives on Political Science

MORAL VIRTUE AND VICE SELF-RESTRAINT AND AKRASIA

In book 2 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle defines Self-restraint, Aristotle argues, arises in the same sit-
moral virtue as an activity of the soul in accordance with uations as the virtue of moderation (NE 1146b17−21,
reason that determines the mean between excess and de- 1148b11−12). Yet self-restraint is a different phenomenon
ficiency (NE 1106b35−1107a1). Virtue is an internal mo- than moderation. The self-restrained person has excessive
tion of the soul that culminates in an external action of and idiosyncratic desires for bodily pleasures but resists and
the body, and actions, internal and external, that “hit” the then masters them; they know that their desires are “wrong”
mean, as it were, are virtues, excesses and deficiencies are or that indulgence in them is a vice (NE 1145b10−11,
vices (but see Hursthouse 2006, 101−08). For instance, 1146a9−14). Although the desires of the self-restrained per-
Aristotle presents the virtue of courage understood as a son go beyond the mean, their reason does not, and it is to
mean in the following way. In the external circumstance reason that the soul, as it were, remains firm. The moderate
of danger in battle the passion of fear is aroused in the person, on the other hand, does not have excessive and id-
soul (NE 1115a25−30). If the soul is disposed to give in iosyncratic desires to begin with (NE 1146a11). Rather, their
to this feeling of fear, it suffers from an excess of fear, desires pursue what reason has determined are the right and
which leads to the vice of cowardice (NE 1107b4). On good things, such as a moderate amount of food and drink
the other hand, if the soul is disposed to suppress or ig- and a moderate amount of sexual pleasure (see Pangle 2013,
nore these feelings of fear, it suffers from a deficiency of 15–16). Thus, according to Aristotle, “the [self-restrained]
fear, which leads to the vice of recklessness (NE 1107b3, person has, and the [moderate person] does not have, base
1116b34−1117a1). If the soul, guided by reason to the desires; and the [moderate person] is such as not to feel plea-
mean, is disposed to feel not too much fear nor too lit- sure contrary to reason, the self-restrained such as to feel the
tle fear but rather the median amount, this leads to the pleasure but not to be led by it” (NE 1152a1−3).
virtue of courage (NE 1107a35). Reason determines the Examples of self-restrained persons would be people who
mean and then guides the passions to it, which is then quit smoking or stop eating sweets in contrast to moder-
followed by an external action of the body (NE 1138b ate people who never smoked or who prefer vegetables to
21−25). cake. Again, Aristotle would suggest that a person who de-
Aristotle identifies and discusses eleven moral virtues sires to commit adultery but resists and keeps their vows to
and their corresponding vices in books 2−5 of the Ethics: their spouse is self-restrained, whereas a moderate person is
courage, moderation, generosity, magnificence, magnanim- someone who desires their spouse and never another. These
ity, ambition, gentleness, friendliness, truthfulness, wittiness, examples illustrate that for Aristotle, whereas self-restrained
and justice. Of special significance for us is the virtue of persons resist and then master desires because they know
moderation, as Aristotle illuminates self-restraint and lack they are “wrong,” moderate and morally virtuous persons
of self-restraint in the unqualified sense against the back- can pursue and enjoy their desires because they are “right” to
ground of this specific virtue and its corresponding vice. begin with. Thus, Aristotle indicates that self-restraint is not
According to Aristotle, “only that which is concerned with a virtue; it is a condition inferior to the virtue of moderation.
the same things as are moderation and licentiousness should Just as self-restraint operates in the same sphere as the
be supposed to be lack of self-restraint and self-restraint” virtue of moderation, lack of self-restraint operates in the
(NE 1148b11−12). same sphere as the vice of licentiousness (NE 1146b17−21,
Moderation is the mean in the desire for pleasure. To feel 1148b11−12). Moreover, as self-restraint, despite being sim-
and act on an excess of the desire for pleasure is the vice of ilar, also differs from moderation, so lack of self-restraint
licentiousness, and, in very rare instances, to feel and act on differs from licentiousness in the following way. The person
a deficiency of the desire for pleasure is the vice of insen- lacking in self-restraint, according to Aristotle, has exces-
sitivity (NE 1107b5−8). Moderation, Aristotle argues, deals sive and idiosyncratic desires for bodily pleasures and gives
specifically with the physical or bodily pleasures of taste in to them. Yet they “know” they shouldn’t, that their desires
and touch, and of touch it concerns only the sexual parts of are “wrong” or will lead to vice (NE 1145b10−14). Thus,
the body (NE 1118a25−1118b7). Moreover, Aristotle further unlike the soul of a self-restrained person, which remains
subdivides these pleasures of taste and touch into two kinds: firm with reason, the soul of the unrestrained person follows
the universal or “natural” kind, such as the desire for food their desires beyond what their reason has determined is the
when hungry and for sexual pleasure when “young and in the mean. The licentious person, like the unrestrained, has ex-
bloom of youth,” and the idiosyncratic kind or those desires cessive and idiosyncratic desires for pleasure and gives in
particular to the individual (NE 1118b8−14). Moderation is to them. Yet, unlike the unrestrained, they are unaware that
understood as achieving the mean in the universal bodily such pleasures should not be indulged (NE 1146b22−24).
pleasures, but it is an extreme in the idiosyncratic pleasures; Thus, whereas those lacking self-restraint “know” that what
the moderate person, according to Aristotle, neither desires they are doing is wrong, the licentious think that what they
nor enjoys any of them (NE 1119a11−18). Licentiousness, are doing is right. The lack of self-restraint, therefore, in-
on the other hand, is an excessive desire for and indulgence volves acting against what one would rationally choose to do,
in both the universal and the idiosyncratic pleasures (NE whereas the licentious act according to choice (NE 1146b22,
1118b21−27). 1148a6−10, 1151a5−10). Aristotle thus suggests that lack
January–March 2015, Volume 44, Number 1 21

of self-restraint is not, in the strict sense, a vice, and that desires in similar situations? If they both “know” equally,
licentiousness is worse. why does the “knowledge” of the unrestrained temporarily
Lack of self-restraint also differs from self-restraint in go into disuse when experiencing intense passion, whereas
the following way. Both self-restrained and unrestrained per- the “knowledge” of the self-restrained does not?
sons have excessive and idiosyncratic desires, and both know Aristotle suggests that those lacking in self-restraint are
that such desires should not be indulged. Yet it is the self- usually young persons who lack the habituation to virtue that
restrained person who resists and then masters these desires, brings the passions of the soul under the internal control of
whereas the unrestrained person gives in and pursues them. reason. According to Aristotle, like sleepy, mad, or drunk per-
Lack of self-restraint thus seems to be a condition in between sons who can “state [geometrical] demonstrations and verses
self-restraint and licentiousness. Like the self-restrained, the of Empedocles” and like an actor speaking their lines, “those
unrestrained person “knows” that their desires are wrong, but who are first learning will put together arguments but not yet
like the licentious they nevertheless give them free reign. understand them” (NE 1147a19−21). A young person, there-
If the unrestrained person “knows” that their desires are fore, can repeat the formulas of moral knowledge that they
wrong, but like the licentious they nevertheless give them free do not yet feel (NE 1147a23). Rather, to retain knowledge
reign, is lack of self-restraint in fact a plausible condition? when in the grip of strong passions, Aristotle asserts that the
Can a person really “know” that what they are doing is wrong formulas “must grow naturally into knowledge, and that re-
but do it anyway, despite their wish to do what is right? quires time” (NE 1147a22). Avoiding lack of self-restraint,
Why don’t they resist like the self-restrained person, or in therefore, requires that we take moral knowledge into our
the end rationalize their behavior such that they actually souls and let it become part of our character. This internal-
think that what they are doing is right, like the licentious ization process the young have not yet had time to complete
person? The plausibility of lack of self-restraint as a condition (also see Henry 2002, 266, and Charles 2007, 206).
is of interest because, in his analysis of it, Aristotle seems The lack of self-restraint characteristic of the young whose
to contradict Socrates’ famous teaching that “knowledge is knowledge temporarily goes into disuse in the face of intense
virtue.” Aristotle acknowledges that Socrates does not think passions is related to albeit distinct from “brutishness.” An-
that lack of self-restraint exists, arguing that if a person knew other undesirable condition that Aristotle discusses in book
an action was bad they would not do it (NE 1145b25−27). 7, brutishness results from an excess of vice so that the
All vice and improper behavior, Socrates suggests, is the vicious person descends into a state less than human (NE
result of ignorance. To shed light on the plausibility of lack 1145a31−32; 1149a5−9). Aristotle discusses various causes
of self-restraint as a condition, we need to consider what of brutishness but focuses on the disruption of character re-
Aristotle thinks are its causes and in what sense he thinks a sulting from “madness” or “disease(s)” such as epilepsy, both
person “knows” what they are doing is wrong. of which, like the intensity of passion involved in lack of self-
restraint, causes one to “lose one’s mind,” as it were.3 Yet
CAUSES OF AKRASIA brutishness is distinguished from lack of self-restraint in the
pleasures that it pursues. According to Aristotle, although the
The first cause of akrasia or lack of self-restraint that is lack of self-restraint concerns the natural pleasures, brutish-
discussed is the intensity of the passions. Aristotle argues that ness concerns those that are unnatural. To illustrate the brutal
if the passions become so intense such that they overpower as opposed to the akratic condition, Aristotle focuses on the
or overrule reason, lack of self-restraint results. According to unnatural pleasure taken in eating human flesh (see Natali
Aristotle, “outbursts of spiritedness, the sexual desires, and 2009, 108). Thus, as examples of brutishness, Aristotle of-
certain other such things clearly bring about a change in the fers the following:
body [. . .], and in some people they even cause madness. It
(T)he human female who, they say, rips open pregnant
is clear, then, that those lacking self-restraint must be said to women and devours human infants; or the sorts of things
be in a state similar to [. . .] people asleep, mad, or drunk” that, people assert, certain savages living around the Black
(NE 1147a15−18). If we are like sleepy, mad, or drunk per- Sea enjoy, some of whom enjoy raw meat, others human
sons when acting in the grip of passion, and thus suffering flesh, and still others trade their children with one another
a temporary “loss of mind,” as it were, we are not actually to feast on them [. . .] the man who made a sacrifice of his
mother and ate of her, and the person who ate the liver of
acting in the presence of knowledge but rather in moments of his fellow slave (NE 1148b20−27).
temporary ignorance (NE 1147b6). Aristotle thus indicates
that at the moment one acts in an unrestrained fashion due to Cannibalism, as Aristotle suggests in the above passage, is
the intensity of passion, one’s knowledge or what Aristotle “beyond the pale,” as it were, and the person who delights in
calls one’s “active” knowledge is not in “use”; it has been such unnatural pleasure falls below what is human.
overpowered by passion (NE 1146b30−35). Returning to the lack of self-restraint, if it involves the
This explanation of the cause of the lack of self-restraint, temporary forgetting of one’s knowledge when overcome by
however, does not appear to explain the difference between desire in an act that lacks restraint, it would seem that Aris-
those lacking in self-restraint and the self-restrained person totle’s account of the lack of self-restraint does not in fact
(see Henry 2002, 263−66). The self-restrained have intense contradict Socrates’ teaching that no one voluntarily does
passions and desires, but they can resist and master them what they “know” to be wrong. Virtue does in fact seem to
when they “know” such passions and desires are wrong. Why be knowledge, and, as Aristotle asserts, “it seems [. . .] that
can’t those lacking in self-restraint resist and master their what Socrates was seeking turns out to be the case. For it is
22 Perspectives on Political Science

not when [knowledge] in the authoritative sense is present or the passion to avoid pain, but rather only knowledge in
that the experience of the lack of self-restraint occurs” (NE a secondary sense, that which is external, as it were, and
1147b14−15). Thus, it is only knowledge in a secondary has not become part of the soul. Aristotle, however, also
sense, knowledge that is still external and not internal to raises another possible cause of the lack of self-restraint that
the soul, which is overcome by passion in the lack of self- again has to do with the precise way in which knowledge
restraint. Yet, what does Aristotle regard as knowledge in the is present in the soul. To understand this cause of the lack
“strict sense,” the type of knowledge that is impervious to of self-restraint we must briefly return to Aristotle’s discus-
passion and that leads him to this apparently Socratic posi- sion of the intellectual virtues in book 6 of the Nicomachean
tion? Aristotle initially suggests that such knowledge flows Ethics.
from the intellectual virtue of prudence. According to Aris- In books 2−5 of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle dis-
totle, “This contention [that it is prudence that resists the cusses the moral virtues understood as means between excess
appetite] is strange. For the same person will be simultane- and deficiency. Book 6 is the beginning of Aristotle’s analy-
ously prudent and lacking self-restraint, and not one person sis of the intellectual virtues. To better illustrate the nature of
would assert that it belongs to a prudent human being to the various intellectual virtues, Aristotle begins by dividing
do voluntarily the basest things” (NE 1146a4−8). Aristotle the rational part of the soul into two parts: the calculative
therefore indicates that those lacking self-restraint lack the part and the scientific or theoretical part. Calculative rea-
virtue of prudence (see Burger 2008, 139; Tessitore 1996, son apprehends things that “admit of being otherwise” (NE
56; Bradshaw 1991, 566; and Hardie 1968, 269−71).4 1139a9). The objects of calculative thinking, therefore, are
Not only youth but also effeminate men, Aristotle sug- the changing particulars or the changing realities. Theoreti-
gests, lack prudence. The absence of prudence and lack of cal reason, on the other hand, apprehends things that “do not
self-restraint arising from effeminacy, however, is slightly admit of being otherwise” (NE 1139a7−8). The objects of
different from that which arises from the passions of youth. theoretical thinking, therefore, are the unchanging realities
Although the young may be unable to do what they “know” is or universals. According to Aristotle, both parts of reason
right because they cannot endure the desire for pleasure, the look for “truth” but in different ways. For calculative reason
effeminate cannot do what they “know” is right because they in its prudential form truth has an ethical dimension; it seeks
cannot endure the pains that most people can (NE 1150b1−2, to discover what is good and bad for the human being (NE
11−12). Such men, according to Aristotle, suffer from soft- 1139a21−28; 1140b4−5). For theoretical reason the objects
ness usually more characteristic of women than men (NE of study are the true and the false simply both within and be-
1150b15). Signs of softness in men are “let[ting] [one’s] yond the human realm (NE 1139a28−30; 1141a21). These
cloak drag, so that [one] not suffer the pain of lifting it up,” two types of thinking, Aristotle argues, give rise to five intel-
and a man who “though he imitates someone sickly, does not lectual virtues. Calculative thinking grounds the virtues of art
suppose that he himself is wretched, similar though he is to and prudence, and theoretical thinking grounds the virtues
the wretched” (NE 1150b3−5). In other words, men who are of science, intelligence, and wisdom (sophia). We will fo-
soft tend to allow a general messiness or unkemptness about cus on prudence and wisdom as described by Aristotle in
their person and will feign sickness to avoid arduous tasks book 6.
and situations. Aristotle defines prudence as deliberating well about what
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle attributes lack of self- is good and bad for human beings (NE 1140b4−5). The end
restraint to effeminate or womanly men, but in the Poli- of such deliberations can be the good and bad for ourselves as
tics, as Bradshaw argues, he seems to attribute it to women individuals, and for our families and cities, the good and the
themselves (Bradshaw 1991, 566−67, 570). In the context bad for us understood collectively (NE 1140b9−10). Aristo-
of explaining why the virtues of men and women differ so tle thus closely associates prudence with the “political art”
that men’s virtues are “ruling” virtues and women’s virtues (NE 1141b24). Political expertise includes the art of legisla-
are “serving” virtues, Aristotle claims that women’s “de- tion, in which the legislator prescribes the virtues, and acting
liberative” faculty “lacks authority” (Pol. 1260a12, 19−25). where the law is silent by issuing decrees and exercising
Understood to mean that a woman’s reason lacks authority equity (NE 1141b25−28, 1147b19−23). Prudence, in Aris-
within her own soul, it seems to suggest that for Aristotle totle’s account, is thus concerned with the moral virtues. The
women cannot control their passions to do what they may lawmaker, exercising prudence, prescribes the moral virtues
know to be right, a condition similar to lack of self-restraint. for the citizens, and it is also an internal source of moral
virtue for the person who possesses it (NE 1144a13−19).
PRUDENCE AND WISDOM Prudence, therefore, is that part of reason that determines the
mean between excess and deficiency, thus allowing for and
Thus far we have discussed two causes of the lack of bringing the moral virtues into being.
self-restraint: (1) the inability to resist the desire for plea- In contrast to prudence, which deliberates about the good
sure that Aristotle suggests is characteristic of the young and and bad for human beings, wisdom, as presented by Aristotle
(2) the inability to endure the onslaught of pain apparently in book 6, studies the true and the false, what is and is not.
characteristic of women and womanly men. Moreover, in Aristotle initially describes wisdom in two ways. First, it is
such cases of lack of self-restraint Aristotle indicates that defined as the combination of intellect and science, and thus
it is not knowledge in the “strict sense,” that which flows as the ability to directly apprehend universal principles (intel-
from prudence, which is overcome by the desire for pleasure lect) and the knowledge that flows from them (science) (NE
January–March 2015, Volume 44, Number 1 23

1141a19). Aristotle then characterizes wisdom, personified minor premise: “This apple before me is sweet”; conclusion:
in the pre-Socratic philosophers Thales and Anaxagoras, as “I will taste this apple.” The action following upon the con-
knowledge of things higher than human (NE 1141a21). Ex- clusion of this second syllogism would be an instance of
amples of such things are constituent parts of the universe, lack of self-restraint, or doing what one knows to be wrong
such as sun, moon, stars, earth, air, fire and water, and such according to the major premise of the first syllogism. The
things as “white” and “straight.” According to Aristotle, “If conclusion, however, to the second syllogism flows from the
[. . .] what is healthful and good is different for human beings universal reality in its major premise.
and for fish, but what is white and straight is always the same, Considering these two syllogisms, especially their major
all would say that what is wise is the same thing but that what premises, it seems clear that Aristotle means to suggest that
is prudent differs” (NE 1141a23−25). Aristotle thus suggests lack of self-restraint flows from a certain way of thinking
that because the good and healthy for human beings is dis- or type of knowledge that, liberating the desires, propels
tinct from what it is for fishes, it is the concern of prudence, persons to act against what they know to be morally right.
whereas because the white and the straight are the same for The knowledge that “sweet things should not be tasted,” the
persons and fishes—they are universal realities—they are major premise of the first syllogism, is knowledge of good
the concern of wisdom (see Burger 2008, 213; but see Reeve and bad, right and wrong for human beings, which flows from
1992, 74, 79).5 prudence grounded in calculative thinking. It is not this type
The implication of this presentation of wisdom is the of knowledge that causes us to act against what we know to
suggestion that, apparently unconcerned with the good and be right, as it is the source of our knowledge of right. The
the bad for human beings, it is unconcerned with moral knowledge that “every sweet thing is pleasant,” the major
virtue. Wisdom, an intellectual virtue, thus appears to be premise of the second syllogism, is of a different order. This
morally neutral, and Aristotle has raised the possibility of an is knowledge of true and false or what is and is not without
intellectual realm above or at least different from the moral regard to good and bad, right and wrong. The moral fact that
realm (see Burger 2008, 214; but see Reeve 1992, 86, 89). we should not taste of sweet things does not make it any less
true or real that if we did taste of such things we would feel
THEORY AND AKRASIA pleasure or our taste buds would be excited. Thus, this type
of knowledge can cause us to go against what we know to be
Returning to akrasia and its causes in book 7 of the Nico- right. However, this is precisely the type of knowledge that
machean Ethics, Aristotle explains the third cause of the Aristotle describes as flowing from theoretical thinking and
lack of self-restraint by reference to the syllogism.6 To take which constitutes “wisdom.”
an example based in book 7, if the major premise of the Prudence, Aristotle suggests, is that which grasps the mean
syllogism, incorporating a universal reality, is “one ought to or what is morally virtuous. It grasps what is good and bad,
taste everything sweet,” and the minor premise, incorporat- right and wrong for human beings, and thus what one should
ing a particular fact, is “this [apple] here is sweet,” then the and should not do. Yet, Aristotle also suggests that a prob-
conclusion of the syllogism is “I ought to taste this apple” lem develops if theoretical thinking emerges as a possibility.
(NE 1147a28−31). Aristotle, as becomes apparent below, Theory grasps what is true and false and thus what is or is
indicates that lack of self-restraint can have its source in not regardless of whether it is morally good or bad for human
the major premise of the syllogism and thus in the type of beings. It is thus liberating in a way, because it can cause the
universal knowledge that we hold. passions and desires in the soul to “slip the leash,” as it were,
To illustrate the lack of self-restraint that may arise from put there by habit and the prudence grounded in calculative
the reasoning involved in a syllogism, Aristotle puts forward thinking. Lack of self-restraint may thus result as the desires
the example of two syllogisms, the major and minor premises surge toward what theory has just shown to be true, rather
of each being known by a single person simultaneously (see than to what prudence has determined is morally right (but
Bostock 2000, 129, 134; but see Destree 2007, 151, 154; see Hardie 1968, 282−83).
Wiggins 1980, 250; and Cooper 1975, 53−55). According to Support for the view that theoretical thinking can cause
Aristotle: a person to pursue the physical pleasures that prudence es-
chews can be found in book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics.
Whenever, then, the universal premise is present that forbids
At the beginning of book 10, before the discussion of what
us from tasting sweet things, and another universal is also
present to the effect that every sweet thing is pleasant, and Henry calls the proper pleasures, Aristotle discusses vari-
this thing here is sweet (and this premise is active), and by ous mistaken views toward pleasure, including the view of
chance the relevant desire is present in us, the one premise Eudoxus. According to Aristotle:
says to avoid this; but the desire for it leads the way, for it
is able to set in motion each of the parts [of the body]. It
turns out, as a result, that someone can come to be without
self-restraint by a reasoned account (NE 1147a31−1147b1). Eudoxus thought that the good was pleasure, because
he saw that all things aim at it—things both rational
The two syllogisms, simultaneously present to the mind of and nonrational—and that, in all cases, what is
a single person, resemble the following: (1) Major premise: choiceworthy is what is fitting, and what is especially
choiceworthy, most excellent. So the fact that all are
“Sweet things should not be tasted”; minor premise: “This borne toward the same thing, reveals, he thought,
apple before me is sweet”; conclusion: “I should not taste this that this is what is best for all [. . .]; and what is good
apple.” (2) Major premise: “Every sweet thing is pleasant”; for all and what all things aim at is the good (NE 1172b9−14).
24 Perspectives on Political Science

As the above passage illustrates, although it may seem NOTES

that Eudoxus, in arguing that pleasure is the good, advocates
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Robert C. Bartlett and Susan
what he believes is a morally choiceworthy pursuit, this is D. Collins (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). All subsequent
not actually the case. Rather, in referring to the pleasure that citations will be taken from this edition.
2. Aristotle, Politics, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago
is the end sought by both rational and nonrational creatures,
Press, 1984). All subsequent citations will be taken from this edition.
Eudoxus actually makes reference to a universal reality that 3. Other causes of brutishness Aristotle identifies are habit, “for example
exists apart from what is right and wrong for human beings. plucking out one’s hair and gnawing on one’s fingernails, or even coal and
Like the white and the straight that are the same for men and dirt,” a corrupt or innately depraved nature, and the absence of nous or the
intellectual faculty in the soul altogether (NE 1148b19, 28−29; 1150a1−6).
fishes and thus the objects of theoretical thinking in book Notice that in the last cause of brutishness—the absence of nous—Aristotle
6, physical pleasure as understood by Eudoxus is a morally claims that “it is a lesser thing than vice, even though it is more frightening”
neutral yet ultimate, perhaps natural, aim of both human and (NE 1150a1−2). It is less morally serious than vice because the human
being lacking intellect is actually rather than metaphorically a brute animal.
nonhuman. Yet for the same reason, the actions that result would be more horrifying
Aristotle indicates further that Eudoxus conceives of phys- than vicious ones.
ical pleasure as an end distinct from the goods sought by 4. This is not to suggest that self-restrained persons possess the virtue
of prudence. According to Aristotle the prudent person possesses all of the
moral virtue when he claims: moral virtues, whereas the self-restrained person does not (NE 1146a9).
Rather, it perhaps suggests that the self-restrained person is on the way to
[Eudoxus’] arguments carried conviction more because prudence.
of the virtue of his character than on their own account, 5. Aristotle here describes the natural philosophy of pre-Socratic philoso-
phers such as Anaxagoras and Thales, rather than the “human” or “political”
for he seemed to be moderate to a distinguished degree. philosophy of Plato’s Socrates (NE 1141b5; also see Burger, 213−14).
Indeed, he seemed to say these things, not because he 6. For a detailed account of Aristotle’s theory of the syllogism, see Prior
was a friend of pleasure, but rather because he thought Analytics, 24a10−26b35.
that such was the case in truth (NE 1172b15−18).

Aristotle thus suggests that although Eudoxus himself may

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