EN BANC

[G.R. No. 146865. February 18, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELGIN LATAYADA (at

large), appellant.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

When the evidence falls short of proving all the elements of carnapping with
homicide, but the killing is conclusively established, the accused may be convicted only
of homicide when the Information does not allege any qualifying circumstance.

The Case

For automatic review before this Court is the December 29, 2000 Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No.
97-917, finding Elgin Latayada guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with
homicide. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby finds
accused ELGIN LATAYADA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
CARNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE, in violation of RA 6539, known as Anti-Carnapping
Act of 1972, as amended by Sec. 20 of Republic Act 7659, and there being one generic
aggravating circumstance of treachery without any mitigating circumstances, the said
accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal
injection. He is also directed to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P18,899.70 as
hospitalization expenses, another P7,300.00 as burial expenses, P50,000.00 moral
damages and further directed to pay the cost of this proceeding. Let another Warrant of
Arrest be issued to the convict for him to serve his sentence. Pursuant to R.A. 7975 and
Rule 122, Sec. 10 of the Rules of Court, let the entire records of this case be forwarded
to the Supreme Court for automatic review.[2]

In an Information dated March 7, 1997, appellant was charged with carnapping with
homicide as follows:

That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, of October 29, 1995 at Sitio
Hanopolan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and without the consent
of the owner, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and drive
away one (1) unit Honda TMX Motorcycle, color blue, bearing plate No. 9B-6096-T, with
Serial Chassis No. 951-50025, with Motor No. KCOIE-028425 PH, Model 1995, owned
and belonging to Rodrigo Estrada, valued at P63,000.00 to his damage and prejudice
and in the course of the commission of the carnapping of the vehicle, accused with
intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one Pedro
Payla, the driver of the motorcycle, with the use of a sharp bladed weapon, thus hitting
the victim on different parts of his body causing his death thereafter.[3]

During his arraignment on September 12, 1997,[4] appellant, with the assistance of
his counsel de oficio, [5] pleaded not guilty to the charge. After trial in due course, the
court a quo rendered the assailed Decision.

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) quoted from appellants Brief
the summary of the evidence for the prosecution, which is as follows:

Sometime on October 29, 1995 at about 6:00 o clock in the evening, Pedro Payla
arrived at the house of Vicenta Cordino at Sitio Hanopolan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental.
Pedro Payla allegedly told Vicenta Dont be afraid, Nang, I am the son of Lucia Payla, I
was stabbed by Elgin Latayada, bring me to the hospital. Vicenta, who was already old,
then called her neighbor Joseph Tion for help and the latter responded. Joseph treated
the wounds of Pedro and asked what happened. Pedro allegedly told Joseph that Elgin
asked to be brought to Hanopolan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental. On their way, Elgin told
Pedro to stop because he wanted to answer the call of nature. After Elgin relieved
himself, instead of boarding at the back of the motorcycle, he stabbed Pedro and
escaped on board the motorcycle.

When a passenger jeepney passed by, Pedro was loaded and brought to Claveria
Hospital. When they passed by a police station, the conductor of the passenger jeep
reported the stabbing incident. At Claveria Hospital, Pedros wound was treated and
sutured. However, due to inadequate medical facilities at Claveria Hospital, the doctor
thereat advised Gina Payla, wife of Pedro, to bring Pedro to Cagayan de Oro. On that
same night, Pedro Payla was brought to [the] Medical Center in Cagayan De Oro City.
Pedro died on October 30, 1995.

On October 30, 1995, at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, Gina Payla, Pedros wife,
was able to converse with him. Again, Pedro pointed to appellant as his assailant and
further narrated the circumstances surrounding his stabbing.
At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, SPO1 Victorino Busalla arrived
at the hospital and then proceeded to take the ante-mortem statement of Pedro. Pedro
could not write because of his injuries; hence, he placed his thumb mark using his own
blood in lieu of his signature on the said statement. The same statement was signed by
Gina Payla who was present when the statement was taken. Pedro died on the same
day.

The motorcycle driven by Pedro with Chassis No. 951-50025, color blue, was originally
owned by Rodrigo Estrada. He later sold the same to [Kagawad Verano] Caabay for
P10,000.00. It was [Kagawad] Caabay who had an arrangement with Pedro regarding
the use of the motorcycle to transport passengers.

The motorcycle was recovered only on November 4, 1995, already cannibalized, at

Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City.

After the prosecution rested its case on June 21, 2002, appellant escaped from prison
which is evidenced by a Notice of Escape submitted to the court a quo. He has
remained at large.[6] (Citations omitted)

Version of the Defense

In its Brief, the defense averred that the accused had escaped from jail after the
presentation of the prosecutions evidence[7] and therefore failed to testify.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of carnapping with
homicide. Held as part of the res gestae were Pedro Paylas statements uttered before
his death to his wife, Gina; and to Prosecution Witnesses Joseph Tion and Vicenta
Cordino that it was appellant who had stabbed him. His Statement taken by a police
officer a day after the incident and on the same day he died, was admitted by the
court a quo as a dying declaration. It admitted these pieces of prosecution evidence as
exceptions to the hearsay rule.
The lower court also ruled that circumstantial evidence indicated that appellant was
responsible for the disappearance of the motorcycle.
Further, the RTC upheld Joseph Tions testimony that on the pretext of wanting to
answer the call of nature, the accused had asked Payla to stop the motorcycle and,
without any warning or provocation, stabbed the latter on the back. Finding treachery to
have qualified the killing, the lower court imposed on the accused the supreme penalty
of death.
Hence, this automatic review.[8]
 The Issues

In his 7-page Brief, appellant raises this lone error for our consideration:

The trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of death upon the accused-
appellant when x x x treachery was not alleged in the Information either as [a] qualifying
or as a generic aggravating circumstance.[9]

In addition to the issue raised by appellant, we find it proper to review first his
conviction for carnapping with homicide, as well as the civil liabilities imposed therefor.
Since an appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for review, it becomes the
duty of this Court to correct any error in the appealed judgment, whether it has been
assigned or not.[10]

The Courts Ruling

The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is guilty of homicide only, not carnapping
with homicide.

First Issue:
Culpability of the Accused

In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to prove two things beyond
reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the commission of the crime charged, or the presence
of all the elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the
perpetrator of the crime.[11]

Elements of Carnapping
with Homicide

The charge filed against appellant for which he was convicted -- carnapping with
homicide -- is punishable under Section 2, in relation to Section 14 of RA 6539[12] as
amended by RA 7659.[13] Under Section 2 of RA 6539, carnapping is the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latters consent; or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons; or with the use of force upon
things. On the other hand, Section 14 of the same act, as amended by RA 7659,
provides:

SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. --- Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as
this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the
motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and
eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not
more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua
to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Italics supplied)

RA 7659 introduced three amendments to the last clause of Section 14:[14] (1) the
change of the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of
rape, and (3) the change of the phrase in the commission of the carnapping to in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. [15]
The Court has held that the third amendment clarifies the intention of the law to
make the offense a special complex crime, in the same way that robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons is treated under paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).[16] Hence, the prosecution must prove not only that the
essential requisites of carnapping[17] were present; but also that it was the
original criminal design of the culprit, and that the killing was perpetrated in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.[18] In the
present case, the prosecution had the burden of proving that 1) appellant took the
motorcycle; 2) his original criminal design was carnapping; 3) he killed Payla; and
4) the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof.
It is undisputed that the motorcycle driven by Payla had been taken without his
consent on October 29, 1995, and recovered days later in a cannibalized condition. The
elements of taking and intent to gain were thus established. The prosecution also
proved it was appellant who had killed him. It failed, however, to discharge its burden of
proving the two other requisites of carnapping.

Insufficiency of Proof
of Carnapping

The trial courts finding was that there was indeed no direct evidence showing that
appellant had taken the motorcycle driven by Payla. [19] The culpability of the former was
deduced from the following pieces of circumstantial evidence: 1) the motorcycle was left
with him after Payla had run for his life; 2) as shown by the police blotter, the stabbing
and carnapping incident was immediately reported to the police; 3) the vehicle was
recovered, its parts missing, five days after the accused had been arrested on June 2,
1997 in Cugman, Cagayan de Oro City, which was only about 25 kilometers from the
scene of the crime; and 4) the accused escaped while in detention at the provincial jail,
33 days after the prosecution had rested its case.
 To be sufficient for a conviction, circumstantial evidence must prove that (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived have
been established; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[20] The pieces of circumstantial
evidence must also constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable
conclusion: that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person.[21]
The circumstantial evidence in the instant case is not sufficient to show that
appellant is guilty of carnapping. On the contrary, the records and the transcripts of
stenographic notes of the proceedings cast doubt on the correctness of the trial courts
conclusion that after stabbing Payla, he fled on board the motorcycle or was the last
person seen with it.
First, there is no mention in the purported antemortem Statement[22] of Payla or in
his statement to his wife and the other prosecution witnesses that appellant carnapped
his motorcycle. Payla merely stated that appellant had stabbed him twice in the back
and once in the face. In fact, the former did not know why he had been stabbed, as he
said in response to a query from his wife[23] and from Joseph Tion.[24] If appellant had
wanted to carnap the motorcyle, Payla would have pointed this out as the reason for the
attack. Yet, the records show that the former intended only to kill the latter. Tion testified
as follows:
PROS. B. APEPE: x x x
Q So after Pedro Payla told you that he was stabbed at the back twice by Elgin
Latayada, what else happened according to Pedro Payla, if any?
A After he was stabbed twice, he asked Elgin what is this now and Elgin Latayada
answered that [D]ont ask questions anymore, this is killing already[] and after
that, Elgin stabbed him (Pedro Payla) on his left cheek (witness pointing to
portion of his left cheek below the ear) and Pedro Payla ran away leaving his
motorcycle behind.
Q Where did Payla go x x x when he ran away?
ATTY BAGABUYO:
We object, your Honor.
COURT:
On what ground?
ATTY. BAGABUYO:
He just ran away.
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Did he tell you where he ran away to?
A Yes, your Honor, to the house of Mrs. Condino.
PROS. B. APEPE:
 Q Did he tell you where was Elgin Latayada after he ran towards the direction of
the house of Mrs. Condino?
A No, sir, Elgin Latayada followed him (P. Payla) about 30 meters from where
the motorcycle was and after that distance, I dont know anymore where
Elgin Latayada proceeded.[25]
On the other hand, Gina Payla testified in this wise:
Q When your husband told you that it was Elgin Latayada who stabbed him, did
you ask him why?
A Yes, sir, I asked my husband why x x x Elgin Latayada stabbed him and he
answered [I] do not know why he stabbed me[] and I told him maybe you
have a misunderstanding with him and he told me they have no
misunderstanding. In fact my husband and Elgin Latayada are schoolmates
before and in fact they are also barkada or friend[s]. x x x [T]hat time, Elgin
requested him to bring him to Hinopolan but my husband told him []No
Gaw, I cannot bring you there because I am going to go home[] but Elgin
insisted to bring him to that place and he will pay P30.00. [M]y husband
agreed and when they were in the isolated place just before the house of
Condino, Elgin told my husband Gaw, stop the motor because I am going to
urinate so my husband stopped the motor[cycle]. When Elgin rode at the
back of the motorcycle], Elgin tapped the back of my husband (witness
demonstrating by placing her two hands on her back just below the
shoulder) and when my husband started the motor[cy]cle, put more gas on
the engine, right there and then Elgin stabbed my husband (witness
pointing to her back right below his left shoulder) and after that he pulled
out the knife and again stabbed him (witness pointing to her back just below
her right back) and my husband said What is this Gaw, is this killing
already? and Elgin answered Yes, Gaw, accept your last moment and after
that he was about to stab my husband x x x (witness pointing to the left side
of her n[e]ck) but my husband was able to crouch and that is why he was hit
on the left cheek and he was able to run towards the house of
Condino.[26] (Italics supplied)
Second, still according to Tions testimony, appellant followed Payla for about 30
meters from where the motorcycle stood, then stabbed the latter, who then ran to
Vicenta Condinos house for help.[27] There is no evidence showing that appellant went
back to take the motorcycle; hence, there is no basis for concluding that he stole it. On
cross-examination, Tion wavered on whether it was his neighbor -- herein appellant --
whom he had seen with the motorcycle when the former tried to retrieve it. It is likewise
unclear from the testimony of Tion whether the motorcycle was already missing at the
time. He further testified thus:
ATTY. R. BAGABUYO: (x x x)
Q You stated here in this affidavit that you went to where the motorcycle was
driven by Pedro Payla to use the same in transporting Pedro Payla to the
hospital?
A Yes, sir.
Q And were you alone in going there?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you saw the motorcycle driven by Pedro Payla, is it not?
A No, sir.
Q When you said, sa diha ako na unta kuhaon ang Motor nga gimaniho ni
Pedro, aron maoy among sakyan paingon sa hospital, naa may tawo nga
nagsandig sa motor ug nag tanao kanamo nga nagpaingon dito sa motor . .
. , which x x x in English means, when I was about to get the motorcycle
driven by Pedro for the purpose of using it in transporting him (Pedro) to the
hospital, I saw a person standing by the motorcycle[,] he was looking at
us. What do you mean by that?
COURT: (to the witness)
Q Before that, which is which, you told the Court just now in your last answer
that the motorcycle was not already there, you did not find the motorcycle
there, but in your affidavit, you said the motorcycle was there and there was
somebody standing near the motorcycle, which is which, which is correct?
What is your answer?
A What happened, sir, was that as we were about to go to that direction, we
met on the way some people and we were not sure if these were the ones
who stabbed [Payla], so we were reluctant to proceed, thats why we did not
go anymore.
Q When you say we, whom are you referring to, who was with you when you
were on the way to go there?
A The members of Mrs. Condinos household particularly her grandchildren and
children.
Q How many were you who went there on the way?
A There were 4 or 5 of us, I was not so sure because they were only following
me.
Q Did you not say a while ago that you were alone when you went to the
motorcycle, you went by yourself?
A Actually, it was I who suggested to go to where the motorcycle was, I went
ahead and they followed. x x x I believe it was only their apprehension as to
what will happen to me thats why they followed.
Q You told the Court that you asked Pedro Payla when you arrived at the
Condinos house or residence, you asked Pedro Payla several times who
stabbed him. [And] several times he answered, he told you that it was Elgin
Latayada, you remember telling the Court then?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you also told the Court that even before that date you already knew Elgin
Latayada for a long time because, in fact, you were neighbors, is not that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Alright, those people whom you met, by the way, you said you met some
people when you were on the way to where the motorcycle was, how many
were they whom you met on the way?
A Only one (1), sir.
Q This person whom you met on the way was not Elgin Latayada?
A It was not Elgin Latayada.
Q And yet, youre telling the Court that you were somewhat reluctant or worr[ied]
to proceed farther because that person you met might have been the one x
x x responsible, and yet you told the Court that what Pedro Payla told you
that it was Elgin Latayada and the person you met was not Elgin Latayada,
how come? Explain to the Court why did you think that probably this was
the person thats responsible when Pedro Payla already told you that it was
Elgin Latayada and this person you met was not Elgin Latayada? You
explain to the Court.
A Actually, it did not enter my mind whether that person I met was the one
responsible or the perpetrator in Pedro Paylas wounding, that did not enter
my mind.
Q [W]hen you first testified on that particular point you said there were people
you met thats why the question now did you not tell the Court a while ago
that you were reluctant to go any farther because those might be the
persons?
PROS. B. APEPE:
He said he met only one (1) person.
Q Alright, let me clarify that point. Earlier on you said on the way to the
motorcycle you met some people then later on x x x, you said there was
only one person you met on the way, which statement is correct, your
statement that you met some people or your latest statement that there was
only one?
A I only met one person, sir. [I]n fact, when we pass[ed], he was at a distance
and I could not clearly see who he was.
Q So, in effect, you are correcting what you said earlier that there were some
people you met because actually, there was only one person you met?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you said just now that that person is somewhat at a distance, you could
not recognize really who he was, that is what you said just now, is it not
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not tell the Court when I was asking you earlier, [and] that you
sounded to be quite sure, that that person you met was not Elgin Latayada,
you told the Court that earlier, isnt it?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now you are telling the Court that you cannot clearly see or identify and yet
you told the Court earlier that that was not Elgin Latayada?
PROS. B. APEPE:
What he said, Your Honor, was they did not actually meet each other.
COURT:
Q Yes, you said that you saw the person only from a distance thats why you
could not clearly see or identify who he was but earlier you told the Court
that the one you met was not Elgin Latayada? You try to explain to the
Court.
A It was only my assumption. I based it on his physical appearance, built, the
way he carr[ied] himself, the way he walk[ed] and I thought that this is not
Elgin Latayada by the way he walk[ed].
Q Alright, proceed counsel. You have more questions?
ATTY. R. BAGABUYO:
Yes, Your Honor, based on this question and answer.
Q Now, you said you met not many but one [person] on your way to the
motorcycle, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And therefore, the person you met was not going to that motorcycle but away
from the motorcycle, correct?
A He was going up, sir.
Q In your affidavit on paragraph 6, you said you saw a person standing by the
motorcycle. Kindly look again at your affidavit?
A No, sir, this is not correct. We were on our way to the motorcycle when we
met that person.
Q Is it not a fact that before I [had] this Affidavit marked, x x x I allowed you to
read it and after reading it, I asked you whether you are going to affirm and
confirm the statement in the affidavit?
 A This portion was not very clear to me (witness referring to 1-B).
Q Is it not also a fact that you x x x mentioned that you read that affidavit before
you affixed your signature?
A Yes, sir.
Q At the time x x x you read the affidavit, you read the entire contents of this
affidavit marked now as Exhibit 1, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at that time, you found the Question and Answer on paragraph 6 to be
true and correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you are saying that that is not correct, is that what you are saying?
A No, sir, the policeman who was taking this affidavit did not get me correctly
upon my statement here, maybe the policeman based this [on] the
statement of Mrs. Condino x x x that her grandchildren went to the place
where the motorcycle was[. B]ut actually, I did not go to where the
motorcycle was[. Maybe] this statement here was based by the policeman
who made this affidavit on what Mrs. Condino told them.
Q But at the time when you read this one you did not tell the policeman that that
is not correct, is it not?
A I did not, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, you did not tell anybody until now that that is not correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the truth that you did not even attempt to go to where the motorcycle
was, is that the truth?
A The truth is that we tried to go to where the motorcycle was but we were only
10 meters away from the house of the Condinos.
Q And what made you decide not to proceed?
COURT:
He already explain[ed] that.[28] (Italics supplied)
On whether the stabbing and carnapping incident was immediately reported to the
police, suffice it to state that entries in the police blotter should not be given undue
significance or probative value, for these are normally incomplete and
inaccurate.[29] This dictum applies to the present case with greater force, because the
report was made by a truck conductor[30] who was a complete stranger to the incident.
As the carnapping by appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot
be said that the killing of Payla was an incident thereof, or that it was committed in the
course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The provisions of the Anti-
Carnapping Act are therefore inapplicable. The killing of Payla is punishable under the
Revised Penal Code, either as homicide or as murder.[31]

Proof of Homicide Sufficient

We now go to the issue of the culpability of appellant for the killing of Payla. In his
Comment[32] to the prosecutions Formal Offer of Exhibits, the former questioned the
admissibility of the latters alleged antemortem Statement or dying declaration, which
had been taken by SPO1 Victorino Q. Busalla. Asking the RTC to disregard the
Statement, appellant pointed out that when it was made, Payla was unaware of his
impending death. He also averred that on it appeared a thumbprint that allegedly
belonged to Payla, but that has not been authenticated.
A dying declaration pertains to ones statement, made under a consciousness of
impending death,[33] on the cause and the surrounding circumstances thereof. It is given
credence on the premise that no one who knows of ones impending death will make a
careless and false accusation.[34]
For a dying declaration to be admissible in evidence, it must be shown that 1) death
was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; 2) the declaration refers to
the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the death; 3) the declaration relates to
facts that the victim was competent to testify on; 4) the declarant thereafter died; and 5)
the declaration is being offered in a criminal case in which the declarants death is the
subject of inquiry.[35]
True, Payla made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his
impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state explicitly a
perception of the inevitability of death.[36] The foreboding may be gleaned from
surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarants injury and conduct that
would justify a conclusion that there was consciousness of impending death. [37]
In this case, Payla could not talk when his wife arrived at the municipal hospital
where he had first been brought.[38] He kept moaning in pain and bleeding profusely
from the stab wounds on his back, while he was being transported to the medical center
in Cagayan de Oro City.[39] Within minutes after arriving there, he lost
consciousness[40] as a result of one of the stab wounds that penetrated his lungs.[41] On
the morning before he died, in his wifes presence he lamented that he could no longer
raise his children as a result of his condition.[42] He died about eight hours after
executing his written Statement before SPOI Busalla.[43]
There is no merit in the averment that the thumbmark of the victim, imprinted on his
Statement with his own blood, has not been authenticated. His wife, Gina, testified that
he could not sign the Statement because of the wound on his back below his right
shoulder.[44] Thus, SPO1 Busalla held the hand of her husband and imprinted the latters
thumbmark on the Statement,[45] which she signed [46] as a witness.
Her testimony was corroborated by SPO1 Busalla. As the police officer[47] who had
taken the Statement of the victim, the former identified the thumbprint appearing
thereon as the latters.[48] Further testifying that Payla could no longer move his hand to
sign the Statement, SPO1 Busalla allegedly placed the formers right thumbprint on it,
using as ink the blood drawn from the left side of the victims face.[49]
In the light of these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Paylas
antemortem Statement.

Res Gestae

No error was committed, either, when the trial court admitted the testimonies of
Gina, Vicente Condino and Joseph Tion on the declaration of Payla that it was appellant
who stabbed him. The utterances separately made by the victim to each of the
witnesses were correctly appreciated as part of the res gestae, since they had been
made immediately after a startling occurrence[50] and had complied with the following
requirements: 1) the statements were spontaneous; 2) they were made immediately
before, during and after the startling occurrence; and 3) they related the circumstances
thereof.[51]
Most telling was the declaration made by Payla within minutes after the stabbing,
and while he was calling for Vicenta Condino to ask for help. Condino testified thus:
ATTY. I. LICO: x x x
Q Your residence is [in] what barangay?
A Anopolan.
Q What town?
A Claveria.
Q Do you own the house where you are living?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where were you on October 29, 1995 at about 6:00 oclock in the afternoon?
A I was in the house.
Q Do you recall if there was an unusual incident that happened at th[at] time?
A Yes, sir.
Q Kindly relate to the Honorable Court what [was] this unusual incident that
happened on October 29, 1995 at about x x x 6:00 oclock.
A At that time, we were about to take our supper. When I was on the table,
somebody came up to the kitchen and I was afraid because I did not know
him and he told me [D]ont be afraid, Nang, I am the son of Lucia Payla, I
was stabbed by Elgin Latayada and bring me to the hospital.
Q And then what happened after that?
 A I [had] my neighbor Joseph Tion called and when he arrived, I told him [he]
will be the one to bring [Payla] to the municipal hospital and [to] inform his
parents because I am old, I cannot manage anymore.[52] (Italics supplied)
Verily, the utterances of Payla to Condino were instinctively made at a time when he
had no more opportunity to concoct a fabricated version of the startling event; hence,
the words he spoke were credible.[53]
In the same category were the statements uttered by Payla to his wife, Gina; and to
Tion. The transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings amply shows that the
victim identified appellant as the assailant, and that the former narrated details of the
stabbing to his wife and to Tion shortly after the incident.

Second Issue:
Treachery

Appellant contends that the RTC erred in appreciating treachery, since it was not
alleged as an aggravating circumstance in the Information as required by Sections 8
and 9 of the Revised Rules of Court.[54] He argues that the maximum penalty that may
be imposed on him is reclusion perpetua, not death. The OSG agrees with his
submission.
We sustain their position that treachery should not have been considered by the
court a quo. Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court require that the
complaint or information shall state, among others, the qualifying and aggravating
circumstances as follows:

SEC. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting
the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no
designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.

SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting

the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily those in the language used in the statute but
in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment. (Italics supplied)

Indeed, a perusal of the Information in this case readily reveals that treachery was
not alleged as an aggravating or a qualifying circumstance in the commission of the
crime charged. Consistent with the new Rules, treachery may not be appreciated,
because it was not alleged in the Information.[55] It is settled that procedural rules are
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time they were approved,
especially when they are more favorable to the accused. [56] In the absence of any
qualifying circumstance, appellant may be convicted of homicide only.

Third Issue:
Penalty and Indemnity

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for homicide
is reclusion temporal, the range of which is 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. Since
appellant escaped from confinement after the prosecution had rested, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is not applicable.[57] There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, he should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period.[58]
As to his civil liability, prevailing jurisprudence imposes the amount of P50,000 as
indemnity ex delicto for homicide.[59] The award of actual damages in the form of
hospitalization and burial expenses, which were adequately proved by receipts,[60] is
affirmed. Being adequately supported by the evidence on record, the grant of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000 is also affirmed.
In addition, the heirs of the victim must also be indemnified for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased.[61] The widow, Gina, testified that her husbands net daily
income was P250.[62]She also testified that they had three children,[63] and that the
deceased was 27 years old at the time of his death.[64] The loss of earning capacity is
thus computed as follows:[65]

Net earning capacity = life expectancy[66] x (gross annual income less

living expenses[67])
= 2 ( 80 - 27) x (P90,000[68] - P45,000)
3

= 35.33 x P45,000

= P1,589,850.00

Effect of Appellants Escape

When an appellant escapes detention pending appeal, the appeal is normally

dismissed, and the lower courts judgment thus becomes final and
executory.[69] However, this Court has held in People v. Esparas,[70] People v.
Prades,[71] and People v. Raquino [72] that this rule does not apply to death cases, in
which an automatic review is mandated by law even if appellant has absconded.[73]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City (Branch 18) in Criminal Case No. 97-917 is
hereby MODIFIED asfollows:
 1. Appellant is found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day.
2. Appellant is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of the deceased the amount of
P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P26,199 as actual damages, P50,000 as moral
damages, and P1 ,589,850 for loss of earning capacity.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., in the result.

[1] Rollo, pp. 20-30. Written by Judge Edgardo T. Lloren.

[2] RTC Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 29.
[3] Rollo, p. 10. Signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ma. Anita Esguerra-Lucagbo.
[4] See Order dated September 12, 1997; records, p. 59.
[5] Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo.
[6] Appellees Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 96-98. Signed by Solicitor General
Simeon V. Marcelo, Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang, and
Associate Solicitor Joseph Andrew R. Salazar.
[7] Appellants Brief, p. 4; rollo, p. 61. Signed by Atty. Teresita S. de Guzman and Atty.
Francisco L. Salomon of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO).
[8] This case was deemed submitted for decision on December 27, 2002, upon receipt
by this Court of appellants Reply Brief. Appellants Brief was received by this
Court on May 15, 2002; appellees Brief, on September 27, 2002.
[9] Appellants Brief, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 61-62. Original in upper case.
[10] People v. Tolentino, 380 SCRA 171, 174, April 3, 2002; People v. Nuevo, 420 Phil.
421, 431, October 26, 2001.
[11] People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1004, June 8, 2000.
[12] Entitled Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972.
[13] Otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law.
[14] Prior to its amendment, the last clause of Section 14 of RA 6539 was as follows: x x
x and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed when the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed in the commission of the
carnapping.
[15] People v. Santos, supra, p. 1005; People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 142, July 7, 1997.
[16] People v. Mejia, pp. 142-143.
[17] The elements of carnapping are the following: 1) there is a taking of a motor vehicle
that belongs to another; 2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by the use of force upon
things; and 3) the taking is done with intent to gain. (People v. Calabroso, 340
SCRA 332, 342, September 14, 2000)
[18] People v. Santos, supra.
[19] RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 71-72.
[20] Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. See also People v. Sirad, 335 SCRA
114, 124, July 5, 2000.
[21] People v. Silvano, 381 SCRA 607, 619, April 29, 2002, citing
People v. Comesario, 366 Phil. 62, 67, April 29, 1999; and People v. Canlas, 372
SCRA 401, 411, December 14, 2001.
[22] Records, p. 15. The English translation appears on p. 358.
[23] TSN, November 10-12, 1997. pp. 67-68.
[24] TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 8-10.
[25] TSN, December 9, 1997, pp. 8-10; pp. 10-11.
[26] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, pp. 67-69.
[27] Supra at note 23.
[28] Id., pp. 34-43.
[29] People v. Mejia, 341 Phil. 118, 147, July 7, 1997; citing People v. Casinillo, 213
SCRA 777, 780, September 11, 1992.
[30] TSN, December 9, 1997, p. 13.
[31] People v. Santos, supra, p. 1006.
[32] Records, pp. 364-365.
[33] People v. Calago, 381 SCRA 448, 456, April 22, 2002; People v. Preciados, 349
SCRA 1, 19, January 5, 2001.
[34] People v. Cortezano, 375 SCRA 95, 112, January 29, 2002.
[35] People v. Amaca, 342 Phil. 900, 911, August 12, 1997; People v. Calago, supra, p.
459; People v. Preciados, supra.
[36] People v. Narca, 341 Phil. 696, 711, July 21, 1997.
[37] People v. Calago, supra.
[38] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, pp. 36-37.
[39] Id., pp. 54 -55.
[40] Id., p. 57.
[41] Id., p. 44.
[42] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, p. 77.
[43] Exhibit A; records, p. 310. The Certificate of Death of Pedro Payla showed that he
died at 9:30 p.m. at the CDG Medical Center in Cagayan de Oro City.
[44] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, p. 85.
[45] Id., p. 87.
[46] Id., pp. 85-86.
[47] TSN, January 23, 1998, pp. 15-16.
[48] Id., p. 16
[49] Id., pp. 22-23.
[50] People v. Mosende, 371 SCRA 446, 455, December 5, 2001.
[51] People v. Amaca, supra, pp. 914-915.
[52] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, pp. 92-94.
[53] People v. Calago, supra.
[54] Effective January 1, 2000.
[55] People v. Baroy, 382 SCRA 56, 70, May 9, 2002; People v. Obosa, 380 SCRA 22,
35, April 2, 2002; People v. Vicente, 372 SCRA 765, 775, December 21, 2001.
[56] Ibid.; People v. Lab-eo, 373 SCRA 461, 474, January 16, 2002; People v. De
Guzman, 418 Phil. 625, 641, October 2, 2001; People v. Vicente, id., pp. 775-
776.
[57] Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or Act No. 4103, as amended, provides
that the Act shall not apply x x x to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence x x x.
[58] Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.
[59] People v. Delim, GR No. 142773, pp. 45-46, January 28, 2003; People v. Yatco, 379
SCRA 432, 446, March 19, 2002; People v. Verde, 362 Phil. 305, 320, February
10, 1999.
[60] Exhibits B to B-39; records, pp. 311-347.
[61] Article 2206(1) of the Civil Code.
[62] TSN, November 10-12, 1997, pp. 14-15
[63] Ibid.
[64] Ibid.
[65] People v. Sirad, 335 SCRA 114, 128, July 5, 2000.
[66] Life expectancy is computed using the formula 2/3 x (80 - age of the victim at the
time of his death), which is based on the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality.
[67] In the absence of proof, living expenses are estimated to be 50 percent of the gross
annual income (People v. Dinamling, 379 SCRA 107, 124, March 12, 2002).
[68] Since Payla was earning P250 a day, his income was P7,500 monthly or P90,000
annually.
[69] Par. 2, Sec. 8, Rule 124, Rules of Court.
[70] 260 SCRA 539, August 20, 1996.
[71] 293 SCRA 411, July 30, 1998.
[72] 315 SCRA 670, September 30, 1999.
[73] For a discussion, see Panganiban, Battles in the Supreme Court, 1998 ed., pp. 68-
71, and Leadership by Example, 1999 ed., pp. 96-97. The herein ponente is
duty-bound to follow the ruling in these Decisions and to decide this case
accordingly, although he dissented from them, and although he still believes that
the review of death cases should be made by the Court only after appellant (who
is at large) is apprehended and placed under the jurisdiction of the Court.
 THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. FABIAN URZAIS Y

LANURIAS, ALEX BAUTISTA, AND RICKY BAUTISTA, Accused.

FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before us for review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04812 dated 19 November 2012 which dismissed the appeal of accused-appellant
Fabian Urzais y Lanurias and affirmed with modification the Judgment2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 13155 finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with
homicide through the use of unlicensed firearm.

Accused-appellant, together with co-accused Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista, was
charged with Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6539, otherwise known as the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with homicide through the use
of an unlicensed firearm. The accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

That on or about the 13th day of November, 2002, or prior thereto, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating with and abetting one
another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away, a Isuzu
Highlander car, colored Forest Green, with Plate No. UUT-838 of one MARIO
MAGDATO, valued at FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) Philippine
Currency, owned by and belonging to said MARIO MAGDATO, against his will and
consent and to his damage and prejudice in the aforestated amount of P500,000.00,
and on the occasion of the carnapping, did assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one MARIO MAGDATO, that is, by shooting the latter with an unlicensed
firearm, a Norinco cal. 9mm Pistol with Serial No. 508432, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound on the head which caused his death.3ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At his arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The trial proceeded against
him. His two co-accused remain at large.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Shirley Magdato (Shirley), Senior Police

Officer 2 Fernando Figueroa (SPO2 Figueroa) and Dr. Jun Concepcion (Dr.
Concepcion).

Shirley, the widow of the victim, testified mainly regarding her husband's disappearance
and discovery of his death. She narrated that her husband used to drive for hire their
Isuzu Highlander with plate number UUT-838 from Pulilan, Bulacan to the LRT Terminal
in Metro Manila. On 12 November 2002, around four o'clock in the morning, her
husband left their house in Pulilan and headed for the terminal at the Pulilan Public
Market to ply his usual route. When her husband did not return home that day, Shirley
inquired of his whereabouts from his friends to no avail. Shirley went to the terminal the
following day and the barker there told her that a person had hired their vehicle to go to
Manila. Shirley then asked her neighbors to call her husband's mobile phone but no one
answered. At around 10 o'clock in the morning of 13 November 2002, her husband's co-
members in the drivers' association arrived at their house and thereafter accompanied
Shirley to her husband's supposed location. At the Sta.Rosa police station in Nueva
Ecija, Shirley was informed that her husband had passed away. She then took her
husband's body home.4 Shirley retrieved their vehicle on 21 November 2002 from the
Cabanatuan City Police Station. She then had it cleaned as it had blood stains and
reeked of a foul odor.5

SPO2 Figueroa of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Cabanatuan City, testified
concerning the circumstances surrounding accused-appellant's arrest. He stated that in
November 2002, their office received a "flash alarm" from the Bulacan PNP about an
alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color. Thereafter, their office was
informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL Subdivision, Cabanatuan
City. Thus, a team conducted surveillance there and a checkpoint had been set up
outside its gate. Around three o'clock in the afternoon of 20 November 2002, a vehicle
that fit the description of the carnapped vehicle appeared. The officers apprehended the
vehicle and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who had been alone, to alight
therefrom. When the officers noticed the accused-appellant's waist to be bulging of
something, he was ordered to raise his shirt and a gun was discovered tucked there.
The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco, with magazine and twelve (12)
live ammunitions. The officers confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of
the victim's. Found inside the vehicle were two (2) plates with the marking "UUT-838"
and a passport. Said vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the back and
on its flooring. The officers detained accused-appellant and filed a case for illegal
possession of firearm against him. The subject firearm was identified in open court. 6

Dr. Concepcion testified about the wounds the victim sustained and the cause of his
death. He stated that the victim sustained one (1) gunshot wound in the head, the
entrance of which is at the right temporal area exiting at the opposite side. The victim
also had several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose and around the
right eye. He also had blisters on his cheek area which could have been caused by a
lighted cigarette.7

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed the defense of denial.

Accused-appellant testified that he had ordered in October 2002 from brothers Alex and
Ricky Bautista, an owner-type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his business. The
brothers, however, allegedly delivered instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half
past three o'clock in the afternoon of 13 November 2002. The brothers told accused-
appellant that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment with the remaining
undetermined amount to be paid a week after. Accused-appellant agreed to this,
amazed that he had been given a new vehicle at such low price. Accused-appellant
then borrowed money from someone to pay the balance but the brothers never replied
to his text messages. On 16 November 2002, his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to
surrender the vehicle as it could be a "hot car." Accused-appellant was initially hesitant
to this idea as he wanted to recover the amount he had paid but he eventually decided
to sell the vehicle. He removed its plate number and placed a "for sale" sign at the back.
On 18 November 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the vehicle upon advice by a
certain Angie. But when he arrived home in the afternoon of that day, he alleged that he
was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija.8 Accused-appellant also testified that he
found out in jail the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise. 9 On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that his real name is "Michael Tapayan y
Baguio" and that he used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second passport in 2001
to be able to return to Taiwan.10

The other defense witness, Oscar Angeles (Angeles), testified that he had known the
accused-appellant as Michael Tapayan when they became neighbors in the AGL
subdivision. Accused-appellant also served as his computer technician. Angeles
testified that accused-appellant previously did not own any vehicle until the latter
purchased the Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from the latter's friends in Bulacan.
Angeles advised accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to
its very low selling price. Angeles corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he
did not want to surrender the car at first as he wanted to recover his payment for it. 11

On 18 October 2010, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of

the crime charged. The RTC anchored its ruling on the disputable presumption that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the
taker and the doer of the whole act.12 It held that the elements of carnapping were
proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt through the recovery of the
purportedly carnapped vehicle from the accused-appellant's possession and by his
continued possession thereof even after the lapse of one week from the commission of
the crime.13 The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused Fabian Urzais alias
Michael Tapayan y Lanurias GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
carnapping as defined and penalized by Republic Act 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972) as amended by R.A. 7659 with homicide thru the use of unlicensed firearm.
Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of forty (40) years
of reclusion perpetua.
In the service of the sentence, accused shall be credited with the full time of his
preventive detention if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide by the disciplinary
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Accused is further sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Mario Magdato the sum of
Php50,000.00 as death indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and
Php672,000.00 as loss of earning capacity.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on 22 December 2010.15

On 19 November 2012, the CA rendered the assailed judgment affirming with

modification the trial court's decision. The CA noted the absence of eyewitnesses to the
crime yet ruled that sufficient circumstantial evidence was presented to prove accused-
appellant's guilt, solely, accused-appellant's possession of the allegedly carnapped
vehicle.

Accused-appellant appealed his conviction before this Court. In a Resolution16 dated 12

August 2013, accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) were
asked to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Accused-appellant
filed a Supplemental Brief17 while the OSG manifested18 that it adopts its Brief19 filed
before the CA for the purpose of the instant appeal.

Before the Court, accused-appellant vehemently maintains that there is no direct

evidence that he robbed and murdered the victim; and that the lower courts erred in
convicting him based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his
possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle. Accused-appellant decries the appellate
court's error in relying on the disputable presumption created by law under Section 3 (j),
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the
vehicle, he is considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing
of its owner. Accused-appellant asserts that such presumption does not hold in the case
at bar.

The Court agrees.

Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of
the crime, i.e.the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands
charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. The Court
finds the prosecution unable to prove both aspects, thus, it is left with no option but to
acquit on reasonable doubt.

R.A. No. 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as
the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using
force upon things.20 By the amendment in Section 20 of R.A. No. 7659, Section 14 of
the Anti-Carnapping Act now reads:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 14. Penally for Carnapping. Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this
term is defined in Section two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of the motor
vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight
months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping is
committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things, and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than
thirty years, when the carnapping is committed by means of violence or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
(Emphasis supplied)
Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping
Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the
inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the
carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion
thereof." This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special
complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal
Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last
clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove the
essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more
importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping
and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping
or on the occasion thereof." Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not
proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the
homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code. 21

In the instant case, the Court finds the charge of carnapping unsubstantiated for failure
of the prosecution to prove all its elements. For one, the trial court's decision itself
makes no mention of any direct evidence indicating the guilt of accused-appellant.
Indeed, the CA confirmed the lack of such direct evidence.22 Both lower courts solely
based accused-appellant's conviction of the special complex crime
on one circumstantial evidence and that is, the fact of his possession of the allegedly
carnapped vehicle.

The Court notes that the prosecution's evidence only consists of the fact of the victim's
disappearance, the discovery of his death and the details surrounding accused-
appellant's arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. Theres
is absolutely no evidence supporting the prosecution's theory that the victim's vehicle
had been carnapped, much less that the accused-appellant is the author of the same.

Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted, but for
circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.23 Decided cases expound that the circumstantial
evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one
fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as
the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt. 24

In the case at bar, notably there is only one circumstantial evidence. And this sole
circumstantial evidence of possession of the vehicle does not lead to an inference
exclusively consistent with guilt. Fundamentally, prosecution did not offer any iota of
evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle, much less with accused-appellant's
participation. In fact, there is even a variance concerning how accused-appellant was
discovered to be in possession of the vehicle. The prosecution's uncorroborated
evidence says accused-appellant was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a
checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while the latter testified
he was arrested at home. The following testimony of prosecution witness SPO2
Figueroa on cross-examination raises even more questions:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: You mentioned the car napping incident, when was that, Mr. witness?

ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, I noticed that every time the witness gave his answer, he is
looking at a piece of paper and he is not testifying on his personal
knowledge.

xx
xx

COURT:

The witness is looking at the record for about 5 min. now. Fiscal, here is
another witness who has lapses on the mind.

FISCAL MACARAIG:

I am speechless, Your Honor.

WITNESS:

It was not stated in my affidavit, sir the time of the carnapping incident.
ATTY. GONZALES:

Your Honor, if he can no longer remember even the simple matter when this
car napping incident happened then he is an incompetent witness and we
are deprive (sic) of the right to cross examine him. I move that his testimony
would be stricken off from the record.

xx
xx

Q: Mr. Witness, what is the date when you arrested the accused Fabian Urzais?

A: It was November 20, 2002 at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, sir.

Q: You said earlier that on November 3, 2002 that you met the accused is that
correct, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why did you see the accused on November 3, 2002, Mr. Witness?

A: During that time, we conducted a check point at AGL were (sic) the Highlander
was often seen, sir.

Q: So, since on November 3, 2002, you were conducting this check point at AGL, it is
safe to assume that the carnapping incident happened earlier than November 3,
2002?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were you present when this vehicle was car napped, Mr. Witness?

A: No, sir.

Q: Since you were not present, you have no personal knowledge about this car
napping incident, right, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: No further question, Your Honor.25

Considering the dearth of evidence, the subject vehicle is at best classified as "missing"
since the non-return of the victim and his vehicle on 12 November 2002. Why the
check-point had begun before then, as early 3 November 2002, as stated by the
prosecution witness raises doubts about the prosecution's version of the case. Perhaps,
the check-point had been set up for another vehicle which had gone missing earlier. In
any event, accused-appellant's crime, if at all, was being in possession of a missing
vehicle whose owner had been found dead. There is perhaps guilt in the acquisition of
the vehicle priced so suspiciously below standard. But how this alone should lead to a
conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide/murder, affirmed
by the appellate court is downright disturbing.

The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping
and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is
either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of
independent evidence inconsistent thereto.26 In the instant case, accused-appellant set-
up a defense of denial of the charges and adhered to his unrebutted version of the story
that the vehicle had been sold to him by the brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista. Though
the explanation is not seamless, once the explanation is made for the possession, the
presumption arising from the unexplained possession may not anymore be invoked and
the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render
the defense of the accused improbable. And this burden, the prosecution was unable to
discharge. In contrast to prosecution witness SPO2 Figueroa's confused, apprehensive
and uncorroborated testimony accused-appellant unflinchingly testified as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Will you please tell us how you came into possession of this Isuzu Highlander with
plate number UTT 838?

A: That vehicle was brought by Ricky Bautista and Alex Bautista, sir.

xx
xx

Q: Do you know why Alex and Ricky Bautista gave you that Isuzu Highlander?

A: Actually that was not the vehicle I ordered form (sic) them, I ordered an owner type
jeep worth Php60,000 but on November 13, 2002 they brought that Isuzu
Highlander, sir.

Q: Why did you order an owner type jeep from them?

A: Because I planned to install a trolley, cause I have a videoke for rent business, sir.
xx
xx

Q: What happened upon the arrival of this Alex and Ricky Bautista on that date and
time?

A: I was a little bit surprise (sic) because Alex alighted from an Isuzu Highlander
colored green, sir.

Q: What happened after that?

A: I told them that it was not I ordered from you and my money is only Php60,000, sir.

Q: What did he told (sic) you?

A: He told me to give them the Php60,000 and they will leave the vehicle and when I
have the money next week I will send text message to them, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was amazed because the vehicle is brand new and the price is low, sir.

xx
xx

Q: Did you find out anything about the Isuzu highlander that they left to you?

A: When I could not contact them I went to my friend Oscar Angeles and told him
about the vehicle then he told me that you better surrender the vehicle because
maybe it is a hot car, sir. "Nung hindi ko na po sila makontak ay nagpunta ako sa
kaibigan kong si Oscar Angeles at sinabi ko po yung problema tungkol sa
sasakyan at sinabi nya sa akin na isurrender na lang at baka hot car yan" 27

xx
xx

Q: Mr. Witness, granting for the sake that what you are saying is true, immediately on
the 16th, according to your testimony, and upon confirming it to your friend, you
then decided to surrender the vehicle, why did you not do it on the 16 th, why did
you still have to wait until you get arrested?

A: Because I was thinking of my Sixty Thousand Pesos (Php60,000.00) at that time,

 and on how I can take it back, sir. ("Kasi nanghinayang po ako sa Sixty Thousand
(Php60,000.00) ko nung oras na un ... pano ko po yun mabawi sabi ko".)

xx
xx

Q: So Mr. Witness, let us simplify this, you have purchased a carnapped vehicle, your
intention is to surrender it but you never did that until you get caught in possession
of the same, so in other words, that is all that have actually xxx vehicle was found
dead, the body was dumped somewhere within the vicinity of Sta. Rosa, those are
the facts in this case?

A: I only came to know that there was a dead person when I was already in jail, sir.

Q: What about the other facts that I have mentioned, are they correct or not?

A: When I gave the downpayment, I do not know yet that it was a hot car and I came
to know it only on the 16th, sir.28
Significantly, accused-appellant's testimony was corroborated by defense witness
Angeles who had known accused-appellant by his real name "Michael Tapayan y
Baguio," to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Q: Do you know if this Michael Tapayan owns any vehicle sometime in 2002?

A: At first none, sir, he has no vehicle.

Q: What do you mean when you say at first he has no vehicle?

A: Later, sir, I saw him riding in a vehicle.

xx
xx

Q: Did Michael Tapayan tell you how much he bought that vehicle?

A: I remember he told me that he bought that vehicle for Thirty Thousand

(Php30,000.00) Pesos, sir.

Q: What was your reaction when you were told that the vehicle was purchased for
only Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000.00)?
A: I told him that it's very cheap and also told him that it might be a carnap (sic)
vehicle.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan when you told him that?

A: He thought about it and he is of the belief that the person who sold the vehicle to
him will come back and will get the additional payment, sir.

Q: Aside from this conversation about that vehicle, did you have any other
conversation with Michael Tapayan concerning that vehicle?

A: After a few days, sir, I told him to surrender the said vehicle to the authorities
because the persons who sold it to him did not come back for additional payment.

Q: What was the reaction of Michael Tapayan to this suggestion?

A: He told me that he will think about it because he was thinking about the money
that he already gave to them.29
Evidently, the disputable presumption cannot prevail over accused-appellant's
explanation for his possession of the missing vehicle. The possession having been
explained, the legal presumption is disputed and thus, cannot find application in the
instant case. To hold otherwise would be a miscarriage of justice as criminal convictions
necessarily require proof of guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and in
the absence of such proof, should not be solely based on legal disputable
presumptions.

The carnapping not being duly proved, the killing of the victim may not be treated as an
incident of carnapping. Nonetheless, even under the provisions of homicide and murder
under the Revised Penal Code, the Court finds the guilt of accused-appellant was not
established beyond reasonable doubt.

There were no eyewitnesses to the killing of the victim, Mario Magdato. Again, both
courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant's possession of
the missing vehicle for the latter's conviction. Shirley, the widow, testified that her
husband and their vehicle went missing on 12 November 2002. Dr. Concepcion gave
testimony on the cause of death of Mario Magdato and the injuries he had sustained.
Most glaringly, no connection had been established between the victim's gunshot
wound which caused his death and the firearm found in the person of accused-
appellant. Only SPO2 Figueroa's testimony gave light on how allegedly accused-
appellant was found to have been in possession of the missing vehicle of the victim. But
even if this uncorroborated testimony was true, it does not link accused-appellant to the
carnapping, much less, the murder or homicide of the victim. And it does not preclude
the probability of accused-appellant's story that he had merely bought the vehicle from
the Bautista brothers who have themselves since gone missing.
The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The equipoise rule
provides that where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the
constitutional, presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. 30

The basis of the acquittal is reasonable doubt, which simply means that the evidence of
the prosecution was not sufficient to sustain the guilt of accused-appellant beyond the
point of moral certainty. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, however, is a burden particular
to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts as may be raised by the
defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense
beyond a reasonable doubt, nor is he required to establish the truth of such matters by
a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. 31

It is the primordial duty of the prosecution to present its side with clarity and persuasion,
so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. What is required
of it is to justify the conviction of the accused with moral certainty. Upon the
prosecution's failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the
Court, lest its mind be tortured with the thought that it has imprisoned an innocent man
for the rest of his life.32 The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.33

In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt
rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 19
November 2012 in C.A. G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04812 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FABIAN URZAIS Y LANURIAS alias Michael Tapayan y Baguio is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping with homicide, without prejudice to
investigation for the crime of fencing penalized under Presidential Decree 1612. His
immediate release from confinement is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Bersamin,** and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on official leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Endnotes:

** Additional Member per Raffle dated 24 February 2016.

1Rollo, pp. 2-16; Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Associate
Justices Mario V. Lopez and Socorro B. Inting concurring.
2 Records, pp. 216-226; Presided by Presiding Judge Angelo C. Perez.
3 Id. at 1.
4 TSN, 20 January 2004, pp. 3-6, 13; Testimony of Shirley.
5 Id. at 6-9.
6TSN, 13 August 2004, pp. 3-8; TSN, 12 September 2006, p. 7; Testimony of SPO2
Figueroa.
7 TSN, 18 April 2006, pp. 5-7; Testimony of Dr. Concepcion.
8 TSN, 9 December 2008, pp. 4-9; Testimony of Accused-Appellant.
9 TSN, 8 January 2009, pp. 8 and 13.
10 TSN, 9 December 2008, pp. 10-12.
11 TSN, 10 August 2010, pp. 3-5; Testimony of Angeles.
12 Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
13 Records, p. 221.
14 Id. at 226.
15 Id. at 229-231.
16Rollo, pp. 23-24.
17 Id. at 38-51.
18 Id. at 25-27.
19 CA rollo, pp.
20 Section 2, R.A. No. 6539.
21People v. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1005-1006 (2000).
22Rollo, p. 10.
23 Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court.
24People v. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 24 (1997); People v. Quitorio, 349 Phil. 114, 129
(1998); People v. Reyes, 349 Phil. 39, 58 (1998) citing People v. Binamira, G.R. No.
110397, 14 August 1997, 277 SCRA 232, 249-250 citing People v. Adofina, G.R. No.
109778, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 67, 76-77. See also People v. Payawal, 317
Phil. 507, 515 (1995).cralawred
25 TSN, 4 October 2006, pp. 3-5.
26People v. Geron, supra note 23 at 25.cralawred
27 TSN 09 December 2008, pp. 4-8.
28 TSN dated 8 January 2009, pp. 11-13.
29 TSN dated 10 August 2010, pp. 4-5.
30People v. Erguiza, 592 Phil. 363, 388 (2008).
31People v. Geron, supra note 23 at 29 citing 23 C.J.S. 195-196.
32People v. Cabalse, G.R. No. 146274, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 629, 640.
33People v. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002).