Petitioners, vs. vs. Respondents Deogracias T. Reyes Jose M. Luison Tolentino & Garcia D. R. Cruz
Petitioners, vs. vs. Respondents Deogracias T. Reyes Jose M. Luison Tolentino & Garcia D. R. Cruz
Petitioners, vs. vs. Respondents Deogracias T. Reyes Jose M. Luison Tolentino & Garcia D. R. Cruz
DECISION
FERNANDO, J : p
The nature of the case presented before the lower court by private respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, assisted by her spouse, Juan B. Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision
of respondent Court of Appeals thus: "Plaintiff seeks recovery of 'one (1) lady's diamond
ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and four (4)
brills 0.10 cts. total weight' which she bought on October 27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc." 1
Then came a summary of now respondent Guevara of her evidence: "Plaintiff's evidence
tends to show that around October 11, 1953 plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de
Garcia, owner of La Bulakeña restaurant recognized her ring in the nger of Mrs. Garcia
and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant answered from her comadre.
Plaintiff explained that that ring was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Defendant
handed the ring to plaintiff and it tted her nger. Two or three days later, at the request of
plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt. Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant
and her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom they showed the ring in
question. Mr. Rebullida examined the ring with the aid of high power lens and after
consulting the stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that plaintiff bought
from him in 1947. The ring was returned to defendant who despite a written request
therefor failed to deliver the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when the sheriff
tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant refused to deliver the ring which had
been examined by Mr. Rebullida, claiming it was lost." 2
2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is no merit to the contention raised in the rst
assigned error that her possession in good faith, equivalent to title, suf ced to defeat
respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases demonstrate, even on that assumption
the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court
of Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in
litigation is such respondent. That is a factual determination to which we must pay heed.
Instead of proving any alleged departure from legal norms by respondent Court, petitioner
would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code, which provides: 'A possessor in the concept of
owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it." She would accord to it a greater legal signi cance
than that to which under the controlling doctrines it is entitled. The brief for respondents
did clearly point out why petitioner's assertion is lacking in support not only from the
cases but even from commentators. Thus: "Actually, even under the rst clause,
possession in good faith does not really amount to title, for the reason that Art. 1132 of
the Code provides for a period of acquisitive prescription for movables through
'uninterrupted possession for four years in good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code,
which provided a period of three years), so that many Spanish writers, including Manresa,
Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the Spanish
Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil Code), the title of the possessor in good faith is not that of
ownership, but is merely a presumptive title suf cient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Español,
6th Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that the title established by the rst clause of
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Art. 559 is only a presumptive title suf cient to serve as a basis for acquisitive
prescription, that the clause immediately following provides that 'one who has lost any
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.' As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court
in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), 43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: 'Article 559 in fact assumes that
possessor is as yet not the owner; for it is obvious that where the possessor has come to
acquire indefeasible title by, let us say, adverse possession for the necessary period, no
proof of loss or illegal deprivation could avail the former owner of the chattel. He would no
longer be entitled to recover it under any condition.'" 9
The second assigned error is centered on the alleged failure to prove the identity of the
diamond ring. Clearly the question raised is one of fact. What the Court of Appeals found is
conclusive. Again, petitioner could not demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion the
Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary manner. As made mention of in the brief for
respondents two disinterested witnesses, Mr. Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Reynaldo
Cementina of the Pasay City Police Department, both of whom could not be accused of
being biased in favor of respondent Angelina D. Guevara, did testify as to the identity of the
ring.
The third assigned error of petitioners would nd fault with respondent Court relying "on
the weakness of the title or evidence" of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia. It is true, in the
decision under review, mention was made of petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia making no
comment when in her presence Rebullida, after examining the ring and the stock card, told
respondent Angelina D. Guevara that that was her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of
the latter asserting ownership. It was likewise stated in such decision that there were
extra-judicial admissions in the original and rst amended answers of petitioner. In the
appraisal of her testimony, respondent Court likewise spoke of her giving a rather dubious
source of her ring the person from whom she allegedly bought it turning out "to be a
mysterious and ephemeral gure." As a matter of fact, as set forth a few pages back,
respondent Court did enumerate the aws in the version given by petitioner. From the
weakness of the testimony offered which, as thus made clear, petitioner, did not even seek
to refute, she would raise the legal question that respondent Court relied on the "weakness
of [her] title or evidence" rather than on the proof justifying respondent Angelina D.
Guevara's claim of ownership. Petition here would ignore the nding of fact of respondent
Court that such ownership on her part "has been abundantly established" by her evidence.
Again here, in essence, the question raised is one of fact, and there is no justi cation for us
to reserve respondent Court.
The legal question raised in the fourth assignment of error is that the matter of the
substitution of the diamond on the ring was a question raised for the rst time on appeal
as it was never put in issue by the pleadings nor the subject of reception of evidence by
both parties and not touched upon in the decision of the lower court. Why no such
question could be raised in the pleadings of respondent Angelina D. Guevara was clari ed
by the fact that the substitution came after it was brought for examination to Mr. Rebullida.
After the knowledge of such substitution was gained, however, the issue was raised at the
trial according to the said respondent resulting in that portion of the decision where the
lower court reached a negative conclusion. As a result, in the motion for reconsideration,
one of the points raised as to such decision being contrary to the evidence is the nding
that there was no substitution. It is not necessary to state that respondent Court,
exercising its appellate power reversed the lower court. What was held by it is controlling.
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What is clear is that there is no factual basis for the legal arguments on which the fourth
assigned error is predicated.
What is said takes care of the fth assigned error that respondent Court was mistaken in
its nding that there was such a substitution. Again petitioner would have us pass on a
question of credibility which is left to respondent Court of Appeals, The sixth assigned
error would complain against the reversal of the lower court judgment as well as petitioner
Consuelo S. de Garcia being made to pay respondent Angelina D. Guevara exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs. The reversal is called for in the light of the appraisal
of the evidence of record as meticulously weighed by respondent Court. As to the
attorney's fees and exemplary damages, this is what respondent Court said in the decision
under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees in the
sum of P1,000, it being just and equitable under the circumstances, and another P1,000 as
exemplary damages for the public good to discourage litigants from resorting to
fraudulent devices to frustrate the ends of justice, as defendant herein tried to substitute
the ring, Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's ring." 1 0 Considering the circumstances, the cursory
discussion of the sixth assigned error on the matter by petitioner fails to demonstrate that
respondent Court's actuation is blemished by legal defects.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby
affirmed. With costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result, Art. 85 of the Code of Commerce not being
applicable.
Footnotes
8. Ibid., p. 493.
9. Refutation of the First Assignment of Error, Brief for Respondents-Appellees, pp. 8-10.