Section 2

Co v. House of Representatives
FACTS:

Records show that Ong Te, Jose Ong Jr’s grandfather, arrived in the Philippines in 1985. He
established his residence in Samar, and was able to obtain certificate of residence from
Spanish colonial administration.

Jose Ong Chuan, Jose Ong Jr’s father, was born in 1905 and was brought by Ong Te here in
the Philippines in 1915. Jose Ong Chuan married a natural-born Filipino, Agripina Lao.
Established their residence in Samar, and in 1954 he filed for his naturalization. At the time
he took his oath of allegiance year 1957, Ong Jr. was still a minor, nine years of age and
still finishing elementary education.

In 1971, his elder brother Emil, was elected a delegate of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. Emil’s status as a natural born was also challenged, but the Convention,
declared Emil as a natural-born Filipino.

(Fast forward to Jose Ong Jr’s predicament…)

HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino Citizen and a resident
of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11, 1987, congressional election for
the second district of Norther Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the
position of reresenttive are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private
respondent, Jose Ong Jr. and in the end Ong was proclaimed the duly elected
representative. Now petitioners filed election protests against Ong saying that he is not a
natural born citizen.

ISSUE:

W/N Ong Jr. is a natural born Filipino Citizen.

HELD:

Article IV Section 2 of 1987 constitution defines natural-born citizens as “those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship,” as well as “those born before 17 January 1973, of Filipino
mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.”

Section 1(3) of the 1987 Constitution was interpreted by the Court as applying to those
who elected Filipino citizenship not only after 2 February 1987 but also to those who elected
citizenship before that date. It was intended to correct the anomalous situation where one
born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was automatically granted the status of
natural-born citizen while one born of Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
elect Philippine citizenship, whereby under earlier laws, he was not a natural-born citizen.
The Court’s based its resolution of the issue by tracing Jose Ong, Jr. citizenship to his
mother who was a natural-born Filipina. What is material to the case is whether he elected
Filipino citizenship when he reached the age of majority as provided for by Section 1 (4)
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which was the operative law when he was born. Under
the 1987 Constitution, natural-born status can only be accorded to individuals who elected
citizenship upon reaching majority. In the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for Ong,
Jr. to formally or in writing elect citizenship when he came of age as he was already a
citizen since he was nine by virtue of his mother being a natural-born citizen and his father
a naturalized Filipino.

Furthermore, election can be both formal and informal. In In Re Mallare (59 SCRA 45
[1974]) it was held that the exercise of the right of suffrage when one comes of age
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. The rule in the Mallare case
was applied whereby Jose Ong’s exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises were considered positive acts of electing Philippine citizenship. Entering a
profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification,
voting during election, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature
are themselves formal manifestations of choice. These, according to the court, cannot be
less binding than the filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration.

In re: Application for Admission to the Bar of Vicente Ching

The 1935 Constitution and CA 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine Citizenship should be made. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted
to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.

FACTS:

Vicente Ching, legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching (Chinese citizen) and Priscila Dulay
(Filipino) was born in La Union year 1964. After having completed bachelor of law course at
St. Louis University, took the bar exams and successfully passed year 1999. Because of the
questionable citizenship status, he was not allowed to take his oath and was required nalang
to submit further proof of his citizenship. (35 years old na si Vicente)

OSG in its comment said that Ching, being the “legitimate child of a Chinese father and a
Filipino mother born under the 1935 Consitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, UNLESS upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship”. Further
OSG clarifies that there are two conditions that must concur in order that the election of the
Philippine citizenship may be effective, name (a) the mother of the person making the
election must be a Filipino citizen (b) said election must be made ‘upon reaching the age of
majority’. OSG said that “upon reaching the age of majority has been interpreted by the
Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years upon reaching the age of 21.

In conlusion, OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the “reasonable time”.

Ching still elected Philippine Citizenship on July 1999. He find refuge in the case of Mallare.

ISSUE:

W/N he elected Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable time”.

HELD:

No. Ching failed to validly elect Philippine Citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed from
the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect is
clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing “upon reaching the age
of majority”. He offered no reasons why there was delay. All that is required of the elector is
to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship, and file the same with the
nearest civil registry. His unreasonable and unexplained delay cannot be simply glossed
over. Philippine Citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when
needed and suppressed when convenient.

The court also ruled that the case of Mallare is not relevant since first Mallare was not born
under 1935 constitution and the enactment of CA no. 625 hence procedure is not applicable
to him. Second, Mallare was already a Filipino, being a natural child of a Filipino mother.

Court resolves to DENY Vicente Ching’s application for admission to the Philippine Bar. 

Republic v. Lim
The constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino Citizenship apply only to
legitimate children. The reason is because illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of their mother and follow her nationality.

FACTS:

This case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with RTC of Lanao Del Norte. After hearing, the court
directed the Civil Registrar to make the following corrections in the birth records of
petitioner Lim.

1. Her family name from “YO” to “YU”

2. Her father’s name from “Yo DIU To” to “YU DIOTO”
3. Her status from “legitimate” to “illegitimate”
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino
 Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed in the trial court’s
decision. Upon petition for review on certiorari, republic assailed as one of the errors, that
CA erred in ordering the correction of citizenship of respondent Lim from “Chinese” to
“Filipino” despite the fact that the respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the
legal requirements for election of citizenship.

ISSUE:

W/N CA erred in affirming the decision of RTC of Lanao Del Sur

HELD:

No, the court did not commit any error. Further, it was ruled in this case that the
constitutional and statutory requirement of electing Filipino Citizenship apply only to
legitimate children, hence, not applicable in the case of Lim since she is an illegitimate
daughter of her Chinese father and Filipina mother in the absence of marriage between the
two. As such she is not required to comply with the said requirements since she
automatically became Filipino upon birth.

The ruling in the case of Mallare was also reiterated in this case. The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of
Philippine Citizenship.

The records show that respondent Lim already registered as a voter of Misasmis Oriental
when she was 18. Needless to say, it constitutes as a positive act of election of Philippine
Citizenship. 

Tecson v. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having allegedly
misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a natural
Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition, holding that
Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending that only the
Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.

Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for the presidency
or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-
 President", of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of "candidates" for
President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death certificate
was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of any other evidence, Lorenzo’s
place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of residence prior his death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would have extended to his son, Allan---respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a Filipino
citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The 1935 Constitution on
citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, thus, the allegation of
bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only before the assailed marriage had no
bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established paternal filiation evidenced by the public
documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of
Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Republic of the Ph v. Sagun

There is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for the judicial declaration of
citizenship of an individual. Courts of Justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies,
the declaration of Sagun’s election of Philippine citizenship is beyond judicial power.

FACTS:

Respondent Sagun in this case is a legitimate child of Albert Chan (Chinese) and Marta
Borromeao (Filipino). Sagun was born on Agust 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect
Philippine Citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. In 1992, Sagun, at the age of 33
finally found her forever and married Alex Sagun. She also executed an Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of Ph. It was notarized but not registered.

Sometimes in 2005, respondent Sagun applied for a Philippine passport. It was denied due
to the citizenship of her father and there being no annotation on her birth cert that she
elected Ph citizenship. Because of that, Sagun thought that it was proper to seek judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship. She was wrong. Really wrong. The trial
court of Baguio rendered a decision granting Sagun’s petition. So in the end she was
declared a Filipino citizen.

OSG filed instant recourse. OSG as petitioner, contends that the judicial declaration of
election of citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally impermissible. Further, OSG
asserted that the election was not done within a “reasonale time”. It was done 12 years
after Sagun reach the age of majority. Sagun basiscally slept on her right. She was busy
finding love.

Sagun, on the other hand, argues that by virtue of her positive acts, she has effectively
elected Philippine citizenship. She speaks Ilocano, tagalong, attendant local schools in
Baguio and a registered voter.

ISSUE:

W/N OSG’s petition is meritorious

HELD:

Yes. The court has consistently ruled that there really is no proceeding established by law,
or by the rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There is no
specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare that a given
person is part of our citizenry. Clearly, the judicial declaration was not within the court’s
competence.

Also, Sagun is a Chinese citizen. Why? because under Section 1(4) of the 1935 consi, the
citizenship of a legitimate child born of Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, UNLESS, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. (sagun was born on 1959 kaya she is under 1935 consti)

Sagun also failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election. She did not
execute a sworn statement of elections of Philippine citizenship. She only submitted oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached age of majority, which was unregistered. in
addition, it was not done within reasonable time.

Furthermore, under Alien Registration Act of 1950, aliens are first required to register as an
alien and may file a petition with the immigration for the cancellation of their alien
certificate of registration if they wish to elect Philippine citizenship. (so basically, you
register so that the immigration may subsequently cancel registration haha)

Ma. v. Fernandez
Registration is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. In the
case of Pascual v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that registration pertains to the entry
made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and
other real rights. Registration is made for the purpose of notification.

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case are the children of a Taiwanese man and a Filipina woman. They
were all raised and have resided in this country for almost 60 years. They do not speak or
understand Chinese language. Immediately upon reaching the age of 21, they claimed
Philippine citizenship. They were able to comply with the first two requirements as provided
under CA 625 (statement of election under oath and oath of allegiance to the consti and the
govt of the ph), however they failed to register the necessary documents.

Complaint was filed against them. It was alleged that they were undesirable and
overstaying aliens. Subsequently, Bureau of Immig charged them for violation of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

They sought nullification of such order before the court of appeals. CA dismissed their case.
CA ruled that they failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law providing for the
procedure and conditions for their continued

ISSUE:

W/N petitioners are still allowed to complete the statutory requirement for such election of
citizenship.

HELD:

Yes. The court ruled that registration of the documents of election beyond the frame should
be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently and
continuously been done. The right of to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and
they should be allowed to comply with the last requirement.

The court further elucidated more on the importance of registration. They cited the case of
Pascua v. CA, which ruled that the purpose of registration is to give notification to bind third
persons. Registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. It is not a requirement for the
validity of a contract, for the effect of registration is to bind third persons.

Why is there a need to bind third persons? The purpose is to protect the rights of third
persons and the owner’s right. It is a means to prevent perpetration of fraud.

In the case at bar, the actual exercise of Philippine citizenship for over a half century is
actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration. In the end,
SC ordered that the decision of CA be set aside.

Republic of Philippines v. Batuigas

Types of Naturalization: (1) Judicial Naturalization under CA 473 (2) Administrative
Naturalization under RA 9139 (3) Derivative Naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473

Derivate naturalization is available to alien women married to Filipino husbands found under
Section 15 of CA 473. In this type of naturalization, the alien woman is no longer required
to prove that she possess qualification for naturalization nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization. Foreign women married to Filipino citizen may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens.
Main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of
allegiance among family members.

FACTS:

In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas. On December 2, 2002,
Azucena (already 60 years of age) filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. OSG filed motion to dismiss arguing that Azucena failed to alleged that
she is engaged in a lawful occupation or some known lucrative trade. RTC, nevertheless,
ruled in favor of Azucena declaring that she has all the qualification and none of the
disqualification.

OSG contends that, Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement under CA 473
since she is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law to engage directly or indirectly in the
retail trade, hence, she cannot possibly meet the income requirement. It was likewise
disputed that contrary to what Azucena claimed, she cannot own real property in the
country since aliens are precluded from owning lands here in Ph.

CA now dismissed OSG’s appeal. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE:

W/N petition of OSG repeating the same arguments is meritorious

HELD:

Petition lacks merit. The court ruled that, upon marriage of Azucena to a Filipino husband,
by virtue of derivative naturalization , Azucena became ipso facto Philippine citizen and it
is neither necessary for her to prove that she has the qualifications for naturalization at the
time of their marriage nor do she has to submit to judicial naturalization.

Court reiterated the procedure of an alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino
Citizenship as ruled in the case of Mo Ya Lim Yao. The alien woman must first file petition
for cancellation of her Alien Registration Certificate (ACR), alleging among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband’s
citizenship. Upon filing of the petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the
join affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does
not belong to any of the groups disqualified, bureau conducts an investigation and
thereafter promulgates the decision.

Records show however that when Azucena was 32 years of age, she already applied for the
cancellation of her ACR, it was however dismissed because husband’s citizenship was not
proven. As records show before this court, Santiago’s Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. So okay na yan.

As to the OSG’s contention naman that Azucena has no lucrative employment, court says
that Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before she
had to quit her job to assume her family duties. As declared by the CA, it was found that
Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living.

Section 3

Yu v. Defensor-Santiago
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and
explicitly and not left to inference or implication.

FACTS:

Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On February 10, 1978, he
was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was
issued Portuguese Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on
July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July
1986. He also declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed,
specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in
April 1980.

The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed a petition for
habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en
banc. The Court en banc denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his Philippine citizenship

HELD:

Yes, the court considered Yu’s acts as an express renunciation. In the case of Board of
Immigration commissioner v. Go Gallano, Express renunciation was held to mean a
renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference
or implication.

Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese
citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status
as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and
represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized
Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly
inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine
citizenship should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has
become unnecessary as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine
citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when

required and suppressed when convenient.

Frivaldo vs. COMELEC

Forfeiture of US citizenship does not have the effect of automatic restoration of one’s
citizenship in the Philippines that has been earlier renounced and at best he is considered
not a Filipino citizen but a Stateless Individual

FACTS:

Frivaldo was proclaimed governor elect in Sorsogon. His citizenship was later on questioned
by league of municipalities contending that he has been naturalized in US.

Frivaldo’s main contention is that he is a Filipino Citizen because his naturalization was not
“impressed with voluntariness” since it was a measure of protection from persecution of the
Marcos Government. Further, he said that the act of participating in the election, pursuant
to the laws of US, forfeits his American citizenship. The case of Nottebohlm was also cited
by Frivaldo to support his contentions. In this case, a German national’s naturalization in
Liechtenstein (country in Europe between Austria and Switzerland) was not recognized
because it had been obtained for reasons of convenience only.

Frivaldo also said that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because the
Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted.

ISSUE:

W/N Frivaldo’s act of participating in the election forfeits his US citizenship and
automatically restore his Philippine Citizenship

HELD:
No. The court ruled that his act in fact forfeit his US citizenship but it does not ipso facto
restore his Philippine Citizenship and at best he must be considered a stateless individual.
Under CA 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends that by simply filing a
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine
Citizenship.

It was also ruled that Nottebohlm case is not relevant because in that case it dealt with a
conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state
is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the US is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national.

As to the absence of Special Committee, the court declared that if the special committee
had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until
this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Labo v. COMELEC
FACTS:

Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as Filipino Citizen, is a mayor-elect of Baguio. It

was alleged that Mayor Labo lost his Philippine citizenship through naturalization upon
marriage with an Australian National and upon taking an oath of allegiance as an Australian
Citizen.

Their marriage was found to be bigamous therefore it was subsequently annulled. Petitioner
now claims that his naturalization did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship and that it
only made him a dual national.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner Labo was divested of his Philippine citizenship.

HELD:

Yes. CA No. 63 enumerates the modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among
these are (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship;
and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support he constitution or laws of a foreign
country, all of which are applicable to petitioner. It is also worth mentioning that under
Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law”.
Even if it be assumed that his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that
his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.

Moreover, it did not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has
reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the methods provided under CA No. 63 as
amended by PD 725.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon Labo Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines
and therefore DISQUALIFED from continuing to serve as Mayor of Baguio City.

Republic v. De la Rosa
This case highlights the necessity to comply with the procedural aspects of naturalization
proceeding pursuant to RA 530.

FACTS:

Once more, the citizenship of private respondent Frivaldo is put in issue. On September 20,
1991, petitioner filed a petition for naturalization. On January 14, 1992, he manifested his
intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. He asked that the hearing set on
March 16 be cancelled and be moved to January 24. He said that the deadline for the filing
of the cert of candidacy was March 15, one day before the schedule hearing.

Motion was granted and the hearing was moved to February 21, 1992. The said order was
not published nor a copy thereof posted.  Six (6) days later, on February 27, respondent
Judge rendered a decision re-admitting Juan Frivaldo as a citizen of the Republic of the
Philippines. On the same day, Frivaldo was allowed to take his oath of allegiane. Haha ang
bilis! Dapat two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken.

Frivaldo’s main argument is that the rationale of the law imposing the waiting period is to
grant the public an opportunity to investigate the background of the applicant and to oppose
the grant of Philippine citizenship. He alleges that such requirement may be dispensed with,
claiming that his life, both private and public, was well known because of his achievements
as a freedom fighter and a former governor of the Province of Sorsogon for six terms.
Feeling famous si Frivaldo 

ISSUE:

W/N the two-year waiting period before the oath of allegiance can be taken by the applicant
pursuant to RA 530 is violated.

HELD:

Yes, it was violated. The naturalization proceedings were full of procedural flaws, rendering
the decision an anomaly.
It is not up to respondent Frivaldo to decide for himself and to select the requirements
which he believes, even sincerely, are applicable to his case and discard those which he
believes are inconvenient. The law does not distinguish between an applicant who was
formerly a Filipino citizen and one who was never such a citizen.

It was also ruled that trial court never acquired jurisdiction to hear the petition for
naturalization because of the absence of publication and posting requirements, hence, null
and void. Under Section 9 of the said law, the petition for naturalization and the order
setting it for hearing must be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in
the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general circulation (Po Yo Bi v. Republic).
Moreover, the publication and posting both of the petition and order must be in its full text
for the court to acquire jurisdiction (Sy v. Republic).

Procedural flaws in the proceedings: (1) hearing of the petition was set ahead of the
scheduled date of hearing without publication (2) petition was heard within 6 months from
the last publication (3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the
finality of the judgment (4) he took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year
waiting period.

WHEREFORE, Frivaldo is declared NOT a citizen and therefore DISQUALIFED from continuing
to serve as Governon and is ordered to VACATE and to SURRENDER the same to the Vice
Gov.

Mo Ya Lim v. Commission of Immigration

An alien woman, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized ipso
facto, provided that she does not possess all of the disqualifications enumerated in CA 473.
(Sections 15 and 4)

FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippine as a non-immigrant on
Febuaryr 8, 1961. She stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and
she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her grand uncle. She was then
permitted to come into the Philippines for a period of one month.

After repeated extension, she was allowed to stay until Feb 13, 1962. But on January 25,
1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino Citizen.

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her

bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, she brought an action for injunction.
At the hearing, it was found out that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either
English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
except one, Rosa. She did not known the names of her brothers in law or sister in law.
Because of this, prayer of preliminary injunction was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
W/N Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Yes. Under section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is
not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise,
an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here follows the
Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen,
provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Seciton 4 reads:

1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations or group of

persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war, during the period of
such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose laws does not
grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Governor of Hong Kong v. Olalia

FACTS:
Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an advantage as
agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong.
The Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of
respondent Muñoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day,
NBI agents arrested him. He questioned the validity of the order of arrest.

The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice
thru DOJ.

DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of
respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the
petitioner, initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law
granting bail in extradition cases and that private responded is a “flight risk”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.

HELD:

The court if bail can be granted in deportation cases, the court sees no justification why it
should not also be allowed in extradition cases. After all, both are administrative
proceedings whre innocent or guilt is not an issue. Clearly, the right of prospective extradite
to apply for bail must be viewed in the light of various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights.

In the case of Mejoff, court ruled that the foreign nationals against whom no formal charges
have been filed may be released on bail pending finality of an order of deportation. Court in
Mejoff relied upon the Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainee’s
right to bail.

While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extradite, however,
there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail

Further, while the time-honored principle of pacta sunt suervanda (“Agreements must be
kept”) demands that the Philippines honor its obligation under the Extradition treaty, it does
not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligation, the Philippines should
diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, the rights
are guaranteed not only by our constitution, but also by international conventions, to which
the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extradite to his right to apply
for bail, provided that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.

International School Alliance Educators v. Quisumbing

“Equal pay for equal work” persons who work with substantially equal qualification, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule
applies to the School notwithstanding its “international character.

FACTS:

Private respondent in this case is an international school established primarily for

dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. They hire both
foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty.

The school grants foreign hires certain benefits not available to the local hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and allowance. They were also paid a
salary rate 25% more than the local hires. They justified these difference by saying that the
foreign hires have to endure (a) dislocation factor and (b) limited tenure
 On June 1995, negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held. The
representative of the local faculty (The Union) contested the difference in salaray rates
between foreign and local-hires.

Petitioner claims that the classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos
and that the grant higher salary constitutes racial discrimination. So basically, they invoke
equal protection clause.

The private respondent’s argument is that

The acting secretary of DOLE, resolved the issue in favor of the private respondent. He said
that the Union cannot invoke equal protection. To him, the classification is reasonable
because it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class.

Quisumbing, as the DOLE Secretary denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:

W/N there has been discrimination

HELD:

Yes. The Constitution specifically provides that the labor is entitled to “humane conditions of
work.” These conditions are not restricted to physical workplace but also includes the
manner by which the employers treat their employees.

The Constitution also directs the state to promote “equality of employment opportunities for
all”. Similarly, the labor code provides that the State shall “ensure eequal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed.”

If an employer accords the employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that
these employees perform equal work.

When the school contends that the petitioner has not adduced evidence that the local hires
perform work equal to that of the foreign hires, the court says that to require the employee
to explain why he receives less is like adding insult to the injury. Hence, it is for the
employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

Carino v. CHR
CHR has power to investigate. Our judicial bodies have power to adjudicate.

FACTS:

On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and
decided to stage rallies in order to air grievances.
 The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the
Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education
served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to
heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were
administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807

As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90 days. The issue was
then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the
dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was
appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed
an action for certiorari regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case.
Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to Secretary Cariño.

ISSUE:

W/N CHR has the power to try and decide and determine certain specific cases such as the
alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights.

HELD:

No, CHR has no power to try and decide cases. The CHR is not competent to try such case.
It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights violation involving
civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and
matters involved therein.

While the Constitution clearly and categorically grants the CHR the power to investigate all
forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights, such is not equivalent to
the power vested in our judicial bodies. To investigate is to examine, explore, delve or
probe into, research on, or study. The purpose of investigation is to discover, to learn or to
obtain information. That’s their power.

To adjudicate, in legal sense, is to “settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine

finally.” Adjudge means to “decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi judicial
powers”.

To investigate is not to adjudicate.

The only thing the commission can do, if it concludes that Sec. Carino was in error, is to
refer the matter to the appropriate government agency or tribunal for assistance; that
would be the Civil Service Commission.

Infant Julian Yusa v. Atty Segui

FACTS:

In this case, petitioner Christina had an amorous relationship with a certain Marcelino
Gicano Constantitno. She became pregnant without the benefit of marriage. Because of
embarrassment, she decided to surrender Baby Julian to the DSWD. Marcelino did not know
anything about this. All along he thought Christina had an abortion. When Marcelino died,
several months after Christina gave birth, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that
there is a Baby Julian. It was an emotional revelation. November 27, 2009, DSWD issued a
certificate declaring that Baby Julian is available for adoption and was subsequently
“matched” with the spouses Medina.

Christina changed her mind. She asked DSWD to cancel adoption proceedings. But atty.
Respondent Segui said that the certificate declaring baby Julian fit for adoption had attained
finality.

DSWD said that should Christina wish to reacquire parental authority and custody over the
baby, she should bring the matter to regular courts.

Christina filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo to obtain custody of Baby
Julian. RTC just dismissed the case because in the end the court ruled that it was a wrong
remedy. Amparo only covers extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance. RTC further
said that the proper thing to do is file a civil case for custody pursuant to the family code
and rule on custody of minors and writ of habeas corpus in relation to custody of minors.

Christina and her counsel (very hard headed) filed petition for certiorari. She assailed that
the life, liberty and security of baby Julian is being violated or threatened by the respondent
DSWD officers. She said that DSWD officers caused her “enforce separation” from baby
Julian amounting to “enforced disappearance”.

ISSUE:

W/N Petition for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and
custody of a minor child.

HELD:

No. The writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The
ruling in the case of Navia v. Pardico was reiterated and the court enumerated the elements
constituting “enforced disappearances”, to wit:

a.) That there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty

b.) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization

c) that it be followed by the State or Political Organization’s refusal to give information as to

the whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition

d) the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from protection of the law for a
prolonged period of time

the court ruled that the third and fourth elements are missing. DSWD officers never
concealed baby Julian’s whereabouts. In fact, Christina obtained a copy of DSWD’s
memorandum explicitly satting that Baby Julian was in the custody of Medina Spouses.
Clearly, she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental authority over the
child and contesting custody over him.
 Navia v. Pardico

FACTS:

A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore. The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur
Pardico (Ben), who were then both staying in her house. When Lolita went out to
investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle. One of them
immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong. Before Lolita could answer,
the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to the security office
of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision. Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the
security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.

Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband Ben, Virginia filed a Petition
for Writ of Amparobefore the RTC of Malolos City. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued
and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the
petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.

Petitioners essentially assail the sufficiency of the amparo petition. They contend that the
writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or
threatened violation of the aggrieved partys right to life, liberty and security are clear.
Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these.
First, the petition is wanting on its face as it failed to state with some degree of specificity
the alleged unlawful act or omission of the petitioners constituting a violation of or a threat
to Bens right to life, liberty and security. And second, it cannot be deduced from the
evidence Virginia adduced that Ben is missing; or that petitioners had a hand in his alleged
disappearance. On the other hand, the entries in the logbook which bear the signatures of
Ben and Lolita are eloquent proof that petitioners released Ben on March 31, 2008 at
around 10:30 p.m. Petitioners thus posit that the trial court erred in issuing the writ and in
holding them responsible for Bens disappearance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper

HELD:

RTCs decision is reversed and set aside.

A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC or The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was promulgated to arrest the
rampant extralegal killings and enforced disappearances in the country. Its purpose is to
provide an expeditious and effective relief "to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity."
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes every human
beings inherent right to life, while Article 9 thereof ordains that everyone has the right to
liberty and security. The right to life must be protected by law while the right to liberty and
security cannot be impaired except on grounds provided by and in accordance with law. This
overarching command against deprivation of life, liberty and security without due process of
law is also embodied in our fundamental law.

The budding jurisprudence on amparo blossomed in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis when this Court
defined enforced disappearances. The Court in that case applied the generally accepted
principles of international law and adopted the International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearances definition of enforced disappearances, as "the
arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the
State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or
by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law."

From the statutory definition of enforced disappearance, thus, we can derive the following
elements that constitute it:
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization;
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give
information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the amparo petition; and,
(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time.
As thus dissected, it is now clear that for the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation
and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must also be
shown and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or
with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization,
followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo
case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of
government participation.

But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough.
It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct
or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any
allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the
government or any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition
whether as responsible or accountable persons.51 Thus, in the absence of an allegation or
proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they
failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely
not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons.

We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against
a private individual or entity. But even if the person sought to be held accountable or
responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here, petitioners are
mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and
nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military
or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-
12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some
governmental involvement. This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

Mijares v. Ranada
FACTS: