Pointers in Labor Law and Social Legislation
Pointers in Labor Law and Social Legislation
Pointers in Labor Law and Social Legislation
Employee’s Compensation (Art. 166, LC): The State shall promote and develop a tax-
exempt employees’ compensation program whereby employees and their dependents, in
the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly secure adequate income
benefit and medical related benefits.
Labor Relations (Art. 211, LC): To promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective
bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial disputes;
To promote free trade unionism as an instrument for the enhancement of democracy and
the promotion of social justice and development;
To foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong and united labor movement;
To promote the enlightenment of workers concerning their rights and obligations as union
members and as employees;
To provide an adequate administrative machinery for the expeditious settlement of labor
or industrial disputes;
To ensure a stable but dynamic and just industrial peace; and
To ensure the participation of workers in decision and policy-making processes affecting
their rights, duties and welfare.
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining,
no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates
of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise
provided under this Code.
Worker’s representation and participation in policy and decision-making (Art. 255,
LC): The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the
employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual
employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to
their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, workers shall have the right, subject
to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate,
to participate in policy and decision-making processes of the establishment where they are
employed insofar as said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided, that
the representatives of the workers in such labor-management councils shall be elected by
at least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (As amended by Section 22,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
To encourage a truly democratic method of regulating the relations between the employers
and employees by means of agreements freely entered into through collective bargaining,
no court or administrative agency or official shall have the power to set or fix wages, rates
of pay, hours of work or other terms and conditions of employment, except as otherwise
provided under this Code.
Tripartism and tripartite conferences (Art. 275, LC): Tripartism in labor relations is
hereby declared a State policy. Towards this end, workers and employers shall, as far as
practicable, be represented in decision and policy-making bodies of the government.
The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives may, from
time to time, call a national, regional, or industrial tripartite conference of representatives
of government, workers and employers for the consideration and adoption of voluntary
codes of principles designed to promote industrial peace based on social justice or to align
labor movement relations with established priorities in economic and social development.
In calling such conference, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may consult with
accredited representatives of workers and employers. (As amended by Section 32, Republic
Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)
Articles1700, Civil Code: Nature of relationship between employer and employee: It is not
merely contractual. Their relation is impressed with public interest that labor contracts
entered into between them must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are
subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects. (Art. 1700,
Civil Code)
B. Construction in favor of labor: Labor contracts are construed as how the parties
intended it to be. But in case of doubt, it shall be construed in favor of the labor. (Art. 1702,
Civil Code)
The Labor Code shall be construed verba legis. But in case of doubt in its implementation
and interpretation, all doubts shall be construed in favor of labor. (Art. 4, Labor Code)
Question: Union filed a Notice of Strike (NOS) against Company on grounds of gross
violation of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) certified the dispute to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. Thereafter, Union filed a second NOS
allegedly over the same CBA violation. Company filed a Motion to Strike Out Notice of
Strike and to refer the dispute to voluntary arbitration, claiming that the Union failed to
exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the 2nd NOS. Union submitted its strike
vote. On the last day of the cooling-off and strike vote periods, the Union officers and
members reported for work but they were allegedly not allowed to enter the company
premises. In protest of what was considered a lock-out, the Union staged a strike on the
same day. Is the strike declared by the Union illegal?
Answer: NO, the declaration of the strike a day before the completion of the cooling-off and
strike vote periods was but a reaction to the company’s locking out the officers and
members of the Union. It is well to stress that under Art. 4 of the Labor Code, “all doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.” In PeÑaflor v.
Outdoor Clothing Manufacturing Corporation, the Court reiterated that the principle laid
down in the law has been extended by jurisprudence to cover doubts in the evidence
presented by the employer and employee.
Answer: NO. In Splash Philippines, Inc. v. Ruizo, the Court said that the 120-day
rule "cannot be used as a cure-all formula for all maritime compensation cases. Its
application must depend on the circumstances of the case, including especially
compliance with the parties' contractual duties and obligations as laid down in the
POEA-SEC and/or their CBA, if one exists." Needless to say, a seafarer cannot claim
full disability benefits on his mere say-so in complete disregard of the POEA-SEC and
the CBA, which are, to reiterate, the law between the parties and which they are
duty bound to observe. And so it must be in Cabatay's case, especially when he
refused the petitioners' offer that his medical condition be referred to a mutually
appointed doctor under Section 19.3 of the TCC-FA, to determine whether, despite
Dr. Tay's combined 36% disability assessment under Annex 3 of the agreement, he
is permanently unfit for further sea service. Absent such a determination
(certification) by a mutually appointed doctor, we hold that Dr. Tay's assessment
should stand. (Marlow Navigation Phils., Inc., et. al., vs. Cabatay, GR No. 212878,
February 01, 2016)
Question: When can the employer be held liable for the death of a seafarer, which
occurred after the termination of the employment contract?
Answer: Section 20(A) of the 1996 Revised POEA-SEC provides that in order to
avail of death benefits, the death of the seafarer must be work-related and should
occur during the effectivity of the employment contract. Under Section 32(A) of
the POEA-SEC, the claimant must still fulfill all the requisites for compensability, to
wit: 1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; 2. The disease
was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3. The
disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the
seafarer. (Balba vs. Tiwala Human Resources, Inc., and/or Togo Maritime Corp.,
GR No. 184933, April 13, 2016)
Question: Does the seafarer have the duty to prove that his work caused his illness
to be entitled to disability benefits?
Answer: YES. The Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (POEA-SEC), particularly Section
20(B) thereof, provides that the employer is liable for disability benefits when the
seafarer suffers from a work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract.
To emphasize, to be compensable, the injury or illness 1) must be work- related and
2) must have arisen during the term of the employment contract. In Jebsen
Maritime, Inc. v. Ravena, the Court held that those diseases not listed as
occupational diseases may be compensated if it is shown that they have been
caused or aggravated by the seafarer’s working conditions. The Court stressed
that while the POEA-SEC provides for a disputable presumption of work-relatedness
as regards those not listed as occupational diseases, this presumption does not
necessarily result in an automatic grant of disability compensation. The claimant
still has the burden to present substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the illness. (Doehle-
Philman Manning Agency, Inc., et. al., vs. Haro, GR No. 206522)
Question: Since 2002, respondent Conag had been deployed annually by petitioner
Scanmaras a bosun's mate aboard foreign vessels owned or operated by its
principal, Crown Ship Management, Inc./Louis Dreyfus Armateurs SAS (Crown
Ship). On March 27, 2009, he was again deployed as a bosun's mate aboard the
vessel MIT Ile de Brehdt. According to him, his job entailed lifting heavy loads and
occasionally, he would skid and fall while at work on deck. On June 19, 2009, as he
was going about his deck duties, he felt numbness in his hip and back. He was given
pain relievers but the relief was temporary. Two months later, the pain recurred
with more intensity, and he was brought to a hospital in Tunisia. On August 25,
2009, Conag was medically repatriated. Upon arrival in Manila on August 27, 2009,
he was referred to the company-designated physicians at the Metropolitan Medical
Center, Marine Medical Services, where he was examined and subjected to
laboratory examinations. The laboratory tests showed that Conag had "Mild Lumbar
Levoconvex Scoliosis and Spondylosis; Right SJ Nerve Root Compression," with an
incidental finding of "Gall Bladder Polyposis v. Cholesterolosis." For over a period of
95 days, he was treated by the company-designated physicians, Drs. Robert Lim and
Esther G. Go, and in their final medical report dated December 1, 2009, they
declared Conag fit to resume sea duties. Later that day, Conag signed a Certificate of
Fitness for Work, written in English and Filipino. Conag claimed that he was
required to sign the certificate as a condition sine qua non for the release of his
accumulated sick pay. Interestingly, however, on February 18, 2010, a mere nine
days after his letter, Conag filed his complaint with the LA for disability benefits,
presumably after he was told that he would not be rehired. Is Conag entitled to
disability benefits?
Answer: NO. It has been held in Philippine Hammonia Ship Agency, Inc. v. Dumadag,
and reiterated in Simbajon, that under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC, the duty to
secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee asking for
disability benefits. Not only did Conag fail to seasonably obtain an opinion from his
own doctor before filing his complaint, thereby permitting the petitioners no
opportunity to evaluate his doctor's assessment, but he also made it impossible for
the parties to jointly seek the opinion of a third doctor precisely because the
petitioners had not known about Dr. Jacinto's opinion in the first place. Indeed, three
months passed before Conag sought to dispute the company-designated physicians'
assessment, and during this interval other things could have happened to cause or
aggravate his injury. In particular, the Court notes that, after he collected his sick
wage, Conag spent two months in his home province and engaged in various
physical activities. In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc. v. Esguerra, this Court
rejected the medical certifications upon which the claimant-seaman anchored his
claim for disability benefits, for being unsupported by diagnostic tests and
procedures which would have effectively disputed the results of the medical
examination in a foreign clinic to which he was referred by his employer. In
Dumadag, where the seafarer's doctor examined him only once, and relied on the
same medical history, diagnoses and analyses produced by the company-designated
specialists, it was held that there is no reason for the Court to simply say that the
seafarer's doctor's findings are more reliable than the conclusions of the company-
designated physicians. (Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., et. al., vs. Emilio Conag,
GR No. 212382, April 6, 2016)
Question: For the seafarer to validly claim disability benefits, is the three-day post-
employment medical examination mandatory?
Answer: YES. The law specifically declares that failure to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the seafarer's forfeiture of
his right to claim benefits thereunder. In Coastal Safeway Marine Services, Inc.
v. Esguerra, this Court expounded on the mandatory reporting requirement
provided under the POEA-SEC and the consequence for failure of the seaman to
comply with the requirement, viz.:
The foregoing provision has been interpreted to mean that it is the company-
designated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman's
disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness, during the
term of the hitter's employment. Conccdedly, this does not mean that the
assessment of said physician is final, binding or conclusive on the claimant, the labor
tribunal or the courts. Should he be so minded, the seafarer has the prerogative to
request a second opinion and to consult a physician of his choice regarding his
ailment or injury, in which case the medical report issued by the latter shall be
evaluated by the labor tribunal and the court, based on its inherent merit. For the
seaman's claim to prosper, however, it is mandatory that he should be
examined by a company-designated physician within three days from his
repatriation. Failure to comply with this mandatory reporting requirement
without justifiable cause shall result in forfeiture of the right to claim the
compensation and disability benefits provided under the POEA-SEC. (Dizon vs.
Naess Shipping Philippines, Inc. and DOLE UK, GR No. 201834, June 1, 2016)
B. Wages
1. Wage versus salary
o Wage – compensation for skilled or unskilled manual labor.
o Salary – paid to white collar workers and denote a higher grade of
employment.
o Wage or Salary includes:
Commission;
Facilities; and
Commodities/Supplements.
2. Payment of wages
o Fair Day’s Wage for a Fair Day’s Labor – (“No Work, No Pay Principle”)
3. Facilities versus supplements
o Facilities – shall include all articles or services for the benefit of the employee
or his family but shall not include tools of the trade or articles or services
primarily for the benefit of the employer or necessary to the conduct of the
employer’s business.
o Part of the wage; Deductible from the wage.
o Supplements – constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits
given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings
or wages.
o Independent of the wage; Not wage deductible.
4. Non-diminution of benefits
o When applicable: The rule is applicable if it is shown that:
o The grant of the benefit is founded on a policy or has ripened into a practice over
a long period.
o The practice is consistent and deliberate.
o The practice is not due to error in the construction or application of a doubtful or
difficult question of law.
o The diminution or discontinuance is done unilaterally by the employer.
General Rule: employees have a vested right over existing benefits voluntarily granted to
them by their employer. Thus, benefits being given to employees cannot be taken back or
reduced unilaterally by the employer because the benefit has become part of the
employment contract, written or unwritten.
Exceptions:
o Correction of error
o Negotiated benefits
o Wage order compliance
o Benefits on reimbursement basis
o Reclassification of position
o Contingent benefits of conditional bonus
o Productivity incentives
5. Wage order, Wage Distortion
o Wage Order – is an order issued by the Regional Board whenever the conditions
in the region so warrant after investigating and studying all pertinent facts and
based on the standards and criteria prescribed by the Labor Code. The Regional
Board proceeds to determine whether to issue the same or not. A wage order
establishes the minimum wage rates to be paid by employers in the region, which
shall in no case be lower than the applicable statutory minimum wage rates.
o Wage Distortion – is a situation where an increase in prescribed wage rates
results in the elimination of severe contraction of intentional quantitative
differences in wage or salary rates between and among employee groups in an
establishment as to effectively obliterate the distinctions embodied in such wage
structure based on skills, length of service or other logical bases of differentiation.
o Elements:
An existing hierarchy of positions with corresponding salary rates;
A significant change or increase in the salary rate of a lower pay class without
a corresponding increase in the salary rate of a higher one;
The elimination of the distinction between the two groups or classes; and
The distortion exists in the same region.
C. Leaves
1. Service Incentive Leave
o SIL is a five-day (5) leave with pay for every employee who has rendered at
least one (1) year of service.
o One (1) year of service is a service within 12 months, whether continuous or
broken, reckoned from the date the employee started working including
authorized absences and paid regular holidays unless the number of working
days in the establishment, as a matter of practice or policy or as provided in
the employment contract is less than 12 months. (Integrated Contractor and
Plumbing Works, Inc. v. NLRC, GR 152427, August 9, 2005)
o SIL does NOT apply to the following:
o Employees of the Government;
o Managerial employees as defined in Book 3;
o Field personnel whose performance is unsupervised or those who are paid a
fixed amount for performing work irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof;
o Those already enjoying Vacation Leave with pay for at least 5 days;
o Those already enjoying said benefits; and
o Those employed in establishments regularly employing less than 10
employees. (IRR Labor Code, Book III, Rule V, Sec.1)
2. Maternity Leave
o Qualifications for Entitlement of Maternity Benefit
o The female member should be employed at the time of delivery, miscarriage or
abortion.
o She must have been given the required notification to the SSS thru her
employer.
o Her employer must have paid at least three (3) months of maternity
contribution within the twelve (12) month period immediately before her
semester of contingency.
o Every pregnant woman in the private sector, whether married or unmarried, is
entitled to maternity leave benefits.
3. Paternity Leave
o Every married male employee in the private sector shall be entitled to
paternity leave benefits of seven (7) days with full pay for the first four
deliveries by his lawful spouse under such terms and conditions as provided
by law. (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8187 for the
Private Sector, Sec. 2)
o Conditions for Entitlement:
o He is an employee at the time of the delivery of his child.
o He is cohabiting with his spouse at the time she gives birth or suffers a
miscarriage.
o He has applied for paternity leave with his employer.
o His wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage.
o Covers only the first four deliveries or miscarriages.
4. Parental Leave for solo parents
o Solo Parent – any individual who falls under any of the following categories:
o A woman who gives birth as a result of rape and other crimes against
chastity even without a final conviction of the offender: Provided, that the
mother keeps and raises the child;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
death of spouse;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood while the
spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at
least one (1) year;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public
medical practitioner;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to legal
separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year, as
long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as declared by a court or
by a church as long as he/she is entrusted with the custody of the children;
o Parent left solo or alone with the responsibility of parenthood due to
abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year;
o Unmarried mother/father who has preferred to keep and rear her/his
child/children instead of having others care for them to give them up to a
welfare institution;
o Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a
child/children;
o Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a
result of the death, abandonment, disappearance or prolonged absence of
the parents or solo parents. (RA 8972)
5. Special Leaves for women workers (Magna Carta for Women)
IV. Post-Employment
A. Employer—employee relationship
1. Tests to determine employer-employee relationship
2. Kinds of employment
Question: For 15 years, LSGI contracted the services of medical professionals, specifically
pediatricians, dentists and a physician, to comprise its Health Service Team (HST). On that
last day school year 2003-2004, the LSGI Head Administrator informed the Medical Service
Team, including herein petitioners, that their contracts will no longer be renewed for the
following school year by reason of LSGI's decision to hire two (2) full-time doctors and
dentists. One of the physicians from the same Health Service Team was hired by LSGI as a
full-time doctor. When petitioners', along with their medical colleagues', requests for
payment of their separation pay were denied, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for separation pay, damages and attorney's fees before the NLRC. The Labor
Arbiter dismissed petitioners' complaint and ruled that complainants, as propounded by
LSGI, were independent contractors under retainership contracts and never became
regular employees of LSGI. Is the LA correct?
Answer: NO. The NLRC correctly identified the existence of an employer-employee
relationship between petitioners and LSGI and not a bilateral independent contractor
relationship. On more than one occasion, the Court recognized certain workers to be
independent contractors: individuals with unique skills and talents that set them apart
from ordinary employees. They were independent contractors because of these unique
skills and talents and the lack of control over the means and methods in the performance of
their work. In some instances, doctors and other medical professional may fall into this
independent contractor category, legitimately providing medical professional services.
However, as has been declared by the-NLRC and the appellate court, petitioners herein
are not independent contractors, rather, they were fixed-term employees. A fixed-
term employment is allowable under the Labor Code only if the term was voluntarily
and knowingly entered into by the parties who must have dealt with each other on
equal terms not one exercising moral dominance over the other. While vague in its
sparseness, the Contract of Retainer very clearly spelled out that LSGI had the power of
control over petitioners. Time and again we have held that the power of control refers to
the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it
essential for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee.
It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that power. (Samonte, et. al., vs. La
Salle Greenhills, Inc., Bro. Bernard S. Oca, GR No. 199683, February 10, 2016)
Question: Are bus drivers and/or conductors with definite routes considered as regular
employees?
Answer: YES. As a general rule, field personnel are those whose performance of their
job/service is not supervised by the employer or his representative, the workplace being
away from the principal office and whose hours and days of work cannot be determined
with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid specific amount for rendering specific
service or performing specific work. If required to be at specific places at specific times,
employees including drivers cannot be said to be field personnel despite the fact that they are
performing work away from the principal office of the employee. In order to monitor their
drivers and/or conductors, as well as the passengers and the bus itself, the bus companies
put checkers, who are assigned at tactical places along the travel routes that are plied by
their buses. The drivers and/or conductors are required to be at the specific bus terminals
at a specified time. In addition, there are always dispatchers in each and every bus
terminal, who supervise and ensure prompt departure at specified times and arrival at the
estimated proper time. Obviously, these drivers and/or conductors cannot be considered
as field personnel because they are under the control and constant supervision of the bus
companies while in the performance of their work. Being engaged in the public utility
business, as bus drivers and/or conductors, they should be considered as regular
employees because they perform tasks which are directly and necessarily connected with
their employer’s business. (Dasco, et. al., vs. Philtranco Service Enterprises Inc., GR No.
211141, June 29, 2016)
On January 1, 1996, the awarded plantation was turned over to qualified agrarian reform
beneficiaries ("ARBs") under the CARL. These ARBs are the same farmers who were
working in the original plantation. They subsequently organized themselves into a multi-
purpose cooperative named "DARBMUPCO." On March 27, 1996, DARBMUPCO entered into
a Banana Production and Purchase Agreement ("BPPA") with DFI. Under the BPPA,
DARBMUPCO and its members as owners of the awarded plantation, agreed to grow and
cultivate only high grade quality exportable bananas to be sold exclusively to DFI. The
BPPA is effective for 10 years. From the start, DARBMUPCO was hampered by lack of
manpower to undertake the agricultural operation under the BPPA because some of its
members were not willing to work. Hence, to assist DARBMUPCO in meeting its production
obligations under the BPPA, DFI engaged the services of the respondent-contractors, who
in turn recruited the respondent-workers. The engagement of the respondent-workers
started a series of labor disputes among DARBMUPCO, DFI and the respondent-contractors.
Who among DFI, DARBMUPCO and the respondent-contractors is the employer of the
respondent- workers?
DFI is the principal. This Court has constantly adhered to the "four-fold test" to determine
whether there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties.1âwphi1 The
four elements of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the power to
control the employee’s conduct.
Of these four elements, it is the power to control which is the most crucial and most
determinative factor, so important, in fact, that, the other elements may even be
disregarded.
That DFI is the employer of the respondent-workers is bolstered by the CA’s finding that
DFI exercises control over the respondent-workers. DFI, through its manager and
supervisors provides for the work assignments and performance targets of the respondent-
workers. The managers and supervisors also have the power to directly hire and terminate
the respondent-workers. Evidently, DFI wields control over the respondent-workers.
(Diamond Farms, Inc., vs. Southern Philippines Federation of Labor (SPFL)-Workers
Solidarity of DARBMUPCO/DIAMOND-SPFL, et. Al., GR Nos. 173254-55 and 173263)
Question: On 23 February 2006, petitioner Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (Manila
Memorial) entered into a Contract of Services with respondent Ward Trading and Services
(Ward Trading). The Contract of Services provided that Ward Trading, as an independent
contractor, will render interment and exhumation services and other related work to
Manila Memorial in order to supplement operations at Manila Memorial Park, Paranaque
City. The employees of Ward Trading worked six days a week for eight hours daily and
were paid P250 per day. Respondents alleged that they asked Manila Memorial to consider
them as regular workers within the appropriate bargaining unit established in the
collective bargaining agreement by Manila Memorial and its union, the Manila Memorial
Park Free Workers Union (MMP Union). Manila Memorial refused the request since
respondents were employed by Ward Trading, an independent labor contractor.
Thereafter, respondents joined the MMP Union. The MMP Union, on behalf of respondents,
sought their regularization which Manila Memorial again declined. Respondents then filed
the complaint. Does an employer-employee relationship exist between Manila Memorial
and respondents?
Answer: YES. A closer look at the Contract of Services reveals that Ward Trading does not
have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machinery, work
premises and other materials since it is Manila Memorial. Respondent Ward is still subject
to petitioner's control as it specifically provides that although Ward shall be in charge of
the supervision over individual respondents, the exercise of its supervisory function is
heavily dependent upon the needs of petitioner Memorial Park. The provisions of the
Service Contract leaves respondent Ward at the mercy of petitioner Memorial Park as the
contract states that the latter may take over if it finds any part of the services to be below
its expectations, including the manner of its performance. Thus, the presumption that Ward
Trading is a labor-only contractor stands. Consequently, Manila Memorial is deemed the
employer of respondents. (Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., vs. Luz, et. al., GR No.
208451, February 03, 2016)
Question: Complainants allege that they are former employees directly hired by
respondent Coca-Cola on different dates from 1984 up to 2000, assigned as regular Route
Helpers under the direct supervision of the Route Sales Supervisors. Their duties consist of
distributing bottled Coca-Cola products to the stores and customers in their assigned
areas/routes. After working for quite sometime as directly-hired employees of Coca-Cola,
complainants were allegedly transferred successively as agency workers to the following
manpower agencies, namely, Lipercon Services, Inc., People's Services, Inc., ROMAC, and
the latest being respondent Interserve Management and Manpower Resources, Inc.
Complainants allege that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) conducted an
inspection of Coca-Cola to determine whether it is complying with the various mandated
labor standards, and relative thereto, they were declared to be regular employees of Coca-
Cola, which was held liable to pay complainants the underpayment of their 13th month
pay, emergency cost of living allowance (ECOLA), and other claims. While admitting
employer-employee relationship with the complainants, nonetheless, respondent
Interserve avers that complainants are not its regular employees as they were allegedly
mere contractual workers whose employment depends on the service contracts with the
clients and the moment the latter sever said contracts, respondent has allegedly no choice
but to either deploy the complainants to other principals, and if the latter are unavailable,
respondent cannot allegedly be compelled to retain them. Who is the employer of the
complainants?
Answer: The contractor, not the employee, has the burden of proof that it has the
substantial capital, investment, and tool to engage in job contracting. Although not the
contractor itself (since Interserve no longer appealed the judgment against it by the Labor
Arbiter), said burden of proof herein falls upon petitioner who is invoking the supposed
status of Interserve as an independent job contractor. It is, thus, evident that Interserve
falls under the definition of a labor-only contractor, under Article 106 of the Labor Code; as
well as Section 5(1) of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as
amended. As for the certification issued by the DOLE stating that Interserve was an
independent job contractor, the Court ruled: The certification issued by the DOLE stating
that Interserve is an independent job contractor does not sway this Court to take it at face
value, since the primary purpose stated in the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve is
misleading. According to its Articles of Incorporation, the principal business of Interserve is
to provide janitorial and allied services. The delivery and distribution of Coca-Cola
products, the work for which respondents were employed and assigned to petitioner, were
in no way allied to janitorial services. (Quintanar, et., al., vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers,
Philippines, GR No. 210565, June 28, 2016)
B. Termination of Employment
1. Termination by Employee
a. Resignation versus Constructive dismissal
Question: La Suerte is a recruitment agency duly authorized by the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) to deploy workers for overseas employment. On
March 20, 2009, La Suerte hired Iladan to work as a domestic helper in Hongkong for a
period of two years with a monthly salary of HK$3,580.00. On July 20, 2009, Iladan was
deployed to her principal employer in Hongkong, Domestic Services International
(Domestic Services), to work as domestic helper for Ms. Muk Sun Fan. On July 28, 2009 or
barely eight days into her job, Iladan executed a handwritten resignation letter. On August
6, 2009, in consideration of P35,000.00 financial assistance given by Domestic Services,
Iladan signed an Affidavit of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim duly subscribed before Labor
Attache Leonida V. Romulo (Labor Attache Romulo) of the Philippine Consulate General in
Hongkong. On the same date, an Agreement, was signed by Iladan, Conciliator-Mediator
Maria Larisa Q. Diaz (Conciliator-Mediator Diaz) and a representative of Domestic Services,
whereby Iladan acknowledged that her acceptance of the financial assistance would
constitute as final settlement of her contractual claims and waiver of any cause of action
against respondents and Domestic Services. The Agreement was also subscribed before
Labor Attache Romulo. On August 10, 2009, Iladan returned to the Philippines. Thereafter,
or on November 23, 2009, Iladan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, refund of placement
fee, payment of salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of the contract, as well as
moral and exemplary damages, against respondents. Was Illadan illegally dismissed?
Answer: NO. In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proving that the
employee's dismissal was legal. However, to discharge this burden, the employee must first
prove, by substantial evidence, that he had been dismissed from employment. It is a settled
jurisprudence that it is incumbent upon an employee to prove that his resignation is not
voluntary. However, Iladan did not adduce any competent evidence to prove that
respondents used force and threat. For intimidation to vitiate consent, the following
requisites must be present; (1) that the intimidation paused the consent to be given; (2)
that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful; (3) that the threat be real or serious, there
being evident disproportion between the evil and the resistance which all men can offer,
leading to the choice of doing the act which is forced on the person to do as the lesser evil;
and (4) that it produces a well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it
comes has the necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury to his person or
property. In the instant case, not one of these essential elements was amply proven by
[Iladan]. Proof of an irregularity in execution of the Quitclaim is absolutely essential. The
Agreement likewise bears the signature of Conciliator-Mediator Diaz. Thus, the signatures
of these officials sufficiently prove that Iladan was duly assisted when she signed the
waiver and settlement. Concededly, the presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. In this case, no
such evidence was presented. (Iladan vs. La Suerte International Manpower Agency,
Inc., and Lao, GR No. 203882, January 11, 2016)
Question: The case stems from a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims filed
by Teodora F. Campo (respondent) against the petitioners, wherein she claimed that she
worked for STWC as a weaving machine operator beginning June 11, 1999, until she was
unlawfully dismissed from employment on November 21, 2010. Prior to her dismissal, she
was suspended for one week beginning November 14, 2010 after a stitching machine that
she was operating overheated and emitted smoke on November 13, 2010. When the
respondent tried to report back to work on November 21, 2010, she was denied entry by
the STWC's security guard, reportedly upon the instructions of Arcenal. For their defense,
the petitioners argued that the respondent, who was hired only in June 2009, voluntarily
resigned from STWC after she was reprimanded for poor job performance. They submitted
a handwritten resignation letter allegedly executed by the respondent on November 13,
2010, together with the Waiver, Release and Quitclaims Statement that she supposedly
signed following her receipt of P30,000.00 from STWC. The respondent, however, denied
having executed the resignation letter, the quitclaim, and the supposed receipt of the
P30,000.00. Was respondent illegally dismissed?
Question: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her complaint for
illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, nonpayment of overtime pay, and nonpayment of
service incentive leave pay. The petitioner averred that after the administrative hearing she
was found to have violated the company rule on the timely issuance of the invoices that had
resulted in delay in the payment of buyers considering that the payment had depended
upon the receipt of the invoices; that she had been suspended from her employment as a
consequence; that after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed
up her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then informed her that
the management did not approve the benefits equivalent to 86% of her salary rate applied
for, but only 1/2 month for every year of service; and that disappointed with the outcome,
she had then brought her complaint against the petitioners. Was Villa illegally dismissed?
Answer: Villa's application for early retirement did not manifest her intention to sever the
employer- employee relationship. Although she applied for early retirement, she did so
upon the belief that she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As
such, her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly and
freely given.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based on
their voluntary agreement that upon reaching a certain age, the employee agrees to sever
his employment. The employee's intent is decisive. In determining such intent, the relevant
parameters to consider are the fairness of the process governing the retirement decision,
the payment of stipulated benefits, and the absence of badges of intimidation or coercion.
In case of early retirement programs, the offer of benefits must be certain while the
acceptance to be retired should be absolute. The acceptance by the employees
contemplated herein must be explicit, voluntary, free and uncompelled.
In Jaculbe v. Silliman University, we elucidated that: [A]n employer is free to impose a
retirement age less than 65 for as long as it has the employees' consent. Stated conversely,
employees are free to accept the employer's offer to lower the retirement age if they
feel they can get a better deal with the retirement plan presented by the employer.
Thus, having terminated petitioner solely on the basis of a provision of a retirement
plan which was not freely assented to by her, respondent was guilty of illegal
dismissal.
Under the circumstances, the CA did not err in declaring the petitioner guilty of illegal
dismissal for violating Article 282 of the Labor Code and the twin notice rule.
Question: For almost 22 years, Mina was a high school teacher enjoying a
permanent status in DWCL’s high school department. In 2002, he was appointed as
an associate professor at the college department but shortly thereafter, or on June 1,
2003, he was appointed as a college laboratory custodian. He was also divested of
his teaching load. His appointment even became contractual in nature and was
subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further notification."
Aside from this, Mina was the only one among the high school teachers transferred
to the college department who was divested of teaching load. Does this tantamount
to constructive dismissal?
Answer: YES. Constructive dismissal is a dismissal in disguise. There is cessation of
work in constructive dismissal because ‘"continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a
diminution in pay’ and other benefits." To be considered as such, an act must be a
display of utter discrimination or insensibility on the part of the employer so intense
that it becomes unbearable for the employee to continue with his employment. The
law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect
their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer. Clearly, Mina’s new
duties as laboratory custodian were merely perfunctory and a far cry from his
previous teaching job, which involved the use of his mental faculties. And while
there was no proof adduced showing that his salaries and benefits were diminished,
there was clearly a demotion in rank. (Divine Word College of Laoag vs. Mina, GR
No. 195155, April 13 2016)
3. Termination by Employer
a. Just Causes
Jonas Michael R. Garza v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., et al. G.R. No. 180972. January
20, 2014: The burden is on the employer to prove that the termination was for valid cause.
Unsubstantiated accusations or baseless conclusions of the employer are insufficient legal
justifications to dismiss an employee. “The unflinching rule in illegal dismissal cases is that
the employer bears the burden of proof.” Embezzlement and failure to remit collections can
only be sustained if the employee actually collected the amounts due to the company.
b. Serious Misconduct
i. Requisites:
1. The misconduct must be serious;
2. It must relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and
3. It must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer.
Question: On November 14, 2005, CPMPC hired Carbonilla, Jr. as a Credit and Collection
Manager. Sometime in 2007, CPMPC underwent a reorganization whereby Carbonilla, Jr.
was also assigned to perform the duties of Human Resources Department (HRD) Manager.
In 2008, he was appointed as Legal Officer and subsequently, held the position of Legal and
Collection Manager. However, beginning February 2008, CPMPC, through its HRD Manager,
Ma. Theresa R. Marquez (HRD Manager Marquez), sent various memoranda to Carbonilla,
Jr. seeking explanation on the various infractions he allegedly committed. Unconvinced by
Carbonilla, Jr.'s explanations, CPMPC scheduled several clarificatory hearings, but the
former failed to attend despite due notice. Later, CPMPC conducted a formal investigation
where it ultimately found Carbonilla, Jr. to have committed acts prejudicial to CPMPC's
interests. As such, CPMPC, CEO Quevedo, sent Carbonilla, Jr. a Notice of Dismissal dated
August 5, 2008 informing the latter of his termination on the grounds of: (a) loss of trust
and confidence; (b) gross disrespect; (c) serious misconduct; (d) gross negligence; (e)
commission of a crime of falsification/inducing Aguipo to violate the law or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code; and (e) committing acts highly prejudicial to the interest
of the cooperative. Consequently, Carbonilla, Jr. filed the instant case for illegal dismissal,
non-payment of salaries, 13th month pay, as well as damages and backawages, against
CPMPC.In defense, CPMPC maintained that the totality of Carbonilla, Jr.'s infractions was
sufficient to warrant his dismissal, and that it had complied with the procedural due
process in terminating him. Did Carbonilla’s acts constitute serious misconduct and loss of
trust and confidence?
Answer: Misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment. For misconduct to be considered as a just cause for termination,
the following requisites must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate
to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful
intent. All of the foregoing requisites have been duly established in this case.
Records reveal that Carbonilla, Jr. s serious misconduct consisted of him frequently
exhibiting disrespectful and belligerent behavior, not only to his colleagues, but also to his
superiors. He even used his stature as a law graduate to insist that he is "above" them, often
using misguided legalese to weasel his way out of the charges against him, as well as to
strong-arm his colleagues and superiors into succumbing to his arrogance
For another, Carbonilla, Jr.'s dismissal was also justified on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. According to jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence will validate an
employee's dismissal when it is shown that: (a) the employee concerned holds a position of
trust and confidence; and ( b) he performs an act that would justify such loss of trust and
confidence. There are two (2) classes of positions of trust: first, managerial employees
whose primary duty consists of the management of the establishment in which they are
employed or of a department or a subdivision thereof, and to other officers or members of
the managerial staff; and second, fiduciary rank-and-file employees, such as cashiers,
auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal exercise of their functions,
regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. These employees, though rank-
and-file, are routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer's money or
property, and are thus classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
The totality and gravity of Carbonilla, Jr. 's infractions throughout the course of his
employment completely justified CPMPC's decision to finally terminate his employment.
The Court's pronouncement in Realda v. New Age Graphics, Inc. is instructive on this matter,
to wit: The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed
upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner should not be taken
singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct and
ability separate and independent of each other. Indeed, the employer cannot be
compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to
its interests. (Cebu People’s Multi-purpose Cooperative and Quevedo vs. Carbonilla, Jr.,
GR No. 212070, January 27, 2016)
Question: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of respondent Brent Hospital and
Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in 2006.
The cause of suspension was Cadiz's Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting
to Unwed Pregnancy. It appears that Cadiz became pregnant out of wedlock, and Brent
imposed the suspension until such time that she marries her boyfriend in accordance with
law. Cadiz then filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice,
Constructive Dismissal, Non-Payment of Wages and Damages with prayer for
Reinstatement. Was Cadiz illegally dismissed?
Answer: YES. The foregoing circumstances, however, do not readily equate to disgraceful
and immoral conduct. Brent's Policy Manual and Employee's Manual of Policies do not
define what constitutes immorality; it simply stated immorality as a ground for disciplinary
action. Instead, Brent erroneously relied on the standard dictionary definition of
fornication as a form of illicit relation and proceeded to conclude that Cadiz's acts fell
under such classification, thus constituting immorality. Jurisprudence has already set the
standard of morality with which an act should be gauged - it is public and secular, not
religious. Whether a conduct is considered disgraceful or immoral should be made in
accordance with the prevailing norms of conduct, which, as stated in Leus, refer to those
conducts which are proscribed because they are detrimental to conditions upon which
depend the existence and progress of human society. The fact that a particular act does
not conform to the traditional moral views of a certain sectarian institution is not sufficient
reason to qualify such act as immoral unless it, likewise, does not conform to public and
secular standards. More importantly, there must be substantial evidence to establish that
premarital sexual relations and pregnancy out of wedlock is considered disgraceful or
immoral. (Capin-Cadiz vs. Brent Hospital and Colleges, GR No. 187417, February 24,
2016)
Question: On November 25, 1985, respondent was initially employed by petitioner
Premiere Development Bank (now Security Bank Savings Corporation [SBSC]) as
messenger until his promotion as loans processor at its Sangandaan Branch.
Thereafter, he was appointed as Acting Branch Accountant and, in June 2007, as
Acting Branch Manager. On March 26, 2008, he was assigned to its Quezon Avenue
Branch under the supervision of Branch Manager Corazon Pinero (Pinero) and held
the position of Customer Service Operations Head (CSOH) tasked with the
safekeeping of its checkbooks and other bank forms. On July 22, 2008, respondent
received a show-cause memorandum from Ms. Ruby O. Go, head of West Regional
Operations, charging him of violating the bank's Code of Conduct when he
mishandled various checkbooks under his custody. The matter was referred to
SBSC's Investigation Committee which discovered, among others, that as of July 11,
2008, forty-one (41) pre-encoded checkbooks of the Quezon Avenue Branch were
missing. Can separation pay be given despite the validity of the employee’s
dismissal?
Answer: The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is primarily
determined by the cause of the dismissal. In the case at bar, respondent's
established act of repeatedly allowing Branch Manager Pinero to bring the
checkbooks and bank forms outside of the bank's premises in violation of the
company's rules and regulations had already been declared by the LA to be gross
and habitual neglect of duty under Article 282 of the Labor Code. The infractions,
while not clearly indicative of any wrongful intent, is, nonetheless, serious in nature
when one considers the employee's functions, rendering it inequitable to award
separation pay based on social justice. It bears stressing that the banking industry is
imbued with public interest. All throughout, there is no showing that he questioned
the acts of Branch Manager Pinero; neither did he take it upon himself to report said
irregularities to a higher authority. Hence, under these circumstances, the award of
separation pay based on social justice would be improper. (Security Bank Savings
Corporation vs. Singson, GR No.214230, February 10, 2016)
c. Willful Disobedience or Insubordination
ii. Requisites:
1. The employee’s assailed conduct has been willful or intentional, the willfulness
being characterized by a “wrongful and perverse attitude”; and
2. In connection to the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.
Question: Is the employee’s failure to meet a company imposed quota equivalent to gross
inefficiency?
Answer: - In fine, an employee’s failure to meet sales or work quotas falls under the
concept of gross inefficiency, which in turn is analogous to gross neglect of duty that is a
just cause for dismissal under Article 282 of the Code. However, in order for the quota
imposed to be considered a valid productivity standard and thereby validate a dismissal,
managements prerogative of fixing the quota must be exercised in good faith for the
advancement of its interest. The duty to prove good faith, however, rests with WWWEC as
part of its burden to show that the dismissal was for a just cause. WWWEC must show that
such quota was imposed in good faith. (Aliling vs. Feliciano 671 SCRA 186, G.R. No.
185819, April 25, 2012)
h. Authorized Causes
a. Automation / Robotics – installation of labor-saving devices.
b. Redundancy – exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is
reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise.
i. Requisites of a Valid Redundancy Program:
1. Good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant positions; and
2. Fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant such as but not limited to:
a. Preferred status;
b. Efficiency; and
c. Seniority
c. Retrenchment (Downsizing)
i. Reduction of personnel usually due to poor financial returns so as to cut down
on costs of operations in terms of salaries and wages to prevent bankruptcy of
the company.
ii. Linked with losses; it is a cost-cutting measure made immediately necessary by
business reduction or reverses.
1. Requirements for Valid Retrenchment
a. Retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business
losses, which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
b. The employer served written notice both to the employees and to the
DOLE at least one (1) month prior to the intended date of retrenchment;
c. The employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to
one month pay or at least one-half month pay for every year of service;
d. The employer exercises it prerogative to retrench employees in good faith
for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the
employees’ right to security of tenure; and
e. The employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would
be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as
status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age and financial hardship for
certain workers.
Question: Arriola, a licensed general surgeon, was offered by SNC-Lavalin, through
its letter, dated May 1, 2008, the position of Safety Officer in its Ambatovy Project
site in Madagascar. After three months, Arriola received a notice of pre-termination
of employment, dated September 9, 2009, from SNC-Lavalin. It stated that his
employment would be pre-terminated effective September 11, 2009 due to
diminishing workload in the area of his expertise and the unavailability of
alternative assignments. Consequently, on September 15, 2009, Arriola was
repatriated.Aggrieved, Arriola filed a complaint against the petitioners, among
others,for illegal dismissal. The petitioners denied the charge of illegal dismissal
against them. They claimed that SNC-Lavalin was greatly affected by the global
financial crises during the latter part of 2008. The economy of Madagascar, where
SNC-Lavalin had business sites, also slowed down. Was the authorized cause for
dismissal proven?
Answer: NO. The Court finds that Arriola was not validly dismissed. The petitioners
simply argued that they were suffering from financial losses and Arriola had to be
dismissed. It was not even clear what specific authorized cause, whether
retrenchment or redundancy, was used to justify Arriola's dismissal. Worse, the
petitioners did not even present a single credible evidence to support their claim of
financial loss. (Industrial Personnel & Management Services, Inc., et. al., vs. De
Vera and Arriola, GR No. 205703, March 07, 2016)
Question: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a station
services agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby Synergy provided
janitors and station attendants to PAL at Mactan airport. Respondents were among
the personnel of Synergy posted at PAL to carry out the contracted tasks. Claiming
to be performing duties directly desirable and necessary to the business of PAL, the
respondents, along with 12 other co-employees, filed complaints for regularization
of their status as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and non-payment of
premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay and allowances. Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases
were pending in the CA, PAL terminated its service agreements with Synergy
effective June 30, 1998, alleging serious business losses. Consequently, Synergy also
terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who forthwith filed
individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn filed a third-
party complaint against Synergy. Was there valid retrenchment?
Answer: NO. The Court held that PAL failed to establish such economic losses which
rendered impossible its compliance with the order to accept the respondent as
regular employees. While retrenchment is a valid exercise of management
prerogative, it is well settled that economic losses as a ground for dismissing an
employee is factual in nature, and in order for a retrenchment scheme to be valid, all
of the following elements under Article 283 of the Labor Code must concur or be
present, to wit:
. (1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent
business losses which, if already incurred, are not merely de minimis, but
substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only expected, are reasonably
imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer;
. (2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to
the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the
intended date of retrenchment;
(3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half QA) month pay for every
year of service, whichever is higher
(4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in
good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent
the employees' right to security of tenure; and,
(5) That the employer uses fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who
would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such
as status, efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for
certain workers.
The absence of one element renders the retrenchment scheme an irregular exercise
of management prerogative. The employer's obligation to exhaust all other means to
avoid further losses without retrenching its employees is a component of the first
element enumerated above. To impart operational meaning to the constitutional
policy of providing full protection to labor, the employer's prerogative to bring
down labor costs by retrenching must be exercised essentially as a measure of last
resort, after less drastic means have been tried and found wanting. (PAL, Inc. vs.
Ligan, et. al., GR No. 203932, June 08, 2016)
Question: The instant case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, payment
of backwages and other benefits, and regularization of employment filed by Allan
Lapastora (Lapastora) and Irene Ubalubao (Ubalubao) against Olympic Housing, Inc.
(OHI). Lapastora and Ubalubao alleged that they worked as room attendants of OHI
from March 1995 and June 1997, respectively, until they were placed on floating
status on February 24, 2000, through a memorandum sent by Fast Manpower. To
establish employer-employee relationship with OHI, Lapastora and Ubalubao
alleged that they were directly hired by the company and received salaries directly
from its operations clerk, Myrna Jaylo (Jaylo).
Prior to their dismissal, they were subjected to investigations for their alleged
involvement in the theft of personal items and cash belonging to hotel guests and
were summarily dismissed by OHI despite lack of evidence. For their part, OHI and
Limcaoco alleged that Lapastora and Ubalubao were not employees of the company
but of Fast Manpower, with which it had a contract of services, particularly, for the
provision of room attendants. They claimed that Fast Manpower is an independent
contractor as it (1) renders janitorial services to various establishments in Metro
Manila, with 500 janitors under its employ; (2) maintains an office where janitors
assemble before they are dispatched to their assignments; (3) exercises the right to
select, refuse or change personnel assigned to OHI; and (4) supervises and pays the
wages of its employees. Was Lapastora illegally dismissed?
Answer: YES. Indisputably, Lapastora was a regular employee of OHI. As found by
the LA, he has been under the continuous employ of OHI since March 3, 1995 until
he was placed on floating status in February 2000. His uninterrupted employment
by OHI, lasting for more than a year, manifests the continuing need and desirability
of his services, which characterize regular employment. Article 280 of the Labor
Code provides as follows:
Art. 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement
to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties,
an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
On the procedural aspect, OHI admittedly failed to observe the twin notice rule in
termination cases. As a rule, the employer is required to furnish the concerned
employee two written notices: (1) a written notice served on the employee
specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side; and (2) a written notice of
termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all
the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination. In the
present case, Lapastora was not informed of the charges against him and was denied
the opportunity to disprove the same. He was summarily terminated from
employment. (Olympia Housing, Inc. vs. Lapastora and Ubalubao, GR No. 187691,
January 13, 2016)
b. Retirement
i. Management Prerogative
a. Discipline
b. Transfer of employees
Question: Echo is a provider of warehousing management and delivery services. King 8
Commercial Corporation (King 8), Echo's predecessor, initially employed Cortes and
Somido. Echo thereafter absorbed the respondents as employees. In 2008, Somido was
made a Warehouse Checker, while Cortes, a Forklift Operator. In January of 2009, the
respondents and their co-workers formed Obrero Pilipino-Echo 2000 Commercial
Chapter (Union). Cortes was elected as Vice-President while Somido became an active
member. The respondents claimed that the Union's President, Secretary and one of the
board members were subsequently harassed, discriminated and eventually terminated
from employment by Echo. In May of 2009, Echo received information about shortages
in peso value arising from the movement of products to and from its warehouse. After
an immediate audit, Echo suspected that there was a conspiracy among the employees
in the warehouse. Since an uninterrupted investigation was necessary, Echo, in the
exercise of its management prerogative, decided to re- assign the staff. The respondents
were among those affected. On July 7, 2009, Enriquez issued a memorandum informing
the respondents of their transfer to the Delivery Section, which was within the premises
of Echo's warehouse. The transfer would entail no change in ranks, status and salaries.
On July 14, 2009, Somido wrote Echo a letter indicating his refusal to be promoted as a
"Delivery Supervisor." He explained that he was already happy as a Warehouse Checker.
Further, he was not ready to be a Delivery Supervisor since the position was sensitive
and required more expertise and training, which he did not have. Cortes similarly
declined Echo's offer of promotion claiming that he was contented in his post then as a
Forklift Operator. He also alleged that he would be more productive as an employee if
he remained in his post. He also lacked prior supervisory experience. On July 16, 2009,
Enriquez, sans consent of the respondents, informed the latter of their
assignments/designations, effective July 17, 2009, as Delivery Supervisors. Echo alleged
that the respondents did not perform the new duties assigned to them. Thereafter,
successive memoranda were issued by Echo to the respondents, who refused to
acknowledge receipt and comply with the directives therein. The Memoranda dated July
20, 2009 suspended them without pay for five days for their alleged insubordination.
The Memoranda dated August 8, 2009 informed them of their termination from
employment, effective August 15, 2009, by reason of their repeated refusal to
acknowledge receipt of Echo's memoranda and flagrant defiance to assume the duties of
Delivery Coordinators. Can the respondents refuse the transfer?
Answer: YES. The offer of transfer is, in legal contemplation, a promotion, which
the respondents validly refused. Such refusal cannot be the basis for the
respondents' dismissal from service. The finding of unfair labor practice and the
award of moral and exemplary damages do not however follow solely by reason
of the dismissal.
Article 212(13) of the Labor Code distinguishes from each other as follows the
concepts of managerial, supervisory and rank-and-file employees:
"Managerial employee" is one who is vested with the powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions
if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not falling within any of
the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of this
Book. (Italics ours)
For promotion to occur, there must be an advancement from one position to another
or an upward vertical movement of the employee's rank or position. Any increase in
salary should only be considered incidental but never determinative of whether or
not a promotion is bestowed upon an employee. An employee is not bound to accept
a promotion, which is in the nature of a gift or reward. Refusal to be promoted is a
valid exercise of a right. Such exercise cannot be considered in law as
insubordination, or willful disobedience of a lawful order of the employer, hence, it
cannot be the basis of an employee's dismissal from service. In the case at bench, a
Warehouse Checker and a Forklift Operator are rank-and-file employees. On the
other hand, the job of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator requires the exercise of
discretion and judgment from time to time. Despite the fact that no salary increases
were effected, the assumption of the post of a Delivery Supervisor/Coordinator
should be considered a promotion. The respondents' refusal to accept the same was
therefore valid. (Echo 2000 Commercial Corporation, et. al., vs. Obrero Filipino-
Echo 2000 Chapter-CLO, et. al., GR No. 214092, January 11, 2016)
c. Productivity standard
d. Bonus
g. Post-Employment ban
b. GSIS Law
i. Coverage and Exclusions
ii. Dependents, beneficiaries
iii. Benefits
c. Portability Law
k. Labor Relations
a. Right to self-organization
i. Who may/may exercise the right
1. Doctrine of necessary implication
ii. Commingling/Mixture of membership
Question: Can both the supervisory and rank-and-file employees be affiliated with
the same labor organization?
Answer: Yes. Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011. The mixture of rank-and-file
and supervisory employees in a union does not nullify its legal personality as a
legitimate labor organization.
Question: Can both the supervisory union and the rank-and-file employees’ union
be affiliated with the same labor federation?
Answer: Yes. Sta. Lucia East Commercial Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor,
August 14, 2011)
As amended by R.A. 9481, the Labor Code now allows a rank and file union and a
supervisory union of the same company to be part of the same federation for the
following reasons:
An employer cannot ignore the existence of a legitimate labor organization at the
time of its voluntary recognition of another union. The employer and the voluntarily
recognized union cannot, by themselves, decide whether the other union
represented an appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer may voluntarily recognize the representation status of a union in
unorganized establishments
San Miguel Foods v. San Miguel Corp. Supervisors and Exempt Union, August 1,
2011: The test of grouping is community or mutuality of interest.There should be
only one bargaining unit for employees involved in “dressed chicken” processing
and workers engaged in “live chicken” operations.Although they seem separate and
distinct from each other, the tasks of each division are actually interrelated and
there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the formation of a single
bargaining unit.
Question: How will the Labor Arbiter rule if malice was not alleged in a complaint
for unfair labor practice?
Answer: Dismiss the case. Manila Mining Corporation Employees Association v.
Manila Mining Corp., September 29, 2010: For a charge of unfair labor practice to
prosper, it must be shown that the employer was motivated by ill-will, bad faith or
fraud, or was oppressive to labor. The employer must have acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy causing social humiliation,
wounded feelings or grave anxiety. While the law makes it an obligation for the
employer and the employees to bargain collectively with each other, such
compulsion does not include the commitment to precipitately accept or agree to the
proposals of the other. All it contemplates is that both parties should approach the
negotiation with an open mind and make reasonable effort to reach a common
ground of agreement.
Question: With the adoption of cost cutting measures, Eduardo was part of
manufacturing that was retrenched by the company. Can Eduardo ask for
reinstatement?
Answer: No. Pepsi Cola Products v. Molon et al., February 18, 2013: Retrenchment
in good faith is not an unfair labor practice. The fact that the retrenchment program
was implemented on a company-wide basis shows that the scheme was not
calculated to stymie union activities.
Question: Jerusalem Corp. (“JC”) has been providing new chairs to its sewing crew
for the past five years. On the sixth year, JC stopped providing new chairs. Can the
company be charged with unfair labor practice for withdrawal of this regular
provision?
Answer: No. Royal Plant Workers Union v. Coca Cola Bottlers, April 15, 2013:
Removal of chairs, which had been provided for more than three decades, was not
ULP. The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated.
Since the CBA stated that any benefit not expressly provided for in the CBA shall be
deemed as purely voluntary acts, and shall not be construed as obligation of the
company, its subsequent removal was valid. The long practice did not convert it into
an obligation or a vested right in favor of the union. Chairs are not considered
“benefits” and are not therefore covered by the prohibition against diminution.
Question: Who has the burden of proof in an unfair labor practice case?
Answer: The party who instituted the case has the burden of proof. Central
Azucarera de Bais Employees Union v. Central Azucarera de Bais, November 17,
2010: Basic is the principle that good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith
has the duty to prove the same. By imputing bad faith to the actuations of CAB,
CABEU-NFL has the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support the
allegation of unfair labor practice. Apparently, CABEU-NFL refers only to the
circumstances mentioned in the letter-response, namely, the execution of the
supposed CBA between CAB and CABELA and the request to suspend the
negotiations, to conclude that bad faith attended CAB’s actions. The Court is of the
view that CABEU-NFL, in simply relying on the said letter-response, failed to
substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice to rebut the presumption of good
faith.
Question: Who has the burden of proof in a case when there is allegation that the
registration of the labor union was attended with fraud?
Answer: The party who instituted the action has the burden of proof. Yokohama
Tire Phils. v. Yokohama Employees Union, March 10, 2010; Heritage Hotel
Manila v. PIGLAS-Heritage, October 30, 2009: The charge that a labor organization
committed fraud and misrepresentation in securing its registration is a serious
charge that should be clearly established by evidence and the surrounding
circumstances.
The petitioner (the party that filed the Petition for Cancellation) has the burden of
proof.
Question: Can employer terminate the employment of union members during the
Freedom Period?
Answer: No. PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Tañeca, August 9, 2010: The mere signing of
the authorization in support of a Petition for Certification Election before the
“freedom period,” is not sufficient ground to terminate the employment of union
members under the Union Security Clause respondents inasmuch as the petition
itself was actually filed during the freedom period.
Question: What is the effect if the employer and the company extends its 5-year
CBA?
Answer: FVC Labor Union-Philippine Transport and General Workers
Organization (FVCLU-PTGWO) v. Sama-Samang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Sa
FVC-Solidarity of Independent and General Labor Organizations (SANAMA-FVC-
SIGLO), November 27, 2009: While the parties may agree to extend the CBA’s
original five-year term together with all other CBA provisions, any such amendment
or term in excess of five years will not carry with it a change in the union’s exclusive
collective bargaining status. By express provision of the above-quoted Article 253-
A, the exclusive bargaining status cannot go beyond five years and the
representation status is a legal matter not for the workplace parties to agree upon.
In other words, despite an agreement for a CBA with a life of more than five years,
either as an original provision or by amendment, the bargaining union’s exclusive
bargaining status is effective only for five years and can be challenged within sixty
(60) days prior to the expiration of the CBA’s first five years.
Question: Can the personality of the petitioner labor be collaterally attacked in the
same certification election proceeding?
Answer: No. Samahang Manggagawa Sa Charter Chemical (SMCC-SUPER) v.
Charter Chemical and Coating Corp., March 16, 2011: The legal personality of
petitioner union cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election
proceedings. The remedy is to file a separate action for cancellation of the union’s
registration/legal personality.
o By employers
3. By labor organizations
Question: What is the concept of Unfair Labor Practice?
Answer: The primary concept of unfair labor practices is stated in Article 247 of
the Labor Code, which states:
Article 247. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof. ––
Unfair labor practices violate the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and
management, including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with
each other in an atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, disrupt industrial
peace and hinder the promotion of healthy and stable labor-management relations.
"In essence, [unfair labor practice] relates to the commission of acts that transgress
the workers’ right to organize." "[A]ll the prohibited acts constituting unfair labor
practice in essence relate to the workers’ right to self-organization." "[T]he term
unfair labor practice refers to that gamut of offenses defined in the Labor Code
which, at their core, violates the constitutional right of workers and employees to
self-organization." Guaranteed to all employees or workers is the ‘right to self-
organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for purposes of collective bargaining.’ This is made plain by no less than three
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 243 of the Code provides as
follows:
Article 248 (a) declares it to be an unfair labor practice for an employer, among
others, to ‘interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right
to self-organization.’ Similarly, Article 249 (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization to ‘restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to
self-organization . . .’
xxxx
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor
union or determine which of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to
engage in concerted activities with co-workers for purposes of collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and
interests. (Mendoza vs. Officers of Manila Water Employees Union, GR No.
201595, January 255, 2016)
Question: What are the responsibilities of a union official and a union member in an
Illegal Strike?
Answer: It is clear that the responsibility of union officials is greater than that of
the members. They are tasked with the duty to lead and guide the membership in
decision making on union activities in accordance with the law, government rules
and regulations, and established labor practices. The leaders are expected to
recommend actions that are arrived at with circumspection and contemplation, and
always keep paramount the best interests of the members and union within the
bounds of law. If the implementation of an illegal strike is recommended, then they
would mislead and deceive the membership and the supreme penalty of dismissal is
appropriate. On the other hand, if the strike is legal at the beginning and the officials
commit illegal acts during the duration of the strike, then they cannot evade
personal and individual liability for said acts. (Toyota Motors Phils. Corp. Workers
Association vs. NLRC, G.R. Nos 158786 & 158789, G.R. Nos. 158798-99 October
19, 2007)
Question: What are acts are considered illegal acts during a strike?
Answer: No precise meaning was given to the phrase illegal acts. It may encompass
a number of acts that violate existing labor or criminal laws, such as the following:
(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that [n]o person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or
obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE Secretary or
NLRC in connection with the assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order under
Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
As earlier explained, this enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other
breaches of existing laws. (supra)
Question: What are the six categories of Illegal Strikes?
Answer: Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an
illegal strike, viz:
(1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees
performing governmental functions; or
(2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor
Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or
(3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to
commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or
(4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a
widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art.
264(e) of the Labor Code]; or
(5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction,
prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of
the Labor Code]; or
(6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or
conclusive arbitration clause. (supra)
2. Picket
o By employer
1. lockout
o Assumption of jurisdiction
1. Nature
2. Effects of assumption ofjurisdiction
a. Labor Arbiter
o Jurisdiction
Question: What is the nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter?
Answer: The foregoing provisos manifestly show the non-litigious and the summary
nature of the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, who is given full discretion
whether to conduct a hearing or not and to decide the case before him through
position papers. (Oriental Shipmanagement Co., Inc. vs. Bastol, G.R. No. 186289
June 29, 2010)
Question: What is the rationale behind the summary nature of proceedings before
Labor Arbiter?
Answer: In Iriga Telephone Co, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 286
SCRA 600 (1998), the Court discussed the reason why it is discretionary on the part
of the Labor Arbiter, who, motu propio, determines whether to hold a hearing or
not. Consequently, a hearing cannot be demanded by either party as a matter of
right. The parties are required to file their corresponding position papers and all the
documentary evidence and affidavits to prove their cause of action and defenses.
The rationale behind this is to avoid delay and curtail the pernicious practice of
withholding of evidence. (Oriental Ship management Co., Inc. vs. Bastol, supra)
Question: When is the reckoning point for the filing a petition for certiorari in
assailing an assailed resolution of the NLRC?
Answer: In practice, service means the delivery or communication of a pleading,
notice or some other paper in a case, to the opposite party so as to charge him with
receipt of it and subject him to its legal effect. The purpose of the rules on service is
to make sure that the party being served with the pleading, order or judgment is
duly informed of the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests; i.e.,
enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefs before the
decision becomes final.
When a party is represented by counsel of record, service of orders and notices must
be made upon said attorney; and notice to the client and to any other lawyer, not the
counsel of record, is not notice in law.
The NLRC Rules governing the issuance and service of notices and resolutions is,
likewise, no different:
b) In case of decisions and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both
parties and their counsel or representative by registered mail or by private
courier; Provided that, in cases where a party to a case or his/her counsel on record
personally seeks service of the decision upon inquiry thereon, service to said party
shall be deemed effected as herein provided. Where parties are numerous, service
shall be made on counsel and upon such number of complainants, as may be
practicable and shall be considered substantial compliance with Article 224 (a) of
the Labor Code, as amended. For purposes of appeal, the period shall be counted
from receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or
representative of record.
c) The bailiff or officer serving the notice, order, or resolution shall submit his/her
return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his/her
return his/her name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt, which
return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case.
In case of service by registered mail or by private courier, the name of the addressee
and the date of receipt of the notice, order or resolution shall be written in the
return card or in the proof of service issued by the private courier. If no service was
effected, the reason thereof shall be so stated.
Also, in Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, et al., the Court held that "the period
for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the time the counsel of
record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration."
The Court further clarified that the period or manner of "appeal" from the NLRC to
the Court of Appeals is governed by Rule 65, pursuant to the ruling of the Court in
the case of St. Martin Funeral
Homes v. NLRC in light of Section 4 of Rule 65, as amended, which states that the
"petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, or
resolution sought to be assailed."
Corollarily, Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC expressly
mandates that "(F)or the purpose(s) of computing the period of appeal, the same
shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders by the counsel of
record. "Although this rule explicitly contemplates an appeal before tile Labor Arbiter
and tile NLRC, we do not see any cogent reason why tile same rule should not apply to
petitions for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals from decisions of the NLRC. This
procedure is in line with the established rule that notice to counsel is notice to party
and when a party is represented by counsel, notices should be made upon the counsel
of record at his given address to which notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent. It is to be noted also that Section 7 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
provides that "(A)ttorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority
to bind their clients in all matters of procedure"' a provision which is similar to
Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. More importantly, Section 2, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure analogously provides that if any party has
appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel.
In Bello v. NLRC, citing anew Ginete v. Sunrise Manning Agency, et al., the Court
held that "the period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the
time the counsel of record received a copy of the Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration."
Thus, based on the foregoing, while in cases of decisions and final awards, copies
thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel/representative by
registered mail, for purposes of appeal, however, the period shall be counted from
receipt of such decisions, resolutions, or orders by the counsel or representative of
record.
In the instant case, it is not disputed that during the NLRC proceedings, petitioner
was represented by counsel, Atty. Romeo S. Occena, as in fact the NLRC albeit
belated, furnished a copy of its July 29, 2009 Resolution to Atty. Occena on
November 19, 2009. Petitioner's several motions during the proceedings before the
NLRC were likewise all signed by Atty. Occena as counsel. Consequently, following
the policy that the period to appeal shall be counted from receipt of resolution by
the counsel of record, considering that petitioner is represented by a counsel, the
latter is considered to have received notice of the NLRC Resolution dated July 22,
2009 on November 19, 2009, the date when his representative and counsel, Atty.
Occena was served notice thereof and not on July 30, 2009, or the date when
petitioner's mother received the same decision.
Accordingly, the 60-day period for filing the petition for certiorari with the CA
should be counted from the receipt by the petitioner's counsel of a copy of the NLRC
Decision dated July 22, 2009 on November 19, 2009. It should be stressed that the
NLRC sent the notice of Resolution to petitioner's counsel only on November 19,
2009. While there was a notice of Resolution dated July 22, 2009, said notice was
not served upon petitioner's counsel. Thus, strictly speaking, the running of the 60-
day period to appeal should be counted from November 19, 2009 when the notice of
Resolution dated July 22, 2009 was served on petitioner's counsel. Considering that
petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on October 7, 2009, the same was well
within the prescribed period to appeal. The petition for certiorari was filed on time.
We find that the NLRC correctly upheld petitioner's dismissal to be valid. Records
show that petitioner was relieved from his post in UST due to his poor work
performance and attitude. However, while petitioner was removed from UST,
private respondent immediately reassigned him to Mercury Drug Fairview which he
refused to accept. Despite notices requiring him to report back to work, petitioner
refused to heed. Considering that it was petitioner who went on absence without
official leave (AWOL), the same negates the allegation of illegal dismissal.
(Cervantes vs. City Service Corporation and Prieto, Jr., GR No. 191616, April 18,
2016)
Question: What is the extent of the authority of the Court of Appeals (CA) to review
in a special civil action for certiorari the findings of fact contained in the rulings of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)?
Answer: Article 223 of the Labor Code pertinently states:
Art. 223. Appeal - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and
executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including
graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of
facts are raised which would cause grave or
irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. x x x x.
In our view, the CA acted judiciously in undoing the too literal interpretation of
Article 223 of the Labor Code by the NLRC. The enumeration in the provision of the
grounds for an appeal actually encompassed the ground relied upon by the
respondents in their appeal. Their phrasing of the ground, albeit not hewing closely
(or literally) to that of Article 223, related to the first and the last grounds under the
provision. In dismissing the appeal on that basis, the NLRC seemed to prefer form
and technicality to substance and justice. Thereby, the NLRC acted arbitrarily, for its
dismissal of the appeal became entirely inconsistent with the constitutional
mandate for the protection to labor.
Secondly, the CA's overturning of the NLRC's ruling was based on its finding that the
petitioners did not sufficiently establish the just and valid cause to dismiss the
respondents from their employment. As the assailed judgment indicates, the CA's
review was thorough and its ruling judicious. The CA thereby enforced against the
petitioners the respected proposition that it was the employer who bore the burden
to show that the dismissal was for just and valid cause. The failure of the petitioners
to discharge their burden of proof as the employers necessarily meant that the
dismissal was illegal. The outcome could not be any other way.
In order to warrant the dismissal of the employee for just cause, Article 282 (b) of
the Labor Code requires the negligence to be gross and habitual. Gross negligence is
the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Habitual
neglect connotes repeated failure to perform one's duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances. Obviously, a single or isolated act of negligence
does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
The ground for dismissal, according to the LA, was gross negligence. Considering,
however, that the petitioners did not refute the respondents' claim that the incident
was their first offense, and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to
establish the supposed habitual neglect on the part of the respondents, like
employment or other records indicative of the service and personnel histories of the
respondents during the period of their employment, the CA reasonably found and
concluded that the just cause to dismiss them was not established by substantial
evidence. (Sugarsteel Industrial, Inc., and Yapjoco vs. Albina, Uy and Velasquez,
GR No. 168749, June 06, 2016)
d. Supreme Court
o Rule 45, Rules of Court
Insular Hotel Employees Union v. Waterfront Insular Hotel, September 22, 2010:
The general rule is individual employees cannot raise a grievance. Only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or
voluntary arbitrators. A labor federation cannot raise a grievance on behalf of
members of its local/chapter.
BPI v. BPI Employees Union (2012): In ruling in favor of the union in a voluntary
arbitration, the Court held that the CBA is the contract between the parties. All
provisions and conditions for availment of benefits should be made clear. Any
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the employees.
Santuyo v. Remerco Garments, March 22, 2010: Article 217(c) of the Labor Code
requires labor arbiters to refer cases involving the implementation of CBAs to the
grievance machinery provided therein and to voluntary arbitration.
Moreover, Article 260 of the Labor Code clarifies that such disputes must be referred
first to the grievance machinery and, if unresolved within seven days, they shall
automatically be referred to voluntary arbitration.
Continental Steel v. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Montano: Being for the benefit
of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits
should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof.
h. DOLE secretary
o Visitorial and enforcement powers
o Under Art. 129 of the Labor Code, the power of the DOLE and its duly
authorized hearing officers to hear and decide any matter involving the
recovery of wages and other monetary claims and benefits was qualified by the
proviso that the complaint not include a claim for reinstatement, or that the
aggregate money claims not exceed Php5, 000. RA 7730, or an Act Further
Strengthening the Visitorial and Enforcement Powers of the Secretary of Labor,
did away with the Php5,000 limitation, allowing the DOLE Secretary to exercise
its visitorial and enforcement power for claims beyond Php5,000. The only
qualification to this expanded power of the DOLE was only that there still be an
existing employer-employee relationship. (Bombo Radyo Phils. Inc. vs.
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 179652,
March 6, 2012)
o Power to suspend effects of termination
o Remedies
i. Voluntary arbitrator
o Jurisdiction
o Remedies
j. Prescription of actions
o Money claims (without any legal bar) – 3 years
o Illegal dismissal (without any legal bar) – 4 years
o Unfair labor practice
o Offenses under the Labor Code
o Illegal recruitment