Tara Johnson v. City of New York, Et Al. (Decision and Order)
Tara Johnson v. City of New York, Et Al. (Decision and Order)
Tara Johnson v. City of New York, Et Al. (Decision and Order)
FILED
IN CLERK'S OFFICE
US DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.
★ SEP 29 2017 *
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK DorNrM^i v/m rMzirir-c
^ BROOKLYN OrPICt
TARA JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OF DECSION
- against - 16 CV 3647(RJD)(RER)
Defendants.
DEARIE,District Judge
Plaintiff Tara Johnson, who is African-American, alleges that she was discriminated
against on the basis of race when she was disqualified from serving as a deputy city sheriff,
ostensibly because she failed a psychological evaluation. She brought suit alleging that
Defendants the City of New York,the past and present commissioners ofthe City's Department
constitutional rights and City and State law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; N.Y. Exec. L. § 296
arguing that Johnson failed to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Johnson's claims fall into four basic categories. First, she alleges a claim for disparate
treatment, that is, intentional racial discrimination. See Veea v. Hempstead Union Free Sch.
DisL, 801 F.3d 72, 85-86(2d Cir. 2015)(discussing the elements for a disparate treatment
claim). Second, Johnson claims that the subjectivity inherent in Defendants' psychological
evaluation process has a disparate impact on African-Americans. See Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Tr.. 487 U.S. 977, 986-88,990(1988)(explaining that a claim for disparate impact
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requires a facially neutral policy that has a disproportionate effect on a protected class and noting
criteria than to objective or standardized tests."). Third, Johnson asserts that the City may
appropriately be held liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658(1978)
because the discrimination she suffered was caused by an unconstitutional municipal policy that
can be attributed to City policymakers. See Oklahoma Citv v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,824(1985).
Finally, Johnson contends that the past and present commissioners of the City's Department of
Finance are liable for these alleged violations of her constitutional and statutory rights.
In a case alleging identical causes of action arising out of the same Sheriffs Academy
23, 2017), Judge Gershon denied Defendants' motion to dismiss the disparate impact, disparate
treatment, and Monell claims, and dismissed the plaintiffs claims against the Department of
Finance commissioners. See id. *3-7. At the motion hearing in this case, the Court ruled as
follows:
A,I think Judge Gershon got it right; B,I quite agree with
you[. Defendants' counsel], the facts here are not as strong as they
were in FBrownl so you can distinguish the case factually, but we're
not dealing in facts here. We're dealing in allegations and the
adequacy of those allegations, and I think the allegations . . . are
sufficient. With respect to the commissioners and so forth, they're
out.
With respect to the Monell claim, we'll hold it for the time being.
Taking Johnson's disparate treatment allegations first, she has adequately pleaded a
prima facie case of race discrimination. In order to survive Defendants' motion to dismiss,
Johnson must allege that(1)she was subject to an adverse employment action, and (2)that race
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was a motivating factor in the decision to take that adverse action. Vega, 801 F.3d at 85-86.
Johnson may satisfy this latter requirement by alleging facts that give "plausible support to a
York. 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015)). Johnson makes two basic allegations. First she alleges
that all of the African-American candidates in her Sheriffs Academy class were, unlike white
candidates, excluded from employment on the basis of their psychological evaluations. Despite
these negative evaluations, Johnson points out that several of the African-American candidates
(including her) went on to serve in other law enforcement roles. Second, Johnson asserts that
Defendants' evaluation process is subjective and thus susceptible to bias. According to Johnson,
however. Defendants do not adequately monitor the evaluation process to protect against bias,
nor does their process comply with certain uniform guidelines promulgated by the federal
government to combat bias in screening for employment. These facts plausibly support at least a
id.
As for Johnson's disparate impact claims, these too survive Defendants' motion to
dismiss. A disparate impact claim has two elements:(1)a facially neutral policy(2)that had a
disproportionate effect on a protected group. See Watson,487 U.S. at 986-88. Defendants argue
that Johnson cannot state a claim for disparate impact because(1)she does not allege the
existence of a facially neutral policy, and(2)the sample size on which she relies in her
complaint, the 15 candidates in her class at the Sheriffs Academy,is too small to raise an
alleges that the relevant policy is Defendants' allegedly subjective psychological evaluation
process, and that this policy has a disproportionate effect on African-American candidates. As
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for Defendants' second point, although they may ultimately be right, and Johnson's statistical
argument is one for a later stage in the case. See Brown.2017 WL 1102677, at *6 ("It may be
that, at a later stage in this litigation, defendants will be able to minimize the validity or
relevance of[Johnson's] statistics. However, statistics that may ultimately prove insufficient can
2013))).
The same conclusion applies with respect to Johnson's Monell claim. Although, as the
Court noted at the hearing, this claim is "questionable," Johnson's theory—^that Defendants
exhibited deliberate indifference in failing to adequately train and supervise the employees
pleaded and cognizable under Monell. See Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.. 941 F.2d 119,122-
23(2d Cir. 1991)(stating that a Monell claim can be supported by "circumstantial proof, such as
evidence that the municipality so failed to train its employees as to display a deliberate
indifference to the constitutional rights ofthose within its jurisdiction "(citing Citv of
Canton v. Harris. 489 U.S. 378, 388-92(1989)). So long as this claim is not withdrawn, it will
The final issue is Johnson's allegation that the individual past and present commissioners
ofthe City's Department of Finance, of which the Sheriffs Department is a part, are liable for
the alleged violations of her rights. The complaint does not allege that these individuals were
personally involved in the alleged offending conduct, nor is there basis other than conjecture for
finding any personal involvement. This is insufficient to state a claim against these individuals.
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See Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127(2d Cir. 2004)("An
individual cannot be held liable under § 1983 'merely because he held a high position of
authority,' but can be held liable if he was personally involved in the alleged deprivation."
(quoting Black v. Coughlin. 76 F.3d 72,74(2d Cir. 1996)); see also Rozenfield v. Dep't of
Design & Constr. of Citv of N.Y.. 875 F. Supp. 2d 189, 202(E.D.N.Y. 2012)(noting that the
same analysis applies with respect to the City and State human rights laws (citations omitted)).
Thus, Johnson's claims against the past and present commissioners ofthe Department of Finance
are dismissed.
For these reasons and those explained on the record. Defendants' motion to dismiss is
granted as to Johnson's claims against the past and present commissioners ofthe Department of
Finance and denied as to her claims of disparate treatment, disparate impact, and municipal
SO ORDERED.
s/ RJD
Dated: Brooklyn, New York
September 7^,2017 )N EARIE
UniteMSta istrict Judge