International Shoe Co. v.

Washington
Citation. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)

Brief Fact Summary. Defendant was an out of state company that employed
salesmen within the state of Washington. Washington sued Defendant to recover
unpaid unemployment taxes and served Defendant in two ways: (1) by mail and (2)
by serving one of its salesmen within the state. Defendant appealed from a verdict
for Washington, claiming that Washington had no personal jurisdiction over
Defendant.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
defendant, the defendant must have such minimum contacts with the state so
that exercising jurisdiction over the defendant would not offend “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.”

Facts. International Shoe Co., Defendant, was a company based in Delaware with
an office in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant employed salesmen that resided in
Washington to sell their product in the state of Washington. Defendant regularly
shipped orders to the salesmen who accepted them, the salesmen would display the
products at places in Washington, and the salesmen were compensated by
commission for sale of the products. The salesmen were also reimbursed for the
cost of renting the places of business in Washington.

Washington sued Defendant after Defendant failed to make contributions to an

unemployment compensation fund exacted by state statutes. The Washington
statute said that the commissioner could issue personal service if Defendant was
found within the state, or by mailing it to Defendant if Defendant was not in the state.
The notice of assessment was served upon Defendant’s salesperson and a
copy of the notice was mailed to Defendant. Defendant appeared specially, moving
to set aside the order that service upon the salesperson was proper service.
Defendant also argued that it did not “do business” in the state, that there was
no agent upon which service could be made, and that Defendant did not furnish
employment within the meaning of the statute. Defendant also argued that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and imposed
a prohibitive burden of interstate commerce. The trial court found for Washington
and the Supreme Court of Washington affirmed, reasoning that the continuous flow
of Defendant’s product into Washington was sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction. Defendant appealed.

Issue. Is service of process upon Defendant’s agent sufficient notice when the
corporation’s activities result in a large volume of interstate business so that
the corporation receives the protection of the laws of the state and the suit is related
to the activities which make the corporation present?

Held. Yes. Affirmed. The general rule is that in order to have jurisdiction with
someone outside the state, the person must have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice. For a corporation, the “minimum contacts”
required are not just continuous and systematic activities but also those that give rise
to the liabilities sued on. Defendant could have sued someone in Washington. It was
afforded the protection of the laws of that state, and therefore it should be subject to
suit.

Dissent. The state’s power to tax should not be qualified by an ambiguous

statement regarding fair play and substantial justice.

Discussion. This decision articulates the rule for determining whether a state has personal
jurisdiction over an absent defendant via the “minimum contacts” test. In general,
International Shoe demonstrates that contacts with a state should be evaluated in terms of
how “fair” it would be to exercise jurisdiction over an absent defendant.

U.S. Supreme Court

International Shoe v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)

International Shoe v. State of Washington

No. 107

Argued November 14, 1945

Decided December 3, 1945

326 U.S. 310

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

Syllabus

Activities within a State of salesmen in the employ of a foreign corporation, exhibiting

samples of merchandise and soliciting orders from prospective buyers to be
accepted or rejected by the corporation at a point outside the State, were systematic
and continuous, and resulted in a large volume of interstate business. A statute of
the State requires employers to pay into the state unemployment compensation fund
a specified percentage of the wages paid for the services of employees within the
State.

Held:
1. In view of 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) , providing that no person shall be relieved from
compliance with a state law requiring payments to an unemployment fund on the
ground that he is engaged in interstate commerce, the fact that the corporation is
engaged in interstate commerce does not relieve it from liability for payments to the
state unemployment compensation fund. P. 326 U. S. 315.

2. The activities in behalf of the corporation render it amenable to suit in courts of the
State to recover payments due to the state unemployment compensation fund.
P. 326 U. S. 320.

(a) The activities in question established between the State and the corporation
sufficient contacts or ties to make it reasonable and just, and in conformity to the due
process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, for the State to enforce against
the corporation an obligation arising out of such activities. P. 326 U. S. 320.

(b) In such a suit to recover payments due to the unemployment compensation fund,
service of process upon one of the corporation's salesmen within the State, and
notice sent by registered mail to the corporation at its home office, satisfies the
requirements of due process. P. 326 U. S. 320.

Page 326 U. S. 311

3. The tax imposed by the state unemployment compensation statute -- construed by

the state court, in its application to the corporation, as a tax on the privilege of
employing salesmen within the State -- does not violate the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 326 U. S. 321.

22 Wash.2d 146, 154 P.2d 801, affirmed.

APPEAL from a judgment upholding the constitutionality of a state unemployment

compensation statute as applied to the appellant corporation.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The questions for decision are (1) whether, within the limitations of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant, a Delaware corporation, has, by its
activities in the State of Washington, rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the
courts of that state to recover unpaid contributions to the state unemployment
compensation fund exacted by state statutes, Washington Unemployment
Compensation Act, Washington Revised Statutes, § 9998-103a through § 9998-
123a, 1941 Supp., and (2) whether the state can exact those contributions
consistently with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The statutes in question set up a comprehensive scheme of unemployment

compensation, the costs of which are defrayed by contributions required to be made
by employers to a state unemployment compensation fund.

Page 326 U. S. 312

The contributions are a specified percentage of the wages payable annually by each
employer for his employees' services in the state. The assessment and collection of
the contributions and the fund are administered by appellees. Section 14(c) of the
Act (Wash.Rev.Stat., 1941 Supp., § 9998-114c) authorizes appellee Commissioner
to issue an order and notice of assessment of delinquent contributions upon
prescribed personal service of the notice upon the employer if found within the state,
or, if not so found, by mailing the notice to the employer by registered mail at his last
known address. That section also authorizes the Commissioner to collect the
assessment by distraint if it is not paid within ten days after service of the notice. By
§§ 14e and 6b, the order of assessment may be administratively reviewed by an
appeal tribunal within the office of unemployment upon petition of the employer, and
this determination is, by § 6i, made subject to judicial review on questions of law by
the state Superior Court, with further right of appeal in the state Supreme Court, as
in other civil cases.

In this case, notice of assessment for the years in question was personally served
upon a sales solicitor employed by appellant in the State of Washington, and a copy
of the notice was mailed by registered mail to appellant at its address in St. Louis,
Missouri. Appellant appeared specially before the office of unemployment, and
moved to set aside the order and notice of assessment on the ground that the
service upon appellant's salesman was not proper service upon appellant; that
appellant was not a corporation of the State of Washington, and was not doing
business within the state; that it had no agent within the state upon whom service
could be made; and that appellant is not an employer, and does not furnish
employment within the meaning of the statute.

The motion was heard on evidence and a stipulation of facts by the appeal tribunal,
which denied the motion

Page 326 U. S. 313

and ruled that appellee Commissioner was entitled to recover the unpaid
contributions. That action was affirmed by the Commissioner; both the Superior
Court and the Supreme Court affirmed. 22 Wash.2d 146, 154 P.2d 801. Appellant in
each of these courts assailed the statute as applied, as a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and as imposing a constitutionally
prohibited burden on interstate commerce. The cause comes here on appeal under §
237(a) of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 344(a), appellant assigning as error that the
challenged statutes, as applied, infringe the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the commerce clause.

The facts, as found by the appeal tribunal and accepted by the state Superior Court
and Supreme Court, are not in dispute. Appellant is a Delaware corporation, having
its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri, and is engaged in the
manufacture and sale of shoes and other footwear. It maintains places of business in
several states other than Washington, at which its manufacturing is carried on and
from which its merchandise is distributed interstate through several sales units or
branches located outside the State of Washington.
Appellant has no office in Washington, and makes no contracts either for sale or
purchase of merchandise there. It maintains no stock of merchandise in that state,
and makes there no deliveries of goods in intrastate commerce. During the years
from 1937 to 1940, now in question, appellant employed eleven to thirteen salesmen
under direct supervision and control of sales managers located in St. Louis. These
salesmen resided in Washington; their principal activities were confined to that state,
and they were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of their sales.
The commissions for each year totaled more than $31,000. Appellant supplies its
salesmen with a line of samples, each consisting of one shoe of a pair, which

Page 326 U. S. 314

they display to prospective purchasers. On occasion, they rent permanent sample

rooms, for exhibiting samples, in business buildings, or rent rooms in hotels or
business buildings temporarily for that purpose. The cost of such rentals is
reimbursed by appellant.

The authority of the salesmen is limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting
orders from prospective buyers, at prices and on terms fixed by appellant. The
salesmen transmit the orders to appellant's office in St. Louis for acceptance or
rejection, and, when accepted, the merchandise for filling the orders is shipped f.o.b.
from points outside Washington to the purchasers within the state. All the
merchandise shipped into Washington is invoiced at the place of shipment, from
which collections are made. No salesman has authority to enter into contracts or to
make collections.

The Supreme Court of Washington was of opinion that the regular and systematic
solicitation of orders in the state by appellant's salesmen, resulting in a continuous
flow of appellant's product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business
in the state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts. But it was also of
opinion that there were sufficient additional activities shown to bring the case within
the rule, frequently stated, that solicitation within a state by the agents of a foreign
corporation plus some additional activities there are sufficient to render the
corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of the state to enforce an
obligation arising out of its activities there. International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 234 U. S. 587; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co., 246 U. S. 79, 246 U. S. 87; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 77 U.S.App.D.C.
129, 134 F.2d 511, 516. The court found such additional activities in the salesmen's
display of samples sometimes in permanent display rooms, and the salesmen's
residence within the state, continued over a period of years, all resulting in a

Page 326 U. S. 315

substantial volume of merchandise regularly shipped by appellant to purchasers

within the state. The court also held that the statute, as applied, did not invade the
constitutional power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, and did not
impose a prohibited burden on such commerce.
Appellant's argument, renewed here, that the statute imposes an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce need not detain us. For 53 Stat. 1391, 26 U.S.C. §
1606(a) provides that

"No person required under a State law to make payments to an unemployment fund
shall be relieved from compliance therewith on the ground that he is engaged in
interstate or foreign commerce, or that the State law does not distinguish between
employees engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and those engaged in
intrastate commerce."

It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce power, may
authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate interstate commerce or impose
burdens upon it. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 299 U. S.
334; Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586; Standard Dredging Corp. v.
Murphy, 319 U. S. 306, 319 U. S. 308; Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S.
652, 324 U. S. 679; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 325 U. S. 769.

Appellant also insists that its activities within the state were not sufficient to manifest
its "presence" there, and that, in its absence, the state courts were without
jurisdiction, that, consequently, it was a denial of due process for the state to subject
appellant to suit. It refers to those cases in which it was said that the mere
solicitation of orders for the purchase of goods within a state, to be accepted without
the state and filled by shipment of the purchased goods interstate, does not render
the corporation seller amenable to suit within the state. See Green v. Chicago, B. &
Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 205 U. S. 533; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky,
supra, 234 U. S. 586-587; Philadelphia

Page 326 U. S. 316

& Reading R. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 243 U. S. 268; People's Tobacco Co.
v. American Tobacco Co., supra, 246 U. S. 87. And appellant further argues that,
since it was not present within the state, it is a denial of due process to subject it to
taxation or other money exaction. It thus denies the power of the state to lay the tax
or to subject appellant to a suit for its collection.

Historically, the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on

their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the
territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 95 U. S. 733. But now that
the capias ad respondendum has given way to personal service of summons or
other form of notice, due process requires only that, in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U. S. 457, 311 U. S. 463. See Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 243
U. S. 91.Compare Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313, 318 U. S.
316, 318 U. S. 319. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421; Hess v.
Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253. ,
Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted
upon as though it were a fact, Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, 282 U. S.
24, it is clear that, unlike an individual, its "presence" without, as well as within, the
state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those
who are authorized to act for it. To say that the corporation is so far "present" there
as to satisfy due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance
of suits against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For
the terms "present" or "presence" are

Page 326 U. S. 317

used merely to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state
which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. L.
Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141. Those demands may
be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it
reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to require the
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An "estimate of the
inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its
"home" or principal place of business is relevant in this connection. Hutchinson v.
Chase & Gilbert, supra, 141.

"Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of
the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give
rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to
an agent to accept service of process has been given. St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S.
350, 106 U. S. 355; Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 172 U. S.
610-611; Pennsylvania Lumbermen's Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407,197 U. S.
414-415; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 213 U. S. 255-
256; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra; cf. St. Louis S.W. R. Co. v.
Alexander, 227 U. S. 218. Conversely, it has been generally recognized that the
casual presence of the corporate agent, or even his conduct of single or isolated
items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf, are not enough to subject it to
suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there. St. Clair v. Cox,
supra,106 U. S. 359, 106 U. S. 360; Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 U. S.
8, 204 U. S. 21; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., supra,515, and cases cited. To
require the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home
or other jurisdiction where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought
to lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due
process.

Page 326 U. S. 318

While it has been held, in cases on which appellant relies, that continuous activity of
some sorts within a state is not enough to support the demand that the corporation
be amenable to suits unrelated to that activity, Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough,
supra; Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., supra; Simon v. Southern R. Co., 236 U. S.
115; People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra; cf. Davis v. Farmers
Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312, 262 U. S. 317, there have been instances in which
the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings
entirely distinct from those activities. See Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255
U.S. 565; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915; cf. St. Louis
S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander, supra.

Finally, although the commission of some single or occasional acts of the corporate
agent in a state sufficient to impose an obligation or liability on the corporation has
not been thought to confer upon the state authority to enforce it, Rosenberg Bros. &
Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U. S. 516, other such acts, because of their nature and
quality and the circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to
render the corporation liable to suit. Cf. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160; Hess v.
Pawloski, supra; Young v. Masci, supra. True, some of the decisions holding the
corporation amenable to suit have been supported by resort to the legal fiction that it
has given its consent to service and suit, consent being implied from its presence in
the state through the acts of its authorized agents. Lafayette Insurance Co. v.
French, 18 How. 404, 59 U. S. 407; St. Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U. S.
356; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, supra, 213 U. S. 254; Washington v. Superior
Court, 289 U. S. 361, 289 U. S. 364-365. But, more realistically, it may be said that
those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction. Smolik v.
Philadelphia &

Page 326 U. S. 319

Reading Co., 222 F. 148, 151. Henderson, The Position of Foreign Corporations in
American Constitutional Law, 94-95.

It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those
activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit and those which do not
cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has
sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit
to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less. St. Louis
S.W. R. Co. v. Alexander, supra, 227 U. S. 228; International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, supra, 234 U. S. 587. Whether due process is satisfied must depend,
rather, upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly
administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to
insure. That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the
state has no contacts, ties, or relations. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, supra; Minnesota
Commercial Assn. v. Benn, 261 U. S. 140.

But, to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue. Compare International Harvester Co. v.
Kentucky, supra, with Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., supra, and People's
Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., supra. Compare Connecticut Mutual Co. v.
Spratley, supra, 172 U. S. 619, 172 U. S. 620, and Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis,
supra, with Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, supra. See 29 Columbia Law
Review, 187-195.
Page 326 U. S. 320

Applying these standards, the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State
of Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and
continuous throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of
interstate business, in the course of which appellant received the benefits and
protection of the laws of the state, including the right to resort to the courts for the
enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those
very activities. It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties
with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional
conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the
obligations which appellant has incurred there. Hence, we cannot say that the
maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves an unreasonable
or undue procedure.

We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state
upon an agent whose activities establish appellant's "presence" there was not
sufficient notice of the suit, or that the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to
make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for communicating the notice. It is enough
that appellant has established such contacts with the state that the particular form of
substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice will be
actual. Connecticut Mutual Co. v. Spratley, supra, 172 U. S. 618, 172 U. S.
619; Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 198 U. S. 424, 198 U. S. 437-
438; Commercial Mutual Co. v. Davis, supra, 213 U. S. 254-255. Cf. Riverside Mills
v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189, 237 U. S. 194, 237 U. S. 195; See Knowles v. Gaslight &
Coke Co., 19 Wall. 58, 86 U. S. 61; McDonald v. Mabee, supra; Milliken v. Meyer,
supra. Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by registered
mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the
suit. Compare Hess v. Pawloski, supra, with McDonald v. Mabee, supra,

Page 326 U. S. 321

243 U. S. 92, and Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 276 U. S. 19, 276 U. S. 24; cf.
Becquet v. MacCarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951; Maubourquet v. Wyse, 1 Ir.Rep.C.L.
471. See Washington v. Superior Court, supra, 289 U. S. 365.

Only a word need be said of appellant's liability for the demanded contributions to the
state unemployment fund. The Supreme Court of Washington, construing and
applying the statute, has held that it imposes a tax on the privilege of employing
appellant's salesmen within the state measured by a percentage of the wages, here,
the commissions payable to the salesmen. This construction we accept for purposes
of determining the constitutional validity of the statute. The right to employ labor has
been deemed an appropriate subject of taxation in this country and England, both
before and since the adoption of the Constitution. Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 301 U. S. 579, et seq. And such a tax imposed upon the
employer for unemployment benefits is within the constitutional power of the
states. Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U. S. 495, 301 U. S. 508, et seq.

Appellant having rendered itself amenable to suit upon obligations arising out of the
activities of its salesmen in Washington, the state may maintain the present suit in
personam to collect the tax laid upon the exercise of the privilege of employing
appellant's salesmen within the state. For Washington has made one of those
activities which, taken together, establish appellant's "presence" there for purposes
of suit the taxable event by which the state brings appellant within the reach of its
taxing power. The state thus has constitutional power to lay the tax and to subject
appellant to a suit to recover it. The activities which establish its "presence" subject it
alike to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax. Equitable Life Society v.
Pennsylvania, 238 U. S. 143, 238 U. S. 146; cf. International Harvester Co. v.
Department of Taxation, 322 U. S. 435, 322 U. S. 442, et seq.; Hoopeston Canning
Co. v. Cullen,

Page 326 U. S. 322

supra, 318 U. S. 316-319; see General Trading Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 322 U. S. 335.

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the following opinion.

Congress, pursuant to its constitutional power to regulate commerce, has expressly

provided that a State shall not be prohibited from levying the kind of unemployment
compensation tax here challenged. 26 U.S.C. 1600. We have twice decided that this
Congressional consent is an adequate answer to a claim that imposition of the tax
violates the Commerce Clause. Perkins v. Pennsylvania, 314 U.S. 586, affirming 342
Pa. 529; Standard Dredging Corp. v. Murphy, 319 U. S. 306, 319 U. S. 308. Two
determinations by this Court of an issue so palpably without merit are sufficient.
Consequently, that part of this appeal which again seeks to raise the question seems
so patently frivolous as to make the case a fit candidate for dismissal. Fay v.
Crozer, 217 U. S. 455. Nor is the further ground advanced on this appeal, that the
State of Washington has denied appellant due process of law, any less devoid of
substance. It is my view, therefore, that we should dismiss the appeal as
unsubstantial, [Footnote 1] Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Watson, 287 U. S. 86, 287 U.
S. 90, 287 U. S. 92, and decline the invitation to formulate broad rules as to the
meaning of due process, which here would amount to deciding a constitutional
question "in advance of the necessity for its decision." Federation of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U. S. 450, 325 U. S. 461.

Page 326 U. S. 323

Certainly appellant cannot, in the light of our past decisions, meritoriously claim that
notice by registered mail and by personal service on its sales solicitors in
Washington did not meet the requirements of procedural due process. And the due
process clause is not brought in issue any more by appellant's further conceptualistic
contention that Washington could not levy a tax or bring suit against the corporation
because it did not honor that State with its mystical "presence." For it is unthinkable
that the vague due process clause was ever intended to prohibit a State from
regulating or taxing a business carried on within its boundaries simply because this
is done by agents of a corporation organized and having its headquarters elsewhere.
To read this into the due process clause would, in fact, result in depriving a State's
citizens of due process by taking from the State the power to protect them in their
business dealings within its boundaries with representatives of a foreign corporation.
Nothing could be more irrational, or more designed to defeat the function of our
federative system of government. Certainly a State, at the very least, has power to
tax and sue those dealing with its citizens within its boundaries, as we have held
before. Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U. S. 313. Were the Court to follow
this principle, it would provide a workable standard for cases where, as here, no
other questions are involved. The Court has not chosen to do so, but instead has
engaged in an unnecessary discussion, in the course of which it has announced
vague Constitutional criteria applied for the first time to the issue before us. It has
thus introduced uncertain elements confusing the simple pattern and tending to
curtail the exercise of State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution.

The criteria adopted, insofar as they can be identified, read as follows: Due Process
does permit State courts to "enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred" if

Page 326 U. S. 324

it be found "reasonable and just according to our traditional conception of fair play
and substantial justice." And this, in turn, means that we will "permit" the State to act
if, upon

"an 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would result to the corporation from a trial
away from its 'home' or principal place of business,"

we conclude that it is "reasonable" to subject it to suit in a State where it is doing

business.

It is true that this Court did use the terms "fair play" and "substantial justice" in
explaining the philosophy underlying the holding that it could not be "due process of
law" to render a personal judgment against a defendant without notice and an
opportunity to be heard. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U. S. 457. In McDonald v.
Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 243 U. S. 91, cited in the Milliken, case, Mr. Justice Holmes,
speaking for the Court, warned against judicial curtailment of this opportunity to be
heard, and referred to such a curtailment as a denial of "fair play," which even the
common law would have deemed "contrary to natural justice." And previous cases
had indicated that the ancient rule against judgments without notice had stemmed
from "natural justice" concepts. These cases, while giving additional reasons why
notice under particular circumstances is inadequate, did not mean thereby that all
legislative enactments which this Court might deem to be contrary to natural justice
ought to be held invalid under the due process clause. None of the cases purport to
support or could support a holding that a State can tax and sue corporations only if
its action comports with this Court's notions of "natural justice." I should have thought
the Tenth Amendment settled that.

I believe that the Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without any "ifs" or
"buts," a power to tax and to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue
corporations whose agents do business in those States. Believing that the
Constitution gave the States that power, I think it a judicial deprivation to condition its
exercise upon this

Page 326 U. S. 325

Court's notion of "fair play," however appealing that term may be. Nor can I stretch
the meaning of due process so far as to authorize this Court to deprive a State of the
right to afford judicial protection to its citizens on the ground that it would be more
"convenient" for the corporation to be sued somewhere else.

There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play," "justice," and
"reasonableness." But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original
Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use
in invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected legislative representatives.
No one, not even those who most feared a democratic government, ever formally
proposed that courts should be given power to invalidate legislation under any such
elastic standards. Express prohibitions against certain types of legislation are found
in the Constitution, and, under the long-settled practice, courts invalidate laws found
to conflict with them. This requires interpretation, and interpretation, it is true, may
result in extension of the Constitution's purpose. But that is no reason for reading the
due process clause so as to restrict a State's power to tax and sue those whose
activities affect persons and businesses within the State, provided proper service
can be had. Superimposing the natural justice concept on the Constitution's specific
prohibitions could operate as a drastic abridgment of democratic safeguards they
embody, such as freedom of speech, press and religion, [Footnote 2] and the right to
counsel. This

Page 326 U. S. 326

has already happened. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455. Compare Feldman v. United
States, 322 U. S. 487, 322 U. S. 494-503. For application of this natural law concept,
whether under the terms "reasonableness," "justice," or "fair play," makes judges the
supreme arbiters of the country's laws and practices. Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U. S.
5, 305 U. S. 17-18; Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.
S. 575, 315 U. S. 600, n. 4. This result, I believe, alters the form of government our
Constitution provides. I cannot agree.

True, the State's power is here upheld. But the rule announced means that
tomorrow's judgment may strike down a State or Federal enactment on the ground
that it does not conform to this Court's idea of natural justice. I therefore find myself
moved by the same fears that caused Mr. Justice Holmes to say in 1930:

"I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at the ever-
increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting down what I believe
to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the decisions now stand, I see hardly
any limit but the sky to the invalidating of those rights if they happen to strike a
majority of this Court as for any reason undesirable."

Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 281 U. S. 595.

[Footnote 1]

This Court has, on several occasions, pointed out the undesirable consequences of
a failure to dismiss frivolous appeals.Salinger v. United States, 272 U. S. 542, 272 U.
S. 544; United Surety Co. v. American Fruit Product Co., 238 U. S. 140; De Bearn v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 233 U. S. 24, 233 U. S. 33-34.

[Footnote 2]

These First Amendment liberties -- freedom of speech, press and religion -- provide
a graphic illustration of the potential restrictive capacity of a rule under which they
are protected at a particular time only because the Court, as then constituted,
believes them to be a requirement of fundamental justice. Consequently, under the
same rule, another Court, with a different belief as to fundamental justice, could, at
least as against State action, completely or partially withdraw Constitutional
protection from these basic freedoms, just as though the First Amendment had never
been written.