G.R. No.

204944-45 December 3, 2014

FUJI TELEVISION NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

It is the burden of the employer to prove that a person whose services it pays for is an independent contractor rather than a regular
employee with or without a fixed term. That a person has a disease does not per se entitle the employer to terminate his or her
services. Termination is the last resort. At the very least, a competent public health authority must certify that the disease cannot be
cured within six ( 6) months, even with appropriate treatment.

We decide this petition for review1 on certiorari filed by Fuji Television Network, Inc., seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals’
Decision2 dated June 25, 2012, affirming with modification the decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission.

In 2005, Arlene S. Espiritu ("Arlene") was engaged by Fuji Television Network, Inc. ("Fuji") asa news correspondent/producer4 "tasked
to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field office."5 Arlene’s employment contract initially provided for a term of one
(1) year but was successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal.6 Sometime in January 2009,
Arlenewas diagnosed with lung cancer.7She informed Fuji about her condition. In turn, the Chief of News Agency of Fuji, Yoshiki Aoki,
informed Arlene "that the company will have a problem renewing her contract"8 since it would be difficult for her to perform her job.9 She
"insisted that she was still fit to work as certified by her attending physician."10

After several verbal and written communications,11 Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract on May 5, 2009 where it was
stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration on May 31, 2009. The contract also provided that the parties
release each other from liabilities and responsibilities under the employment contract.12

In consideration of the non-renewal contract, Arlene "acknowledged receipt of the total amount of US$18,050.00 representing her
monthly salary from March 2009 to May 2009, year-end bonus, mid-year bonus, and separation pay."13 However, Arlene affixed her
signature on the nonrenewal contract with the initials "U.P." for "under protest."14

On May 6, 2009, the day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and attorney’s fees with
the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. She alleged that she was forced to sign the
nonrenewal contract when Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji withheld her salaries and other benefits for March and April
2009 when she refused to sign.15

Arlene claimed that she was left with no other recourse but to sign the non-renewal contract, and it was only upon signing that she was
given her salaries and bonuses, in addition to separation pay equivalent to four (4) years.16

In the decision17 dated September 10, 2009, Labor Arbiter Corazon C. Borbolla dismissed Arlene’s complaint.18Citing Sonza v. ABS-
CBN19 and applying the four-fold test, the Labor Arbiter held that Arlene was not Fuji’s employee but an independent contractor.20

Arlene appealed before the National Labor Relations Commission. In its decision dated March 5, 2010, the National Labor Relations
Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.21 It held that Arlene was a regular employee with respect to the activities for which
she was employed since she continuously rendered services that were deemednecessary and desirable to Fuji’s business.22 The
National Labor Relations Commission ordered Fuji to pay Arlene backwages, computed from the date of her illegal dismissal.23 The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the instant appeal. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter
dated 19 September 2009 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is issued ordering respondents-appellees to pay
complainant-appellant backwages computed from the date of her illegal dismissal until finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.24

Arlene and Fuji filed separat emotions for reconsideration.25 Both motions were denied by the National Labor Relations Commission for
lack of merit in the resolution dated April 26, 2010.26 From the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, both parties filed
separate petitions for certiorari27 before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals consolidated the petitions and considered the
following issues for resolution:

1) Whether or not Espirituis a regular employee or a fixed-term contractual employee;

1
 2) Whether or not Espiritu was illegally dismissed; and

3) Whether or not Espirituis entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.28

In the assailed decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission with the modification that Fuji
immediately reinstate Arlene to her position as News Producer without loss of seniority rights, and pay her backwages, 13th-
month pay, mid-year and year-end bonuses, sick leave and vacation leave with pay until reinstated, moral damages,
exemplary damages, attorney’sfees, and legal interest of 12% per annum of the total monetary awards.29 The Court of Appeals
ruled that:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition of Fuji Television Network, Inc. and Yoshiki Aoki is DENIED and the petition of Arlene S.
Espiritu is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 5, 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission, 6th Division in
NLRC NCR Case No. 05-06811-09 and its subsequent Resolution dated April 26, 2010 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS,
as follows:

Fuji Television, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to immediately REINSTATE Arlene S. Espiritu to her position as News Producer without loss
of seniority rights and privileges and to pay her the following:

1. Backwages at the rate of $1,900.00 per month computed from May 5, 2009 (the date of dismissal), until reinstated;

2. 13th Month Pay at the rate of $1,900.00 per annum from the date of dismissal, until reinstated;

3. One and a half (1 1/2) months pay or $2,850.00 as midyear bonus per year from the date of dismissal, until reinstated;

4. One and a half (1 1/2) months pay or $2,850.00 as year-end bonus per year from the date of dismissal, until reinstated;

5. Sick leave of 30 days with pay or $1,900.00 per year from the date of dismissal, until reinstated; and

6. Vacation leave with pay equivalent to 14 days or $1,425.00 per annum from date of dismissal, until reinstated.

7. The amount of ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;

8. The amount of ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages;

9. Attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary awards herein stated; and

10. Legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum of the total monetary awards computed from May 5, 2009, until their full
satisfaction.

The Labor Arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to make another recomputation of the above monetary awards consistent with the above
directives.

SO ORDERED.30

In arriving at the decision, the Court of Appeals held that Arlene was a regular employee because she was engaged to perform work
that was necessary or desirable in the business of Fuji,31 and the successive renewals of her fixed-term contract resulted in regular
employment.32

According to the Court of Appeals, Sonzadoes not apply in order to establish that Arlene was an independent contractor because she
was not contracted on account of any peculiar ability, special talent, or skill.33 The fact that everything used by Arlene in her work was
owned by Fuji negated the idea of job contracting.34

The Court of Appeals also held that Arlene was illegally dismissed because Fuji failed to comply with the requirements of substantive
and procedural due process necessary for her dismissal since she was a regular employee.35

The Court of Appeals found that Arlene did not sign the non-renewal contract voluntarily and that the contract was a mere subterfuge by
Fuji to secure its position that it was her choice not to renew her contract. She was left with no choice since Fuji was decided on
severing her employment.36

Fuji filed a motion for reconsideration that was denied in the resolution37 dated December 7, 2012 for failure to raise new matters.38

2
Aggrieved, Fuji filed this petition for review and argued that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming with modification the National Labor
Relations Commission’s decision, holding that Arlene was a regular employee and that she was illegally dismissed. Fuji also questioned
the award of monetary claims, benefits, and damages.39

Fuji points out that Arlene was hired as a stringer, and it informed her that she would remain one.40 She was hired as an independent
contractor as defined in Sonza.41 Fuji had no control over her work.42 The employment contracts were executed and renewed annually
upon Arlene’s insistence to which Fuji relented because she had skills that distinguished her from ordinary employees.43 Arlene and Fuji
dealt on equal terms when they negotiated and entered into the employment contracts.44 There was no illegal dismissal because she
freely agreed not to renew her fixed-term contract as evidenced by her e-mail correspondences with Yoshiki Aoki.45 In fact, the signing
of the non-renewal contract was not necessary to terminate her employment since "such employment terminated upon expiration of her
contract."46 Finally, Fuji had dealt with Arlene in good faith, thus, she should not have been awarded damages.47

Fuji alleges that it did not need a permanent reporter since the news reported by Arlene could easily be secured from other entities or
from the internet.48 Fuji "never controlled the manner by which she performed her functions."49It was Arlene who insisted that Fuji
execute yearly fixed-term contracts so that she could negotiate for annual increases in her pay.50

Fuji points out that Arlene reported for work for only five (5) days in February 2009, three (3) days in March 2009, and one (1) day in
April 2009.51 Despite the provision in her employment contract that sick leaves in excess of 30 days shall not be paid, Fuji paid Arlene
her entire salary for the months of March, April, and May; four(4) months of separation pay; and a bonus for two and a half months for a
total of US$18,050.00.52 Despite having received the amount of US$18,050.00, Arlene still filed a case for illegal dismissal.53

Fuji further argues that the circumstances would show that Arlene was not illegally dismissed. The decision tonot renew her contract
was mutually agreed upon by the parties as indicated in Arlene’s e-mail54 dated March 11, 2009 where she consented to the non-
renewal of her contract but refused to sign anything.55 Aoki informed Arlene in an e-mail56 dated March 12, 2009 that she did not need
to sign a resignation letter and that Fuji would pay Arlene’s salary and bonus until May 2009 as well as separation pay.57

Arlene sent an e-mail dated March 18, 2009 with her version of the non-renewal agreement that she agreed to sign this time.58 This
attached version contained a provision that Fuji shall re-hire her if she was still interested to work for Fuji.59 For Fuji, Arlene’s e-mail
showed that she had the power to bargain.60

Fuji then posits that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the elements of an employer-employee relationship are present,
particularly that of control;61 that Arlene’s separation from employment upon the expiration of her contract constitutes illegal
dismissal;62 that Arlene is entitled to reinstatement;63 and that Fuji is liable to Arlene for damages and attorney’s fees.64

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 was filed on February 8, 2013.65 On February 27, 2013, Arlene filed a
manifestation66 stating that this court may not take jurisdiction over the case since Fuji failed to authorize Corazon E. Acerden to sign
the verification.67 Fuji filed a comment on the manifestation68 on March 9, 2013.

Based on the arguments of the parties, there are procedural and substantive issues for resolution:

I. Whether the petition for review should be dismissed as Corazon E. Acerden, the signatory of the verification and certification
of non forum shopping of the petition, had no authority to sign the verification and certification on behalf of Fuji;

II. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the National Labor
Relations Commission when it ruled that Arlene was a regular employee, not an independent contractor, and that she was
illegally dismissed; and

III. Whether the Court of Appeals properly modified the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision by awarding
reinstatement, damages, and attorney’s fees.

The petition should be dismissed.

Validity of the verification and certification against forum shopping

In its comment on Arlene’s manifestation, Fuji alleges that Corazon was authorized to sign the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping because Mr. Shuji Yano was empowered under the secretary’s certificate to delegate his authority to sign the necessary
pleadings, including the verification and certification against forum shopping.69

On the other hand, Arlene points outthat the authority given to Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Eto in the secretary’s certificate is only for the
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.70 Fuji did not attach any board resolution authorizing Corazon orany other person

3
tofile a petition for review on certiorari with this court.71 Shuji Yano and Jin Eto could not re-delegate the power thatwas delegated to
them.72 In addition, the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano in favor of Corazon indicated that she was empowered to sign
on behalf of Shuji Yano, and not on behalf of Fuji.73

The Rules of Court requires the

Rule 7, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides the requirement of verification, while Section 5 of the same rule
provides the requirement of certification against forum shopping. These sections state:

SEC. 4. Ver if ica tio n. — Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.

A pleading required to be verifiedwhich containsa verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and
belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.— The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint orother initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is
pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has
been filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading
but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The
submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt ofcourt,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminalactions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as
well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

Section 4(e) of Rule 4574 requires that petitions for review should "contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in
the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42." Section 5 of the same rule provides that failure to comply with any requirement in Section 4 is
sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.

Effects of non-compliance

Uy v. Landbank75 discussed the effect of non-compliance with regard to verification and stated that:

[t]he requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the
form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended
to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking or
act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be
dispensed with inorder that the ends of justice may thereby be served.76 (Citations omitted)

Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals77 cited the discussion in Uy and differentiated its effect from non-compliance with the
requirement of certification against forum shopping:

On the other hand, the lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the failure of the petitioner tosubmit the required
documents that should accompany the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient ground for the
dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which
are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf of the corporation.78 (Emphasis supplied)
Effects of substantial compliance with the requirement of verification and certification against forum shopping

Although the general rule is that failure to attach a verification and certification against forum shopping isa ground for dismissal, there
are cases where this court allowed substantial compliance.

4
In Loyola v. Court of Appeals,79 petitioner Alan Loyola submitted the required certification one day after filing his electoral protest.80 This
court considered the subsequent filing as substantial compliance since the purpose of filing the certification is to curtail forum
shopping.81

In LDP Marketing, Inc. v. Monter,82 Ma. Lourdes Dela Peña signed the verification and certification against forum shopping but failed to
attach the board resolution indicating her authority to sign.83 In a motion for reconsideration, LDP Marketing attached the secretary’s
certificate quoting the board resolution that authorized Dela Peña.84 Citing Shipside, this court deemed the belated submission as
substantial compliance since LDP Marketing complied with the requirement; what it failed to do was to attach proof of Dela Peña’s
authority to sign.85 Havtor Management Phils., Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission86 and General Milling Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission87 involved petitions that were dismissed for failure to attach any document showing that the
signatory on the verification and certification against forum-shopping was authorized.88 In both cases, the secretary’s certificate was
attached to the motion for reconsideration.89 This court considered the subsequent submission of proof indicating authority to sign as
substantial compliance.90 Altres v. Empleo91 summarized the rules on verification and certification against forum shopping in this
manner:

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements . . . respecting non-
compliance with the requirement on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective.
The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict
compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good
faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally
not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of
"substantial compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of
them inthe certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating
his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.92

There was substantial compliance

Being a corporation, Fuji exercises its power to sue and be sued through its board of directors or duly authorized officers and agents.
Thus, the physical act of signing the verification and certification against forum shopping can only be done by natural persons duly
authorized either by the corporate by-laws or a board resolution.93

In its petition for review on certiorari, Fuji attached Hideaki Ota’s secretary’s certificate,94 authorizing Shuji Yano and Jin Eto to represent
and sign for and on behalf of Fuji.95 The secretary’s certificate was duly authenticated96 by Sulpicio Confiado, Consul-General of the
Philippines in Japan. Likewise attached to the petition is the special power of attorney executed by Shuji Yano, authorizing Corazon to
sign on his behalf.97 The verification and certification against forum shopping was signed by Corazon.98

Arlene filed the manifestation dated February 27, 2013, arguing that the petition for review should be dismissed because Corazon was
not duly authorized to sign the verification and certification against forum shopping.

Fuji filed a comment on Arlene’s manifestation, stating that Corazon was properly authorized to sign. On the basis of the secretary’s
certificate, Shuji Yano was empowered to delegate his authority.

Quoting the board resolution dated May 13, 2010, the secretary's certificate states:

5
 (a) The Corporation shall file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, against Philippines’ National Labor Relations
Commission ("NLRC") and Arlene S. Espiritu, pertaining to NLRC-NCR Case No. LAC 00-002697-09, RAB No. 05-06811-00
and entitled "Arlene S. Espiritu v. Fuji Television Network, Inc./Yoshiki Aoki", and participate in any other subsequent
proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom, including but not limited to the filing of appeals in the appropriate venue;

(b) Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Etobe authorized, as they are hereby authorized, to verify and execute the certification against
nonforum shopping which may be necessary or required to be attached to any pleading to [sic] submitted to the Court of
Appeals; and the authority to so verify and certify for the Corporation in favor of the said persons shall subsist and remain
effective until the termination of the said case;

....

(d) Mr. Shuji Yano and Mr. Jin Etobe authorized, as they are hereby authorized, to represent and appear on behalf the [sic]
Corporation in all stages of the [sic] this case and in any other proceeding that may necessarily arise thereform [sic], and to act
in the Corporation’s name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform any and all of the following:

1. The possibility of amicable settlement or of submission to alternative mode of dispute resolution;

2. The simplification of the issue;

3. The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;

4. The possibility of obtaining stipulation or admission of facts and documents; and

5. Such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action.99 (Emphasis in the original; Italics omitted)

Shuji Yano executed a special power of attorney appointing Ms. Ma. Corazon E. Acerden and Mr. Moises A. Rollera as his attorneys-in-
fact.100 The special power of attorney states:

That I, SHUJI YANO, of legal age, Japanese national, with office address at 2-4-8 Daiba, Minato-Ku, Tokyo, 137-8088 Japan, and being
the representative of Fuji TV, INc., [sic] (evidenced by the attached Secretary’s Certificate) one of the respondents in NLRC-NCR Case
No. 05-06811-00 entitled "Arlene S. Espiritu v. Fuji Television Network, Inc./Yoshiki Aoki", and subsequently docketed before the Court
of Appeals asC.A. G.R. S.P. No. 114867 (Consolidated with SP No. 114889) do hereby make, constitute and appoint Ms. Ma. Corazon
E. Acerden and Mr. Moises A. Rolleraas my true and lawful attorneys-infact for me and my name, place and stead to act and represent
me in the above-mentioned case, with special power to make admission/s and stipulations and/or to make and submit as well as to
accept and approve compromise proposals upon such terms and conditions and under such covenants as my attorney-in-fact may
deem fit, and to engage the services of Villa Judan and Cruz Law Officesas the legal counsel to represent the Company in the Supreme
Court;

The said Attorneys-in-Fact are hereby further authorized to make, sign, execute and deliver such papers ordocuments as may be
necessary in furtherance of the power thus granted, particularly to sign and execute the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping needed to be filed.101 (Emphasis in the original)

In its comment102 on Arlene’s manifestation, Fuji argues that Shuji Yano could further delegate his authority because the board
resolution empowered him to "act in the Corporation’s name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decided [sic], do and
perform any and all of the following: . . . such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action."103 To clarify, Fuji
attached a verification and certification against forum shopping, but Arlene questions Corazon’s authority to sign. Arlene argues that the
secretary’s certificate empowered Shuji Yano to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, and not a petition for review
before this court, and that since Shuji Yano’s authority was delegated to him, he could not further delegate such power. Moreover,
Corazon was representing Shuji Yano in his personal capacity, and not in his capacity as representative of Fuji.

A review of the board resolution quoted in the secretary’s certificate shows that Fuji shall "file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals"104 and "participate in any other subsequent proceeding that may necessarily arise therefrom, including but not limited to the
filing of appeals in the appropriate venue,"105 and that Shuji Yano and Jin Eto are authorized to represent Fuji "in any other proceeding
that may necessarily arise thereform [sic]."106 As pointed out by Fuji, Shuji Yano and Jin Eto were also authorized to "act in the
Corporation’s name, place and stead to determine, propose, agree, decide, do, and perform anyand all of the following: . . . 5. Such
other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the action."107

Considering that the subsequent proceeding that may arise from the petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals is the filing of a
petition for review with this court, Fuji substantially complied with the procedural requirement.

On the issue of whether Shuji Yano validly delegated his authority to Corazon, Article 1892 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states:

6
ART. 1892. The agent may appoint a substitute if the principal has not prohibited him from doing so; but he shall be responsible for the
acts of the substitute:

(1) When he was not given the power to appoint one;

(2) When he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the person appointed was notoriously
incompetent or insolvent. All acts of the substitute appointed against the prohibition of the principal shall be void.

The secretary’s certificate does not state that Shuji Yano is prohibited from appointing a substitute. In fact, heis empowered to do acts
that will aid in the resolution of this case.

This court has recognized that there are instances when officials or employees of a corporation can sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping without a board resolution. In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. CIR,108 it was held that:

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and certification without need of
a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting
General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases109 do not provide a complete listing of authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the
rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing
cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the corporation to sign the verification or certificate against
forum shopping, being ‘in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.’110

Corazon’s affidavit111 states that she is the "office manager and resident interpreter of the Manila Bureau of Fuji Television Network,
Inc."112 and that she has "held the position for the last twenty-three years."113

As the office manager for 23 years,Corazon can be considered as having knowledge of all matters in Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office and is
in a position to verify "the truthfulness and the correctness of the allegations in the Petition."114

Thus, Fuji substantially complied with the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping.

Before resolving the substantive issues in this case, this court will discuss the procedural parameters of a Rule 45 petition for review in
labor cases.

II

Procedural parameters of petitions for review in labor cases

Article 223 of the Labor Code115 does not provide any mode of appeal for decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. It
merely states that "[t]he decision of the Commission shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the
parties." Being final, it is no longer appealable. However, the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission’s decisions does not
mean that there is no more recourse for the parties.

In St. Martin Funeral Home v. National Labor Relations Commission,116 this court cited several cases117 and rejected the notion that this
court had no jurisdiction to review decisions of the National Labor Relations Commission. It stated that this court had the power to
review the acts of the National Labor Relations Commission to see if it kept within its jurisdiction in deciding cases and alsoas a form of
check and balance.118 This court then clarified that judicial review of National Labor Relations Commission decisions shall be by way of
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Citing the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, it further ruled that such petitions shall be filed before
the Court of Appeals. From the Court of Appeals, an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original action where the issue is limited to grave abuse of discretion. As an original action, it
cannot be considered as a continuation of the proceedings of the labor tribunals.

On the other hand, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is a mode of appeal where the issue is limited to questions of law. In
labor cases, a Rule 45 petition is limited toreviewing whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined the presence or absence of
grave abuse of discretion and deciding other jurisdictional errors of the National Labor Relations Commission.119

In Odango v. National Labor Relations Commission,120 this court explained that a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is
"available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases"121 and that its sole office "is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."122 A petition for certiorari does not include a review
of findings of fact since the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission are accorded finality.123 In cases where the aggrieved

7
party assails the National Labor Relations Commission’s findings, he or she must be able to show that the Commission "acted
capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy."124

When a decision of the Court of Appeals under a Rule 65 petition is brought to this court by way of a petition for review under Rule 45,
only questions of law may be decided upon. As held in Meralco Industrial v. National Labor Relations Commission:125

This Court is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court ina petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are
completely devoid of support from the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a gross misapprehension of facts.
Besides, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the
parties and binding on this Court.126

Career Philippines v. Serna,127 citing Montoya v. Transmed,128 is instructive on the parameters of judicial review under Rule 45:

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a Rule 45 petition. In one case, we discussed the particular parameters of a Rule 45
appeal from the CA’s Rule 65 decision on a labor case, as follows:

In a Rule 45 review, we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision, in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we
undertake under Rule 65. Furthermore, Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. In
ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was
presented to it; we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it, not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was
correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the NLRC
decision challenged before it.129 (Emphasis in the original)

Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion in Abott Laboratories, PhiIippines v. Aicaraz130 discussed that in petitions for review under Rule 45,
"the Court simply determines whether the legal correctness of the CA’s finding that the NLRC ruling . . . had basis in fact and in
Iaw."131 In this kind of petition, the proper question to be raised is, "Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in ruling on the case?"132

Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion also laid down the following guidelines:

If the NLRC ruling has basis in the evidence and the applicable law and jurisprudence, then no grave abuse of discretion exists and the
CA should so declare and, accordingly, dismiss the petition. If grave abuse of discretion exists, then the CA must grant the petition and
nullify the NLRC ruling, entering at the same time the ruling that isjustified under the evidence and the governing law, rules and
jurisprudence. In our Rule 45 review, this Court must denythe petition if it finds that the CA correctly acted.133 (Emphasis in the original)

These parameters shall be used in resolving the substantive issues in this petition.

III

Determination of employment status; burden of proof

In this case, there is no question thatArlene rendered services to Fuji. However, Fuji alleges that Arlene was an independent contractor,
while Arlene alleges that she was a regular employee. To resolve this issue, we ascertain whether an employer-employee relationship
existed between Fuji and Arlene.

This court has often used the four-fold test to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Under the four-fold test,
the "control test" is the most important.134 As to how the elements in the four-fold test are proven, this court has discussed that:

[t]here is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforesaid elements. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the
relationship may be admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security registration, appointment letters or employment
contracts, payrolls, organization charts, and personnel lists, serve as evidence of employee status.135

If the facts of this case vis-à-vis the four-fold test show that an employer-employee relationship existed, we then determine the status of
Arlene’s employment, i.e., whether she was a regular employee. Relative to this, we shall analyze Arlene’s fixed-term contract and
determine whether it supports her argument that she was a regular employee, or the argument of Fuji that she was an independent
contractor. We shall scrutinize whether the nature of Arlene’s work was necessary and desirable to Fuji’s business or whether Fuji only
needed the output of her work. If the circumstances show that Arlene’s work was necessary and desirable to Fuji, then she is presumed
to be a regular employee. The burden of proving that she was an independent contractor lies with Fuji.

8
In labor cases, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence.136 "Substantial evidence" has been defined as "such amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion."137

If Arlene was a regular employee, we then determine whether she was illegally dismissed. In complaints for illegal dismissal, the burden
of proof is on the employee to prove the fact of dismissal.138 Once the employee establishes the fact of dismissal, supported by
substantial evidence, the burden of proof shifts tothe employer to show that there was a just or authorized cause for the dismissal and
that due process was observed.139

IV

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the National Labor

Fuji alleges that Arlene was anindependent contractor, citing Sonza v. ABS-CBN and relying on the following facts: (1) she was hired
because of her skills; (2) her salary was US$1,900.00, which is higher than the normal rate; (3) she had the power to bargain with her
employer; and (4) her contract was for a fixed term. According to Fuji, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that Arlene was forcedto
sign the non-renewal agreement, considering that she sent an email with another version of the non-renewal agreement.140 Further, she
is not entitled tomoral damages and attorney’s fees because she acted in bad faith when she filed a labor complaint against Fuji after
receiving US$18,050.00 representing her salary and other benefits.141 Arlene argues that she was a regular employee because Fuji had
control and supervision over her work. The news events that she covered were all based on the instructions of Fuji.142 She maintains
that the successive renewal of her employment contracts for four (4) years indicates that her work was necessary and desirable.143 In
addition, Fuji’s payment of separation pay equivalent to one (1) month’s pay per year of service indicates that she was a regular
employee.144 To further support her argument that she was not an independent contractor, she states that Fuji owns the laptop
computer and mini-camera that she used for work.145 Arlene also argues that Sonza is not applicable because she was a plain reporter
for Fuji, unlike Jay Sonza who was a news anchor, talk show host, and who enjoyed a celebrity status.146 On her illness, Arlene points
outthat it was not a ground for her dismissal because her attending physician certified that she was fit to work.147

Arlene admits that she signed the non-renewal agreement with quitclaim, not because she agreed to itsterms, but because she was not
in a position to reject the non-renewal agreement. Further, she badly needed the salary withheld for her sustenance and
medication.148 She posits that her acceptance of separation pay does not bar filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.149

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that:

Art. 280. Regular and casual employment.The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the
oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided, That, any employee who has
rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which heis employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exist.

This provision classifies employees into regular, project, seasonal, and casual. It further classifies regular employees into two kinds: (1)
those "engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer"; and (2)
casual employees who have "rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken."

Another classification of employees, i.e., employees with fixed-term contracts, was recognized in Brent School, Inc. v. Zamora150 where
this court discussed that:

Logically, the decisive determinant in the term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but
the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship, a day certainbeing
understood to be "that which must necessarily come, although it may not be known when."151 (Emphasis in the original)

This court further discussed that there are employment contracts where "a fixed term is an essential and natural appurtenance"152 such
as overseas employment contracts and officers in educational institutions.153

Distinctions among fixed-term

GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga154 expounded the doctrine on fixed term contracts laid down in Brentin the following manner:
9
Cognizant of the possibility of abuse in the utilization of fixed term employment contracts, we emphasized in Brentthat where from the
circumstances it is apparent that the periods have been imposed to preclude acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, they
should be struck down as contrary to public policy or morals. We thus laid down indications or criteria under which "term employment"
cannot be said to be in circumvention of the law on security of tenure, namely:

1) The fixed period of employment was knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties without any force, duress, or improper
pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstances vitiating his consent; or

2) It satisfactorily appears that the employer and the employee dealt with each other on more or less equal terms with no moral
dominance exercised by the former or the latter.

These indications, which must be read together, make the Brent doctrine applicable only in a few special cases wherein the employer
and employee are on more or less in equal footing in entering into the contract. The reason for this is evident: whena prospective
employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make demands upon the prospective employer, such
prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus
required for the protection of the employee.155(Citations omitted)

For as long as the guidelines laid down in Brentare satisfied, this court will recognize the validity of the fixed-term contract.

In Labayog v. M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc.,156 this court upheld the fixedterm employment of petitioners because from the time they were
hired, they were informed that their engagement was for a specific period. This court stated that:

[s]imply put, petitioners were notregular employees. While their employment as mixers, packers and machine operators was necessary
and desirable in the usual business ofrespondent company, they were employed temporarily only, during periods when there was
heightened demand for production. Consequently, there could have been no illegal dismissal when their services were terminated on
expiration of their contracts. There was even no need for notice of termination because they knew exactly when their contracts would
end. Contracts of employment for a fixed period terminate on their own at the end of such period.

Contracts of employment for a fixed period are not unlawful. What is objectionable is the practice of some scrupulous employers who
try to circumvent the law protecting workers from the capricious termination of employment.157 (Citation omitted)

Caparoso v. Court of Appeals158 upheld the validity of the fixed-term contract of employment. Caparoso and Quindipan were hired as
delivery men for three (3) months. At the end of the third month, they were hired on a monthly basis. In total, they were hired for five (5)
months. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.159 This court ruled that there was no evidence indicating that they were pressured
into signing the fixed-term contracts. There was likewise no proof that their employer was engaged in hiring workers for five (5) months
onlyto prevent regularization. In the absence of these facts, the fixed-term contracts were upheld as valid.160 On the other hand, an
independent contractor is defined as:

. . . one who carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work, or service on its own account and
under one’s own responsibility according to one’s own manner and method, free from the control and direction of the principal in all
matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof.161

In view of the "distinct and independent business" of independent contractors, no employer-employee relationship exists between
independent contractors and their principals. Independent contractors are recognized under Article 106 of the Labor Code:

Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor. Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the
former’s work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter’s subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.

....

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting-out of labor to protect the
rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only
contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties
involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this
Code.

There is "labor-only" contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in
the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are
performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary
shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if
the latterwere directly employed by him.

10
In Department Order No. 18-A, Seriesof 2011, of the Department of Labor and Employment, a contractor is defined as having:

Section 3. . . .

....

(c) . . . an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out with a contractor the performance or completion of a specific
job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or
completed within oroutside the premises of the principal.

This department order also states that there is a trilateral relationship in legitimate job contracting and subcontracting arrangements
among the principal, contractor, and employees of the contractor. There is no employer-employee relationship between the contractor
and principal who engages the contractor’s services, but there is an employer-employee relationship between the contractor and
workers hired to accomplish the work for the principal.162

Jurisprudence has recognized another kind of independent contractor: individuals with unique skills and talents that set them apart from
ordinary employees. There is no trilateral relationship in this case because the independent contractor himself or herself performs the
work for the principal. In other words, the relationship is bilateral.

In Orozco v. Court of Appeals,163 Wilhelmina Orozco was a columnist for the Philippine Daily Inquirer. This court ruled that she was an
independent contractor because of her "talent, skill, experience, and her unique viewpoint as a feminist advocate."164 In addition, the
Philippine Daily Inquirer did not have the power of control over Orozco, and she worked at her own pleasure.165

Semblante v. Court of Appeals166 involved a masiador167 and a sentenciador.168 This court ruled that "petitioners performed their
functions as masiadorand sentenciador free from the direction and control of respondents"169 and that the masiador and sentenciador
"relied mainly on their ‘expertise that is characteristic of the cockfight gambling.’"170 Hence, no employer-employee relationship existed.

Bernarte v. Philippine Basketball Association171 involved a basketball referee. This court ruled that "a referee is an independent
contractor, whose special skills and independent judgment are required specifically for such position and cannot possibly be controlled
by the hiring party."172

In these cases, the workers were found to be independent contractors because of their unique skills and talents and the lack of control
over the means and methods in the performance of their work.

In other words, there are different kinds of independent contractors: those engaged in legitimate job contracting and those who have
unique skills and talents that set them apart from ordinary employees.

Since no employer-employee relationship exists between independent contractors and their principals, their contracts are governed by
the Civil Code provisions on contracts and other applicable laws.173

A contract is defined as "a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service."174 Parties are free to stipulate on terms and conditions in contracts as long as these "are not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy."175 This presupposes that the parties to a contract are on equal
footing. Theycan bargain on terms and conditions until they are able to reach an agreement.

On the other hand, contracts of employment are different and have a higher level of regulation because they are impressed with public
interest. Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides full protection to labor:

ARTICLE XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

....

LABOR

Section 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

11
The State shall promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary
modes in settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce their mutual compliance therewith to foster industrial peace.

The State shall regulate the relations between workers and employers, recognizing the right of labor to its just share in the fruits of
production and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments, and to expansion and growth.

Apart from the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor, Article 1700 of the Civil Code states:

ART. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor unions, collective
bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.

In contracts of employment, the employer and the employee are not on equal footing. Thus, it is subject to regulatory review by the
labor tribunals and courts of law. The law serves to equalize the unequal. The labor force is a special class that is constitutionally
protected because of the inequality between capital and labor.176 This presupposes that the labor force is weak. However, the level of
protection to labor should vary from case to case; otherwise, the state might appear to be too paternalistic in affording protection to
labor. As stated in GMA Network, Inc. v. Pabriga, the ruling in Brent applies in cases where it appears that the employer and employee
are on equal footing.177 This recognizes the fact that not all workers are weak. To reiterate the discussion in GMA Network v. Pabriga:

The reason for this is evident: when a prospective employee, on account of special skills or market forces, is in a position to make
demands upon the prospective employer, such prospective employee needs less protection than the ordinary worker. Lesser limitations
on the parties’ freedom of contract are thus required for the protection of the employee.178

The level of protection to labor mustbe determined on the basis of the nature of the work, qualifications of the employee, and other
relevant circumstances.

For example, a prospective employee with a bachelor’s degree cannot be said to be on equal footing witha grocery bagger with a high
school diploma. Employees who qualify for jobs requiring special qualifications such as "[having] a Master’s degree" or "[having] passed
the licensure exam" are different from employees who qualify for jobs that require "[being a] high school graduate; withpleasing
personality." In these situations, it is clear that those with special qualifications can bargain with the employer on equal footing. Thus,
the level of protection afforded to these employees should be different.

Fuji’s argument that Arlene was an independent contractor under a fixed-term contract is contradictory. Employees under fixed-term
contracts cannot be independent contractors because in fixed-term contracts, an employer-employee relationship exists. The test in this
kind of contract is not the necessity and desirability of the employee’s activities, "but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the
commencement and termination of the employment relationship."179 For regular employees, the necessity and desirability of their work
in the usual course of the employer’s business are the determining factors. On the other hand, independent contractors do not have
employer-employee relationships with their principals. Hence, before the status of employment can be determined, the existence of an
employer-employee relationship must be established.

The four-fold test180 can be used in determining whether an employeremployee relationship exists. The elements of the four-fold test are
the following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power of control, which is the most important element.181

The "power of control" was explained by this court in Corporal, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission:182

The power to control refers to the existence of the power and not necessarily to the actual exercise thereof, nor is it essential for the
employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee. It is enough that the employer has the right to wield that
power.183 (Citation omitted)

Orozco v. Court of Appeals further elucidated the meaning of "power of control" and stated the following:

Logically, the line should be drawn between rules that merely serve as guidelines towards the achievement of the mutually desired
result without dictating the means or methods to be employed in attaining it, and those that control or fix the methodology and bind or
restrict the party hired to the use of such means. The first, which aim only to promote the result, create no employer-employee
relationship unlike the second, which address both the result and the means used to achieve it. . . .184 (Citation omitted)

In Locsin, et al. v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,185 the "power of control" was defined as "[the] right to control not only
the end to be achieved but also the means to be used in reaching such end."186

Here, the Court of Appeals applied Sonza v. ABS-CBN and Dumpit Murillo v. Court of Appeals187 in determining whether Arlene was an
independent contractor or a regular employee.

12
In deciding Sonza and Dumpit-Murillo, this court used the four-fold test. Both cases involved newscasters and anchors. However,
Sonza was held to be an independent contractor, while Dumpit-Murillo was held to be a regular employee.

Comparison of the Sonza and

Sonza was engaged by ABS-CBN in view of his "unique skills, talent and celebrity status not possessed by ordinary employees."188 His
work was for radio and television programs.189 On the other hand, Dumpit-Murillo was hired by ABC as a newscaster and co-
anchor.190 Sonza’s talent fee amounted to ₱317,000.00 per month, which this court found to be a substantial amount that indicatedhe
was an independent contractor rather than a regular employee.191Meanwhile, Dumpit-Murillo’s monthly salary was ₱28,000.00, a very
low amount compared to what Sonza received.192

Sonza was unable to prove that ABS-CBN could terminate his services apart from breach of contract. There was no indication that he
could be terminated based on just or authorized causes under the Labor Code. In addition, ABS-CBN continued to pay his talent fee
under their agreement, even though his programs were no longer broadcasted.193 Dumpit-Murillo was found to have beenillegally
dismissed by her employer when they did not renew her contract on her fourth year with ABC.194

In Sonza, this court ruled that ABS-CBN did not control how Sonza delivered his lines, how he appeared on television, or how he
sounded on radio.195 All that Sonza needed was his talent.196 Further, "ABS-CBN could not terminate or discipline SONZA even if the
means and methods of performance of his work . . . did not meet ABS-CBN’s approval."197 In Dumpit-Murillo, the duties and
responsibilities enumerated in her contract was a clear indication that ABC had control over her work.198

Application of the four-fold test

The Court of Appeals did not err when it relied on the ruling in Dumpit-Murillo and affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding that Arlene was a regular employee. Arlene was hired by Fuji as a news producer, but there was no showing that
she was hired because of unique skills that would distinguish her from ordinary employees. Neither was there any showing that she had
a celebrity status. Her monthly salary amounting to US$1,900.00 appears tobe a substantial sum, especially if compared to her salary
whenshe was still connected with GMA.199 Indeed, wages may indicate whether oneis an independent contractor. Wages may also
indicate that an employee is able to bargain with the employer for better pay. However, wages should not be the conclusive factor in
determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor.

Fuji had the power to dismiss Arlene, as provided for in paragraph 5 of her professional employment contract.200 Her contract also
indicated that Fuji had control over her work because she was required to work for eight (8) hours from Monday to Friday, although on
flexible time.201 Sonza was not required to work for eight (8) hours, while Dumpit-Murillo had to be in ABC to do both on-air and off-air
tasks.

On the power to control, Arlene alleged that Fuji gave her instructions on what to report.202 Even the mode of transportation in carrying
out her functions was controlled by Fuji. Paragraph 6 of her contract states:

6. During the travel to carry out work, if there is change of place or change of place of work, the train, bus, or public transport shall be
used for the trip. If the Employee uses the private car during the work and there is an accident the Employer shall not be responsible for
the damage, which may be caused to the Employee.203

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it upheld the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission that Arlene was not an
independent contractor.

Having established that an employer-employee relationship existed between Fuji and Arlene, the next questions for resolution are the
following: Did the Court of Appeals correctly affirm the National Labor Relations Commission that Arlene had become a regular
employee? Was the nature of Arlene’s work necessary and desirable for Fuji’s usual course of business?

Arlene was a regular employee

The test for determining regular employment is whether there is a reasonable connection between the employee’s activities and the
usual business of the employer. Article 280 provides that the nature of work must be "necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer" as the test for determining regular employment. As stated in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Nazareno:204

In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular, the applicable test is the reasonable connection
between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. The standard,
supplied by the law itself, is whether the work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, a
fact that can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which the
13
business or trade is pursued in the usual course. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is divorced from the normal
activities required incarrying on the particular business or trade.205

However, there may be a situation where an employee’s work is necessary but is not always desirable inthe usual course of business of
the employer. In this situation, there is no regular employment.

In San Miguel Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,206 Francisco de Guzman was hired to repair furnaces at San Miguel
Corporation’s Manila glass plant. He had a separate contract for every furnace that he repaired. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
three (3) years after the end of his last contract.207 In ruling that de Guzman did not attain the status of a regular employee, this court
explained:

Note that the plant where private respondent was employed for only seven months is engaged in the manufacture of glass, an integral
component of the packaging and manufacturing business of petitioner. The process of manufacturing glass requires a furnace, which
has a limited operating life. Petitioner resorted to hiring project or fixed term employees in having said furnaces repaired since said
activity is not regularly performed. Said furnaces are to be repaired or overhauled only in case of need and after being used
continuously for a varying period of five (5) to ten (10) years. In 1990, one of the furnaces of petitioner required repair and upgrading.
This was an undertaking distinct and separate from petitioner's business of manufacturing glass. For this purpose, petitioner must hire
workers to undertake the said repair and upgrading. . . .

....

Clearly, private respondent was hired for a specific project that was not within the regular business of the corporation. For petitioner is
not engaged in the business of repairing furnaces. Although the activity was necessary to enable petitioner to continue manufacturing
glass, the necessity therefor arose only when a particular furnace reached the end of its life or operating cycle. Or, as in the second
undertaking, when a particular furnace required an emergency repair. In other words, the undertakings where private respondent was
hired primarily as helper/bricklayer have specified goals and purposes which are fulfilled once the designated work was completed.
Moreover, such undertakings were also identifiably separate and distinct from the usual, ordinary or regular business operations of
petitioner, which is glass manufacturing. These undertakings, the duration and scope of which had been determined and made known
to private respondent at the time of his employment, clearly indicated the nature of his employment as a project employee.208

Fuji is engaged in the business of broadcasting,209 including news programming.210 It is based in Japan211 and has overseas offices to
cover international news.212

Based on the record, Fuji’s Manila Bureau Office is a small unit213 and has a few employees.214 As such, Arlene had to do all activities
related to news gathering. Although Fuji insists that Arlene was a stringer, it alleges that her designation was "News
Talent/Reporter/Producer."215

A news producer "plans and supervises newscast . . . [and] work[s] with reporters in the field planning and gathering
information. . . ."216 Arlene’s tasks included "[m]onitoring and [g]etting [n]ews [s]tories, [r]eporting interviewing subjects in front of a video
camera,"217 "the timely submission of news and current events reports pertaining to the Philippines[,] and traveling [sic] to [Fuji’s]
regional office in Thailand."218 She also had to report for work in Fuji’s office in Manila from Mondays to Fridays, eight (8) hours per
day.219 She had no equipment and had to use the facilities of Fuji to accomplish her tasks.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission that the successive renewals of Arlene’s contract
indicated the necessity and desirability of her work in the usual course of Fuji’s business. Because of this, Arlene had become a regular
employee with the right to security of tenure.220 The Court of Appeals ruled that:

Here, Espiritu was engaged by Fuji as a stinger [sic] or news producer for its Manila Bureau. She was hired for the primary purpose of
news gathering and reporting to the television network’s headquarters. Espiritu was not contracted on account of any peculiar ability or
special talent and skill that she may possess which the network desires to make use of. Parenthetically, ifit were true that Espiritu is an
independent contractor, as claimed by Fuji, the factthat everything that she uses to perform her job is owned by the company including
the laptop computer and mini camera discounts the idea of job contracting.221

Moreover, the Court of Appeals explained that Fuji’s argument that no employer-employee relationship existed in view of the fixed-term
contract does not persuade because fixed-term contracts of employment are strictly construed.222 Further, the pieces of equipment
Arlene used were all owned by Fuji, showing that she was a regular employee and not an independent contractor.223

The Court of Appeals likewise cited Dumpit-Murillo, which involved fixed-term contracts that were successively renewed for four (4)
years.224 This court held that "[t]his repeated engagement under contract of hire is indicative of the necessity and desirability of the
petitioner’s work in private respondent ABC’s business."225

With regard to Fuji’s argument that Arlene’s contract was for a fixed term, the Court of Appeals cited Philips Semiconductors, Inc. v.
Fadriquela226 and held that where an employee’s contract "had been continuously extended or renewed to the same position, with the

14
same duties and remained in the employ without any interruption,"227 then such employee is a regular employee. The continuous
renewal is a scheme to prevent regularization. On this basis, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Arlene.

As stated in Price, et al. v. Innodata Corp., et al.:228

The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to
consider is that a contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor contracts must yield to the common good.
Thus, provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at liberty to insulate themselves and
their relationships from the impact of labor laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other.229 (Citations omitted)

Arlene’s contract indicating a fixed term did not automatically mean that she could never be a regular employee. This is precisely what
Article 280 seeks to avoid. The ruling in Brent remains as the exception rather than the general rule.

Further, an employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. The law does not preclude the possibility that a regular
employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract for valid reasons. This was recognized in Brent: For as long as it was the employee
who requested, or bargained, that the contract have a "definite date of termination," or that the fixed-term contract be freely entered into
by the employer and the employee, then the validity of the fixed-term contract will be upheld.230

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed

the National Labor Relations Commission’s finding of illegal dismissal

Fuji argues that the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Arlene was illegally dismissed, in view of the non-renewal contract
voluntarily executed by the parties. Fuji also argues that Arlene’s contract merely expired; hence, she was not illegally dismissed.231

Arlene alleges that she had no choice but to sign the non-renewal contract because Fuji withheldher salary and benefits.

With regard to this issue, the Court of Appeals held:

We cannot subscribe to Fuji’s assertion that Espiritu’s contract merely expired and that she voluntarily agreed not to renew the same.
Even a cursory perusal of the subject Non-Renewal Contract readily shows that the same was signed by Espiritu under protest. What is
apparent is that the Non-Renewal Contract was crafted merely as a subterfuge to secure Fuji’s position that it was Espiritu’s choice not
to renew her contract.232

As a regular employee, Arlene was entitled to security of tenure and could be dismissed only for just or authorized causes and after the
observance of due process.

The right to security of tenureis guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution: ARTICLE XIII. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND
HUMAN RIGHTS

....

LABOR

....

It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living
wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law.

Article 279 of the Labor Code also provides for the right to security of tenure and states the following:

Art. 279. Security of tenure.In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause of when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

Thus, on the right to security of tenure, no employee shall be dismissed, unless there are just orauthorized causes and only after
compliance with procedural and substantive due process is conducted.
15
Even probationary employees are entitled to the right to security of tenure. This was explained in Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. v.
Magtibay, Jr.:233

Within the limited legal six-month probationary period, probationary employees are still entitled to security of tenure. It is expressly
provided in the afore-quoted Article 281 that a probationary employee may be terminated only on two grounds: (a) for just cause, or (b)
when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee
at the time of his engagement.234 (Citation omitted)

The expiration of Arlene’s contract does not negate the finding of illegal dismissal by Fuji. The manner by which Fuji informed Arlene
that her contract would no longer be renewed is tantamount to constructive dismissal. To make matters worse, Arlene was asked to sign
a letter of resignation prepared by Fuji.235 The existence of a fixed-term contract should not mean that there can be no illegal dismissal.
Due process must still be observed in the pre-termination of fixed-term contracts of employment.

In addition, the Court of Appeals and the National Labor Relations Commission found that Arlene was dismissed because of her health
condition. In the non-renewal agreement executed by Fuji and Arlene, it is stated that:

WHEREAS, the SECOND PARTY is undergoing chemotherapy which prevents her from continuing to effectively perform her functions
under the said Contract such as the timely submission of news and current events reports pertaining to the Philippines and travelling
[sic] to the FIRST PARTY’s regional office in Thailand.236 (Emphasis supplied)

Disease as a ground for termination is recognized under Article 284 of the Labor Code:

Art. 284. Disease as ground for termination. An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be
suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health
of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

Book VI, Rule 1, Section 8 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:

Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal.– Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to his healthor to the health of his coemployees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a
certification by a competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a
period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall
not terminate the employee but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former
position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.

For dismissal under Article 284 to bevalid, two requirements must be complied with: (1) the employee’s disease cannot be cured within
six (6) months and his "continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees"; and (2) certification issued by a competent public health authority that even with proper medical treatment, the disease
cannot be cured within six (6) months.237 The burden of proving compliance with these requisites is on the employer.238 Noncompliance
leads to the conclusion that the dismissal was illegal.239

There is no evidence showing that Arlene was accorded due process. After informing her employer of her lung cancer, she was not
given the chance to present medical certificates. Fuji immediately concluded that Arlene could no longer perform her duties because of
chemotherapy. It did not ask her how her condition would affect her work. Neither did it suggest for her to take a leave, even though she
was entitled to sick leaves. Worse, it did not present any certificate from a competent public health authority. What Fuji did was to
inform her thather contract would no longer be renewed, and when she did not agree, her salary was withheld. Thus, the Court of
Appeals correctly upheld the finding of the National Labor Relations Commission that for failure of Fuji to comply with due process,
Arlene was illegally dismissed.240

VI

Whether the Court of Appeals properly modified

The National Labor Relations Commission awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, on the ground that the filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal may have seriously strained relations between the parties. Backwages were also awarded, to be
computed from date of dismissal until the finality of the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision. However, only backwages
were included in the dispositive portion because the National Labor Relations Commission recognized that Arlene had received
separation pay in the amount of US$7,600.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision but
modified it by awarding moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, and all other benefits Arlene was entitled to under her

16
contract with Fuji. The Court of Appeals also ordered reinstatement, reasoning that the grounds when separation pay was awarded in
lieu of reinstatement were not proven.241

Article 279 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 279. Security of tenure. In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. (Emphasis
supplied)

The Court of Appeals’ modification of the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision was proper because the law itself provides
that illegally dismissed employees are entitled to reinstatement, backwages including allowances, and all other benefits.

On reinstatement, the National Labor Relations Commission ordered payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, reasoning
"that the filing of the instant suit may have seriously abraded the relationship of the parties so as to render reinstatement
impractical."242 The Court of Appeals reversed this and ordered reinstatement on the ground that separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
is allowed only in several instances such as (1) when the employer has ceased operations; (2) when the employee’s position is no
longer available; (3) strained relations; and (4) a substantial period has lapsed from date of filing to date of finality.243

On this matter, Quijano v. Mercury Drug Corp.244 is instructive:

Well-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. . . .

To protect labor’s security of tenure, we emphasize that the doctrine of "strained relations" should be strictly applied so as not to deprive
an illegally dismissed employee of his right to reinstatement. Every labor dispute almost always results in "strained relations" and the
phrase cannot be given an overarching interpretation, otherwise, an unjustly dismissed employee can never be reinstated.245 (Citations
omitted)

The Court of Appeals reasoned that strained relations are a question of fact that must be supported by evidence.246No evidence was
presented by Fuji to prove that reinstatement was no longer feasible. Fuji did not allege that it ceased operations or that Arlene’s
position was no longer available. Nothing in the records shows that Arlene’s reinstatement would cause an atmosphere of antagonism
in the workplace. Arlene filed her complaint in 2009. Five (5) years are not yet a substantial period247 to bar reinstatement.

On the award of damages, Fuji argues that Arlene is notentitled to the award of damages and attorney’s fees because the non-renewal
agreement contained a quitclaim, which Arlene signed. Quitclaims in labor cases do not bar illegally dismissed employees from filing
labor complaints and money claim. As explained by Arlene, she signed the non-renewal agreement out of necessity. In Land and
Housing Development Corporation v. Esquillo,248 this court explained: We have heretofore explained that the reason why quitclaims are
commonly frowned upon as contrary to public policy, and why they are held to be ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the
workers’ legal rights, is the fact that the employer and the employee obviously do not stand on the same footing. The employer drove
the employee to the wall. The latter must have to get holdof money. Because, out of a job, he had to face the harsh necessities of life.
He thus found himself in no position to resist money proffered. His, then, is a case of adherence, not of choice.249

With regard to the Court of Appeals’ award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, this court has recognized in several
cases that moral damages are awarded "when the dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor,
or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy."250 On the other hand, exemplary damages may be
awarded when the dismissal was effected "in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner."251

The Court of Appeals and National Labor Relations Commission found that after Arlene had informed Fuji of her cancer, she was
informed that there would be problems in renewing her contract on account of her condition. This information caused Arlene mental
anguish, serious anxiety, and wounded feelings that can be gleaned from the tenor of her email dated March 11, 2009. A portion of her
email reads:

I WAS SO SURPRISED . . . that at a time when I am at my lowest, being sick and very weak, you suddenly came to deliver to me the
NEWS that you will no longer renew my contract.1awp++i1 I knew this will come but I never thought that you will be so ‘heartless’ and
insensitive to deliver that news just a month after I informed you that I am sick. I was asking for patience and understanding and your
response was not to RENEW my contract.252

Apart from Arlene’s illegal dismissal, the manner of her dismissal was effected in an oppressive approach withher salary and other
benefits being withheld until May 5, 2009, when she had no other choice but to sign the non-renewal contract. Thus, there was legal
basis for the Court of Appeals to modify the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision.

17
However, Arlene receivedher salary for May 2009.253 Considering that the date of her illegal dismissal was May 5, 2009,254 this amount
may be subtracted from the total monetary award. With regard to the award of attorney’s fees, Article 111 of the Labor Code states that
"[i]n cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of wages recovered." Likewise, this court has recognized that "in actions for recovery of wages or where an employee was
forced to litigate and, thus, incur expenses to protect his rights and interest, the award of attorney’s fees is legallyand morally
justifiable."255 Due to her illegal dismissal, Arlene was forced to litigate.

In the dispositive portion of its decision, the Court of Appeals awarded legal interest at the rate of 12% per annum.256 In view of this
court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,257 the legal interest shall be reducd to a rate of 6% per annum from July 1, 2013 until full
satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals decision dated June 25, 2012 is AFFIRMED with the modification
that backwages shall be computed from June 2009. Legal interest shall be computed at the rate of 6% per annum of the total monetary
award from date of finality of this decision until full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

18