Republic of the Philippines

Metropolitan Trial Court

Manila

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff,

-versus- CRIM.CASE NO. 123456

FOR VIOLATION OF B.P. 22

Henry Chao,
Accused.
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Memorandum for the Accused

The accused, by the undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this Memorandum.

Facts of the Case

Accused Henry Chao is charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) Manila
with five (5) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22).
On June 1, 2011, accused, who was the manager of Atlas Parts, borrowed from
Ben Que the amount of P50,000.00, with 5°/o monthly interest, payable in five (5) equal
monthly installments of P 12,500.00. Accused said that the money will be used to pay for
their stocks. As per their agreement, the accused issued and delivered to Que five checks
after Que gave him in cash the P 50,000.00 that he loaned. This transaction was made
in Que’s house in Mandaluyong. Que further testified that he personally saw the accused
sign the checks and thereafter, handed them to Que.
Each of the five checks were dated as follows:
No. 0001 dated July 1, 2011
No. 0002 dated August 1, 2011
No. 0003 dated September 2, 2011
No. 0004 dated October 1, 2011
No. 0005 dated November 1, 2011
On their respective due dates, Que deposited each of them to his Savings Account
at BOD Bank, Manila City Hall Branch in Manila, but all of them were dishonored by the
drawee, Alloy Bank, for the reason “Account Closed.” After each dishonor, Que personally
went to the accused and demanded that he (accused) make good his commitment, but
he merely ignored Que’s demands.
The accused testified that Account No. 123456 maintained at Alloy Bank, Pasong
Tamo Branch is owned by Atlas Parts and, as the manager, the accused is the signatory.
During the due dates, the accused was not anymore the Manager of Atlas Parts
because in the middle of June 2011, he resigned as Manager.
On January 2, 2012, upon the advice of a lawyer, Que sent a demand letter by
registered mail to the address given by the accused which points to his office at 007
Malugay Street, Malabon City, giving him five (5) days to make good his promise.
However, the accused did not receive the demand letter sent by Que since he already
resigned as manager. Thus, he was not aware of the dishonor.
Meanwhile, Que has filed another collection suit against Atlas Parts seeking to
recover the same P50,000.00 covered by the dishonored slips.

Issues
1. Whether or not the accused is liable under B.P. 22.
2. Whether or not the venue of the criminal action is proper.

Discussion

The accused is not liable under B.P. 22.

Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 holds criminally liable “any person who
makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the
time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check.” It further provides that “Where the check is drawn by a
corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in
behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.”
There is no dispute that the accused is a manager of Atlas Parts and in the
transaction with Que, the check issued was in the account name of Atlas Parts with the
accused as signatory, thus it can be said that the issuance of check by the accused
violated B.P. 22.
Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a
check that was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was
actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five (5)
banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due
thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received
such notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper
(Ambito vs. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 69).
 Thus, there are further requisites in order for a person to be liable under the said
law, namely:
1. that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored; and
2. that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay
the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its
payment.
In the case at hand, Que sent the demand letter to the office of the accused. However,
the accused did not receive the demand letter since he already resigned as manager
when the letter was sent. Thus, he was not aware of the dishonor.
Moreover, in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Hence, for B.P. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. The presentation
of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature, does not meet the required proof
beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. Prosecution must be
properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of
dishonor (Alferez vs. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA 116).
During the trial, Que testified that he did not have a registry return card which would show
that accused received the letter. Instead, he presented a registry receipt and said that
since the letter was not returned to him, it is presumed that it was received by accused.
It is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
drawer of the check (Alferez vs. People, G.R. No. 182301, January 31, 2011, 641 SCRA
116). Thus, the registry receipt, which is supposed to prove that letter was sent to
accused, fails to serve as sufficient proof that notice was received by accused.
Now, it can be settled that accused is not liable under B.P. 22 since there was no
proof showing that he received notice of dishonor. However, prosecution contends that
the forestalling of the existence of prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of
funds should not be applied to this case since here, the reason of the dishonor is “Account
Closed,” and not just insufficiency of funds. Section 2 of B.P. 22 provides:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 – AN ACT PENALIZING THE MAKING OR
DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR
CREDITS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
“Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making,
drawing and issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer
pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.”
In other words, prosecution contends that the prima facie evidence of issuing the
check shall be immediately accepted and that accused should not be given the benefit of
the doubt that he was unaware that he has insufficient funds in the drawee bank when he
issued such checks. Giving the accused five days from receipt of the notice, to pay the
holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment,
should be dispensed with. The reason for this contention is that such payment would be
impossible since the account is already closed and the accused cannot make a deposit
in drawee bank anymore.
Despite this contention, still, accused should not be liable under B.P. 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to
coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation (Lozano vs.
Hon. Martinez, G.R. Nos. L-63419, L-66839-42, L-71654, L-74524-25, L-75122-49, L-
75812-13, L-75765-67 and L-75789, December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323).
Given that the accused is charged with an offense punishable under B.P. 22, it is
immaterial whether or not the accused pays or is capable of paying his debt from Que.
The offense contemplated in this law is the act of issuing a check with knowledge that
such check is worthless. In case the debtor is really unaware of such insufficiency of funds
at the time he issued checks, B.P. 22 provides that he shall be first given notified of such
insufficiency through a notice of a dishonor, and be required to pay his debt, before he
can be held liable. Thus, as discussed earlier, the mere act of issuing a check with
insufficient funds is not sufficient to hold the accused liable, there must also be proof that
the other two requisites are satisfied.
In the instant case, the first requisite was not satisfied since no evidence was
produced by the prosecution that the accused received a notice of dishonor, which is
supposed to notify him that the account of Atlas Parts has closed. Thus, accused is not
liable under B.P. 22.

The venue of the criminal action is not proper.

Even assuming that the accused is liable under B.P. 22, the case at hand should
be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases,
unlike in civil cases, is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It
is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the
offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have
taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction
over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory
(Isip vs. People, G. R. No. 170298, June 26, 2007, 525 SCRA 735).
Relative to violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 of which accused has been
charged of the elements or essential ingredients of the offense are as follows:
1. The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
2. The knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue there are
no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check
in full upon its presentment; and
 3. The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment (Ting vs. Court of Appeals, 344
SCRA 551).
Therefore, a criminal offense under B.P. 22 is triable in the court of a municipality or
territory where the issuance of check was made or where the said check was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank.
In this case, it was shown that the issuance of checks with insufficient funds was
allegedly committed in the house of Que in Mandaluyong and the dishonor of checks
were made by the drawee, Alloy bank, which is located in Pasong Tamo, Makati. Thus,
the alleged crime is triable in the courts of either two cities.
However, the criminal action was filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila. Thus, the court should dismiss the action since the alleged crime was committed
outside of its limited jurisdiction.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, PREMISED CONSIDERED, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable

Court that the case be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and that the accused be
acquitted from the present charge for failure of the prosecution to prove that accused is
liable under B.P 22.

Pasig City, Philippines, October 11, 2016

PUBLIC ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

Hall of Justice, Pasig City
By:

ALYANNA ANGELINA M. CABRAL

Public Attorney