Inductivism, Hypothetico-Deductivism, Falsificationism

and Kuhnian Reconciliation

Anthony Ferrucci

Inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism, falsificationism and Kuhn’s

paradigm shifts differ in approach and scope within the scientific
community. Although there are similarities between aspects of the
four approaches, there are major divisions between the three and
how they attempt to construe, and view, scientific progress. From
the onset, the three theories differ greatly in interpreting the
statement “science is based on facts.” An important topic of
significance is how the competing theories might view pseudo-
science and its relationship with, in particular, astrology and creation
science. Nonetheless, each theory possesses persuasive and
critiqueable features that have helped shape the landscape of human
scientific endeavor and laid the foundation for their own
modification.
Inductivism proposes and rests on a common understanding of
the laws of the universe. To the inductivist, there are laws of nature,
uniformities that govern these laws. Inductivism claims that “facts”
are observable, and that theories should be derived from these facts
by observation. Anyone with similar training will most likely see the
same facts as another under similar circumstances. In essence, these
observable facts are “objective.” The inductivist places a very high
degree of faith into the senses, and it is the senses, to the unbiased
and unprejudiced observer, that relay these facts to the qualified
observer. Inductivism has another major tenant worth noting: “Facts
are prior to and independent of theory,” according to Alan Chalmers
(1999, p. 4). The old phrase “seeing is believing” carries much
credence with inductivism. Interpreting Chalmers’s claim to
inductivism explores a key aspect to the inductivist: laws are fixed,
uniform and objective. They are not dependent on a particular
theory for them to be facts in the first place, they are simply facts,
independent of the observer.
Hypothetico-deductivism rejects the context of discovery so
crucial to the inductivist. As the inductivist places a high degree of
credibility in the senses and observation to derive observable facts
from the perceptions, the hypothetico-deductivism resists this
notion. Hypothetico-deductivism asserts that “facts” are not always

In M.P. Wolf and L. Musselman (eds.) Voicing Ideas, vol 3, pp. 35-41. Fresno, CA:
California State University, Fresno.
36 Anthony Ferrucci

observable. In microbiology, physics, and other fields, things are

more often too small to be observed by the human eye alone, not to
mention microscopic organisms that have been discovered in recent
years. Furthermore, a hypothetico-deductivist would point to the
fact that many things have come to scientists not by observation, but
rather by accident, through dreams, visions and preexisting theories.
Hypothetico-deductivism rejects the notion that facts are neutral and
objective. Facts are theory-laden and dependent. Human eyes are not
passive receptors, and this criticism is only confirmed upon showing
the same picture to two people, getting two different results.
The context of discovery, so important to the observationally
dependent inductivist is set aside, scientific progress is interpreted
by examples of accidental discovery, confirmed conjectures, and
theory derived hypotheses. Hypothetico-deductivism requires no
such specific process, instead relying on confirmation of a particular
theory. The more a scientific theory is confirmed, the better, and
every subsequent test that reaffirms the original hypothesis gives
more credibility to the original theory. Theories are thus confirmed,
not proven, yet every instance that lends support corroborates the
theory. The claim that all ravens are black is confirmed with every
black raven encountered, giving more support to the claim that all
ravens are black.
It is necessary to discuss the nature of scientific discovery and
how this might be interpreted by both inductivism and hypothetico-
deductivism. There are several questions that are substantive to both
inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism alike. As Chalmers is able
to illustrate, “’Science is derived from the facts’ could be interpreted
to mean that scientific knowledge is constructed by first establishing
the facts and then subsequently building the theory to fit them”
(1999, p. 41). As he later points out, can we really derive facts from
deductive logic? Arriving at new facts does not seem likely from
deduction alone. Bertrand Russell used another famous critique of
inductivist derivation. A turkey is fed every morning at the same
time, 9 AM. The turkey safely concludes “I am fed every morning at
9 AM,” until Christmas Eve when the turkey is killed at 9 AM,
showing a fault in the reasoning here. It seems that even inductive
arguments as well have major obstacles to overcome.
Chalmers gives three possible attempts to sidestep the
aforementioned obstacles to inductive reasonings, deeply embedded
in both hypothetico-deductivism and inductivism relating to the
context of discovery and deriving “facts.”
1. The number of observations forming the basis of a
generalization must be large.
Inductivism, Hypothetico-Deductivism… 37

2. The observations must be repeated under a wide variety

of conditions.
3. No accepted observation statement with the derived law.
Understanding the critiques of inductivism and the problem with
deriving facts from observations, the same deductive problem faces
hypothetico-deductivism in the form of the infamous Raven’s
Paradox. Under hypothetico-deductivism, the statement “All ravens
are black” is confirmed with every black raven discovered. The
problem with this claim is equivalence, which is “all non-black
things are non-ravens.” The immediate problem with the paradox is
that one could easily find objects that are both non-black and non-
raven. Although philosophers and logicians have proposed many
defenses to the paradox at hand, it serves as a necessary critique of
hypothetico-deductivism’s fundamental tenant, the theory of
confirmation and its logical foundation.
Falsificationism offers radically different approaches to the beliefs
outlined above. Agreeing with the hypothetico-deductivist,
falsificationists would also reject the strict context of discovery,
although this is not entirely accurate, as will be discussed later. To
fasificationism, just because you confirm a hypothesis does not mean
you’ve given enough confirmation. A problem apparent from the
three attempted solutions to overcome obstacles to confirmation
persists: how many observations must be witnessed before a theory
is confirmed? A problem for the falsificationist is that no specific
number of confirmations will make any hypothesis true. A body of
science must be falsifiable. A theory must be open to testing; although
confirmation is important, it is not the principle factor. Kepler’s
theories could have been falsified, Einstein’s groundbreaking work
could have/still could turn out to be false, and this is, according to
the falsificationist, what makes science “science.”
Falsificationism would also reject the notion that science is based
on observable facts because a falsificationist must be prepared to
reject previous theories for new ones, and this is how scientific
progress is made. Scientific progress, to the falsificationist, is a
never-ending quest to falsify previous theories for better ones – the
more falsifiable the better. This notion follows to some degree with
the hypothetico-deductivist at confirmation, but in a different way.
Confirmation does not yield new evidence; rather, theories can be
shown to turn out incorrect. The notion of scientific progress for the
falsificationist rests on the premise that scientific theories are
tentative. This poses a problem for inductivism because supposedly
science is based on “objective” facts, which of course would not be
tentative at all. Since theories are based on facts, there is no need to
falsify them in the way the falsificationist has suggested. For
38 Anthony Ferrucci

hypothetico-deductivism, although science is not based on facts,

progress is made by confirmation of preexisting theories, which
presupposes theories are to precede these “facts” as construed by
inductivism.
Various criticisms have been offered of falsification that are
necessary for the task at hand. There have been historical examples
of theories proposed from a more hypothetico-inductivist approach
that have shed light on some problems with falsificationism. Should
one completely abandon one’s theory outright if contrary evidence is
shown against it? A strict falsificationist would have rejected the
idea that a planet may lie beyond Uranus because it conflicted with
previous laws set forth by Newton or Kepler. A conjure was
proposed that another planet may lie beyond Uranus which would
explain the deviations in Newton and Kepler’s theories. It would
turn out that Urbain Le Verrier had many difficulties convincing his
colleagues that such was the case, however, the theory turned out to
be true, showing that a given counterexample does not always falsify the
original hypothesis. This shows how a theory may be hidden from
falsificationism under other complex assumptions. Many theories in
the history of science would have been rejected in their infancy
under the strict sense of falsicationism, the discovery of the planet
Neptune being a small example. The same could be said about calls
to reject Newton’s gravitational theory because of Mercury’s
irregular orbit. However, such attempts were deflected because of
causes in other theories. To “throw the baby out with the bath
water” is not too far off here. Complexities involving various
theories give rise to falsicationism and how it attempts to deal with
these inadequacies.
Considering these vast differences and similarities between the
three approaches, it is interesting to consider the varying
interpretations of two examples of considerable interest, creationism
and astrology. Inductivism seems to be more accepting, by
definition, of such pseudo-sciences. If inductivism claims to be based
on “observable facts” then the senses might give credit to
creationism and astrology. Inductivism often employs abductive
reasoning, the attempt to provide the best explanation with a given
set of circumstances. Inductivism appears to be the most receptive
out of the competing views thus far to creationism and/or astrology,
as they are often relied upon because of the “best possible
explanation” outlined above.
It’s rather difficult for hypothetico-deductivism to incorporate
these pseudo-sciences, not necessarily because of a difference in the
context of discovery, but rather its approach to confirmation. Can
creationism really be confirmed? With regard to astrology, it looks
Inductivism, Hypothetico-Deductivism… 39

easy to confirm anyone’s daily horoscope based on the often vague,

general fortunes found in the daily newspaper. It appears possible to
confirm astrology by reading, “All Leos will have plenty of luck
today.” Hypothetico-deductivism may or may not accept astrology
and creationism based on the theory of confirmation, but it seems to
raise numerous questions about whether or not one can really
confirm claims made by either of the two pseudo-sciences. It begs
the question, does confirmation in this sense really ever, or can it
ever, confirm such instances? Hypothetico-deductivism seems to
leave this question unanswered in its definition and approach to
confirmation, instead leaving it up to an individual to determine.
Where hypothetico-deductivism leaves vagueness and
uncertainty in its outlook on astrology and creationism,
falsicationism seems to leave little room to consider astrology and
creationism as science. Michael Ruse says that, “A body of science
must be falsifiable...A theory must be open to possible refutation”
(Ruse 1982, p. 75). It seems unlikely that astrologists and creationists
offer their positions and theories up for refutation. Are creationism
and astrology ever really falsifiable? Out of the three approaches, it
seems falsicationism would clearly be the most critical. The claims
given by creationists do not seem to be even testable, giving
scientists claims that are not tentative or giving of new knowledge.
Also, bending creationists’ views around preconceived dogmatism is
counterproductive to scientific progress in general. Refutation is key
to fasificationism, leaving creationism and astrology dependent on
abduction for credit, not interpretation of new evidence to confirm
their theories.
As is evident, inductivism, hypothetico-deductivism and
falsicationism differ in their outlook on scientific progress,
interpretation of “facts,” and their acceptance and/or denial of
pseudo-sciences. Scientists do not always allow their own positions
to be refuted and falsified. Although scientists can be dogmatic in
their approach as well, many, and perhaps most, scientists subscribe
to the falsificationist approach to science. Hypothetico-deductivism
offers promise in its faith of scientific confirmation, and it has been
demonstrated that it is, to some degree, compatible with
falsicationism. Science must continue to progress through an open
quest to put existing theories to the test, allowing preconceived
notions of “facts,” whatever they may be, up to scientific criticism
and refutation.
Thomas Kuhn famously published The Structures of Scientific
Revolutions in 1962, a publication that brought previous theories in
the history and philosophy of science into a whole new context.
Kuhn’s ideas were a revolutionary step in the philosophy of science,
40 Anthony Ferrucci

in that he proposed a new way to interpret the work of science.

Nonetheless, with the three previously held positions in mind, Kuhn
sought to propose a different yet similar approach to understand
and decipher previous scientific discoveries and breakthroughs by
coining the term “paradigm.” Scientists work feverishly in a
problem-solving mentality hoping to create anomalies within the
specific paradigm. Kuhn calls this initial process “normal science.”
Normal science is where Kuhn places most scientists during their
careers. Once these anomalies are detected, scientists enter a crisis
mode and embark on what Kuhn calls “revolutionary science.” It is
in this period of revolutionary science that theories are checked,
previously held formulations are re-analyzed and possible
refutations are generated, for a new paradigm, or paradigm shift to
occur.
Kuhn published his work at a time when Sir Karl Popper was in
the process of championing falsificationism. The main theme
involving Kuhn with the discussion at hand is if Kuhn’s view of
scientific progress, paradigm shift, and revolution is as incompatible
as his critics make it out to be. Without having to recap all of Kuhn’s
views, a Kuhnian approach would reject, like the falsificationist, old
theories for new and improved paradigms. In fact a central tenant to
Kuhn’s view is the new paradigm’s treatment of previously held
theories, which brings the discussion on scientific approaches full-
circle. Paramount to Kuhn and falsificationism is the rejection of
previously held theories that have been been replaced by new ones.
In that sense, Kuhn appears to make the same mistake that a
falsificationist makes in prematurely rejecting theories because of an
apparent falsified instance.
Where Kuhn seems to redeem himself with the falsificationist,
and perhaps the other two theories, is where he talks about scientific
progress in the latter part of the book.
First, the new candidate must seem to resolve some outstanding
and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way.
Second, the new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively
large part of the concrete problem solving activity that has accrued
to science through it’s predecessors. (1996, p. 168)
Who is to say that the four approaches do not still solve problems
within science, stimulating and producing paradigm shifts? What
Kuhn got right specifically is how he treats problems that can be met
in no other way, not necessarily promoting his own scientific
method, but any and all approaches that can solve the problem at
hand. This is what science, and particularly the varying approaches
can and should have in common. Solving problems is scientific
progress.
Inductivism, Hypothetico-Deductivism… 41

It might seem tempting to support a particular scientific

approach, and many scientists and philosophers alike are quick to
cling to and promote a single approach and attempt to boast of its
superiority over rival theories. However, within the context of
scientific progress, it seems only fitting to assert that it has not been a
collection of facts that has progressed humanity, but rather the
attempt to make science better by trial and error, an idea not
restricted to a particular approach. Science is the most important
endeavor in the history of humanity, a bold claim that scientists have
attempted to support. Science is progressing, basing its advancement
on prior theories that have been confirmed and then perhaps
refuted. In light of the three, perhaps four, theories, there are
elements that could be incorporated to fit this furtherance of
scientific discovery. However, mankind must accept failure as a
necessary element of science. Bold claims, theories and conjectures
and their possible refutation are fundamentally paramount for the
future of scientific progress.

REFERENCES
Chalmers, A. (1999). What Is This Thing Called Science?: An Assessment of the Nature and
Status of Science and Its Methods. 3rd Edition. New York: Open University Press.
Kuhn, T. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ruse, M. (1982). “Creation Science is Not Science.” In Science, Technology, and Human
Values, 40:72-78.