ARTICLE III.

SECTION 14

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have speedy, impartial and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witness and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

People vs. Claro

G.R. No. 199894
April 5, 2017
FACTS: Claro was convicted of rape against AAA by entering in the motel, locked the door, pulled
her on the bed and kissed her, he undressed her then succeeded in having carnal knowledge
against the will and consent of AAA. The accused seeks to undo the decision.

ISSUE 1: In criminal cases, what does the requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
necessarily mean? - Dee

RULING: Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or that degree of
proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Requiring proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the guilt of the accused, no matter
how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further means that the courts should duly
consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the process the courts should persistently insist
that accusation is not synonymous with guilt; hence, every circumstance favoring his innocence
should be fully taken into account. That is what we must be do herein, for he is entitled to nothing
less.

ISSUE 2: Did the RTC and CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt? - Kat

RULING 2: NO. The Court ruled that there is reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused of the
rape. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs,
and depending on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of
the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral
certainty, or the truth of the charge. If upon such proof there is reasonable doubt remaining, the
accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal.

Inacay vs. People

G.R. No. 223506
Nov. 29, 2016
FACTS Inacay was represented by a certain Eulogia B. Manila (Manila), who represented herself
as a lawyer. During arraignment, Inacay pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.Subsequently,
Inacay found out, after talking to a lawyer, that Manila is not a member of the Bar.
ISSUE 3: Was Inacay denied the right to counsel? - Kristian

RULING: YES, In this case, Inacay, during the proceedings before the trial court and the appellate
court, was represented by Manila who, based on the Certification issued by the OBC, is not a
lawyer. At that time, Inacay had no inkling that he was being represented by a sham lawyer. It
was only when his conviction of the offense charged was upheld by the appellate court did Inacay
learn that Manila is not a lawyer. Clearly, Inacay was not assisted by counsel in the proceedings
before the lower courts and, hence, was denied of due process.

Arroyo vs. People

G.R. No. 220598
July 19, 2016
FACTS: Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was charged with the crime of plunder as
penalized by R.A. 7080.

ISSUE 4: Where the information alleged conspiracy but did not specify who was the main
plunderer or mastermind, was the Sandiganbayan correct in declaring GMA as the mastermind?
- Mikko

RULING: No. The Sandigabayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of its
jurisdiction. To start with, its conclusion that GMA had been the mastermind of plunder was plainly
conjectural and outrightly unfounded considering that the information did not aver at all that she
had been the mastermind; hence, the Sandigabayan thereby acted capriciously and arbitrarily. In
the second place, the treatment by the Sandiganbayan of her handwritten unqualified "OK" as an
overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering that such act was a common legal
and valid practice of signifying approval of a fund release by the President. Indeed, pursuant to
People v. Lizada, supra, an act or conduct becomes an overt act of a crime only when it evinces
a causal relation to the intended crime because the act or conduct will not be an overt act of the
crime if it does not have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.

Enrile vs. People

G.R. No. 213445
Aug. 11, 2015
FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Janet Lim
Napoles, and others before the Sandiganbayan for allegedly acquiring ill-gotten wealth through a
series of overt criminal acts.

ISSUE 5: In denying his motion for bill of particulars, did the Sandiganbayan deny Enrile of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him? - Patrick

RULING: Yes. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in implementing the constitutional right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, specifically
require certain matters to be stated in the Information for its sufficiency. The requirement aims to
enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged.
Negatively stated, unless Enrile is given the particulars and is later given the chance to
object to unalleged details, he stands to be surprised at the trial at the same time that the
prosecution is given the opportunity to play fast and loose with its evidence to satisfy the
more than P50 Million requirement of law.
 People vs. Bolo
G.R. No. 217024
Aug. 15, 2016
FACTS: Bolo, committed rape by foreign object by insert his finger into the vagina of AAA, a
minor.

ISSUE 6: Where the information failed to specify the particular provision of law which appellant
allegedly violated, was his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him
violated? - Cole

RULING:NO The fact that the Information did not specifically state therein that appellant was being
charged with "rape in violation of Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code" does not
automatically result in the violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. As the CA properly ratiocinated, while the Information failed to specify
the particular provision of law which appellant allegedly violated, the character of the crime
is not determined by the specification of law but by the recital of the ultimate fact and
circumstances of the case. Hence, since the body of the Information clearly alleged that appellant,
through force and intimidation, inserted his finger into AAA's vagina, a minor, thereby enumerating all
the essential elements of the crime, appellant is considered sufficiently apprised of the charge against
him. Similarly, the prosecution's failure to specify the exact time and place of the commission of the
crime does not call for appellant's acquittal for they are not elements of the crime of rape.

Quimvel vs. People

G.R. No. 214497
April 18, 2017
FACTS: Quimvel was accused of Acts of Lasciviousness by inserted his hand inside the panty of
AAA, a minor and mashed her vagina.

ISSUE 7: For having been convicted under R.A. No. 7610 and not under the RPC, was Quimvel
denied of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against
him? - Jehanne

RULING: No. It is fundamental that, in criminal prosecutions, every element constituting

the offense must be alleged in the Information before an accused can be convicted of the
crime charged. This is to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation against him, which
is part and parcel of the rights accorded to an accused enshrined in Article III, Section 14(2) of
the 1987 Constitution. In this case, the elements of the offense penalized under Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610 were sufficiently alleged in the Information.

Alid vs. People

G.R. No. 198598
August 2, 2017

Facts: Alid the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture (DA), of Cotabato City.
was charged of falsification for allegedly falsifying his travel documents.

ISSUE 8: For having been convicted of the crime of falsification of a private document
under par. 2 of Art. 172 of RPC, was Alid denied of his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and the cause of accusation against him? - Jeck
Ruling: Applying the rules, the conviction of Alid for falsification of a private document under
paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid only if the elements of that felony constituted the elements of his
indictment for falsification by a public officer under Article 171.

Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification, it is readily apparent that the two
felonies are different. Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes beyond the elements of
falsification enumerated under Article 171.

Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2, Article 172 are included under
Article 171.

Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of the accusation against
him, he cannot be convicted of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172. To
convict him therefor, as the Sandiganbayan did, violates the very proscription found in the Constitution
and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this ground alone, we find that the court a quo erred in its
decision.

ARTICLE III. SECTION 15.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

Caram vs. Atty. Segui

G.R. No. 193652
August 5, 2014

FACTS: Caram had an amorous relationship with Constatino and eventually became pregnant
with the latter’s child without the benefit of marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead
Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion when in fact she proceeded to complete the
term of her pregnancy.

ISSUE 9: Can the issue of child custody and parental rights be the subject of a writ of amparo? -
Jarwin

RULING: NO. In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her
"enforced separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however, the
respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact, Christina
obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum explicitly stating that Baby Julian
was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition before the RTC. Besides,
she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the respondent DSWD officers
presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in the afternoon of August 5, 2010.
There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in the context of the Amparo rule as the
third and fourth elements are missing.
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or
a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty
and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

Mison vs. Gallegos

G.R. No. 210759
June 23, 2015

FACTS: Interpol of Seoul, Korea sent a Notice to Interpol Manila requesting assistance in the
location and deportation of respondent Ja Hoon Ku (Ku) Consequently, the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea wrote a Letter-Request to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportation of Ku to Korea for being an
undesirable alien.

Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo with Interim Remedies
He also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
Finding said supplemental petition to be sufficient in form and substance, Judge Gallegos, in an,
issued a Writ of Amparo.

ISSUE 10: Was the writ of amparo properly granted in this case? - Louigi

RULING: No. The RTC’s grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo was improper in this case as
Ku and his whereabouts were never concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty
and security were unfounded and unsubstantiated.
Ku’s circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or involuntary
disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but there was no refusal on the part
of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was there any refusal to give information on the
whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the
protection of the law for a prolonged time.
Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was not able to present evidence that he was
exposed to "life-threatening situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary,
the records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his counsel.
As Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance of the privilege
of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.

Mamba vs. Bueno

G.R. No. 191416
Feb. 7, 2017

FACTS: The canteen owned by Emelita was robbed. The Task Force Lingkod Bayan (Task
Force), an agency created by the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuao to help the local police force in
maintaining peace and order in the municipality, undertook an investigation on the robbery.

ISSUE 11: Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of
amparo? - Myka

RULING: NO. The CA did not err in granting the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo. In
an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial
evidence. Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing
or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. More importantly,
the writ of amparo likewise covers violations of the right to security. Clearly, there is substantial
evidence in this case that would warrant the conclusion that the respondent's right to security, as
a guarantee of protection by the government, was violated. Accordingly, the CA correctly issued
the writ of amparo in favor of the respondent.

Callo vs. Morente

G.R. No. 230324
Sept. 19, 2017

FACTS: Danielle Tan Parker was a fugitive from justice in the United States of America with an
outstanding arrest warrant. Parker was detained and then filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus.

ISSUE 12: Is Parker entitled to the writ of amparo? - Dee

RULING: No. There is no enforced or involuntary disappearance, or any threats thereof,

that would warrant the issuance of the writ of amparo. For the issuance of the writ, it is not
sufficient that a person's life is endangered. It is even not sufficient to allege and prove that a
person has disappeared. It has to be shown by the required quantum of proof that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government or a political organization, and that there is a refusal to acknowledge the same or to
give information on the fate or whereabouts of the missing persons. In this case, Parker has not
disappeared. Her detention has been sufficiently justified by the Bureau of Immigration,
given that there is an SDO and a pending criminal case against her.

ARTICLE III. SECTION 16.

All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Torres vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. Nos. 221562-69
Oct. 5, 2016
FACTS: Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the case on the ground that his constitutional rights
to due process and speedy trial were violated by the inordinate delay of the case.

ISSUE 13: Was the right of Torres to speedy disposition of his case violated? - Kat

RULING 13: Yes. The lapse of time in the conduct of the proceedings is tantamount to a
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay, which we find to be in violation of petitioner's
constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases. Any delay in the investigation and
prosecution of cases must be duly justified. The State must prove that the delay in the prosecution
was reasonable, or that the delay was not attributable to it. In the present case, respondents failed
to submit any justifiable reason for the protracted conduct of the investigations and in the issuance
of the resolution finding probable cause.

Remulla vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 218040
April 17, 2017
ISSUE 14: Is it mandatory for the accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy
disposition can be recognized? - Kristian

FACTS: Remulla filed a criminal complaint alleging that Maliksi, as governor of Cavite, caused
the purchase of certain medical supplies from Allied Medical Laboratories Corporation without
conducting any public bidding, thereby giving unwarranted benefit or preference to it.

Ruling: NO. The factors therein must be weighed according to the different facts and
circumstances of each case, bearing in mind the prejudice caused by the delay both to the
accused and the State. There is no constitutional or legal provision which states that it is
mandatory for the accused to follow up his case before his right to its speedy disposition can be
recognized. To rule otherwise would promote judicial legislation where the Court would provide
a compulsory requisite not specified by the constitutional provision. It simply cannot be done,
thus, the ad hoc characteristic of the balancing test must be applied.

ARTICLE III. SECTION 17.

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

De la Cruz vs. People

G.R. No. 200748
July 23, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner was charged with the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (R.A. 9165).

ISSUE 15: Can the urine drug test of the petitioner arrested of extortion be used against him
without violating his right against self-incrimination? - Mikko

RULING: No. The drug test was a violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy and right against
self-incrimination. Gutang v People is a case wherein the SC considered a urine sample
admissible as evidence, however the circumstances of such case is different from the case at bar.
It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and tested for drugs. He
also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was adamant in exercising his rights, but all of
his efforts proved futile, because he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under
those circumstances.

OCA vs. Judge Yu

A.M. No. MT J-12-1813
March 14, 2017

FACTS: Judge Eliza B. Yu was found guilty of Gross Misconduct and Conduct Unbecoming of a
Judicial Official for committing online libel, and sending messages with sexual undertones and
lewd graphics. Her dismissal was based on the correspondences found on her Email address.

Respondent argues, among others, that she was deprived of her right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE 16: Was Judge Yu deprived of her constitutional right against self-incrimination? - Patrick

RULING: No. The constitutional guarantee only set the privilege of an individual to refuse to
answer incriminating questions that may directly or indirectly render her criminally liable. The
constitutional guarantee simply secures to a witness - whether a party or not - the right to refuse
to answer any particular incriminatory question. The privilege did not prohibit legitimate
28

inquiry in non-criminal matters. At any rate, the rule only finds application in case of oral
testimony and does not apply to object evidence.