Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 237428

represented by SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA,
Petitioner, Present:

SERENO, C.J.,*
CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
PERLAS-BERNABE,
- versus - LEONEN,
JARDELEZA,
CAGUIOA,
MARTIRES,
TIJAM,
REYES, JR., and
GESMUNDO, JJ.

Promulgated:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Respondent. ____________________

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:
Whoever walks in integrity and with moral character walks securely,
but he who takes a crooked way will be discovered and punished.

-The Holy Bible, Proverbs 10:9 (AMP)

*

No Part.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 237428
Decision 3 G.R. No. 237428

Integrity has, at all times, been stressed to be one of the required

qualifications of a judge. It is not a new concept in the vocation of
administering and dispensing justice. In the early 1600's, Francis Bacon, a
philosopher, statesman, and jurist, in his “Essay LVI: Of Judicature” said –
“[a]bove all things, integrity is the Judge's portion and proper virtue.”
Neither is integrity a complex concept necessitating esoteric philosophical
disquisitions to be understood. Simply, it is a qualification of being honest,
truthful, and having steadfast adherence to moral and ethical principles. 1
Integrity connotes being consistent – doing the right thing in accordance
with the law and ethical standards everytime. Hence, every judicial officer
in any society is required to comply, not only with the laws and legislations,
but with codes and canons of conduct and ethical standards as well, without
derogation. As Thomas Jefferson remarked, “it is of great importance to set
a resolution, never not to be shaken, never to tell an untruth. There is no vice
so mean, so pitiful, so contemptible and he who permits himself to tell a lie
once, finds it much easier to do it a second and third time, till at length it
becomes habitual, he tells lies without attending to it, and truths without the
world's believing him. This falsehood of the tongue leads to that of the heart
and in time depraves all its good dispositions.” Mental dishonesty and moral
mischief breed all that integrity is not.

In our jurisdiction, one cannot be qualified to be a member of the

Judiciary, lacking such mandatory requirement of “proven integrity”.
Inevitably, an appointee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court must be the exemplar of honesty, probity and integrity. The purpose
of this requirement is self-evident as the Chief Justice heads the Judiciary
and adjudicates cases as a member of the Court that “has the last word on
what the law is.”2 Together with other Justices, the Chief Justice also
disciplines members of the Bar for misconduct. The significance of probity
and integrity as a requirement for appointment to the Judiciary is
underscored by the fact that such qualifications are not explicitly required of
the President, the Vice-President or the Members of Congress under the
Constitution. The Constitution, thus, demands in no uncertain terms that the
Chief Justice be the embodiment of moral and ethical principles. He or she
must be of unquestionable character, possessed of moral authority to demand
obedience to the law and to impose a rule of conduct. Indeed, one who
exacts compliance with the law and ethical standards should be their
foremost adherent.

No one is above the law and the Constitution, not even a Chief Justice
who took an oath to protect and defend the Constitution and obey the laws of

<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/integrity> (visited on March 19, 2018);

<https://www.thefreedictionary.com/integrity> (visited on March 19, 2018).
2
Conde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 228 Phil. 145, 151 (1986).
Decision 4 G.R. No. 237428

the land. The Court in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,3 says
it tritely – “the Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court.”4 All public officers whether in the Executive,
Legislative or Judicial departments are bound to follow the law. If a public
officer violates the law, he or she shall suffer punishment, sanctions and
adverse consequences. The obligatory force of the law is necessary because
once we allow exceptions, concessions, waiver, suspension or non-
application to those who do not want to follow the law, nobody else will
obey the law.

In this unprecedented case for quo warranto against the incumbent

Chief Justice, the Republic entreats this Court to declare Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno (respondent) ineligible to hold the highest post in the Judiciary for
failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member
of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and
later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution,
the Anti-Graft Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees. The Republic accordingly seeks the
nullification of respondent's appointment, asserting that her failure to file the
required disclosures and her failure to submit the same to the Judicial and
Bar Council show that she is not possessed of “proven integrity” demanded
of every aspirant to the Judiciary.

The Case

Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article

VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66
of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the present Petition 5 for the
issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare as void
respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust
and altogether exclude respondent therefrom.

The Antecedents

From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning a period of 20

years, respondent served as a member of the faculty of the University of the
Philippines-College of Law (U.P. or U.P. College of Law), initially as a
temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to December 31, 1991)
and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until her resignation
therefrom on June 1, 2006.6 As a regular faculty member, respondent was
paid by the month by U.P.7
3
460 Phil. 830 (2003).
4
Id. at 943.
5
Rollo, pp. 3-44.
6
Id. at 172.
7
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018.
Decision 5 G.R. No. 237428

Based on the records of the U.P. Human Resources Development

Office (U.P. HRDO),8 respondent was on official leave from the U.P. College
of Law for the following periods:

June 1, 2000 - May 31, 2001

June 1, 2001 - May 31, 2002
November 1, 2003 - May 31, 2004
June 1, 2004 - October 31, 2004
November 1, 2004 - February 10, 2005
February 11, 2005 - October 31, 2005
November 15, 2005 - May 31, 2006

While being employed at the U.P. College of Law, or from October

2003 to 2006, respondent was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
Republic in two international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the
Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases).9

The Personal Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished under oath by

respondent further details, among others, the following
engagements/services rendered by her for various government agencies:10

Position From To No. of Department/ Nature of work Supervisor

Years Agency
Legal Counsel 1994 2008 14 yrs. Various agencies of Legal – various Executive
government – Office international trade Secretaries
of the President, and investment Alberto
Office of the Solicitor law in WTO Romulo,
General, Manila (Geneva), ICSID Eduardo Ermita
International Airport (Washington, and Leandro
Authority, Department DC). ICC-ICA Mendoza, Chief
of Agriculture, (Singapore, Paris) Presidential
Department of Trade and in bilateral Legal Counsel
and Industry, WTO- dispute resolution Avelino Cruz
AFTA Commission, mechanisms and Merceditas
Philippine Coconut Gutierrez;
Authority Solicitor
Generals
Alfredo
Benipayo,
Antonio
Nachura and
Agnes
Devanadera,
MIAA General

8
Annex “D” of the Petition.
9
Id. at 173.
10
Id. at 850-851.
Decision 6 G.R. No. 237428

Manager
Alfonso Cusi,
Sen. Edgardo
Angara, Sec.
Salvador
Escudero,
Undersecretary
Thomas Aquino,
Amb. Lilia
Bautista

Deputy Commission on Legal and Acting

Commissioner Human Rights (UP Administrative Chairman &
Diliman, Comm.
Commonwealth Ave., Abelardo
QC, TEL:928-7098) Aportadera
(TEL: 687-
7571)

Incidentally, the U.P. HRDO certified that there was no record on

respondent's 201 file of any permission to engage in limited practice of
profession.11 Her engagement as legal counsel for the Republic continued
until 2009.12

Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from

November 1986 to June 1, 2006, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains
the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for 1985, 13
1990,14 1991,15 1993,16 1994,17 1995,18 1996,19 1997,20 and 2002,21 filed by
respondent. On the other hand, the records of the Central Records Division
of the Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by
respondent for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending
December 1998 which was subscribed only in August 2003 and transmitted
by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003. 22
Belatedly, in respondent’s Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, she
attached a copy of her SALN for 198923 which she supposedly sourced from
the “filing cabinets”24 or “drawers of U.P.”25 Similarly, despite having been
employed as legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to
2009, there is likewise no showing that she filed her SALNs for these years,
except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed
11
Id. at 65.
12
Id. at 173.
13
Id. at 597-597A.
14
Id. at 598-598A.
15
Id. at 599-599A.
16
Id. at 600-600A.
17
Id. at 601-601A.
18
Id. at 602-602A.
19
Id. at 603-603A.
20
Id. at 604-604A.
21
Id. at 54-55.
22
Id. at 60-62.
23
Id. at 1727-1728.
24
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 105.
25
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 120.
Decision 7 G.R. No. 237428

and filed before the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012.

After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until

2006, and thereafter as practitioner in various outfits including as legal
counsel for the Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July
2010.

In support of her application as Associate Justice, respondent

submitted to the Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (ORSN)
of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) her SALN for the year 2006. 26 This
SALN for 2006 bears no stamp received by the U.P. HRDO and was signed
on July 27, 2010.27 According to respondent, the JBC considered her
nomination for the position of Associate Justice as that of a private
practitioner and not as a government employee.28 Only recently, in a letter29
to the ORSN dated February 2, 2018, likewise attached to her Ad Cautelam
Manifestation/Submission, respondent would explain that such SALN was
really intended to be her SALN as of July 27, 2010. 30 Respondent further
explained during the Oral Arguments that she merely downloaded the SALN
form and forgot to erase the year “2006” printed thereon and that she was
not required by the ORSN to submit a subscribed SALN.31

Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the

Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC stand, the only SALNs available on
record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989,
1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11)
SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in U.P. No SALNs were
filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the
Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P.
College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered
government service as of August 16, 2010.

In tabular form, respondent's inclusive years in government

employment vis-á-vis the SALNs filed by her and available on record are as
follows:

26
Id. at 67-70.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 174.
29
Id. at 1729-1730.
30
TSN, Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives.
31
TSN, Oral Arguments dated April 10, 2018.
Decision 8 G.R. No. 237428

As faculty member of the U.P. College of Law:

Year SALN ought to be filed SALN actually filed by
respondent
November SALN as of November SALN ending December
1986 1986 (entry SALN) 31, 1985
-no record of SALN as of
November 1986 (entry
SALN)-
1987 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 1986
1988 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 1987
1989 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 1988
1990 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1989 31, 1989 (sourced by
respondent from one of the
“filing cabinets” or
“drawers” of U.P.)
1991 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1990 31, 1990
1992 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1991 31, 1991
1993 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 1992
1994 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1993 31, 1993
1995 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1994 31, 1994
1996 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1995 31, 1995
1997 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1996 31, 1996
1998 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1997 31, 1997
1999 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 1998 31, 1998 (filed with the
Ombudsman on December
16, 2003)
2000 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 1999
2001 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 2000
Decision 9 G.R. No. 237428

2002 SALN ending December -no record-

31, 2001
2003 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 2002 31, 2002
2004 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 2003
2005 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 2004
2006 SALN ending December -no record-
31, 2005
June 1, 2006 SALN as of June 1, 2006 -no record of SALN as of
(exit SALN) June 1, 2006 (exit SALN)-
Alleged break in government service from June 2, 2006 until
August 15, 2009 but was engaged as legal counsel for the
Republic from June 2, 2006 to 2009.
As Associate Justice of the Supreme Court:
August 16, SALN as of August 16, SALN ending December
2010 2010 (re-entry SALN) 31, 2009 but filed with the
Office of the Clerk of
Court En Banc only on
June 22, 2012 and
unsubscribed

-no record of SALN as of

August 16, 2010 (re-entry
SALN)-

2011 SALN ending December SALN ending December

31, 2010 31, 2010 but unsubscribed
2012 SALN ending December SALN ending December
31, 2011 31, 2011

A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by

then President Benigno C. Aquino III (President Aquino III) as Associate
Justice, and on August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office as such.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012,
the JBC announced32 the opening for application and recommendation of the
position of Chief Justice. During the 2012 deliberations for the position of
the Chief Justice, the members of the JBC En Banc were Associate Justice
Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta) as Acting ex officio Chairman;
Undersecretary Michael Frederick L. Musngi as ex officio member vice Leila
M. De Lima; Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Representative Niel
Tupas as ex officio members representing the Congress; Justice Regino C.
Hermosisima Jr. as regular member representing the retired Supreme Court
Justices; Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman as regular member representing
32
Id. at 83.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 237428

the Private Sector; Atty. Maria Milagros N. Fernan-Cayosa as regular

member representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and Atty. Jose V.
Mejia as regular member representing the academe. The JBC Executive
Committee (Execom) was composed of the JBC Regular Members and
assisted by the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO) headed by Atty.
Annaliza S. Ty-Capacite (Atty. Capacite).

The JBC announcement was preceded by an En Banc meeting held on

June 4, 2012 wherein the JBC agreed to require the applicants for the Chief
Justice position to submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for
the last two years of public service, all previous SALNs up to December 31,
2011 for those in government service.33 However, for the other judicial
vacancies, the JBC required the submission of only two SALNs. 34
Accordingly, in the Announcement35 published on June 5, 2012, the JBC
specifically directed the candidates for the Chief Justice post to submit, in
addition to the usual documentary requirements, the following:

(1) Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN):

a. for those in the government: all previous SALNs

(up to 31 December 2011)

b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31

December 2011

(2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and

foreign bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign Currency
Deposits Act.36 (Emphasis ours)

The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with

incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements will not be interviewed
or considered for nomination.”37

Nevertheless, the JBC En Banc subsequently agreed to extend the

deadline for the filing of applications or recommendations to July 2, 2012
and the submission of the other documentary requirements to July 17,
2012.38

On June 25, 2012, the JBC En Banc resolved not to require the
incumbent Supreme Court Justices who are candidates for the Chief Justice
position to submit other documentary requirements, particularly the
required clearances. Instead, the JBC En Banc required the incumbent
33
TSN dated February 12, 2018, X-3, Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives; see
also Joint Comment of JBC Regular Members Atty. Jose V. Mejia and Atty. Maria Milagros Fernan-Cayosa
(Re: Resolution dated 20 February 2018) in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC.
34
JBC Announcement dated June 19, 2012; id. at 2190.
35
Id. at 84-86.
36
Id. at 83.
37
Id. at 86.
38
JBC Announcement dated June 19, 2012; id. at 2190.
Decision 11 G.R. No. 237428

Justices to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver, medical certificate,

laboratory results and the PDS.

On July 2, 2012, respondent accepted several nominations from the

legal and the evangelical community for the position of Chief Justice and in
support of her nomination, respondent submitted to the ORSN her SALNs
for the years 2009,39 2010,40 and 2011.41 Respondent also executed a waiver
of confidentiality42 of her local and foreign bank accounts.43

On July 6, 2012, or even before the deadline of the submission of the

documentary requirements on July 17, 2012, the JBC En Banc came up with
a long list of the candidates totaling twenty-two (22), respondent included,
and scheduled the public interview of said candidates on July 24-27, 2012.44

On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting,45

deliberated on the candidates for the position of Chief Justice with
incomplete documentary requirements. In particular, the JBC examined the
list of candidates and their compliance with the required submission of
SALNs. The minutes of the JBC deliberation reveal as follows:

xxxx

The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to

SALNs, whether five (5) SALNs would constitute a substantial compliance
if the candidate has been in the government service for twenty (20) years.

The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the
candidates coming from the government, and identified who among them
would be considered to have substantially complied:

1. Justice Arturo D. Brion – has substantially complied

2. Justice Antonio T. Carpio – has substantially complied

3. Secretary Leila M. De Lima – has substantially complied

4. Chairperson Teresita J. Herbosa – has complied

5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza – has complied

6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro – has substantially

complied

7. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan

39
Id. at 71-72.
40
Id. at 73-74.
41
Id. at 75-77.
42
Id. at 269.
43
Id. at 174-175.
44
Minutes of JBC Meeting dated July 6, 2012.
45
Annex “17” of the Comment.
Decision 12 G.R. No. 237428

The Executive Officer informed the Council that Dean

Pangalangan lacks five (5) SALNs. She was informed that
he could not obtain them from the U.P., but he is trying to
get from the Civil Service Commission.

Justice Lagman moved that the SALNs of Dean

Pangalangan be considered as substantial compliance.

8. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez

Justice Peralta said that as per the report, Congressman

Rodriguez did not submit even one SALN. He commented
that he may not be interested although he accepted his
nomination.

The Executive Officer informed the Council that he is

abroad. He was notified through email, as his secretary
would not give his contact number.

9. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento – has lacking SALNs

10. Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno

The Executive Officer informed the Council that she

had not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten (10)
years, that is, from 1986 to 2006.

Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his

professor at U.P. and that they were required to submit
SALNs during those years.

11. Judge Manuel DJ Siayngco – has complied

Atty. Cayosa mentioned that Judge Siayngco has to submit

a certificate of exemption because judges are also required
to comply with that requirement.

12. Dean Amado D. Valdez – has lacking requirements

13. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. - has complied

14. Atty. Vicente R. Velasquez – has lacking requirements

15. Dean Cesar L. Villanueva – has lacking requirements

16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora – has lacking SALNs and MCLE

cert.

x x x x.46 (Emphasis ours)

46
Id. at 288-289.
Decision 13 G.R. No. 237428

Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary

requirements, the JBC En Banc agreed to again extend the deadline for the
submission of the lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and that the
determination of whether a candidate has substantially complied with the
requirements be delegated to the Execom. It also appears that the JBC En
Banc further agreed that the candidates who fail to complete the
requirements on said date are to be excluded from the list of candidates to be
interviewed and considered for nomination, unless they would be included if
in the determination of the Execom he or she has substantially complied.47

Thus, on July 20, 2012, the ORSN, through its then Chief Atty.
Richard Pascual (Atty. Pascual), inquired as to respondent’s SALNs for the
years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999.48 During the Congressional hearings on
impeachment, Atty. Pascual would later on testify that he asked respondent
to submit her SALNs from 1996 to 2006, or spanning a period of 10 years. 49
During the Oral Arguments, respondent would maintain that Atty. Pascual
only required her to submit her SALNs from 1995-1999 and did not ask for
her more recent SALNs. Either way, the years requested from respondent are
within the period (1986 to 2006) covered by her employment with the U.P.
College of Law.

In response, the respondent, in the afternoon of July 23, 2012,

transmitted a letter50 of even date to the JBC, which stated:

xxxx

As I had noted in my Personal Data Sheet, after my resignation

from government service in 2006, as a professor at the University of the
Philippines, I became a full-time private practitioner. Hence, when I was
nominated for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in
2010, my nomination was considered as that of a private practitioner, and
not as a government employee. Thus, the requirements imposed on me in
connection with the consideration of my name, were those imposed on
nominees from the private sector, and my earlier-terminated government
service, did not control nor dominate the kind of requirements imposed on
me.

Considering that most of my government records in the academe

are more than fifteen years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to
retrieve all of those files.

In any case, the University of the Philippines has already cleared

me of all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of 01 June 2006. Since
47
Id. at 289-290.
48
Id. at 270-271.
49
House Committee Hearing on February 27, 2018.
50
Id. at 78-79 and 270-271.
Decision 14 G.R. No. 237428

it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that the
SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and accomplished (CSC
Resolution No. 060231 dated 01 February 2006 and CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 10-2006 dated 17 April 2006), this clearance can be taken as
an assurance that my previous government employer considered the
SALN requirements to have been met. A copy of the Clearance dated 19
September 2011 issued by the University of the Philippines is hereby
attached.

In the 05 June 2012 Announcement, the Judicial and Bar Council

imposed the requirement of submitting all previous SALNs for those in
the government. As I pointed out earlier, my service in government is not
continuous. The period of my private practice between my service in the
University of the Philippines ending in 2006 and my appointment to the
Supreme Court in 2010 presents a break in government service. Hence, in
compliance with the documentary requirements for my candidacy as Chief
Justice, I submitted only the SALNs from end of 2009 up to 31 December
2011, since I am considered to have been returned to public office and
rendered government service anew from the time of my appointment as
Associate Justice on 16 August 2010.

Considering that I have been previously cleared from all

administrative responsibilities and accountabilities from my entire earlier
truncated government service, may I kindly request that the requirements
that I need to comply with, be similarly viewed as that from a private
sector, before my appointment to the Government again in 2010 as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

x x x x51

The letter dated July 23, 2012 was received by the Office of the
Administrative and Financial Services (OAFS) and copies thereof were
received by the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the
OEO.52 The letter, however, was neither examined by the JBC regular
members nor was it deliberated upon either by the JBC En Banc or the
Execom.53 Although the determination of whether a candidate has
substantially complied with the documentary requirements was delegated to
the Execom, the latter could not produce any minutes of the meeting or
record that the members thereof deliberated on the July 23, 2012 letter of
respondent.54
51
Id. at 78-79.
52
See Comment of Executive Officer Atty. Capacite in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-
11-17-SC, p. 5.
53
See Joint Comment of Atty. Mejia and Atty. Cayosa in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-
11-17-SC, p. 6.
54
Letter dated April 6, 2018 of Atty. Capacite to the Office of Justice Tijam, certifying that there
was no such minutes of meeting. The letter states:
xxxx
This pertains to your request (through a telephone call) this afternoon for a copy of the
minutes of a meeting wherein the Executive Committee of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) supposedly
made a determination after the 20 July 2012 JBC En Banc meeting of who among the candidates for the
Chief Justice position had or had not substantially complied with the documentary requirements for the said
post.
As I have earlier informed you, no such minutes is extant in our records.
Decision 15 G.R. No. 237428

On the scheduled date of the interview on July 24, 2012, despite

respondent's submission of only 3 SALNs, Atty. Pascual prepared a Report –
Re: Documentary Requirements and SALN of candidates for the Position of
Chief Justice of the Philippines55 wherein respondent was listed as applicant
No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she had “COMPLETE
REQUIREMENTS” and a note stating “Letter 7/23/12 – considering that her
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is
reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.”

The JBC then proceeded to interview the candidates, including

respondent who was interviewed on July 27, 2012. On August 6, 2012, the
ORSN prepared a list of the 20 candidates, respondent included, vis-à-vis
their SALN submissions. Opposite respondent’s name was an enumeration
of the SALNs she submitted, i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011 and an excerpt from
her July 23, 2012 letter that “considering that [respondent’s] government
records in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files." On August 13, 2012, the
JBC voted on who would be included in the short list and on the same day,
transmitted to the President its nominations56 for the position of Chief
Justice, as follows:

1. Carpio, Antonio T.
2. Abad, Roberto A.
3. Brion, Arturo D.
4. Jardeleza, Francis H.
5. Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.
6. Zamora, Ronaldo B.
7. Leonardo-De Castro, Teresita J.
8. Villanueva, Cesar L.

A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on

August 24, 2012, respondent was appointed by then President Aquino III as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as

Chief Justice, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon
(Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the
House of Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable
violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public
trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful
declarations in her SALNs.

x x x x.
55
See Annex “C” of the Joint Comment of Atty. Mejia and Atty. Cayosa in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC
and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC,
56
Id. at 278-279.
Decision 16 G.R. No. 237428

The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the

House and, thereafter, was found to be sufficient in form and substance. The
respondent filed her answer to the impeachment complaint. After the filing
of the reply and the rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted
several hearings on the determination of probable cause, the last of which
was held on February 27, 2018.57

During these hearings, it was revealed that respondent purportedly

failed to file her SALNs while she was a member of the faculty of the U.P.
College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002
and 2006. During the hearing on February 7, 2018 of the House Committee
on Justice, Justice Peralta, as a resource person being then the acting ex-
officio Chairman of the JBC, further claimed that during the JBC
deliberations in 2012, he was not made aware that respondent submitted
incomplete SALNs nor that respondent's letter dated July 23, 2012 to the
JBC was ever deliberated upon.58 This was confirmed by Atty. Fernan-
Cayosa;59 by Atty. Capacite, who emphasized that based on the rubber stamp
received, only the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the
OEO were furnished copies of the letter; 60 and by Atty. Pascual on the basis
of the transmittal letter.61

The foregoing sworn declarations made during the hearings before the
House Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the
proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the
proceedings of the JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief
Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No.
17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter62 dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio
Mallari to the OSG requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

Thus, the present petition.

The Case for the Republic

The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo
warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity of respondent's

57
Id. at 176-177.
58
TSN dated February 7, 2018, VI-3, Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives.
59
TSN dated Febraury 12, 2018, LCLV, XIII-2, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
60
TSN dated February 12, 2018, HLEF, XXII-3, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
61
TSN dated February 12, 2018, LCLV, XXVIII-4, Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives.
62
Id. at 93-94.
Decision 17 G.R. No. 237428

appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed within the
one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66, 63 of the Rules of
Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light during the
proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the
impeachment complaint filed against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims
that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.

In justifying resort to a petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues

that quo warranto is available as a remedy even as against impeachable
officers, like respondent. The Republic argues that a petition for quo
warranto is different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ of
quo warranto is being sought to question the validity of her appointment,
while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable
violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. 64
Citing the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and the
cases of Funa v. Chairman Villar65 and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,66 the
Republic argues that quo warranto may be resorted to even against
impeachable officers and that the respondent's assumption of the position as
Chief Justice under the color of an executive appointment is a public wrong
correctible by quo warranto.

The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief

Justice on the ground that the latter failed to show that she is a person of
proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in
the Judiciary under Section 7(3),67 Article VIII of the Constitution.
According to the Republic, because respondent failed to fulfill the JBC
requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven.
The Republic posits that the JBC's ostensible nomination of respondent does
not extinguish the fact that the latter failed to comply with the SALN
requirement as the filing thereof remains to be a constitutional and statutory
requirement.68

In sum, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her

SALNs as required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent
has not proven her integrity which is a requirement under the Constitution.
The Republic thus concludes that since respondent is ineligible for the
63
Sec. 11. Limitations. — Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action
against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose, nor
to authorize an action for damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless
the same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's
right to the office in question.
64
Rollo, p. 13.
65
686 Phil. 571 (2012).
66
85 Phil. 126 (1949).
67
Sec. 7. (3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. (Emphasis ours)
68
Rollo, p. 28.
Decision 18 G.R. No. 237428

position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold
office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

The Case for the Respondent

Being circumspect in the examination of every pleading and

document on record, this Court observes that, initially, the Comment Ad
Cautelam dated March 16, 2018 filed before Us was neither signed by the
respondent herself nor verified to have been read by her and attested by her
that the allegations therein are true and correct of her personal knowledge or
based on authentic records. This Court is not unaware that under the Rules
of Court, specifically Section 4, Rule 7, not all pleadings need to be under
oath, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. In fact, the rules on quo
warranto do not require the filing of such comment, but pursuant to the
dictates of the fundamental right of due process and also the desire of this
Court to dispose of this case judiciously, impartially, and objectively, this
Court gave the respondent the opportunity to be heard and oppose the
allegations in the petition by requiring her to file a comment thereto. Thus,
this Court anticipated a response from the respondent to take such
opportunity to settle the uncertainty of her nomination and appointment
through her comment to the petition. What was received by this Court,
however, was an unverified Comment repudiating the Court's jurisdiction,
merely signed by counsel, who appeared to be representing the respondent.

Wary of the legal implications of such unverified pleading, i.e.

possible refutation of the allegations stated therein and repudiation of the
signing counsel's authority to represent, this Court in its April 3, 2018
Resolution69 set as a condition for the conduct of Oral Arguments prayed for
by respondent, that the latter affirm and verify under oath the truth and
veracity of the allegations in the Comment Ad Cautelam filed by counsel
supposedly on her behalf.

In an Ad Cautelam Partial Compliance/Manifestation dated April 5,

2018, respondent affirmed and verified under oath the truth and veracity of
the allegations in the said Comment Ad Cautelam through a Verification
dated April 6, 2018 attached therein.

In the said Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent argues that, on the

strength of Section 2,70 Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and the cases of
Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,71 Cuenco v. Hon. Fernan,72 In Re: First
69
Id. at 501-505.
70
Sec. 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
71
213 Phil. 288 (1984).
72
241 Phil. 162 (1988).
Decision 19 G.R. No. 237428

Indorsement from Hon. Gonzales,73 and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for

Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio,74 the Chief
Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent
contends that the use of the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section
2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment.
According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the
Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public officers who can
be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.

It is likewise the argument of respondent that since a petition for quo

warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum
because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary
power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much
higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution which vests upon the Supreme Court disciplinary and
administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof. She theorizes
that if a Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through quo warranto
initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the Supreme Court through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section

11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within
one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification. Respondent contends that the supposed “failure” to file the
required SALNs allegedly took place for several years from 1986 to 2006,
thus, the “cause of ouster” existed even before the respondent was appointed
as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore, as early as her appointment,
the Republic, through the OSG, already had a cause of action to seek her
ouster. Even assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be counted
from the Republic's “discovery” of the disqualification, the petition would
still be time-barred since the Republic would have made such a “discovery”
through U.P., considering that the U.P. HRDO is required to submit a list of
employees who failed to file their SALNs.

Respondent avers that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file
her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her
appointment to office was regular. According to respondent, the Republic
failed to overcome this presumption as the documents relied upon by it, i.e.,
certifications from the U.P. HRDO and the Ombudsman, do not categorically
state that respondent failed to file her SALNs. On the contrary, respondent
points out that the U.P. HRDO had certified that she had been cleared of all
administrative responsibilities and charges as of June 1, 2006 and that there
was no pending administrative charge against her.
73
243 Phil. 167 (1988).
74
En Banc Resolution dated August 10, 2012 in A.M. No. 12-8-4-SC.
Decision 20 G.R. No. 237428

It is likewise the contention of respondent that public officers without

pay or those who do not receive compensation are not required to file a
SALN. Thus, respondent argues that for the periods that she was on official
leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN for the
inclusive years. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as an
absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided for under the
Constitution.

Nonetheless, respondent represents that she continues to recover and

retrieve her missing SALNs and will present them before the Senate sitting
as the Impeachment Tribunal and not to this Court considering her
objections to the latter's exercise of jurisdiction.

Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit

the same to the JBC has no bearing on one's integrity. The submission of
SALNs was simply among the additional documents which the JBC had
required of the applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's
position that the non-filing of SALN is not a ground for disqualification
unless the same was already the subject of a pending criminal or
administrative case or if the applicant had already been finally convicted for
a criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case,
respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012
that respondent had not submitted to the JBC her SALNs as a U.P. professor
and yet none of them invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the
“integrity rule.”

Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant

for the position of Chief Justice is a person of “proven integrity” is a
question “constitutionally committed to the JBC” and is therefore a political
question which only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative
when it included respondent's name in the shortlist of nominees for the
position of Chief Justice.

The Republic's Reply

In refuting respondent’s arguments, the Republic justifies its resort to

the unconventional method of quo warranto. The Republic cites the cases of
Estrada v. Desierto75 and Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or
Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et al. 76 where this Court took
cognizance of a petition for quo warranto to oust an impeachable official. It
reiterates its argument that it seeks respondent’s ouster, not on account of
commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to
assume the position of Chief Justice.
75
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
76
En Banc Resolution dated May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748.
Decision 21 G.R. No. 237428

The Republic maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office”
in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the
Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment and
disagrees with respondent’s interpretation that the word “may” qualifies only
the penalty imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office.
The Republic claims that respondent’s interpretation would lead to an absurd
situation in the event that the Senate imposes a lesser penalty, like
suspension of the President, which would result in a vacancy in the position
not intended by the Constitution. This is because vacancy in the Office of the
President occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation, in which event the Vice-President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term.

Invoking the verba legis principle in statutory construction, the

Republic claims that Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not
expressly prohibit resort to other means to remove impeachable officers in
position.

Contrary to respondent’s claim that this Court has no disciplinary

authority over its incumbent members, the Republic cites Section 13 of A.M.
No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and
corruption and ethical violations against members of the Supreme Court.
The Republic points out that such Ethics Committee conducted the
investigation in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC77 and A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC.78

Meanwhile, in support of its claim that the petition is not time-barred,

the Republic explains that the State has a continuous interest in ensuring that
those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. It argues that the
one-year period provided under Section 11 of Rule 66 merely applies to
individuals who are claiming rights to a public office, and not to the State.
To consider the instant petition as time-barred, the Republic argues, is to
force the State to spend its resources in favor of an unqualified person.

Further, the Republic claims that even if it be assumed that the one-
year period applies against the State, it cannot be deemed to have been
notified of respondent’s failure to file her SALNs. It argues that it has no
statutory obligation to monitor compliance of government employees other
than its own. It alleges that SALNs are not published, hence it has no
feasible way of taking cognizance of respondent’s failure to file SALN.

In any case, the Republic claims that the unique circumstances of the
instant case behoove this Court to be liberal in interpreting the one-year
77
647 Phil. 122 (2010).
78
599 Phil. 258 (2009).
Decision 22 G.R. No. 237428

reglementary period.

As to the question on jurisdiction, the Republic contends that the

Supreme Court is clothed with the authority to determine respondent’s
qualifications and eligibility to hold the position of the Chief Justice. It
argues that the determination of this issue is not a political question because
such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the pertinent
provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial
Ethics.

Going to the fundamental issue of respondent’s eligibility to hold the

position of Chief Justice, the Republic reiterates that respondent failed to
comply with the requirement of submitting SALNs and thus has failed to
prove her integrity. Further, the Republic cites respondent’s gross
misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of SALNs
was because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALNs. According to
the Republic, respondent’s allegation seems to imply that she did file her
SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman state
otherwise.

The Republic posits that respondent’s lack of integrity is further

bolstered by her failure to disclose to the JBC that she failed to file her
SALN 11 times during her tenure as U.P. Law Professor.

Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law,

and the filing of SALN is a qualification implied from the requirement of
integrity. The filing of SALN is not an additional requirement unduly
imposed on applicants to positions in the Judiciary. When respondent failed
to file her SALN, she did not comply with the Constitution, laws and
appropriate codes of conduct. There is no need to allege or prove graft and
corruption in order to prove an aspiring magistrate’s lack of integrity.

Finally, the Republic contends that the presumption of regularity

cannot be applied in respondent's favor. The Republic claims that such
presumption attaches only to official acts and not to all acts of officials. The
presumption, according to the Republic, applies only to official acts
specified by law as an official duty or to a function attached to a public
position. In this case, the filing of SALN is neither an official duty nor a
function attached to a position of a U.P. College of Law Professor. In any
case, the Republic claims that it has successfully disputed such presumption
through the Certifications it presented from U.P. and the Ombudsman.

The Republic’s Memorandum

Decision 23 G.R. No. 237428

In addition to the arguments put forth by the Republic in the Petition

and the Reply, the Republic further justified its non-inclusion of the JBC in
the instant petition. It contends that since the petition only disputes the
respondent's eligibility to become the Chief Justice, the Solicitor General
correctly instituted the quo warranto petition only against respondent.

Insisting on respondent's lack of integrity, the Republic argues that

respondent had the legal obligation to disclose to the JBC that she failed to
file her SALNs at least 11 times, citing the case of OCA v. Judge Estacion
Jr.79

The Republic also argues that respondent's claim of good faith is not a
defense. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 301980 and R.A. No. 671381 are special
laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein
malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial. Thus, her act of blaming
the Review and Compliance Committee of U.P. for its failure to inform her
that she had no SALNs on file does not exonerate her. The Republic further
notes that respondent resorted to the fallacy of tu quoque – a diversionary
tactic by using the fault of others to justify one's own fault.

Believing in the strength of its case, the Republic underscores its

contention that the respondent was not able to dispute the evidence put forth
by the Republic that she failed to religiously file her SALNs throughout her
entire stint in the government. The Republic claims that it is futile for
respondent to merely allege during the Oral Arguments that she filed her
SALNs and will produce them before the Senate. Respondent's admissions
during the Oral Arguments, together with the U.P. HRDO's certification,
prove that she did not religiously file her SALNs as required by law.

As to the applicability of this Court's ruling in Concerned Taxpayer v.

Doblada, Jr.,82 the Republic argues that the case is not on all fours with the
instant petition. The Doblada ruling, according to the OSG, did not involve
issues on qualifications to public office unlike the present petition. Second,
unlike in Doblada, respondent in this case failed to offer any countervailing
evidence to disprove the Certifications by the U.P. HRDO and the
Ombudsman. Lastly, the statement in Doblada relied upon by the respondent
is a mere dictum. The issue therein is centered on Doblada's unexplained
wealth. Furthermore, Doblada was decided only in 2005 or after respondent
violated the legal requirement on the filing of SALNs.
79
317 Phil. 600 (1995).
80
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. Approved on August 17, 1960.
81
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR
PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF
PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST, GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR
EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS AND TRANSACTIONS AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Approved on
February 20, 1989.
82
498 Phil. 395 (2005).
Decision 24 G.R. No. 237428

The Respondent’s Memorandum

Respondent insists that she can be removed from office only through
impeachment. In addition to the arguments raised in her Comment Ad
Cautelam, respondent asserts that impeachment was chosen as the method of
removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from
harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions
which are vital to the continued operations of government. Such purpose,
according to respondent, would be defeated if Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution would not be construed as providing an exclusive means for the
removal of impeachable officers. Respondent argues that it would be absurd
for the framers of the Constitution to provide a very cumbersome process for
removing said officers only to allow a less difficult means to achieve the
same purpose.

Respondent contends that the Republic, in citing the 2010 PET Rules
and the cases of Estrada v. Desierto83 and Lawyers League for a Better
Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et al.,84
erroneously lumps together the Chief Justice, the President and the Vice-
President, simply because they are all impeachable officers. Respondent
argues that there are substantial distinctions between the President and Vice-
President on the one hand, and Members of the Supreme Court on the other:
first, unlike Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the
Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no similar
provision with respect to the other impeachable officials, i.e., the Members
of this Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the
Ombudsman; and second, the President and Vice-President are elected
officials while the other impeachable officers are appointive officials.

Respondent also argues that there is not a single pronouncement in

Funa v. Chairman Villar85 and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera86 (by way of a
ruling or obiter dictum) to the effect that an impeachable officer may be
ousted through a writ of quo warranto, and that both cases were not even for
quo warranto.

Respondent maintains that whether respondent was a person of

“proven integrity” when she applied for the position of Chief Justice is a
political question outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which
83
Supra note 75.
84
Supra note 76.
85
Supra note 65.
86
Supra note 66.
Decision 25 G.R. No. 237428

only the JBC and the President as the appointing authority could determine.
She avers that the application of the political question doctrine is not
confined to the President or Congress, as the Republic supposedly argues,
but extends to other government departments or officers exercising
discretionary powers, such as the JBC which uses its wisdom and discretion
in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is a person of “proven”
integrity.

Respondent also contends that absent any challenge to her nomination

and appointment on the ground of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the JBC and the President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.

Respondent reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred. She

argues that the Republic cannot rely on Agcaoili v. Suguitan87 because it
mentioned the principle nullum temus occurit regi or “no time runs against
the king” only in passing, as the “general rule concerning limitation of action
in quo warranto proceedings.” She avers that Agcaoili is in fact authority
for the principle that prescription will definitely run against the State if the
rule or statute clearly so provides.

Respondent avers that she complied with the SALN laws as Professor
of the U.P. College of Law and that the law presumes regularity in the filing
of SALNs. According to respondent, that at least 11 of her SALNs have
been found tends to prove a pattern of filing, rather than non-filing.

Respondent argues that the burden of proof in quo warranto

proceedings falls on the party who brings the action and that based on
Doblada, the Republic failed to discharge this burden. Respondent claims
that the records of the U.P. HRDO are incomplete and unreliable and there
was no categorical statement in its Certification that she failed to file her
SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
2004, 2005, and 2006. Further, she avers that the records of the Office of the
Ombudsman are even more incomplete and unreliable, thus, any certification
from said office would likewise be insufficient to prove that she failed to file
11 of her SALNs while she was a U.P. Professor.

Respondent contends that she has actually presented preponderant

evidence that she filed her SALNs. She avers that she has recovered 11 of
her U.P. SALNs and she has direct proof that she executed at least 12
SALNs as a U.P. Professor. She stresses that the U.P. HRDO has thrice
“cleared” her of all administrative responsibilities and administrative
charges.

Respondent also claims that she was not even required to file a SALN
from 1986 to 1991 because her status and appointment then was merely
87
48 Phil. 676 (1929).
Decision 26 G.R. No. 237428

temporary. According to her, the fact that she served as counsel for the
Republic for the PIATCO cases in 2004, 2005 and 2006 does not negate her
defense that under the law, she was not required to file her SALNs for the
years when she was on leave and was not receiving compensation arising
from public office (i.e., 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006).

Respondent’s Memorandum also sought to address certain matters

raised during the Oral Arguments.

As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her

SALNs were in fact found in the records of the U.P. HRDO, and she was
able to retrieve copies of some of her SALNs from the U.P. Law Center.
Without prejudice to her jurisdictional objections, she attached them to the
Memorandum. She argues that the fact that the SALNs for certain years are
missing cannot give rise to the inference that they were not filed. She points
out that U.P. was only required to keep the SALNs for a period of ten (10)
years after receipt of the statement, after which the SALN may be destroyed.

In explaining her statement before the JBC that her SALNs were
irretrievable, respondent avers that she honestly could not retrieve copies
from U.P. over the course of a weekend given to her to complete her missing
documentary requirements. She declares that she did not keep copies of her
SALNs and she was not required to do so by law.

Respondent asserts that her 2009 SALN was not belatedly filed. She
explains that her 2009 SALN is an entry SALN which she originally filed on
September 16, 2010 within thirty (30) days after her assumption of office as
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. According to her, the revised
2009 SALN which has the annotation “revised as of 22 June 2012,” is a
revised version executed in June 2012 to more accurately reflect the
acquisition cost of certain assets declared in 2010.

With respect to the purported 2006 SALN, respondent avers that it

was not the SALN required by RA 6713, but a mere statement of her assets
which the JBC requested as a tool to determine her assets for comparison
with her income tax returns. She explains that she merely happened to use a
downloadable SALN form which she filled up and dated as of the time of its
writing, i.e., July 27, 2010. She claims that she never misrepresented the
same to be her 2006 exit SALN from U.P. According to her, she in fact
considers her 2006 SALN as one of the missing SALNs she is still trying to
locate.

Respondent claims that she could not recall all the circumstances why
her 1998 SALN was executed only in 2003 which, according to her, was
reasonable since it happened 15 years ago. She claims that there is no law
prohibiting her from submitting the same, and the fact that the SALN was
Decision 27 G.R. No. 237428

filed serves the purpose of the law and negates any intention to hide
unexplained wealth.

It is also respondent’s position that the omission of her husband’s

signature on her 2011 SALN was inadvertent and was not an offense.
According to her, it could not adversely impact on her integrity absent any
allegation or finding that she acquired ill-gotten wealth. She argues that the
Civil Service Commission’s Guidelines which require the signature of the
spouse who is not a public officer, was promulgated only in January 2013.

With regard to the jewelry she acquired from 1986 to 1991 which
were supposedly declared in her 1991 SALN but were undeclared in her
1990 SALN, respondent avers that these assets were actually declared in her
1985 and 1989 SALNs, and they were consistently declared in all her
subsequent SALNs beginning 1991. According to respondent, she should
not be faulted for her inadvertent omission to declare such assets in her 1990
SALN as her declaration of the same thereafter is consistent with good faith
and cured whatever error there may have been in her 1990 SALN. She
argues that said assets were not manifestly disproportionate to her lawful
income and even as a U.P. Professor, she could have afforded to purchase
jewelry worth Php15,000.00 over a span of six (6) years.

Finally, respondent argues that it is an “unreasonable and oppressive”

interpretation of the law to reckon her entry SALN as Associate Justice of
the Court from the date of her appointment (August 16, 2010) and not from
December 31, 2009 when it was actually filed. Respondent contends that
R.A. No. 6713 only requires that the SALN be filed “within thirty days after
assumption of office” – a directive she supposedly complied with. She
argues that while the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713
state that the SALN should be reckoned from the first day of service, the law
provides for a review and compliance procedure which requires that a
reporting individual first be informed and provided an opportunity to take
necessary corrective action should there be any error in her SALN.
Respondent avers that she did not receive any notice or compliance order
informing her that her entry SALN was erroneous, and she was not directed
to take the necessary corrective action.

The Respondent's Reply/Supplement to Memorandum

At the close of the Oral Argument, granted upon respondent's Ad

Cautelam motion, the Court specifically required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days, after
which, the petition shall be submitted for decision. Notwithstanding such
clear directive from the Court, and even without being required to,
respondent moves (again Ad Cautelam) for the inclusion of her
Decision 28 G.R. No. 237428

Reply/Supplement to her memorandum filed beyond the period granted by

the Court to the parties. The belated filing of said Reply/Supplement in
disregard of the Court's directive merits its non-admission. Nevertheless, as
the Court remains circumspect of the pleadings submitted by the parties and
in accordance with the dictates of due process and fair play, respondent's
Reply/Supplement to her Memorandum, albeit filed Ad Cautelam, is
admitted.

Respondent raises two points in her Reply/Supplement: first, the new

matter of tax fraud allegedly committed by her; and second, the forum-
shopping allegedly committed by the Republic.

Respondent sought to address the inclusion of the charge of tax fraud

allegedly committed by her relative to the fees she received in the PIATCO
cases which respondent argues to have been raised by the Republic only in
its memorandum. Respondent denies having concealed or under declared her
income in the PIATCO cases. She further points out that the Summary and
the Powerpoint presentation prepared by BIR Deputy Commissioner Guballa
and which were attached to the Republic's memorandum were incomplete,
inaccurate and merely preliminary. In any case, respondent avers that BIR
Deputy Commissioner Guballa himself found that respondent had
“substantially declared all income (legal fees) from the PIATCO case in her
ITRs from years 2004 to 2009 BUT there were certain discrepancies.”88

Respondent also accuses the Republic of having committed deliberate

forum-shopping in filing the action for quo warranto even when the
impeachment proceeding was already pending before the House of
Representatives. Contending that all the elements of forum-shopping are
present, respondent points to the (1) identity of parties between the quo
warranto action and the impeachment case inasmuch as the House
Committee on Justice is also part of the Government; (2) identity of causes
of action considering that the quo warranto case is based on respondent's
alleged lack of proven integrity for failure to file all her SALNs when she
was teaching at the U.P. College of Law and for concealing her true income
and evasion of taxes which were the same attacks on her eligibility and
qualifications as enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment; and (3) identity
in the relief sought as both the quo warranto and the impeachment sought
her removal from the Office of the Chief Justice.

The Motions for Intervention

Through a Joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached

Comment-In-Intervention, movant-intervenors composed of (1) former CEO
of PAG-IBIG Fund, Zorayda Amelia Capistrano Alonzo, (2) peace & human
rights advocate Remedios Mapa Suplido, (3) urban poor advocate Alicia
88
Respondent's Reply/Supplement to Memorandum Ad Cautelam.
Decision 29 G.R. No. 237428

Gentolia Murphy, (4) Chairperson of Pambansang Kilusan ng mga

Samahang Magsasaka (PAKISAMA) Noland Merida Penas, (5) Fr. Roberto
Reyes, and (6) poet, feminist & youth advocate Reyanne Joy P. Librado
(Capistrano, et al.,) seek to intervene in the present petition as citizens and
taxpayers.

The comment-in-intervention is a virtual echo of the arguments raised

in respondent's comment that quo warranto is an improper remedy against
impeachable officials who may be removed only by impeachment and that
the application of the PET rules are limited only to the President and Vice-
President who are elective, and not appointive, officials. Movant-intervenors
similarly argue that the petition is already time-barred as the cause of action
arose upon respondent's appointment as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012 or
almost six (6) years ago.

Capistrano et al. argue that it is not incumbent upon respondent to

prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by the
Constitution for members of the Judiciary; rather, the onus of determining
whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. They also posit
that nowhere in the Constitution is the submission of all prior SALNs
required; instead, what is required is that all aspiring justices of the Court
must have the imprimatur of the JBC, the best proof of which is a person's
inclusion in the shortlist.

Capistrano et al. persuade that respondent's explanation that her

government records in the academe for 15 years are irretrievable is
reasonable and that respondent did not mislead the JBC. On the contrary,
they claim that the JBC accepted her explanation when it deemed respondent
as qualified. In doing so, they conclude, that the JBC determined that she
possessed the integrity as required by the Constitution.

A few hours after the filing of the Capistrano et. al.,'s Comment-in-
Intervention, another set of intervenors composed of: (1) BAYAN MUNA
Representative (Rep.) Carlos Isagani Zarate; (2) ACT Teachers Partylist
Rep. Antonio Tinio & Francisca Castro; (3) GABRIELA Women's Party
Rep. Emerenciana De Jesus & Arlene Brosas; (3) ANAKPAWIS Partylist
Rep. Ariel Casilao; (5) KABATAAN Partylist Rep. Sarah Jane Elago; (6)
Convenors and members of Movement Against Tyranny (MAT), namely:
Francisco A. Alcuaz, Bonifacio P. Ilagan, & Col. George A. Rabusa (Ret.);
(7) Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag; (8) Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo,
D.D.; (9) Secretary Gen. of Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)
Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; (10) Member of MDD Youth (an Affiliate of Aksyon
Demokratiko) Kaye Ann Legaspi; and (11) Secretary General of National
Union of People's Lawyers Atty. Ephraim B. Cortez (Zarate, et al.,) filed a
Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene and Opposition-in-
Intervention, pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. They claim that as
Decision 30 G.R. No. 237428

citizens and taxpayers, they have a legal interest in the matter of

respondent's ouster or removal.

Zarate et al. raise the similar argument that the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court may only be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust and that it is
only the Congress who has the power to remove the Chief Justice through
the exclusive mode of impeachment.

They further argue that the issue of respondent's non-submission of

complete SALNs, without more, does not have the effect of putting to
question her integrity as she did not conceal her SALNs. They argue that the
qualification of having a “proven integrity” is a standard subject to the
discretion of, first, the JBC who submits the list of qualified candidates; and
second, of the President, who will select among the shortlist whom to
appoint as Chief Justice.

Movant-Intervenor Rene A.V. Saguisag subsequently filed a

Supplement to Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene and
Opposition-in-Intervention Cum Petition to Recuse seeking the inhibition of
unnamed Members of this Court who “may have prematurely thrown their
weight on the other side, actually or perceptually” on the ground that
respondent is entitled to an impartial arbiter.

As well, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed its Motion
for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Opposition-in-Intervention as an
organization of all Philippine lawyers, having the fundamental duty to
uphold the Constitution and an interest in ensuring the validity of the
appointments to the Judiciary. The IBP's arguments reflect the arguments of
the respondent and the other movant-intervenors that the quo warranto
petition is time-barred and is unavailable against an impeachable officer. The
IBP further argues that the determination of whether respondent is of
“proven integrity” belongs to the JBC and which question the Court cannot
inquire into without violating the separation of powers. It is likewise the
contention of the IBP that the petition is fatally flawed since the JBC never
required the submission of respondent's SALNs from 2001 to 2006.

Also seeking to intervene in the instant petition, Senators Leila M. De

Lima (Senator De Lima) and Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Senator Trillanes) as
citizens, taxpayers, and senators of the Republic, filed a Motion to Intervene
and Admit Attached Opposition-In-Intervention (Ad Cautelam) on April 4,
2018.

In the said Motion, Senators De Lima and Trillanes assert that they
Decision 31 G.R. No. 237428

possess a clear legal interest, both personal and official, in the subject matter
of the Republic's petition to oust the Chief justice on the ground that she
does not possess the constitutional requirement of integrity. According to
Senators De Lima and Trillanes, they have the right and duty to uphold the
Constitution and to oppose government actions that are clearly and patently
unconstitutional. It is also Senators De Lima and Trillanes' theory that the
instant quo warranto case is aimed to deprive the Senate of its jurisdiction as
the impeachment tribunal. They argue that their mandated duty as judges in
the possible impeachment trial of the Chief Justice will be pre-empted and
negated if the quo warranto petition will be granted. Their claimed legal
interest in their intervention in and opposition to the petition for quo
warranto is mainly anchored upon their duty and prerogatives as Senators-
judges in an impeachment trial and to protect the institution of impeachment
as a mode of enforcing accountability.

Senators De Lima and Trillanes' Opposition-In-Intervention is a mere

reiteration of the respondent's argument that this Court has no jurisdiction
over a petition for quo warranto against an impeachable officer. They argue
that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is, by express provision of the
Consitution, removable from office exclusively by impeachment. They also
aver that the ground raised in the petition for quo warranto – lack of
integrity for failing to submit one's SALN – is part of the allegations in the
impeachment case being heard in the House of Representatives. Thus, they
argue that the use of an identical ground in a quo warranto proceeding
directly undermines the jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide
impeachment cases and the prerogative of the senators to try the same.

Senators De Lima and Trillanes also advance the argument that the
Constitution identifies and enumerates only three qualifications for
appointment to the Supreme Court: (1) natural born citizenship; (2) age,
i.e., at least forty years; and (3) an experience of at least 15 years either as
judge of a lower court or in the practice of law in the Philippines. They
assert that the filing of a SALN, taking of psychological or physical
examination, and similar requirements, are merely discretionary
administrative requirements for consideration of the JBC, not Constitutional
requirements, hence, can be waived, removed entirely, or adjusted by the
JBC in the exercise of its discretion. According to the said movant-
intervenors, Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states
that,“[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence”, does not speak of objective
constitutional qualifications, but only of subjective characteristics of a judge.
They, therefore, contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and
experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence,
integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

Corollarily, Senators De Lima and Trillanes argue that the subjective

Decision 32 G.R. No. 237428

considerations are not susceptible to analysis with tools of legal doctrine.

Hence, questions on this matter are for the consideration of political
institutions under the Constitution, i.e., the JBC and the President (prior to
appointment) and the House of Representatives and the Senate (after
appointment).

The Motions for Inhibition

By way of separately filed motions, respondent seeks affirmative

relief, in the form of the inhibition of five (5) Justices of the Court, the
jurisdiction of which she questions and assails. Respondent prays for the
inhibition of Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta,
Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez Tijam, and Teresita J. Leonardo-De
Castro from hearing and deciding the present petition.

In common, respondent imputes actual bias on said Justices for having

testified before the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment
complaint. In particular, respondent considered Justice Bersamin's allusion
to respondent as a “dictator” and his personal resentment about the supposed
withdrawal of the privilege previously enjoyed by the members of the Court
to recommend nominees to vacant positions in the Judiciary, as evidence of
actual bias.

Justice Peralta's inhibition, on the other hand, is being sought because

as then Acting ex officio Chairperson of the JBC when respondent was
nominated for appointment as Chief Justice, he would have personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings and for
having served as a material witness in the matter in controversy.

Justice Jardeleza's inhibition is sought on the ground that his

testimony before the House Committee on Justice reveals that he harbors ill
feelings towards respondent on account of the latter's challenge to his
integrity during the nomination process for the Associate Justice position
vice Justice Roberto A. Abad which he characterized as “inhumane”.

Respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's

statement as quoted in a Manila Times article to the effect that if respondent
continues to ignore and to refuse to participate in the impeachment process,
she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the Constitution.

Respondent likewise made mention that Justice Tijam and Justice

Bersamin wore a touch of red during the “Red Monday” protest on March
12, 2018 wherein judges and court employees reportedly called on
respondent to make the supreme sacrifice and resign.

Respondent also calls for the inhibition of Justice De Castro for

Decision 33 G.R. No. 237428

having allegedly prejudged the issue as regards the validity of respondent's

nomination and appointment in 2012 when Justice De Castro testified under
oath during the House Committee on Justice hearings that respondent should
have been disqualified from the shortlist on account of the SALNs she
allegedly failed to submit.

At the last minute, respondent also seeks to disqualify Justice Samuel

R. Martires for his purported insinuations during the Oral Arguments
questioning her “mental” or “psychological” fitness on the basis of her belief
that God is “the source of everything in (her) life.”89

Respondent also prays that the Ad Cautelam Respectful Motions for

Inhibitions of Associate Justices Peralta, Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza,
Tijam, Bersamin and Martires be resolved by the Court En Banc, without the
participation of the Justices she seeks to disqualify.

The Issues

From the arguments raised by the parties and the issues as delineated
in the Advisory governing the special Oral Arguments by way of
accommodation to respondent, the paramount issues to be resolved by the
Court are:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course
to the instant petition for quo warranto against respondent who is an
impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment complaint has
already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of

prescription;

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of a candidate's eligibility for

nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether
such determination partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALNs as mandated by

the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules
and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;

c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission

of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if so, whether the failure to
89
Id.
Decision 34 G.R. No. 237428

submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of

respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of a finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the

position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the
JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is a de jure or de facto officer.

The Ruling of the Court

Preliminary Issues

Intervention is an ancillary remedy

restricted in purpose and in time

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain
purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest
that may be affected by those proceedings.90

Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but

rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first
requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and
prejudice should result as spelled out under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, as follows:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in

the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in
the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding.

Each of the movant-intervenors in this case seek to intervene as

citizens and taxpayers, whose claimed interest to justify their intervention is
their “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the
Philippine Constitution”. The movant-intervenors further assert a “public
right” to intervene in the instant case by virtue of its “transcendental
importance for the Filipino people as a whole”. Apart from such naked
allegations, movant-intervenors failed to establish to the Court’s satisfaction
the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is well-settled on the matter:

90
Hi-Tone Marketing Corp. v. Baikal Realty Corp., 480 Phil. 545, 569 (2004).
Decision 35 G.R. No. 237428

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted

by the court when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules
of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal
interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either of the
parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as
qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a
direct and immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain
or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest
must be actual and material, a concern which is more than mere
curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not be indirect
and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or
collateral. x x x.91 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble,

do not, in any way, come within the purview of the concept of “legal
interest” contemplated under the Rules to justify the allowance of
intervention. Movant-intervenors failed to show any legal interest of such
nature that they will “either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the
judgment”. Even the IBP's assertion of their “fundamental duty to uphold
the Constitution, advocate for the rule of law, and safeguard the
administration of justice”, being the official organization of all Philippine
lawyers, will not suffice. Admittedly, their interest is merely out of
“sentimental desire” to uphold the rule of law. Meanwhile, Senators De
Lima and Trillanes' claimed legal interest is mainly grounded upon their
would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the
articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment
court. Nevertheless, the fact remains that as of the moment, such interest is
still contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the
Senate. It bears stressing that the interest contemplated by law must be
actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent
or expectant.92

Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire
to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, were allowed to intervene,
proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and
interminable.93

Emphatically, a quo warranto proceeding is an action by the

government against individuals unlawfully holding an office. Section 1,
Rule 66 provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. — An action

91
Ongco v. Dalisay, 691 Phil. 462, 469-470 (2012) citing Hon. Executive Secretary, et al. v.
Northeast Freight Forwarders, Inc., 600 Phil. 789, 799 (2009).
92
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Heirs of Estanislao Miñoza, 656 Phil. 537, 547
(2011).
93
Id. at 547-548.
Decision 36 G.R. No. 237428

for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be

commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds

or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by

the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the

Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.

The remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in any
private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are
viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a
private quarrel among rival claimants.94

Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell,95 historically traced the

nature of quo warranto proceedings as a crime which could only be
prosecuted in the name of the King by his duly authorized law officers. In
time, the criminal features of quo warranto proceedings were modified and
as such, the writ came to be used as a means to determine which of two
claimants was entitled to an office and to order the ouster and the payment
of a fine against the usurper. This quasi-criminal nature of quo warranto
proceedings was adopted in some American states. Nonetheless, Newman
explains that the Code of the District of Colombia, which was the venue of
the case, continues to treat usurpation of office as a public wrong which can
be corrected only by proceeding in the name of the government itself. Thus:

In a sense – in a very important sense – every citizen and every

taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law, in the administration of
law, and in having only qualified officers execute the law. But that
general interest is not a private, but a public interest. Being such, it is to
be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney, who are
expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo warranto
proceedings against usurpers in the same way that they are expected to
institute proceedings against any other violator of the law. That general
public interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute
such proceedings, for, if it was, then every citizen and every taxpayer
would have the same interest and the same right to institute such
proceedings, and a public officer might, from the beginning to the end of
his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.

The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an
94
Oakland Municipal Improvement League v. City of Oakland (1972) 23 Cal. App. 3D 165, 170.
95
238 U.S. 537 (1915).
Decision 37 G.R. No. 237428

action for quo warranto is when such individual has a claim over the
position in question. Section 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. — A

person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his
own name.

In this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming

to be entitled to the questioned position nor are they the ones charged with
the usurpation thereof.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the movants-intervenors, in

their respective Motions, presented nothing more than a mere reiteration of
respondent's allegations and arguments in her Comment.

For these reasons, the Court, in its Resolution 96 dated April 3, 2018,
resolved to deny the motions for intervention respectively filed by
Capistrano et al., and Zarate et al., and to note the IBP's intervention. For
similar reasons, the Court resolves to deny the motion for intervention of
Senators De Lima and Trillanes.

No basis for the Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court to inhibit in
the case

The instant petition comes at the heels of the recently-concluded

hearings on the determination of probable cause in the impeachment
complaint against respondent before the House Committee on Justice.
Several Members of the Court, both incumbent and retired, were invited,
under pain of contempt, to serve as resource persons. Those Members who
were present at the Committee hearings were armed with the requisite
imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only
on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as material and
relevant to the issues being heard. For lack of particularity, the Court
supposes that the attendance of some of its Members in the House
Committee hearings is the basis of movant-intervenor Saguisag's motion to
recuse.

On the other hand, respondent was more emphatic when she sought
affirmative relief, in the form of the inhibition of six (6) Justices, of the
Court, whose jurisdiction she questions and assails. Specifically, respondent
prays for the inhibition of Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado
M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez Tijam, Teresita J. Leonardo-
96
Rollo, pp. 501-505.
Decision 38 G.R. No. 237428

De Castro and Samuel R. Martires fundamentally on the ground of actual

bias for having commonly testified before the House Committee on Justice
on the impeachment case.

As for Justice Samuel R. Martires, respondent concludes Justice

Martires' manifested actual bias based on his statements during the Oral
Arguments which purportedly tended to question respondent's mental and
psychological fitness.

In particular, respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on

the latter's statement as quoted in a Manila Times article to the effect that if
respondent continues to ignore and to refuse to participate in the
impeachment process, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the
Constitution.

Respondent cites the article entitled, “Appear in Congress or violate

Constitution,” dated December 4, 2017, where Justice Tijam was
purportedly quoted to have said:

Impeachment is a constitutional process and a mandate enshrined in the

Constitution. Justices took an oath to defend, preserve, protect the
Constitution. If Chief Justice Sereno continues to ignore and continues
to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, ergo, she is
clearly liable for culpable violation of the Constitution. (emphasis
supplied)

Respondent claims that the aforesaid statements of Justice Tijam are

indicative of his stance that there may be a ground to impeach and remove
respondent from office, which is also the objective of the quo warranto
petition against her.

Ultimately, the cause for inhibition simmers to the question of

whether, in so appearing and testifying before the House Committee on
Justice, the Members of the Court are precluded from hearing and deciding
the instant petition for quo warranto. To this, the Court answers in the
negative.

Jurisprudence recognizes the right of litigants to seek disqualification

of judges. Indeed, elementary due process requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. “A judge has both the duty of rendering
a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.”97

However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification

of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial
and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s
97
Query of Exec. Judge Estrada, RTC, Malolos, Bulacan, 239 Phil. 1, 6 (1987).
Decision 39 G.R. No. 237428

sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must
therefore prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial.
“[W]hile it is settled principle that opinions formed in the course of judicial
proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the
judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge.”98

A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila

Times article reveals that the manifest intent of the statements was only to
prod respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of
impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public accountability, thus:

He added that he wanted to encourage Sereno to show up at the

Congress hearings “to respect and participate in the impeachment
(process), and to defend herself and protect the institution.”

Sereno, he said, should be a role model when it comes to

respecting the Constitution.

“Impeachment is not an invention of politicians. It was drafted by

the framers of the Constitution. Media, which propagates the myth that
impeachment is a numbers game, hence, is political and arbitrary, fails to
emphasize the fact that the rule of the majority is the essence of
democracy,” the magistrate stressed.

Tijam believes that the impeachment process against Sereno is not

an attack on the high court or the Judiciary because the Supreme Court
does not consist of the chief justice alone.

“Impeachment is [neither] an assault on the Judiciary nor an

infringement on the independence of the Judiciary, because it is enshrined
in the Constitution. Parenthetically, when the SC strikes down acts of
Congress and acts of the President and the Executive Department for being
unlawful and unconstitutional, the SC is not assaulting the independence of
Congress and the Executive Department because the expanded power of
judicial review is enshrined in the Constitution,” Tijam pointed out.

Sereno, he said, should be a role model when it comes to

respecting the Constitution.99 (Emphasis ours)

Notably, respondent conveniently and casually invoked only a portion

of the article which suited her objective of imputing bias against Justice
Tijam.

As to the act of wearing a red tie which purportedly establishes

Justices Tijam and Bersamin's prejudice against her, the argument is
baseless and unfair. There is no basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish
a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate's performance of
98
People v. Hon. Ong, 523 Phil. 347, 358 (2006).
99
<http://www.manilatimes.net/appear-congress-violate-constitution/366575/> (visited on April 6,
2018).
Decision 40 G.R. No. 237428

adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red

piece of clothing was merely coincidental and should not be deemed a
sufficient ground to disqualify them.

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, et

100
al., this Court explained that:

[T]he second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1,101 does not give judges
unfettered discretion to decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The
inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have
noted that the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground
for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. This Court has
to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice
before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself. The only exception to the rule is when the error is
so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice.102 (Citations omitted)

In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory
inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere fact that some of the
Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice
determining probable cause for the impeachment of respondent does not
make them disqualified to hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat
was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty
to investigate the impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not
be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior consent of the Supreme
Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set
for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed
within this context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse
attack against respondent.

In fact, Justice Tijam, in his Sworn Statement 103 submitted to the

House Committee on Justice, clearly identified the purpose of his attendance
thereat:

2. In reply, I sent a letter to Representative Umali on

November 24, 2017, informing him that inasmuch as the issue involved

100
606 Phil. 615 (2009).
101
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in
which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he
is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth
degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a
case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
102
Supra at 638-639.
103
Dated December 6, 2017.
Decision 41 G.R. No. 237428

actions of the Supreme Court En Banc, I deemed it proper to first

secure its approval before participating in the House Committee
hearing.

3. On November 28, 2017, the Supreme Court En Banc gave

clearance for Justices who have been invited by the House Committee on
Justice to testify in connection with the impeachment complaint, to give
testimony on administrative matters if they so wish. The Court’s
Resolution in this regard states that the authority was granted “only
because the proceedings before the Committee on Justice of the House
of Representatives constitute part of the impeachment process under
Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.”

A copy of the Court’s Resolution is hereto attached as Annex “A.”

4. I am submitting this Sworn Statement to the House

Committee on Justice as my testimony in relation to A.M. No. 17-06-02-
SC, based on my best recollection of events relating to said matter and
available records. I shall, however, be willing to give further testimony
should the House Committee find it appropriate to propound questions
thereon at the December 11, 2017 Committee hearing, subject to
applicable limitations under law and relevant rules.

5. I will appear and give testimony before the House

Committee on Justice not as a witness for the complainant, but to
honor the Committee’s invitation to shed light on A.M. No. 17-06-02-
SC and to accord due respect to the Constitutionally established
process of impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

Likewise, the Justices, including Justice Tijam, who appeared during

the House Committee on Justice hearings, refused to form any conclusion or
to answer the uniform query as to whether respondent's acts constitute
impeachable offenses, as it was not theirs to decide but a function properly
belonging to the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court. 104 Evidently, no
bias and prejudice on the part of the Justices could be inferred therein.

A judge may decide, "in the exercise of his sound discretion," to

recuse himself from a case for just or valid reasons. The phrase just or valid
reasons, as the second requisite for voluntary inhibition, must be taken to
mean -

x x x causes which, though not strictly falling within those enumerated in

the first paragraph, are akin or analogous thereto. In determining what
causes are just, judges must keep in mind that next to importance to the
duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the
judge. For it is an accepted axiom that every litigant, including the state,
in criminal cases, is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge, and the law intends that no judge shall preside in any
104
See TSN of the House Committee on Justice dated December 11, 2017, p. XI-2;XVII-1.
Decision 42 G.R. No. 237428

case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and

independent.105

Respondent's call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on

distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices
may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings of the House
Committee on Justice.

Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po

maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador,” is clearly a hypothetical
statement, an observation on what would the Court be if any of its Members
were to act dictatorially.

Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin’s remark

that he was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of
the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’ “privilege” to
recommend nominees to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be
presumptuous to equate this statement to a personal resentment as
respondent regards it. There has always been a high degree of
professionalism among the Members of the Court in both their personal and
official dealings with each other. It cannot also be denied that the statement
reflected a natural sentiment towards a decision reached and imposed by a
member of a collegial body without consultation or consensus.

Meanwhile, respondent's allegation of actual bias and partiality

against Justice Peralta is negated by his testimony during the January 15,
2018 hearing of the House Committee on Justice, where he stated that he has
been very supportive of the Judiciary reforms introduced by respondent as
the Chief Justice, even if she suspects that he is one of those behind her
impeachment.

Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on Justice

also contradicts respondent’s allegation that Justice Peralta’s apparent bias
arose from his belief that respondent caused the exclusion of his wife, Court
of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of
applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta has
made it clear during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has
already moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his testimony was
merely to protect prospective applicants to the Judiciary.

Justice Peralta’s testimony during the Congressional hearing that “had

(he) been informed of (the) letter dated July 23, 2012 and a certificate of
clearance, (he) could have immediately objected to the selection of the Chief
Justice for voting because this is a very clear deviation from existing rules
that if a member of the Judiciary would like...or...a candidate would like to
105
30 Am. Jr. 767.
Decision 43 G.R. No. 237428

apply for Chief Justice, then she or he is mandated to submit the SALNs,” is
clearly a hypothetical statement, which will not necessarily result in the
disqualification of respondent from nomination. It was also expressed in
line with his functions as then Acting Chairperson of the JBC, tasked with
determining the constitutional and statutory eligibility of applicants for the
position of Chief Justice. It bears stressing, too, that at the time said
statement was made, the petition for quo warranto has not been filed; thus,
such statement cannot amount to a prejudgment of the case.

Furthermore, according to Justice Peralta, while he was then the

Acting Ex Officio Chairperson of the JBC at the time of respondent's
application for the position of Chief Justice, he had no personal knowledge
of the disputed facts concerning the proceedings, specifically the matters
considered by the members of the JBC in preparing the shortlist of
nominees. He explained that it was the ORSN of the JBC which was tasked
to determine completeness of the applicants' documentary requirements,
including the SALNs.

As for Justice Martires' statements during the Oral Arguments, this

Court does not view them as indication of actual bias or prejudice against
respondent. Our review of the record reveals that Justice Martires' did not
refer to respondent as the object of his statements, as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES :
Solicitor Calida, would you agree with me na lahat ng taong may
dibdib ay may kaba sa dibdib? At lahat ng taong may ulo ay may katok sa
ulo.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:

Yes, Your Honor, I agree.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Now would you consider it a mental illness (sic) when a person
always invokes God as the source of his strength? The source of his
inspiration? The source of happiness? The source of everything in life? Is
that a mental illness.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:

Not necessarily, Your Honor.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
So, I'm just making a follow-up to the question that Justice Velasco
earlier asked. So, would you agree with me that the psychiatrist made a
wrong evaluation with respect to the psychiatric report of the Chief
Justice?106

Neither are We prepared to conclude that Justice Martires' statements

were based on an extraneous source, other than what what he has learned or
encountered over the course of the instant proceedings. There is nothing in
106
Transcript of Stenographic Notes dated April 10, 2018, pp. 234-235.
Decision 44 G.R. No. 237428

the interpellation, nor in Justice Martires' statements that he has read the
psychiatric report, nor has read newspaper accounts tackling the same. He
merely asked the OSG if he has read the same, and his opinion regarding it.

Contrary to respondent's contentions, Justice Martires has not

suggested that she suffers from some mental or psychological illness. At
most, his questions and statements were merely hypothetical in nature,
which do not even constitute as an opinion against respondent. Certainly, to
impute actual bias based on such a brief discourse with respect to
hypothetical matters is conjectural and highly speculative. “Allegations and
perceptions of bias from the mere tenor and language of a judge is
insufficient to show prejudgment.”107

In the same vein, insinuations that the Justices of the Supreme Court
are towing the line of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte in entertaining the quo
warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds
of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members
of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people
who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the Solicitor General who has supposedly met consistent
litigation success before the Supreme Court shall likewise automatically and
positively be received in the present quo warranto action. That the Court
spares the Solicitor General the rod is easily dispelled by the Court's firm
orders in G.R. Nos. 234359 and 234484 concerning alleged extra legal
killings – a case directly concerning the actuations of the executive
department – to provide the Court with documents relative to the Oplan
Tokhang operations and by a uninamous vote, rebuked the Solicitor
General's plea for reconsideration. Suffice to say that the Court decides
based on the merits of a case and not on the actors or the supposed
benefactors involved.

Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and

partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent’s
motions for inhibition must perforce fail. Mere conjectures and speculations
cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The
presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role of dispensing
justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor,
should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.

In Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan,108 We held:

“[B]ias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary

inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence.

107
Gochan v. Gochan, 446 Phil. 433, 439 (2003); People v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 150, 158
(1999).
108
469 Phil. 373 (2004).
Decision 45 G.R. No. 237428

Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These

cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of
judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without
respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich.” 109
(Citation omitted)

The Court has pointedly observed in Pimentel v. Hon. Salanga:110

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a
natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in
unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill
behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or
prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as
yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not
thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to
assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will
do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal
case that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be given a
fair, impartial and just hearing" is "premature." Prejudice is not to
be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation
under his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do
equal right to the poor and the rich." To disqualify or not to disqualify
himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of
conscience.111 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

The Court has consequently counseled that no Judge or Justice who is

not legally disqualified should evade the duty and responsibility to sit in the
adjudication of any controversy without committing a dereliction of duty for
which he or she may be held accountable. Towards that end, the Court has
aptly reminded:

To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon

the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified to sit in a given case. It is
his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if the
judge is not disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed
with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk the responsibility
without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction.112

It is timely to be reminded, too, that the Supreme Court is a collegial

judicial body whose every Member has solemnly and individually sworn to
dispense and administer justice to every litigant. As a collegial body, the
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The only things that the
Supreme Court collectively focuses its attention to in every case are the
merits thereof, and the arguments of the parties on the issues submitted for

109
Id. at 384-385.
110
128 Phil. 176 (1967).
111
Id. at 182-183.
112
People v. Moreno, 83 Phil. 286, 294 (1949); Perfecto v. Contreras, 28 Phil. 538 (1914); Joaquin
v. Barretto, 25 Phil. 281, 287 (1913).
Decision 46 G.R. No. 237428

consideration and deliberation. Only thereby may the solemn individual oath
of the Members to do justice be obeyed.

In line with the foregoing, We deem it baseless, not to mention

problematic, the respondent's prayer that the matter of inhibition of the six
Associate Justices be decided by the remaining members of the Court En
Banc. The respondent herself was cognizant that the prevailing rule allows
challenged Justices to participate in the deliberations on the matter of their
disqualification. Moreover, exclusion from the deliberations due to
delicadeza or sense of decency, partakes of a ground apt for a voluntary
inhibition. It bears to be reminded that voluntary inhibition, leaves to the
sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other
just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.113 Indeed, the
best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the
magistrate sought to be disqualified. Moreover, to compel the remaining
members to decide on the challenged member's fitness to resolve the case is
to give them authority to review the propriety of acts of their colleagues, a
scenario which can undermine the independence of each of the members of
the High Court.

In the En Banc case of Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong Bank,114 the Court
elucidated that a challenge to the competency of a judge may admit two
constructions: first, the magistrate decides for himself the question of his
competency and when he does so, his decision therein is conclusive and the
other Members of the Court have no voice in it; and second, the challenged
magistrate sits with the Court and decides the challenge as a collegial body.
It was in Jurado that the Court adopted the second view as the proper
approach when a challenge is poised on the competency of a sitting
magistrate, that is, the Court, together with the challenged magistrate,
decides. Jurado further expressly excluded a possible third construction
wherein the Court decides the challenge but without the participation of the
challenged member on the ground that such construction would place power
on a party to halt the proceedings by the simple expedient of challenging a
majority of the Justices. The Court sees no reason to deviate from its
standing practice of resolving competency challenges as a collegial body
without excluding the challenged Member from participating therein.

Accordingly, the Court resolves to DENY respondent's motion to

exclude Associate Justices Peralta, Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, Tijam,
Bersamin, and Martires in the resolution of the separate motions for
inhibition against the said Associate Justices. Likewise, the Court resolves
to DENY the said separate motions for inhibition.

113
Dr. Raul M. Sunico v. Judge Pedro Dl. Gutierrez, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2457, February 21, 2017.
114
1 Phil. 395 (1902).
Decision 47 G.R. No. 237428

Substantive Issues

I.
The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant
Petition for Quo Warranto

The petition challenges respondent’s right and title to the position of

Chief Justice. The Republic avers that respondent unlawfully holds her
office because in failing to regularly declare her assets, liabilities and net
worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as an
Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Court, she cannot be said
to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring
member of the Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent’s
appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. Respondent counters that, as
an impeachable officer, she may only be removed through impeachment by
the Senate sitting as an impeachment court.

Supreme Court has original

jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the

Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This
Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto.

Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the

venue of an action for quo warranto, when commenced by the Solicitor
General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court
of Appeals, or in the Supreme Court.

While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the

appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs, a direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition.115 In the instant case, direct resort to the
Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the
qualification of no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a
person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office
is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special
115
Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Assn., Inc. (CREBA) v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 635 Phil.
283, 300 (2010).
Decision 48 G.R. No. 237428

interest as it obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a

public position.116

The instant petition is a case of

transcendental importance

While traditionally, the principle of transcendental importance applies

as an exception to the rule requiring locus standi before the Courts can
exercise its judicial power of review, the same principle nevertheless, finds
application in this case as it is without doubt that the State maintains an
interest on the issue of the legality of the Chief Justice's appointment.

Further, it is apparent that the instant petition is one of first impression

and of paramount importance to the public in the sense that the qualification,
eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest
official of the Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo
warranto. The Court's action on the present petition has far-reaching
implications, and it is paramount that the Court make definitive
pronouncements on the issues herein presented for the guidance of the
bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Thus, the questions
herein presented merit serious consideration from the Court and should not
be trifled on.

Policy and ethical considerations likewise behoove this Court to rule

on the issues put forth by the parties. This Court has always been a vigilant
advocate in ensuring that its members and employees continuously possess
the highest ideals of integrity, honesty, and uprightness. More than
professional competence, this Court is cognizant of the reality that the
strength of Our institution depends on the confidence reposed on Us by the
public. As can be gleaned from Our recent decisions, this Court has not
hesitated from disciplining its members whether they be judges, Justices or
regular court employees. This case should not therefore be treated merely
with kid gloves because it involves the highest official of the judicial branch
of the government. On the contrary, this is an opportune time for this Court
to exact accountability by examining whether there has been strict
compliance with the legal and procedural requirements in the appointment
of its Members.

Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that as a member of the

Supreme Court, she is an impeachable officer. As such, respondent argues
that a quo warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be
lodged against her, especially when there is an impending impeachment case
against her.

116
Republic of the Philippines v. Pablico Corpin, 104 Phil. 49, 53 (1958).
Decision 49 G.R. No. 237428

This argument is misplaced.

The origin, nature and purpose of

impeachment and quo warranto
are materially different

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of
the public official, the two proceedings materially differ. At its most basic,
impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo
warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

To lend proper context, We briefly recount the origin and nature of

impeachment proceedings and a quo warranto petition:

Impeachment

Historians trace the origin of impeachment as far as the 5 th century in

ancient Greece in a process called eisangelia.117 The grounds for
impeachment include treason, conspiracy against the democracy, betrayal of
strategic posts or expeditionary forces and corruption and deception.118

Its modern form, however, appears to be inspired by the British

parliamentary system of impeachment. Though both public and private
officials can be the subject of the process, the British system of
impeachment is largely similar to the current procedure in that it is
undertaken in both Houses of the Parliament. The House of Commons
determines when an impeachment should be instituted. If the grounds,
normally for treason and other high crimes and misdemeanor, are deemed
sufficient, the House of Commons prosecutes the individual before the
House of Lords.119

While impeachment was availed for “high crimes and misdemeanors”,

it would appear that the phrase was applied to a variety of acts which can
arguably amount to a breach of the public's confidence, such as advising the
King to grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of
the due execution of the laws, procuring offices for persons who were unfit,
and unworthy of them and squandering away the public treasure,
browbeating witnesses and commenting on their credibility, cursing and
drinking to excess, thereby bringing the highest scandal on the public justice
of the kingdom, and failure to conduct himself on the most distinguished
117
<Matthew R. Romney, The Origins and Scope of Presidential Impeachment, HINCKLEY
JOURNAL OF POLITICS> (visited on March 15, 2018).
118
Id.
119
Jack Simson Caird, Impeachment, BRIEFING PAPER, Number CBP7612, 6 June 2016.
Accessed from <http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7612#fullreport>
(visited on March 15, 2018).
Decision 50 G.R. No. 237428

principles of good faith, equity, moderation, and mildness.120

While heavily influenced by the British concept of impeachment, the

United States of America made significant modifications from its British
counterpart. Fundamentally, the framers of the United States visualized the
process as a means to hold accountable its public officials, as can be gleaned
from their basic law:

The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United

States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors.121

Other noted differences from the British process of impeachment

include limiting and specifying the grounds to “treason, Bribery, or other
High Crimes and Misdemeanors”, and punishing the offender with removal
and disqualification to hold public office instead of death, forfeiture of
property and corruption of blood.122

In the Philippines, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is

from the 1935 Constitution.123 Compared to the US Constitution, it would
appear that the drafters of the 1935 Constitution further modified the process
by making impeachment applicable only to the highest officials of the
country; providing “culpable violation of the Constitution” as an additional
ground, and requiring a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives to
impeach and three-fourths vote of the Senate to convict.

As currently worded, our 1987 Constitution, in addition to those stated

in the 1935 basic law, provided another additional ground to impeach high-
ranking public officials: “betrayal of public trust”. Commissioner Rustico
De los Reyes of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained this ground
as a “catch-all phrase to include all acts which are not punishable by statutes
as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in
office. It includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty,
tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or
misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and
which tend to bring the office into disrepute.”124

From the foregoing, it is apparent that although the concept of

impeachment has undergone various modifications to suit different
jurisdictions and government forms, the consensus seems to be that it is
120
<Matthew R. Romney, The Origins and Scope of Presidential Impeachment, HINCKLEY
JOURNAL OF POLITICS> (visited on March 15, 2018).
121
Section 4, Article II of the US Constitution.
122
See Justice Jose Vitug's Separate Opinion, Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives in
G.R. No. 160261, 460 Phil. 830 (2003); Puno, Renato V. The Process of Impeachment and its applicability
in the Philippine Legal System, Ateneo Law Journal (1982). p. 165.
123
See Justice Jose Vitug's Separate Opinion, Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives in
G.R. No. 160261, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
124
Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 272.
Decision 51 G.R. No. 237428

essentially a political process meant to vindicate the violation of the public's

trust. Buckner Melton, in his book The First Impeachment: The
Constitution’s Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount, succintly
opined :

Practically all who have written on the subject agree that impeachment
involves a protection of a public interest, incorporating a public law
element, much like a criminal proceeding....[I]mpeachment is a process
instigated by the government, or some branch thereof, against a person who
has somehow harmed the government or the community. The process,
moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that extent, a judicial
trial.125

Quo warranto

The oft-cited origin of quo warranto was the reign of King Edward I
of England who questioned the local barons and lords who held lands or title
under questionable authority. After his return from his crusade in Palestine,
he discovered that England had fallen because of ineffective central
administration by his predecessor, King Henry III.126 The inevitable result
was that the barons, whose relations with the King were governed on paper
by Magna Carta, assumed to themselves whatever power the King's officers
had neglected. Thus, King Edward I deemed it wise to inquire as to what
right the barons exercised any power that deviated in the slightest from a
normal type of feudalism that the King had in mind. The theory is that
certain rights are regalia and can be exercised only upon showing of actual
grants from the King or his predecessor. Verily, King Edward’s purpose was
to catalogue the rights, properties and possessions of the kingdom in his
efforts to restore the same.

In the Philippines, the remedies against usurpers of public office

appeared in the 1900s, through Act No. 190.127 Section 197 of the Act
provides for a provision comparable to Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court:

Sec. 197. Usurpation of an Office or Franchise- A civil action may be

brought in the name of the Government of the Philippine Islands:

1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds

or exercises a public civil office or a franchise within the
Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the
authority of the Government of the Philippine Islands;
2. Against a public civil officer who does or suffers an act which,
by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his office;
3. Against an association of persons who act as a corporation
125
<As cited in Matthew R. Romney, The Origins and Scope of Presidential Impeachment,
HINCKLEY JOURNAL OF POLITICS> (visited on March 15, 2018).
126
Nathan Isaacs, The Statutes of Edward I. Their Relation to Finance and Administration,
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 8 (Jun., 1921), pp. 804-818.
127
See Agcaoili v. Suguitan, supra note 87.
Decision 52 G.R. No. 237428

within the Philippine Islands, without being legally

incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

Based from the foregoing, it appears that impeachment is a

proceeding exercised by the legislative, as representatives of the sovereign,
to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of the
public officer by determining the public officer’s fitness to stay in the office.
Meanwhile, an action for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of
the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a public official
based on predetermined rules.

Quo warranto and impeachment can

proceed independently and
simultaneously

Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and
impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies
are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining
to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

The term “quo warranto” is Latin for “by what authority.” 128
Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ of inquiry. 129 It
determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office
he or she occupies.130

In review, Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the

usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced
by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or

exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the

provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the

Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act.

Thus, a quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to

128
Legal Opinions of the Attorney General – Quo Warranto – Right to Public Office by Attorney
General Xavier Becerra of the State of California.
129
Gerald Kogan and Robert Craig Waters, The Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court by, The
Record (Journal of the Appellate Practice and Advocacy Section) of the Florida Bar, Vol. VI, No. 1, August
1997.
130
Legal Opinions of the Attorney General – Quo Warranto – Right to Public Office by Attorney
General Xavier Becerra of the State of California.
Decision 53 G.R. No. 237428

determine the right or title to the contested public office or to oust the holder
from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates
elected, while in quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment.

The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only
directly, by quo warranto proceedings. In the past, the Court held that title
to public office cannot be assailed even through mandamus or a motion to
annul or set aside order.131 That quo warranto is the proper legal vehicle to
directly attack title to public office likewise precludes the filing of a petition
for prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the validity of the appointment
of a public officer. Thus, in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,132 the Court held:

“[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as

judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo
warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of
the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office
and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder
takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain
relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to
cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is
an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office.”133

As earlier discussed, an action for quo warranto may be commenced

by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, or by any person claiming to
be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or
exercised by another.134

That usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and

carries with it public interest in our jurisdiction is clear when Section 1, Rule
66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or
a public prosecutor.135

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion,

may suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto
where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to
him, the Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the
appropriate action in court or he may choose not to file the case at all. The
Solicitor General is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in
actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the
131
Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong et al., 595 Phil. 491, 501-502 (2008) citing Pilar
v. Sec. of the DPWTC, et al., 125 Phil. 766 (1967) and Gamboa, et al. v. CA, et al., 194 Phil. 624 (1981).
132
Supra note 66.
133
Id. at 133.
134
Sections 2, 3 and 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
135
Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Decision 54 G.R. No. 237428

government policy on the matter at hand.136

The instance when an individual is allowed to commence an action for

quo warranto in his own name is when such person is claiming to be entitled
to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another.137 Feliciano v. Villasin138 reiterates the basic principle enunciated in
Acosta v. Flor139 that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private
person suing must show no less than a clear right to the contested office.

In case of usurpation of a public office, when the respondent is found

guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a
public office, position or franchise, the judgment shall include the following:

(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office;
(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and
(c) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the
public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires.140

The remedies available in a quo warranto judgment do not include

correction or reversal of acts taken under the ostensible authority of an office
or franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be
imposed retroactively upon prior exercise of official or corporate duties.141

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive

remedies and may even proceed simultaneously. The existence of other
remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a
quo warranto proceeding.142

Respondent's Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam

specifically tackled the objection to the petition on the ground of forum
shopping. Essentially, respondent points out that the inclusion of the matter
on tax fraud, which will further be discussed below, is already covered by
Article I of the Articles of Impeachment. Hence, respondent argues, among
others, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of

several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential
136
Topacio v. Assoc. Justice Gregory Santos Ong et al., supra note 131, citing Gonzales v. Chavez,
282 Phil. 858, 885 (1992).
137
Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
138
578 Phil 889 (2008).
139
5 Phil. 18 (1905).
140
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
141
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoom, Inc. v. Ensher (1965) 238 Cal. App. 2d 250, 255.
142
Citizens Utilities Co. v. Super Ct., 56 Cal. App. 3d 399, 405 (1076); 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 7
(1951).
Decision 55 G.R. No. 237428

facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another.143 Forum shopping originated as a concept in private international
law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or
place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid
overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue.144 At present, our
jurisdiction has recognized several ways to commit forum shopping, to wit:
(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same
prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for
dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either
litis pendentia or res judicata).145

We have already settled that the test for determining existence of

forum shopping is as follows:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum

shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum
shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. 146
(Emphasis ours)

Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit"
and is variously referred to in some decisions as lis pendens and auter action
pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the
situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the
same cause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and
vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity
of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would

143
Grace Park International Corporation v. Eastwest Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 210606,
July 27, 2016, 798 SCRA 644, 651.
144
First Philippine International Bank v. CA, 322 Phil. 280, 303 (1996).
145
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, G.R. No. 208393, June 15, 2016, 793 SCRA 527, 550.
146
Yap v. Chua, et al., 687 Phil. 392, 400 (2012).
Decision 56 G.R. No. 237428

amount to res judicata in the other case.147

On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent

case when the following requisites are satisfied: (1) the former judgment is
final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is —
between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.148

Ultimately, what is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and
the litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or
related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the
process creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.149

Guided by the foregoing, there can be no forum shopping in this case

despite the pendency of the impeachment proceedings before the House of
Representatives, contrary to respondent's position.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally

different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on the usurping,
intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in
impeachment, it is the commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a
different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether or not respondent legally holds
the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the
first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's prosecution
for certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being
prosecuted herein for such impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles
of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be based on
established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to
hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment
necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office and
thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she
committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal from office.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different.

Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the respondent is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office,
xxx, judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, x x x."150 In short, respondent in a quo
warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public
147
Benavidez v. Salvador, 723 Phil. 332, 342 (2013).
148
City of Taguig v. City of Makati, supra at 551.
149
Yap v. Chua, et al., supra at 399-400.
150
Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
Decision 57 G.R. No. 237428

office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in

impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall
result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is
legally holding.151 It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person
from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold
or occupy.

In the said Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam,

respondent advanced the argument that the "impeachment proceeding" is
different from the "impeachment case", the former refers to the filing of the
complaint before the Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the
proceedings before the Senate. Citing Francisco v. House of
Representatives, respondent posits that the "impeachment proceeding"
against her is already pending upon the filing of the verified complaint
before the House Committee on Justice albeit the "impeachment case" has
not yet started as the Articles of Impeachment has not yet been filed with the
Senate. Hence, in view of such proceeding before the Committee on Justice,
the filing of the instant petition constitutes forum shopping.

The difference between the "impeachment proceeding" and the

"impeachment case" correctly cited by the respondent, bolsters the
conclusion that there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment
proceeding" before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment
case" proper. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the
Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against the respondent.

The House Committee on Justice's determination of probable cause on

whether the impeachment against the respondent should go on trial before
the Senate is akin to the prosecutor's determination of probable cause during
the preliminary investigation in a criminal case. In a preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused; he does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. The
process is merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a
person may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is not a trial of the case
on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime
has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof.152 As such, during the preliminary investigation
before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. In fact,
jurisprudence states that the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the
151
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 2:
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high
crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
152
776 Phil. 623 (2016).
Decision 58 G.R. No. 237428

trial.153

Thus, at the time of the filing of this petition, there is no pending

impeachment case that would bar the quo warrranto petition on the ground
of forum shopping.

In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and a final
decision in one will not strictly constitute as res judicata to the other. A
judgment in a quo warranto case determines the respondent’s constitutional
or legal authority to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office
to which he lays claim;154 meanwhile a judgment in an impeachment
proceeding pertain to a respondent’s “fitness for public office.”155

Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto,
this Court cannot shirk from resolving the instant controversy in view of the
fact that respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the
possibility of an impeachment trial against respondent.

Impeachment is not an exclusive

remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed
from office

Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office
only by impeachment on the Court’s ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,156
Cuenco v. Fernan,157 In Re Gonzales,158 Jarque v. Desierto159 and Marcoleta
v. Borra.160 It should be stressed, however, that none of these cases
concerned the validity of an impeachable officer’s appointment. Lecaroz
involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while
the rest were disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally
for acts done during their tenure in public office. Whether the impeachable
officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void was
not an issue raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is
to the effect that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be
criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of
removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to
qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The
proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or
right to the office he or she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as
153
SPO2 Jamaca v. People, 764 Phil 683 (2015).
154
Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil. 238, 246-247 (1999).
155
Separate Opinion of Justice Jose C. Vitug in Francisco v. HRET, supra note 3.
156
213 Phil. 288 (1984).
157
241 Phil. 816 (1988).
158
243 Phil. 167 (1988).
159
En Banc Resolution dated December 5, 1995 in A.C. No. 4509.
160
601 Phil. 470 (2009).
Decision 59 G.R. No. 237428

authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed against an
impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed
to have been aware of its power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule
66 of the Rules of Court.

Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of
the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable
officers. Following respondent’s theory that an impeachable officer can be
removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice-
President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for
the dismissal of the protest on the ground that it can potentially cause his/her
removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To sustain
respondent’s position is to render election protests under the PET Rules
nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since
fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of
the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The
Court could not, therefore, have unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power
by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.

Further, the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto,
contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of
ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by
any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10)
days after the proclamation of the winner.161 Despite disloyalty to the
161
A.M. No. 10-4-29-SC or The 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, pertinently
provide:
ELECTION CONTESTS
RULE 13. Jurisdiction. – The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the Philippines.
RULE 14. How initiated. – An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-President. An election protest
shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.
RULE 15. Election protest. – The registered candidate for President or Vice-President of
the Philippines who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified election protest with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty days after the proclamation of the winner.
RULE 16. Quo warranto. – A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of the President or Vice- President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines may be filed by any registered voter who has voted in the election concerned within
ten days after the proclamation of the winner.
RULE 17. Contents of the protest or petition. – (A) An election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall commonly state the following facts:
(a) the position involved;
(b) the date of proclamation; and
(c) the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation.
(B) A quo warranto petition shall also state:
(a) the facts giving the petitioner standing to file the petition;
(b) the legal requirements for the office and the disqualifications prescribed by law;
(c) the protestee’s ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines.
(C) An election protest shall also state:
(a) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
Decision 60 G.R. No. 237428

Republic being a crime against public order162 defined and penalized under
the penal code, and thus may likewise be treated as “other high crimes,” 163
constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to remove
the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly
available.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance
of a quo warranto petition against an impeachable officer. In the
consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-
Arroyo,164 the Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo
warranto petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the
filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the
President. Petitioner therein prayed for judgment confirming him to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity.
In fact, in the said cases, there was not even a claim that respondent therein
was disqualified from holding office and accordingly challenged
respondent's status as de jure 14th President of the Republic. By entertaining
the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact determined whether then
President Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of
resignation.

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution

does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers. The
provision reads:
had been voted for the same office.
(b) the total number of precincts of the region, province, or city concerned;
(c) the protested precincts and votes of the parties to the protest in such precincts per the
Statement of Votes By Precinct or, if the votes of the parties are not specified, an explanation why the votes
are not specified; and
(d) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral
frauds, anomalies, or irregularities in the protested precincts.
162
Art. 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees. — The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period shall be imposed upon public officers or employees who have failed to resist a
rebellion by all the means in their power, or shall continue to discharge the duties of their offices under the
control of the rebels or shall accept appointment to office under them.
163
Michael J. Gerhardt in "Putting the Law of Impeachment in
Perspective"(1999).FacultyPublications.Paper975.http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/975 made the
following observations:
In the English experience prior to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution,
impeachment was primarily a political proceeding, and impeachable offenses were regarded as "political
crimes." For instance, Raoul Berger observed in his influential study of the impeachment process that the
English practice treated "[h]igh crimes and misdemeanors [as] a category of political crimes against the
state." Berger supported this observation with quotations from relevant periods in which the speakers use
terms equivalent to "political" and "against the state" to identify the distinguishing characteristics of an
impeachable event. In England, the critical element of injury in an impeachable offense had been injury to
the state. The eminent legal historian, Blackstone, traced this peculiarity to the ancient law of treason,
which distinguished "high" treason, which was disloyalty against some superior, from "petit" treason,
which was disloyalty to an equal or an inferior. The late Professor Arthur Bestor explained further
that "[t]his element of injury to the commonwealth-that is, to the state and to its constitution-was
historically the criterion for distinguishing a 'high' crime or misdemeanor from an ordinary one."
(Emphasis ours)
164
406 Phil. 1 (2001).
Decision 61 G.R. No. 237428

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other
public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by
law, but not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under

consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation.165

The provision uses the permissive term “may” which, in statutory

construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a
mandatory effect.166 We have consistently held that the term “may” is
indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of
that opportunity is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to
exercise.167 An option to remove by impeachment admits of an alternative
mode of effecting the removal.

On this score, Burke Shartel in his work Federal Judges:

Appointment, Supervision, and Removal: Some Possibilities under the
Constitution,168 makes an interesting and valid observation on a parallel
provision on impeachment under the U.S. Constitution from which ours was
heavily patterned:

x x x it is not reasonable to spell out of the express provision for

impeachment, an intention or purpose of the framers to create an exclusive
remedy. The common canon for interpreting legislation, - expresio unius
excusio est alterius – has no proper application to an express provision for
one of several common-law remedies. The express provision for removal
by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by
other methods when there are other adequate reasons to account for this
express provision. The main purpose of the framers of the Constitution in
providing for impeachment was to supply a legislative check on the other
departments of our government, and particularly on the chief executive.
Without an express provision, impeachment would have been impliedly
prohibited by the doctrine of separation of powers. If this legislative check
was desired, a reservation in express words was essential. Another reason
for the express provisions on this subject was that the framers of the
Constitution did not wish to make the executive and judicial officers of
our government completely dependent on Congress. They wanted to
confer only a limited power of removal, and the desired limitations on the
power to impeach had to be explicitly stated. These two reasons explain
165
People v. Amigo, 322 Phil. 40 (1996).
166
Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 656 Phil. 246 (2011).
167
Muñoz v. Commission on Elections, 527 Phil. 733 (2006).
168
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 28, No. 7 (May, 1930), pp. 870-909, published by The Michigan
Law Review Association; <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1279763>(visited on April 20, 2018).
Decision 62 G.R. No. 237428

the presence in the Constitution of the express provisions for

impeachment; it is not necessary to resort to any supposed intent to
establish an exclusive method of removal in order to account for them. On
the contrary, logic and sound policy demand that the Congressional power
be construed to be a concurrent, not an exclusive, power of removal.

We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the

Constitution allows the institution of a quo warranto action against an
impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on
grounds distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the
validity of a public officer’s appointment while the latter indicts him for the
so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office he
holds.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made

absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
Shartel, above cited, eloquently incites as follows:

x x x. There is no indication in the debates of the Convention that the

framers of the Constitution intended at this point to make a complete
statement of causes of removal from office. The emphasis was on the
causes for which Congress might remove executive and judicial officers,
not on causes of removal as such. x x x How then can the causes of
removal by impeachment be construed as a recital of the causes for which
judges may be removed? It is especially hard to see why the express
provision for impeachment – a limited legislative method of removing all
civil officers for serious misconduct – should be construed to forbid
removal of judges by judicial action on account of disability or any
reasonable cause not a proper ground for action by the Houses of
Congress.

Neither can the Court accept respondent’s argument that the term
“may” in Section 2, Article XI qualifies only the penalty imposable at the
conclusion of the impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in
lesser penalties like censure or reprimand. Section 3(7), Article XI of the
Constitution specifies the penalty of “removal from office” and
“disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines” in
impeachment cases.169 There is nothing in the said provision that
deliberately vests authority on the impeachment court to impose penalties
lower than those expressly mentioned. Also, respondent has not shown that
such was authority was intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution.
The ultimate penalty of removal is imposed owing to the serious nature of
the impeachable offenses. This Court had occasion to rule:
169
Section 3(7), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states: “ Judgment in cases of impeachment
shall not extend further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and
punishment according to law.”
Decision 63 G.R. No. 237428

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of

relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases like this, we follow
what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose
Abad Santos stated in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is

to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which
force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.170
(Emphasis supplied)

To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable

officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or
election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment
proceeding.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments

even of impeachable officers. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd
situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be
questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification,
when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless
such an officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually
impeached, he can continue discharging the functions of his office even
when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in
permitting unqualified and ineligible public officials to continue occupying
key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they are
successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have
been the intent of the framers of the Constitution.

We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. 171
Thus, the people have the right to have only qualified individuals appointed
to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as
proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to
correct a “public wrong” arising from defective or void appointments.
Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy.172

As respondent herself previously opined in one case: “Reason is the

foundation of all legal interpretation, including that of constitutional
interpretation. And the most powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the

170
Sarmiento v. Mison, G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987, 156 SCRA 549, 552.
171
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 1.
172
Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from Paying
Filing, Docket and Other Fees, A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009.
Decision 64 G.R. No. 237428

essence of things.”173

The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the
usurpation of public office and to ensure that government authority is
entrusted only to qualified individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo
warranto should be an available remedy to question the legality of
appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that they
occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of
wielding vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.

At this juncture, it would be apt to dissuade and allay the fear that a
ruling on the availability of quo warranto would allow the Solicitor General
to “wield a sword over our collective heads, over all our individual heads,
and on that basis, impair the integrity of the Court as a court."174

Such view, while not improbable, betrays a fallacious and cynical

view of the competence and professionalism of the Solicitor General and the
members of this Court. It presupposes that members of this Court are law
offenders. It also proceeds from the premise that the Solicitor General is the
Executive's pawn in its perceived quest for a “more friendly” Court. Verily,
fear, particularly if unfounded, should not override settled presumptions of
good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties. This Court,
absent a compelling proof to the contrary, has no basis to doubt the
independence and autonomy of the Solicitor General. 175 It is worthwhile to
note that while the Solicitor General has a prerogative in the institution of an
action for quo warranto, its exercise of such discretion is nevertheless
subject to the Court’s review. In Topacio v. Ong,176 this Court explained:

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may

suspend or turn down the institution of an action for quo warranto where
there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court
ruled:

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute

discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not to prosecute or to
abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may
even dismiss, abandon, discontinue or compromise suits either with or
without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case,
however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it
without any legal and valid reasons, for the discretion given him is not
unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by
law but with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.

173
Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno in Gutierrez v. The House of
Representatives Committee on Justice, 658 Phil. 322 (2011).
174
TSN, Oral Arguments dated April 10, 2018, p. 200.
175
See Section 1 of Executive Order No. 300, July 26, 1987 entitled, Constituting The Office Of
The Solicitor General As An Independent And Autonomous Office Attached To The Department Of Justice
And For Other Purposes
176
Supra note 131.
Decision 65 G.R. No. 237428

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General

exercises his discretion in the management of the case. He may start the
prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may
opt not to file the case at all. He may do everything within his legal
authority but always conformably with the national interest and the
policy of the government on the matter at hand. (Emphasis ours)

Neither should it be forgotten that the Solicitor General is an officer of

the Court, tasked "to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice
and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner
that a special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from committing
any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert or impede and degrade the
administration of justice."177 Either way, in the event that quo warranto cases
against members of the Judiciary inundate the courts’ dockets, it does not
follow that the courts are powerless to shield its members against suits
which are obviously lacking in merit, or those merely intended to harass the
respondent.

The Supreme Court’s exercise of its

jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers

Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively

provides that the House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power
to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that
the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which is given the power to try
impeachment cases is the Senate.

Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for

quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable
official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried
and decided by the Senate.

Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy
a public position. It is a direct proceeding assailing the title to a public
office.178 The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the
defendant is legally occupying a public position which goes into the
questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified
and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not
qualified and without any authority, the relief that the Court grants is the
ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. 179 In other words, while
177
See Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Hon. Francisco I. Chavez, 282 Phil. 858, 881 (1992).
178
Sec. Defensor Santiago v. Sen. Guingona, Jr., 359 Phil. 276, 302 (1998).
179
In Mendoza v. Allas, 362 Phil. 238, 244-245 (1999), the possible outcome of a Petition for Quo
Warranto can be any of the following:
Decision 66 G.R. No. 237428

impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue

exercising his or her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him
or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.

Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such
remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an official has committed
misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's
performance in the office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try
a person's culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.

In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc.,180 the

Court further explained the court’s authority to issue a writ of quo warranto,
as complementary to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of
powers, as follows:

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly
complements the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in
our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of the
legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations
under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of the
franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited
to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one
to which no such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same
way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately
amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does
not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by
abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be
distressed enough by the franchisees’ violation of the franchises
extended to them. (Emphasis ours)

Applying the ratio in Divinagracia, the Court’s exercise of its

jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress
from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
If the court finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is
entitled to the office. If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as
follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of
usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right,
privilege, or franchise, judgment shall be rendered that such defendant be ousted and
altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or relator, as the case may be, recover
his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective rights in and
to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires."
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right,
privilege or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
180
602 Phil. 625, 669 (2009).
Decision 67 G.R. No. 237428

impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it

preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power of
impeachment.

Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her

SALN also formed part of the allegations against her in the Verified
Complaint for Impeachment. Verily, the filing of the SALN is a
Constituional requirement, and the transgression of which may, in the
wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted as constituting culpable
violation of the Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the Constitutional SALN
requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of
having to be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence – qualifications not expressly required by the fundamental law
for the other impeachable officers.181 And as will be extensively
demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs and to
submit the same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In
other words, when a Member of the Supreme Court transgresses the SALN
requirement prior to his or her appointment as such, he or she commits a
violation of the Constitution and belies his or her qualification to hold the
181
1987 CONSTITUTION
Article VII, SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of
the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
Article VII, SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same
qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same manner as the President. He may be
removed from office in the same manner as the President.
The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment
requires no confirmation.
Article IX-B, SECTION 1. (1) The Civil Service shall be administered by the Civil Service
Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with proven capacity for
public administration, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections
immediately preceding their appointment.
xxxx
Article IX-C, SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be Members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Article IX-D, SECTION 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a
Chairman and two Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, certified public accountants with not less than ten years
of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately
preceding their appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.
Article XI, SECTION 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens
of the Philippines, and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any elective
office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have for ten years or more been a
judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
Decision 68 G.R. No. 237428

office. It is not therefore accurate to place Members of the Supreme Court,

such as respondent, on absolutely equal plane as that of the other
impeachable officers, when more stringent and burdensome requirements for
qualification and holding of office are expressly placed upon them.

In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement
formed part of the impeachment complaint does not justify shifting
responsibility to the Congress, no matter how noble the respondent and the
intervenors portray such act to be. The fact remains that the Republic raised
an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the position of Chief Justice,
an obviously legal question, which can be resolved through review of
jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason, practicality
and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately
if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To
abdicate from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived
availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to
sanction the initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and
arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment
proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset,
may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law. Evidently, this
scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention unnecessary
disbursement of public funds.

Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is a tribunal composed

of politicians who are indubitably versed in pragmatic decision making and
cognizant of political repercussions of acts purported to have been
committed by impeachable officials.182 As representatives of the Filipino
people, they determine whether the purported acts of highest ranking
officials of the country constitute as an offense to the citizenry. Following
this premise, the impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the
validity or constitutionality of the Chief Justice's appointment, nor can their
ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize
Congress to rule on public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of
checks and balances as it would dilute the judicial power of courts, upon
which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto.

Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to
obliviate confusion in the future as to when quo warranto as a remedy to
oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the
Court’s function of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution,
the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at
the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
182
Paolo Celeridad, Evidence of Character: The Burden of Proving the Truth with respect to the
Political Nature of Impeachment Trials by Means of Substantial Evidence, 87 PHIL. L.J. 985 (2013).
Decision 69 G.R. No. 237428

hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the

subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the
commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if
it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or
validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding,
but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an
impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.

Judicial power versus Judicial

restraint and fear of a
constitutional crisis

Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower

courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.183

In the presence of all the requisites184 for the Court's exercise of

judicial review, there can be no doubt that the exercise thereof is not
discretionary upon the Court, nor dependent upon the whims and caprices of
any of its Members nor any of the parties. Even in cases rendered moot and
academic by supervening events, the Court nevertheless exercised its power
of review on the basis of certain recognized exceptions. 185 Neither is its
exercise circumscribed by fear of displeasing a co-equal branch of the
government. Instead, the Constitution makes it crystal clear that the exercise
of judicial power is a duty of the Court.

As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made

183
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 1.
184
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(2) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case. (Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and Management,
689 Phil. 357, 369 (2012).
185
Namely: (1) there is a grave violation of the Constitution; (2) the case involves a situation of
exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and (4) the case is capable
of repetition yet evading review. (David v. Macapagal Arroyo, 522 Phil. 705 (2006).
Decision 70 G.R. No. 237428

dependent upon the action or inaction of another branch of the government.

The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment, is thus misplaced.

For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of
the resolution of the instant petition, no impeachment trial has been
commenced by the Senate. In fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay
lackadaisical, on the part of the Court to assume, at the time the petition was
filed, that the House of Representatives will affirm a favorable resolution
with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will eventually carry on.

For another, and as extensively discussed, the question of whether or

not respondent usurped a public office is undoubtedly justiciable. Recall
Francisco, Jr., v. House of Representatives:186

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option

before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because this Court is
not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no
other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred. Otherwise, this
Court would be shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of
the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court
is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august
words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a power; it
is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty.

Thus, to exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s

appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. We have held that:

While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive

power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee should possess none
of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where
the law prescribes certain qualifications for a given office or position,
courts may determine whether the appointee has the requisite
qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be declared
void.187 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that

respondent will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of
the Court's duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it.
Indeed, the easiest way to lose power is to abdicate it.

Neither does the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis

a reason for the Court to abandon its positive constitutional duty to take
cognizance of a case over which it enjoys jurisdiction and is not otherwise
legally disqualified. A constitutional crisis may arise from a conflict over the
186
Supra note 3, at 919.
187
J/Sr. Supt. Engaño v. Court of Appeals, 526 Phil. 291, 299 (2006).
Decision 71 G.R. No. 237428

determination by the independent branches of government of the nature,

scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers. Thus, there can be
no constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself provides the means and
bases for the resolution of the “conflict.” To reiterate, the Court's exercise of
jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit of its
judicial power to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. In so doing, the Court
is not arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine whether an
impeachable officer may be removed by impeachment or not, which is a
political, rather than a judicial, exercise.188

In fine, it is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. It cannot be

waived by stipulation, by abdication or by estoppel. Quo warranto
proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of
the Supreme Court's constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle
actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or
transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the
government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court
through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's jurisdiction and
the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution – it
cannot rule on the constitutionality of an appointment of a Member of the
Supreme Court with jurisprudential binding effect because rulings of the
impeachment court, being a political rather than a judicial body, do not form
part of the laws of the land. Any attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power
in the determination of whether the respondent's appointment is
constitutional or not will, in point of fact, amount to culpable violation of
the Constitution.

In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed
188
In Emilio Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., 725 Phil. 380 (2014),
the Court held that:
“On the practical side, our nation has witnessed the complications and problems an impeachment
proceeding entails, thus justifying its limited application only to the officials occupying the highest
echelons of responsibility in our government. To name a few, some of the negative practical effects of
impeachment are: it stalls legislative work; it is an expensive process in terms of the cost of prosecution
alone; and, more importantly, it is inherently divisive of the nation.”
In so saying, the Court referred to the words of Alexandor Hamilton, thus:
Thus, impeachment is characterized as essentially raising political questions or questions of
policies created by large historical forces. Alexander Hamilton observed:
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than
difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason,
will seldom fail to agitate the passions of thewhole community, and to divide it into parties more or
less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the
other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated
more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
(The Federalist No. 65 [www.constitution.org/fed/federa65)
Decision 72 G.R. No. 237428

constitutional duty and abdicate its judicial power. To do so would similarly

amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts
its judicial independence and equanimity to decide cases without fear or
favor; without regard as to a party's power or weakness; without regard to
personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our sacrosanct oaths as magistrates
of this Court, which We voluntarily imposed upon ourselves without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion, to support and defend the
Constitution and to obey the laws of the land, are strongly and faithfully
realized.

Seeking affirmative relief from the

Court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance

In repudiating the Court's jurisdiction over her person and over the
subject matter, respondent harps on the fact that as Chief Justice, she is an
impeachable officer who may be removed only by impeachment by the
Senate constituted as an impeachment court. As extensively discussed, the
Court maintains jurisdiction over the present quo warranto proceedings
despite respondent's occupation of an impeachable office, as it is the legality
or illegality of such occupation that is the subject matter of the instant
petition. Further, respondent cannot now be heard to deny the Court's
jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable official
because respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the
Court by praying for the inhibition of several Members of this Court and by
moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

While mindful of Our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court

of Appeals,189 which pronounced that a party may file a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time
raise affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief without waiving its
objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person, as well as Section
20,190 Rule 15, this Court, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative
relief in a court is tantamount to voluntary appearance therein.191

Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi,192

cited in NM Rotchschild & Sons (Australia) Limited v. Lepanto
Consolidated Mining Company,193 wherein defendants filed a Motion for
189
306 Phil. 84 (1994).
190
SEC. 20. Voluntary appearance. The defendant's voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
(Emphasis ours.)
191
See Palma v. Hon. Galvez, et al., 629 Phil. 86 (2010); Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh
Division) v. Judge Quilala, 759 Phil. 700 (2008); Herrera-Felix v. Court of Appeals, 479 Phil. 727, 735
(2004).
192
606 Phil. 351 (2011).
193
677 Phil. 351 (2011).
Decision 73 G.R. No. 237428

Inhibition without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court,

We held:

Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance

dissipate when the respondents' motion for inhibition is considered. This
motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from
further hearing the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other
than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested their voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active
participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation
of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of
the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's
jurisdiction. (Emphasis in the original)

Accordingly, We rule that respondent, by seeking affirmative relief, is

deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court.
Following settled principles, respondent cannot invoke the Court's
jurisdiction on one hand to secure affirmative relief, and then repudiate that
same jurisdiction after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief.

II.
The Petition is Not Dismissible
on the Ground of Prescription

Prescription does not lie against the State

The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:

Limitations. – Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to

authorize an action against a public officer or employee for his ouster
from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after
the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such
office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in
accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment
establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample jurisprudence the
application of the one-year prescriptive period for filing an action for quo
warranto.

In Bumanlag v. Fernandez and Sec. of Justice,194 the Court held that

the one-year period fixed in then Section 16, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is
a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action for quo
warranto and that the inaction of an officer for one year could be validly
considered a waiver of his right to file the same.

194
110 Phil. 107, 111 (1960).
Decision 74 G.R. No. 237428

In Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic,195 We held that a person

claiming to a position in the civil service must institute the proper
proceedings to assert his right within the one-year period, otherwise, not
only will he be considered to have waived his right to bring action therefor
but worse, he will be considered to have acquiesced or consented to the very
matter that he is questioning.

The Court explained in Madrid that the reason for setting a

prescriptive period is the urgency of the matter to be resolved. The
government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims
to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service, as against another
actually holding it, so that the government may not be faced with the
predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually
holding the office although illegally, and another for one not actually
rendering service although entitled to do so.196

In Torres v. Quintos,197 the Court further explained that public interest

requires that the rights of public office should be determined as speedily as
practicable. We have also explained in Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala198
that there are weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand
the adoption of such limitation as there must be stability in the service so
that public business may not be unduly retarded.199

Distinctively, the petitioners in these cited cases were private

individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the instant case where no
private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is
the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo
warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest
position in the Judiciary.

Thus, the question is whether the one-year limitation is equally

applicable when the petitioner is not a mere private individual pursuing a
private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong
and suing for public interest? The answer is no.

Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which makes

it compulsory for the Solicitor General to commence a quo warranto action:

SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence

action. – The Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the
President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has
good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can
195
109 Phil. 578 (1960).
196
Id.
197
88 Phil. 436 (1951).
198
168 Phil. 328 (1977).
199
Id. at 334, citing Unabia v. City Mayor, et al., 99 Phil. 253, 257 (1956)
Decision 75 G.R. No. 237428

be established by proof must commence such action. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, when the Solicitor General himself commences the

quo warranto action either (1) upon the President's directive, (2) upon
complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that
there is proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office, position or franchise; (b) a public officer does or
suffers an act which is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) an
association acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated or
without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge of his task and
mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government
are upheld. In these three instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under
the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.

That the present Rule 66 on quo warranto takes root from Act No.
160, which is a legislative act, does not give the one-year rule on
prescription absolute application. Agcaoili v. Suguitan,200 squarely addressed
this non-absolute character of the one-year prescriptive period as follows:

x x x in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said that

originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action for
quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by
the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an
action by the Government. The ancient writ of quo warranto was a high
prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one
who usurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to
inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in order to
determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized
countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and
no limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general
principle it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or
penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to
enforce a public right.

xxxx

In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to the

appellant, the period of prescription had not begun to run at the time of the
commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the
commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been
made. He had a right to await the answer to his protest, in the confident
belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action would be
unnecessary.201 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Continuing, Agcaoili cites People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullman’s Palace

200
Agcaoili v. Saguitan, supra note 87.
201
Id. at 692, 697.
Decision 76 G.R. No. 237428

Car Co.,202 to emphasize that the State is not bound by statute of limitations
nor by the laches, acquiescence or unreasonable delay on the part of its
officers:

It is conceded, the state, acting in its character as a sovereign, is not bound

by any statute of limitations or technical estoppel. It is urged, however, that
in quo warranto, under the common-law rule, the courts, in the exercise of
their discretion to grant the writ or not, or upon final hearing, refused aid
when the conditions complained of had existed for a number of years with
knowledge on the part of the sovereign, and that the provisions of § 1 of
chapter 112 of the Revised Statutes, entitled Quo Warranto, that leave to
file the information shall be given if the court or judge to whom the
petition is presented shall be satisfied there is probable cause for the
proceeding, leave the court still possessed of power to consider upon the
hearing, and then apply the same doctrine of waiver and acquiescence. It is
the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the
performance of duty on the part of the officers of the state, is not
imputable to the state when acting in its character as a sovereign.
There are exceptions to this general rule, but we are unable to see that the
allegations of the plea bring the case within the principles of any such
exceptions.

Jurisprudence across the United States likewise richly reflect that

when the Solicitor General files a quo warranto petition in behalf of the
people and where the interests of the public is involved, the lapse of time
presents no effective bar:

An information in the nature of a quo warranto cannot be filed by a private

individual without leave, which the court may, at its discretion, either grant
or refuse. To regulate their discretion as affected by the lapse of time, the
English courts adopted the rule which we have stated. But the Attorney
General, representing the Crown in England and the State in this country,
may file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, without
leave, according to his own discretion; and we find no English law
which holds that an information, so filed, can be barred by the lapse of six
years independently of any statute to that effect. xxx

The Attorney General being a public officer, may be presumed to be

capable of a salutary and reasonable discretion, as well as the court, and
when, acting in behalf of the State, he deems it his duty to prosecute for a
forfeiture, it is not for the court, in the absence of any statutory limitation,
to say he is too late. Indeed this court has itself decided that, after the
information has once been filed, its discretion ceases, and it has then
nothing to do but administer the law the same as in any other case. 203
(Citations omitted)

202
175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A. 366.
203
State of Rhode Island v. Pawtuxet Turnpike Company (Supreme Court of Rhode Island), Jan 1,
18678 R.I. 521 (R.I. 1867).
Decision 77 G.R. No. 237428

In People v. Bailey:204

Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of
limitations, xxxx We are of the opinion that the established rule of law, as
to the statute of limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is
correctly stated in the quotations above made and "that the attorney
general may file the information on behalf of the people at any time,
and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding." The law,
in thus permitting the attorney-general, either upon his own information or
upon the information of a private party, to file an information at any time
against one who has unlawfully intruded into and is holding a public
office, does not place the courts or private parties in much danger of
having to deal with stale claims. The action can only be brought with the
consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is
to be assumed, he will not permit the institution of such a suit, if by
reason of a great lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for any
other reason the state has ceased to have a present interest in it.
(Citations omitted)

People v. Bailey quotes McPhail v. People ex rel. Lambert,205 as

follows:

We do not consider this quo warranto proceeding, prosecuted by the state's

attorney, for the purpose of ousting one charged with wrongfully and
without authority of law exercising the office, jurisdiction and powers of a
police magistrate, as simply a civil remedy, for the protection of private
rights only. Police magistrates are public officers, that are provided for in
the constitution of the state; and by that instrument the judicial powers of
the state are, in part, vested in them. The office of police magistrate is one
in which the state and the general public have a deep interest, and the
jurisdiction attached to it is uniform with that belonging to the office of
justice of the peace. It is a matter of public concern to the people of the
state, and against their peace and dignity, that any one should unlawfully,
and without authority of right, exercise the jurisdiction, powers and
functions of such office, and also a matter of interest to the state and to the
general public that more persons than the law authorizes are acting as
police magistrates. In this country the rule is that the attorney general or
state's attorney may file the information in behalf of the people, where
the interests of the general public are involved, at any time, and that,
in conformity with the maxim, 'Nullum tempus occurrit regi,' lapse of
time constitutes no bar to the proceeding. (Citations omitted)

Aptly, in State ex rel Stovall v. Meneley,206 it was held that a quo

warranto action is a governmental function and not a propriety function, and
therefore the doctrine of laches does not apply:

Governmental functions are those performed for the general public with
respect to the common welfare for which no compensation or particular
benefit is received. xxx Quo warranto proceedings seeking ouster of a

204
(District Court of Appeal of California), 30 Cal.App. 581, 584, 585.
205
160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 806.
206
(Supreme Court of Kansas) 271 Kan. 355, 372, 22 P.3d 124 (2001).
Decision 78 G.R. No. 237428

public official are a governmental function. (Citations and annotations

omitted) No statute of limitations is, therefore, applicable. The district
court did not err in denying Meneley's motion to dismiss based on the
statute of limitations. xxxx

The doctrine of laches, furthermore, does not apply when a cause of action
is brought by the State seeking to protect the public. (Citations and
annotations omitted) xxx Having already noted that the quo warranto
action is a governmental function and not a propriety function, we hold the
district court did not err in denying Meneley's motion to dismiss on the
basis of laches.

In fact, liberal interpretation to quo warranto provisions is sanctioned

given that its primary purpose is to ascertain whether one is constitutionally
authorized to hold office. State ex rel Anaya v. McBride207 elucidates:

Since the Constitution provides for separate and equal branches of

government in New Mexico, any legislative measure which affects
pleading, practice or procedure in relation to a power expressly vested by
the Constitution in the judiciary, such as quo warranto, cannot be deemed
binding. We cannot render inoperative a clause in the Constitution on so
slender a reed. One of the primary purposes of quo warranto is to
ascertain whether one is constitutionally authorized to hold the office
he claims, whether by election or appointment, and we must liberally
interpret the quo warranto statutes to effectuate that purpose.

Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is

proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be no defense on the ground
of laches or prescription.208 Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription
does not lie against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108
(4)209 of the Civil Code, applies in this case.

Circumstances obtaining in this

case preclude the application of the
prescriptive period

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from
the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. People v. City Whittier,210
explains that the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing
exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. Indeed, on point is People v.
Bailey,211 when it ruled that because quo warranto serves to end a
continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action.
Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person

207
539 P.2d 1006 (1975).
208
Republic of the Phils v. Court of Appeals, 253 Phil. 689, 713 (1989).
209
Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
xxxx
(4) Juridical persons, except the State and its subdivisions.
210
People v. City of Whittier (1933) 133 Cal.App. 316, 324; 25 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 223 (1955).
211
People v. Bailey (1916) 30 Cal.App. 581, 584, 585.
Decision 79 G.R. No. 237428

to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary.

In fact, in Cristobal, the Court considered certain exceptional

circumstances which took the case out of the statute of limitations, to wit:
(1) there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner,
amounting to the abandonment of his right to the position; (2) it was an act
of the government through its responsible officials which contributed to the
delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition was grounded upon the
assertion that petitioner's removal from the questioned position was contrary
to law.

In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning

respondent's qualification for office only upon discovery of the cause of
ouster.

As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright

as to whether or not she filed her SALNs covering the period of her
employment in U.P. Recall that during her application for the Chief Justice
position, the JBC required the submission of her previous SALNs. In
response to the JBC, respondent never categorically stated that she filed the
required SALNs. Instead, she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating
that she should not be required to submit the said documents as she was
considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not feasible to
retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are
more than fifteen years old; and that U.P. already cleared her of “all
academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of June 1, 2006”212 in a
Clearance213 dated September 19, 2011.

Even up to the present, respondent has not been candid on whether

she filed the required SALNs or not. While respondent stated in her
Comment that she filed the required SALNs when she was still connected
with the U.P. College of Law,214 she again offered as support the U.P.
Clearance above-cited; that she was considered as coming from private
practice when she was nominated as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court,
hence, should not be required to submit those SALNs; and that it was not
feasible for her to retrieve said SALNs from U.P. as her records therein are
more than 15 years old. Notably, these are mere reiterations of her
representations before the JBC.

Hence, until recently when respondent's qualification for office was

questioned during the hearings conducted by the House Committee on
Justice on the impeachment complaint against the respondent, there was no
indication that would have prompted the Republic to assail respondent's
212
Rollo, pp. 2147-2148.
213
Id. at 2144.
214
Id. at 228.
Decision 80 G.R. No. 237428

appointment, much less question the wisdom or reason behind the said
recommending and appointing authorities' actions. The defect on
respondent's appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the
contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this

case, on the part of the Republic as would amount to an abandonment of its
right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest.
Neither can delay be attributed to the Republic in commencing the action
since respondent deliberately concealed the fact of her disqualification to the
position. Prescription, therefore, cannot be pleaded against the Republic.

Neither can respondent successfully invoke Act No. 3326215 as

mentioned in her Table of Authorities.216 Respondent refers to Section 1217
thereof which provides for the prescriptive periods for violations penalized
by special acts and municipal ordinances. Plainly, Act No. 3326 is
inapplicable to the instant petition as respondent is not being sought to be
penalized for violation of the laws relating to the non-filing or incomplete,
irregular or untruthful filing of SALNs. At any rate, even the theorized
applicability of Act No. 3326 will not work to respondent's advantage given
that Section 2218 thereof provides that the prescriptive period shall be
reckoned either from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
or if such be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of the judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

Finally, it bears to stress that this Court finds it more important to rule
on the merits of the novel issues imbued with public interest presented
before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality. The Court
cannot compromise on the importance of settling the controversy
surrounding the highest position in the Judiciary only to yield to the
unacceptable plea of technicality. It is but more prudent to afford the
Republic, as well as the respondent, ample opportunities to present their
cases for a proper and just disposition of the case instead of dismissing the
petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate
215
AN ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS PENALIZED
BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND TO PROVIDE WHEN PRESCRIPTION
SHALL BEGIN TO RUN. Approved on December 4, 1926.
216
Rollo, p. 1198.
217
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a year for offenses punished only by a fine or by
imprisonment for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years for those punished by
imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for those punished by
imprisonment for two years or more, but less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other offense
punished by imprisonment for six years or more, except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
218
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment.
x x x x.
Decision 81 G.R. No. 237428

consideration in providing for a one-year prescriptive period was public

interest, so is it the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act
nonchalantly and idly watch title to the public office in question be
continuously subjected to uncertainty. Indeed, dismissal of cases on
technicality is frowned upon especially where public interest is at the other
end of the spectrum.

III.
Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and
Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice

To arrive at a judicious appreciation of the parties' respective

contentions as to respondent's qualification for the position of Chief Justice,
the Court first reviews the supervisory authority exercised by it over the
JBC, and visits the JBC's rules and procedure relating to the acceptance and
nomination of respondent as Chief Justice.

A.
The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority
Over the JBC

The Court's supervisory authority

over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own
rules

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision

of the Supreme Court, composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress
as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of
the private sector. (Emphasis ours)

Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,219 elucidates on the power of

supervision in general:

On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing

or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers
perform their duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill
their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by
law to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of
supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are
faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed,

219
669 Phil. 32 (2011).
Decision 82 G.R. No. 237428

but he does not lay down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify
or replace them.220

Reflective of the above and similar pronouncements, 221 the seminal

case of Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, et al.,222 explains
that the power of supervision being a power of oversight does not authorize
the holder of the supervisory power to lay down the rules nor to modify or
replace the rules of its subordinate. If the rules are, however, not or
improperly observed, then the supervising authority may order the work be
done or redone, but only for the purpose of conforming to such rules.

Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the
JBC, it is consistently held that the Court's supervisory power consists of
seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As
when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its
supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter
and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules.223

The JBC occupies a unique position in the body of government. While

the JBC is created by the Constitution, the Constitution itself prescribes that
it exists as an office subordinate to the Supreme Court. Thus, under the
Constitution, the JBC is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
and it is the Supreme Court that determines the emoluments of the regular
JBC members and provides for the appropriations of the JBC in its annual
budget.224

The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary and such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.225 On this, Justice Arturo
Brion, in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial
and Bar Council, et al.,226 offers a succinct point:

Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of
its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to use to
determine who to recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how
and when to do its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision,

220
Id. at 50.
221
Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146 (1994).
222
741 Phil. 460 (2014).
223
Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, 757 Phil. 534 (2015).
224
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 8:
xxxx
4.The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.
225
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article VIII, Section 8:
xxxx
5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
226
632 Phil. 657 (2010).
Decision 83 G.R. No. 237428

direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to

make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed because of JBC’s fault or inaction, or because of
extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that,
constitutionally, the Court can also assign the JBC other functions
and duties – a power that suggests authority beyond what is purely
supervisory. 227 (Emphasis ours)

JBC's absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or

improper actions beyond the latter's reach is therefore not what the
Constitution contemplates.

What is more, the JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although

calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited.

In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,228 this Court explained that

while a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring
magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements:

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary

and incidental to the JBC's principal function of choosing and
recommending nominees for vacancies in the Judiciary for appointment by
the President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms
the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for
every vacancy in the Judiciary, subject only to the minimum
qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position.
The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of
flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants.
Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to

fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an effective and efficient
administration of justice.229 (Emphasis ours)

So too, the JBC's exercise of discretion is not automatically equivalent

to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process
beyond the scope of the Court's supervisory and corrective powers. The
primary limitation to the JBC's exercise of discretion is that the nominee
must possess the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and
the laws relative to the position. While the resolution of who to nominate as
between two candidates of equal qualification cannot be dictated by this
Court upon the JBC, such surrender of choice presupposes that whosoever is
nominated is not otherwise disqualified. The question of whether or not a
227
Id. at 700.
228
Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, supra.
229
Id. at 549.
Decision 84 G.R. No. 237428

nominee possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts

and therefore does not depend on, nor call for, the exercise of discretion on
the part of the nominating body.

Thus, along this line, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions in the same
category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving.
Questions of policy or wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government."230

Baker v. Carr231 gives the classic definition of a political question:

x x x [p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a

political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on the one question.

Obviously, the exercise of the JBC's discretion in the nomination

process is not full as it is limited by the requirements prescribed by the
Constitution and the laws for every position. It does not involve a question
of policy but simply a determination, based on facts, of whether a candidate
possesses the requisite qualifications or not. The JBC neither assumes an
existence separate from the Judiciary as it is not intended to be an
independent Constitutional body but merely a Constitutional office created
and expressly subjected to the Court's supervision. Judicial encroachment
upon the exercise of wisdom of a co-equal branch of the government, which
is the very basis of the political question doctrine, is therefore not attendant
when the Court supervises and reviews the action of the JBC which is
neither an executive nor a legislative branch enjoying independent political
prerogatives.

In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of

supervision over the JBC, to insure that the JBC faithfully executes its duties
as the Constitution requires of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court is
thus empowered to inquire into the processes leading to respondent's
nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the face of the Republic's
contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to
230
Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
231
369 U.S. 186.
Decision 85 G.R. No. 237428

begin with.

Qualifications under the Constitution

cannot be waived or bargained
away by the JBC

As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the

Constitution itself when it prescribed the qualifications absolutely required
of a person to be eligible for appointment as a Member of the Court.

The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are

enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution:

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme

Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower

courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen
of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence,

integrity, probity, and independence. (Emphasis ours)

Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications,

Our fundamental law is clear that a member of the Judiciary must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. The
inclusion of subsection 3 is explained in this wise:

xxxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

My amendment is to add a new subsection (3) on Section 4 which reads: A
MEMBER OF THE Judiciary MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN
COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE.

Before the Committee decides on whether or not to accept the amendment,

I would like to explain it first.

Mr. Presiding Officer, this is a moral provision lifted with modifications

from the “Canons of Judicial Ethics.” The reputation of our justices and
judges has been unsavory. I hate to say this, but it seems that it has become
the general rule that the members of the Judiciary are corrupt and the few
honest ones are the exceptions. We hear of justices and judges who would
issue injunctive relief to the highest bidder and would decide cases based
on hundreds of thousands, and even millions, mercenary reasons.

The members of the deposed Supreme Court, with a few exceptions,

Decision 86 G.R. No. 237428

catered to the political likings and personal convenience of Mr. Marcos by

despicably surrendering their judicial independence. Why should we resist
incorporating worthy moral principles in our fundamental law? Why
should we canalize our conservative thoughts within the narrow confines
of pure legalism?

I plead to the members of the Committee and to my colleagues in this

Constitutional Commission to support my amendment in order to
strengthen the moral fiber of our Judiciary. Let not our Constitution be
merely a legal or political document. Let it be a moral document as well.

x x x x232

Requirement of these traits stems from the need to ensure the strength
and sustainability of the third branch of the government. Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., Inc.,233 sufficiently explains the state interest involved in
safeguarding judicial integrity:

Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving

disputes. The power and the prerogative of a court to perform this function
rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen’s
respect for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court’s absolute
probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state interest of the highest
order.

An approximation of what defines the term “integrity” was made by

the Court in Jardeleza, as follows:

In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as

stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as
"competence, integrity, probity and independence are not easily
determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the years."
Additionally, "it is not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to
determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge,
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given this realistic situation, there
is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts
and principles." A set of uniform criteria had to be established in the
ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him"
and his office. Likewise for the sake of transparency of its proceedings,
the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of
competence," "probity and independence," "soundness of physical and
mental condition, and "integrity."

As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of

qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if
not, approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for
honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to
sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s
232
RECORDS, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, Vol. I., pp. 484-485 (July 14, 1986).
233
129 S. Ct. 2252, 2266-67 (2009)
Decision 87 G.R. No. 237428

reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable

government officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances
from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among
others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check
and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and
character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and
checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such
that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character."234 (Emphasis ours)

The case of Jardeleza, however, is not the first time this Court
interpreted the requirement of integrity. In Samson v. Judge Caballero,235 this
Court dismissed a judge for “obvious lack of integrity” in making a false
statement in his Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Meanwhile, in Re: Judge
Jaime V. Quitain,236 this Court declared Judge Quitain to be dishonest and
lacking in integrity when he failed to disclose in his PDS that he was
imposed a penalty of dismissal from service in an administrative case filed
against him.

Emphatically, integrity is not only a prerequisite for an aspiring

Member of the Court but is likewise a continuing requirement common to
judges and lawyers alike. Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct 237
provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office
but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s
faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.

SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures

against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware.

The Code of Professional Responsibility, equally applicable to

respondent being first and foremost a lawyer, mince no words in requiring
that a lawyer shall perform his profession in a manner compatible with the
integrity of the profession, thus:

234
Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno, et al., supra note 222, at 492-494.
235
612 Phil. 737 (2009).
236
JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007
237
A.M. No. 03-05-01-SC Adopting the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
(April 27, 2004).
Decision 88 G.R. No. 237428

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES

AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER
COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.

Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of
the defenseless or the oppressed.

Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he
shall not refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to
the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.

Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false

statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application
for admission to the bar.

Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the
bar of any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character,
education, or other relevant attribute.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity
with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. In
Edaño v. Judge Asdala,238 this Court stated that:

The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates
that judges must not only maintain their independence, integrity and
impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or
partiality, which may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary. Integrity
and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are deemed
essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the
personal demeanor of judges. This standard applies not only to the
decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is
their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view
of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that
independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by
238
555 Phil. 195 (2007).
Decision 89 G.R. No. 237428

judges and reflected in their decisions, but that these must also appear
to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any
erosion of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect
in their actions in order to avoid doubt and suspicion in the dispensation of
justice.239 (Emphasis ours)

To make sure that applicants to judicial positions possess these

constitutionally-prescribed character requirement, the JBC was created.
Jardeleza captures the purpose of the JBC which it finds to be rooted in the
categorical constitutional declaration that "[a] member of the Judiciary must
be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To
ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary,
the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among
others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all
qualified and suitably best for appointment. Jardeleza continues that, in this
manner, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more
importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.

Thus, in compliance with their mandate, the JBC provided for Rule 4
on Integrity in JBC-009 Rules,240 as follows:

RULE 4
INTEGRITY

Section 1. Evidence of Integrity – The council shall take every

possible step to verify the applicants records and of reputation for honesty,
integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound
moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to
the council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable
government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances
from the court National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such
other agencies as the council may require.

Section 2. Background Check – The Council may order a discrete

[sic] background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall
check or verify to validate the means thereof.

Section 3. Testimonies of Parties – The Council may receive

written opposition to an applicant on ground of his moral fitness and its
discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a
hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who
shall be allowed to be [sic] cross-examine the opposite and to offer
countervailing evidence.

Section 4. Anonymous Complaints – Anonymous complaints

239
Id. at 201.
240
September 23, 2002.
Decision 90 G.R. No. 237428

against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on
its face probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations
may be true. In the latter case the Council may either direct a discrete [sic]
investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or
during the interview.

Section 5. Disqualification – The following are disqualified from

being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as Ombudsman or
Deputy Ombudsman:

1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;

2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals;

and

3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in

administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine or more
than P10,000, unless has been granted judicial clemency.

Section 6. Other instances of disqualification – Incumbent judges,

officials or personnel of the Judiciary who are facing administrative
complaints under informal preliminary investigation (IPI) by the Office of
the Court of Administrator may likewise be disqualified from being
nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges are serious
or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant for nomination.

For purpose of this Section and of the preceding Section 5 in so far

as pending regular administrative cases are concerned, the Secretary of the
Council shall, from time to time, furnish the Office of the Court of
Administrator the name of an applicant upon receipt of the
application/recommendation and completion of the required papers; and
within ten days from the receipt thereof the Court Administrator shall
report in writing to the Council whether or not the applicant is facing a
regular administrative case or an IPI case and the status thereof. In regard
to the IPI case, the Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of
the complaint and the comment of the respondent.

B.
Compliance with the Constitutional and
statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person's integrity.

Respondent postulates that the filing of SALNs bear no relation to the

Constitutional qualification of integrity. In so arguing, respondent loses sight
of the fact that the SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the
Constitution and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws and its
implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one who fails to file his
or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws; and one who violates
the Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be a person of
integrity as such equation is theoretically and practically antithetical.
Decision 91 G.R. No. 237428

We elaborate:

The filing of SALN is a

Constitutional and statutory
requirement

The filing a SALN is an essential requirement to one’s assumption of

a public post. It has Constitutional, legal and jurisprudential bases.

Of paramount significance, Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution

on the Accountability of Public Officers states:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption

of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the
case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag
rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner
provided by law. (Emphasis ours)

However, even prior to the 1987 Constitution, and as early as 1960,

our laws through R.A. No. 3019, required from every public officer a
detailed and sworn statement of their assets and liabilities, thus:

SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. — Every public

officer, within thirty days after assuming office, thereafter, on or before the
fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as
upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the
corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of department or
Chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true,
detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office
less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their
first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close
of the said calendar year.

SECTION 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained

wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found
to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the
name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out
of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be
a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse
and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration,
when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily
shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures
incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
Decision 92 G.R. No. 237428

including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any

ostentatious display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-
official character by any public official when such activities entail
expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise
be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances
hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative
suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until
the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.

Respondent herself, in her Dissenting Opinion in Phil. Savings Bank

v. Senate Impeachment Court241 interprets that “failure to comply” with the
law is “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the
dismissal from service of the public officer.”

In 1961, R.A. No. 3019 was amended by R.A. No. 3047 242 by
specifying the period within which a public official should make the
disclosure and enumerating certain public officials who are exempt from the
requirement.

Even during the martial law years, under then President Marcos, the
obligation imposed upon public officers and employees to declare their
assets and liabilities was maintained under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
379243 but with the curious addition that the filing and submission of SALN
are now to be required from all citizens, subject to few exceptions. P.D. No.
379 was later on amended by P.D. No. 417 244 which amended the contents of
the statement and the manner of providing the acquisition cost of the
properties. Yet still, P.D. No. 379 was further amended by P.D. No. 555,245
which prescribed stiffer penalties for violation thereof.

Two years after the birth of the 1987 Constitution, R.A. No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees246 was enacted and thereby expanded the obligation to disclose
by enumerating the information required to be disclosed as regards the
assets, liabilities, business interests and financial connections; requiring the
identification and disclosure of relatives in government; making the
statements and disclosures available and accessible to the public; and
241
Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P. A. Sereno in G.R. No. 200238, November
20, 2012.
242
AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION SEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY
HUNDRED AND NINETEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “THE ANTIGRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT” SO AS TO EXEMPT CLASSROOM TEACHERS, LABORERS, CASUAL AND
TEMPORARY EMPLOYEES, AND BARRIO OFFICIAL FROM THE REQUIREMENTS THEREOF.
Approved June 17, 1961.
243
REQUIRING THE SUBMISSION OF STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET
WORTH, January 21, 1974.
244
AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 379 BY
ENLARGING THE COVERAGE OF THE SAME, March 19, 1974.
245
AMENDING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 379 ENTITLED "REQUIRING THE
SUBMISSION OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH", September 16, 1974.
246
February 20, 1989.
Decision 93 G.R. No. 237428

prohibiting certain acts.

In particular, Sections 8 and 11 of R.A. No. 6713 provide:

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees

have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of,
and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure.

- All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall
file under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections
and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen
(18) years of age living in their households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs,
assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in
banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
(d) liabilities, and;
(e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and
(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to

file the aforestated documents shall also execute, within thirty (30)
days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary
authority in favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all
appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net
worth, and also their business interests and financial connections
in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first
assumed any office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may
file the required statements jointly or separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the

Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections shall
be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the

national office of the Ombudsman;
Decision 94 G.R. No. 237428

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the

Senate and the House of Representatives, respectively;
Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court;
Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national
executive officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the
Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, with the Office of the President, and those
below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their
respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil Service
Commission.

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty

of every public official or employee to identify and disclose, to the
best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the
Government in the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the
Civil Service Commission.

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed

under this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable
hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or
reproduction after ten (10) working days from the time they
are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be
required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the cost of
reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the
cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to
the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the
statement. After such period, the statement may be
destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain

or use any statement filed under this Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and
communications media for dissemination to the general
public.

xxxx

Section 11. Penalties. — (a) Any public official or employee,

regardless of whether or not he holds office or employment in a casual,
temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any
violation of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one (1)
year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice
and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is
punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted
under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be
Decision 95 G.R. No. 237428

punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not
exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of
the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative

proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public
official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against
him.

xxxx

The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency

and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result
not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended provides:

Section 9. Penalties for violations. — x x x x

(b) Any public officer violating any of the provisions of Section 7

of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one thousand pesos
nor more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one
year and six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the
discretion of the Court.

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative

proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public
officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

Both Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 and Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019
require the accomplishment and submission of a true, detailed and sworn
statement of assets and liabilities.247 Further, under Section 11 of R.A. No.
6713, non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold
public office. As the Court explained in Hon. Casimiro, et al. v. Rigor:248

x x x The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined in the

Constitution to promote transparency in the civil service and serves as a
deterrent against government officials bent on enriching themselves
through unlawful means. By mandate of law, every government official or
employee must make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net
worth in order to avoid any issue regarding questionable accumulation of
wealth. The importance of requiring the submission of a complete,
truthful, and sworn SALN as a measure to defeat corruption in the
bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is
necessary to particularly minimize, if not altogether eradicate, the
opportunities for official corruption, and maintain a standard of honesty in
the public service. Through the SALN, the public can monitor movement
in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and balance
mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth. The failure to file

247
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission v. The Office of the President, 661 Phil. 643 (2011).
248
749 Phil. 917 (2014).
Decision 96 G.R. No. 237428

a truthful SALN reasonably puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and
normally amounts to dishonesty.249

As respondent acutely relates in her dissent in Philippine Savings

250
Bank:

In the present case, because of the fact that the Chief Justice is a public
officer, he is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. This already operates as the
consent required by law.

The Offices of the Chief Justice and of the 14 Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court are an express creation of the Constitution, which vests
them with explicit powers necessary for the proper functioning of a
democratic government.

Foremost is the principle that public office is by virtue of the peoples

mandate to exercise a sovereign function of the government. Hence, a
public office is a public trust or agency. Appended to the constitutional
principle that public office is a public trust is the tenet that public officers
occupy very delicate positions that exact certain standards generally not
demanded from or required of ordinary citizens.

Those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and
are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its
benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the
duties of their office. The public has the right to demand the performance
of those duties.

One of these burdens or duties is explicitly articulated in Sec. 17 of Art. XI

of the 1987 Constitution, viz:

xxxx

This provision requires all public officers and employees, regardless of

rank, to declare their assets and liabilities upon their assumption of office,
as may be required by law. However, it likewise imposes a positive duty
and a heavier onus on the President; the Vice-President; and members of
the Cabinet, Congress, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions
and other Constitutional offices and officers of the Armed Forces with
general or flag ranks to publicly disclose their assets and liabilities. 251
(Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)

Faithful compliance with the requirement of the filing of SALN is

rendered even more exacting when the public official concerned is a member
249
Id. at 929-930.
250
Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, supra note 241.
251
Id.
Decision 97 G.R. No. 237428

of the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Usman,252 the

Court emphasized:

From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or

government employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his
assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any questionable
accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of the government and the
people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and
employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to eradicate
corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all
government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the
end in view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In the present case, respondent clearly violated the above-

quoted laws when he failed to file his SALN for the years 2004-2008.
He gave no explanation either why he failed to file his SALN for five
(5) consecutive years. While every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide with the law,
the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies
in order to maintain the faith of our people in the administration of
justice.253 (Emphasis ours)

The above holds necessarily true considering that the obligation of

members of the Judiciary to file their respective SALNs is not only a
statutory requirement but forms part of the mandatory conduct expected of a
judge so that an “honorable competent and independent Judiciary exists to
administer justice and thus promote the unity of the country, the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people.”254

The Code of Judicial Conduct, in no uncertain terms, provide:

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES

RULE 5.02 - A judge shall refrain from financial

and business dealing that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's impartiality, interfere
with the proper performance of judicial activities
or increase involvement with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court. A judge should so
manage investments and other financial interests
as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds
for disqualifications.

x x x x

252
675 Phil. 467 (2011).
253
Id. at 472.
254
Preamble, The Code of Judicial Conduct.
Decision 98 G.R. No. 237428

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE

RULE 5.08 - A judge shall make full financial

disclosure as required by law. (Emphasis ours)

x x x x

Compliance with the SALN

requirement indubitably reflects on
a person's integrity

To recapitulate, Section 7, Article VIII of the Constitution requires

that a member of the Judiciary must be of proven integrity. To be of proven
integrity means that the applicant must have established a steadfast
adherence to moral and ethical principles.255

The necessity of having integrity among the members of the judiciary

is clearly discussed in the Commentary on the Bangalore Principles of
Judicial Conduct:256

Integrity is the attribute of rectitude and righteousness. The

components of integrity are honesty and judicial morality. A judge
should always, not only in the discharge of official duties, act
honourably and in a manner befitting the judicial office; be free
from fraud, deceit and falsehood; and be good and virtuous in
behaviour and in character. There are no degrees of integrity as so
defined. Integrity is absolute. In the judiciary, integrity is more than a
virtue; it is a necessity.

Failure to file the SALN is clearly a violation of the law. The offense
is penal in character and is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for
public officials and employees. It disregards the requirement of transparency
as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official
who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be
said to be of proven integrity and the Court may consider him/her
disqualified from holding public office. In De Castro v. Field Investigation
Office, Office of the Ombudsman,257 We held:

Public service demands the highest level of honesty and

transparency from its officers and employees. The Constitution requires
that all public officers and employees be, at all times, accountable to the
people; serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice; and lead modest lives. Public office is a
public trust; it must be treated as a privilege rather than a right, and rest
firmly upon one's sense of service rather than entitlement. In this light, the
255
<http://www.dictionary.com/browse/integrity > (visited on March 19, 2018).
256
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_unodc_commentary-e.pdf> (visited
on May 8, 2018)
257
G.R. No. 192723, June 5, 2017.
Decision 99 G.R. No. 237428

Court deems it necessary to reiterate, as a final note, its pronouncement in

Casimiro v. Rigor:

The constitutionalization of public accountability shows the

kind of standards of public officers that are woven into the
fabric of our legal system. To reiterate, public office is a
public trust, which embodies a set of standards such as
responsibility, integrity and efficiency. Unfortunately,
reality may sometimes depart from these standards, but our
society has consciously embedded them in our laws so that
they may be demanded and enforced as legal principles,
and the Court is mandated to apply these principles to
bridge actual reality to the norms envisioned for our public
service.

The requirement to file a SALN is not a trivial or a formal

requirement. Neither is it something over which public officials can exercise
discretion. It is mandated by Our Constitution and laws. It is meant to forge
transparency and accountability in the government and as a measure meant
to curb corruption. This is clear from the policy of R.A. No. 6713:

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is the policy of the State to

promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials and
employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall
discharge their duties with utmost responsibility, integrity, competence,
and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and uphold
public interest over personal interest.

Respondent nevertheless argues that the filing of SALN has no

relation to an applicant's integrity, moral fitness or character. She cites the
cases of Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho,258 Daplas v. Department of
Finance and the Office of the Ombudsman, 259 Atty. Navarro v. Office of the
Ombudsman and Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
Services,260 to support her argument that in order to establish lack of
integrity, there is an additional requirement that there must be a showing that
there is an intent to commit a wrong.261

It is inaccurate to use the aforesaid cases to support respondent's

conclusion that her integrity is not affected by her failure to file SALNs.

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho,262 the Court upheld the

Ombudsman's finding that Racho is guilty of dishonesty for unexplained
wealth. The Court, in that case, noted that Racho's SALN did not reflect the
aggregate amount of his bank deposits.

258
656 Phil. 148 (2011).
259
G.R. No. 221153, April 17, 2017.
260
G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016, 801 SCRA 46.
261
Rollo, pp. 235-237.
262
Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, supra.
Decision 100 G.R. No. 237428

In Daplas v. Department of Finance and the Office of the

Ombudsman,263 this Court merely held therein petitioner Daplas guilty of
simple negligence instead of dishonesty and grave misconduct for her failure
to declare several real and personal properties in her SALN. The Court
found that “petitioner's failure to declare the Galant sedan in her SALNs
from 1997 to 2003 stemmed from the fact that the same was registered in her
husband's name, and purportedly purchased out of his personal money”.

Meanwhile, in Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman and Department

of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service,264 this Court exonerated
Atty. Navarro of dishonesty, grave misconduct and violation of R.A. No.
6713. The Court ruled, in that case, that the properties not reflected in
therein petitioner's SALN were rightfully excluded as they do not actually
belong to him. This Court even noted therein that the SALN before 2011
merely required a general statement of one's assets and liabilities.

It is apparent from the foregoing that the above mentioned cases are
factually different from the instant petition. The aforesaid jurisprudence,
aside from determining the administrative liability of therein public
employees, dealt with misdeclaration of assets or properties. Meanwhile, the
instant petition questions respondent's qualifications and as an incident
thereto, the validity of the process leading to her appointment. Further, the
fundamental issue in the case at bar is not merely inaccurate entries, but the
glaring absence of respondent's SALN for various years prior to her
resignation from the U.P. College of Law.

Respondent posits that a person's failure to file SALN, without more,

would not automatically negate “integrity.”265 It is respondent's theory that
the failure to file SALN without any allegation or evidence that one
committed graft and corruption by acquiring unexplained wealth has no
bearing on integrity. Respondent's argument, however, does not persuade.

The SALN laws contemplate both the (1) physical act of filing her and
her family’s statement of assets, liabilities and net worth and (2) filing of a
true, genuine and accurate SALN. RA 6713 and RA 3019, being special laws
that punish offenses, are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is
the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the
character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated. An act which is declared malum prohibitum renders malice or
criminal intent completely immaterial.266 Thus, whether or not respondent
accumulated unexplained wealth is not in issue at this point in time, but
263
Daplas v. Department of Finance and the Office of the Ombudsman, supra.
264
Navarro v. Office Of The Ombudsman And Department Of Finance-Revenue Integrity
Protection Services, supra.
265
Rollo, pp. 2111-2112.
266
People v. Quijada, 328 Phil. 505 (1996).
Decision 101 G.R. No. 237428

whether she, in the first place, complied with the mandatory requirement of
filing of SALNs. Worse, to subscribe to respondent's view means that the
Court would altogether be deprived of the opportunity to ascertain whether
or not she accumulated unexplained wealth as the tools for doing so, that is,
the filed SALNs and the representations contained therein, are lacking.

Respondent chronically failed to

file her SALNs and thus violated
the Constitution, the law and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. A
member of the Judiciary who
commits such violations cannot be
deemed to be a person of proven
integrity

To recall, the record of the U.P. HRDO only contains respondent's

SALNs for the years 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and
2002. Later, respondent produced a photocopy of her SALN for 1989 and
attached the same to her Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission. On the
other hand, the records of the Central Records Division of the Office of the
Ombudsman yields “no SALN filed by respondent except for the SALN
ending December 1998” which was subscribed only in August 2003 and
transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16,
2003. Further, despite having worked as legal counsel for the Republic from
2003 to 2006 (up until 2009), there is no record that respondent filed her
SALNs for that period.

Respondent could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or non-

filing of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet,
respondent opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for
no clear reason. Respondent likewise manifests having been successful in
retrieving most of the “missing” SALNs and yet withheld presentation of
such before the Court, except for a photocopy of her 1989 SALN submitted
only in the morning of the Oral Argument and allegedly sourced from the
“drawers of U.P.” Only in respondent's Memorandum Ad Cautelam did she
attach the SALNs she supposedly recovered. But the SALNs so attached,
except for the 1989 SALN, were the same SALNs priorly offered by the
Republic. Other than offering legal or technical justifications, respondent has
not endeavored to convince this Court of the existence of the still
unaccounted SALNs. As she herself stated in her July 23, 2012 letter to the
JBC, only some, but not all, of her SALNs are infeasible to retrieve. Thus,
this Court is puzzled as to why there has been no account of respondent’s
more recent SALNs, particularly those from 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005
and 2006.
Decision 102 G.R. No. 237428

Instead, respondent layers her defenses as follows:

1. Invoking the so-called “Doblada doctrine”, respondent

maintains having filed all her SALNs.

Respondent firmly latches on to her allegation that she filed her

SALNs, only that she has no records of the same. It is, however, too shallow
and impetuous for this Court to accept such excuse and disregard the
overwhelming evidence to the contrary.

Respondent urges the Court to apply in her favor the case of

Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr.,267 and deem as sufficient and
acceptable her statement that she “maintains that she consistently filed her
SALNs.” Respondent argues that in Doblada, the Court gave no evidentiary
value to the Office of the Court Administrator's (OCA) report stating that a
branch Sheriff had failed to file his SALN for eighteen (18) years, based
only on contrary evidence presented by the respondent Sheriff that proves
the existence of only one (1) of his missing SALNs. According to
respondent, the Court's rationale in Doblada that one cannot readily
conclude that respondent failed to file his sworn SALN simply because these
documents are missing in the OCA's files should likewise be made
applicable to her case. Respondent thus concludes that the Republic must
categorically prove its allegation that respondent did not file her SALNs for
all relevant years, and not just show that the same are no longer on file with
the relevant offices.

A more cerebral reading of Doblada, however, poses checkered

differences to the case at bar.

To begin with, the Court imposed the ultimate penalty of dismissal,

with forfeiture of all benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any
branch or service of the government including government-owned and
controlled corporation against Doblada for his failure to declare a true and
detailed statement of his assets and liabilities for the years 1974, 1976, 1989,
1991, 1993, 1995 and 1998. The pronouncement of the Court with regard to
the non-filing of his SALNs for several years was therefore not the basis for
the imposition of the appropriate penalty against Doblada.

The progenesis of Doblada's troubles was a letter-complaint filed by a

concerned taxpayer with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, in turn,
referred the complaint to the OCA. Upon report and recommendation of the
OCA, the Court directed the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
conduct a discreet investigation of the case and thereafter, to submit a report
thereon. The NBI reported discrepancies in Doblada's SALNs and his yearly
salaries constituting prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth and further
267
498 Phil. 395 (2005).
Decision 103 G.R. No. 237428

stated that “[Doblada] also failed to submit his sworn statement of assets and
liabilities for the years 1975 to 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1997 as said
documents were not submitted to the NBI by the Records Control Division
of the Supreme Court.” Thereafter, the case was referred to the OCA for
evaluation, report and recommendation.

Initially, the OCA reported that Doblada's records disclose that he had
not been submitting his SALNs for the years 1975, 1977 to 1988, 1990,
1992, 1999 and 2000. When asked to explain, Doblada maintains having
filed all his SALNs and admits that he does not have copies of said SALNs
as he might have accidentally disposed of the same during the various times
that he transferred office. As proof, Doblada submitted a copy of a letter
dated May 7, 2001 sent by the Acting Branch Clerk of Court, stating therein
that attached to said letter are the sworn SAL[N] of the staff of RTC, Pasig
City, Branch 155, including that of respondent's, for the year 2000. Said
letter was established to have been sent to and duly received by the OCA,
and yet Doblada's SALN for 2000 was one of those missing in the OCA's
files.

It was factually established then that Doblada submitted his SALNs to

the branch clerk of court, presumably as the chief or head of the office. The
head of the office then transmitted the original copy of the SALNs received
to the repository agency which, in Doblada's case, is the OCA. Thus, the
OCA's report that Doblada did not file his SALNs was rendered inaccurate
by proof that Doblada, through the head of the office, actually transmitted
the required original copy of the 2000 SALN to the OCA.

Considering the contrary proof presented by Doblada in the form of

the letter of the head of the personnel of Branch 155 that the SALN for 2000
exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository
agency, the Court therein inferred that Doblada filed his SALNs.

In respondent's case, while the U.P. HRDO, as the concerned

personnel division, produced respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1989, 1990,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, these very same SALNs are
neither proven to be in the records of, nor was proven to have been sent to
and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository agency. Even then,
the Court presently receives the certified copies of said SALNs as evidence
of the existence and the filing thereof.

Nevertheless, for the SALNs which the U.P. HRDO itself cannot
produce, i.e., 1986, 1987, 1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005
and 2006, and not proven to be in the records of, nor proven to have been
sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman, are altogether a different
matter. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were
neither established by direct proof constituting substantial evidence nor by
mere inference.
Decision 104 G.R. No. 237428

The Court in Doblada also gave the latter the benefit of the doubt
considering the lack of the categorical statement from the OCA, as the
repository agency, that Doblada failed to file his SALN for the relevant
years. The Court observed that the report of the OCA simply stated that “it
does not have on its file the subject SAL[N] of [Doblada].” Hence, the
Court therein concluded that there was no substantial evidence to show that
Doblada failed to file his SALNs for the relevant years.

In stark contrast, the Certification of the Omdusman, as the repository

agency in respondent's case, made the categorical statement that “based on
records on file, there is no SALN filed by [respondent] for calendar years
1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998 which was submitted to
this Office on December 16, 2003.”

Respondent, through counsel, attempts to mislead the Court as to the

value of the Ombudsman's Certification by re-directing Our attention to a
“handwritten certification”268 affixed by the SALN custodian of the
Ombudsman. Upon closer examination, the “handwritten certification” aside
from having been “issued” only on April 6, 2018 appears to have been made
at the behest of respondent's counsel where the handwritten words may have
been tailor-fitted to suit respondent's theory. The signatory of the
“handwritten certification” is the same signatory as that of the Certification
earlier issued by the Ombudsman, and thus the former could not have
possibly negated or altered the tenor of the latter. In any case, such
“handwritten certification” cannot eclipse a Certification duly and officially
issued by the Ombudsman in response to a subpoena issued by the Congress.

Thus, taking the undisputed pieces of evidence consisting of (1) the

U.P. HRDO certifications proving that respondent's SALNs for 1986, 1987,
1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 are not in its
possession; and (2) the Ombudsman certification that based on its records,
there is no SALN filed by respondent except that for 1998; coupled with
respondent's inability to show proof that these SALNs actually exist and that
these were actually transmitted to and duly received by the Ombudsman as
the repository agency, conclusively establish that for the years 1986, 1987,
1988, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, respondent did
not file her SALNs.

Otherwise stated, on the basis of the evidence on record and

respondent's unexplained failure to support her allegation of filing with
substantial proof, the Court reaches the inevitable conclusion that the only
SALNs filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989,
1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002, or only eleven
(11) SALNs out of her 20 years in U.P., or for even more if her engagement

268
Rollo, p. 2283.
Decision 105 G.R. No. 237428

as legal counsel by the Republic and as Deputy Commissioner of the

Commission on Human Rights as lauded in respondent's PDS, are treated as
government service.

It is for this reason that We hold that the Republic was able to
discharge its burden of proof, and thus it becomes incumbent upon
respondent to discharge her burden of evidence. Sps. De Leon, et al., v. Bank
of the Philippine Islands269 offers a distinction between burden of proof and
burden of evidence:

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court defines "burden of proof" as

"the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law."
In civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the plaintiff, who is
required to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. Once
the plaintiff has established his case, the burden of evidence shifts to
the defendant, who, in turn, has the burden to establish his defense. 270
(Emphasis ours)

Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different

when it is filed by the State. Floyd Mechem in his book, entitled A Treatise
on the Law of Public Offices and Officers,271 explains that when the
respondent is called upon at the suit of the State to show by what warrant he
assumes to exercise the functions of a public office, the burden of proving
his title rests upon the respondent. When, however, the respondent has made
out a prima facie right to the office, it is only at that time that the burden of
evidence shifts to the State.272

Montgomery H. Throop adopted the same view as Mechem. Throop,

in his book, entitled A Treatise on the Law relating to Public Officers and
Sureties in Official Bonds,273 states that upon the trial of an information in
the nature of a quo warranto, the prosecutor is not required, in the first
instance, to show want of title in the person, against whom the information
is exhibited. The burden is upon the respondent to establish a good title; he
must establish the continued existence of every qualification, necessary to
the continued holding of the office, if any such qualifications exist. But
where the respondent has shown a good prima facie title, the burden of proof
is shifted to the prosecutor.274

In this jurisdiction, Vicente J. Francisco wrote in his book the Revised

Rules of Court in the Philippines,275 that in a quo warranto proceeding, the
burden rests on the defendant or respondent, as against the State at least, to
269
721 Phil. 839 (2013).
270
Id. at 848.
271
1890.
272
Id. at 493-494.
273
1892.
274
Id. at 744-745.
275
Volume IV-B , 1972.
Decision 106 G.R. No. 237428

show his right to the office from which it is sought to oust him. Moreover,
since the object of such proceedings is to test the actual right to the office,
and not merely a use color of right, it is incumbent upon the respondent to
show a good legal title, and not merely a colorable one, for he must rely
wholly on the strength of his own title.276

With the submission of its evidence, including the Certifications from

the U.P. College of Law and the Ombudsman showing that respondent did
not file all her SALNs, the Republic has made out a prima facie case that
respondent failed to comply with the SALN law. The duty or burden of
evidence thus shifted to respondent to controvert the Republic’s prima facie
case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of the Republic. 277
However, what respondent merely offered in response to the Republic’s
evidence is an unsubstantiated claim that she had filed all her SALNs.
Without admissible documentary and testimonial support, this bare and
uncorroborated assertion scarcely overcomes the Republic’s case.

2. Being on leave without pay exempts respondent from filing her

SALNs.

Aside from maintaining that she filed all her SALNs, respondent
layers her defenses by saying that her non-filing of SALN is nevertheless
excused because she was on leave from the U.P. College of Law during June
1, 1998 to October 16, 1998, June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2001, June 1, 2001 to
May 31, 2002, November 1, 2003 to May 31, 2004, June 1, 2004 to October
31, 2004, February 11, 2005 to October 31, 2005 and November 15, 2005 to
May 31, 2006. However, per the Certification278 issued by the U.P. HRDO
dated December 8, 2017, it appears that respondent filed her SALN for the
year ending December 31, 2002, a year she was purportedly on leave. To this
Court, respondent's own act of filing a SALN in 2002 negates her argument
that being on leave excuses her from filing her SALN. As likewise pointed
out during the Oral Arguments,279 respondent, as a regular faculty member,
receives monthly compensation and from at least January 2000 to May 2000
(when she was not on leave), she earned income and thus should have filed
her SALN covering said period.

Further, being on leave from government service is not synonymous

with separation from government service. Suffice to say that one does not
cease to become a government employee only because one takes an official
leave.

On the contrary, relevant laws provide that all public officials and
employees are required to file a SALN.
276
Id. at 332.
277
See Department of Education v. Tuliao, 735 Phil. 703 (2014).
278
Rollo, p. 64.
279
TSN, Oral Arguments on April 10, 2018, p. 102.
Decision 107 G.R. No. 237428

To review, Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution categorically

requires that "[a] public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office
and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under
oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme
Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and
officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall
be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law."

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 states that "[p]ublic officials and

employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under
oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net
worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses
and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.” Further, “[t]he [SALN] and the [d]isclosure of [b]usiness
[i]nterests and [f]inancial [c]onnections shall be filed by: (1) Constitutional
and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of
the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court Administrator; and all national
executive officials with the Office of the President; (3) Regional and local
officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions; (4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval
captain, with the Office of the President, and those below said ranks, with
the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and (5) All other public
officials and employees, defined in RA 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.”

Relatedly, Section 34, Chapter 9, Book 1 of the Administrative Code

of 1987 also states that "[a] public officer or employee shall upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law,
submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth."

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713, however, provides for certain exceptions

to the requirement: (1) those serving in honorary capacity – these are
persons who are working in the government without service credit and
without pay; (2) laborers – these are persons who perform ordinary manual
labor; and (3) casual or temporary workers. Respondent claims exception on
the argument that for the periods she was on official leave from U.P., she did
not receive any pay.

This statement, however, is inaccurate. The fact that respondent did

not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a
government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from
the SALN laws. She did not receive pay not because she was serving in an
Decision 108 G.R. No. 237428

honorary capacity, but for the simple reason that she did not render any
service for said period. Fundamental is the rule that workers who were not
required to work are not, by law, entitled to any compensation.

3. Respondent is not required by law to keep a record of her

SALNs.

Respondent invokes Section 8, paragraph C(4) of R.A. No. 6713

which provides:

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. x x x

xxxx
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under
this Act, shall be made available for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction
after ten (10) working days from the time they are filed as required by
law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay
a reasonable fee to cover the cost of reproduction and mailing of such
statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for
a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement. After such
period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing
investigation.

There is no argument that the filed SALNs need not be retained by the
receiving officer or the custodian after more than ten years from the filing or
receipt thereof as such documents may be destroyed unless needed in an
ongoing investigation. In this context, the filer is likewise under no
obligation to keep records of such SALNs after the ten-year period.

The fact, however, remains that even respondent's more recent SALNs
falling within the ten-year period for her application to the Chief Justice
position are not on record. Logically, a public officer under question should
obtain a certification from the repository agency to attest to the fact of filing.
In the event that the SALNs were actually filed but missing, such
certification should likewise attest to the fact that the SALNs filed could no
longer be located due to a valid reason (such as destruction by a natural
calamity, gutted by fire or destruction pursuant to the ten-year period above-
cited).

4. Respondent was never asked to comply with the SALN

laws.

Respondent likewise banks on the supposed presumption that she filed

the SALNs considering that the U.P. HRDO never called her attention to the
Decision 109 G.R. No. 237428

non-filing thereof and instead, released a clearance and certification in her

favor. However, said circumstance, if true, does not detract from the fact that
the duty to properly accomplish the SALN belongs to the public official and
the corrective action that the concerned authority is expected to undertake is
limited only to typographical or mathematical rectifications.

For the years that respondent rendered government service in U.P., the
relevant rules would be that provided under the Rules Implementing the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
dated April 21, 1989. Rule VIII thereof provides:

Rule VIII
Review and Compliance Procedure

Section 1. The following shall have the authority to establish compliance

procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said
statements have been properly accomplished:

(a) In the case of Congress, the designated committees of both Houses of

Congress subject to approval by the affirmative vote of the majority of
the particular House concerned;
(b) In the case of the Executive Department, the heads of the departments,
offices and agencies insofar as their respective departments, offices and
agencies are concerned subject to approval of the Secretary of Justice
(c) In the case of the Judicial Department, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; and
(d) In the case of the Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional
Offices, the respective Chairman and members thereof; in the case of
the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman.

The above official shall likewise have the authority to render any opinion
interpreting the provisions on the review and compliance procedures in the
filing of statements of assets, liabilities, net worth and disclosure of
information.

In the event said authorities determine that a statement is not properly

filed, they shall inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual

involved in a similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the
opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject to any
sanction provided in the Code.

The Rules implementing R.A. No. 6713 thus authorize only certain
officials of the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments, and the
Constitutional Commissions and Constitutional offices to establish
compliance procedures for the review of statements in the SALN to
determine whether said statements have been been properly accomplished.
The said officials are also authorized to render opinions interpreting the
provisions on the review and compliance procedures and to determine
Decision 110 G.R. No. 237428

whether or not a SALN is properly filed. If the SALN was not properly filed,
the authorized officials are required to inform the reporting individual and
direct him/her to take the necessary corrective action. The records do not
show that at the time respondent assumed her post as a professor in U.P., or
at any time thereafter until her resignation, that concerned authorized
official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had established
compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P.

The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order

came about only on April 16, 2006 when the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) issued Memorandum Circular No. 10, s. 2006 amending Rule VIII.
This was pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 06-0231 dated February 1, 2006
wherein the CSC adopted the revised rules on review and compliance
procedure. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to
perform its ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to respondent when
such rule was not yet in existence at that time.

At any rate, Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman280 clarifies on the

limited corrective action which the head of office can perform as regards the
review of SALNs:

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, the corrective action to be allowed should

only refer to typographical or mathematical rectifications and
explanation of disclosed entries. It does not pertain to hidden,
undisclosed or undeclared acquired assets which the official concerned
intentionally concealed by one way or another like, for instance, the
use of dummies. There is actually no hard and fast rule. If income has
been actually reported to the BIR in one's ITR, such fact can be considered
a sign of good faith.

xxxx

The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees

to disclose their assets, liabilities and net worth accurately and truthfully.
In keeping up with the constantly changing and fervent society and for the
purpose of eliminating corruption in the government, the new SALN is
stricter, especially with regard to the details of real properties, to address
the pressing issue of transparency among those in the government service.
Although due regard is given to those charged with the duty of filtering
malicious elements in the government service, it must still be stressed that
such duty must be exercised with great caution as grave consequences
result therefrom. Thus, some leeway should be accorded the public
officials. They must be given the opportunity to explain any prima facie
appearance of discrepancy. To repeat, where his explanation is adequate,
convincing and verifiable, his assets cannot be considered unexplained

280
Supra note 260.
Decision 111 G.R. No. 237428

wealth or illegally obtained.281 (Emphasis ours)

5. Respondent’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with

complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC
confirms or ratifies her compliance with the SALN requirement.

Respondent, both in her pleadings and in the Oral Arguments, harps

on the purported failure of the JBC to exclude her from the list of shortlisted
applicants. She points to at least eleven times that the JBC could have
disqualified her due to her lack of SALNs but failed to do so. Hence, she
argues that she is deemed to have substantially complied with the legal
requirements at the time of her application.

Respondent’s argument is specious. The invalidity of respondent’s

appointment springs from her lack of qualifications. Her inclusion in the
shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor
supply her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been
disqualified at the outset. It must be underscored that the JBC En Banc
included respondent in the shortlist for the position of Chief Justice without
deliberating her July 23, 2012 Letter. Without prejudice to this Court’s ruling
in A.M No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC, the JBC En Banc
cannot be deemed to have considered respondent eligible because it does not
appear that respondent’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely
addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and
subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this
Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where
the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to
ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake.282 Again, without prejudice to
the outcome of the pending administrative matter, it appears that
respondent’s inclusion was made under the erroneous belief that she
complied with all the legal requirements concomitant to the position.

Respondent failed to properly and

promptly file her SALNs, again in
violation of the Constitutional and
statutory requirements

Further, the failure to file a truthful SALN not only puts in doubt the
integrity of the officer, but such failure to file a truthful, complete and
accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended
by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements.283

On its face, the SALNs filed by respondent covering her years of

government service in U.P., appear to have been executed and filed under
281
Id. at 71-73.
282
See Sps. Modesto v. Urbina, et al., 647 Phil. 706 (2010).
283
Gupilan-Aguilar v. Office of the Ombudsman, 728 Phil. 210, 234 (2014).
Decision 112 G.R. No. 237428

suspicious circumstances:

(a) Respondent's SALN as of December 31, 1996 was

accomplished and notarized only on June 29, 1998, or two
years late;

(b) Her SALN as of December 31, 1998 was filed only

in 2003, or five years late;

(c) Her SALNs for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and
2002 were notarized only on August 21, 2003;284

(d) Both the 1996285 and 1997286 SALNs were

subscribed and sworn to by respondent before Zenaida P. Cruz
(Administrative Officer IV, Human Resource Development and
Records Section, U.P. Law Center) on June 29, 1998. However,
under the Notarial Registry of Eugenia A. Borras, four SALNs
of respondent were acknowledged before her on August 21,
2003 as cited in the next preceding paragraph. It appears thus
that there were two SALNs for 1997 executed by respondent;

(d) She failed to file her SALNs for 2004, 2005, and
2006 which were the years when she received the bulk of her
fees from the PIATCO cases. As respondent divulged, she
received from the Republic, through the OSG, the following
fees287 in relation to the PIATCO cases:

Year Income
2004 P7,055,513.56
2005 P11,532,226.00
2006 P2,636,006.64
2007 P4,673,866.36
2008 P4,070,810.93
2009 P301,552.00
TOTAL P30,269,975.49

(e) Her SALN for 2006 was accomplished only on

July 27, 2010 and unsubscribed, only to be later on claimed by
respondent to have been really intended as SALN as of July 27,
2010;

284
Rollo, p. 1965.
285
Id. at 1961.
286
Id. at 1963.
287
Id. at 2003.
Decision 113 G.R. No. 237428

The SALNs that she submitted in support of her application for Chief
Justice likewise bear badges of irregularities:

(f) Her SALN for 2009 was not accomplished under

oath, was likewise belatedly filed only on June 22, 2012 and
indicates therein that she was an Associate Justice of the Court
when her appointment came only on August 16, 2010;

(g) Her SALNs for 2006 and 2009 did not reflect the
fees she received as counsel for the Republic in the PIATCO
cases.

The Bureau of Internal Revenue’s (BIR) Report shows

that respondent received from the OSG the total gross amount
of P32,494,805.27 as fees from 2004 to 2009 for the PIATCO
cases. The BIR Report also shows that she paid the withholding
taxes on said fees in the total amount of Php4,599,504.71. By
mathematical computation, respondent would have had
Php27,895,300.56 as her net disposable income. This net
disposable income was not reflected in respondent’s SALN for
2006 (which she claims to really be her SALN as of July 27,
2010) nor in her SALN as of 2009. Her SALN for 2009
revealed a net worth of only Php17,936,353.00;

(h) The unaccounted income from the PIATCO cases

could not have been due to losses or liabilities considering that
respondent have had an increase in her net worth from 2002 to
2009. Her SALN for 2002 shows a net worth of only
Php3,804,000.00 while her SALN for 2009 shows a net worth
of Php17,936,353.00, her net worth thus increased by
Php14,132,353.00. While the BIR Report shows that
respondent received approximately Php27M in disposable net
income, her SALN only shows an increase of approximately
Php14M in net worth. The difference between the two, in the
amount of estimatedly Php13M, was conspicuously missing in
the SALNs filed by respondent;

(i) There is a glaring difference between the two 2010

SALNs filed. The total value of respondent's personal
properties in the “SALN as of July 27, 2010” is
Php9,000,000.00, while the value of her personal properties as
declared in her “SALN as of December 31, 2010” increased to
Php11,723,010. Respondent, therefore, enjoyed an increase of
approximately Php2,700,000.00 in personal properties in just a
span of five (5) months after having been appointed as
Decision 114 G.R. No. 237428

Associate Justice.

(j) It is contrary to human experience that the SALNs

purportedly recovered by respondent's husband were not
stamped received by the UP HRDO. It is unusual that
respondent did not bother to demand that her personal copy be
duly stamped received with particulars as to the date and initial,
at least of the party who received the same as proof that she
timely filed her SALN.

(k) There is no indication from the stamped “Certified

Photocopy” and initialed by Rosemarie Pabiona on the SALNs
that she is the official custodian of the same, and whether the
photocopies of the original are on file, contrary to Section 24,
Rule 1322 of the Rules of Court.

The above circumstances betray respondent's intention to falsely state

a material fact and to practice deception in order to secure for herself the
appointment as Chief Justice. It is therefore clear as day that respondent
failed not only in complying with the physical act of filing, but also
committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity.288

Consistently, the Court does not hesitate to impose the supreme

penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to
have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures. For
instance, in Rabe v. Flores,289 the Court unanimously imposed the ultimate
penalty of dismissal from service upon a regional trial court interpreter with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leaves and with prejudice to
re-employment for dishonesty and for failure to disclose her business
interest, which was a “stall in the market” for a continued period of four
years. The Court stressed that it is the obligation of an employee to submit a
sworn statement as the “public has a right to know” the employee's assets,
liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests.

The dockets of the Sandiganbayan itself show that several charges for
violations of R.A. No. 6713 for failure to file and for untruthful declarations
in the SALNs resulted to a plea of guilt from the accused, lest the latter run
the risk of being imprisoned.290 Interestingly, the Sandiganbayan concluded a
criminal case291 against a certain Rogelio Pureza, then a Senior
Superintendent of the Philippine National Police, who was charged with 4
288
Office of the Ombudsman v. Racho, supra note 258.
289
338 Phil. 919 (1997).
290
See People of the Philippines v. P/C/ Supt. Eugene G. Martine, SB-12-CRM-0228 to SB-12-
CRM-0234, January 12, 2018; People of the Philippines v. Sadikul Adalla Sahali, SB-16-CRM-0501 to
0506, August 18, 2017; People of the Philippines v. Maria Gracia Cielo Magno Padaca, SB-15-CRM-0248
to 025, September 27, 2017; People of the Philippines v. Ruby Sahali Tan, SB-16-CRM-1291 to 1296,
September 18, 2017.
291
People v. Pureza, Sandiganbayan Criminal Case Nos. 27995-98, June 30, 2006.
Decision 115 G.R. No. 237428

counts of violation of Section 8 in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713

for failure to file his annual SALN for the years 1990, 1991, 1992 and 1993.
In the course of the investigation by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military relative to an anonymous letter of a concerned resident of
Kalookan City on the alleged illegal activities and unexplained wealth of
several policemen, Pureza was found to have no record of his SALN from
1989 to 1993 on file with the PNP Records Center. In handing a guilty
verdict, the Sandiganbayan reasoned that the non-existence of the SALs with
the Records Center of the PNP proved that the accused did not file his SAL
for 1990 to 1993. The Sandiganbayan observed that even assuming that the
accused had indeed filed his SAL with the PNP and his records were lost
during the transfer of records, he could have easily and conveniently
obtained a copy of his SAL from either the CSC or the Office of the Military
Ombudsman.

It is thus plainly obvious that the courts do not take violations of the
SALN laws slightly even as against lowly public officials.

With more reason should such test of dishonesty and lack of integrity
be applied in the instant case when respondent failed to file her SALNs for
several years and for those years that she filed, the SALNs so filed prove to
be untruthful.

C.
Respondent failed to submit the required
SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant
to the JBC rules

The JBC required the submission

of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent
Associate Justices, absent which,
the applicant ought not to have
been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination

Further compounding respondent's woes is the established and

undisputed fact that she failed to submit the required number of SALNs in
violation of the rules set by the JBC itself during the process of nomination.

To recall, the announcement for the opening of the application and

recommendation of the position of Chief Justice in 2012 was preceded by a
JBC En Banc meeting where the members thereof agreed that applicants
who were previously in the government service must submit all previous
SALNs. This agreement was reflected in the JBC's announcement published
Decision 116 G.R. No. 237428

on June 5, 2012, where it was made clear that applicants from the
government shall submit, in addition to the usual documentary requirements,
all previous SALNs, with a warning that those with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for
nomination.

As extensively quoted, the minutes292 of the JBC deliberation held on

July 20, 2012 show that the JBC deliberated on the candidates who
submitted incomplete SALNs and then determined who among them are to
be considered as having “substantially complied.” Senator Francis G.
Escudero, as then ex officio member, suggested that “at least an attempt to
comply with a particular requirement” can be used as a parameter for
determining substantial compliance.293

With this, the JBC proceeded to go over, one by one, the compliance
of the candidates with the lacking documentary requirements. For instance,
Justice Abad was considered as having substantially complied because he
submitted 4 SALNs in his 6 year-stint with the OSG and because the filing
of the SALN at the time Justice Abad joined the government was not yet
required. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan lacked 5 SALNs but that he was trying
to get them from the Civil Service Commission and so, regular member
Justice Aurora Santiago-Lagman moved that the SALNs he submitted be
considered as substantial compliance. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez did
not submit even one SALN which prompted Justice Peralta to remark that
Congressman Rodriguez may no longer be interested. Commissioner Rene
V. Sarmiento also submitted incomplete SALNs, but there was no mention
whether the SALNs he submitted were considered as substantial compliance.
Similarly, for respondent, the JBC determined that she did not submit her
SALNs from 1986 to 2006 and that, as remarked by Senator Escudero, the
filing thereof during those years was already required. There was no
indication that the JBC deemed the three SALNs (for the years 2009, 2010
and 2011) submitted by respondent for her 20 years as a professor in the U.P.
College of Law and two years as Associate Justice, as substantial
compliance.

We revisit the pertinent portions of the aforesaid Minutes as follows:

III. Deliberation on Candidates with Incomplete Documentary

Requirements:

xxxx

Justice Peralta suggested that the Council examine the matrix per
candidate as follows:

Justice Roberto A. Abad

292
JBC Minutes, July 20, 2012.
293
JBC Minutes, July 20, 2012.
Decision 117 G.R. No. 237428

The Executive Officer reported that Justice Abad lacks the Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the years 1982-1983.

Justice Peralta mentioned that Justice Abad joined the government

in the late 70’s and during that time there was no R.A. 6713 yet.
He added that Justice Abad might no longer locate them.

Senator Escudero said that SALNs were not yet required at that
time.

The Executive Officer said that Justice Abad had been with the OSG
from 1982 to 1986; but he submitted only his SALNs for the period
1981, 1984, 1985 and 1986. He was already asked to submit the
lacking SALNs.

Justice Peralta asked whether there is a need for them to explain the
reason for failing to comply with the requirements considering the time
constraint.

Senator Escudero said that it would be more proper for the JBC to ask
the candidate for the reason; however, in the case of Justice Abad, he
opined that he substantially complied with the requirements of the
JBC.

Justice Lagman agreed with the Senator.

There being no objection, the Council agreed that Justice Abad had
SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIED with the requirements of the JBC

xxxx

The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect

to SALNs, whether five (5) SALNs would constitute a substantial
compliance if the candidate has been in the government service for
twenty (20) years.

The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly
the candidates coming from the government, and identified who
among them, would be considered to have substantially complied:

1. Justice Arturo D. Brion- has substantially complied;

2. Justice Antonio T. Carpio- has substantially complied;

xxx

5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza-has complied;

6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro-has substantially complied;

xxxx

10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

Decision 118 G.R. No. 237428

The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had

not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten (10) years,
(sic) that is, from 1986 to 2006.

Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his

professor at U.P. and that they were required to submit SALNs
during those years.

xxxx

16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora- has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert.

xxxx

From the foregoing discourse, it appears that respondent was

specifically singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to
submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in the U.P. College of
Law. This is in obvious contrast with the other shortlisted applicants who
submitted SALNs, or whose years in government service correspond to the
period prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 6713.

The minutes of the JBC En Banc meeting also show that Senator
Escudero moved that the determination of whether a candidate has
substantially complied with the requirements be delegated to the Executive
Committee.294 In the end, it appears that the JBC En Banc decided to require
only the submission of the past ten (10) SALNs, or from 2001-2011, for
applicants to the Chief Justice position.295 This, as much, was confirmed by
Atty. Pascual during the Congressional hearings.296

From the foregoing, it is clear that the JBC En Banc did not do away
with the requirement of submission of SALNs, only that substantial
compliance therewith, i.e., the submission of the SALNs for the immediately
preceding 10 years instead of all SALNs, was deemed sufficient.

Conformably thereto, the following candidates submitted their

respective letters as regards the submission of the SALNs:

(a) Justice De Castro submitted a letter 297 dated July 17, 2012 with the
attached SALNs for 16 years covering the period 1997 to 2011, from the
time she became an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan on September
23, 1997 until December 2011 as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
She also disclosed that her SALN from February 19, 1973 until November
30, 1978 which she filed during her employment in the Supreme Court,
could no longer be located. She also disclosed that her personal files,
294
JBC Minutes
295
House Committee on Justice Report, p. 22.
296
House Committee Hearing on February 27, 2018.
297
JBC files of Justice De Castro.
Decision 119 G.R. No. 237428

including her SALNs that she filed while employed at the Department of
Justice from December 1, 1978 to September 22, 1997, were among those
burned when the third floor of the DOJ was gutted by fire in late 1996 or
early 1997. In any case, upon inquiry from the CSC, she was told that her
SALNs filed as DOJ employee were already disposed of, as it was way
beyond the statutory ten (10) – year period.

(b) Jose Manuel Diokno submitted a sworn and verified statement298 dated
July 17, 2012, stating therein that while he served as General Counsel of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and as Special Counsel to the Board of
Directors of the Development [Bank] of the Philippines, his engagement was
only as a consultant on a contractual basis and as such, was not required to
file a SALN.

(c) Justice Carpio submitted a letter299 dated July 23, 2012 stating that he
resigned as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel effective January 31, 1996 and
as such, he did not submit a SALN for the year 1995 because the submission
for that year was on April 30, 1996 when he was no longer employed with
the government. Nevertheless, the clearance issued by the Office of the
President certifies that Justice Carpio has submitted his SALN and that he
has no pending criminal or administrative case.

(d) Justice Abad submitted an attestation300 dated July 23, 2012 that he
does not have a copy of his SALNs for the years 1968 to 1974, 1976 to 1980
and 1982 to 1983.

(e) Dean Amado Valdez wrote a letter301 dated July 23, 2012 saying that
he could no longer find the SALNs covering the years 1985 to 1987, 2002 to
2003 and 2004 representing the years of his intermittent government service.
He said that in, any case, the assets reflected in the SALN which he already
filed were acquired after he left government service as shown by his income
tax returns for the periods from 2005 to 2011.

Notably, Jose Manuel Diokno and Dean Amado Valdez were not
included in the short list.

That such was the standing requirement of the JBC from at least the
incumbent Associate Justices applying for the position of Chief Justice is
evident from the fact that five (5) out of six (6) applicants who were
incumbent Associate Justices, namely: (1) Justice Carpio; (2) Justice Brion;
(3) Justice Velasco; and (4) Justice De Castro were determined to have
completely complied with the SALN requirement; and (5) Justice Abad was
determined to have substantially complied. These Justices submitted the
298
JBC files of Jose Diokno.
299
JBC files of Justice Carpio.
300
JBC files of Justice Abad.
301
JBC files of Dean Amado Valdez.
Decision 120 G.R. No. 237428

following numbers of SALNs:302

Justice Carpio 14 SALNs

Justice Brion 12 SALNs
Justice Velasco 19 SALNs
Justice Leonardo-De Castro 15 SALNs
Justice Abad 7 SALNs

This belies respondent’s representation that the JBC maintained its

requirement that the candidates submit all previous SALNs. If such were the
case, only those candidates determined to have complied should have been
shortlisted, and the others, including respondent, should not have qualified.
In any case, the requirement of submitting SALNs within the ten-year period
instead of all previous SALNs is more in keeping with the law. Recall that
Section 8, paragraph C(4) of R.A. No. 6713 provides that the filed SALNs
need not be retained by the receiving officer or the custodian after more than
ten years from the filing or receipt thereof, and actually allows such
documents to be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation.

Be that as it may, records clearly show that the only remaining

applicant-incumbent Justice who was not determined by the JBC En Banc to
have substantially complied was respondent, who submitted only 3 SALNs,
i.e., 2009, 2010 and 2011, even after extensions of the deadline for the
submission to do so.

Instead of complying, respondent offered, by way of her letter dated

July 23, 2012, justifications why she should no longer be required to file the
SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government
service only in 2009, thus her government service is not continuous; that her
government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to
retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative
responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that
respondent submitted only 3 SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P., and that
there was nary an attempt on respondent's part to comply.

Respondent sought to be excused from complying with the SALN

requirement because, allegedly, the SALNs requested from her (1995-1999
as respondent alleged) from U.P., are old and thus “infeasible to retrieve.”
But the Republic, through the OSG, was able to present before the Court
copies of respondent's SALNs for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, and 2002 from the U.P. HRDO. These files, therefore, are not
“infeasible to retrieve.” Also, in comparison with the other nominees, the
302
ORSN Report dated August 6, 2012.
Decision 121 G.R. No. 237428

SALNs which the latter could no longer produce are much older in age than
the SALNs which respondent regarded as “infeasible to retrieve”. For
instance, Justice Abad had no copy of his SALN from 1968-1974, 1976-
1980 and 1981-1983 while Justice Leonardo-De Castro had no copy of her
SALNs from 1973-1978.

Respondent likewise sought special treatment as having complied

with the submission of the SALN by submitting a Certificate of Clearance
issued by the U.P. HRDO. This clearance, however, hardly suffice as a
substitute for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to
clearing respondent of her academic and administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of
the date of her resignation on June 1, 2006. But such could not, by any
stretch of imagination, be considered as compliance with the SALN
requirement. Obviously, an administrative officer, performing ministerial
and administrative duties, could not have certified respondent's compliance
with the filing of SALNs which is a statutory, and not merely an
administrative, requirement.

In all these, respondent curiously failed to mention that she, in fact,

did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in U.P.
Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the
JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from a Member of the
Supreme Court. On this score, the observations of the Court in the case of
OCA v. Judge Estacion, Jr. 303 ring special significance:

He concealed from the appointing authority, at the time he applied for the
judicial post until his appointment, information regarding the criminal
charges for homicide and attempted homicide filed against him. Such fact
would have totally eluded the Court had it not been complained of by one
Mrs. Ruth L. Vda. de Sison who, incidentally, is the mother of one of the
victims. x x x

xxxx

x x x Respondent did not honestly divulge all that the appointing authority
ought to know to correctly discern whether he is indeed fit for the judicial
post. He continuously suppressed vital information on his personal
circumstances under the false belief that he can mislead the Court and get
away with it for good. What respondent did, or omitted to do, was a
calculated deception committed not only against the Court but against the
public as well, clearly indicative of his lack of moral rectitude to sit as
magistrate, and sufficiently repulsive that it detracts from public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. Dismissal indeed is the
appropriate retribution for such kind of transgression.

Be it stressed that judges are held to higher standards of integrity and

ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public

303
317 Phil. 600 (1995).
Decision 122 G.R. No. 237428

trust. They should inspire trust and confidence, and should bring honor to
the judiciary. And because of their critical position in the judicial
bureaucracy, this Court as overseer is duty-bound to insure that the
integrity of the judicial system is preserved and maintained, by pursuing
that ever-vigilant search for the virtues of competence, integrity, probity
and independence mandated by no less than the Constitution itself. 304
(Citations omitted)

Indubitably, respondent not only failed to substantially comply with

the submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. The
contents of respondent's Letter dated July 23, 2012 itself betray an exercise
of dishonesty and disposition to deceive in an attempt to secure for herself
the appointment as Chief Justice. In Ombudsman v. Peliño,305 We held:

Under the laws governing civil service, dishonesty is classified as a

grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first
infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor
and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. This ideal
standard ensures that only those of known probity, competence and
integrity are called to the challenge of public service. It is understood to
imply a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness;
lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of
fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.
Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to
perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public
officer or employee.306

For these reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered

respondent for interview as it already required the submission of, at least, the
SALNs corresponding to the immediately preceding 10 years up to
December 31, 2011.

Parenthetically, the Court observes that the circumstances surrounding

the receipt of, and the action or non-action of the JBC, on respondent's
Letter dated July 23, 2012 likewise leave much to be desired. The Letter,
while ostensibly sent to and received by the JBC on the same date, does not
appear to have been brought to the attention of the JBC En Banc. Excerpts307
from the Report of the House Committe on Justice on this point is revealing:

Justice Peralta, who was acting Chief Justice and ex officio

Chairman of the JBC at the time, testified that he never learned about the
non-submission of the SALNs by then-applicant [respondent], and that he
also never saw the letter submitted by the [r]espondent explaining why she
could not submit her SALNs. He stated that had he known about these
matters, he could have raised these issues during the en banc meeting of
the JBC. Atty. [Maria Milagros N. Fernan-]Cayosa likewise stated that she
never saw the letter-explanation, and that she merely relied on the matrix
304
Id. at 602-603.
305
532 Phil. 203 (2008).
306
Id. at 219-220.
307
Report of the House Committee.
Decision 123 G.R. No. 237428

prepared by the JBC Secretariat which stated that the Respondent Chief
Justice Sereno had already submitted her complete requirements.308

Even the JBC’s Execom to which the duty of ascertaining whether or

not the candidates have substantially complied with the documentary
requirements had been expressly delegated by the JBC En Banc, could not
produce any minutes of meeting or record to show that respondent was in
fact determined to have complied.

At any rate, the issue of whether or not there is administrative

culpability in the ranks of the JBC, the OEO or the ORSN relative to the
nomination of respondent in 2012 is not a concern in the instant petition and
is a matter best left to be decided in A.M. No. 17-11-12-SC and A.M. No.
17-11-17-SC, now pending before the Court.

Respondent's failure to submit to

the JBC her SALNs for several
years means that her integrity was
not established at the time of her
application

Respondent argues that failure to submit the SALNs to the JBC is not
cause for disqualification because the SALN was not among the documents
which the JBC considered as evidence of integrity.

This Court, again, disagrees.

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the

applicant is eyeing the position of the Chief Justice. The minutes of the JBC
En Banc meeting309 enlightens as to the rationale behind the requirement:

Senator Escudero moved that additional requirements be imposed

by the (JBC) for the position of Chief Justice, namely (1) all previous
SALNs (up to December 31, [2011]) for those in the government or SALN
as of December 31, (2011) for those from the private sector; and (2)
waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign
currency bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law and Foreign
Currency Deposits Act. The documents shall be treated with utmost
confidentiality and only for the use of the JBC. He proposed that these
additional requirements be included in the publication of the
announcement opening the said position. He explained that the basis of
his motion was the fact that the reason why Chief Justice Corona was
removed from office was due to inaccuracies in his SALN. The
Members of the House of Representatives, in the exercise of their
wisdom, determined that non-inclusion of assets in one's SALN is an
impeachable offense. Likewise, majority of the Senate voted to convict
because of the inaccuracies in the bank accounts and statements in his
308
Report of the House Committee.
309
Minutes on June 4, 2012.
Decision 124 G.R. No. 237428

SALN. He said that the JBC would not want to recommend a person
who is susceptible to such kind of attack. He said that the JBC should
impose higher standards to aspirants for the position of Chief Justice.

Congressman Tupas concurred with Senator Escudero's motion and

suggested that the waiver should not be limited to year-end balances only.

There being no objection, the motion was APPROVED. The (JBC)

agreed to PUBLISH the announcement opening the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippines together with the
additional requirements.

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

The requirement to submit the SALNs along hand with the waiver of
bank deposits, is therefore not an empty requirement that may easily be
dispensed with, but was placed by the JBC itself for a reason – in order to
allow the JBC to carry on its mandate of recommending only applicants of
high standards and who would be unsusceptible to impeachment attacks due
to inaccuracies in SALNs.

Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC
and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant's
fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In respondent's
case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would
be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since
the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the
SALN. This is precisely the reason why the JBC required the submission of
the SALNs together with the waiver of bank deposits, thus:

Justice Lagman expressed that previously the Members had agreed

that they would only use the waiver when there is a complaint, doubt, or
suspicion on the SALN of any of the candidates.

Senator Escudero said that if the argument that the JBC would not
use the waiver unless there is a complaint, bank information could not be
secured. The complaint could have no basis. He commented that by the
time the JBC receives the information, the public interview is finished. In
this case, the least that the JBC could do is to give the candidate an
opportunity to explain his side. He explained that the theory and logic
behind the requirement of a waiver was precisely due to the fact that
the former Chief Justice was impeached because of inaccuracies in his
SALN. Thus, the JBC should ensure that all the nominees who would
be nominated would not be accused of the same. The JBC would just
want to avoid a situation where the next Chief Justice, nominated by
the JBC and appointed by the President, would again be subjected to
impeachment.

Justice Peralta asked the Senator for clarification whether it is his

suggestion that if the JBC finds something wrong on the bank account of
any candidate, he or she would be asked in public.
Decision 125 G.R. No. 237428

Senator Escudero replied that it could be done; however, in the

questions that would be propounded by a Member, or in the response of
the candidates, the amounts need not be stated. The questions should
only tackle inconsistencies of bank deposits as against their SALNs.

Justice Lagman agreed with the Senator.

xxxx

Justice Hermosisima commented that the waiver is very easy to

comply with. The problem is that banks may not be able to respond given
the very short period of time. He said that the JBC requires a waiver so
that in the event that there is any question as to the accuracy of a
candidate's accounting in his or her SALN, then, the JBC would be able to
look into the bank accounts without violating the bank secrecy law. He
said that the JBC need not look into their accounts for now as no
complaint has been filed yet on any of the candidates.

Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas commented that

everybody should comply.

x x x x.310 (Emphasis ours)

Respondent is presumed to know of the importance of the filing of the

SALN together with the bank waiver. The waiver which respondent
executed under oath clearly provides:

This waiver is executed on the condition that the JBC or its duly
authorized representatives shall make use of it, as well as any and all
information or data obtained by virtue thereof, for the exclusive and sole
purpose of evaluating my qualifications for the position of Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis ours)

Conclusively then, respondent's failure to submit her SALNs to the

JBC means that she was not able to prove her integrity at the time of her
application as Chief Justice.

D.
Respondent's disposition to commit deliberate
acts and omissions demonstrating dishonesty
and lack of forthrightness is discordant with
any claim of integrity

The Court cannot play blind against the manifest inconsistencies, lack
of forthrightness and dishonesty committed by respondent as a government
official prior to and at the time of her application as Chief Justice. In
310
Minutes JBC En Banc Meeting dated July 16,2012, pp. 11-12.
Decision 126 G.R. No. 237428

addition to the suspicious and highly questionable circumstances

surrounding the execution of her SALNs, the following untruthful
statements and dishonest acts (as herein elsewhere discussed) ultimately
negate respondent's claim that she is a person of proven integrity:

(1) Respondent had no permit from U.P. to engage in

private practice while in government service but she did engage
in private practice as shown in her PDS and admitted in her Ad
Cautelam Comment;

(2) Respondent represented that after her resignation

from U.P. in 2006, she was engaged, full time, in private
practice. However, in her PDS, it was stated that she was
engaged as counsel by the government in the PIATCO cases
from 1994 up to 2009;

(3) Respondent claims that the clearance issued by

U.P., clearing her of academic/administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative
charges as of June 1, 2006 can be taken as an assurance that
U.P. considered the SALN requirements to have been met since
it is the ministerial duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that
the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and
accomplished. However, this ministerial duty of U.P. HRDO to
call her attention as regards compliance with the SALN
requirements was imposed only in April 2006 (CSC Resolution
No. Memorandum Circular No. 10-2006 dated April 17, 2006)
as stated in her Letter. Hence, the U.P. HRDO could not have
been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to respondent when such rule was not yet in
existence at that time;

(4) Her PDS shows that she was Deputy

Commissioner of the Commission on Human Rights only later
to be disclaimed by her during the Oral Argument stating that it
was only a functional title;

(5) In her Letter dated July 23, 2012 to the JBC,

respondent represented that her SALNs were infeasible to
retrieve when the SALNs that she selectively filed were
available all along in U.P. and in fact the OSG was able to get
copies of the same. Even respondent herself was able to get a
copy of her 1989 SALN from U.P.;

(6) There is a marked incompatibility between the

excuse respondent proffered in her Letter dated July 23, 2012,
Decision 127 G.R. No. 237428

and the explanation she gave in the Oral Argument. In the

Letter, the respondent reasoned that it is “infeasible to retrieve”
all her SALNs because of the age of said documents, i.e., that
they are more than fifteen years old. However, during her Oral
Arguments, she explained that it was “infeasible” to retrieve
them only because of time constraints;

(7) She claims that the other candidates for the Chief
Justice position did not comply with the SALN requirement for
the application, when it was only she who did not comply. Out
of the six incumbent Justices who were candidates for the Chief
Justice positions, it was only respondent who did not comply
with SALN submission. There are competent proofs on record
to show these other candidates' compliance, contrary to
respondent's allegations.

(8) Respondent committed tax fraud when she failed

to truthfully declare her income in her income tax returns for
the years 2007-2009 and in her value-added tax (VAT) returns
for the years 2005-2009;

Per the BIR Report,311 respondent underdeclared her

income in her quarterly VAT Returns the following amounts in
the taxable years 2005-2009:

Period Quarterly Income Declared Income Over (Under) (Php)

from PIATCO Case per VAT Return
(Php) (Php)
2005
Q3 1,398,807.50 - -1,398,807.50
Q4 7,234,455.44 667,333.33 -6567122.11
2006
Q1 - 469,375.00 469,375.00
Q2 - 1,416,664.25 1,416,664.25
Q3 1,539,546.28 - -1,539,546.28
Q4 1,387,292.12 1,246,992.00 -140,300.12
2007
Q1 - 2,620,340.17 2,620,340.17
Q2 - -
Q3 4,379,198.29 2,183,529.33 -2,195,668.96
Q4 633,670.58 - -633,670.58
2008

311
Rollo, p. 1973.
Decision 128 G.R. No. 237428

Q1 - 2,650,440.00 2,650,440.00
Q2 - -
Q3 - 508,032.00 508,032.00
Q4 5,184,435.85 1,045,262.67 -4,139,173.19
2009
Q1 344,243.65 301,552.00 -42,691.65
Total Undeclared Income Subject to VAT -16,656,980.39

On this matter, respondent avers in her Reply/Supplement to the

Memorandum Ad Cautelam that she was not given the chance to be heard on
this new matter in the Republic's Memorandum, which makes reference to
new documents, totally alien to and outside of the matters raised in the
Republic's Petition, Reply, and other previous submissions.

There is no truth to the allegation that respondent was not afforded the
opportunity to address this matter or that this matter is "totally alien" to this
proceedings. This matter was actually brought up during the Oral
Argument. In its Memorandum, the Republic explained that during the Oral
Argument, some Members of the Court raised questions regarding
respondent's income as counsel in the PIATCO cases and the payment of the
corresponding taxes thereto, hence, the inclusion of the same in its
Memorandum.312 In the same way, respondent could have addressed the
same in her Memorandum Ad Cautelam, instead she opted to do so in a
belatedly filed Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam.

At any rate, respondent's argument in the said Reply/Supplement,

implying that the allegations on the tax fraud are unfounded, and that in
including this matter, which is a mere reiteration of the discussion in Article
I of the Articles of Impeachment, the OSG usurped the sole power of the
House of Representatives to initiate and prosecute the Articles of
Impeachment in blatant disregard of the Constitution,313 deserve scant
consideration.

It bears stressing that respondent is not being prosecuted for tax fraud
in this case. The Court did not discuss the merits of the said tax fraud nor
did the Court made any conviction against the respondent as regards the said
offense. Neither is this Court's finding of respondent's lack of proven
integrity during her application anchored upon this act. This matter is cited
as a corroborative circumstance to respondent's non-filing of certain SALNs,
already established in this case. Notably, the Congress had already
determined that a probable cause exist that respondent committed the said
offense.

312
Id. at 1884.
313
Reply/Supplement, p. 2-8.
Decision 129 G.R. No. 237428

Further, respondent's disposition and propensity to commit dishonesty

and lack of candidness are manifested through her subsequent acts
committed during her incumbency as Chief Justice, which are now matters
of public record and also determined to be constituting probable cause for
impeachment:

(9) Caused the procurement of a brand-new Toyota

Land Cruiser worth at least Php5,000,000.00;

(10) Caused the hiring of Ms. Helen Macasaet without

the requisite public bidding and who received excessive
compensation amounting to more than Php11,000,000.00;

(11) Misused at least Php3,000,000.00 of government

funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the
venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting;

(12) Created the Judiciary Decentralized Office (JDO)

in the guise of reopening the Regional Court Administration
Office (RCAO) without being sanctioned by the Court En
Banc;

(13) Issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in

Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court's internal rules
and misrepresented that the TRO was issued upon the
recommendation of the Member-in-charge;

(14) Manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to

transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao;

(15) Ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect

to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay
to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased
judges and Justices;

(16) Appointed Geraldine Econg as Head of the JDO

and Brenda Jay Angeles-Mendoza as Chief of the Philippine
Mediation Center Office (PMCO) without the approval of the
Court En Banc;

(17) Failed and refused to appoint qualified applicants

to several high-ranking positions in the Supreme Court;
Decision 130 G.R. No. 237428

(18) Ordered the dissemination of erroneous

information on what transpired during the Supreme Court En
Banc deliberations in A.M. No. 16-08-04-SC on the alleged
involvement of four (4) incumbent judges in illegal drugs and
undermined the co-equal power of the Executive Department
by ordering the Executive Secretary himself to file cases against
the judges;

(19) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude

then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice Francis Jardeleza,
by using highly confidential document involving national
security against the latter;

(20) Clustered the nominees for the six (6) vacant

positions of Associate Justice in the Sandiganbayan without
legal basis and in so doing, impaired the power of the President
to appoint members of the Judiciary;

(21) Misrepresented to the members of the Supreme

Court En Banc that there were Justices who requested to do
away with the voting of recommended applicants to the vacant
positions in the Supreme Court;

(22) Manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude

Court of Appeals Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas-Peralta
from the shortlist of nominees for the position of Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals;

(23) Interfered with the investigation conducted by the

House of Representatives on the alleged misuse of the tobacco
funds in the Province of Ilocos Norte by unilaterally preparing a
Joint Statement, asking the House of Representatives to
reconsider its show cause order against the Justices of the Court
of Appeals, and then pressuring then Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals, now Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. to
likewise sign the same;

(24) Undermined and disrespected the impeachment

proceedings conducted by the House of Representatives against
her.314

Again, while concedingly the foregoing acts as revealed during the

Congressional hearings on the impeachment are not proper subjects of the
instant quo warranto petition, these acts are nevertheless reflective and
314
Resolution Setting Forth the Articles of Impeachment Against Supreme Court Chief Justice
Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, March 19, 2018.
Decision 131 G.R. No. 237428

confirmatory of respondent's lack of integrity at the time of her nomination

and appointment as Chief Justice and her inability to possess such
continuing requirement of integrity. Indeed, Rule 130, Section 34 of the
Rules on Evidence provide:

SEC. 34. Similar acts as evidence. -- Evidence that one did or did not do a
certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do
the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to
prove a specific inent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. (Emphasis ours)

E.
Respondent's ineligibility for lack of proven
integrity cannot be cured by her nomination
and subsequent appointment as Chief Justice

The Court is all too aware that the instant petition neither partakes of
an administrative or criminal proceeding meant to determine culpability for
failure to file SALNs. Respondent maintains that she filed all her SALNs,
only that she refuses to present proof of such SALNs before the Court. The
Court's pronouncement, however, should not be made dependent upon the
pieces of evidence which a party may possibly present in a different forum.
Rather, the Court is mandated to render judgment based on the evidence
presented before it, in compliance with the dictates of due process. And the
evidence, as it stands before Us, shows that respondent failed to file nine
SALNs in her 20-year service in U.P. College of Law and submitted to the
JBC only three out of the required ten SALNs at the time of her application
as Chief Justice.

Respondent split hairs in stating that failure to file is different from

failure to submit the SALNs to the JBC. That may be true. But it is likewise
true that despite ample opportunity to do so, respondent chose not to present
evidence as to preponderate the case in her favor. The Court cannot therefore
be faulted, at least for purposes of the instant quo warranto proceedings, to
conclude that respondent not only failed to submit the SALNs to the JBC,
but altogether failed to file the same.

Such failure to file and to submit the SALNs to the JBC, is a clear
violation not only of the JBC rules, but also of the law and the Constitution.
The discordance between respondent's non-filing and non-submission of the
SALNs and her claimed integrity as a person is too patent to ignore. For lack
of proven integrity, respondent ought to have been disqualified by the JBC
and ought to have been excluded from the list of nominees transmitted to the
President. As the qualification of proven integrity goes into the barest
standards set forth under the Constitution to qualify as a Member of the
Decision 132 G.R. No. 237428

Court, the subsequent nomination and appointment to the position will not
qualify an otherwise excluded candidate. In other words, the inclusion of
respondent in the shortlist of nominees submitted to the President cannot
override the minimum Constitutional qualifications.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be

possessed at the time of appointment and assumption of office and also
during the officer's entire tenure as a continuing requirement. 315 When the
law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain
disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to serve as public
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even becomes a
candidate.316

The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of

the Court's finding that respondent is ineligible, in the first place, to be a
candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said
position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to
do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take
judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO, as
regards the circumstances relative to the selection and nomination of
respondent submitted to this Court in A.M. No. 17-11-12 and A.M. No. 17-
11-17-SC. Relatedly, the Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the
power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in
and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires.317

Neither will the President's act of appointment cause to qualify

respondent. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the
participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is
evident from the composition of the JBC itself. The regular members of the
JBC are appointees of the President, including an ex-officio member, the
Secretary of Justice, who serves as the President's alter ego. As observed
during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

xxxx

MR. CONCEPCION. The Judicial and Bar Council is no doubt an

315
Maquiling v. COMELEC, 709 Phil. 408 (2013).
316
Id.
317
SEC. 9. Judgment where usurpation found. – When the respondent is found guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, judgment shall be
rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefro, and that the petitioner or relator,
as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the respective
rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.
Decision 133 G.R. No. 237428

innovation. But it is an innovation made in response to the public clamor

in favor of eliminating politics in the appointment of judges.

At present, there will be about 2,200 positions of judges, excluding

those of the Supreme Court, to be filled. We feel that neither the President
alone nor the Commission on Appointments would have the time and the
means necessary to study the background of every one of the candidates
for appointment to the various courts in the Philippines, specially
considering that we have accepted this morning the amendment to the
effect that no person shall be qualified unless he has a proven high sense
of morality and probity. These are matters that require time, which we are
sure the President does not have except, probably, he would have to
endorse the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation or to some
intelligence agency of the government. And we do not think that these
agencies are qualified to pass upon questions of morality, integrity and
competence of lawyers.

As regards the implication that we are, in effect, depriving the

President of the power of appointment, all we do consider is the fact that
the members of the Council are all appointees of the President. They are
alter egos of the President so, in effect, they are exercising the power by
virtue of the appointment by the President. So, the alleged negation or
denial or emasculation of the appointing power of the President does not
really exist since all members of the Council, except those who are ex-
officio members who, by the way, are also appointees of the President, are
all appointees of the President.

In effect, the action of the JBC, particularly that of the Secretary of

Justice as ex-officio member, is reflective of the action of the President. Such
as when the JBC mistakenly or wrongfully accepted and nominated
respondent, the President, through his alter egos in the JBC, commits the
same mistake and the President's subsequent act of appointing respondent
cannot have any curative effect.

Besides in Luego v. Civil Service Commission,318 We said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be

performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights,
the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot
be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should
have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations
of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (Emphasis
ours)

As emphasized in Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission:319

318
227 Phil. 303, 307 (1986).
319
253 Phil. 717, 725 (1989).
Decision 134 G.R. No. 237428

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this

case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission
has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the
Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a
particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a
substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested,
subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. (Emphasis ours)

Thus, while the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to

the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements
are satisfied, in the absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to
attack.

Even as respondent took her “oath of office,” she remains

disqualified. An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office
and a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. 320 The oath, couched in
the following tenor, states:

Ako ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay

at katapatan, sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking
kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas, na aking itataguyod
at ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas; na tunay na mananalig
at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang legal,
at mga dekretong pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may
kapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
pananagutang ito nang walang ano mang pasubali o hangaring umiwas.

Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

As respondent herself expressed through her dissent in Philippine

Savings Bank, “[w]hen a public officer affixes his signature on his Oath of
Office, he embraces all his constitutional and statutory duties as a public
officer, one of which is the positive duty to disclose all of his assets and
liabilities. Thus, for all public officers, what is absolute is not the
confidentiality privilege, but the obligation of disclosure.”321

While respondent putatively took an oath to defend and support the

320
Chairman Chavez v. Ronidel, et al., 607 Phil. 76, 83 (2009).
321
Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, supra note 241.
Decision 135 G.R. No. 237428

Constitution and to obey the laws of the land, she had not been forthright
with the circumstances surrounding the lacking SALNs. This makes her oath
untruthful and altogether false.

F.
Respondent is a de facto officer removable
through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible

therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title
that confers on him the status of a de facto officer.322

Tayko v. Capistrano,323 through Justice Ostrand, instructs:

Briefly defined, a de facto judge is one who exercises the duties of

a judicial office under color of an appointment or election thereto x x x.
He differs, on the one hand, from a mere usurper who undertakes to act
officially without any color of right, and on the others hand, from a judge
de jure who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified and whose
term of office has not expired x x x. (Citations omitted)

For lack of a Constitutional qualification, respondent is ineligible to

hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or
title thereto. As such, respondent has never attained the status of an
impeachable official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust respondent from the appointive
position of Chief Justice. Tayko continues:

The rightful authority of a judge, in the full exercise of his public

judicial functions, cannot be questioned by any merely private suitor, nor
by any other, excepting in the form especially provided by law. A judge de
facto assumes the exercise of a part of the prerogative of sovereignty, and
the legality of that assumption is open to the attack of the sovereign power
alone. Accordingly, it is a well established principle, dating from the
earliest period and repeatedly confirmed by an unbroken current of
decisions, that the official acts of a de facto judge are just as valid for all
purposes as those of a de jure judge, so far as the public or third persons
who are interested therein are concerned. The rule is the same in civil and
criminal cases. The principle is one founded in policy and convenience,
for the right of no one claiming a title or interest under or through the
proceedings of an officer having an apparent authority to act would be
safe, if it were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the title
of such officer up to its original source, and the title or interest of such
person were held to be invalidated by some accidental defect or flaw in the
appointment, election or qualification of such officer, or in the rights of
those from whom his appointment or election emanated; nor could the
supremacy of the laws be maintained, or their execution enforced, if the
322
Regala v. Court of First Instance of Bataan, 77 Phil. 684 (1946).
323
G.R. No. 30188, October 2, 1928.
Decision 136 G.R. No. 237428

acts of the judge having a colorable, but not a legal title, were to be
deemed invalid. As in the case of judges of courts of record, the acts of a
justice de facto cannot be called in question in any suit to which he is not a
party. The official acts of a de facto justice cannot be attacked collaterally.
An exception to the general rule that the title of a person assuming to act
as judge cannot be questioned in a suit before him in generally recognized
in the case of a special judge, and it is held that a party to an action before
a special judge may question his title to the office of judge on the
proceedings before him, and that the judgment will be reversed on appeal,
where proper exceptions are taken, if the person assuming to act as special
judge is not a judge de jure. The title of a de facto officer cannot be
indirectly questioned in a proceeding to obtain a writ of prohibition to
prevent him from doing an official act nor in a suit to enjoin the collection
of a judgment rendered by him. Having at least colorable right to the
officer his title can be determined only in a quo warranto proceeding or
information in the nature of quo warranto at suit of the sovereign.
(Citation omitted)

Although Tayko dealt with a challenge to the title of a judge, who is

not an impeachable official, the ruling therein finds suitable application
since quo warranto as a remedy is available against respondent who is a de
facto Chief Justice, having a mere colorable right thereto. This must
necessarily be so since the Constitution, in providing that impeachable
officials can only be removed by impeachment, presumes that such
impeachable official is one having de jure title to the office.

Upon a finding that respondent is in fact ineligible to hold the position

of Chief Justice and is therefore unlawfully holding and exercising such
public office, the consequent judgment under Section 9, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court is the ouster and exclusion of respondent from holding and
exercising the rights, functions and duties of the Office of the Chief Justice.

IV.
Guidelines for the Bench, the Bar and the JBC

The present is the exigent and opportune time for the Court to
establish well-defined guidelines that would serve as guide posts for the
bench, the bar and the JBC, as well, in the discharge of its Constitutionally-
mandated functions. In sum, this Court holds:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be

availed of, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present, when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the
time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold
office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official concerned is
Decision 137 G.R. No. 237428

impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or

to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Members of the Judiciary are bound by the qualifications of honesty,

probity, competence, and integrity. In ascertaining whether a candidate
possesses such qualifications, the JBC in the exercise of its Constitutional
mandate, set certain requirements which should be complied with by the
candidates to be able to qualify. These requirements are announced and
published to notify not only the applicants but the public as well. Changes
to such set of requirements, as agreed upon by the JBC En Banc through a
proper deliberation, such as in this case when the JBC decided to allow
substantial compliance with the SALN submission requirement, should also
be announced and published for the same purpose of apprising the
candidates and the public of such changes. At any rate, if a candidate is
appointed despite being unable to comply with the requirements of the JBC
and despite the lack of the aforementioned qualifications at the time of
application, the appointment may be the subject of a quo warranto provided
it is filed within one year from the appointment or discovery of the defect.
Only the Solicitor General may institute the quo warranto petition.

The willful non-filing of a SALN is an indication of dishonesty, lack

of probity and lack of integrity. Moreso if the non-filing is repeated in
complete disregard of the mandatory requirements of the Constitution and
the law.

Consistent with the SALN laws, however, SALNs filed need not be
retained after more than ten years by the receiving office or custodian or
repository unless these are the subject of investigation pursuant to the law.
Thus, to be in keeping with the spirit of the law requiring public officers to
file SALNs – to manifest transparency and accountability in public office –
if public officers cannot produce their SALNs from their personal files, they
must obtain a certification from the office where they filed and/or the
custodian or repository thereof to attest to the fact of filing. In the event that
said offices certify that the SALN was indeed filed but could not be located,
said offices must certify the valid and legal reason of their non-availability,
such as by reason of destruction by natural calamity due to fire or
earthquake, or by reason of the allowed destruction after ten years under
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713.

V.
Blatant Disregard and Open Defiance
to the Sub Judice Rule

Perhaps owing to novelty, the instant case has opened a pandora's box
of unsolicited opinions, streaming in abundance from those professed legal
and non-legal experts alike. This flurry of opinions, demonstrations, public
Decision 138 G.R. No. 237428

and media appearances made by the parties themselves or at their behest, or

by their lawyers and spokespersons, had demonstrably shifted the plane from
what should otherwise be a purely legal, calm and sober approach to the
present controversy into a detestable feast of pros and cons, and of a
mediocre and haphazard approximation of a perceived good versus evil. This
veritable feast had become too delectable to escape the waiting predators'
keen sense of attack, especially at a time when the prey appears to be at its
most vulnerable. This Court is an institution designed and dedicated to a
specific purpose and thus refuses to fall prey and invite claws to dig into its
walls. Because of the various extraneous redirections from the merits which
the instant case has received, there is a need to emphasize that this case
involves a purely legal and justiciable matter which the Court intends, and
had resolved, through the application of the Constitution, the law and
relevant jurisprudence, unswayed by personalities or sentiments.

As such, the Court had lent extreme tolerance to the parties and non-
parties equally, as the Court shall ultimately speak through its decision. Be
that as it may, the Court, in jealous regard of judicial independence, cannot
simply overlook the open and blatant defiance of the sub judice rule suffered
by the present action.

The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to

the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing
the court, or obstructing the administration of justice.324 The rationale for this
rule is for the courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law, to be immune
from every extraneous influence; for the case to be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and for the determination of such facts be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudice or symphathies. In fine, what is sought to be protected is
the primary duty of the courts to administer justice in the resolution of cases
before them.325

Thus, it is generally inappropriate to discuss the merits of and make

comments on cases sub judice and such acts may even result to contempt of
court. In U.S. v. Sullen326 it was stated:

In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial

business unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to impair the
impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice,
this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for
contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of
its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference
obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon
as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an
unprejudiced tribunal.
324
Romero, II., et al. v. Senator Estrada, et al., 602 Phil. 312, 319 (2009).
325
P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., 726 Phil. 642 (2014).
326
36 F. 2d 220.
Decision 139 G.R. No. 237428

In Our jurisdiction, this rule finds legal basis on the Court's power of
contempt. Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.

– After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period may be fixed by the
court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the
following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

xxxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to

impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

x x x (Emphasis ours)

The oft-cited defense of persons charged with indirect contempt for

violating the sub judice rule is their right to free speech. Needless to say, this
Court would be the first in line of combat in a legal battle to uphold such
constitutionally-protected right. However, when actions, posing to be
innocent exercise of such right, "impede, interfere with and embarrass the
administration of justice" or "make a serious and imminent threat thereto",
this Court will not hesitate to call out and punish the same. 327 In Sheppard v.
Maxwell,328 the US Supreme Court reminds that although the freedom of
expression should be given great latitutde, it must not be so broad as to
divert the trial away from its objective which is to adjudicate both criminal
and civil matters in an objective, calm, and solemn courtroom setting.

The sub judice rule finds a more austere application to members of the
Bar and of the Bench as the strict observance thereof is mandated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct:

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS

OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH
TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT.

Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the

media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR THE

327
P/Supt. Marantan v. Atty. Diokno, et al., supra note 325.
328
384 U.S. 333 (1966).
Decision 140 G.R. No. 237428

PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

CANON 1 – INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a

fundamental guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and
exemplify judicial independence in both its individual and institutional
aspects.

SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner

the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before any court or
administrative agency.

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for

the discharge of judicial duties in order to maintain and enhance the
institutional and operational independence of the judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of

judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary,
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

CANON 2 – INTEGRITY

Integrity is essentially not only to the proper discharge of the

judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct

above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm

the people's faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely
be done but must also be seen to be done.

CANON 3 – IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial

office. It applies not only to the decision itself but to the process by which
the decision is made.

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in

and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the
legal profession, and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the
judiciary.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is

before or could come before them, make any comment that might
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair
the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment
in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

CANON 4 – PROPRIETY
Decision 141 G.R. No. 237428

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges

must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by
the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity
of the judicial office.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to

freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising
such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the judiciary.

Lawyer speech is subject to greater regulation for two significant

reasons: one, because of the lawyer's relationship to the judicial process; and
two, the signficant dangers that a lawyer's speech poses to the trial
process.329 As such, actions in violation of the sub judice rule may be dealt
with not only through contempt proceedings but also through administrative
actions.

It is thus perturbing that certain officials of the separate branches of

the Government and even men and women learned in law had succumbed to
the tempting affray that tends to divert the instant quo warranto action from
its primary purpose. Even worse, respondent and her spokepersons chose to
litigate respondent's case, apart from her Ad Cautelam submissions to the
Court, before several media-covered engagements. Through her actuations,
respondent appears to have forgotten that this is a court action for quo
warranto, and as such, the concomitant rule on sub judice unnegotiably
applies. Worst still, respondent who is a lawyer and who asserts right to the
Chief Justice position and therefore must foremost be aware of the rule,
continues to conjure public clamor against the Court and its Members with
regard to this pending case in Court.

It is interesting to note that respondent initially refused to participate

in the congressional hearings for the impeachment complaint. When this
petition for quo warranto was filed, respondent continuously refuses to
recognize this Court's jurisdiction. Instead of participating in the process
and answering the charges against her truthfully to assist in the expeditious
resolution of the matter, respondent opted to proceed to a nationwide
campaign, conducting speeches and accepting interviews, discussing the
merits of the case and making comments thereon to vilify the members of
the Congress, cast aspersions on the impartiality of the Members of the
Court, degrade the faith of the people to the Judiciary, and falsely impute ill-
motives against the government that it is orchestrating the charges against
her. It is well-nigh unthinkable for respondent to profess deprivation of due
process when she herself chose to litigate her case before the media.

329
See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
Decision 142 G.R. No. 237428

These public appearances,330 to name a few, are as follows:

Event Source Quotations

'Speak Truth to Video: "Kung manalo ang quo warranto,
Power' forum in <https://web.facebook.co mapupunta tayo sa diktaturya,"
m/juliusnleonen/videos/88
UP Diliman, 9291114607029/>
she said. "Talagang wawasakin
Quezon City on Article: completely ng quo warranto na ito
May 5, 2018 <https://www.rappler.com ang judiciary."
/nation/201854-sereno-
quo-warranto-destroy- "Pag itong quo warranto natuloy,
judicial-independence>
hindi na right and reason, kundi
will — will na nu'ng whoever is on
top. So kailangan natin pigilan
ito . . . " she said.
Integrated Bar of Article: “Ano po ang tawag sa kondisyon
the Philippines <https://businessmirror.co na ang citizen walang kalaban-
m.ph/sereno-sees-
(IBP) Central dictatorship-after-filing-
laban sa gobyerno” Chief Justice
Luzon Regional of-quo-warranto-petition- Maria Lourdes A. Sereno asked.
Convention and against-her/> “Ang tawag po doon dictatorship,
Mandatory hindi po constitutional democracy
Continuing Legal ang tawag doon,” she said.
Education at thr “That is what is going to happen if
Quest Hotel here the quo waranto petition is
on May 2, 2018 granted,” Sereno stated.

“The booming voice of Justice

Vicente Mendoza has reverberated
that if the quo waranto petition is
granted, the Judiciary will destroy
itself,” Sereno said as she also
praised the IBP’s stand to oppose
and dismiss the petition.
Forum on Video: “Of my colleagues, I know that
upholding <https://web.facebook.co several of them, have had their
m/24OrasGMA/videos/10
Judicial 156438427991977/?t=16>
qualifications, their inability to
Independence at Article: submit documentary requirements,
the Ateneo Law <http://newsinfo.inquirer. waived, several of them. If the JBC
School in net/985460/defend- was correct in saying that an
Rockwell, Makati judicial-independence-cj- attempt to submit requirements,
sereno-tells-law-students>
City on that good faith should be accorded
Wednesday, April to the 14, including those against
25, 2018 me, why am I the only one being
singled out?,” she told law
students at the Ateneo Law School
during a forum on judicial
independence.

“The questions propounded by

Supreme Court itself, they wanted
to examine everything I did in the
past in the hope they would find
330
The websites indicated herein were last accessed on May 8, 2018.
Decision 143 G.R. No. 237428

something scandalous in my life. I

was just preparing myself for the
question, ‘ilang boyfriend mo
na?,’” Sereno said, which elicited
laughter from the crowd.

“Hindi ko naman po minanipula ni

konti ang JBC...14 kaming pare-
parehong sitwasyon. Bakit
nagreklamo kung kayo nalagay sa
listahan at ako nalagay sa
listahan. Ang masama ay hindi
kayo ang nalagay at ako ang
nalagay,” she added.
Speech at the <https://www.philstar.com“The month of May is a time that
Commencement /headlines/2018/04/23/180is supposed to be devoted to
8492/sereno-camp-
Exercises of the writing decisions in the many
questions-sc-haste-decide-
College of Law of her-case> pending cases before the Court.
the University of Anyway the session will resume on
San Agustin <https://news.mb.com.ph/ June 5, so what’s with the rush?”
(USA) in Iloilo 2018/04/21/no-need-to-
rush-quo-warranto-
City, on April 20, sereno/>
“Wala namang dahilan para
2018 magmadali.”
“Kung totoo po, indication po ito
na mayroon na po silang
conclusion bago pa man marinig
ang lahat,” Sereno said.
Fellowship of the <http://newsinfo.inquirer. “Even your very livelihoods are
Philippine Bar net/981806/sereno-ups- threatened; there is no safety for
Association attack-vs-quo-warranto- any of you…That is how deadly
in-speech-at-lawyers-
(PBA) in Makati forum?
this quo warranto petition is,” she
City on April 11, utm_campaign=Echobox added.
2018 &utm_medium=Social&u
tm_source=Facebook#link Sereno said if the Supreme Court
_time=1523450119> would cooperate in the move of the
Executive to oust her sans
impeachment trial, “I will use
directly the words of Chief Justice
Davide that it will be judicial
hara-kiri, if not a judicial
kamikaze bringing it the
destruction of the entire judiciary
as well as the entire constitutional
framework.”
30th Anniversary <http://newsinfo.inquirer. “I look at any forum to try me
and 23rd National net/973692/sereno- other than the constitutionally
delivers-most-powerful-
Convention of the speech-yet-not-all-peers-
exclusive form of impeachment as
Philippine happy> an admission by the complainant
Women Judges and my other detractors that after
Association 15 hearings, they have failed to
(PWJA) in come up with any evidence which I
Manila Hotel on can be convicted in the Senate,”
Decision 144 G.R. No. 237428

Thursday, March she asserted.

8, 2018
“Sila ang nagsimula bakit ayaw
nilang tapusin? Napakaaga naman
yata para umamin sila na wala
silang napala kundi matinding
kabiguan kaya’t kung anu-ano na
lamang ang gimik ang ginagawa
nila masunod lamang ang kanilang
nais,” Sereno added.
CNN Philippines <https://www.youtube.co In this interview, CJOL Sereno,
(March 9, 2018); m/watch? among others, stated that her
v=HlYKAQ4QPcY
One on One with 1. http://cnnphilippi
defense preparation was directed
the Chief Justice nes.com/videos/2018/03/0 towards the impeachment
with Pinky 9/One-on-one-with-Chief- proceedings as she has not assessed
Webb Justice-Maria-Lourdes- yet the quo warranto petition as of
Sereno.html> the interview.
- “From the very beginning, we
were looking really at the
impeachment provisions of the
Constitution so that has been the
preparation all along. Well, I
haven't yet assessed this latest quo
warranto petition. Not yet time
maybe”

- CJOL Sereno refused to talk

about the quo warranto petition,
but interpreted the SC's resolution
which directed her to comment on
said petition without taking due
course to the petition. CJOL said
that such action of the SC does not
mean anything and affirmed
Webb's interepretation that such
action does not mean that the SC
assumes jurisdiction over the quo
warranto case.

- “Yan naman talaga ang hindi ko

pwede pagusapan, ano.”

- On jurisdiction: “Normal yan,

marami kaming ganyan petition.
Wala naman talagang ibig sabihin
yan. In most cases, walang ibig
sabihin yun kasi hindi pa
prejudged. Pero hayaan niyo po
muna yung lawyers ko ang
magsabi kasi mahirap naman pong
Decision 145 G.R. No. 237428

pangunahan ko sila eh ginagawa

pa po nila yung sagot eh”.
- “Marami ho kaming laging
ginagamit na without due course at
marami kaming dinidismiss na
nanggaling sa without giving due
course pero pinagkocomment... It
doesn't mean... Ang usual tradition
po namin ay walang ibig sabihin
po yun”
Speech of CJOL <https://www.youtube.co Directed towards politicians
Sereno at the m/watch? supposedly regarding the ongoing
v=iN5l1xW9bpk>
Panpacific impeachment proceedings, CJOL
University North Sereno said, “'Wag na 'wag niyo
Philippines kami gigipitin” and further stated
(March 9, 2018) that such what judicial
(Posted by CNN independence means.
Philippines) - I know that our women judges,
for example, are always eager to
make a stand for judicial
independence. Kayong mga
pulitiko, wag nyong pakialaman
ang aming mga gustong gawin
kung palagay nyo kayo ay tama at
andyan ang ebidensya, lalabas
naman yan eh. Pero huwag na
huwag nyo kaming gigipitin. Yan
ang ibig sabihin ng judicial
independence”
Speech on “The <http://newsinfo.inquirer. - CJOL Sereno emphasized that AJ
Mumshie on net/987807/live-chief- Leonardo-De Castro's inhibition
justice-sereno-at-up-
Fire: Speak diliman-forum>
would prove that she is unbiased.
Truth to Power” - Hindi sila tumigil, hangga't
held at the naisip ng isa, yung nagaakusa sa
University of the akin, “ay yung SALN niya, yung
Philippines (May SALN nya na sinabi nya sa JBC na
5, 2018) nahihirapan niyang humanap (sic).
*Forum was Yun, dun tugisin. At sinabi nya na
organized by dapat ako ay idisqualify dahil
youth groups, unjust daw na ako ang naappoint.
Ako Ay Isang May injustice na nangyari. So
Sereno and Youth alam na natin ang isa sa
for Miriam pinagsisimulan nito”
- CJOL Sereno said that “Even
when they thought they have won,
in the end, they will never win. The
country is already woke. The youth
would not listen to lies. The people
Decision 146 G.R. No. 237428

own the judiciary. They are not

owned by the judiciary, the
justices, the judges” and that the
“good will always prevail over
evil”.
- CJOL Sereno said that two of her
accusers, who she considers as her
rival also, will be one of those who
will decide the quo warranto
petition filed against her, thereby
against the basic rules of fair play.
- “Eh bakit biglang umatras sila
(pertaining to his accusers in the
impeachment proceedings) at
ginawa itong kaso na quo
warranto kung saan ang dalawa sa
nagsabing hindi ako dapat
naappoint eh sila rin ang
maghuhusga sa akin. Saan kayo
nakakita ng sitwasyon na yung
karibal niyo sa posisyon ang may
kapangyarihan sabihin kayong
dapat ka matanggal sa posisyon,
hindi ikaw dapat. Paano nangyari?
Under what rules of fairness, what
rules of Constitution or legal
system can an accuser who acted
also as my prosecutor during the
oral arguments now sit as judge?
This violates the most basic norms
of fairplay...Ngayon talaga, nakita
na, na hindi ho ako bibigyan
talaga ng ilang ito ng kahit anong
modicum of fairness”
- She discussed that one of the
effects of an invalid appointment is
the forfeiture of retirement
benefits.
- “At alam nyo ho, pag sinabi na
invalid yung appointment, pati
yung retirement benefits ho
tatanggalin”
- The granting of a quo warranto
would result into dictatorship and
would destroy the judiciary.
- At ano ho ang mangyayari kung
ang buong sangay, ang lahat ng
kawani ng gobyerno ay kayang
takutin at hindi na pwedeng
Decision 147 G.R. No. 237428

maging independent?.. Ano hong

mangyayari kung ang COMELEC
ho ay sinabihan ng Presidente at
Solicitor General na “yung partido
lang namin ang pwedeng manalo,
kung hindi i-quo warranto ka
namin?” Ano po yun? Ano yung
tawag sa ganoong sitwasyon na
may matinding pananakot sa
buong bayan? Ang tawag po dun,
diktaturya.. Kung manalo po ang
quo warranto, yan po ang
magiging resulta”
- “Saang korte kayo pupunta? Sino
ang magtatapang na huwes kung
madali na sila mapatanggal?...
Hindi na ho kayo makakatakbo,
kasi lahat ho ng judges tatakutin
ng Solicitor General...Saan ho
kayo pupunta sa isang arbiter na
impartial?.. wala na po.
Wawasakin nitong quo warranto
petition nito, completely ang
judiciary”
- “Ano na ho ang mangyayari sa
bayan natin kung wala na hong
security of tenure sa government
service? Kasi kung may kaunting
kulang lang sa file... kulang ang
file na nabigay sa JBC.. eh
naglalabasan na ho ang SALN
ko... pero eto tatanggalin at
gagawa sila ng prinsipyo at
ikawawasak ng buong bayan para
lang sa kanilang personal na
interes. Nakakalagim po ang
pangyayaring ito”
Speech on <https://www.youtube.co CJOL Sereno discussed the
Ateneo Law m/watch? contents of the quo warranto
v=oh35V4BMiww>
School for the petition.
forum Tindig: A - On the prescriptive period, CJOL
forum on Sereno said that jobs of the
upholding justices, judges and government
judicial employees are jeopardized because
independence as of the assertion of the OSG that a
a pillar of petition for quo warranto does not
democracy prescribe against the government.
(April 25, 2018) CJOL Sereno said that such
assertion makes the action
imprescriptible.
- “According to the Solicitor
General, the one year prescriptive
period can never apply against
Decision 148 G.R. No. 237428

government. It must be personal

knowledge of the Solicitor General
himself. And so if you change the
person of the Solicitor General, the
period continues to always be
fresh. It's a never prescriptible, a
completely imprescriptible action.
So you jeopardize the jobs of the
justices, the judges and all gov't
employees. You allow selected
targeting against the Chief Justice
for reasons that are very obvious
now and you destroy the legal
profession”
1.
- On the effect of the quo warranto
petition, CJOL Sereno said that all
incumbent judges and justices
would be prejudiced because their
qualifications may suddenly be
reviewed.

- “The SC itself really wanted to

examine every little thing I did in
the past in the hope that they
would find something scandalous
about my life...”
- “It also prejudices more than
2000 judges and justices that are
already sitting now because all of
their qualifications may suddenly
be reviewed. The JBC was wrong
to waive this qualification for this
position. I can tell you as a matter
of record that of my colleagues, I
know that several of them have had
their qualifications, their inability
to submit documentary
requirements, waived. Several of
them. So if the JBC was correct in
saying that an attempt to submit
the requirements, the good faith
accorded to those who had missing
requirements, should be accorded
to 14 of us, including those who
have complained loudly against me
among my colleagues, why am I
the only one being singled out?
The rules of inability to submit all
the SALNs were waived in favor of
14 out of 20 applicants. 6 out of
the 8 were shortlisted. Why is the
rule being invoked only against
Decision 149 G.R. No. 237428

me? And so it would appear that

this is selected targeting”

The public actuation of respondent showing disdain and contempt

towards some Members of the Court whom she dubbed as “Biased 5” later
increased and modified to “Biased 6” can no longer be tolerated. She may be
held liable for disbarment for violating the Canons of Professional
Responsibility for violating the sub judice rule by repeatedly discussing the
merits of the quo warranto petition in different fora and for casting
aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Court even before a
decision is made, designed to affect the results of the Court's collegial vote
and influence public opinion. This wrongful actuation exemplify a poor
regard for the judicial system and may amount to conduct unbecoming of a
Justice and a lawyer.

Such actions, indeed, resulted to the obfuscation of the issues on hand,

camouflaging the charges against her with assaults to judicial independence,
and falsely conditioning the public's mind that this is a fight for democracy.
Once and for all, it should be stated that this is not a fight for democracy nor
for judicial independence. This is an undertaking of the Court's duty, as it is
called for by the Republic, to judicially determine and settle the uncertainty
in the qualification, or otherwise, of respondent to sit on the highest position
in the Judiciary.

The detrimental effect of this open and blatant disregard of the sub
judice rule or the evil sought to be prevented by the said rule is already
manifest. In fact, in the May 2, 2018 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
certain individuals, including lawyers, already made their own pre-judgment
on the case:

GRANTING THE QUO WARRANTO PETITION IS ILLEGAL,

A BETRAYAL OF DEMOCRACY

THE SUPREME COURT TRAMPLED ON the Philippine

Constitution and betrayed its primary duty to the Filipino people when it
violated Chief Justice Ma. Loudes Sereno's right to due process.

The Supreme Court abandoned its chief mandate to ensure an

independent judiciary by accepting a bankrupt Quo Warranto petition and
refusing to inhibit five openly biased Justices.

The Judiciary's Code of Conduct decrees resistance against

attempts to subvert judicial independence. It orders judges to be impartial.
The five justices bowed to Congress' impeachment summons. They
attacked the Chief Justice in proceedings that refused her right to question
accusers. Doing so, they prejudged the Chief Justice and betrayed the
Court's position as a co-equal branch of the government.

We repudiate as illegal a ruling tainted with these shameful

Decision 150 G.R. No. 237428

acts.

The Quo Warranto action against CJ Sereno, filed beyond the one
year deadline, is itself illegal and unconstitutional. the Supreme Court has
affirmed many times that impeachment is the only mode for removing an
impeachable officer.

In accepting this farcical petition, it crushes constitutional checks

and balances it threatens every Filipino citizen's right to a free, impartial
justice system.

The State derives its power from the people. When the key
instruments of the State conspire to subvert the Constitution and
democracy, the people must rise as the last bastion of our rights and
freedoms.

We challenge the Supreme Court: Pull back from the brink. Do

not be a party to the death of judicial independence. Heed the
Constitution. OBEY THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT. COMPEL
THE INHIBITION OF THE BIASED 5. DISMISS THE ILLEGAL QUO
WARRANTO PETITION!

If the Biased 5 will not inhibit, then we call on them to resign. The
people will not acccept any Decision tainted by gross injustice and
Justices who cannot act with justice. (Emphasis ours)

It could readily be seen that such statements do not only "tend to" but
categorically force and influence the deliberative and decision-making
process of this Court. Notably, the threatening tenor could not go unnoticed.

To be sure, the Court is not merely being unreasonably sensitive in

addressing this matter, as in fact, it guarantees that it is not swayed or
influenced by such attacks and maintains its judicial independence in
resolving this controversial case. However, when aggressive actions are
taken against the Judiciary as an institution and clouds of doubt are casted
upon the people's faith in the administration of justice, especially so when
the same are perpetrated by members of the Bar, this Court cannot be
apathetic to and is not helpless against such attacks, but the prudent thing to
do is to stand and deal with it head on.

Epilogue

The foregoing discourse thins down to a public officer's accountability

to the public. The very purpose and nature of public office is grounded upon
it being a public trust. No less than our Constitution gave special importance
on the principle of a public office being a public trust. Section 1, Article XI
of the 1987 Constitution categorically states that:
Decision 151 G.R. No. 237428

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers

and employees must at all times be accountable to the people,
serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

It is therefore an established principle that public office is not

"property" but is a public trust or agency, governed by the Constitution and
by existing laws. There is no Torrens title to a public office. Justice
Malcolm, in Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal,331 expounded
on this principle, viz.:

In the case of Taylor v. Beckham ([1899], 178, U. S., 548), Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller said that: "Decisions are numerous to the effect that public
offices are mere agencies or trust, and not property as such." The basic
idea of government in the Philippine Islands, as in the United States, is
that of a popular representative government, the officers being mere
agents and not rulers of the people, one where no one man or set of
men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office, but where
every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law and
holds the office as a trust for the people whom he represents. 332
(Emphasis ours)

The right to hold public office under our political system is therefore
not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all, only because and by virtue
of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it. 333 Needless to
say, before one can hold public office, he or she must be eligible in
accordance with the qualifications fixed by law and the authority conferring
and creating the office. There is no such thing as a vested interest or an
estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. A public officer
who is not truthful, not forthright, in complying with the qualifications to
public office, perforce, has not legally qualified, was not legally appointed,
and consequently, has not legally assumed the said public office. A
disqualification cannot be erased by intentional concealment of certain
defects in complying with the qualifications to public office set by the
Constitution and laws. The passage of time will not cure such invalidity of
holding public office, much less, foreclose the right and duty of the
government, the keeper of the said public office, to oust and remove the
usurper.

One who claims title to a public office must prove beyond cavil that
he/she is legally qualified to the said office, otherwise, he or she has no
ground to stand upon his or her claim of title to the office and his or her title
may reasonably be challenged. A qualification must be proved positively,
clearly, and affirmatively. It cannot be proved by mere acquiescence nor by
estoppel or prescription. In the same vein, a disqualification cannot be
obliterated by intentional concealment thereof. As a matter of fact, such
331
41 Phil. 188 (1920).
332
Id. at 194.
333
Aparri v. CA., et al., 212 Phil. 215, 221-222 (1984).
Decision 152 G.R. No. 237428

concealment is a clear manifestation of lack of integrity, probity, and

honesty. It cannot be over-emphasized that public service requires integrity.
For this reason, public servants must, at all times, exhibit the highest sense
of honesty. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities, they must
faithfully adhere to, and hold sacred and render inviolate the constitutional
principle that a public office is a public trust.334 The expectation of a strong
adherence to this principle escalates proportionately as one ascends to public
office. John Adams, then President of the United States, said, “society's
demands for moral authority and character increase as the importance of the
position increases.”
In this case, it was found that respondent is ineligible to hold the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court position for lack of integrity on account of her
failure to file a substantial number of SALNs and also, her failure to submit
the required SALNs to the JBC during her application for the position.
Again, one of the Constitutional duties of a public officer is to submit a
declaration under oath of his or her assets, liabilities, and net worth upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law. 335
When the Constitution and the law exact obedience, public officers must
comply and not offer excuses. When a public officer is unable or unwilling
to comply, he or she must not assume office in the first place, or if already
holding one, he or she must vacate that public office because it is the correct
and honorable thing to do. A public officer who ignores, trivializes or
disrespects Constitutional and legal provisions, as well as the canons of
ethical standards, forfeits his or her right to hold and continue in that office.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and
is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly,
Respondent Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared

vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the
application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action

from the Court.

Respondent Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE

within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of
Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting
aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.
334
Atty. Alconera v. Pallanan, 725 Phil. 1, 17 (2014).
335
1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XI, Section 17.
 Decision 153 G.R. No. 237428

SO ORDERED.

NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(No part)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Acting Chief Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
Decision 154 G.R. No. 237428

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SAMUEL R. MARTIRES ANDRES B. REYES, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

C E RT I FI CAT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice