G.R. No.

165177 August 25, 2005

FACTS:

On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for "Recovery of
Possession and Ownership," docketed as Civil Case No. 328, with the MTC of San
Felipe, Zambales. She alleged that she is the owner of Cadastral Lot No. 2650, with an
area of 400 sq. m. located at Sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe,
Zambales, having purchased the same in 1976 from spouses Artemio and Angela
Pronto. In 1977, she was issued Tax Declaration No. 10462 and paid the taxes due
thereon.6

In 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways constructed a road which
traversed Cadastral Lot No. 2650 thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the rest of
petitioner’s lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration No. 02-2460R in 1991.7

Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq.
m. lot and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner. Hence, on January
18, 1996, she instituted a complaint for recovery of possession and ownership against
respondent.

Respondent contended that the area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473
square meter lot, covered by the Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-13011; and that
he has been in continuous possession and occupation thereof since 1955. In his
Amended Answer with Counterclaim,9 however, respondent failed to allege that the
questioned lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted
fruit bearing trees in the property. Respondent further pleaded the defenses of lack of
cause of action and prescription.

The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the
controverted lot on the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for
failure of petitioner to prove prior physical possession and ownership thereof.

The RTC affirmed the assailed decision,11 hence petitioner filed a petition for review
before the Court of Appeals which was however denied for insufficiency of evidence to
prove ownership or prior actual physical possession.

The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied. Hence the instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint was proper.

HELD:

Pertinent portion of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. – … a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, …
may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons
claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with the damages
and costs. (Emphasis supplied)

In Lopez v. David Jr.,13 it was held that an action for forcible entry is a quieting process
and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs when it improperly assumed
jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession had
exceeded one year. After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced
in the RTC via an accion publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one
year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of
possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted
before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover
ownership as well as possession.14

Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus,

In the instant case, petitioner’s complaint alleges that:

2. That plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of land denominated as Cadastral lot No. 2650,
San Felipe Cadastre, situated at sitio Caarosipan, Barangay Manglicmot, San Felipe,
Zambales which she bought in 1976 from Spouses Artemio Pronto and Angela Merano
when she was still a widow, with the following boundaries: North, Alipio Abad, East,
Antonio Cueva, South, Juan Borja, and West, Old Provincial Road, containing an area of
108 square meters, declared under Tax Declaration No. 002-1860R and assessed at
P1,120.00;

3. That plaintiff has been in open, continuous, exclusive and adverse as well as
notorious possession of the said lot and in the concept of an owner since she
[acquired] it in 1976 until the time when defendant took possession forcibly, two
years ago;

4. That in or before 1990 the land was traversed by a new National Highway and the
land was segregated from a bigger portion of the land, the western portion is now the
land in question and since the new provincial road which traversed the whole land of the
plaintiff, the old highway which is west of Lot 2650 shall belong to the plaintiff in
compensation of the portion of her lot traversed by the new highway, said old highway is
also taken by defendant unlawfully;16

It is clear that petitioner’s averment make out a case for forcible entry because she
alleged prior physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible
entry thereon by respondent. Considering her allegation that the unlawful possession of
respondent occurred two years17 prior to the filing of the complaint on January 18, 1996,
the cause of action for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to
entertain the case. Petitioner’s complaint therefore should have been filed with the
proper RTC.

It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or
cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent.18 Hence, the failure of
respondent to insist on the defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in
his Amended Answer with Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the
case.

On this point, the Court held in Bongato v. Malvar19 that:

It is wise to be reminded that forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive
time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. Indeed, the
one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted
from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth,
then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the
lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either
an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or
an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the cause of action for forcible entry
filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment
on July 10, 1992. Hence, even if Severo Malvar may be the owner of the land,
possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of
petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents should
have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible
entry. Their cause of action for forcible entry had prescribed already, and the MTCC had
no more jurisdiction to hear and decide it.

...

Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the
parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may
assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and
even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed we likewise held
in Bayog v. Natino[.]

Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should
still be dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is
part of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Petitioner admitted that she has never seen the
Cadastral Map of San Felipe, Zambales, and relied only on the Survey Notification
Card20 from the Bureau of Lands,21 with a sketch of Cadastral Lot No. 2650. Said card,
however, does not reflect the 108 sq. m. lot subject of this case. Neither did petitioner
cause the survey of Cadastral Lot No. 2650 after the construction of a new road to prove
that the segregated portion on the western side is part thereof. Ei incumbit probotio qui
dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.22 Failing to
discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.

In the same vein, ownership of the lot in question cannot be awarded to respondent
considering that OCT No. P-13011,23 and the Survey Plan24 were not formally offered in
evidence. While the issue of ownership may be passed upon in ejectment cases for the
sole purpose of determining the nature of possession,25 no evidence conclusively show
that the lot in question is covered by said OCT No. P-13011 or any other title of
respondent.

WHEREFORE, the May 16, 1999 decision of the Municipal Trial Court of San Felipe,
Zambales, the January 26, 2000 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 71, Iba,
Zambales, and the March 12, 2004 decision of the Court of Appeals,
are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint in Civil Case No.
328 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.