G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29,
1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing,
upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence,
and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which
is now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-
adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he
was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was
issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14,
1965 and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court
finds the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for
Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM
OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION
1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT
SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA;
III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-
appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of the decision of
acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the
basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint
against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of
their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented
for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the
criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against
Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source
of obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation
by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa
criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of
our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent
killeth unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a
criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not
the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by
the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a
proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate
individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such
a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p.
617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that
have been little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very
little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be
Idemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are
loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy
of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the
harms done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the
Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that
an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing
excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the
Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional
voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements
therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can
be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain
of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II,
Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to
an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather
than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is
conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And
so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which was
enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by
the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special
laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at
first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the
latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its
own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code)
Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds
"the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes
the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in
character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed
by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by
marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered
opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from
responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property
as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real
property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be
sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company."
In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living
with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is
the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of
Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless,
sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does
not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to
judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child
does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor,
does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding
the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that
Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become
milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to
proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Issues:
1. WON the present civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case.
2. WON Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married.
Ruling of the Court:

1. No, the present civil action for damages is not barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case. Firstly, there is a distinction as regards the proof required in
a criminal case and a civil case. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. Furthermore, a civil case
for damages on the basis of quasi-delict does is independently instituted from
a criminal act. As such the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not
extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.

2. Yes, the above mentioned provision may still be applied against Atty Marvin Hill.
Although parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of
the child, emancipation by marriage is not absolute, i.e. he can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. As in the present
case, killing someone else contemplated judicial litigation, thus, making Article 2180
apply to Atty. Hill.However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a
matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his
son.