46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara

*
G.R. No. 152752. January 19, 2005.

INOCELIA S. AUTENCIO, petitioner, vs. City Administrator

RODEL M. MAÑARA and The CITY OF COTABATO,
respondents.

Civil Procedure; Evidence; Fraud; Fraud is never presumed, it must be

established by clear and convincing evidence.—Fraud is never presumed; it
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In the present case,
apart from the Manifestation, there is no clear evidence of fraud. While
respondent’s counsel did not object to the admission of the Manifestation,
the leeway to consider and assess its probative value nonetheless lay in the
appellate court.
Same; Same; Same; Failure to invoke a defense within the prescribed
period constitutes a waiver thereof; Defenses not invoked below cannot be
raised on appeal.—In her original appeal to the CSC, petitioner did not
raise the issue of respondent’s alleged misrepresentation, which had
allegedly induced her to agree to submit the case for resolution without any
formal hearing. Instead, she

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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Autencio vs. Mañara

merely questioned the harshness of the penalty imposed by the City
Government. Failure to invoke a defense within the prescribed period
constitutes a waiver thereof. Defenses not invoked below cannot be raised
on appeal.
Same; Same; Same; It is jurisprudentially settled that mistakes of
counsel as to argumentation, the relevancy or irrelevancy of a certain
evidence or the introduction thereof are—among others—all mistakes of
procedure that bind the client.—In waiving the presentation of evidence in a
formal hearing, the counsel of petitioner might have believed in the futility
of resisting the charge; thus, he opted to waive her right to present evidence.
That he allegedly relied on respondent’s statement that she could be held
liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence was a risk he took on
her behalf. It is jurisprudentially settled that mistakes of counsel as to
argumentation, the relevancy or irrelevancy of a certain evidence or the
introduction thereof are—among others—all mistakes of procedure that
bind the client.
Administrative Law; The need to maintain the faith and confidence of
the people in the government demands that the proceedings in
administrative cases should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of complainants.—At this point, we stress that complaints against
public officers and employees relating or incidental to, or in connection
with, the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
interest. The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the people in the
government demands that the proceedings in administrative cases should not
be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants.
Same; If administrative actions are made to depend upon the whim or
will of complainants, the disciplining authorities and the courts would be
stripped of their prerogative.—In a real sense, complainants in
administrative cases are just witnesses. Therefore, regardless of their
desistance or representations, courts will not desist from imposing the
appropriate disciplinary sanction, if the evidence so warrants. If
administrative actions are made to depend upon the whim or will of
complainants, the disciplining authorities and the courts would be stripped
of their prerogative.

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48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara

 Same; Due Process; In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process; Where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural
due process may be cured.—In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due
process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the
purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during
which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always be
adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural
due process may be cured.
Same; Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected,
so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.—Settled is the rule in
our jurisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be
respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the
task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment for that of the latter
in respect of the sufficiency of evidence.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla for petitioner.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is simply

the opportunity to explain one’s side or to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of. Furthermore, the counsel’s
actions and mistakes on procedural matters bind the client. On the
other hand, the complainant’s manifestations or representations on
questions of law do not bind the decision makers or the courts.

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Autencio vs. Mañara

The Case

1
 1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
2
Court, challenging the September 12, 2001 Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 56061. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for

lack of merit and the assailed resolution of the CSC is affirmed in its
3
entirety.”
4
Petitioner also assails the February 8, 2000 CA Resolution denying
her Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The CA summarized the facts in this manner:

“On December 27, 1996, City Administrator Rodel M. Mañara lodged a

complaint against petitioner Inocelia S. Autencio with the Office of the City
Mayor for dishonesty and misconduct in office. The complaint alleged that
on the third week of October 1996, Riza Bravo, an employee of the City
Assessor’s Office charged with the preparation of the payroll of casual
employees, changed the September 1996 payroll prepared by her upon the
order of petitioner. The first prepared payroll for the said month reflected
five (5) days attendance of seven (7) casual employees. It was made to
appear in the second prepared payroll that the seven casual employees
worked for the whole month of September. Despite the fact that the seven
casual employees rendered services only for five days for the month of
September and two weeks for the month of October 1996, the petitioner
directed them to prepare and reflect in their respective daily

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 3-17.

2 Annex “C” of Petition; Id., pp. 30-34. Penned by Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion and
concurred in by Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili (chairman of the Special Seventeenth Division)
and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. (acting member).
3 CA Decision, p. 5; Id., p. 34.
4 Rollo, p. 36.

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50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara
time records full attendance for the months in question. The petitioner told
them that one-half of their salaries for the month of September 1996 will be
deducted as their contributions for the Christmas party of their office and
that this matter will be a surprise for the regular employees and must be kept
secret among themselves.
“Mrs. Bravo personally collected the salaries of the seven casual
employees from the City Treasury Office upon instruction of the petitioner
on October 28, 1996, and distributed to them only one-half of their salary
and gave the remainder to the petitioner.
“Pending investigation of the administrative complaint, on January 2,
1997, petitioner was preventively suspended for a period of ninety (90)
days.
“After x x x hearing, the Office for Legal Services of the City of
Cotabato, on June 30, 1997, issued a resolution/decision which was
approved by the City Mayor Ludovico D. Badoy, declaring the petitioner
guilty of misconduct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led
to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. However, as regards to the charge
of dishonesty, the same was found wanting due to insufficiency of evidence.
A penalty of forced resignation with forfeiture of retirement benefits except
for earned leave accumulated before the filing of the complaint was
imposed.
“The petitioner appealed the said resolution to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). On June 9, 1998, the CSC issued Resolution No.
981413 modifying the decision of the City Mayor to grave misconduct and
imposed on her the penalty of dismissal for cause with all its accessories.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CSC on September 21, 1999
5
issued Resolution No. 99-2135 denying the same.”

In her Motion for Reconsideration of CSC Resolution No. 98-1413,

petitioner alleged that she had waived her right to present her
evidence at a formal hearing and agreed to submit the case for
resolution, only because of the manifestation of the complainant and
the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for the lesser
offense of simple negligence.
On September 21, 1999, the CSC issued Resolution No. 99-2135
denying her Motion. According to the CSC, regardless of

_______________

5 CA Decision, pp. 1-2; Id., pp. 30-31.

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 Autencio vs. Mañara

whether she agreed to submit the case for resolution, the fact
remains that she caused the changes in the payroll of the seven
casuals and made it appear that they had worked for the full month
of September.
Raising the issues of whether she was denied due process and
whether the penalty imposed by the CSC was “harsh,” petitioner
elevated the case to the CA.
On September 12, 2001, the CA affirmed the CSC Resolutions.
Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, appending thereto the
Manifestation of incumbent Cotabato City Mayor Datu Muslimin G.
Sema. The mayor stated therein that, based on the records, petitioner
had been misled into waiving her right to a formal hearing; and that
he had no objection to the reopening of the case. On February 8,
2002, the CA denied reconsideration.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Ruling that petitioner had not been denied due process, the CA
reasoned that “the requirements of due process are satisfied when the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their
side of the controversy.” Petitioner was given this opportunity—
records show that she was informed of the formal charges against
her; she was able to file her Answer as well as documents
evidencing her claim; and she was represented by a lawyer during
the pre-hearing conference. The CA said that “[t]he failure of
petitioner and her counsel to take full advantage of the opportunity
to be heard does not change the fact that they were accorded such
opportunity.” One may be heard not only through oral argument but
also through pleadings.
The CA likewise held that the penalty imposed by the CSC was
not “harsh.” It affirmed the CSC’s finding that the evidence had
sufficiently shown her grave misconduct in allowing the
irregularities leading to the illegal payment of salaries to casuals.
Pursuant to the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the commensu-

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52 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara
rate penalty for such serious
6
offense is dismissal from the service.
Hence, this Petition.

Issue

The lone issue raised by petitioner in her Memorandum involves a

pure question of law:

“x x x [W]as the petitioner deprived of substantial due process?”

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition is devoid of merit.

Lone Issue:
Denial of Substantial Due Process

Petitioner insists that she waived her right to a formal hearing, only
because she was made to believe that she would be liable for the
lesser offense of simple negligence. She relies emphatically on the
Manifestation of the incumbent city mayor of Cotabato stating that
an injustice was committed against her because she had been
deceived to the point that she waived her right to present evidence.
According to her, this Manifestation constituted a judicial admission
that the present counsel of the city government did not object to, and
that the appellate court should have taken into consideration.
We find no merit in petitioner’s contention. The legal7
presumption is that official duty has been duly performed.
Government officials are presumed to have regularly performed

_______________

6 This case was deemed submitted for decision on May 25, 2004, upon this Court’s
receipt of petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. V. Emmanuel C. Fontanilla.
Respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Atty. Datu Mando V. Sinsuat, Jr., was
received on May 17, 2004
7 §3 (m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.

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Autencio vs. Mañara
8
 8
their functions;
9
and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this
presumption. The Manifestation is insufficient to overturn this
principle. It contains mere conclusions, not statements of fact.
In the court—not the witnesses or the parties—lies the duty of
drawing legal conclusions from the evidence presented.
Significantly,
10
the author of the Manifestation was not the city
mayor at the time the investigation of petitioner’s case was
conducted. How could he have known about the alleged
misrepresentation? Petitioner did not explain.
Fraud is never presumed; it must be established by clear and
11
convincing evidence. In the present case, apart from the
Manifestation, there is no clear evidence of fraud. While
respondent’s counsel did not object to the admission of the 12
Manifestation, the leeway to consider and assess its probative value
nonetheless lay in the appellate court.
In her original appeal to the CSC, petitioner did not raise the
issue of respondent’s alleged misrepresentation, which had allegedly
induced her to agree to submit the case for resolution without any
formal hearing. Instead, she merely questioned the harshness of the
penalty imposed by the City Government. Failure to invoke a
defense within the pre-

_______________

8 Sps. Romero v. Tan, G.R. No. 147570, February 27, 2004, 424 SCRA 108;
Corpuz v. Siapno, 404 SCRA 83, June 17, 2003; Columbus Philippines Bus
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 417 Phil. 81; 364 SCRA 606,
September 7, 2001.
9 Agpalo, The Law of Public Officers (1st ed., 1998), p. 190.
10 The city mayor at the time was Hon. Bandoy, while the incumbent city mayor
who made the Manifestation was Hon. Sema.
11 Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd. v. Sps. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207, March 14, 2003;
Maestrado v. Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 418, 435; 327 SCRA 678, 694, March 9,
2000; Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 171; 326 SCRA 285, February 23, 2000.
12 See Bitong v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 516; 292 SCRA 503, July 13, 1998.

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54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara

13
scribed period constitutes a waiver
14
thereof. Defenses not invoked
below cannot be raised on appeal.
 In waiving the presentation of evidence in a formal hearing, the
counsel of petitioner might have believed in the futility of resisting
the charge; thus, he opted to waive her right to present evidence.
That he allegedly relied on respondent’s statement that she could be
held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence was a
risk he took on her behalf. It is jurisprudentially settled that mistakes
of counsel as to argumentation, the relevancy or irrelevancy of a
certain evidence or the introduction thereof15
are—among others—all
mistakes of procedure that bind the client.
At this point, we stress that complaints against public officers and
employees relating or incidental to, or in connection with, the
performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
16
interest. The need to maintain the faith and confidence of the
people in the government demands that the proceedings in
administrative cases should not 17
be made to depend on the whims
and caprices of complainants.
Administrative proceedings are akin to criminal prosecutions in
the sense that no compromise may be entered into between the
parties as regards the penal sanction. Complainants are not vested
with the power of removal or suspension. That prerogative belongs
to the proper government officials.

_______________

13 Mendoza v. Civil Service Commission, 233 SCRA 657, July 5, 1994.

14 Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1150; 268 SCRA 688,
February 26, 1997; Manila Bay Club Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil. 805; 245
SCRA 715, July 11, 1995; Reparations Commission v. Visayan Packing Corp., et al.,
193 SCRA 531, February 6, 1991.
15 Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, 208
SCRA 523, May 8, 1992.
16 Sy v. Academia, 198 SCRA 705, July 3, 1991.
17 Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 335 Phil. 1077; 268 SCRA 608, February 21, 1997.

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Autencio vs. Mañara

Moreover, in a real sense, complainants in administrative cases are

18
just witnesses. Therefore, regardless of their desistance or
representations, courts will not desist from imposing the appropriate
19
disciplinary sanction, if the evidence so warrants. If administrative
actions are made to depend upon the whim or will of complainants,
the disciplining
20
authorities and the courts would be stripped of their
prerogative.
We agree with the CA that petitioner was afforded due process.
On the formal charge against her, she had received sufficient
information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She
filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted
Affidavits of personnel in the Assessor’s Office to support her claim
of innocence. A prehearing conference was conducted by the legal
officer, during which she—assisted by her counsel—had
participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor
Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.
In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to 21
explain one’s side suffices to meet the requirements of due process.
22
A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the
purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted,
during which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need
23
not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity
to appeal or seek

_______________

18 Ibid.
19 Abenojar v. Lopez, 203 Phil. 385; 118 SCRA 1, November 2, 1982.
20 Ibid.
21 Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, 314 Phil. 612; 244 SCRA 640, May 31,
1995; Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, 312 Phil. 1095; 243 SCRA 155, March 31, 1995; Esber
v. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA 664, August 26, 1993 (citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 43, September 26, 1990; Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, 161
SCRA 732, May 31, 1988).
22 Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, supra (citing Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, supra).
23 §48, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V, 1987 Administrative Code.

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56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Autencio vs. Mañara

reconsideration of the action or ruling 24

complained of, defects in
procedural due process may be cured.
Finally, settled is the rule in our jurisdiction that the findings of
fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as they
25
are supported by substantial evidence. It is not the task of this
 Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the
administrative body and to substitute its own judgment
26
for that of
the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. In any event, the
Decisions of the CSC and the Court of Appeals finding petitioner
guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are
supported by substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

          Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales and Garcia,

JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.—In administrative proceedings, technical rules of

procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due
process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial
sense. (Ocampo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 322 SCRA 17 [2000])

——o0o——

_______________

24 Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary, 342 Phil. 618; 276 SCRA 652, August 4,
1997; Casuela v. Office of the Ombudsman, 276 SCRA 635, August 4, 1997;
Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, supra; Esber v. Sto. Tomas, supra.
25 Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 414 Phil. 590; 362 SCRA 304, August
2, 2001.
26 Ibid.; Rubenecia v. Civil Service Commission, supra.

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