Conflict of Law
Conflict of Law
Conflict of Law
Summary
I. Preliminary Consideration
ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the
Philippines.
Importance
• To adjust conflicting rights in international, mercantile and corporate transactions
• To solve personal, family, property, and successional, contractual problems, possessed of facts or
elements operating in two or more states
Basic Causes
• Multiplicity of governments with separate legal systems
• Different system of laws may apply to different class of citizens (India)
• Different municipal tribunals may give identical laws varying interpretations
Scope of Functions
(1) To prescribe the conditions under which the court is competent to entertain such a suit
(2) To determine for each class of cases the particular territorial system of law by reference to which the
rights of the parties may be ascertained
(3) To specify the circumstances in which a foreign judgment can be recognized as decisive of the question
in dispute
Monism – international law and domestic law belong to only one system of law with international law
considered as superior to domestic law.
Dualism – (pluralist theory, based on positivism) domestic and international law are two different spheres
of law. They would favor state law.
Direct vs. Indirect Sources
Direct Sources Indirect Sources
• Constitution • Natural moral law
• Codifications • Works of writers
• Special laws
• Treaties and conventions
• Judicial decisions
• International customs
III. Issues on Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction defined
Jurisdiction is the authority of a tribunal to hear and decide a case. (from the latin “jus dicere” meaning
“the right to speak”)
Kinds of jurisdiction
1. Over the subject matter (BP 129 as amended)
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law...
Binding upon the whole world Binding only between and among the parties in
the case
Exceptions to comity
1. When the foreign law, judgment, or contract:
a) is contrary to a sound and established public policy;
b) is contrary to almost universally conceded principles of morality (contra bonos mores);
c) involves procedural matters;
2. When the case involves penal laws, contracts or judgments;
3. When the case involves purely fiscal matters (i.e. revenue producing)or administrative matters;
4. When the application of foreign law, judgment, or contract may work:
(a) undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents or citizens of the forum;
(b) against the vital interests and national security of the state of the forum;
5. When the case involves real or personal property situated in the forum.
Theory of Comity
Under this theory, we apply the foreign law because of its convenience, and finally, because we want
protection to our citizens, residents, and transients in our land.1
Theory of Justice
The purpose of all laws is the dispensing of justice; if this can be attained in many cases by applying the
proper foreign law, we must do.
V. Collateral Matters
Nature and proof of foreign judgments
- Recognition and enforcement
- Requisites
Section 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order, is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC vs. FASGI ENTERPRISES, INC. (G.R. No. 137378, 12 October
2000)
FACTS: Unable to obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI Enterprises
Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America, filed a complaint for "enforcement of foreign judgment" before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Philippines. The Makati court, however, in an order, dismissed the case,
thereby denying the enforcement of the foreign judgment within Philippine jurisdiction, on the ground
that the decree was tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower court ruled
that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the parties. While the assailed foreign
judgment ordered the return by Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI) of the purchase
amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to PAWI the third and fourth containers of
wheels. This situation, the trial court maintained, amounted to an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI.
FASGI appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the trial court and ordered the full enforcement of the California judgment. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign judgment may be enforced in the Philippine jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
Generally, in the absence of a special compact, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to
a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country; however, the rules of comity, utility and
convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the
immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown
that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation or voluntary appearance
of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under
which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and
binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of
regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (H) BERHAD., vs. CA and PNCC (G.R. No. 110263, 20 July 2001)
FACTS: Petitioner sought to recover the indemnity of the performance bond it had put up in favor of
private respondent to guarantee the completion of the Felda Project and the non-payment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest- CDCP Sdn. Bhd. for the completion of Paloh Hanai and Kuantan By-Pass Project in
Malaysia. Judgment was rendered in favor of Petitioner. However, after unsuccessful attempts to enforce
the judgment of the High Court of Malaya against respondent, petitioner initiated the complaint before
the RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila.
Private respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim and therein raised the grounds it
brought up in its earlier denied motion to dismiss. In its Reply the petitioner contended that the High
Court of Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent by its voluntary submission
to the courts jurisdiction through its appointed counsel. Furthermore, private respondents counsel waived
any and all objections to the High Court’s jurisdiction in a pleading filed before the court. To prevent the
enforcement of the foreign judgment private respondent relied on the defense that (1) the person who
received summons was not authorized to receive such and (2) there was no board resolution authorizing
their retained lawyers in Malaysia to admit all the claims of the Petitioner. The trial court dismissed
Petitioners complaint. Petitioner interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court
dismissed the same and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE#1: Whether or not the Malaysian Court had acquired jurisdiction over PNCC so that its judgment is
rendered valid.
HELD#1: YES.
Matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of summons or court process upon
the defendant, the authority of counsel to appear and represent a defendant and the formal requirements
in a decision are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum, i.e., the law of Malaysia in this
case.
Here, it is the procedural law of Malaysia where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity
of the service of court process on private respondent as well as other matters raised by it. As to what the
Malaysian procedural law is, remains a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of
and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules
of Court provide that it may be evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated
copy thereof. It was then incumbent upon private respondent to present evidence as to what that
Malaysian procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed service of summons upon a financial
officer of a corporation, as alleged by it, is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and
regularity of service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the High Court of Malaya must
stand.
ISSUE#2: Whether or not the judgment by Malaysian court cannot be enforced in the Philippines on the
ground that it did not state the fact and the law relied upon.
HELD#2: YES
The lex fori or the internal law of the forum governs matters of remedy and procedure. Considering that
under the procedural rules of the High Court of Malaya, a valid judgment may be rendered even without
stating in the judgment every fact and law upon which the judgment is based, then the same must be
accorded respect and the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the judgment of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise.
All in all, private respondent had the ultimate duty to demonstrate the alleged invalidity of such foreign
judgment, being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the High Court of Malaya. But instead of
doing so, private respondent merely argued, to which the trial court agreed, that the burden lay upon
petitioner to prove the validity of the money judgment. Such is clearly erroneous and would render
meaningless the presumption of validity accorded a foreign judgment were the party seeking to enforce
it be required to first establish its validity
B. Characterization
1. Defined
2. Steps in characterization
3. Theories on characterization
[1] Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
[2] Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
[3] Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority; and
[4] Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-
born citizens.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless by their
act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law.
2. R.A. No.9225 AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN
CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT. AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS
AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act.
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion."
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a
foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must Meet the requirements under Section
1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office:
Provided, That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper
authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be
exercised by, or extended to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are
naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed
forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San
Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. However, respondent Cruz enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among
others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps. Later, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection. Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz
was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-
born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: YES. [R]epatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. In
respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed
Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. No. 2630, which provides:
Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided
in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status
as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.
It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
4. MO YA LIM YAO et al., vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION (G.R. No. L-21289, October 4,
1971)
FACTS: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In
the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter
the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for
a period of one month. She was permitted to come into the Philippines to stay for a period of one
month. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond to undertake, among others that
said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner
of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions,
petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines. Later, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung may be considered a Filipino citizen by reason of marriage
with a naturalized FIlipino.
HELD: YES. The Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act 473) provides:
Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law
who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof. A foreign-born minor
child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the
time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless
he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will
continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age. A child born outside of the
Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless
within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen
at the American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of
allegiance. It is obvious that the Revised Naturalization Law is to establish a complete procedure
for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such
a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the
possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but
categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure
it prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and children, and, to that end,
in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the
Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the
Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become"
Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such
naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status
if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all
such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be
"considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos
at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary
oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she
is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
Domiciliary Theory
1. Distinguished from citizenship and nationality
2. Definition of domicile
3. Kinds of domicile
4. Domicile vs. residence
EDGAR SAN LUIS, vs. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS (G.R. No. 133743 06 February 2007)
FACTS: The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who
was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death, citing election case
laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not "residence," for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile."
HELD: NO. [T]here is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for
purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention
of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person
is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not
necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.
Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the
instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa up to the time of his death.
Testate Estate of AMOS BELLIS deceased PEOPLE’S BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, et al., executor,
oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, et al., heirs-appellee. (G.R. No. 23678, June 6, 1967)
FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas of the United States. He executed a will in the
Philippines, disposing a part of his estate in favor of his illegitimate children, before he died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was probated in the CFI of Manila.
ISSUE: Which law must apply to the dispositions in the will, the Texas Law or Philippine law?
RULING: It is the Texas Law. Texas Law should govern the execution of the will and the successional rights
of the illegitimate children. As stated in Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, it renders
applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard the
amount of successional rights, among others.
Here, Amos G. Bellis, is a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the
amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on,
nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national
of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas
has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application
of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here
involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of
Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours. Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the
doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they
argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.