FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 211543, December 09, 2015

DOMINGO G. PANGANIBAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES., Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the 18 November 2013 Decision2 rendered by the
Fifth Division of public respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0031, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Domingo G. Panganiban, the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused DOMINGO G.

PANGANIBAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds, and considering the
mitigating circumstance of restitution of the amount malversed, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment [of] ten (10) years and'one (1) day to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Accused Domingo G. Panganiban is further ordered to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed or
P463,931.78, and, to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification from holding any public office.

SO ORDERED.3 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

The following factual and procedural antecedents may be gleaned from the records: c han Roblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry

Having already previously served as mayor of the Municipality of Sta. Cruz, Laguna from 2004 to 2007,
petitioner Domingo G. Panganiban was once again elected to said position in the May 2013 elections.
Sometime in May 2006 or during his previous term, petitioner obtained a cash advance in the sum of
Php500,000.00 from the municipality, ostensibly for the purpose of defraying the projected expenses4 of a
planned official travel to the City of Onkaparinga, Adelaide, South Australia, to study and research said city's
sustainable environmental projects.5 The availment of the cash advance is evidenced by, among others, the
following documents: (a) Disbursement Voucher (DV) No. 05-372 dated 17 May 2006 signed by Caridad P.
Lorenzo (Lorenzo), the Municipal Accountant; (b) an Obligation Slip dated 16 May 2006; (c) a copy of the 17
May 2006 check in the sum of Php500,000.00 prepared by Ronaldo O. Valles (Valles), the Officer-in-Charge
of the Municipal Treasurer's Office; and (d) a Promissory Note executed by petitioner.6 Although scheduled
for 9 June to 9 July 2006, the official travel of petitioner did not push through for undisclosed reasons.7

His attention called to the unliquidated cash advance, petitioner instructed Lorenzo to withhold his salaries
which the latter started doing in July 2006 and recorded and posted the payments in the journal and
subsidiary ledger, respectively.8 Assigned in 2006 as audit team leader for the local government units of the
Province of Laguna, on the other hand, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor Rebecca C. Ciriaco
(Ciriaco) examined the financial records of the municipality of Sta. Cruz and discovered that the aforesaid
cash advance had not yet been liquidated. In addition to submitting her reports in accordance with COA
regulations, Ciriaco consequently served a letter dated 15 August 2006, demanding petitioner's liquidation of
the cash advance. On the basis of the documents on hand, however, Ciriaco noted that petitioner had an
unliquidated cash advance of Php463,931.78 as of 31 August 2006, a fact she reflected in the quarterly
report she submitted to the COA Regional Cluster Director.9

As a consequence, an investigation of the non-liquidation of the cash advance was subsequently conducted
by the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. During the pendency thereof, petitioner's salary
deductions continued such that, by the expiration of his term in June 2007, the remaining unliquidated
amount was reduced to Php256,318.45.10 Prior to her assignment to other units, Ciriaco submitted a report
stating that, as of 30 September 2007, said latter sum remained unliquidated from the time the cash
advance was granted on 17 May 2006.11 Assigned to the municipality in October 2007, on the other hand
State Auditor Augusto Franco Tria (Tria) came across said outstanding cash advance while preparing his
quarterly report and, not receiving the records from Lorenzo, wrote a demand letter dated 10 October 2007
to petitioner.12 In an explanation dated 16 October 2007, the latter apprised Tria of the arrangement to
have the cash advance liquidated by means of salary deductions.13
On 9 November 2007, petitioner was issued a certification signed by, among others, Lorenzo and Valles, to
the effect that the unliquidated balance of the subject cash advance will be deducted from his terminal leave
pay.14 The record shows that, on 19 November 2007, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon issued
a resolution, finding probable cause to charge petitioner with the crime of malversation of public funds.
Although an information charging him for malversation of the full sum of Php500,000.00 was subsequently
filed and docketed as Criminal Case No. SB-08-CRM-0031 before public respondent,15petitioner paid the
unliquidated balance by causing the same to be deducted from his terminal leave pay. The payment is
evidenced by DV No. 100-2007-11-1152 dated 22 November 2007 which shows that the sum of
Php256,318.45 was deducted from his terminal leave pay of Php359,947.98.16 When the COA Regional
Office called him about petitioner's unliquidated cash advance in December 2007, Tria consequently reported
that the amount was already paid in foil by means of the aforesaid deduction.17

With the issuance of the warrant for his arrest pursuant to public respondent's Resolution dated 21 February
2008, petitioner posted bail in the reduced sum fixed in the order granting his motion for reduction of the
recommended bail. Acting on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its 19 November 2007 Resolution,
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, in turn, issued a Memorandum dated 28 September 2008
which, while denying said motion for lack of merit, recommended the filing of an amended information to
correct the amount subject of the charge. The accusative portion of the amended information subsequently
filed states:
That on May 17, 2006, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Santa Cruz, Laguna, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Domingo G. Panganiban, a public
officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Sta. Cruz, Laguna and as such accountable for public funds
received and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office, acting in relation to his office and taking advantage
of the same, obtained cash advances in the total amount of Php500,000.00 from the Municipal Treasury of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna to finance his projected travel to Adelaide, South Australia but said accused once in
possession of said amount of money did not undertake his official travel and was only able to return the
amount of Php36,068.22 upon demand by a duly authorized officer and therefore has willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously taken, misappropriated and converted to his own personal use and
benefit the amount of Php463,931.78, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the
aforestated amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.18 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, petitioner entered a "Not Guilty" plea on 26 June 2009. The
preliminary and pre-trial conferences subsequently terminated, public respondent went on to conduct the
trial of the case on the merits. To prove the accusation, the prosecution called Lorenzo, Ciriaco, Valles and
Leilani T. Penarroyo (Penarroyo), a Clerk assigned at petitioner's office who acknowledged receiving and
turning over to petitioner the 15 August 2006 demand letter from the COA.19 Marked in the course of the
testimonies of the above-named witnesses, the following documents were admitted in evidence by public
respondent when formally offered by the prosecution: (a) DV No. 05-372; (b) Obligation Slip; (c) Duplicate
Copy of the Check; (d) documents pertaining to petitioner's planned official travel to Adelaide, South
Australia; (e) report, letter, indorsement and documents regarding the unliquidated cash advance as of 31
August 2006; (f) COA's 15 August 2006 demand letter to petitioner; and (g) the list of officials with
unliquidated advances as of 30 September 2007 prepared by Ciriaco.20

Its Demurrer to Evidence denied in public respondent's (Minute) Resolution dated 28 June 2010,21 the
Defense proceeded to present the testimonies of Lorenzo and Tria.22 In lieu of the testimonies of Farra T.
Salvador (Salvador), the Municipal Human Resource Manager, the parties stipulated that said witness would
be able to testify on petitioner's earned leave record.23 The parties likewise dispensed with the testimony of
Valles whose signatures on the 9 November 2007 certification and DV No. 100-2007-11-1152 were, instead,
admitted.24 The following documents were, upon being formally offered by the Defense, further admitted in
evidence by public respondent, to wit: (a) subsidiary ledger of the municipality; (b) petitioner's statement of
leave credits, leave record and application for terminal leave; (c) DV No. 100-2007-11-1152, together with
the journal entry voucher and petitioner's obligation request for the payment of terminal leave; (d) the 9
November 2007 Certification; (e) a 9 July 2009 Certification clearing petitioner of money and property
accountabilities; (f) COA's 10 October 2007 demand letter; and (g) petitioner's 16 October 2007
explanation.25cralawre d

On 18 November 2013, public respondent rendered the herein assailed Decision26 finding petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds, upon the following ratiocinations: (a)
the defense of good faith is unavailing since petitioner was legally obliged to return the money immediately
after the period of his intended travel lapsed; (b) the cash advance released in his favor was fully returned
by petitioner by way of deductions from his salaries and terminal leave pay more than a year after COA's
demand for the settlement thereof and long after his last term of office expired; (c) payment not being a
cause for extinction of criminal liability, the full restitution of the amount alleged to have been malversed
does not exculpate petitioner therefrom; and (d) at most, restitution of the malversed amount is a
mitigating circumstance that entitles petitioner to a reduction of the imposable penalty. Duly opposed by the
Prosecution, petitioner's motion to reopen the case anchored on the supposed negligence of his previous
counsel was denied in public respondent's Resolution dated 5 March 2014,27 hence, this petition.

Petitioner urges the grant of his petition and the reversal of the assailed decision on the following
grounds: chanRoble svi rtual Lawli bra ry

A.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER IN ITS APPEALED

DECISION.

B.

THE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ITS APPEALED DECISION WHEN IT IMPOSED A PRISON

SENTENCE THAT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW.28
The petition is impressed with merit.

Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the
same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such
public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property.29 For a prosecution of the crime to prosper, concurrence of the following elements must be
satisfactorily proved: (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or property for which
he is accountable, and, most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented, or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.30 Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code pertinently provides as follows:
ARTICLE 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of malversation. —Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit
any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than 12,000 pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification
and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facieevidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal uses.
Public respondent correctly ruled that petitioner was a public officer, satisfying the first element of the crime
of malversation of public funds or property. However, public respondent erroneously ruled that petitioner
had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; that the funds or
property are public funds or property for which he was accountable; and that he had consented, or, through
abandonment to take them.

To have custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the duties of his office, a public officer must
be a cashier, treasurer, collector, property officer or any other officer or employee who is tasked with the
taking of money or property from tie public which they are duty-bound to keep temporarily until such money
or property are properly deposited in official depository banks or similar entities; or until they shall have
endorsed such money or property to other accountable officers or concerned offices. Petitioner was not
shown to have been such public officer, even temporarily, in addition to his main duties as mayor. Needless
to say, he was not accountable for any public funds or property simply because it never became his duty to
collect money or property from the public.31 Therefore, petitioner could not have appropriated, taken,
misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.

The confusion in this case arose from the start, when the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
accused petitioner with the crime of malversation of public funds, notwithstanding the fact that what he
received from the Municipality of Sta. Cruz Laguna was a cash advance - a cash advance which was not
shown to have been fraudulently taken by petitioner from the municipality, either by himself or in cahoots
with the treasurer, cashier or any other accountable officer. In fact, said cash advance was shown to have
been properly acquired by documentary proof.

As narrated, petitioner was granted a cash advance in the sum of Php500,000.00 for an intended official
travel to Adelaide, Australia from 9 June to 9 July 2006 which did not push through. His attention called to
his obligation to liquidate the aforesaid sum, petitioner entered into an agreement with Lorenzo for the sum
to be liquidated by means of salary deductions which was, accordingly, implemented. That the agreement
was already in place within the 60-day period for liquidation provided under COA Circular 97-002 is evident
from the fact that, by the time Ciriaco caused the 15 August 2006 demand letter to be served upon
petitioner, the amount to be liquidated had already been reduced to Php463,931.78. The practice was
continued until the end of petitioner's term, with the remaining balance of the unliquidated cash advance
eventually satisfied by deducting the sum of Php256,308.45 from his terminal leave pay of Php359,947.98
on 22 November 2007.

Had the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon made the correct information and subsequent amended
information, the charge should have been failure of accountable officer to render accounts under Art. 218 of
the Revised Penal Code, not malversation of public funds or property under Art. 217.

Article 218 provides as follows:

Art. 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts. — Any public officer, whether in the service or
separated therefrom by resignation or any other cause, who is required by law or regulation to render
account to the Insular Auditor,32 or to a provincial auditor and who fails to do so for a period of two months
after such accounts should be rendered, shall be punished by prision correctional in its minimum period, or
by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both.
The erroneous information against the accused was exacerbated when the public respondent went on to
convict the accused for malversation under Article 217 despite the contrary documentary proof and the
testimonies of witnesses both of the prosecution and defense during trial, showing a properly issued cash
advance.

Even before he was required by the COA to account for the unliquidated cash advance, petitioner had
already instructed Lorenzo to withhold his Php18,000.00 monthly salary. Because Lorenzo started to
withhold petitioner's salary starting July 2006 or even before Ciriaco's 15 August 2006 demand letter, the
latter reported the corresponding reduction of the amount to be liquidated to the COA Regional Cluster
Director. Questioned whether such an agreement was an allowed practice, Ciriaco's successor, Tria,
significantly testified as follows:

Q. Mr. Witness, during your assignment as State Auditor in the

Municipality of Sta. Cruz[,] Laguna, what matter, if any, did you come
across relating to accused Domingo Panganiban?

A. Since I assumed back in October of 2007 and since we are required to

submit a quarterly report of outstanding cash advances, I came
across the cash advance in the amount of P256,000.00 plus of the
municipal mayor and inquired about the said transaction from the
accountant.
Q. Relative to this amount that you mentioned, what action or did you do
about it, if any, at that time?

A. Since we assumed in October 2007 and there was [no] record turned
over to us, and we have observed that there was an outstanding
balance of P200,000.00, I issued a demand letter to the former Mayor
to determine the status of the said cash advance and also to
determine whether it was acknowledged by the former mayor.

xxxx

Q. After you sent that demand letter, what happened next, if any?

A. I received an explanation from the former Municipal Mayor on October

6, 2007.

Q. When you received an explanation, was it in writing, Mr. Witness?

A.
Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q. What happened next, if any, Mr. Witness, after you received this
explanation from the accused, Panganiban?

A. In December of 2007, our Regional Office called my attention

regarding the said cash advance. I reported that the cash advance
was already paid in full because the terminal pay of the former
Municipal Mayor was already paid and it was already deducted from
the proceeds of the terminal pay.

Q. How did you communicate this matter?

A. They called me at our office in Sta. Cruz Laguna, Provincial Office, sir.
ATTY. VISTAN

Q. Was there any written documentation of this report?

A. I cannot recall any written documentation. All I know is that they

called me and I informed them that the said cash advance was
already paid and on the following year - already, the status of [the]
cash advances were reported to our office.

xxxx

Q. Based on the explanation, Mr. Witness, what were your findings since
you issued a demand letter asking the accused to liquidate the
amount of P-256,318.45 within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
demand letter?

A. Upon reading the explanation of the former Municipal Mayor, I came

to know that there was [an] agreement between the Municipal Mayor
and the former Auditor for the original cash advance of P500,000.00
and as agreed upon, it was deducted from the salary of the Mayor.

ATTY. VISTAN

Q. Based on your experience as State Auditor for 24 years, Mr. Witness,

have you come across any other matter wherein cash advance was
liquidated in this manner that you found in relation to the case of
Domingo Panganiban?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you recall how many cases of such nature or how many
liquidations of such nature you encountered in your career as State
Auditor?

A. There are certain cash advances particularly in the Municipality of

Mayhay wherein there are unliquidated cash advances but the
persons liable arranged for the payment by instalment. It was an
 agreement between the person and the municipality and we just
respect the agreement and allow it that way.

ATTY. VISTAN

Q. In addition to that matter, is there anything else that comes to your

mind, any other cash advance and/or liquidation thereof?

A. I think that particular case of the Mayor.

Q. Do you know if there were any charges or cases that arose because of
that matter?

A. No particular case, sir.

JUSTICE GESMUNDO

Q. So what you are telling us, Mr. Witness, is that this is an allowed
practice?

A. Yes, your Honor, we allowed that practice.33

The practice of liquidating cash advances by means thereof being one that is allowed, the withholding of
petitioner's salaries continued until the expiration of his term of office. With the remaining balance satisfied
from his terminal leave pay, petitioner was eventually cleared of financial and property liabilities to the
municipality. Long before petitioner was arraigned under the amended Information on 26 June 2009, Tria
had, in fact, already reported to the COA Regional Office in December 2007 that the cash advance had
already been fully paid. To the mind of the Court, the confluence of these circumstances serves to negate
the factual and legal bases for Petitioner's liability for failure to render accounts, even if it was this correct
charge which was made against him. The manner by which he liquidated the cash advance was, after all,
admitted as an allowed practice and was permitted to continue until the full amount was satisfied. At this
point, the Court reiterates the finding in Yong Chan Kim v. People,34 a case for swindling (estafa), but which
in principle is applicable in this case. Therein, it was ruled, thus:
xxxx

Liquidation simply means the settling of an indebtedness. An employee, such as herein petitioner, who
liquidates a cash advance is in fact paying back his debt in the form of a loan of money advanced to him by
his employer, as per diems and allowances. Similarly, as stated in the assailed decision of the lower court,
"if the amount of the cash advance he received is less than the amount he spent for actual travel x x x he
has the right to demand reimbursement from his employer the amount he spent coming from his personal
funds." In other words, the money advanced by either party is actually a loan to the other. Hence, petitioner
was under no legal obligation to return the same cash or money, i.e., the bills or coins, which he received
from the private respondent.

xxxx
The Court further declared in that case, thus:
xxxx
The ruling of the trial judge that ownership of the cash advanced to the petitioner by private respondent was
not transferred to the latter is erroneous. Ownership of the money was transferred to the petitioner. Even
the prosecutibn witness, Virgilio Hierro, testified thus:

Q When you gave cash advance to the accused in this Travel Order No.
2222 subject to liquidation, who owns the funds, accused or
SEAFDEC? How do you consider the funds in the possession of the
accused at the time when there is an actual transfer of cash? x x x

A The one drawing cash advance already owns the money but subject
to liquidation. If he will not liquidate, he is obliged to return the
amount.

Q xxx xxx xxx.

So why do you treat the itinerary of travel temporary when in fact as

of that time the accused owned already the cash advance. You said
the cash advance given to the accused is his own money. In other
words, at the time you departed with the money it belongs already to
the accused?

A Yes, but subject for liquidation. He will be only entitled for that
credence if he liquidates.

Q [In] other words, it is a transfer of ownership subject to a suspensive

condition that he liquidates the amount of cash advance upon return
to station and completion of the travel?

A Yes, sir.

x x x x35
In addition, on the matter of liquidation of cash advance, Commission on Audit Circular No. 96-004 dated
April 19, 1996 pertinently states:

xxxx

3.2.2 LIQUIDATION OF CASH ADVANCE

3.2.2.1 The cash advance for travel shall be liquidated by the

official/employee concerned strictly within sixty (60) days after
 his return to the Philippines as required under Section 16, of EO
248, as amended otherwise, payment of his salary shall be
suspended until he complies therewith.

3.2.2.2 The official/employee concerned shall draw a liquidation voucher

to be supported by the following:

a. Certificate of travel completed (Appendix B):

b. Plane or boat tickets covering actual transportation fare from

the point of embarkation in the Philippines to the place of
destination and back, provided, that the presentation of a
certification or affidavit of loss executed by the official or
employee concerned shall no.t be considered as appropriate
replacement for the required transportation tickets;

c. Bills and receipts covering representation expenses incurred,

if the official concerned has been authorized to incur the
same;

d. Hotel room bills with official receipts, regardless of whether

or not the amount exceeds the prescribed rate of Two
Hundred United States Dollars per day, provided that for this
purpose, no certification of affidavit of loss shall be
considered or accepted;

e. Where the actual travel expenses exceeds the prescribed rate

of Three Hundred United States Dollars per day, The
certification of the head of the agency concerned as to its
absolute necessity shall also be required in addition to the
presentation of the hotel room bills with official receipts.

3.2.2.3 Where a trip is cancelled, the amount paid in advance shall be

refunded in full. In cases where the trip is cut short or
terminated in advance of the itinerary, the excess payment shall
likewise be refunded. The head of the agency shall see to it such
refunds are enforced promptly.
In all, Petitioner's full liquidation of his cash advance by means of an arrangement allowed by the COA
ultimately translated into a legal avoidance of violation of Art. 218.

And even granting that it was malversation which petitioner was alleged to have committed, it has been
ruled that good faith is a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation of public funds as it would negate
criminal intent on the part of the accused.36 Petitioner's full liquidation of his cash advance by means of an
arrangement allowed by the COA ultimately translated into the good faith he interposed as a defense.

The felony of malversation of public funds being one which involves breach of the public trust that is
uniformly punished whether committed through dolo or culpa,37 defenses relative thereto are to be rightfully
accorded strict and close scrutiny. Reviewing relevant jurisprudence on the matter, however, the Court
handed down the following pronouncements in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan38 to wit:
[I]n Villacorta39 this court found that the cash in the possession of the accused therein was found short
because of the disallowance by the audit team. The items comprising the shortage were paid to government
personnel either as wages, travelling expenses, salaries, living allowances, commutations of leave, terminal
leaves and for supplies. The accused therein did not put the missing funds to personal use; in fact, when he
demanded payment from said personnel, they redeemed their chits and made restitution. Furthermore, at
the time of the audit, the accused had an actual balance deposit with the provincial treasurer in the sum of
P64,661.75.

In Quizo,40 the therein accused incurred a shortage in the total sum of P17,421.74 because the audit team
disallowed P16,720.00 in cash advances he granted to some employees, P700.00 representing
accommodated private checks, and an actual cash shortage of P1.74. On the same day when the audit was
conducted, P406.18 was reimbursed by the accused, P10,515.56 three days thereafter and the balance of
P6,500.00 another three days later. This Court, in a spirit of leniency, held that the accused had successfully
overthrown the presumption of guilt. None of the funds was used by him for his personal interest. The
reported shortage represented cash advances given in good faith and out of goodwill to co-employees, the
itemized list of which cash advances was verified to be correct by the audit examiner. There was no
negligence, malice or intent to defraud; and the actual cash shortage was only P1.74 which, together with
the disallowed items, was fully restituted within a reasonable time.

While we do not wish it to appear that the mere fact of restitution suffices to exculpate an accountable
public officer, as each case should be decided on the basis of the facts thereof, it appears that the Court was
of the persuasion that the confluence of the circumstances in the Villacorta and Quizo cases destroyed
the prima facie presumption of peculation and criminal intent provided for in said Article 217.
The factual and legal bases for petitioner's criminal liability thus discounted, the Court will no longer dwell on
great length on the propriety of the penalty handed down by public respondent. On the theory that he was
guilty as charged, petitioner was imposed the "indeterminate penalty of imprisonment [for] ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to eighteen (18) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum."41 While the Indeterminate Sentence Law mandates the imposition of
an indeterminate sentence with minimum and maximum periods for the benefit of the accused, it goes
without saying that the minimum and maximum penalties to be imposed should, themselves, be
determinate.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING and SETTING

ASIDESandiganbayan's assailed 18 November 2013 Decision. In lieu thereof, another is
entered ACQUITTINGDomingo G. Panganiban.

The Court orders the public respondent to forthwith cancel the cash bail of the petitioner and immediately
reimburse the amount to him.

SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., conc