Crimpro Case Doctrines
Crimpro Case Doctrines
Crimpro Case Doctrines
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on
4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of criminal
offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the
phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at
the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of
the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the
offense is halted.
Piñote vs. Ayco What happened: Judge allowed the defense to present
witnesses when the public prosecutor was in the hospital.
Judge allowed (and ordered) him to cross-examine them
when he attended in subsequent hearings, but he refused.
People vs. Piccio What happened: The People, through the private prosecutors
but with conformity of public prosecutor, filed the Notice of
Appeal with CA. (Without the OSG’s conformity)
People vs. Dela Cerna What happened: Rape complaint filed before the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, when rape cannot be prosecuted de oficio
Re: Llorente
Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must
be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral
certainty." The validity and sufficiency of the Information,
however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import of the
ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established
by the prosecution during the trial and not when the
Information is filed.
Pacoy vs. Hon. Cajigal Crime involved: Homicide -> Murder -> Homicide
Information: “With the aggravating circumstance of killing, 2Lt.
Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.”
What happened: The accused pleaded guilty to the crime of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank. The judge, after arraignment, ordered the prosecutor to
amend the Information to murder because of such
circumstance. The prosecutor then entered his amendment by
crossing out the word Homicide and instead wrote the word
Murder in the caption and in the opening paragraph of the
Information. The accusatory portion remained exactly the
same as that of the original Information for Homicide, with the
correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from Escuita to
Escueta. The accused later refused to plea again, believing
that his right against double jeopardy was violated. The
Information was later amended again back to Homicide since
the aggravating circumstance was generic, not qualifying.
Unionbank vs. People Crime involved: perjury (in a Certificate against Forum
Shopping)
Information filed in: Makati RTC
Where Certificate was submitted: Pasay MeTC
Sy Tiong vs Caet
With this background, it can be appreciated that Article 183 of
the RPC which provides: “shall testify under oath, or make an
affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person
authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” in fact refers to either of two punishable acts (1)
falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a
criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a
person authorized to administer an oath on any material
matter where the law requires an oath.
Ferrer v. Sandiganbayan Crime involved: violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Note: Sir pointed out that a fine is not the same as civil
liability. The imposition of the fine in the criminal case is not
for the purpose of indemnifying the aggrieved party but for
vindicating the State for the offense committed by the
wrongdoer.
The Supreme Court said that the civil liability arising from a
crime may be determined in the criminal proceedings if the
offended party does not waive to have it adjudged or does
not reserve the right to institute a separate civil action
against the defendant. Accordingly, if there is no waiver or
reservation of civil liability, evidence should be allowed to
establish the extent of injuries suffered. •Even in case of an
acquittal, unless there is a clear showing that the act from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist, the judgment
shall make a finding on the civil liability of the accused in
favor of the offended party.
The SC said that where the court has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the
crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the
court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that
the law requires the court to resolve. One of the issues in a
criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising from
the crime.
In this case, Munoz was not civilly liable because there was
no libel to speak of since the communication was privileged.
Note: Sir noted the statcon issue raised; i.e., that there was
an alleged conflict between Article 36 of the Civil Code and
the Rules of Court and that since Art. 36 is substantive law
while the Rules of Court is procedural law, then the former
should prevail.
Note: Sir highlighted the fact that San Miguel sent notice of
dishonor to Sps. Gaditano three times but Sps. Gaditano still
did not fund the checks (see #4 below)
(3) Even if the trial court in the civil case declares Asia
Trust liable for unlawful garnishment of the savings
account, the Spouses cannot be automatically
adjudged free from criminal liability for violation of
BP 22, because the mere issuance of worthless
checks with knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds to support the checks is in itself the
offense.
Contentions of Accused:
● In asserting their right to due process, specifically to
a fair and impartial preliminary investigation,
petitioners impute reversible errors in the assailed
issuances, arguing, among other things, that
although respondents may have the power to
conduct criminal investigation or preliminary
investigation, respondents do not have the
power to conduct both in the same case.
● Petitioners also point out that the affidavits do not
qualify as a complaint within the scope of Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as the allegations therein
are insufficient to initiate a preliminary investigation,
there being no statement of specific and individual
acts or omissions constituting reckless imprudence.
● Hasty disposition of the case - 24 working days
Although NBI’s report was not sworn to, still, the report can
be accepted as a complaint since it was ATTACHED TO
OTHER AFFIDAVITS WHICH ARE SWORN.
Borlongan v. Pena [Agent was claiming for his agency fees; purported principal
filed a motion to dismiss in relation to the civil case - agent is
now alleging that the submitted documents (in the motion to
dismiss) were falsified since signatories did not actually affix
their signatures, and were neither stockholders nor officers.
Baltazar vs. People Once a case has been filed with the court, it is
that court, no longer the prosecution, which has full
control of the case, so much so that the information may
not be dismissed without its approval. Significantly, once
a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed,
the court may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of
judicial discretion. In doing so, the trial judge must
himself be convinced that there was indeed no sufficient
evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can
be arrived at only after an assessment of the evidence in
the possession of the prosecution. What was
imperatively required was the trial judge's own
assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for
the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely
to accept the prosecution's word for its supposed
insufficiency.
Chan y Lim v. Secretary of In Crespo, the Court laid down the rule that once an
Justice Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
rests on the sound discretion of the court. In subsequent
cases, the Court clarified that Crespo d oes not bar the
Justice Secretary from reviewing the findings of the
investigating prosecutor in the exercise of his power of
control over his subordinates. The Justice Secretary is
merely advised, as far as practicable, to refrain from
entertaining a petition for review of the prosecutor's
finding when the Information is already filed in court. In
other words, the power or authority of the Justice
Secretary to review the prosecutor's findings subsists
even after the Information is filed in court. The court,
however, is not bound by the Resolution of the Justice
Secretary, but must evaluate it before proceeding with
the trial. While the ruling of the Justice Secretary is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.
San Miguel v. Maceda When bail is a matter of right, forfeiture of bail is not
absolute. When the accused jumped bail, the judge can
forfeit the original bail BUT SHOULD impose a new
increased bail. When bail is a matter of discretion, The judge
has two options when the accused jumps bail: (1) forfeit the
original bail and impose a new increased bail OR (2) forfeit
the original bail AND not impose a new bail altogether
In verbatim:
Where bail is a matter of right and prior absconding and
forfeiture is not excepted from such right, bail must be
allowed irrespective of such circumstance. The existence of
a high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond
confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase
the bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to
assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted,
such amount to be subject, of course, to the other provision
that excessive bail shall not be required
Lavides v. CA The bail condition that arraignment should take place first
before granting bail, is INVALID. Remember that filing of
motion to quash information should only be BEFORE
arraignment. If the judge would impose the said invalid
condition, the accused would be limited to two options: (1)
file motion to quash information and wait for its resolution
while being detained because or (2) choose not to quash
information and just wait for arraignment in order for him to
eventually post bail.
In verbatim:
to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he
has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2)
foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right
to bail.
Trillanes IV v. Pimentel 1. Trillanes contends that the Jalosjos case was inapplicable
to him because Jalosjos was charged with rape while his
was a political offense. SC said the rules on bail do not
make a distinction as to the political complexion or the moral
turpitude involved in the offense. What matters, among
others, is the penalty charged by the offense
Ans: the substantial merits of the case. Since the case was
taken on appeal, the court can determine is the accused was
really guilty beyond reasonable doubt; and this can be the
basis for granting or denying bail. The case called this "a
less stringent sound discretion approach."
People v. Fitzgerald 1. Where the CA granted motion for new trial, it does NOT
mean that the CA's finding that there is strong evidence of
guilt was negated; especially so since it is the CA that has
still control of the case. In this case, the CA only ordered the
RTC to RECEIVE the evidence, and not to RESOLVE the
case entirely. Thus. this bolsters the idea that a motion for
new trial will not negate the finding of strong evidence of
guilt.
In verbatim:
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or
prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. A
mere claim of illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that
the trend now is for courts to permit bail for prisoners who
are seriously sick.
J. Leonen's Dissent:
This puts pressure on all trial courts and the Sandiganbayan
that will predictably be deluged with motions to fix bail on the
basis of humanitarian considerations. They will have to
decide whether this is applicable only to Senators and
former Presidents charged with plunder and not to those
accused of drug trafficking, multiple incestuous rape, serious
illegal detention, and other crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment.
Chua v. CA Where bail is denied by the RTC, the accused cannot filed a
separate petition via a special civil action or special
proceeding to question such denial; otherwise, he is liable
for forum shopping. The accused SHOULD file a motion to
review in the CA as an INCIDENT in his appeal.
BAIL SCENARIOS
(Scenario B) (Scenario C)
Pending appeal at the CA = Pending appeal at the CA: Pending appeal at the CA =
Bail is DISCRETIONARY 1. If with at least one DENY BAIL
bail-negating
circumstance = DENY *This is because conviction by
BAIL the RTC is already a
2. If no bail-negating determination of strong
circumstance = Bail is evidence of guilt. (People v.
DISCRETIONARY NItcha, p. 327 of Riano)
Upon conviction by the RTC Upon conviction by the RTC: Upon conviction by the RTC =
= Bail is DISCRETIONARY 1. If with at least one DENY BAIL
bail-negating
circumstance = NO BAIL *This is because conviction by
2. If no bail-negating the RTC is already a
circumstance = Bail is determination of strong
DISCRETIONARY evidence of guilt.
Pending Trial at the RTC = Pending trial at the RTC = Bail is a Pending trial at RTC = bail is
Bail is a matter of RIGHT matter of RIGHT (Sec 4) DISCRETIONARY (Sec 4-b);
Thus,
*Thus, RTC judge cannot deny 1. If strong evidence of
bail even if accused jumped bail guilt = DENY BAIL
previously. S/he can only increase (Sec 7)
amount of bail. (San Miguel v.
Maceda) *The prosecution has
the burden of showing
*But take note that increasing bail that the evidence of
requires hearing (Sec 20; Andres guilt is strong (Sec 8;
v. Beltran) see Secs.6-7 of AM
12-11-2-SC for
(see Sec 10 of AM 15-06-10-SC procedure)
for procedure)
*Regardless if accused
is not yet convicted, he
will be denied bail if
there is strong
evidence of guilt of the
crime of Reclusion
Perpetua (Trillanes v.
Pimentel)
(see Sec 10 of AM
15-06-10-SC for procedure)
(see Sec 10 of AM
15-06-10-SC for procedure)
Apply for bail in any court where accused is held. (Sec 17; p.317 of RIano)