Celerino Mercado vs.

Espinocilla
GR No. 184109
Feb. 1, 2012

Facts:

Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of
570 sq. m., located at Bulan, Sorsogon. After he died, his five children,
Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552 equally
among themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four
siblings, and Macario took possession of Dionisia’s share. In an affidavit of
transfer of real property dated November 1, 1948, Macario claimed that
Dionisia had donated her share to him in May 1945. Thereafter, on August 9,
1977, Macario and his daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida Gabelo sold 225
sq. m. to his son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen Espinocilla
and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. Then, Roger Espinocilla
sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. Hence, respondent Belen Espinocilla
occupies 109 sq. m., 120 sq. m. for Caridad Atienza, 290 sq. m. for Caroline
Yu, and 132 sq. m for petitioner, Salvacion's son.

Petitioner filed before the RTC to sue the respondents to recover the
area of 28.5 sq. m. which he bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m.
which allegedly belonged to him but was occupied by Macario’s house. His
claim has since been modified to an alleged encroachment of only 39 sq. m.
that he claims must be returned to him. He avers that he is entitled to own
and possess 171 sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his
mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. According to
him, his mother’s inheritance is 142.5 sq. m., that is, 114 sq. m. from
Doroteo plus 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. Since the area he occupies is only
132 sq. m., he claims that respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.
on the other hand, respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land
they occupy by virtue of acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for
petitioner’s claim of encroachment.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of petitioner and held that
he is entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC found that petitioner inherited 142.5 sq.
m. from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt
Aspren. The RTC computed that Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each
inherited 142.5 sq. m. of Lot No. 552. Each inherited 114 sq. m. from
Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. The RTC further ruled that Macario
was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to
petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m. on appeal, CA reversed its decision.

Issue:
 Whether petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion is barred by
prescription.

Held:

Yes. Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real

rights over immovable property, is concerned with lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession
should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted, and
adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership
and other real rights over immovable property are acquired through
uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years without need of title or of
good faith.

Petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’

possession with his assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of
Dionisia’s share created a constructive trust. In a constructive trust, there is
neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called
trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the property
for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee
and cestui que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive
trust is for the trustee himself, and therefore, at all times
adverse. Prescription may supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate
the relationship.

Respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq.

m. of Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in
1945 although his claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only
made in a 1948 affidavit. Also, Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was
public and adverse since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also
occupied portions of Lot No. 552. Indeed, the 1977 sale made to Roger
confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said sale of
225 sq. m. was an act of ownership over Macario’s original share and
Dionisia’s share. In 1985, Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he
sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It was only in the year 2000, upon
receipt of the summons to answer petitioner’s complaint, that respondents’
peaceful possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was
interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macario’s 1948
affidavit void is of no moment. Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned
with Macario’s title or good faith.
 Moreover, petitioner’s action for recovery of possession having been
filed 55 years after Macario occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also barred by
extinctive prescription. The CA while condemning Macario’s fraudulent act of
depriving his three sisters of their shares in Dionisia’s share, equally
emphasized the fact that Macario’s sisters wasted their opportunity to
question his acts.

G.R. No. 199150

February 6, 2012
CARMINA G. BROKMANN, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:
The criminal charge stemmed from the failure of the petitioner to
return or remit the proceeds of jewelries amounting to P1,861,000.00. The
prosecution anchored its case on the testimony of Anna de Dios (private
complainant), and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) executed between
the private complainant and the petitioner. The gist of the MOA provides: (1)
the petitioners acknowledgment and receipt, on various dates, of jewelries
from the private complainant amounting to P1,861,000.00; (2) the petitioner
failed to remit the proceeds of the sale of the subject jewelries; and (3) the
private complainant filed the estafa case against the petitioner for the non-
remittance of the proceeds of the sale of the jewelries.

The petitioner asserted in defense her lack of bad faith and intention to
deceive the private complainant. She narrated that she and the private
complainant had been engaged in the buy and sell of jewelries for 15 years.
She admitted receiving the subject jewelries on a consignment basis but she
averred that not all the jewelries were sold. The petitioner emphasized that
she made partial payments of her obligation and had no intention of
absconding. With respect to the MOA, she insisted that there was no period
in the agreed terms as to when the remittance of the proceeds for the sale of
the jewelries or the return of the unsold jewelries should be made.

The RTC found the petitioner liable for estafa, and sentenced the
petitioner to imprisonment of six (6) years and six (6) months of prision
mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. The RTC also ordered the petitioner to restitute the private
complainant P1,047,720.00 as actual damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not agent held liable?

HELD:
The offense of estafa, in general, is committed either by (a) abuse of
confidence or (b) means of deceit.[8] The acts constituting estafa committed
with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa
committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not an essential requisite of estafa
by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud or
deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas. In this case, the charge
against the petitioner and her subsequent conviction was for estafa
committed by abuse of confidence. Thus, it was not necessary for the
prosecution to prove deceit as this was not an element of the estafa that the
petitioner was charged with.
In a contract of agency for the sale of a specific item, an agent has the duty
to return upon demand of its owner. Otherwise, he shall be liable for estafa.

G.R. No. 173857

March 21, 2012
LEONCIA MANUEL & MARINA S. MUDLONG, vs. LEONOR SARMIENTO,

Petitioner Leoncia Manuel appointed her granddaughter, petitioner Marina

Mudlong, as her attorney-in-fact, granting her the authority to sell a parcel of
land containing an area of 23,959 square meters located in Tigbe (Diliman),
Norzagaray, Bulacan, registered in her (Leoncia Manuel) name. In turn,
Marina Mudlong informed several real estate brokers that the said property
was for sale, including respondent Leonor Sarmiento.

In March 1997, Chiao Liong Tan, a businessman, was looking for a property to
purchase in Norzagaray, Bulacan. Chiao Liong Tans secretary, Antonia de
Leon, told Josie Buluran, a broker, about it. Josie Buluran and other brokers,
namely, Ernesto Sanchez and Lucy Eustaquio, started looking for a property
for Chiao Liong Tan. Josie Buluran asked Rodolfo Santos, a former barangay
captain of Partida, Norzagaray, if he knew of any property that might be for
sale in the area. Rodolfo Santos told Josie Buluran that the property of
Leoncia Manuel, which was adjacent to his land, was for sale, and that she
should get in touch with respondent, because the title and other documents
of the property were in her possession. He referred Josie Buluran to his wife,
Teodora Doray Santos, to facilitate her introduction to respondent. Thus, Josie
Buluran went to Doray Santos, who told respondent about Chiao Liong Tans
interest in the property of Leoncia Manuel.

On May 7, 1997, Chiao Liong Tan, Antonia de Leon, Josie Buluran and Lucy
Eustaquio went to the property of petitioner Leoncia Manuel. Thereafter, they
went to the house of the spouses Rodolfo and Doray Santos to meet
respondent. Chiao Liong Tan asked respondent if she could give him the
complete documents of Leoncia Manuels property. Respondent showed Chiao
Liong Tan the photocopy of the title of the said property and the old tax
receipts. Chiao Liong Tan told respondent that he needed the new plan and
new tax receipts plus the tax clearance. He asked respondent if she could
provide the said documents by 2:00 p.m. of that day.

Hence, at 2:00 p.m. of March 7, 1997, respondent and Josie Buluran went to
Chiao Liong Tans office in Binondo to present the documents he requested.
At the end of their meeting, Chiao Liong Tan agreed to buy the property of
Leoncia Manuel at P100.00 per square meter, and asked respondent to
produce her authority to sell.

On March 8, 1997, respondent, the spouses Rodolfo and Doray Santos, and
Lucy Eustaquio went to petitioner Marina Mudlongs house to ask her to
execute an exclusive authority to sell in respondent's favor. It appears that
respondent brought two blank authority to sell forms, which petitioner Marina
Mudlong both signed.

Respondent filled in the first form to reflect her real agreement with
petitioner Marina Mudlong: (1) the asking price for the property was P65.00
per square meter; (2) respondents commission would be the difference
between Marina Mudlong's asking price and the price agreed upon by the
buyer; (3) the term of respondent's exclusive authority to sell was for one
month, which was reckoned from the date the said document was notarized
on March 8, 1997.

ISSUE: whether the plaintiff, herein respondent, was an exclusive agent.

Held: The Appellate Court finding respondent as exclusive agent of

petitioners despite evidence to the contrary, that is, there were two sets of
authority to sell, one notarized, while the other was unnotarized; the
unnotarized authority to sell was presented to the buyer, while the notarized
authority to sell was presented to the court as the basis for respondents
action. According to petitioners, the only authority to sell that should be
recognized is the unnotarized authority to sell presented to the buyer, as the
said authority played a vital and determining role, without which there could
be no meeting of the minds between the buyer and the seller with respect to
the sale of the property.

The presence of the other agents, namely, Rodolfo, Josie, Antonia de Leon,
and Lucy Eustaquio does not detract from the exclusive nature of the
authority to sell that Marina had granted to Leonor. The fact that Marina also
granted the other brokers an authority to sell on 11 March 1997, after she
had already constituted Leonor as her exclusive agent on 8 March 1997, and
during the validity of Leonor's exclusive authority to sell, underscores
Marina's bad faith and intentional breach of her contract with Leonor.

When an authority to sell is notarized, there is a presumption that it had

been validly executed.

G.R. No. 184528

April 25, 2012
NILO OROPESA, vs. CIRILO OROPESA

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Decision
rendered by the CA affirming the Order of the RTC in a Special Proceedings
which dismissed Nilo Oropesa’s, peitioner, petition for guardianship over the
properties of his father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

Petitioner filed with the RTC of Parañaque City, a petition for him and a
certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his
father, respondent, Cirilo Oropesa.

In said petition, petitioner alleged that respondent has been afflicted with
several maladies and has been sickly for over 10 years already having
suffered a stroke that his judgment and memory were impaired and such has
been evident after his hospitalization. That due to his age and medical
condition, he cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and
has become easy prey for deceit and exploitation by people around him,
particularly his girlfriend, Ms. Luisa Agamata.

Respondent filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship filed by his
(ever caring and loving) son.

During trial, petitioner presented his evidence which consists of his, his
sister, and respondent’s former nurse’s testimony.

After presenting evidence, petitioner rested his case but failed to file his
written formal offer of evidence.
Respondent, thereafter, filed his Omnibus Motion to declare that petitioner
has waived the presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and Evidence since they
were not formally offered; to expunge the documents of the petitioner from
records; and to grant leave to the Oppositor to file Demurrer to Evid. A
subsequent Demurrer was filed and was granted.

MR was filed by petitioner and appealed the case to CA; failed, now to the
SC.

Issue: Whether respondent is considered incompetent as per the Rules who

should be placed under guardianship?

Held: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which

one person, called a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the
law regards as incapable of managing his own affairs. A guardianship is
designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the ward’s property, as well as to render any assistance
that the ward may personally require. It has been stated that while custody
involves immediate care and control, guardianship indicates not only those
responsibilities, but those of one in loco parentis as well.