Whitaker - Aristotle Interpretation
Whitaker - Aristotle Interpretation
Whitaker - Aristotle Interpretation
C. W. A. W H I T A K E R
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ISBN 978-0-19-823619-1
Acknowledgements
C.W.A.W.
Peterhouse, Cambridge
October 1995
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Contents
Abbreviations ix
Introduction i
1, The Title 5
2, Chapter i: Significant Utterances 8
1. Words, Thoughts, and Things 9
2. Truth and Falsehood 25
3, Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 35
1. The Structure of Chapters 2 and 3 35
2. Simple and Compound Words 37
3. Human Speech and Inarticulate Utterances 45
4, The Role of Names and Verbs in the Assertion 52
5, Indefinite Names and Verbs 61
6, Inflexions of Names and Verbs 67
4, Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions 71
Bibliography 221
Index 229
Abbreviations
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
APo. Posterior Analytics
APr. Prior Analytics
Cat. Categories
DeAn. De Anima
De Int. De Interpretatione
De Sensu De Sensu et Sensibilibus
EN Nicomachean Ethics
GA Generation of Animals
GC De Generatione et Corruptione
HA History of Animals
Mela. Metaphysics
PA Parts of Animals
Ph. Physics
Poet Poetics
Pol. Politics
Pmb, Problems
Prog. An. Progression of Animals
Rhet. Rhetoric
Rhet. ad Alex, Rhetoric to Alexander
SE Sophistici Elenchi
Top. Topics
WORKS OF PLATO
Ap. Apology
Crat, Cratylus
Gorg. Gorgias
Hipp, Maj, Hippias Major
Hipp, Min, Hippias Minor
Prat. Protagoras
Rep, Republic
Soph. Sophist
Symp. Symposium
x Abbreviations
Tht. Theaetetus
Tim, Timaeus
OTHER ABBREVIATIONS
LSI Liddell, H. G,, and Scott, R., A Greek-English Lexicon,
rev. by Sir H. S. Jones and R. McKenzie (Oxford, 1968).
OED The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford, 1971).
RE Pauly, A., and Wissowa, G. (eds.), Real-Encyclopadie
der dassischen Altertumswissenschaft (Stuttgart, 1894).
Introduction
1
See, e.g., Ammonitis, In Aristotelis De Interpretatione Commentarius, A. Busse
(ed.), Commentaria in Amtotelem Graeca, iv (Berlin, 1897), i. 22-2. % J. Tricot,
Aristou: Organon, 2, De I'lnterpre'tation (Paris, 1989), viii, and J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle
the Philosopher (Oxford, 1981), 79,
2
For the former, see N. Krelzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds Significant by
Convention', in J. Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation
(Dordrecht, 1974), 3-21. Examples of the latter approach are seen in Montanari,
who prefaces his study of chapters 1-4 with an argument that they form an
autonomous body of theory, irrelevant to the rest of the treatise and the Organon
in general (E. Montanari, La sezione linguistics del Peri Hermeneias di Aristotele,
2 vote,, Studi e testi, 5 and 8 (Florence, 1988); see i. 12 £), and Arens, who also con-
centrates on chapters 1-4, where Aristotle 'formulates his genera! views on lan-
guage* (H. Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition, Studies in the
History of Linguistics, 29 (Amsterdam, 1984): see i).
3
See the Bibliography, passim.
2 Introduction
The Title
1
The terms used in this section are general, utterances being referred to as, lit-
erally, 'what is in the voice' and thoughts as 'affections in the souP (i6*3f.; see also
Plato, Rep. 51 id). We shall see that the affections in the soul referred to here must
be thoughts, rather than, for example, perceptions or emotions.
io Aristotle's De Interpretatione
relation between thought and its objects, it will be seen that these
two views are consistent with each other,
According to the view put forward in chapter i of the De
Interpretatione, then, words are conventional and not natural; they
are not the same for everyone, and stand as tokens for thoughts. In
advancing this view, Aristotle was reacting to a debate which had
been carried on by earlier thinkers. The debate was already going
on in the time of Democritus, who argued against the naturalist
theory by drawing attention to four types of phenomena, which, he
claimed, could not take place if language were natural. He pointed
out first that the same word may have several meanings; secondly
that different words may have the same meaning; thirdly that one
name can be substituted for another, and fourthly that there are
many things which do not have names.6 The third of these argu-
ments corresponds to that used by Aristotle ia citing the change-
ability of words and of money.
The debate was taken up in Plato's Cratylus, in which
Hermogenes advocates the view put forward by Democritus. The
names of things can be changed, since their attachment to any item
depends only on 'convention and agreement' (Crat. 384di-6,
43362 ff.). Aristotle takes up the term 'convention* (ovv&rfxrf) from
Plato (De Int. i"j*i i), Hermogenes is also given the argument that
the names in use vary between different nationalities (Crat
385d7-e3); Aristotle makes this the principal difference between,
on the one hand, writing and utterances, which are not the same
for all, and, on the other hand, thoughts and things, which are the
same.
As well as adopting some of the vocabulary and arguments used
by Democritus and by the character Hermogenes on the side of
conventionalism, Aristotle distances himself from the naturalist
position portrayed by Plato. In the Cratylus it was argued that
naming is an action, and actions are not relative to us, but have a
nature of their own: we must carry out an action with the appro-
priate implement, and not in whatever way we choose (Cmt,
38731-8),. It is thus concluded that a name is a tool (Crat. 38838,
brjf.). Aristotle explicitly rejects this view, stating that language
signifies by convention, and not as a tool (i6h33-i7a2). The token
6
H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin, 1951), frag, B
26. See also RE, vii. cols. 17821
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 13
replaces the tool as the model for how words do their job. We shall
see other ways in which he responds to the Cratylus, in examining
the treatment of simplicity and complexity in words and thoughts
in the final part of chapter i.
exelvo, DeAn. 418*3 ft). We are told in book III that thought works
in an analogous fashion (429*13-18). Before conceiving of any
object of thought, the mind is blank: it is not actually anything, until
it begins to think (429s23fl). It is capable of taking on the form of
an object of thought, and so, Aristotle goes on to say, that which
thinks and that which is thought about are the same, and know-
ledge is the same as the thing known (430a3-5,431*1 £). The theory
concerns the process of conceiving a thought of some intelligible
thing. In this process, the intelligible form of the object of thought
is taken on by the thinker, so that this same form is common both
to the object and to the thinker, in this way, a likeness of the object
of thought is present in the mind.
It is important to clarify that Aristotle does not mean that the
affections in the soul are mental images or pictures: they are
thoughts, and a thought is like its object, since both share the same
form. This does not make a thought into a picture. In the De Anima
thoughts and images are carefully distinguished. The crucial differ-
ence is that images (^avnza/tara) cannot be woven into complex
thoughts which have a truth value, whereas simple thoughts
can. Imagination takes perception as its starting point,
and cannot take place without it (De An, 428bn-i6). We are told
that creatures are guided by imagination either because they lack
rationality, as do brute beasts, or because their intellect is tem-
porarily veiled, through sleep or disease (429*5-$). So, while images
may accompany thoughts, they are clearly not the same as thoughts
themselves (432aio-i4). To say that a thought is a likeness, then, is
not to say that it is an image or picture.
Once we have seen that the two are separate, it should be clear
that Aristotle is concerned in the De Interpretation with thoughts
and not images. If by 'affections in the soul' he meant mental
images and not thoughts, then he would be claiming that spoken
utterances are tokens for images, and not thoughts; yet, later in the
chapter we are told that simple thoughts correspond to names and
verbs (16*13 fc), and in chapter 3 we see that both speaker and
hearer register in thought the utterance of a word (i6b2o£).
Aristotle is clearly interested in the relation between words and
thoughts, and not. that between words and mental images,
Despite the clear distinction which he draws between thoughts
and images, Aristotle has been accused of adopting the view that a
16 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
' See, e.g., H. Arena, Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition
(Amsterdam, 1984), 31, and J. L, Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De
Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 113.
10
Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds Significant by Convention*, in A
Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic and its Modern Interpretation (Dordrecht, 1974), 9.
" Cf. Top. I03l>20-3i.
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 17
the point that writing and utterances are not the same for all,
whereas thoughts and things are. In the course of this point, he
describes affections of the soul as being the 'primary things of
which spoken utterances are signs'
i6a6). The debate arises over the interpretation of this clause, and
also involves a textual dispute.
Three main interpretations have been advanced. Proponents of
all three agree that the sentiment contained in this clause is 'words
are primarily of affections in the soul'. The disagreement
comes as to whether 'primarily' qualifies 'words', 'signs', or 'affec-
tions in the soul*. According to Ammonius, 'primarily* qualifies
"affections in the soul'. Words are signs, primarily of thoughts, and
secondarily of something else, that is, of things.14 He develops this
interpretation by making thoughts intermediaries between words
and things, so that words are of thoughts directly, and of things
indirectly. I shall argue that Ammonius' interpretation of how to
read 'primarily* is correct. Before considering his view in more
detail, we must consider the other two interpretations of the clause,
and also discuss the bearing of the textual dispute.
According to the second interpretation, adopted by Kretzmann,
'primarily* is to be taken with 'signs*. Words are primarily signs
of thoughts, and secondarily something else, that is, symbols of
them.15 The two terms 'sign' and 'symbol' (as he translates it)
are expanded as follows. Spoken utterances are, according to him,
primarily natural signs, or symptoms, of mental impressions; this
is expressed by the word 'sign'. They are also, secondarily,
conventional signs or tokens; for this, the word 'symbol* is used. So,
according to this view, when Aristotle says that a word is a
word when it becomes a symbol (i6a27f.), he means that a
sound is already a natural symptom of some mental event, and
when it is adopted as a conventional symbol it becomes a word in
addition.
Aristotle's comments on animal noises are cited in defence of
this view. He clearly says that, while animal noises are not words,
yet they do indicate something (i6a28~3o). This means of expres-
sion does not depend on the formation of a convention. Pepin
exploits in defence of Kretizmann's view an inference drawn by
14
Ammonius, In Artstotetls De Interpretatione Commentariuf, A. Busse (ed.),
Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, rv (Berlin, 1897), 17 tt
15
Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds'.
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 19
16
1. P^pin,"£it[t(Sof.a, Sp«a,'O/totopara: A propos de De Interpretatione i, 1683-8
et Potttique VIII 5,134036-39', in 3, Wiesner (ed.), Aristotele$: Wtrk und Wirktmg, I
(Berlin, 1985), 22-44: see 41, n. 60.
" Lo Piparo comments on these lines, 'if this were so, intelligence and learning
would normally exist without the contribution of hearing' (R Lo Piparo, 'Aristotle:
The Material Conditions of Linguistic Expressiveness", Versus; Quaderni di studi
semiotici, no. 50-1 (May-Dec. 1988), 83-102; see ioo).This is to misunderstand what
Aristotle means. He does not mean that speech could be informative even if it were
not audible, but that it is informative not because it is audible, but because it con-
sists of words.
2O Aristotle's De Interpretatione
word a word does not permit a word to be both a natural and a
conventional sign, and so the interpretation of Kretzmann and
P6pin cannot be supported.
The third way of interpreting Aristotle's words at i686-8 is
adopted by Belardi. In 'words are primarily signs of affections in
the soul', Belardi takes 'primarily' to qualify 'words': it is pri-
marily words which are signs of thoughts; secondarily, some other
items are signs of them, and these other items are written marks.18
In an earlier publication, Belardi suggested that words were pri-
marily signs of affections in the soul, secondly signs of images, and
thirdly of concepts.1* Both positions taken by Belardi involve
excluding the things from the scheme, and seeing Aristotle's com-
ments on signs as confined only to writing, utterances, and various
mental states. Accordingly, he claims that Aristotle nowhere says
that words are symbols of things.20 As we have seen, though, in a
passage in the Sophistici Elenchi words are indeed said to be tokens
for things (SE i65a6ff.).21 We see the importance of the relation
between words and things in many other passages. Important
examples to be found in the De Interpretatione include the follow-
ing: verbs are defined as being signs of a certain sort of thing (i6b7,
10); the verb 'to be', unlike other words, is not a sign of a thing
(i6b22f.); in chapter 7, assertions are classified according to the
kinds of things which they take as subject (i7a38ff.); the truth of
utterances matches things (19*33). Given the great importance of
the relation between words and things in the De Interpretatione,
and the mention of both words and things in the sentence under
discussion, it is vastly preferable to suppose that this relation finds
a place in the discussion. Belardi, however, goes to some trouble to
exclude it.
We now come to the textual question lurking in this sentence
(16%). This concerns whether to adopt as the correct reading the
genitive plural 'of the first things' (ngtuttov), or either of two syn-
18
W. Belardi, 'Riconsiderando la seconda frase del De Interpretatione', Studi e
saggi linguistki, 21 (1981), 79-83. Bar a criticism of this view, see p. 181 of H.
Weidemann, 'Grundzflge der aristotelischen Sprachtheoric', in Schcnitter (cd.),
Sprachtheorien der abendlandischen Antike (Tubingen, 1991), 170-92.
" W. Belardi, It tinguaggio netta jtiosafia, diAristottle (Rome, 1975): see especially
106-9.
m
Ibid, 109.
zt
With reference to this passage, Belardi argues that we must instead take
Aristotle to mean that words are used as symbols of states of mind.
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 21
n
L. Minio-Paluello, Ariaotelis Categorise et liber De Inlerpretatione (Oxford,
1949)-
s
See Kretzmann, 'Aristotle on Spoken Sounds', 18, n. 4, and Belardi, II linguag-
gio netta fitosetfia di Aristotele, lofiL
** E. Montanari, La seiione Knguistica del Peri Benueneias di Aristotele, i vote.,
Studi c testf, 5 and. 8 (Florence, 1988), I 126-32 and IL 47-9.
22 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
on philosophical grounds, I have argued that Kretzmann's inter-
pretation involves a confusion over Aristotle's views on nature
and convention, and that BeJardi neglects the importance of the
relation between words and things. We are left agreeing with
Ammonius, then, that Aristotle means to say that spoken words are
primarily signs of thoughts, and secondarily signs of things.
Our understanding of these lines cannot consist merely in
a choice between the three interpretations of Ammonius,
Kretemann, and Belardi, however. We still need to explain what it
means for words to be signs primarily of thoughts and secondarily
of things. In order to elucidate this, let us remember the relation
between thoughts, and things investigated above. Thoughts are like-
nesses, that is, formal copies, of things. The thinker takes on the
form of the thing, so that the form is present both in the thing and
in his mind, just as the same impression might be shared by two
wax tablets. If words are of thoughts, and thoughts are exact
copies of things, it would seem to follow inevitably that words
would also be signs of things. Of course, they are only signs of things
by virtue of the fact that the words are already in the first place
signs of thoughts, which are in turn copies of the things. Thus,
Aristotle's view that thoughts are likenesses of things easily
explains why it is that words are signs first of thoughts and then
of things, Ammonius' account of the relation between words,
thoughts, and things is rather different. He takes words to signify
thoughts immediately and directly, and to signify things only indi-
rectly, through thoughts as intermediaries,25 Thoughts are not inter-
mediaries, though, standing between the words and the things:
rather, they are identical in form with the things. Words express
people's thoughts, which are in turn likenesses of things. It is for
this reason, and not because thoughts stand as intermediaries, that
words are signs first of thoughts and secondarily of things,
We may now answer the question of whether the De
Interpretatione and Sophistici Elenchi are consistent in their use of
'token' or not. In the former work words are said to be tokens for
thoughts, while in the latter they are tokens for things. The two
positions are clearly consistent with each other. Words stand for
thoughts and also for things; since words are arbitrary tokens
25
Ammonius, In Amtotdis De Interpretatione Commentarius 24. 7-9. Cf. a
scholiast on Cat 1*1 (in T, Waitz, Arutotelis Organon Craece (Leipzig, 1844),
i. 30.
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 23
24
Cf. Meta. F 1006*29f.: a word signifies being something. For a discussion of this
point, see Appendix I.
24 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the world: things are combined in a certain way, and the true affir-
mation asserts truly that they are so combined. A false affirmation
asserts the combination of things which are in fact divided.
Similarly, if things are divided, a true statement about them will be
a negation, asserting that they are separated, and a false statement
the affirmation which falsely asserts their combination. Truth con-
sists in correctly matching combination and division in thought or
utterance with the combination and division in things. In an affir-
mation, a subject and predicate are represented as combined, and
in a negation they are shown as divided front each other.
Combination and division, then, are features of the world, which
thoughts and statements represent either truly or falsely. The defi-
nitions of truth and falsehood in Metaphysics r are consistent with
this view, though more superficial and less helpful. There, truth is
defined as saying that what is is or that what is not is not, and false-
hood as saying that what is not is or that what is is not (Meta. F,
ioiib25~7).These definitions introduce the idea of a true assertion
matching the way things are and a false one failing to match,
without making clear what feature or aspect of the world it is that
an assertion either succeeds in matching or fails to match. The
definitions in terms of combination and division make up this
deficiency.
The theory appears again in chapter 10 of Metaphysics &
(i05ia34~bi7), A true thought is a thought that what is combined
is combined or that what is divided is divided, while a false thought
represents the things as being the opposite to the way they are.32
la both Metaphysics £4 and 0io, Aristotle discusses being true as
one of the senses in which something may be said to be. The same
point is also made in Metaphysics A? (roi7a3i~s). In this sense of
being, being is being true, or compounded, and not-being is being
false, or divided. This notion incorporates the traditional associa-
tion between being and unity in Greek thought. 'To be is to cohere,
and be one; not to be is to fail to cohere, and instead to be many*
(Meta. 0,105ibn ft).33There are thus real nonentities in the world.
32
It is consistent with this view that. Aristotle should speak of an affirmation as
asserting 'something of something' (nvitg xma ro/of), and a negation as asserting
'something away from something* (twos Aao m>o$, De Int. 17*25!.: ct APr. 47ll3),
33
For olher references to being as being compounded, see SE I50b22; 151*20-32;
Ph. i88bi8; Meta. Ill, iO43*i8tt Ct Ph. 2*5*20, where we are again told that one of
the senses of not being is that to do with combination or division,
28 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
38
Making contact with a simple using thought or language may be spoken of as
true (Mew. losi^); this is, however, a different sense of troth
30 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
y!
For a general study of the goat-stag, see G. SiUitti, Tragelaphos, Elenchos, 2
(Naples, 1980),
Chapter i: Significant Utterances 31
call the second one evidence for the first. Furthermore, the Greek
does not bear this interpretation happily. 'This* (rode) normally
refers forward.45 Expressions such as 'and there is evidence'
(mjftetov 6e), followed by an explanation (introduced by yog), are
indeed common, but the forward-referring 'this' (rode) is not
found.4*
Another interpretation is possible, by punctuating with a comma
instead of a full stop after 'it is not yet false or true' (i6ai6).47
Aristotle would then be adding to his first illustration the comment
that the words 'man* and 'pale' are signs of a particular thing, or of
this: 'for it is not yet false or true, but it is a sign of Ms.' This would
correspond to the comment that the goat-stag signifies something,
and the two illustrations would follow each other smoothly, the
second supporting the same point as the first, but with an
even stronger example. We often see the word 'this' (rode) in the
deictic sense of 'this particular thing'.48 In Metaphysics T we find a
closely related word (rodt) used in speaking of the signification of
words. A word signifies being or not being this (Mete ioo6a3o),This
covers names, such as 'man', and indefinite names, such as 'not-
man'. In either case, the signification must be tied to a this. In the
Posterior Analytics 'triangle' signifies this (rode aijftaivei,APo. 71*15;
cf. De Int. 20^30). As we have learnt, to signify is to be a sign of a
thing. The things which 'man' and 'pale* are of are here
referred to using the deictic pronoun, as if pointing out the thing
signified.
On this interpretation, the passage at 16*13-18 would assume a
highly symmetrical structure, which might be set out as follows:
1. Names and verbs are like thoughts without combination and
division,
2, [First illustration] like 'man' and 'pale', which,
(a) if nothing is added,
(b) are not yet either true or false,
(c) and are signs of a this:
45
See, e.g., De Int. 20*10; Rhet. i^trj^fi. At Top. I32a23f. it is used twice, appar-
ently once referring back and once forward, but the text here may be corrupt,
* We find in some passages a different word for 'this*, which can refer back
(oryitiov H Tovtav, and not rovie). See, e.g., APo. 87bi, Meteorology 350*28; and
Waltz,
47
Aristolelis Organon, i. 327.
I am indebted to David Sedley for suggesting this interpretation.
48
See, e.g., j4ft>.77*i;GC3i7 l> 9, 21,28; Atoa.Z, 10^24, Meta, A, io69bn.
34 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
3. [Second illustration] for even 'goat-stag'
(a) signifies something,
(6) but is not yet true or
(c) unless 'is' or 'is not' is added, either simply or with time.
The three clauses under the second iEustration correspond to
those under the first, occurring in reverse order. Both illustrations
support the point that simple words are neither true nor false, and
that truth value would only follow with the addition of something,
that is, some verb. While these simple words are neither true nor
false, they do signify something. This point is made in both illus-
trations, though in slightly different words, 'Man' and 'pale' stand
for a this, that is, some real thing which may be designated. Goat-
stag is introduced as an extreme example to choose; 'even goat-stag
signifies something' (aypawei n). This is perhaps a more cautious
claim: since the goat-stag does not exist, Aristotle does not commit
himself to saying that it is a sign of a Ms; nevertheless, the word is
meaningful. Just as it is not meaningless, it is not false: it is not a
one-word assertion, and so can have no truth value.
We may now look back briefly on chapter i, before going on.The
first part of the chapter sets out in general terms the relation
between writing, speech, thought, and things, while the second part
introduces a distinction between simple and complex utterances
and thoughts, and so allows the notions of truth and falsehood to
be brought in. This first chapter deals briefly with important issues
which underlie the rest of the treatise. Later chapters will contain
detailed studies of contradictory pairs of assertions. Before
Aristotle can go on to this, he must explain how assertions work,
and to do this he must define the name and verb, and show how
they combine together to form compound utterances which are
either true or false. The outline of this project is seen in chapter i,
where the name and verb are distinguished from complex utter-
ances. He is now ready to go on to define the name and verb, which
is the task of the next two chapters.
3
In both the definitions of the name and of the verb it is stated that
no part of the word signifies separately (i6a2ot, i6b6f.).The point
2
The symmetry of the chapters, with definitions followed by explanations, sug-
gests that the additional clause 'and it is a sign of something said of something else1
(16'"?) should be a part of the definition of the verb. It receives its explanation at
16*91 For this reason, Bekkers comma at i&f seems preferable to Minio-Paluelo's
colon.
38 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the same. Both the Greek words for 'fair' and 'horse' are modified
when they enter the compound name, the former by the
doubling of a letter and the dropping of its inflexional ending, and
the latter by the dropping of the rough breathing or aspiration.
Both words also undergo a change in their accentuation, marking
their tonal pronunciation. We shall need to determine whether
these factors are intended by Aristotle to be relevant to the loss
of signification which the words suffer when they join the
compound.
The interpretation of the next sentence bears on this question.
He now goes on to say that in the compound 'Fair-horse', 'horse'
(amoq) signifies nothing by itself; in the phrase 'fair horse',
however, 'horse' (ataog) is an independent word, and does have its
own separate signification (16*21 £). There arises the question of
whether the Greek word for 'horse' is meant to appear in the same
form in these two contexts. In Aristotle's time, Greek was written
without accents or breathings, so that the two occurrences of'horse'
would have been indistinguishable. With the introduction of
accents and breathings, however, it seems most obvious to read
'horse* without them at its first occurrence (i6a2i), and with them
at its second (i6a22). This difference in accentuation, which is
highlighted in a modern, or indeed medieval, text, has inclined
some commentators to argue that the two are seen as completely
different words, and by this means to account for why Aristotle con-
sidered that one is significant, and the other is not.
This approach is taken by Leo Magentinus and by Aekrill, Leo
Magentinus takes the possession of the proper breathings and
accents as a necessary condition for meaningfulness: 'expressions
with their proper breathings and accents are significant, but without
these they signify nothing.'4 Ackritl follows the same approach, and
thinks of English examples where the parts of a compound word
do not form proper words when separated. So, he argues that the
two elements of 'pirate-boat' do not signify if removed from the
compound, 'assuming that we count "-" as a letter: "pirate-",
"-boat" '.5 Thus, the failure of the first element of 'pirate-boat' to
signify separately while in the compound is attributed to the fact
* Cited by Busse in Ammonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretations Commenfarua,
A. Busse (ed), Commentaria in Aristatelem Graeca, Iv (Berlin, 1,897), xxxvj,
5
J. L, Ackrili, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretalione (Oxford, 1963).
116.
4O Aristotle's De Interpretatione
that 'pirate-', unlike 'pirate', is not a real word. Aekril! also
offers another criterion. If one element of the compound cannot
stand as an independent word, then neither can the other; 'pirate'
ia 'pirateer' is not an independent word because 'er' is not. Both of
these explanations depend on there being parts of compounds
which are not independent words when written by themselves.
As Ackrill says, this approach cannot stretch to all cases, since
there are many compounds both of whose elements can stand
independently.6
On the above view, then, it is the alteration of a word in some
way when it enters a compound which prevents it from being fully
significant. This does not seem adequate to account for the differ-
ence in meaning, though. The loss of an accent or the appearance
of a hyphen might be a consequence of the combination of words
into a compound, but there seems no reason why it should bring
about a change in meaning. If we bear in mind that Aristotle wrote
without using accents or breathings, and that the two occurrences
of horse' would have looked exactly the same in the text as he first
wrote it, a different interpretation suggests itself He might then be
saying that 'in "Fair-horse" "horse" signifies nothing in itself, as it
does in the phrase "fair horse" ' (i6a2i f.). According to this view,
'horse* is seen as the same utterance in both cases, the difference
in accent and breathing being merely incidental, and not apparent
in the written text. Aristotle would not then mean that the word
without its breathing and accent could have no meaning anywhere,
but that 'horse' has no independent signification as a part of the
compound word 'Fair-horse', but does as a part of the phrase 'fair
horse".
According to this interpretation, the illustration would directly
support Aristotle's view that every word, even a compound one,
has its own signification, so that, once a word becomes an element
in a compound, it loses the independent signification which it pos-
sessed while it stood by itself. We shall see in the next few lines that,
while an element in a compound has no independent signification,
it does not cease to signify altogether, but, contributes to the signi-
fication of the whole.
We must now ask what it means to say that an element of the
7
Arens and Aekrill both lament Aristotle's choice of a proper name as an
example, on the grounds that its signification has nothing to do with the compo-
nents of the word (H. Arens, Aristotle's Theory of Language and its Tradition
(Amsterdam, 1984), 41; Aekrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretations, H?).
This criticism seems strange. A name can be appropriate or inappropriate: it must
therefore have a meaning which can be tested against the actual character of the
name's bearer. Etymology, or the search for the true nature of something by con-
sideration of its name, could be carried out on proper names as well as ordinary
nouns (see, e.g., Plato, Crat. 3840).
6
Ammonius, In Aristotelis De Interpretations Commentarius 33. 26-34. i-
42 Aristotle's De Interpretation
the compound as a whole; for Ammonips, on the other hand, the syllables of any
word combine in producing the signification of the whole, and so 'jointly signify*
(avamitta&>eo>), so that there is no difference between simple words and compound
ones regarding the signification of their parts (Ammonius, In Aristoidis De
Interprclationc Commentarius, 32, 30-3).
14
I write the Greek in capitals in order to avoid adding misleading accents and
breathings. Ackrill's English equivalents {'mice* and 'ice') capture the example
well.
Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 45
more literally, 'without letters' (16*28 f,), and, Aristotle adds, none
of these sounds is a word (i6a29),To understand this more clearly,
we need to look at other works, and understand the views found
there on articulate and inarticulate utterances.
The difference between voice (fiatvy), sound (ipo^ot;) and speech
(dtdlemo^) is discussed in two passages in the History of Animals
(HA 1.1,488*31 ff, and IV, 9,535*27 ff,}. Ax draws from these pas-
sages a hierarchic division in four levels,16 The first level is a divi-
sion of things into those which make a noise and those which do
not (^>00i?Ttxd and ov tfto^nxaj.The specilc difference at this level
is the production of sound, whether vocal or not. Animals which
make no sound at all are included in the latter category. At the
second level things which make a sound are divided into the living
and the non-living, where the non-living include musical instru-
ments, which can be said homonymously to have a voice (De An.
420b6f.). Thirdly, the living can be divided into animals without
voice and those with voice (5<jw aQtova and £<pa tptuvqevra). The,
former are voiceless, though not necessarily noiseless.
Voice is a particular kind of sound, and is distinguished from
other sounds in two ways. First, voice is made by a living thing (De
An. 42Obs). Secondly, it must be made by certain organs (De An,
420bi3f.), The grasshopper, gurnard, scallop, and certain other
animals emit noises using various other parts of their bodies, but
these are not voice." The organs required for voice are lungs and
a windpipe. Air is drawn in through the windpipe, hitting it as it
comes in, so as to produce sound.18 This is the material aspect of
the production of voice. There is also another aspect: the soul is
responsible for voice." Voice accompanies some imagination
(Qavraaia), and is a significant sound (ipo4>o$ arfftavnxog, 420^2 f.).
We would thus expect those animals capable of producing voice
also to have imagination, and this is suggested by another passage
(DeAn. 428*10 £)
16
W. Ax, 'WoQof, 4>oivt) und {feUexrof als Ginndbegriffe aristotelischer
Sprachreflexion', Glossa, 56 (1978), 245-71. See also R. A. Zirin, 'Inarticulate
Noises*, in J, Corcoran (ed.). Ancient Logic and its Modem Interpretation
(Dordrecht, 1974), 23-5.
" HA 535b4W.; De An. 420*1 a ff.
!S
De An. 42ok2ift; ct PA 673*23 ft
" De An. 420*2"! ft Animals which are capable of voice may also produce noise,
and may even produce it with the organs normally involved in the production of
voice: coughing is a noise produced by the tongue (De An, 4zot*3ot).
Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 47
36
37
CiProk Sgs'isB.
KreEzraana is therefore right to render 'unlettered' (dygafi/tatof) as 'inarticu-
late*, and Zirin is not inconsistent with him in claiming that it instead denotes
utterances which cannot be resolved into phonemes. See Kretzroann, 'Aristotle
on Spoken Sounds Signiieant by Convention', in Corcoran (ed.), Ancient Logic,
3-21, and Zirin, 'Inarticulate Noises"; also R. A. Zirin. 'Aristotle's Biology of
Language*, Transactions of the American Philological Association, no (1980),
325-4?.
52 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
In the last two sections, which have covered the first portion of
chapter 2, we have first considered the contrast between words
and the complex utterances formed out of them, and then
that between articulate human speech and the inarticulate sounds
made by animals. Both sections, then, have been devoted to the
study of the word, embracing both name and verb. We must
now go on to examine how Aristotle differentiates the name
from the verb, and how he defines their different roles in the
assertion.
Names and verbs are both utterances which are significant
according to convention, and of which no part signifies separately.
They are distinguished by the criterion of 'signifying time in addi-
tion': a name is 'without time* (16*20), while a verb is 'that which
signifies time in addition* (i6b6). Aristotle also distinguishes a verb
as being a sign of something said of a subject (i6b7, 10): that is, a
verb signifies a predicate. We might expect a corresponding state-
ment that a name stands for the subject in a sentence; however, the
definition of the name includes no such statement, and we shall see
that names may also stand for predicates.
The simplest assertion is composed of names and verbs (17*20,
vfn). Here, Aristotle follows in the footsteps of Plato, who iden-
tified the two basic constituents of an assertion in the Sophist using
the same words, which I translate as 'names and verbs' (Soph,
26231-07). However, although the words used are the same,
Aristotle does not define them as Plato does. For Plato, they are
defined in terms of the types of object which they signify: a 'verb'
signifies an action. Aristotle, on the other hand, defines the verb in
terms of its function in the sentence; it is not distinguished from
names by the type of object which it signifies. This will become
clearer as we go on.
The name and verb are the basic constituents of an assertion.
Thus, Ammonias comments that Aristotle was not concerned with
the distinction between names and verbs in the Categories, and that
he introduces the distinction in the De Interpretatione because it is
important to the study of the assertion. By means of the difference
between names and verbs, we distinguish subject terms from predi-
Chapters 2—3: The Name and Verb 53
We have seen so far that names are words which do not convey
any notion of time in addition to their basic signification; they
include the modern categories of noun and adjective. Verbs are
more complicated. Not only do they convey an indication of time,
but they are also 'signs of something said of something else'. We
must now go on to form a deeper understanding of what this
means: we shall see that this part of the definition of the verb is
connected with its role in the assertion. The verb is essential to
the formation of an assertion; we are twice told that there can be
no affirmation or negation without a verb (i7aio, I9bi2). Thus,
Aristotle often considers the difference between a name by itself
and the assertion which would be formed if some form of the verb
'to be' were added. 'Goat-stag* is not true or false unless being or
not-being is added to it (16*16-18): that is, 'goat-stag is' is an asser-
tion, while the bare word alone is not. Similarly, for the definition
of man to be converted from a mere phrase (Adyog-) to an assertion
(Idyog <mo$avjix0<;), 'is', 'was*, or 'will be' needs to be added
(i7ao £). The addition of Is' to a name is the minimal condition
for the formation of an assertion, and gives what Aristotle consid-
ers to be the primitive type of assertion (i9bi5). We have already
considered the meaning of these assertions;44 we must now turn to
consider the working of assertions in which subject and predicate
are signified.
At the end of chapter 3 we learn of the function of the verb in
forming such assertions. This is made clear through a consideration
of what a verb means when uttered in isolation, as compared with
the role which it plays in an assertion. An isolated verb certainly
signifies something, we are told, since the speaker arrests his
thought and the bearer pays attention (i6 b i9ff,). By virtue of this
signification, it counts as a name, and not a mere empty sound. The
additional qualification needed for it to count as a verb is, however,
missing: it does not signify that something is or is not (i6b2i 1).
Isolated from the context of an assertion, it does not assert that
anything is the case.
There now follows, in explanation, an account of the verb 'to be'.
erties both of the name and the verb (Dionysius Tbrax, An Gmmmatica 60. 2-4).
Varro classified participles as having time and case, as against names, which have
case but not time, and verbs, which have time but not case (Varro, De Lingua Latina,
G. Goetz and F. Schoell (eds.) (Leipzig, 1910), 10. ij).
44
See the discussioo of 'goat-stag is* in Chap, 2, Sect. 2 above.
56 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
'For "to be" or "not to be" is not a sign of a thing,' Aristotle says,
'not even if you were to utter "being" by itself (i6b22t). He goes
on to say that by itself 'being' is nothing: it 'additionally signifies* a
combination, which cannot be conceived of without the things
which are combined (i6b23~5). This statement may readily be
understood if we bear in mind the theory of the assertion as a com-
bination of subject and predicate, A complex thought which has
truth value is one which brings together in the mind a subject and
predicate, and represents them either as combined or divided. The
word 'is' represents this combination in a spoken assertion. This is
why Aristotle says that it is not a sign of a thing: the two things sig-
nified in an assertion are the subject and the predicate, for example,
Socrates and walking. The 'is' which turns these two words into an
assertion, and not just a list, does not stand for a thing. It does not
in fact signify anything: 'by itself it is nothing,' and is entirely
without content unless united with two words which stand for
things, in which case 'is' expresses their combination.Thus, the com-
bination which it expresses 'cannot be conceived of without the
things which are combined*. Even if you uttered the word 'being',
that would not signify (i6b23t).
The verb 'to be' signifies a combination in a similar way to that
in which all verbs signify time: both are said to 'signify in addition*
(ziQoaatjficiivetv, i6b6, 24). 'Thrives' signifies thriving, but also that
the subject is thriving now; that is, the signification of time is addi-
tional to its bask meaning. This basic meaning is what Aristotle has
in rnind when he says that a word 'signifies something' (16*17, b2o)-
In the copula we have a word which has an additional signification,
while lacking a basic signification of its own. It performs a unique
role in the structure of an assertion, which it could not perform
without the presence of other words to stand for the subject and
predicate. It is neither subject nor predicate, but 'predicated in
addition* (jtQoaxarfifOQOvftevov, I9bi9).45
How, though, is this account of the copula supposed to explain
why it is that a verb by itself is just a name? The use of 'for' (i6b2)
45
In this passage Aristotle seems to doubt whether the copula should be called
a verb, and calls it 'name or verb* (vfti). 'Nanae* must here be meant in a similarly
general sense to i6bi9, and is perhaps best translated 'word*. His thought may be
that a genuine verb should signify something, and not just indicate the combination
of the subject and predicate. Ct hts refusal to recognize indefinite names and verbs
as names and verbs proper (i6'2<), bn).
Chapters 2-3: The Name and Verb 57
clearly implies that the two points are intended to be related in this
way. The answer becomes clear if we consider that verbs may be
analysed into a participle together with the verb 'to be*. An as-
sertion such as 'man thrives' (avOQwmoi; vyiaivei) is equivalent,
Aristotle says, to 'man is thriving* (&V&QOMO<; vytaivurv lanv, 2ibg;
see also APr. 5ibi3-i6).46 Since 'thrives' can be replaced by 'is
thriving' with no change in meaning, it seems reasonable to ask
whether there is some element in 'thrives' which 'signifies a com-
bination in addition', and so performs the function of 'is' in 'is
thriving'. 'Combination' means the attaching of a predicate to a
subject, and we have seen that this is involved in any assertion, not
just those containing the verb 'to be'.47 There must therefore be a
combination expressed in an assertion which contains only name
and verb, just as there is in an assertion containing two names and
a copula. This combination must be indicated by the verb: accord-
ingly, we find a verb defined as being a sign of something said of
something else, and a sign that something holds of a subject (16*7,
10). Thus, part of the force of a verb is that it predicates its basic
meaning of a subject: like the copula, it 'additionally signifies* that
a predicate holds of a subject.
We may now see how the discussions of the solitary verb
(i6bi9-22) and the copula (i6b22-~s) are linked.The explanation of
what it means for a solitary verb to be a name is provided by con-
sidering the copula. Neither verb nor copula can fulfil its function
of claiming that a predicate holds of a subject if it is removed from
the context of an assertion and uttered by itself. 'Is' when uttered
by itself signifies nothing whatever, since it has no basic significa-
tion. "Thrives*, if uttered by itself, is not without signification,
because it conveys the basic signification of thriving, even outside
an assertion. However, it cannot, exercise its 'additional significa-
tion' that a predicate holds of a subject, nor can it 'additionally
signify' when it is that the predicate holds. Stripped of its two addi-
tional significations, it has only its basic signification left. By itself,
* The equivalence of 'walks' with 'is walking' is also observed at Mete. A7,
1017*22-30. The point there is that any predication can be expressed in a form which
uses 'to be'; predication is therefore linked with being, and each kind of item which
can be predicated is something which 'is' in a different sense. In other words, in the
copulative 'is' we find the sense of being which is to do with the categories. The poi0t
is also found at APr. 49*6-10, where Aristotle says that to say that one thing holds
of another has as many senses as there are categories.
47
Cl DeAn. 430*26 ff.
58 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
such as 'not man' are considered as a single unit, I shall adopt the
convention of writing 'not-man' and 'doesn't-thrive*. By this means
it will also be clear to which word the negation belongs: the impor-
tance of this will be seen in Chapter 6.
Having considered why indefinite names and verbs might be
treated as single compound words, and not phrases, we also need
to ask why Aristotle was sufficiently interested in these expressions
to devote a special treatment to them, and why they are put in a
class of their own rather than being counted as proper names and
verbs. We find that negated names and verbs are of great interest
later on in the De Interpretatione. The main concern of the treatise
is the examination of contradictory assertions. As part of this
project, Aristotle lists all the ways in which negation may be
introduced into each type of assertion, then decides which of the
resulting assertions are negations and which affirmations, and sorts
them into their contradictory pairs, working out inferences between
related assertions (i9bi5-i8, 27 ft). Given the project for which
Aristotle is preparing in the early chapters, it is to be expected
that negated names and verbs will play a part in his account of
language.
The question remains why they should be separated into their
own categories apart from names and verbs. In the case of indefi-
nite names, no explanation is given for why they are not genuine
names; the term 'indefinite* provides a clear clue, however. We see
in several passages that to signify is to signify some single thing.
Even if some expression signifies more than one thing, still a dif-
ferent word could be assigned to each signification, so that each
one would then only signify one thing (Mete. ioo6a34-bi3); not to
signify one thing is to signify nothing (Me/a. ioo6b7). A name, then,
must signify some definite, single thing, A non-man is anything at
all that is not a man: the expression cites something definite, that
is, man, and then points away from it in every direction indiscrimi-
nately, whereas the genuine name 'man' points towards something
definite.35 If 'man' is looked on as conveying definite information
on what is signified, 'not-man' removes one point of doubt, but
55
We may compare Plato's analysis of negation as denoting something other than
what is negated, rather than opposite to it (Soph, 25?b), While something might be
supposed to have only one opposite, there will be an indefinite number of things
which differ from it, and thus an indefinite number of things denoted by the
negation.
64 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
H
For a discussion, see A. Diaz Tejera, *Tiempe> ft'sico y liempo linguistic© en
Arist(Steles', Revista Espanola de Littgiibtiea, 15 (1985), 37-58,
70 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
ones. In chapter 10, where indefinite names and verbs are also
brought into the account, he says that without a verb in some tense
or other there can be no assertion (i9biaff.; cf. i6ai8, ""3), and
adds that verbs of all tenses are verbs according to his definition,
since they signify time in addition (19*13 ft). Thus, although
the inflexion of a verb is excluded from being a genuine verb in
chapter 3, it is counted as one for all practical purposes: it fulfils
the same function as does the genuine verb in the formation of
assertions,62
We are now ready to leave chapters 2 and 3. Armed with an
understanding of Aristotle's account of the name and verb, we may
move on to his account of larger linguistic units.
62
Inflexions make possible what is, according to Aristotle, one of the most impor-
tant and useful types of argument dealt with fa the Topics (Top. 119*36ft, 154*121).
The 'argument from inflexions' employs the idea that a relationship which holds
between two words in one inflexion will also hold between them in all other inflex-
ions. If justice is praiseworthy, then something done justly will be done in a praise-
worthy way. The inflexion of 'praiseworthy' will follow that of 'just' (Top. ii4 b i ft
Cf. I24"iof£, I36bi5(t, i^i*yo1L',Rhet, 1397*20ft). In the Poetics, we find theirtiex-
ion introduced as one of the eight parts of speech (Poet I456b2i £. I457>i8ff.). The
term is given a loose definition; it has a very broad application, and may apply to
any words related in form.
4
(17*17 ft).3 The point made here is that not all phrases are asser-
tions: some are mere utterances without truth value, and in this
resemble words. What differentiates the phrase from the name and
verb is that phrases have significant parts.
Much of the chapter is spent in setting out the distinction
between words, compound words, phrases, and assertions. Thus,
Aristotle goes on, 'man' signifies something, but does not affirm or
deny: it does not signify 'that it is or is not' (i6b2&~3o). For an asser-
tion to be formed, something would need to be added, that is, a
verb,4 No mere word can be an assertion: an assertion involves com-
plexity, and demands the presence of a verb. We are next reminded
that no part of a word signifies: 'ice' in 'mice' (vg in uvg) is mere
voice, having no signification. Since 'mice' (wi»g) is a simple word,
it does not have parts which signify at all. In a compound word,
however, the parts signify, but not in their own right (i6b32f.). As
1 have argued, the point is that the parts of compound words tend
to express the signification which they would have if they appeared
in isolation, but when parts of the compound they do not signify
independently. Even compound words, therefore, fail to come
under the definition of the phrase,
There follows a brief sentence in explanation of the part of the
definition stating that phrases signify. Every phrase signifies, he
says, not as a tool, but by convention (i:6b33-i732); we are referred
back to the earlier discussion of convention in chapters i and
2 (i6"3f., 26-9). Finally, the assertion is introduced (layog
axo^amao^ I7a2 ft). The assertion is a kind of phrase. While com-
plexity is necessary for an expression to be an assertion, it is not
sufficient: all phrases are complex in that they have parts which
signify in their own right; however, not all phrases are assertions,
but only those capable of truth or falsehood. There may be said to
be two types of non-assertoric phrase: first, there are expressions
which do not contain a verb, like 'fair horse1 (xoldj aaiog , i6a22),
or the definition of man (i7an).sThese phrases cannot be complete
3
The same term is also sometimes used to refer to affirmations, as opposed to
negations (e.g. APr. 32a28; De An. 432*10), or to assertions in general (e.g. De Int.
22*11), It is always clear from the context which sense the word has; since the basic
meaning of the word is 'saying*, it will refer to affirmations if contrasted with
'denying,* and, if contrasted with 'asserting*, it will denote mere utterances without
truth value,
4
i6*t7f., l> 2£, 17*1 it, I9 b i2f,
5
See also Poet. 1457*24-7.
Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions 73
1
See the discussion of 19*14-19 in Chapter 10 below.
Chapter 5: Simple and Compound Assertions 75
caot parts, if the whole only signifies one thing? On the other hand,
how is the unity of the definition to be established, if it is composed
of several words, each signifying a different thing in its own right?
The parenthesis dismisses this objection. The unity of the essence
defined in the definition does not prevent the definition from
having independent words as its parts. Indeed, a definition must
contain parts with their own separate meanings, even though a
single thing is being defined: a one-word definition would be a mere
renaming.2 The unity of essence does not fall within the province
of the De Interpretatione, and we are, for a second time, referred to
another treatise for a fuller discussion (17*14!.). The problem is
raised again in Posterior Analytics II, 6, and is dealt with in
Metaphysics Ziz.
Aristotle now returns to the basic assertion, and two different
criteria are given for what makes an assertion single (17*15-24).
This is an important question, and is picked up again in chapters 8
and ii. The first criterion is to do with whether the assertion
expresses a single claim about a single subject; according to this cri-
terion, an assertion which expresses a multiple sense is really more
than one assertion, regardless of its apparent form. This might be
called the semantic criterion,
The second criterion is syntactic rather than semantic: according
to this, two assertions which have been combined may be con-
sidered one by conjunction, while separate assertions which are not
conjoined would count as more than one,3 Applying the two cri-
teria clearly gives a different result. Two assertions linked by 'and*
would still count as more than one by the semantic criterion, since
two distinct claims would, be made, but on the syntactic criterion
would count as conjoined into a single assertion. We are thus, in
effect, given two senses in which an assertion may be said to be
single: we are told that a single assertion either reveals one thing
or is one by conjunction, and more than one assertion either makes
more than one claim or else is not conjoined (17*15-17).
2
Top, 102*2-6, !48b33-i4<j34. A similar issue arises at Co*. ib25-2*i, where 'in the
Lyceum' is included among things which are not complex; (rd xmn /tqfa/uav
ovialoxijv Myvfteva): this only means that, according to some extralinguistie cri-
terion, the signification of *in the Lyceum' is simple and not complex, not that the
phrase has no significant parts.
-' Ct Poet. 1457*4-6, where the corrupt text seeins to define a conjunction
(awfej#<«s) as that which can make many significant utterances into one; examples
are words such as "but* and 'and* (piv. ij-coi, As).
76 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
denied, and vice versa (if'26-31). Thus, all affirmations and nega-
tions are paired off with one another; to every affirmation there is
a negation, and to every negation an affirmation (17*31-3). In any
such pair, the affirmation represents something as holding, white
the negation represents it as not holding. Having arrived at this
result, Aristotle defines a new term, that is, the contradictory pair
(dvn^aoif), consisting of the affirmation and the negation which
are opposed to each other (i7a33 i).1 He also stipulates that the two
contradictory assertions must oppose each other in the same sense:
contradiction which depends on homonyrny and other sophistries
does not count as genuine (17*34-7).
Chapter 6 marks the conclusion of the project of the opening
chapters, in which new concepts and linguistic phenomena are
introduced, progressively moving on to higher levels of structure,
and making use of earlier definitions in establishing later one&
Thus, after a discussion of significant utterances, the name and verb
were defined as significant utterances of a certain sort; it was then
shown how these combine into assertions with truth value; asser-
tions themselves may be said to be members of a larger unit, that
is, the contradictory pair (cf. APo. 72*13 £,). This final unit differs
from the others in that it is, as it were, an abstraction from ordinary
language: the utterance 'man is pale-—man is not pale' is not a
quotation from ordinary speech, but an analysis of a structure
found in it.
The main task of the remaining part of the De Interpretations is
the examination of contradiction. The preliminary work of the first
six chapters enables Aristotle to begin this task in earnest. In the
first part of this study, taking up chapters 7-9, contradictory pairs
of assertions are classified according to different criteria and then
examined. For each group of assertions he tests the rule that, in
every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other false.
In each of the three chapters, a group of exceptions to this rule is
found, the best-known being the future singular assertions of
chapter 9.1 shall call this rule 'RCP' (for 'Rule of Contradictory
Pairs'). It may be stated as follows:
RCP: Of every contradictory pair, one member is true and the other
false,
1
A more literal translation would be 'contradiction*. We also see the term used
to denote one of the members of the contradictory pair (21*22).
8o Aristotle's De Interpretatione
assertions do not both cite the same predicate, they must belong to
different contradictory pairs, I shall contioue with the convention
of writing 'is-not' in translating Aristotle's examples, which will
make plain that 'not* attaches to the verb, and so produces a nega-
tion and not an affirmation.
For Aristotle, then, negation is not an external operation. For one
who held a theory of external negation, it would be impossible for
RCP ever to be violated. For such a person, a negation would be a
comment on an affirmation taken as a whole: it would deny that
the affirmation is true, A suitable notation to express this view
would be 'p' for the affirmation and '~p' for the negation: the affir-
mation is taken as an atom and denied by the negation. It would
follow from this view that if the affirmation were true, the negation
which contradicts it would have to be false, and vice versa. This rela-
tion between the contradictories is represented in the truth table
for negation: if the truth value of one contradictory is given, the
truth value of the other can be inferred to be the opposite. In other
words, RCP would have to be upheld.
Aristotle, however, does not hold such a view of negation. He
sees a negation as an assertion which alleges the separation of el-
ements which an affirmation represents as combined. A better
notation to represent this view would be to write the affirmation
as 'a + b' and the negation as 'a ~ &': this would reflect Aristotle's
belief that negation is internal to the assertion, and involves alter-
ing the relation between subject and predicate from combination
to separation. It does not follow inevitably from this view of con-
tradiction that one contradictory will always be true and the other
false. Thus, truth and falsehood are not mentioned in chapter 6, and
form no part of Aristotle's definition of contradiction. Instead,
whether one contradictory is true and the other false will depend
on the nature of the items which form the subject matter of the
assertions: if there are subjects and predicates in the world which
may truly be said both to be combined and separated, or neither
to be combined nor separated, then RCP will not hold. We cannot
infer from the mere nature of contradiction that no such subjects
and predicates exist: rather, we roust make an investigation of the
types of items with which the world is stocked before deciding
whether RCP is universally true or not.
The theory which one adopts concerning negation is therefore
crucial to the status of RCP. To an exponent of external negation,
82 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the rule will be a logical law, whose truth follows a priori from the
nature of contradiction, without requiring any examination of the
subject matter with which language is concerned: any two asser-
tions which are both true or both false cannot, by definition, be
contradictories,3 For Aristotle, on the other hand, RCP cannot be
established as true from the nature of contradiction. Rather, its
truth depends on the nature of the subject and predicate cited in
any particular assertion: it is for this reason that Aristotle under-
takes an examination of 'things' (jrpay/<ara), beginning in chapter
7, and so exposes three classes of exceptions to RCP, In other cases,
RCP is upheld; for most assertions, then, Aristotle is in agreement
with the exponent of external negation in saying that if one con-
tradictory is true, the other is false. Aristotle's account is more sat-
isfying, since it offers an explanation of how the claims made about
the world by two contradictories differ, rather than merely defin-
ing a contradictory as an assertion bearing a different truth value
from the assertion which it contradicts.
3
For an exposition of external negation and an attack on the Aristotelian ¥iew
see G. Frege, 'Negation', in P. Geach and M, Black (eds.). Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford, 1960),
7
1
We here see 'thing' used in the same all-embracing sense as in chapter t,
covering all items which can be spoken of. See also SE 165*6.
2
I shall translate the latter 'singulars* and not 'particulars', for reasons which will
become apparent.
' The same distinction is made at APr. 43*15 ft In APo. I. 4 a further distinction
is drawn between what is 'throughout the whole' (x«rd aanos) and what is 'univer-
sally' (tfaOoAov): the former holds throughout some class, while the latter must also
be essential to the members of the class (73*28-34,73*"'26-74*3),
84 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
denote a thing, such as man, which is a universal, and the adverb
'universally' (xaOolov) to refer to a certain manner of making an
assertion about a universal,4 A universal assertion about a univer-
sal is marked by a word such as 'all' (nag) or 'no* (oudetg). 'All',
unlike 'man*, does not signify a universal thing. Instead, it signifies
that the assertion about the thing signified by 'man' is made uni-
versally (i7 b nt). In those assertions which are made universally,
a claim is made about every item of which the universal term can
be truly predicated: something is said to hold of every man or no
man. In a non-universal assertion about a universal, a claim is made
about a universal such as man, without adding that it holds of man
universally. The three classes of assertions may be set out as follows:
1. Assertions about singulars. Examples: Socrates is pale, Socrates
is-not pale (18*2),
2. Assertions made universally about universab. Examples: every
man is pale, no man is pale (i7b5 f.).
3. Assertions made non-universally about universals. Examples:
man is pale, man is-not pale (i7b8-ii).
In the first class, the subject is a singular, in the next two a uni-
versal. In classes 2 and 3 different kinds of claims are made about
the same type of subject. The third class is the hardest to under-
stand. Should the sample assertion be translated *a man is pale", or
'man is pale'? What would the latter mean? This will become clear
as we go on.
In the course of the chapter, Aristotle investigates the properties
of the above classes of assertions. His first observation is that
among the second group some pairs of assertions are contraries
(i7b3~5). Contraries are subsequently distinguished from contra-
dictories. The contraries 'every man is pale' and 'no man is pale'
cannot both be true together, but their contradictories can both be
true: this would be the case supposing some men to be pale and
others not (i7b22-6). Among the third group, on the other hand,
there are no contrary assertions, Aristotle adds an obscure qualifi-
cation to this, though: 'what is expressed may be contrary' (i768).
4
For a similar distinction between the ingredients of an assertion and the manner
in which the assertion is made, c£ 23b6t, where contrary thoughts are said nol to be
thoughts of contraries (evavrlum), but thoughts conceived in a contrary way
(
Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP 85
7
See also the discussion of 20*5-15, considered below in Chapter 10.
8
J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 129 f.
Chapter j: The First Exception to RCP 87
15
e.g. J.-A, Draowski, Institutiones Philosophlcae, 3 vols, in i (Leuven, 1840-1),
L is; 1 i. Urrfburu, Compendium Philosophiae Sc.hoiasti.cae, 2 vols, (Madrid, 1902),
i jjt
16
T. Waitz, Aristotelis Organon Graece, 2 vols., i. 334.
'•' Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, 47,129,
m
G. E, M. Anscombe, 'Aristotle and the Sea Battle', Mind, 65 (1956), 1-15.
Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP 91
" This allows Aristotle to say that, 'man' signifies a single thing (Meta, T, 1006*3' )•
28
Cf.APr. 43*29-32.
92 Aristotle's De Interpretations
21
The troth of the non-universal assertion does not imply the truth of the uni-
versal one. Even if the non-universal assertion cites a property of the subject, there
is a case in which it may not hold universally: a property which holds by nature but
not always, as seen in 'man is two-footed,* will not hold of the subject universally;
while man is naturally two-footed, it is not the case that every man has two feet
(Top. i34"5-i7)-
Chapter j: The First Exception to RCP 93
1
See, e.g., i6aj9-26, "6-10,19-15, j6&26-i7*a.
2
Aristotle may again be seen to have the Cratylus in mind: 'tnan! and 'horse*
were there employed as examples (Crat. 38586-10),
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP 97
2. UNANSWERABLE QUESTIONS:
THE DIALECTICAL BACKGROUND
violate the rule, and we need to turn to chapter n for further infor-
mation. There he repeats the point that an assertion which asserts
one thing of many or many of one does not count as single; we may
not conclude, just because a single word is used, that a single thing
is designated by it (20hi2 ft), As in chapter 8, assertions which are
apparently simple may in fact be complex, if the words that stand
for subject and predicate do not signify a single thing. In these
cases, 'there is a single utterance, but more than one assertion'
(20b20l).
Aristotle goes on to explain the importance of assertions which
are compound, though apparently simple (20*22-30), A dialectical
question expects as its answer one member or the other of a certain
contradictory pair. In posing a question, both members of a con-
tradictory pair are offered, and the answerer is invited to choose
which member is true. Certain dialectical questions are unanswer-
able, though: if the question is compound in the way we have been
discussing, then a single response is not appropriate. The two ques-
tions that have been asked under the guise of a single one may
deserve to be answered differently; furthermore, even if a single
true answer could be given to both, Aristotle insists that it is not
right to give a single answer to what was not a single question
(20b24-6).
At this point (2Obz6) we are referred to the Topics, and it is to
that work and to the Sophistici Elenchi that we must look in order
to understand more. The proper posing and answering of questions
is of the greatest importance in dialectic, book VIII of the Topics
being devoted to the subject. If a question is properly put, then the
answerer has only to answer *yes' or 'no.' If it has been improperly
phrased, though, the answerer may need to correct the faultiness
of the question in order to obtain something to which an answer
can be given (Top. i5?b6-33; SE I75b7~i4), Double questions are
dealt with in chapter 5 of the Sophistici Elenchi*This sophistry
involves making two questions into one, so that the answerer does
not realize that he is being presented with more than one question,
and answers as if only one thing had been asked (SE i67b38ff.). In
some cases it is easier to tell that there are in fact two questions
hidden in one, and in other cases it is more difficult.
4
The sophistry is also mentioned by Plato (Corg. 4660, 5033); see G. Ryle,
'Dialectic in the Academy*, in J. R. Bambrough (ed.). New Esmys on Plato and
Aristotle (London, 1965),
loo Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the contradiction is the true one. There can therefore be no difference between
'is Callias at horn*?' and 'isn't Callias at home?": they are the same question, with
only one right answer. It is interesting to compare De Int. 22|I8-I0, where 'neces-
sary* and 'impossible' are said to signify the same thing, but "conversely*
{®Tr£e&TQaft[t£v&jg},
* At Top. 160*23-34, however, a different position is seen. There, Aristotle admits
that there are cases in which a question with multiple meaning may be given a single
answer, If the source of ambiguity is well known, and if the predicate attaches or
does not attach to the subject in all its senses (that is, if RCP is not violated), then
a single answer may be given.
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP 103
hold of something, not those which make two assertions, one after
the other (17*25 £}. Following the argument in chapter 6 that simple
assertions are either affirmations or negations, and that they may
all be ordered into contradictory pairs, a further restriction is
added. Assertions are only to be considered to be genuinely con-
tradictory which assert and deny 'the same thing of the same thing,
and not homonymously' (17*35): the same predicate and subject
must appear in both affirmation and negation. This requirement
would rule out assertions such as 'Coriscus is blind,' where there
are two men with the same name, so that either of two claims might
equally well be represented by the same words.
So, both obviously compound assertions and those in which
homonymous terms appear have been excluded from the discus-
sion in chapters 5 and 6. Had they been included, both, as we have
seen in the Sophistici Elenchi, would have furnished examples of
contradictory pairs which violate RCP, and consequently of unan-
swerable dialectical questions. However, even with the discussion
limited to assertions containing non-homonymous words, in which
'something is asserted of something,' problematic types of asser-
tion remain. The hidden compound assertions discussed in chapter
8 were not ruled out by either of the restrictions seen in chapters
5 and 6. 'Cloak is pale' is not a compound assertion, and so should
count as simple (17*20-2), Further, it is not ruled out along with
assertions which contain homonymous words, because 'cloak' is
not homonymous, but stands for two things taken together as a
unit.
Chapter 8 thus pursues the project of studying simple assertions
in non-homonymous contradictory pairs, but finds that within the
class of apparently simple assertions there are some which are
nevertheless not single; they are simple as opposed to complex in
their outward form, but, on the semantic criterion of whether they
make a single claim of a single subject or not, they turn out to be
multiple. These result when an assertion contains a word which
stands for two things taken together as if they were one. At the start
of the chapter the semantic criterion for the unity of an assertion
is invoked: a single assertion must assert a single thing of a single
thing (i8 a i2f,), not just 'something of something' (17*25 fc). These
contradictory pairs of apparently simple assertions do not neces-
sarily abide by RCP, since for an affirmation to be true, both of the
concealed predications must hold, and for the negation to be true,
106 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
neither must hold. If one concealed predication holds and the
other does not, then both members of the contradictory pair will
be false.
We have also seen that Aristotle's interest in RCP in chapter 8
is closely connected to his interest in the issue of which dialectical
questions can be answered and which cannot. Questions and con-
tradictory pairs are linked, A question is a demand for agreement,
'either with the premiss or the other portion of the contradiction'
(2ob23): in asking a question a premiss is put forward, with which
the answerer may agree or disagree. A dialectical question, in fact,
amounts to the same thing as a dialectical premiss (Top. 104^8; A Pa,
72a9f.); Aristotle even allows himself to speak of a question as
being true or false (Top, 160*23 ft)-8
To give the correct answer to a dialectical question, then, is to
select the true member of a contradictory pair and reject the false
member. This is obviously impossible in cases in which there is not
one true member and one false member, that is, if RCP is not
upheld. In chapter 8 we have seen contradictory pairs in which both
members are false; there is thus no true assertion to select from the
pair, and the question which offers both members of the pair for
acceptance or rejection cannot be answered. Similarly, in chapter 7
we saw contradictory pairs in which both members were true. To
accept either assertion would be to reject the other; yet neither can
be rejected, and so the dialectical question cannot be answered. To
answer a question involves an act of acceptance and an act of rejec-
tion. If either of these acts is impossible, then the question cannot
be answered. A contradictory pair which violates RCP thus corre-
sponds to a question which is unanswerable.
The existence of such contradictory pairs is of great significance
for the practice of dialectic. In a dialectical debate, one person
adopts a position, and is then the answerer, while another person,
the questioner, proposes questions with the aim of eliciting a train
of assertions from the answerer which will form an argument
ending in the refutation of his position. The assertions which form
s
We should not make the mistake of insisting that the De Int. is a treatise about
assertions only, and that questions are alien to the enquiry in the same way as
prayers and other expressions which lack truth value, which were dismissed from
consideration, in chapter 4 (i7a2-7). The diaiectical question and the contradictory
pair of assertions are intimately connected.
Chapter 8: The Second Exception to RCP 107
1
Dickason writes, "Since nearly the time Aristotle wrote, interest has waxed and
waned in his early work, De Interpretatione he' (A, Dickason, 'Aristotle, the Sea
Fight and the Cloud", Journal of the History of Philosophy, 14 (1976), 11-22: see
11).
no Aristotle's De Interpretation
must be true statements about the future, since (by RCP) one
member or the other of a contradictory pair about the future must
be true: if there are true statements about the future, then the
future must be the way it is truly predicted to be. This follows from
the conception of a true statement as one which says how things
are. It follows that all future events are necessary, and nothing in
the future will happen by chance (i8a34-bi6). Thus, the undesirable
consequence of fatalism follows from the assumption of RCP for
future singulars.
This section concludes with an unsuccessful attempt at solving
the problem (i8bi7-25). If the truth of predictions implies the
necessity of the future, the most obvious way of escaping from fatal-
ism would be by denying the truth of future singular assertions. This
move does not have the desired consequence, however, since all
predictions would then be false, and so the event predicted would
neither take place nor not take place. We would be no closer to
reinstating chance events, and would merely have shown that there
is no future at all. The failure of this solution shows that something
more than merely denying the truth of predictions is needed if
fatalism is to be avoided.
In the next section, further unfortunate consequences are shown
to follow from the assumption of RCP: as well as chance, deliber-
ation is also abolished (i8b26-i9**6). These conclusions are mani-
festly absurd, Aristotle then argues {19*7-22). Fatalism, then,
cannot be accepted, and we are now ready for the solution.
In the final section Aristotle presents his own view of how future
singular contradictory pairs work (i9a23-b4). According to this
view, certain future events are open to go either way. Certainly,
either there will be a sea-battle or not, but the outcome is not
settled in advance: it is contingent. The contingency of an event is
reflected in the distribution of truth and falsehood between the two
members of the contradictory pair. So, while it must be the case
that one prediction is true and the other false, it is not determined
which is which. Truth and falsehood are not decided between the
two members of the pair, and so RCP cannot be said to hold.
Aristotle's solution is a subtle one. It involves a denial of RCP:
this is necessary, since he has argued strenuously that if RCP were
to hold, fatalism would inevitably follow. However, the two ways in
which RCP is denied in chapters j and 8 will not help us in chapter
9. In chapter 7, both members of certain contradictory pairs were
Chapter g: The Third Exception to RCP 111
1
See, e.g., D, Frede, Ariitateles und die Seeschlacht: Das Problem der Contingentia
Futura in De Int. 9, Hyporoncnala, 27 (Gdttingeu, 1970), 24, and also D, Frede, 'The
Sea-Battle Reconsidered: A Defence of the Traditional Interpretation*, in Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 3 (1985), 31-87.
3
See, e.g., J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford,
1963). 134-
H2 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
division of assertions into those which affirm and those which deny,
as well as a pairing of every affirmation with the negation that con-
tradicts it. The rale concerns the apportionment of truth and false-
hood between the two members of a contradictory pair: one
member is true, and the other false. It follows that an exception to
RCP will not necessarily be an exception to PB. PB will only be
violated by a single assertion which is both true and false, or neither
true nor false. RCP, however, will be violated if two members of a
contradictory pair are both true or both false; in this case, each
member considered separately would have one truth value and
only one, and so PB would be upheld. It was this situation which
we found in chapters 7 and 8. In chapter 7, it was seen that 'man is
pale* and 'man is-not pale' might both be true; in chapter 8, "cloak
is pale' and 'cloak is-not pale' could both be false, if'cloak' stands
for two things. While both cases constitute exceptions to RCP, in
neither case is PB violated, since each single assertion is either true
or false. Aristotle's interest in RCP reflects his concern with con-
tradictory pairs rather than assertions considered as separate items.
Had he devoted chapters 7 and 8 to an investigation of whether PB
holds of isolated assertions, no exceptions would have been found,
and we would have learnt nothing about which assertions to
beware of in dialectic. I shall argue that chapter 9 shows us a third
group of assertions for which RCP is violated while PB is upheld.
4
For the rival view, see Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione,
mf.
H4 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
not from PB, it follows that there must be truths about the future,
since of any contradictory pair, either the affirmation or the nega-
tion must be true. We see, then, that 'if every affirmation is true or
false' (18*37!) cannot be a statement of PB. Aristotle is arguing
that if one person affirms what the other denies, then one or the
other must be telling the truth, if of every affirmation and negation
one is true and the other false. The claim that every assertion is
either true or false would not imply that either assertion needed to
be true. PB cannot be the rule that is invoked,
The text as quoted above is problematic. It does not look like a
statement of RCP, and does not make sense as a statement of PB
either, since the word used (xazdipaotg) means 'affirmation', and not
'assertion', so that this could not be the claim that every assertion
is either true or false. It is better to read 'if every affirmation or
negation is true or false', following Ammonius and a Syriae trans-
lation: we would then have one of the standard abbreviations of
RCP, seen already at the start of the chapter (18*28 £), as is required
by the structure of the argument.
So, the argument that there are true predictions about the future
rests on the assumption that RCP holds. Aristotle has only assumed
that RCP holds in general, with no reference to time (18*34), He
now supplies an argument to fill this deficiency, and argues that if
RCP holds for contradictory pairs about the present, then it must
hold for those about the future as well (iS*39-b3), He argues as
follows. If it is true to say that something is pale or that it is not
pale, then it is necessary for it to be pale or not to be pale. If it is
pale, or is not pale, then it was true to predict that it would be pale
or not pale. The same argument is sketched for the false member
of a contradictory pair (18*2 f.).This argument, then, starts from the
assumption that RCP holds of present assertions, and infers that it
must hold of future predictions, by deducing that things must be as
a true present assertion says, and if they are that way, then a pre-
diction made in the past must have predicted them truly. In
this passage Aristotle does not argue circularly from RCP back to
itself: rather, he argues for the application of RCP to assertions
about the future, on the hypothesis that it holds for those about the
present,
The argument contains a step which has frequently been viewed
as a glaring modal fallacy. On this view, Aristotle is supposed to be
smuggling in necessity, by assuming that what is true about the
116 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
it could not fail to happen. From this the necessity of the event may
be deduced. Again, important use is made of the principle that true
assertions correctly describe how things are or will be.*
Aristotle has already argued that, on the assumption that RCP
is upheld, it cannot be the case that both members of the con-
tradictory pair are true (18*38 £), He now adds that fatalism
cannot be avoided by claiming that neither assertion is true, that is,
that something would neither take place nor not take place
(i8bi7~-25).10Thi$ would seem to be a natural way of trying to solve
the problem: the necessity of the future was proved from the truth
of assertions about it, and so, it would seem, if there were no true
assertions about the future, then the future would not be necessary.
He here argues that this would not solve the problem, and has two
arguments against the attempted solution.
First, he points out that if neither assertion were true, then this
would involve a violation of RCP: it would come about that one
member of the contradictory pair was false, but that the other one
was not true (i8bi8-2o). Aristotle puts it this way in order to make
it explicit that RCP is violated, RCP states that one member is false
and the other true; but, if neither were true, then one would indeed
be false, but the other would fail to be true, and this would violate
RCP. This point makes use of the assumption that an assertion
which is not true is false: that is, PB is tacitly employed. Aristotle's
objection here is as follows. The argument that RCP applies to
future assertions rests, as we have seen, on the assumption that it
applies in general (i8a39f£); therefore a simple denial of RCP for
future assertions will also overthrow it for present ones, which is
highly undesirable.
Secondly, he adds, even if this were so, there would neither be a
sea-battle nor not be one, if a sea-battle were predicted (i8b2o~5).
In effect, there would be no future at all. The reasoning is as follows.
If an assertion is true, then what it asserts must hold: 'if it is true to
say that something is white and black, then both must hold; if it is
* This argument does not depend on a confusion between always being true and
being necessarily true, as Hintikka argues. This confusion does not seem to be at
work in the chapter, 'Necessarily troe* is only deduced from 'always true* by means
of several intermediate stages For the rival view, see J. Hintikka, 'Necessity,
Universality and Time in Aristotle", Ajatia, 20 {1957), 65-90, repr. in J. Barnes, M.
Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds.). Articles on Aristotle, iii (London, 1979), 108-24.
10
Aristotle here uses a word normally meaning 'such as' (olov) in the sense 'that
is*. For the same use see 17*20.
n8 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
true to say that something will hold tomorrow, then it will hold'
(i8b2i i). He will also need the principle that if an assertion is oot
true, then what it predicts will not happen; we have already seen
Mm use the principle that something is not the ease if, and only if,
the assertion claiming that it is the case is false (i8b3). He con-
nection can only be made by assuming that if an assertion is not
true, then it is false, and this is the Principle of Bivalence, Thus,
Aristotle can only infer that the sea-battle will neither happen nor
fail to happen if he means both members of the contradictory pair
to be false, and neither true. It is worth understanding this clearly,
because it shows us that here, while he assumes for the moment
that RCP is violated, he continues to rely on PB in his argument
(i8b20~5): while RCP is openly suspended, PB is tacitly taken for
granted. Again we see that the two must be kept distinct if we are
to follow his thought. Aristotle shows us, then, that the move of
denying that there are true future singular assertions, far from
destroying the fixedness of the future and releasing future events
to go either way, would actually destroy the reality of the future
altogether.
We should now ask why Aristotle inserts this argument here. He
has so far been drawing out the dangerous consequences of taking
RCP to hold of future singulars. He now blocks off one way in
which one might be tempted to solve the problem. If the truth of
predictions is what is responsible for threatening us with fatalism,
then it might seem that fatalism could be avoided by claiming that
all predictions are false. The defect of this move, he points out. is
that it would prevent future events from taking place at all. This
places a constraint on the solution. While RCP cannot be accepted
if fatalism is to be avoided, it must be denied in such a way as
to escape the problem of abolishing future contingent events
altogether. Aristotle returns to the example of the sea-battle in
working out his solution; there must either be a sea-battle or not,
even though neither its occurrence nor its non-occurrence is
necessary (i9a29f£). We shall see how this works in more detail
later.
Aristotle now sums up the argument so far (i8626ff.), and pro-
ceeds to draw out other undesirable consequences of the hypoth-
esis that RCP holds of future singulars. We are presented with a
kind of lazy argument (i8b3i-3): there would be no need to delib-
erate or take trouble over anything, since if we are to act, then we
Chapter g: The Third Exception to RCP I ig
In the next section it is argued that the consequences that have just
been set out are impossible (19*7-22). We have seen that the argu-
ment based on RCP attacks the existence of chance and the effi-
cacy of deliberation, Aristotle now goes on to say that the existence
of both is, however, self-evident: we see that deliberation and action
are genuine causes of future events (i9a7-9), and, in. general, there
are many evident cases wbere something has a potentiality for
being or not being (19*9-11), In these cases, both being and not
being are possible (wfiof,). This recalls us to the assumption on
which the fatalist position was based, namely that of every contra-
dictory pair about the future, one assertion is true and the other
fake. Both, however, must be possible, Aristotle now insists, if
the future is to be open in the way needed for chance and deliber-
ation. If the argument in the earlier part of the chapter is to be
believed, only one outcome is ever possible: yet in order for
there to be chance, deliberation, or action, there must be a poten-
tiality for either of two outcomes.13 Aristotle appeals to our in-
tuition that there are potentials which may not be actualized: this
cloak can be cut, but will not be; it is open for it to be cut, but, as
it happens, it wil be worn out first (i9ai2-i4). Equally, it had the
potential not to be cut, since in fact it is worn out before being cut
(I9ai4-i6).
He concludes that it is obvious that not everything is necessary.
Two classes among non-necessary things are distinguished
(19*18-22). First, there are chance events, which happen as it
chances to turn out, and for which the affirmation is no more true
than the negation (19*19 f.; cf. i8b8f.). Secondly, there are events
which may be called usual: these tend to turn out one way rather
than the other, but still may go either way; one member of the pair
is generally the true one, but the other might always turn out to be
true instead (19*20 ft). The three groups of events are distin-
guished, then, according to the behaviour of the contradictory pairs
of assertions pertaining to them. As we shall see, this has a bearing
on which contradictory pairs abide by RCP and which do not.
Contradictory pairs relating to necessary events will abide by RCP;
those which relate to the occurrence or non-occurrence of events
which are open to chance, or which usually happen one way but
are still not fixed, will not abide by it.
In the final section (i9*23-b4), Aristotle sets out the view of
future singular contradictory pairs which we must accept in order
to avoid fatalism. This solution will mean that RCP, the premiss on
which the fatalist conclusions were founded, will need to be
rejected. The solution cannot, however, be that simple. We have
seen that another paradox results from claiming that both members
of the contradictory pair are false: the result of this is that there
will neither be a sea-battle nor not be one (18*20-5). Thfi solution
must therefore avoid the vicious consequences both of accepting
RCP and of denying it in that particular way.
Aristotle first concedes that there is a weak sense in which every-
thing is necessary (itfz^i.). When something is the case, it is
necessary for it to be the case. This is only necessity on a hypothe-
sis: something must be, given that it is; its being follows necessarily
from the hypothesis of its being. This does not mean, though, that
everything is necessary pure and simple (ebrf<3g, 19*26). Similarly,
what is not, necessarily is not, given that it is not; but this does not
make it impossible. The same argument applies to contradictory
pairs, he goes on (19*27-32): everything necessarily is or is not; also,
everything necessarily will be or will not be. This disjunction cannot
be split up, though, and necessity applied to either disjunct sep-
arately. To illustrate this point, Aristotle reverts to the example of
the sea-battle. We saw the sea-battle used earlier to argue that fatal-
ism could not be escaped by claiming that both members of the
contradictory pair were false. For, if it is false that there will be a
sea-battle tomorrow, and false that there will not be one, then the
battle will neither take place nor not take place (i8K2s), He is
seeking to preserve the common-sense view that either there will
be a sea-battle or not, while it is not determined which of these out-
comes will be actualized. The example of the sea-battle, then, is
used in both cases to express a constraint on the solution. While
RCP, if accepted, leads to fatalism, it must not be denied in such a
way as to force there to be no future at all: even an event which is
open must either take place or not. So, Aristotle here says that it
is necessary that either there will be a sea-battle tomorrow or
not. However, neither the sea-battle, if it happens, nor its oon-
occurrence if it does not, will be necessary (19*29-32).
We now move to the crux of the chapter (i9a32 ft). We are first
reminded of the important principle that the truth of utterances
matches the way things are (i9a32~s); we have seen this principle
used before, to argue that there is a state of affairs to correspond
to a true assertion, and that there was a true prediction to corre-
spond to the state of affairs (i8a39~b3) and to argue that if both
members of a contradictory pair about the future were false, then
there would be no future (i8b2O~5)> The principle is now applied
122 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
becoming true: does a prediction become true when the event pre-
dicted becomes inevitable? What about the tense of the prediction?
Is it actually the present-tensed version of the prediction that
becomes true? If a future-tensed assertion became true with the
occurrence of the event predicted, then the tense in the assertion
would be wrong, and the prediction would become obsolete as it
became true.
The view that Aristotle denied truth value to future singular
assertions rests principally on the interpretation of this phrase as
'not yet true or false*. A more careful look at the text shows that
this interpretation is extremely unlikely. If Aristotle did indeed
intend to avoid fatalism by claiming that predictions were not yet
true or false, then this would have to apply to all future singular
assertions. Instead, the statement where he is supposed to claim this
applies only to one of the two classes of non-necessary future asser-
tions, that is, to the usual ones. The statement 'but not thereby true
or false' (i'9839) is a rider to the statement that one member of a
contradictory pair relating to a usual event is truer than the other,
just as 'but not this one or that one, but whichever it happens to
be' (ov fttvroi T0de ij rode aAX6n6i£Q'ih:v%ev, I9a37 f.) is a rider to the
statement that, in the case of chance events, it must be the case that
one member of the contradictory pair is true, and the other false.
In both cases, 'but not* (pv pevioi) introduces a qualification. Thus,
if in the second of the two statements (19*39) he did indeed mean
'not yet true or false', Aristotle would only be claiming this for
usual events, and not for non-necessary events in general.
It remains to defend the choice of 'thereby' as a translation in
place of 'yet', and to explain the sense here more fully. The state-
ment made seems to be the following: 'one member of the pair
tends more towards truth, but is not thereby, or on that account,
true or false' (19*38 f.) Taken literally, this makes doubtful sense. It
would be reasonable for Aristotle to warn us against jumping to
the conclusion that something is true just because it is more likely,
or tends towards truth. It would be very strange if he warned us at
the same time not to jump to the conclusion that it is false just
because it is more likely to be true.
In order to understand this phrase, we must realize that 'true or
false' is an elliptical statement of RCP. We see RCP abbreviated
twice in exactly the same way as at the end of chapter 7 (18*10-12).
There, Aristotle concludes the chapter by stating that RCP is not
124 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
value, and is not an assertion. We also see the statement that every
assertion is true or false in the Categories (Cat, 2*7-10); the asser-
tion is to be distinguished by this criterion from utterances which
are not compound, and which cannot have any truth value. The
point that truth value is only possible with complexity recurs in
chapter i of the De Interpretatione (i6aio£f.). In chapter 10 we see
the argument that 'not-man' is not a negation, since every negation
must be true or false, and 'not-man* is neither (20*34 f t ) . Again, in
Metaphysics F, Aristotle insists that anyone who says that anything
is or is not the case will necessarily either be saying something true
or something false (Meta. r, ioiih28). To add to these passages,
there is a text in which Aristotle explicitly states that truth and
falsehood apply to past and future assertions as well as to present
ones, using a contingent assertion concerning a singular as his
example: 'not only is it false or true that Cleon is pale, but also that
he was or will be* (De An, 430*41).
It is apparent from these passages that PB is a fundamental prin-
ciple governing all assertions. To assert is to represent things as
being a certain way. Either they are that way or not; hence the
utterance of something true or something false is inevitable if an
assertion has been made. The assertions considered in chapter 9 are
no exceptions to this. They predict the future, either truly or falsely:
they are predictions, not prayers or one-word ejaculations. As the
future is open, it is not fixed which are the true predictions and
which the false ones, but this does not prevent them from being
true or false, just as the openness of the future does not prevent
one outcome or the other from actually taking place.
The chapter concludes with the statement that RCP is violated
in the case of 'things which are not, but are capable of being or not
being', that is, in the of things in the future which may turn out
either way (I9a39-b4). We still need to ask how it is that this solu-
tion constitutes an exception to RCP. The exception presented in
chapter 9 appears to be of a different sort from those seen in chap-
ters 7 and 8. In those chapters, contradictory pairs were found in
which either both members were true or both false: thus, RCP was
not upheld. In chapter 9, though, one member of each pair is indeed
true and the other false (19*36 ft). This would appear to be a state-
ment that they abide by RCP. Yet, a few lines later the chapter is
concluded with the statement that it is not necessary for one
member of a contradictory pair to be true and the other false. Why
Chapter g; The Third Exception to RCP 127
16
See, e.g,, H. B. Andersen and J. Faye, *Om Fremtidige S0siag', Museum
Tufculanurn, 40-3 (1980), 149-81, and, for a review of the many interpretations, V,
Celtuprica, // capitolo <j del DC Interpretatione di Amtotek; Rassegna di studi
1930-1973 (Bologna, 1977),
17
R, Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame (London, 1978), chap. 5.
" Fine, 'Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione 9*.
130 Aristotle's De Interpretation*
19
For this formulation see Fine, Truth and Necessity in De interpretations t)\
36.28
See W, Rneate and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford, 1962), 47,
Chapter g: The Third Exception to RCP 131
event will take place or not. This position does not correspond to
the conception, of realism arrived at by taking the issue of the
chapter to be PB, according to which predictions are true, but not
therefore necessary. If Aristotle's thought is to be followed and his
solution to fatalism understood, we must realise that RCP is the
rule at the centre of chapter 9, as it was in chapters 7 and 8.
We have seen that chapter 9 is not a detached study of fatalism.
Instead, it continues the work of chapters 7 and 8 into a new class
of assertions, that is, those which concern future singulars, and so
identifies the final group of assertions which violate RCP. Questions
posed about future singulars are unanswerable, just as there can be
no knowledge of chance future events, since they are open to go
either way.21 Chapter 9 therefore shows us another class of asser-
tions to be avoided in debate,22 and the dialectical motivation of the
De Interpretation is once again apparent.
21
See Mete, £2,1027*20-6.
a
Ct Top. 129*28 £, where we are warned that investigations of properties which
do not always hold should be confined to the present.
10
subject. Also, while only simple assertions are of interest here, the
point roust apply to compound ones too, since, as we have seen,
they are formed by combining simple ones together (17*21 fc),
Examples of assertions follow, and so Aristotle moves on to the first
of the three groups discussed in the chapter.
This group consists of assertions containing the verb 'to be' and a
name or indefinite name standing for the subject. Contradictory
pairs of assertions are set out, beginning with non-universal asser-
tions containing a name, then going on to those containing an inde-
finite name and finally to universal assertions, first with a name and
then with an indefinite name standing for the subject. We thus have
the following:
man is—man is-not
not-man is—not-man is-not
every man is—not every man is
every not-man is—not every not-man is,
Similar pairs of assertions could be made using past and future
verbs, Aristotle adds (i9 b i8£). Assertions containing a name and
the verb 'to be* are labelled as 'first' or 'primitive' (i9bi5), and the
move to the other, less primitive, examples is marked by 'then'
(i9bi6) to introduce those containing the indefinite name, and
'again' (i9bi7) to introduce the universal assertions,5 We may note
that we are here once again presented with universal and non-
universal assertions about universals, which we first saw in chapter
7. Here, however, the same assertions are divided according to new
criteria, so that both universal and non-universal assertions will be
found in each of the three groups of chapter 10.
Several questions arise concerning this passage. Why are asser-
tions containing the verb 'to be' dealt with separately from those
in which other verbs are added to a name? We are also confronted
once again with the question of what 'man is' means. Is this a com-
plete utterance, and, if so, in what sense are we to take 'is"? We see
5
Cf. the use of 'first' and 'then' at i7*8t
136 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
in several other passages that the verb 'to be* marks the minimum
that needs to be added to a name in order to form an assertion with
truth value. Thus, single names signify something, but are neither
true nor false unless 'is' or "is not* is added, and do not signify 'that
it is or is not' (16*14-18, b28~3o); even the definition of man is not
an assertion, unless 'is*, 'will be", or 'was' is added (17*11£; cf.
20-351).
The examples of assertions containing a name and the verb 'to
be' are clearly meant as complete assertions; they do not await
completion by the addition of another word, TThe use of 'is' must
therefore be different from that seen in 'man is Just,' How, though,
do assertions like 'man is' differ from those such as 'man walks'?
If 'is* appears here in a complete sense, there would seem to be no
difference: both, we might suppose, are examples of verbs. Yet
Aristotle clearly separates the two types of assertion. Assertions
such as 'man walks' are only introduced after a discussion of asser-
tions containing the copula, such as 'man is just,* and are said to
follow their pattern (2oa3-i5),
In reading chapter i, we have already had occasion to consider
the sense of being which is involved in claiming that goat-stag, or
man, is. I argued that the sense of 'to be' here cannot be that which
is found in 'man is pale.* This copulative use of the verb demands
the presence of a second name to designate the predicate of the
assertion, and by itself accomplishes nothing (i6b23~5). 'Goat-stag
is' is not an incomplete utterance waiting for the addition of a
predicate: it is an assertion in its own right, aad is true or
(i6'i6-i8). Moreover, it is not the claim that a goat is a stag: the
combination between goat and stag in a goat-stag is not the com-
bination seen in a state of affairs in which a predicate holds of a
subject.
Being, therefore, is in some sense a predicate, which is asserted
to hold of goat-stag or of man. It is not a predicate in the same way
as walking is, though. First of all, 'is' means something different
depending on what category the subject belongs to (Mete, &j,
1017*22-7). Furthermore, being in the ease of each thing is a con-
sequence of what that thing happens to be: to say that ice is is to
say that ice is solid (Meta. Ha, io42b27f.), and, in general, the sub-
stance of each thing is the origin of its being (Meta. ioi7bis,
i043a2).Thus, being, in the case of man, consists in being what man
is, that is, a rational two-footed animal. So, 'is' in 'man is' and 'is* in
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions 137
'goat-stag is' make different claims, since being man and being
goat-stag are two different things, as determined by their respec-
tive definitions. The former assertion is true, since there is such a
thing as man, while the latter is false, since there is no such thing
as goat-stag. Both assertions contain the same sense of 'is', that
relating to substance, but the substance which is said to be is not
the same, and so 'is' makes a different claim in each case.*The verb
'to be' exhibits similar behaviour when used as a copula. Thus, we
are told that the copula has a different sense for each category
(APr. 49a6-ro; Meta. A?, 1017*22-30). In 'man is pale' and 'man is
just,' then, the same sense of the verb, that pertaining to the cate-
gory of quality, is used to predicate two different qualities of a
subject, just as in 'man is' and 'horse is' the same sense of the verb
asserts the existence of two different substances.
To claim that something is, then, is a very different operation
from attaching a normal predicate to it 'Is' is very far from being
a sign of a single thing, with which any existent subject may be said
to be combined in the same sense (cf. APo. 92bi4). 'Man is' could
not be analysed as 'man is being,' where 'being' signified some thing
in its own right. It therefore does not fall into the same class as
'man walks': the latter is discussed only after assertions such as
'man is walking,* which makes the same claim, and in which the
structure of the assertion is more evident.
to 'not-just', and likewise the negated copula, here called 'the nega-
tion' because it is what makes an assertion negative, may be added
either to 'just' or 'not-just' (i9b24 ft). These four assertions may be
set out as follows:
man is just—man is-not just (I9b27 f.)
man is not-just—man is-not not-just (i9b28£).
It will be seen that an assertion is only a negation if the copula
is negated. Thus, of the above assertions, those on the left are all
affirmations, since they claim that something holds of something
else; those on the right, since they each deny that something holds,
are negations. The nature of the subject and predicate does not
affect whether the assertion is a negation or not,
In these later chapters, we find that Aristotle not only presents
sets of contradictory pairs, as he did in. chapters 7-9, but is also
interested in the inferences which can be drawn between the
various assertions. His statement of the relation between the above
assertions is brief and obscure: he says that two of the assertions
are in a series with the affirmation and negation in the same way
as the privations, and two are not (i9b23f,). For a more detailed
explanation, we are referred to the Analytics,9 In Prior Analytics 1,
46, Aristotle explores the difference between the two forms of con-
tradiction represented by 'not-being pale' and 'being not-pale'
(APr. 5ib7t). These are abbreviations of full assertions, and corre-
spond to the two sorts of opposition mentioned above (De Int,
I9b2o). These, he says, do not signify the same thing. The former,
and not the latter, is the negation of 'being pale' (APr. 5ib8-io).
Various arguments are presented which are intended to show that
they are distinct. The manifest difference between 'is-not capable
of walking* and 'is capable of not-walking' is cited (5ibi4-20).
Furthermore, to say that something is not-equal presupposes that
there is something unequal which is underlying, and of which
inequality may be affirmed. In order to say that something is-not
equal, however, and so deny equality of it, nothing needs to be
underlying (5ib2S-7),w Negations, as we have seen, are true even
of the non-existent (De Int. i6bis).
same thing. I have argued above in Chapter 3, Section 5 that an indefinite name
such as 'not-equal* is considered as a single word, on the analogy of "unequal*
(16*29 tt).
" "To be' appears as an Infinitive in the Greek forms of ihe&e sample assertions
only because they arc quoted in indirect speech.
** For the inference from C' to B, cf. the inference which we saw in chapter 7,
that if man is ugly, he is-not fair (17*33).
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions 141
such as 'unequal* stand in the same relation to the two basic asser-
tions A and B as do the assertions containing the indefinite names
such as 'not-good'. We may now see what Aristotle means in
chapter 10 of the De Interpretatione, when he says that two of his
four assertions stand in the same relation as do the privations, while
the other two do not (igb2^ fc). C' and D' stand to A and B as do
C and D. So, C and D are matched in their relation to A and B by
the privations C' and D'. A and B, however, are not balanced by
another pair of assertions.
In the treatment of assertions containing the copula in chapter
10, we have so far been considering non-universal assertions about
universals (u/20-g); we now move on to universal assertions
about universals (i9b32 f t ) . We thus have the following:
every man is just—not every man is just
every man is not-just—not every man is not-just.
These assertions, Aristotle says, are related in the same way,
except that the diagonal assertions are not simultaneously true in
the same way as those above (i9b3Sf.). In order to consider this
statement, it will help to set out both the non-universal and the uni-
versal assertions, following the order prescribed in the Prior
Analytics (APr. 5ib36-9). 1 shall assign the letters E, F, G, and H
to the universal assertions.
A: man is just B: man is-not just
D: man is-not not-just C: man is not-just
E; every man is just F; not every man is just
G: not every man is not-just H: every man is not-just
In the Prior Analytics passage, we are told that A and C cannot
both be true together, whereas B and D can (52*12-14). Similarly,
if ever)' roan is just, then it cannot be the case that every man is
not-just, so that E and H cannot both be true. F and G might cer-
tainly both be true, if some men were just and others not. If we
follow the comments in the Prior Analytics, the relations between
diagonals in the two sets of assertions seem to follow exactly the
same pattern.
Why, then, does Aristotle say that the two sets of assertions do
not work in the same way (I9b35)? If we look within the De
Interpretatione instead of relying on the comments to be found in
the Prior Analytics, this will become clear. The difference between
142 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
the two sets of assertions is that the former consists of non-
universal assertions, the latter of universal ones. We have seen in
chapter 7 that the former can violate RCP, while the latter cannot,
So, certain assertions of the types represented by A and B can be
true together: they constitute one of the exceptions to the rule that
one member of a contradictory pair is always true and the other
false (i7b3offi). If B is true, then C may be true.13 Thus, A and C
may both be true, whereas in the second set of assertions the cor-
responding diagonals, E and H, may not. Non-universal assertions
concerning a universal may behave differently from the universal
assertions concerning a universal which appear in the second set.
Not all assertions in the first set violate RCP, however ('man is
an animal,' for example, would not supply an exception), and in
these cases the diagonals will work in the same way for both sets:
this is marked by the statement, following the claim that the two
sets do not work in the same way, 'but sometimes it is possible'
(19b36).
Having considered these two sets of assertions which take 'man'
as the subject, Aristotle now takes *not-man' as subject. The result-
ing assertions are:
not-man is just— not-man is-not just (i9l>38f.)
not-man is not-just— aot-man is-not not-just ( 19*39 £).
He has already discussed the effect of negating the predicate and
the copula, and so here introduces negation to the subject. Each of
the three elements of assertions formed by means of the copula has
now been negated: there are no further oppositions (dvwftawg),
Aristotle says (20*1). We have seen that inferences can be drawn
between those assertions in which the copula is negated, and those
in which the predicate is negated: while only the attaching of 'not'
to the copula can have the effect of producing a negative assertion,
it is still possible to infer, for example, from 'man is not-just* to
'man is-not just.' The third way of introducing negation into an
assertion containing the copula involves negating the subject, so
that 'net-man* appears as the name, in place of 'man' (2oa2). Since
the subject is different, these assertions are, he says, entirely sep-
arate (20ai-3): any claim about not-man is made about that which
" According to the Prior Analytics passage, B does not imply C, though C may
be true If B is. B might be true and C false if there were no subject underlying the
predication (APr, 52*4 1).
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions 143
15
We may now see how it is that universal assertions may be dealt with to each
of the three groups of assertions in chapter 10. The addition of 'every* does not
move an assertion to a radically different level of complexity, and so is considered
in this chapter as subordinate to the classification of assertions into those in which
*is* is added to a name, those containing the copula and those not containing the
copula.
B
The presentation of sample assertions is not always so clear; at I7bi8 and i"fz$,
the copula is missed out, so as to bring "not" and 'every* into juxtaposition; at 19*33 f.,
we find 'not* preceding 'every', even with the copula present; at 20*38!., however,
"not* is added to %' and not to 'every'.
146 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
lative aspect that is negated, and not the aspect of its meaning
which signifies the predicate: otherwise there could be no nega-
tions, since only if the copula is negated is an assertion a negation.
An assertion containing a verb can always be expressed as one
containing a copula, by substituting the copula and a participle for
the verb (e.g. 2ib9ff.). This reveals its structure more clearly, and
it is for this reason that 'man is just' is presented before sman
walks.'
5. INFERENCES, NEGATIONS,
AND WORD ORDER
be the question % a horse a man?* and so would count as simple, A name and a
definition can be.substituted for each other: see Appendix II.
3
1 L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 145.
Chapter n: Sophistic Puzzles 153
* Cf. the problem of the snub nose (Mete 25, 1030*28 ft). Aristotle would not
agree with a logician who claimed that -—;—p was equivalent to ~p: the former is
a case of babbling, and not an acceptable fonn ot" eipression. See L, Wittgenstein,
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, D. R Pears and B. R McGuianess (trs,) (London,
1961; ist pub, 1922), see 5,512.
154 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
is false, since Homer is dead. This cannot be dealt with by the pre-
vious rule, since 'Homer is a poet' does not contain any implicit
contradiction. Instead, this sophism is treated in the same way as
the good cobbler. Just as goodness only pertains to the cobbler
accidentally, so 'is' is only attached accidentally to Homer; he only
is in that he is a poet, so that he cannot be said to be absolutely.
We may note that the copula 'is' is here said to be predicated of
Homer (21*27): it is not predicated absolutely, though, as it would
be in 'Homer is*; the function of 'is' in 'Homer is a poet* is what is
called in chapter 10 'additional predication' (vfigf.),
In the final comment of the chapter, Aristotle draws a connec-
tion with another sophism, related to the argument that if Homer
is a poet then Homer is: the sophism concerns the argument that
what is not is, on the grounds that it may be believed (2ia32f.).*
In chapter n, thinking concerning simple and compound asser-
tions is applied to exposing double questions and fallacious
inferences. The treatment of sophisms in this chapter, like the dis-
cussion of RCP in chapters 7-9, is aimed at drawing the line
between, the ground of genuine dialectic and the daogers of
inferences which seem to follow but do not, or questions which
seem to have answers but do not. We also find an explicit discus-
sion of dialectical questions (20*22-30), which sheds light on
Aristotle's preoccupations in earlier chapters.
not show us contradictories which were both trae or both false: the
exception was constituted only by the fact that it was not settled
which was which. It would therefore be a radical departure for
Aristotle to admit in chapter 12 that contradictories could be trae
of subjects in general, including singular ones, and he refuses to do
it. Instead, he says, assertions of possibility must constitute an
exception to the usual practice whereby negations are formed by
adding 'not' to the verb or copula (2ibi9-23),
He declares, then, that the negation of 'possible to be' is 'not
possible to be' (2ib23f.). In this case, unlike the others, the nega-
tion is reached by negating not 'to be", but 'possible'. According to
Ackrill, the problem of how to negate modal assertions results from
Aristotle's 'dangerously elliptical forms of expression'.3 The state-
ments under consideration could be spelled out in the form 'it is
possible that Socrates is wise*: in that case, if the negation is to be
arrived at by negating 'is', we might simply say that it is the first 'is'
which should be negated and not the second, for, according to
modern ideas of sentence structure, the first 'is' is the main verb of
the sentence, the second one being merely subordinate.
According to this criticism, then, Aristotle has blundered badly
through presenting his sample assertions in too abbreviated a form.
Had he written them out in full, he would have seen that it is the
first 'is* which should be negated. The criticism is mistaken,
however. Aristotle's method for finding the correct negation of an
assertion is not to look for the main verb and negate it, but to look
for the verb which combines subject with predicate, and negate that
(e.g. 2i838f.). An affirmation claims that a predicate holds of a
subject, and the core of it is the copula which links the two. A nega-
tion claims that subject and predicate are separated, and this sep-
aration is to be indicated by negating the copula. The 'is' of 'it is
possible that' is not a copula, and does not link subject with predi-
cate. So, even if he had written out 'it is possible that Socrates is
wise* in full, his normal practice for forming negations would
dictate that the second 'is', and not the first, should be negated. It
would be alien to Aristotle to consider this sentence as having 'it'
for its subject and the first 'is* for its main verb. Instead, he would
see the assertion as claiming that wisdom holds of Socrates poss-
ibly, rather than truly or necessarily (cf. 22*11-13).
1
S. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 149.
Chapter 12: Modal Assertions 159
1
See T. Wait/, AristoteUs Organon Greece, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1844), i, 361.
J
Ackriil suggests that this passage is out of place (J. L, Ackrill, Aristotle's
Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford, 1963), 152).
164 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
possible is not necessary. This view might be characterized as
interpreting 'possible* as 'contingent*, and so excluding the
necessary,
The right side of the square, however, involves the other con-
ception of possibility, according to which what is necessary is also
possible. Thus, in the top right portion, 'necessary not to be' follows
from "not possible to be'. Here, what is not possible is not as
non-contingent; had it been seen as contingent, what is not poss-
ible would have included the necessary along with the impossible,
just as in the top left portion of the square what is possible is
neither necessary nor impossible; instead, 'not possible* is taken as
'impossible', and so implies 'necessary that not*. The Square of
Opposition thus incorporates two inconsistent conceptions of
possibility. This inconsistency is now exposed (22bio ff,), and in the
remaining part of the chapter Aristotle argues against the view of
possibility as being merely contingency, and in favour of the view
that it includes what is necessary as well. The left side of the Square
of Opposition is changed in accordance with this position.4
We may now go on to consider the argument that the square as
set out contains an inconsistency. We first see an argument to the
effect that what is necessary is also possible (22bu-i4): this result
will then be seen to violate the way in which the left side was set
out. The argument proceeds by reductia ad absurdum. Supposing
that the necessary were not possible, the negation will follow
instead, for 'it is necessary either to affirm or deny' (22bi2 £): as we
have seen, Aristotle takes it that RCP must apply to modal state-
ments. Then, if the necessary is not possible, it must be impossible,
which is absurd (22bi3 £). The hypothesis on which the reductio is
based is therefore false, and so what is necessary is, after all, possi-
ble. This statement is now combined with the incompatible view of
possibility found on the left of the square: from 'possible to be*
there follow 'not impossible to be' and 'not necessary to be', as we
see from the top left portion (22bi4~i6). We now have, from the
reductio, 'what is necessary is possible,' and from the top left of the
square, 'what is possible is not necessary'; combining the two, what
4
See the debate between Hintikka and Bluck (K. I J. Hintikka, 'On the
Interpretation of De Interpretatione XII-XIIF, Acta Plnlomphka Fennica, 14
(1962), 5-22, and R. S, Bluck, 'On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De Interpretatione
12-13', Classical Quarterly, m, 13 (1963), 214-22).
Chapter ij: More on Modal Assertions 165
be' follow from 'possible to be* (22bij t); for, we are told, if some-
thing is possible, then either outcome may result, and then
whichever is true, the other is not true (22bi8-2o). It follows that,
since both outcomes are possible, neither is necessary, and so
neither necessity nor impossibility (that is, necessity that not) can
follow from possibility. Only the fourth and last statement involv-
ing necessity is now left as a candidate for the place of consequent
of 'possible to be': that is, 'not necessary not to be' (22b22f,). This
can follow from, 'possible to be' since it is also true of what is
necessary, and, we are now assuming, what is necessary is possible
(22*23 £)• The inferences now run: what is necessary is also poss-
ible, and what is possible is also not necessary not to be. There is
no longer any contradiction,The places of 'not necessary to be' and
'not necessary not to be' on the left side of the original Square of
Opposition are therefore swapped. This means that, reading along
each line, there is an assertion followed by its contradictory, as there
was in the first place oa all the other lines (22^24-8),
Although Aristotle has proposed that possibility does follow
from necessity, and has adjusted the Square of Opposition in accor-
dance with this view, the matter has still not been finally settled.
There are arguments to be weighed on both sides of the question
(22b29ff,), On the one hand, we have the reductio argument that
what is necessary must be possible, since otherwise it would be
impossible (22bn-i4): if one tried to evade the absurd conse-
quences of this argument by insisting that 'not possible to be' is not
the negation of 'possible to be', then 'possible not to be' would have
to be the negation, instead (22b3i t), and in that case what is nec-
essary will be capable of not being, which is equally absurd. The
reductio argument thus cannot be wriggled out of by someone who
wished to maintain that there is a class of possible things which are
not necessary. The view of possibility as contingency still has its
pull, however. So, Aristotle says, the capacity for something to be
and the capacity for it not to be are generally thought to go
together (22b33-6); what may be cut may not be cut too (cf.
19*12 ft). What is possible can therefore go either way, and if the
necessary is possible, then it would be capable of not being, which
is false.
The two views are thus in deadlock, one supported by a strong
argument to the effect that what is necessary is possible, and the
other by a common-sense notion of possibility as contingency. The
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions 169
eludes that m most cases contrary beliefs are those which corre-
spond to contradictory assertions.
The consideration of beliefs and assertions must be closely con-
nected, since assertions are the spoken expressions of beliefs. Just
as names and verbs are like simple thoughts which have not yet
been combined into something that can be true or false (16*9-15),
so there are beliefs, which involve either a true or a false combi-
nation of these simple thoughts. We have seen in earlier chapters
how two assertions which both count as affirmations, because the
verb or copula is not negated, may yet seem to contradict each
other. The sense of the subject or predicate may imply some sort
of negation, even if the assertion is not a negation (i9b24fl).
Aristotle suggests that it is relevant to consider the beliefs which
the assertions express: discovering which beliefs are most strongly
opposed to each other will contribute to our understanding of
spoken assertions.
He now approaches the principal question of the chapter, that
is, whether the true belief which is contrary to a false belief is the
belief in the contradictory or the contrary (23*381). The question
is whether contradictory or contrary beliefs are the more violently
opposed. Thus, he goes on, of something good, there is a true belief
that it is good, but two false beliefs about it, namely the belief that
it is not good, and the belief that it is bad.1 Which of the two false
beliefs is contrary to the true one, in the sense of being most
opposed to it? Both are admissible candidates, he argues in a paren-
thesis: they are not merely beliefs whose subjects are contraries,
such as the beliefs that something good is good, and something bad
is bad, both of which might be true. Instead, they involve contrary
suppositions concerning the same subject (23*3-7).
There follows an argument that the most opposed beliefs are
contradictory ones (23b7 ft). Of something good, there is the belief
that it is-not good, and then the belief that it is something else
which it is not. Aristotle explains that it is the former of these which
constitutes error on the subject: there is a limitless number of false
beliefs representing things as holding which do not, or as not
holding which do, but these are not to be posited as constituting
error, or being deceived (caidtij, 23b9-i3). To be deceived about
1
He does not mean his example of a true belief to be the tautological 'the good
is good,'
Chapter 14; Contrary Beliefs 173
2
For this use of 'accidentally' (xutd <>(j«/fe/}»y»%) to denote something which, while
it must always accompany something, is nevertheless only incidental and not essen-
tial, see Ph, 240*8-12 (a passenger in a boat is moved accidentally, as a consequence
of the boat's motion), and De Sensu 437*12-15, discussed in Chap, 2, Sect. 1.3 above
(voice conveys meaning accidentally, not because it is audible, but because it con-
sists of words).
174 Aristotle's De Interpretatiooe
is therefore directly, and not, indirectly, opposed to the true belief,
There are varying degrees of error, and the error involved in believ-
ing the contradictory of what is true is the most serious error that
can be committed on that subject. The conclusion is now general-
ized; for instance, the thought contrary to It is a man' is 'it is-not a
man* (23b27-32),
Next, having considered something good as the subject of
thought, we move on to consider something not-good. This proce-
dure matches that of chapter 10, in which the consideration of man
as an example is followed by the consideration of not-man. The
case of something not-good is analogous to the case of something
good (23b33-24*3): in both cases, it is the contradictory thoughts
which are found to be contrary. If the subject is good, then the con-
trary of the true affirmative thought 'it is good* is the negative
thought 'it is-not good.' Similarly, if the subject is not good, then
the contrary of the true negative thought 'it is-not good' is the false
affirmative thought It is good.'
In the final section we come to universal beliefs. These are
treated in the same way (24a3~b9).3 'Everything good is good*
means the same as 'whatever is good is good,* and the contrary
thought to that, from above, should be 'whatever is good is-not
good*; this in turn is equivalent to 'nothing good is good' (24*4-6).
In this case, unlike the earlier ones, the procedure of looking for
the most contrary beliefs does not give us beliefs whose expres-
sions are contradictories. The deepest error, if 'everything good is
good' is true, is not to believe that just one good thing is not good,
which would, according to chapter 7, be the contradictory, but to
be mistaken about every good thing, and believe none of them to
be good. We may compare chapter 8, where the negation of 'man
and horse are pale' claims not that at least one of them is not pale,
but that neither of them is. So here, the most opposed belief to
'every man is good' is not the belief that there is just one counter-
example to the goodness of humanity, but the belief which sep-
arates man from goodness entirely,
Aristotle now goes on to say that these results must apply to
spoken assertions as well as to beliefs, if spoken affirmations and
J
Minio-Paluello divides this passage into two paragraphs. Since the subject of
universal assertions occupies the whole passage, however, it may usefully be
regarded as a unit (L. Minio-Paluello, Aristotelis Categorise et liber De
Interpretation (Oxford, 1949)}.
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs 175
negations are tokens for those in the soul (24**! £). He now sets out
the contrary and contradictory universal assertions, and reiterates
that contraries cannot both be true (24b2-9), Contrary universal
assertions are the affirmation and negation 'of the same thing', that
is, 'everything good is good' and 'nothing good is good' (24*3-5).
One contrary asserts that subject and predicate are completely
combined, the other that they are entirely separate. We are next
reminded how universal contradictories work: the contradictory of
the former would be 'not everything good is good' (24b5 £.), These
statements are consistent with what was said in chapter 7
(i7bi6-22; cf. APr, 59b8-~o),
The final sentence makes the point that universal contraries
cannot both be true. A truth cannot be contrary to a truth, either
in belief or in spoken contradiction (24^6 £). The word 'contradic-
tion' (a-nitpaatf) is here used in an unusual sense to refer to the
opposition found in spoken utterances, as contrasted with that
found in beliefs. Contraries, he explains, are to do with contradic-
tories. This terse comment is made clearer by what follows: the con-
tradictories of contraries may be simultaneously true, but the
contraries themselves cannot (24b8£). The statement recalls the
characterization of contraries in chapter 7: the contraries 'every
man is just* and *no man is just' cannot both be true, but both of
their contradictories, 'not every man is just' and 'some man is just,'
may (i7b20-6). To say that 'contraries are to do with contradicto-
ries' is thus an abbreviated way of referring to this account of their
behaviour.4
It has been established, then, that in general it is contradictory
beliefs, and therefore contradictory assertions, which are contrary,
or most strongly opposed (23b24-32).$ In the case of universal
assertions, however, it is the contraries, as defined in chapter 7,
rather than the contradictories, which are the most opposed. The
question raised at the beginning of the chapter, whether two affir-
mations can be contrary (23*27 £), is now settled. A contradictory
pair cannot possibly contain two affirmations (17*33 £), so that in
cases where the strongest opposition is between contradictories,
two affirmations clearly cannot be opposed. Universal assertions
provide the only case in which contraries and contradictories are
4
For a similar use of 'to do with* (JKJK with the accusative), cf. "truth and false-
hood are to do with combination and separation' (16*121).
5
C£ Meta. r
176 Aristotle's De Interpretatione
6
Even universal beliefs are not really different, he says (24*3 ft): the contraries
'all that is good is good* and 'nothing good is good* are the most strongly opposed
for the same reason that contradictories are in other cases: the negation represents
the subject and predicate of the affirmation as being entirely separated from each
other,
7
To establish the contrary of" a universal thesis will also be sufficient to prove its
falsehood. The supposition on which a proof by reductio is based, however, should
be the contradictory of what we wish to prove and not its contrary, since if one con-
tradictory is false, the other must be true, whereas from the falsehood of one con-
trary the truth of the other does not follow (APr. 62*11-19).
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs 177
* Ct Mete, KS, 1062*2 £: there cannot be a proof simpticiter, but only ad hominem.
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta, r 187
5
See APr, 64*^4-6, and A. Code, 'Aristotle's Investigation of a Basic Logical
Principle: Which Science Investigates the Principle of Non-Contradiction?*,
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, id (1986), 341-57.
* See F. A. Trendelenburg, Element® Logices Aristotelicae (Berlin, 1836), 361
7
J, Lukasiewicz, 'Aristotle on the Law of Contradiction', in I Barnes, M.
Schofield, and R. Sorabji (eds,). Articles on Aristotle, iii (London, 1979), 50-62: see
p. 55, sect. ii.
188 Appendix: I
signify anything: unlike names and verbs, such words are not ele-
ments out of which rational speech may be constructed.13
I shall now consider what Aristotle means by saying that a word
signifies 'being or not being this particular thing'. The deictic
pronoun 'this particular thing' (rodt) denotes the thing which a
word stands for. We may compare the comment in chapter i of the
De Interpretatione, which I interpret as meaning that a word is a
sign of a this (i6"i6).M The 'this' which the word signifies may
belong to any category, not just that of substance.15 For Aristotle,
to signify is to stand for a thing, which may be a particular (rode w,
Cat, 3*10-13), or a quality (noiav it, Cat. 3bi3-23, io"i8), or a quan-
tity (Cat, 5^26 £). If a word signifies something's being, this by no
means restricts the discussion to substantial essences. Members of
all the categories are, in their different ways, things which are
thus, the referents of verbs count as being, as well as those
of names (Mete. Aj, ioi7a23-3o). The point, then, is that a word
merely signifies being or not being some definite thing. Signification
is thus distinguished from assertion: 'man' signifies something, but
does not assert that it is or is not (De Int. i6b28£). For an assertion
to be formed, the name would have to be combined with the copula
(i6ai6f.). Aristotle marks this distinction by talking here of a
name's signifying being something (TO eivcu, Meta. Aj ioo6a3o),
rather than that something is (on eanv, De Int. 16^291).
I have considered how a word can be said to signify being some-
thing; the text, however, says that it signifies being or not being
something. What does it mean for a word to signify not being some-
thing? Does he mean that 'man' signifies not being all the many
things which man is not, as well as signifying being man? If this
were so, a word's signification would be infinite, and Aristotle
insists that signification is definite. The next sentence makes it clear
that 'man' signifies a definite single thing, and does not also signify
not being an indefinite number of other things (1006*31). It seems
more likely that Aristotle's statement includes, in addition to those
words which signify something's being, those words which signify
13
See Poetics 20,
14
See also A Po. 71*15, where the same pronoun as here (rod/) is used in the same
way.
K
The term 'this particular thing' (rodt), unlike "some this* (rodt «), is not used by
Aristotle in a technical sense to indicate a member of the category of substance. See
EN i ist'35; Meta. A, 98is8.
192 Appendix I
something's not being. These are expressions such as 'not-man*
(OVH avQgmaog) and 'doesn't-thrive' (ov% vymivei, De Int. 16*29-32,
b
o-i5). These indefinite names and verbs can appear in a simple
assertion in which a single thing is asserted of a single thing
(19*5-12): this requires the explanation that even 'not-man* signi-
fies a single thing in a way (i9b9).16 Thus, they are not genuine
exceptions to the rule that all signification involves signifying a defi-
nite single thing. Expressions like 'not-man' and 'doesn't-thrive*
start from some definite thing, signified by 'man' or 'thrives', and
then point away-, from it instead of towards it. Rather than signify-
ing being a certain thing (rodt), they signify not being it.
Compared with 'man', 'not-man' can indeed be said to be indef-
inite. 'Not-rnan! may be truly predicated of all subjects which are
not men; its realm of application is only definite in the sense that
there is one class of items to which it does not apply. Within the
infinite class of objects of which *not-man' may be truly predicated,
it may be predicated indiscriminately of a large range of items
which have nothing in common but not being men. In another
sense, however, 'not-man' may be seen as having a definite signifi-
cation. The expression can only signify in the way that it does by
first picking out a definite referent, namely man. If 'man* had no
definite signification, then 'not-man* could not signify anything.
Thus, Aristotle does not consider indefinite names and verbs as true
exceptions to his doctrine of definite signification. All significant
words point to some definite referent, whether they then denote
the being or non-being of that referent. Both types of signifying,
therefore, can be thought of as definite.
The statement that a name signifies being or not being this par-
ticular thing (1006*29!), then, covers any significant word, 'Man*
and 'not-man' are both brought into the argument as examples of
words which the opponent might utter (ioo6a3if£, b23ff.), and
together stand for all significant words." Whatever word the oppo-
nent may utter must signify being or not being something. The
result of this, as Aristotle goes on to say, is that 'not everything can
be both so and not so.' At least whatever the opponent has signi-
fied must definitely be itself, and not other than itself; otherwise the
opponent could not have signified it. Since this is so for any utter-
!
* POT a discussion of this statement, see Chap, 10, Sect, i above,
" I have argued above that Aristotle sees 'not-nuui* (e«Sx &v0gemo%) as a single
word. See Chap. 3, Sect. 5,
The Principle of Contradiction in Meta. F 193
ance which the opponent might make, it is true for every such utter-
ance. These lines, therefore, give us a very compressed argument to
the effect that nothing which can be referred to in words is both so
and not so.
The next argument against the opponent now follows (ioo6a3i).
Aristotle takes the word 'man' as an example: 'further, if "man" sig-
nifies a single thing, let this be two-footed animal.' Some commen-
tators have suggested that he here brings in doctrine about
substances, and narrows his conception of signification to apply
only to picking out substantial essences. There is no need to think
that any such narrowing takes place. 'Man' is taken as an example
of a word which signifies being something, where 4not-man* later
represents words signifying not being something (ioo6b22fl). By
this, Aristotle means that the word picks out the being of man; if
there is such a thing as man, then the word signifies being that thing
(ioo6a32~4). The word, then, signifies the essence of man (TO
avQQumq) eivai).
Here again, some commentators see Aristotle as narrowing his
argument: if the word 'man' signifies what it is to be a man, then,
it is alleged, the idea of signification is closely bound up with the
doctrine of substance. 'Signifying one thing', complains Furth, 'is
heavily theory-laden.'18 Anscoinbe states that a word signifies one
thing if, and only if, it is a sign of a per se existent.19 If this is true,
she argues, then the argument can apply only to individuals and
their essential predicates. However, Anscombe seems to assume
that 'man' signifies a subject who is a man, that is, the unity which
consists of a subject and an essential predicate. Instead, it seenis
much more likely that 'man* merely signifies the universal, man,
that is, something which can be predicated of many individuals (De
Int. 17*39!; Cat. 3bi5-i8), rather than an individual of which the
predicate holds. The word 'man* does not signify Socrates, or an
unnamed individual who might be Socrates or might be someone
else. It only signifies a thing which is said of Socrates and all indi-
viduals like Mm (De Int, 17*38-40).
Commentators who seek to connect signification with the doc-
lft
M, Furth, 'A Note on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction', Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, 16 (1986), 371-81.
" G. E. M, Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Oxford, 1961), 41. C£
S, M. Cohen, "Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, 16 (1986), 359-70: see 370.
194 Appendix I
20
Ct T. H. Irwin, 'Aristotle's Concept of Signification', in M. Schofleld and M.
Nussbaum (eds,), Language and Logos (Cambridge, 1982), 252,
" This is the force of 'let it be* (Sana, 1006*31). Ct 1037*12!
ThePrincipleofContradictioninMeta,r 195
would be the same (ioo6b22fl). Here Aristotle uses his view that
words signify being things (1006*29 fi). If the words 'man' and
'net-man' signified the same thing, this would mean that they
picked out the same object; the entity picked out by the one word
would be the same as that picked out by the other. Being for a man
would be being for a not-man (ioo6b24t). Some commentators
have been tempted to translate 'being for not-man' (w/tij avBgatm^
elvai) as 'the essence of not-man*,27 There is no need to credit
Aristotle with such a doubtful essence. We have seen that 'not-rnan'
signifies a single thing in a way (De Int. I9b9). Not-inan might have
an essence in the weak sense in which essence and definition extend
to all categories of being, but the point here is that 'not being
man' expresses the signification of not-man, not that it defines its
essence.28
Aristotle has suggested that all words either signify one thing or
many (ioo6a32~4); in this division, 'not-man' falls among those
words signifying one thing. It is not homonymous: that would mean
that the sense in which an ox is a not-man would be different from
the sense in which a sheep is a not-man, just as an animal and a
picture may be designated by the same Greek word in different
senses (both, are £$a, Cat i a r f£). Surely, however, sheep and oxen
are not-men for exactly the same reason, that is, because they are
not two-footed animals,29 Further, if we were to say that 'not-man'
signifies something different for each thing that is not a man, then
'not-man' would have infinitely many significations, since there are
infinitely many things that are not men (SE 165*11 £); and since to
signify an infinite number of things is to signify nothing (ioo6b6t),
'not-man' would lose its signification altogether. Instead,'not-man'
seems to have a single signification. Non-men all have in common
that they are not men: 'being for not-man' consists just in not being
a man.
Here, then, Aristotle argues that if 'man' and 'not-rnan' did not
signify anything different, the two words would only pick out a
single thing (ioo6b22 ft). If this were so, he goes on to say, then 'is
a man and a not-man' would say precisely the same as 'is a man
v
See, e.g., Forth, 'A Note on Aristotle's Principle of Non-Contradiction*,
3
See Top. 103*27-9; Mete. Z, 1030*21 ft
29
Similarly, it would not seem right to say that non-men are said 'with regard to
a single thing* (.t^df IV). Non-men are not like entities, or things pertaining to med-
icine, which are related to a central concept in various ways. Non-men are all related
to man in the same way, that is, by not being one, Cf, Meta, 24,1030*32 £f.
198 Appendix I
have seen, argues the other way around: since there are distinctions
between objects, and a word signifies a definite thing, then not
everything can be so and not so (1006*30 £).
One argument should be looked at in more detail, since its func-
tion has often been confused with that of the argument which I
have discussed at length above. According to the next major argu-
ment after the refutation (ioo7320-bi8), if the opponents were
right, then there could be no substance, and everything would be
merely accidental, since man would also be not-man. However,
there can be no accidents without substance, since accidents are
accidental to subjects, and not to each other (ioo7b2 ft).Therefore,
there must be substance (if there is to be anything at all). Some
commentators worry that, since substance is brought in explicitly
here, it must have been lurking all along:32 Aristotle appears to be
employing here a distinction between substance and accident to
which the opponent need not agree, and perhaps has been employ-
ing it in earlier parts of the chapter by speaking of the signification
of 'man'.
This need not be a worry: the two arguments are entirely distinct.
In the earlier argument, which is an ad hominem refutation
addressed to the opponent, nothing is taken for granted except that
'man', or some other arbitrary word which the opponent utters, sig-
nifies something. It is legitimate to take this as a starting-point,
since it is something to which the opponent must commit himself
if he is to maintain his position that rational speech is possible. The
later argument is not an ad hominem refutation, and Aristotle
therefore is not required only to use arguments which the oppo-
nent must grant. He is no longer addressing the opponent, but is
drawing out absurd consequences of the opponent's view from his
own standpoint. The introduction of substance in the later argu-
ment does not mean that it is presupposed in the earlier one, nor
will the refutation only work if the opponent utters a word signi-
fying a substance.
The refutation argument is the most interesting and successful
argument which Aristotle brings to bear against those who deny
the Principle of Contradiction. Since the opponents are committed
to the possibility of rational discourse, they must be committed to
33
See, e.g., Cohen, 'Aristotle on the Principle of Non-Contradiction*.
202 Appendix I
cations of the names will become evident (21*21 ft). Thus, if the
definition of man is substituted for 'man' in 'dead man', the
phrase 'dead man* will be seen to contain an opposition, since
'man' really signifies something which is living. Similarly, a defini-
tion will be unsuccessful if it mentions implicitly what it attempts
to define. This only becomes explicit when the names in the sup-
posed definition are replaced by phrases (Top. I42a34-b6).2 In all of
these cases, the signification of a name is set out clearly by substi-
tuting a phrase for it, and fallacies caused by neglecting the signi-
fication of the name may be solved. In a proof, however, the name
is preferable for the sake of brevity (APr. 49b5).The name is shorter
than the phrase, and so more convenient,1 while the phrase is
longer, but more informative. Of course, the phrase is not perspic-
uous unless one is familiar with the names used in it; Aristotle says
that the names in a definition should be replaced by other defini-
tions as far as is possible (Top. 149*1-3), and words should not be
replaced by others still more obscure (i4985-7),
There are also other phrases besides the definition which may be
substituted for a word.4 While 'man' only signifies one thing, there
are many different phrases that are equivalent to and substitutable
for the name 'man*: these include not only the definition, but also
whatever is proper to man, Properties (iS«t) are things which hold
uniquely of something: if something is a man, then it is capable of
learning grammar, and if capable of learning grammar, then it is a
man: these can be 'predicated interchangeably of the thing' (Top.
I02ai9ff.). Only those predicates which are proper to the thing sig-
nified by the name are interchangeable with it: 'asleep' would not
be substitutable for 'man', even if by chance all men and only men
should happen to be asleep at a certain time (Top. io2*i9-24).Thus,
there is a very large number of phrases which can be substituted
2
For the same procedure, see Top, 130*38 ft and 147*9 ft C£ also Mela. 25,
icxjo^aSff.: the problem of the snub nose starts from the assumption that equivalent
expressions can always be substituted for each other,
3
In a sense, the name stands for the phrase: a name is also spoken of as a sign
of its phrase (Meta. Tj, 1012*24, H6, 1045*261). The name is likewise more con-
venient than the thing (SE 165*6ft),
4
It should not be surprising that the word I have translated 'phrase' (le-fog) does
not mean 'definition'. At De Int. i6b26f£, this term is simply defined as a significant
utterance which has separately significant parts, A definition (<%oj) is defined as
being a phrase (Ao'yos) which signiies an essence (Top. ioifc38); thus, deinitions form
a subset of phrases, and we should not assume that a statement about phrases applies
only to definitions.
206 Appendix II
for 'man', even though 'man* signifies a single thing. We should now
ask whether all of the phrases substitutable for 'man' expand its
signification equally well, or whether the signification is only prop-
erly expressed by the definition. If words with multiple significa-
tion are to be distinguished from those with simple signification, it
seems important for only one phrase to match each signification:
the distinction between the two kinds of words would otherwise be
threatened.5
Aristotle distinguishes between the definition (%og), which sig-
nifies the essence, and the property (tdtov), which does not (Top,
io3b9£). Both definitions and properties are phrases which
uniquely specify the same object and so may be substituted for the
name which stands for the object. The definition stands out from
the properties in that it gives an informative account of the object,
rather than merely designating it uniquely. Since definition,
name, and properties all specify the same item, they are all mutu-
ally substitutable. Thus, a definition may be substituted for a
property, and so we find Aristotle telling us that one phrase may
expand the signification of another (Top. 102*1 f,). A word such
as 'man', therefore, does not have a multiple signification Just
because a great many phrases can be substituted for it. Among
these many phrases, it is the definition which makes the word's
signification manifest,6
We find, however, that not all phrases which represent significa-
tions are definitions. Even 'goat-stag' signifies something (De Int.
16*16 £). No one can know what something non-existent is, we are
told, but it is perfectly possible to ask what the name signifies, or
what its phrase signifies (APo. 92bs-8)JSimilarly, the phrase which
expands the signification of the word 'void' is not a definition of it
in any usual sense. The word signifies *a place in which there is
nothing*: yet no such thing can exist (Ph. 2i3b30f£). The fact that
5
There are also phrases which signify more than one thing (SE 165*13): thus, a
word with many significations could presumably be replaced by a phrase with many
significations, as well as by several phrases, each with only a stogie signification.
6
Etymology may be used in supplying an equivalent phrase for a name. At Top.
112*32-8, this method is recommended for foiling one's opponent by twisting the
sense of » word from its ordinary use. Elsewhere, support for definitions is some-
times found in etymology. The 'automatic' (to awa/teaov) is thus found to be what
happens for no reason (than afaoftdnpr y&vrat, Ph. lyfzyt). Cl Rfiet. 1400^-2$.
1
Thus, the refutation argument of Mete. F4 would work even if the opponent said
'goat-stag'. It signifies being something, even though the goat-stag 'is* only in a most
remote sense of the word.
The Substitution of Phrases for Words 207
there are words signifying things which do not exist means that to
ask what a word signifies is not a reliable method for discovering
definitions. The question 'what does the name signify?* does not
necessarily yield an answer to the question 'what is it?* (APo.
92ba6-34). I shall consider this problem in more detail in Appendix
III.
Despite this caution, something useful can be learned by asking
'what does the name signify?' or 'in how many ways is the name
said?' Of being, Aristotle says 'in as many ways as it is said, in so
many ways does being signify* (Meta, A?, 1017*231). So, when he
asks 'in how many ways is it said?* (jroaa^cBg Myeiat;) he is asking
for a list of the significations of a word. This method of enquiry is
used frequently. As we have seen, a different phrase can be assigned
to match each signification of a word. Thus, when a name has more
than one signification, it has 'many phrases' (aoliol loyai), or 'it is
said in many ways' (110^0%®$ MyeTcu), The two expressions are
closely related in Greek; in order to capture this in English, the
former might be rendered as 'many sayings'. The question 'in how
many ways is it said?' is quite different from the question 'what is
it?' and is used in altogether different circumstances. The defini-
tions of Metaphysics A answer the former question, but not the
latter. The book is a glossary of the meanings of important philo-
sophical terms: its title is given as 'concerning "in how many ways"'
(jteQirov}iooax&;,Meta.Zi, iO28an). Terms such as 'to hold' (Meta.
A23) or 'to be from something* (Meta, 424) have several significa-
tions and thus several explanatory phrases. The task of this book is
to explain the meanings of terms, rather than to answer the ques-
tion 'what is it?' and offer definitions in any strong sense.
Determining the various meanings of words is important in
carrying out an investigation. Confusion as to the number of senses
of a word results in indeterminacy of thought (De Caelo 28ob2 ft),
and thought must be definite if it is to succeed as thought at all
(Meta. T, ioo6b5~n). Different methods are appropriate to differ-
ent enquiries. When Aristotle is interested in defining substances,
searching after the significations of words will not necessarily help:
if the word signiles a substance, then it may help, but if it does not,
then finding the signification of the word will yield a phrase which
looks like a definition but is not. When he is dealing with technical
philosophical terms, on the other hand, asking for definitions which
express the essence signified by the term would be useless. Instead,
2o8 Appendix II
the correct method is to ask in how many ways the word signifies,
and to elucidate each signification,
A consistent view of signification may be seen in all these con-
texts. All words (names, verbs, and their inflexions) signify. Some
words only signify one thing, while others signify more than one
thing. What is signified may exist or it may not; it may belong to
any category, and need not be a substance or a physical object.
Signification comes in definite units; a phrase may be substituted
for each unit of signification, and then a name for each phrase. All
phrases which uniquely specify the same thing are interchangeable,
though only the definition is explanatory of the word's significa-
tion. There are thus phrases which stand for the same object, but
which pick out different aspects of it, rather like 'the morning star"
and 'the evening star*. This picture is complicated by the existence
of things which do not have definitions, and yet may be signified:
in these cases there will still be a phrase expressing the significa-
tion of the name, but this phrase will not be a definition. This poses
a problem for the task of finding definitions, which brings us to the
next appendix.
Appendix III
tions, and not just phrases which give the signification of the words,
might apply to all the categories of being (Top. 103*2-] ft; Mem, Z,
1030*17-32), Just as members of the categories other than that of
substance can be said to be, in derived or secondary senses of being,
so there may be definitions of them, although not in the full sense
in which there are definitions of substances. The non-existent could
even be said to have a definition. A definition is a phrase which
answers the question 'what is it?' Something non-existent, then,
should only have a definition to the extent that it can be said to be.
Being is 'said in many ways', and things are said to be by being
qualities of being, routes toward being, destructions or deprivations
of being, or by various other relations to the central concept, which
is substance (Mete, F, ioo3b5-io). So, Aristotle goes on, even that
which is not can be said to be. However, the sense in which a goat-
stag 'is' is one very far removed from the category of substance,
where definitions properly and primarily apply. In passages
where Aristotle discusses definition, rather than the many senses
of being, he is quite clear that the non-existent cannot have a defi-
nition. He is equally clear that words like 'void' or 'goat-stag'
signify something (De Int. i6ai6£; Ph, 2i3b30f.),The phrase which
reveals the signification of such a word must have some sort of
content.
The point in Posterior Analytics II. 7 is that asking the question
'what does the name signify?' is, not an appropriate method to use
when looking for a definition, since the answer may be a definition
or may not be. The reason why the method does not work is not
because it yields a nominal definition, different from the real one;
in cases where there is a definition to find, the answer to *what does
the name signify?* will indeed be the definition. However, there will
be no way of telling whether the phrase which states the
signification of the name is a definition or not. The chapters
which follow address the problem of how definitions are to be
discovered.
As we have seen, several possible methods for establishing defi-
nitions have been considered and rejected. Among these is demon-
stration, A definition, expresses what something is; demonstration,
however, does not show what something is, but only that it is or is
not (92*38 f.). Before the definiendum can be defined, it must be
identified as actually existing. This, however, is merely a prelimin-
ary step, and does not contribute to the definition of the thing: for
214 Appendix HI
nition gives the cause, and this guarantees that the thing exists, as
well as showing what it is,
If we consider the investigation into eclipses, or thunder, we may
have some hazy notion that thunder is some noise in the clouds,
and an eclipse is some sort of privation of light, but this does not
count as knowledge of the existence of eclipses (93*20-6), Thus,
when we investigate eclipses properly, we are not only searching
for a definition, but also seeking to establish whether such a phe-
nomenon exists at all. Aristotle's talk of 'the cause of whether it is*
(93a4) points to the possibility that the demonstration may show
that the supposed phenomenon does not in fact exist. An example
of this would be void: as we discover what void would be if it
existed, we also discover that it cannot exist. If the demonstration
shows that something does exist, we will also learn what it is. We
can see how this works for physical phenomena. An examination
of the physical principles which account for eclipses, thunder, and
the like shows us at the same time whether there genuinely are such
supposed phenomena, and also why they come about and so what
they are.
This allows Aristotle to draw the subtle conclusion that, although
we do not demonstrate what something is, nevertheless it becomes
known by means of a demonstration (93^5-20), As we learn that
there is such a thing as thunder, since its existence is guaranteed by
the physical causes and principles which have been cited in the
demonstration, we also realize what thunder is, and are able to
extract a definition from the demonstration, although the definition
has not been demonstrated. This theory of the simultaneous
answering of the 'why* and the 'whether' questions neatly solves
Aristotle's problems about priority. Let us consider the following
demonstration of the existence of thunder:
Noise accompanies the quenching of fire.
Fire is quenched in the clouds.
Therefore, there is a noise (of fire being quenched) in the clouds.
The conclusion is a statement of the existence of the phenome-
non in question: the demonstration establishes its reality. We have
a rough, preliminary grasp of thunder, expressed in the vague claim
that 'thunder is some noise in the clouds' (93*22 ff.). This does not
amount to a knowledge that such a thing as thunder exists, but it
is a necessary preliminary to the success of the demonstration, since
216 Appendix III
without this preliminary grasp of what thunder is, the noise in the
clouds which is demonstrated to exist could not be identified as
thunder. The preliminary grasp must therefore be postulated in
order to account for the matching of the phenomenon which is to
be understood with the understanding of it provided by the demon-
stration: we must be able to say, 'now I understand what thunder
is,' and not just, 'now I know of a phenomenon which was previ-
ously totally unfamiliar.' Since we can identify thunder as a noise
in the clouds, we can move directly from the conclusion that a noise
in the clouds exists to see that thunder exists. Furthermore, we learn
at the same time what thunder is, since the reasons which guaran-
tee its existence make up the definition of what it is. The definition
of thunder, then, is supplied by the middle term of the demonstra-
tion which establishes its existence (93*11): thunder is the quench-
ing of fire in the clouds. This type of definition is arrived at by a
demonstration, although it is not demonstrated.
We have thus seen a number of different ways of thinking about
definitions. In chapter 10, these are summed up, and we may now
address the question of how they are related, and once again con-
sider whether Aristotle meant there to be a distinction between the
real and the nominal definition. The chapter begins with a discus-
sion of different types of definition. A definition, he says, is a phrase
saying "what it is* (93b29). One kind, he goes on, is a phrase which
says what the name, or other name-like phrase (Myo<; ovo/iara>6tis),
signifies (93^301). This statement is consistent with the Topics,
where Aristotle says that a definition is a phrase which signifies
essence, and which is rendered in place of a name, or in place of a
phrase (Top, ioib38-i02a2). 'Name-like phrase' here denotes the
sort of phrase which, like a name, can be defined: it is possible to
define what is meant by 'an animal capable of learning grammar',
though it is not possible to define an assertion, question, or the
Iliad, all of which are also 'phrases* (Aoyoi) in Aristotle's terminol-
ogy. The name-like phrase is thus put alongside the name as some-
thing whose signification can be spelled out by the method of
substitution.
The expression which I have translated as 'name-like phrase* has
traditionally been translated as 'nominal definition',5 As Ross
noted, the Greek words do not bear this sense well.6 Furthermore,
5
See, e.g., LSI
6
W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1949).
Signification and Definition 217
it is hard to see what the sentence would mean if one did follow
this translation. Aristotle would be saying that one kind of defini-
tion is 'an account of what the name signifies, or some other
nominal definition*. Yet on the view that Aristotle recognized the
concept of the nominal definition, 'an account of what the name
signifies* would itself be a nominal definition. What, then, would
'some other nominal definition' be? The term 'nominal definition'
takes its origin from this passage: the expression does not appear
elsewhere in Aristotle. I have argued that 'nominal definition' is not
the correct translation. It might still be the case, of course, that
nominal definitions are at issue here, even though Aristotle does
not call them by that name: this position is argued for by Barnes.7
We have seen, though, that these definitions which cite what a name
signifies also answer 'what is it?' (93b29): in other words, they are
definitions of the thing signified by the name. They therefore cannot
be merely nominal definitions.8
Aristotle's example of the sort of definition which states what a
name signifies is that of triangle. In this case, we have a definition
which states what triangle is before we know whether it exists or
not. This seems paradoxical; we do, however, know 'accidentally'
that triangle exists (93b35). That is, we are in possession of the def-
inition of triangle, though it has not yet been established by demon-
stration that it is a genuine definition, and not just a phrase
expanding the signification of a word standing for something non-
existent. This 'accidental' knowledge of the definition serves the
same function as the preliminary grasp of what thunder is (93*21 £).
So, in the case- of things like triangles, Aristotle says, the prelimi-
nary knowledge that is necessary is merely what 'triangle* signifies,
rather than that such a thing exists (71*14i). It follows that the def-
inition with which a geometer begins expresses what 'triangle' sig-
nifies. The account of what "triangle* signifies is a definition of what
triangle is (cf. 93^29): it is not merely a nominal definition, expound-
ing the name and not the thing.
The second sort of definition expresses why something is, and can
only be reached after learning that it is (93b32 ft). The first sort,
then, signifies but does not show or reveal (Seatwai), while the
7
J, Barnes, Aristotle: Posterior Analytics (Oxford, 1975; 2nd edn,, Oxford, 1994):
see 222 £
s
Barnes argues to the contrary. However, his conception of the nominal defini-
tion is ynorthodox, and looks as if it would readily include real definitions (ibid.
223).
218 Appendix HI
* The two definitions are really versions of the same thing: each object can only
have one definition, which may be better or less well expressed (Top, 139^7ft).
16
C£ De An, 413*11-20; there, most people are said to give definitions that are
like conclusions: they merely state that something is the case, without explaining
why. A definition ought also to show the cause of something.
Signification and Definition 219
" Cf. the De int., where we must examine the behaviour of things in order to
understand how assertions made about them work.
220 Appendix III
THE DE INTERPRETATIONS:
TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES
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see also amphiboly and homonymy PA 6,11 n,, 47-50
Ammonius i n., 6, 21-2, 41, 43, 52-3, Pk. 27 n., 31 n., 69, 173 n., 187, 206,
62 212, 213
amphiboly 103, 104 n. Poet. 6,25,42,450., 47, 48, 49, 62,
analytics 187 70 n., 71 n., 75 n., 138, 179, 191 n.
Anaxagoras 114 Pol. 50
Andronicus of Rhodes 5, 14 Prob. 47 n., 49 n,, 50, 5 1 n.
animal noises 18, 47-51 Rhet. 1 1 n., 7011., 179, 2060.
animals 15, 46-51, 195 n. SE 2, 4, n, 20, 22, 24, 27 n., 830. ,92,
Anscotnbe 90, 114 n., 12211,, 193 99-105, 107, 150, 151, 153, 1550.,
answers 76, 99-102, 104, 106-7, 12? 182. 197, 204-5, 2o6n.
Apollonius Dyscolus 89 n. Top. 2-4, 1 1 n., 16 n., 70 n., 75 n.,
Apuleius 890. 85 n., 91-2, 94, 98, 99, 102 n., 104,
Aquinas 5 n,, 89 1 06, 131 n., 147 n., 151, 153-5, '73.
Arens i n,, 16, 41 n,, 43, 58 n,, 590. 182. 1970., 204-6, 213, 214, 216.
Aristotle; 2180.
APo. 17, 31 n., 33, 75, 79, 83 n., articulation 47-51
101 n., 127, 137, 18311., 187, 191 n,, assertions 7, 23-4, 28-30, 76, 79, 172,
199, 206. 207, 209—20 198
230 Index
assertions (cent): calculation n
as answers 76, 100-2 categories 280,, 32, 570,, 136-7, 191,
composition of 52,55-61, 132-5, 197.213
158, 178-9 causes 214-15, 218-19
compound 76-7, 96-7 chance 110,116,119-20,122-4
copula in 137-43 change 173
copula missing from 143-6 Cohen 193 n., 195 n., 201 n.
criteria for unity of 75-7, 95-6, 105, combination 56-9,
150 and division 26-32, 65, 69, 78, 80-1,
definition of 72-3, 125-6 134, 158
expressing beliefs 171, 174 complexity 49,60,72
future singular 109-25, 129-30 hidden 95-7, 103, 151, 204
hidden complexity in 95-104 in things 27-9, 30-1
indefinite 86 in thoughts 16, 25, 29
modal 156-70 in utterances 25-7
multiple 75-6, 95-8, 150-5 see also combination and division
non-universal 84-7,90-4, 112, 135, compounds 29,44-5
142, 143-4 conjunction 74, 75, 95, 97
one-word 60 conjunctions 25, 75 n., 138
partial 86-90, 169 consonants 48
past and future 68-70 contingency 28, no, 161-2, 163-4,
primitive 26, 55, 74, 135 168-70
simple 76-7, 95-6, 152 contradiction 2-3, 79-82, 138, 175,
single 75-7, 95-6, 99, 133, 153 184-5,198
singular 83-4, 89-90, 92-3, 135 Principle of 157, 183-203
and things 83 contradictories 84—8. 92, 138, 171—7,
universal 83-90, 92, 112, 141-3, 169 184-5
Augustine 890. contradictory pairs 92-3,111-12,
Ax 46-7, 50, 58 n. 178 n.
axioms 183 chance, necessary, and usual 120-5
and contraries 175
babbling 153-4 definition of 78-82
Barnes 217 and dialectical questions 3, 99, 101,
being 214 106, 151, 180-1
and categories 32, 137, 213 future singular 110,118,126-7
as predicate 136-7, 138 n. modal 156-60, 1 68
and signification 191-2 and non-existence 65
as subject 159 and potentiality 169
and troth 27-8, 31-2 and refutation 180-1
and unity 27 Rule of, see RCP
see aha copula, existence, and 'is' universal 87-8
Bekker 37 n. contraries 84-5, 146, 163, 171-7, 204
Belardi 20. 21-2 convention its, 12, 13, 17, 18-19,36,45,
beliefs 24, 29, 171-7 72
contradictory 172-5 see also tokens
ultimate 183 'conversely' loan., 162
universal 174-6 copula 31-2, 53, 56-9, 61, 136, 137-43,
birds 49-50 155
Bivalenee, Principle of 111-13, negated 139, 142, 145-6, 156-9
117, 118, 122n., 125-6, 129- see also 'is*
3i
Boethius 19, 3 1,430,, 53 n,, 890. Dante 49 n.
Bonitz 133 n. definition 16,17,91, 137,305-6,209-20
Index 231
dist. phrase 205 Fine 116, 122 n., 129, 130 n.
mathematical 210, 217, 219 form 15-17, 22
real and nominal 211-12, 216-17 Forms, Platonic 64,930,
and signification 206, 210-13, 217- Frege 82 n.
ig function 44
unity of 74-5 Furth 193, 197 n.
unsuccessful 205 future 68-9, 109-11, 114-19, 129-
deliberation no, 118-20, 125 3i
Democritus 12 disappearance of HI, 117-18, 121,
demonstration 183, 187-8, 209-10, 124
213-16, 218-20 necessity of, see necessity
dialectic 2-3, 99-101, 106-8, 117-8, openness of 120, 122, 124-6
151-2, 176-7, 180-2 reality of 124, 129
assertions used in 91, 94
see also questions, dialectical genus 31, 91, 202, 2.14
Dickason 1090, goat-stag;
Diogenes Laertius 5 'goat-stag is* 30-2, 136-7
Dionysius Ibrax 540. its lack of truth value 26, 30, 32-4,
disjunction 121 38,55,?4
division, see combination and division its signification 16-17, 24-5, 32-4,
double questions, see questions, doable 65,206
dreams 28 n. see also non-existence
grammar 1, 60
eclipses 215 groans 19
elements: see also utterances, inarticulate
of assertions 35, 38, 61, 178
physical 44 Heraditus 184
of speech 48,51 Hermogenes 12
of syllogisms 182 Hintikka 117 n., 1640.
emotions 90. Homer 154-5
equivalences 161 homogeneous bodies 44
error 29, 171-4, 183-6 homonymy 46, 79, 92, 103, 105, 196,
essence 16, 44, 75, 193, 197 197
and definition 205 n,, 216 hypothesis 121, 183
and signiication 195, 212
etymology 41 n, images 15-17, 20
'every* 143-4, 148 imagination 15,46
'exchange*, see substitution implication 165-7
Excluded Middle, Principle of 130, impossibility lai, 161-6
165-6 indeflniteness 147, 195, 204
existence 210, 213-16 indeterminacy of thought 207
see also being and V individuals 89
explanation 214 see aho singulars
expressions ($d«c) 71-2, j6, 102 indivisibility 29, 37, 48-9
induction 209-10
fallacy 184-5,205 inferences 139-43, 146, 152, 161, 167-
modal 115-16 o8
see aba sophistries infinite regress 153-4
falsehood: inflexions 53
and error 171 argument from 70 n.
see also truth and falsehood of names §7
familiarity 186,211 of verbs 68-70, 74, 134
fatalism 109-21, 124, 129-31 Irwin 64 n,, 98 n., 1940., 211
232 Index