The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy
The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy
The Emerging Republic of Korea Navy
O n 21 May 1997 the author, then director of the Policy, Plans, and Programs
Division, in the Maritime Staff Office of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense
Force, attended a preparatory meeting for proposed navy-to-navy staff talks for
the exchange of opinions on various maritime and naval subjects with the Re-
public of Korea Navy. My counterpart at this meeting, which was held at a navy
facility in Taejung, in the central region of the Republic of Korea, was the Naval
Policy Director of ROKN* Headquarters.
Navy-to-navy talks symbolize military exchanges between countries. The
JMSDF has had such talks with the U.S. Navy, an allied partner, for a long time
and also with the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy, regarded as a “father” of mod-
ern navies. During the mid-1990s the JMSDF began to have such talks with the
Royal Australian Navy, which has close relations with the navies of many South-
east Asian nations. The JMSDF hopes that the Australian navy can help it bridge
historical gaps in relations—arising from the wariness in these countries caused
by the bitter experience of World War II—between the JMSDF and Southeast
Asian navies. Military-to-military exchanges developed rapidly in those years, as
a part of the new international exchanges that arose in the post–Cold War era, so
the establishment of a close relationship with the ROKN had become a serious
and urgent issue for the JMSDF. For all these reasons, I, as an official responsible
for JMSDF policy in MSO, proposed to meet with my counterpart in the ROKN
as a preliminary measure.
Because our meeting was held before the start of official exchanges, and be-
cause we did not know each other, the atmosphere was awkward at first. However,
* All abbreviations used in this article are expanded in the sidebar on page 16.
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as time passed, we gradually became friendly, finding that we had much in com-
mon as sailors. A number of exchanges followed fairly quickly, and in the years
since then the relationship between the two navies has deepened. Still, the history
of this official relationship between the JMSDF and the ROKN is very short—only
about ten years—when one considers the geographical proximity between the two
nations; true mutual understanding has yet to mature. Much can still be done to
bring the JMSDF and ROKN closer together.
It is for that reason, and from that perspective, that I, as a former leader of the
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force, would like here to examine comprehen-
sively the Republic of Korea Navy. I will discuss the whole service, except for
(though they are officially part of the ROKN) the ground forces of the Republic
of Korea Marine Corps.
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KODA 15
conquering the Ming dynasty of China; however, the Japanese forces were, in gen-
eral, unsuccessful. Yi Sun-Shin interrupted the Japanese supply lines at sea several
times, sometimes causing serious problems. In 1598 Hideyoshi suddenly died,
and the Japanese forces started to withdraw. Taking full advantage of this change
of tide, Yi Sun-Shin, together with Ming naval forces, attacked a retreating Japa-
nese convoy off the coast of the peninsula. He made good use of intelligence, local
topography (marked by islands and narrow straits), tactics (especially surprise at-
tack and separation of the enemy), and equipment (such as “turtle ships,” which
were heavily protected by iron armor casements of a turtleback shape) and finally
defeated the sea forces of Japan. The Korean-Chinese combined force reportedly
sank two hundred out of five hundred Japanese ships, putting an end to a
seven-year-long war on the Korean homeland.5 The tragic loss of Yi Sun-Shin in
the final action made him a true hero—a man who saved the Korean nation at
the cost of his life. Even today, the Koreans respect him as a savior of their coun-
try. To commemorate his achievement, the lead ship of KDX-II destroyer class
was named Yi Sun-Shin.
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ABBREVIATIONS
AMS auxiliary minesweeper
AO auxiliary oiler
AOR auxiliary replenishment oiler
APD auxiliary personnel transport destroyer
ARL auxiliary repair light
ARS auxiliary rescue/salvage ship
ASR auxiliary submarine rescue ship
ASROC antisubmarine rocket
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASV antisurface vessel; antisurface vehicle [e.g., Lynx helicopter]
ASW antisubmarine warfare
CVSG aircraft carrier strike group
DD destroyer
DDG guided-missile destroyer
DE destroyer escort
FAC fast attack craft (gun)
FFG guided-missile frigate
FFS fast frigate, small
FRAM Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
FS frigate, small
FSG guided-missile frigate, small
JML Japanese minelayer
JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force
KDX-I first generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
KDX-II second generation of destroyers designed and built in South Korea
KDX-III Aegis DDG, third generation of destroyers designed and built in
South Korea
KSS Korean midget submarine
LPD landing platform, dock
LSM landing ship, medium
LSMR landing ship medium, rocket
LSSL landing ship support, large
LST landing ship, tank
MCM mine countermeasures
MHC minehunter, coastal
ML minelayer
MSC minesweeper, coastal
MSO Maritime Staff Office [JMDSF]
PC patrol craft (submarine chaser)
PCE patrol craft, escort
PCF patrol craft, fast
PCS patrol craft, sweeper
PF patrol frigate [World War II construction]
PG guided-missile patrol boat
PKM patrol killer boat, medium
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PT patrol torpedo boat
ROK Republic of Korea
ROKN Republic of Korea Navy
SLOC sea line of communication
SMG Strategic Mobile Group
SS conventionally powered [diesel-electric] attack submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
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KODA 17
With regard to large combatant ships, the ROKN had in 1951 only two out-
dated, World War II–vintage patrol frigates capable of operations on “blue wa-
ter”—that is, on the high seas, away from home waters. Beyond these two ships,
there were only about ten coastal minesweepers of U.S. and Japanese build, as
well as ten small patrol craft (see table 1).
TABLE 1
ROKN STRENGTH IN 1951 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
Japanese-left gunboats (22), former Japanese coastal patrol crafts (8), self-propelled oil barges, tug-
Others
boats, and various service craft
Source: All numerical data in the charts in this article are from the Jane’s Fighting Ships of each year. The type designations (DD, SS, PGM, etc.), which vary in suc-
cessive editions of Jane’s, are the author’s own. See the sidebar for a legend.
In spite of these handicaps, the ROKN took great pride, and found a strong
spiritual foundation, in the fact that though the smallest service in the South Ko-
rean Armed Forces, it had engaged in combat with great courage and effectiveness
6
in the war’s most difficult period, the first years after the state’s establishment.
The highest operational command billet—Commander in Chief, ROK Fleet
—was established in September 1953, soon after the armistice agreement was
7
signed in July.
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TABLE 2
ROKN STRENGTH 1960–80 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
PT 3 U.S.-built, 30 tons
1 Norwegian-built,
AO 1 1
1,400 tons
Others Patrol crafts, self-propelled oil barges, tugboats, and various service crafts
Source: The official personnel strength of ROKN is not available in open sources like Jane’s. The total number of personnel in the ROKN used in the charts was
calculated by subtracting ROK Marine Corps strength from the sum of the “active duty service members” and “draftees” given in Jane’s.
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uninterested in underway logistics; it purchased only one large oiler, from Nor-
way. The main mission of the navy in this period was still coastal defense, not
blue-water operations.
In these years the Republic of Korea participated in the Vietnam War, with the
ROKN deploying transport ships to the South China Sea. In home waters, on 19
January 1967 a U.S.-built PCE was sunk in the Sea of Japan north of the Military
9
Demarcation Line by North Korean shore batteries. In June 1970, an ROKN
vessel that had been broadcasting propaganda to the North was captured by a
10
North Korean patrol craft.
During the 1970s, the administration of President Pak Chung-Hee devel-
oped and announced an “eight-year national defense plan” intended to build a
11
self-reliant national defense capability. On the basis of this plan, the ROK
started to construct a fleet using its domestic technology and industrial re-
sources. Noteworthy products of this plan were the Ulsan-class frigates, with
displacements of two thousand tons, and the Pohang-class corvettes, of one
thousand tons. The ROKN eventually constructed, respectively, nine and
twenty-four of these types, which have been regarded as the workhorses of the
fleet in coastal operations. Since then, the ROKN has constructed almost all of
its own major combatants, at several shipyards.
TABLE 3
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
6 Korean-built,
KSS 11
midget submarines
KDX-1 (11) 3
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KODA 21
TABLE 3 CONTINUED
ROKN STRENGTH 1980–2000 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
FS 4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae 4
PCF 2 Wildcat 47
ML 1 Wonsan
MSC/MHC 1 Yangyang
3 licensed production,
MHC
Swallow
LST 4 Alligator
1 Norwegian-built, 1,400
AO
tons
AOR 3 Chunjee
ASR 1 Chunghaejin
Others An oceanographic research ship, a variety of auxiliary ships, and various service craft
The ROKN selected the German-developed Type 209 submarine for its
first-generation submarine (known as the Chang Bogo class). The navy imported
the first boat; the South Korean shipbuilding industry assembled the second and
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third boats; and the fourth was built in-country, from keel laying to final fitting-
out. By this means, the ROKN, which had started its submarine force from noth-
ing, paved the way to a real undersea-warfare capability—establishing training
procedures for the crews, developing operational concepts, and learning the tech-
nology needed for building diesel-electric submarines.
Additionally, while introducing the new SSs, the ROKN planned to establish a
submarine-rescue posture, indispensable for a submarine-operating navy. To
this end the navy introduced two submarine-rescue ships from the U.S. Navy
and ordered a Korean-built unit, Chunghaejin, along with the other measures
necessary to realize an appropriate and viable submarine-rescue capability.
As for destroyers, the ROKN seems to have set itself a goal of about ten DDs
that were superior in surface combat power to those of the North. In this period
it replaced six of eleven old, U.S.-built destroyers with three KDX-I units (the
Kwanggaeto Daewang class), trading a reduction in the total number of units for
improved capability.
Furthermore, the ROKN replaced its diverse collection of U.S.-built patrol
boats and craft with a force made up of two types, the Ulsan frigates and Pohang
corvettes. This improved not only practical operational capability but also ratio-
nalized education, training, and logistic support. In other words, the Navy made
a successful transition from a posture of many types with a few ships each to the
one with a few types with many ships each.
In general, and though the number of destroyers dropped, the operational ca-
pability of the ROK fleet, focused as it was on coastal defense against the North
Korean navy, apparently reached the level that the ROKN had envisioned. With
respect to ASW, however, it was inadequate, even after the introduction of the
three KDX-I destroyers and the Lynx helicopter. The ASW posture of the ROKN
still remains questionable today, in relation to the perceived threat of North Ko-
rean submarines and the geopolitical nature of the country. Where the ROKN
had once depended heavily on U.S.-built small patrol craft, in the 1980s and
1990s it made rapid progress in producing its own vessels, building a large num-
ber of domestically developed Sea Dolphin–class and Wildcat-class PCFs. A
buildup of the defenses of South Korean territorial waters was continually re-
quired, even “demanded,” of the ROKN by clandestine intrusions of North
Korean boats and small craft, which had continued ever since the war.
We can see in these facts a consistent ROKN policy toward the stark realities
of South–North confrontation and East–West rivalry that faced it—that is, fric-
tion and tension on the peninsula against the background, in the first part of the
period, of the Cold War and then of the unstable post–Cold War international
order that followed. Judging from statistics, the ROKN needed about a hundred
PCFs, including small PKMs (the Sea Fox class), to take proper measures against
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KODA 23
clandestine intrusion attempts from the sea and suspicious boat movements off
both coasts of the peninsula. In June 1999, for instance, a conflict occurred be-
tween small craft of the South and North near the Northern Limit Line off the
west coast of the peninsula. In June 2002 another engagement, including an ex-
change of fire, occurred in the same waters; the ROKN lost a patrol craft,
PKM-357.
A heavy burden was thus imposed on the ROKN by the nation. In contrast,
the JMSDF is relatively free of this burden, partly because larger distances reduce
the small-boat threat, and partly thanks to Japan’s coast guard. This difference
underlies clear contrasts that can be seen in the force-planning assumptions of
12
these two neighboring navies.
In the area of amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy decommissioned in
these years a large number of U.S.-built LSTs and LSMs. It filled the gap with four
domestically built, higher-performance LSTs of the Alligator class. As for MCM
ships, the navy introduced a minelayer, Wonsan, and several Yangyang-class
MSCs/MHCs, together with Swallow-class MHCs. Finally, the ROKN saw some im-
provement in its MCM operational capabilities; however, progress was still slow. At
the end of this period, three Korean-built, Chunjee-class AORs, which could steam
with surface forces at high speed, were introduced to the fleet. This improved sub-
stantially the fleet’s capability to support operations on the high seas.
In the last two decades of the century, specifically in the late 1990s, modern-
ization in the ROK fleet, both in quality and quantity, was conspicuous. This
trend was supported by a noteworthy change-of-command speech of the twen-
tieth Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ahn Byung-Tae, who made it clear that
13
the ROKN would aim to become a blue-water navy.
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TABLE 4
ROKN STRENGTH 2000–2008 (MAJOR COMBATANTS)
2000 2008
SS (214) 1
KDX-I 3 3
KDX-II 4
KDX-III 1
FS 4 Korean-built, Dong-Hae 4
ML 1 Korean-built, Wonsan 1
Others Patrol boats, oceanographic research ship, and various service craft
six KDX-IIs (the Chungmugong Yi Sun-Shin class) and three KDX-IIIs (Sejong
Daewang class), almost in parallel. The KDX-III is equipped with the latest Aegis
combat system. By the time this program is completed, the ROK fleet’s destroyer
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KODA 25
force will reach the level of the leading navies of the world. With respect to small,
fast patrol boats, the ROKN has kept its strength at around eighty units, a num-
ber achieved by 2000. These boats have remained in frontline service, with the
main mission of the coastal defense, together with the larger Ulsan and Pohang
ships. However, it is about time for the ROKN to start planning for their replace-
ments; these large and small patrol units will soon be reaching the ends of their
service lives.
For amphibious warfare, the South Korean navy has one LPD, Dokdo, and
four Alligator-class LSTs. Only two of the old U.S.-built LSTs remain today. The
ROKN has also introduced high-speed air-cushion landing craft, which are ex-
pected to improve the capability of the amphibious force in terms of quality;
meanwhile, the service seems to be reviewing the strategic concept of its am-
phibious force and accordingly the number of landing ships it requires.
Underlying all this activity may be an ROKN strategic estimate that South
Korea has substantially surpassed North Korea—thanks to the country’s over-
whelming economic growth in recent years—and that the capability and possi-
bility of all-out, full-scale invasion into the South by the North are extremely
low. The navy apparently also thinks that the ROK military, together with U.S.
forces, could surely interdict and repel such an invasion, except in a nuclear sce-
nario. The buildup of the amphibious force in quality at the expense of quantity
may reflect such an estimate.
Also, one aspect of the amphibious program can be seen as a fresh approach
to the international situation. The ROKN is now fully aware of the new mis-
sions of international contribution and cooperation, such as peacekeeping
and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief operations. The South Korean
navy learned a vital lesson from bitter experience when it found itself unable to
participate sufficiently in the multinational relief operations on northern Su-
matra, in Indonesia, after the earthquake and tsunami in December 2004.
Memories of this episode may well be reflected in multirole amphibious ships
projected for the future.
In the area of mine warfare, the ROKN has decommissioned all eight of its
outdated U.S.-built MSCs. Its new mine-countermeasures force is composed
of three Yangyang-class MSCs/MHCs and six Swallow-class MHCs, all of do-
mestic construction but carrying new, foreign-developed MCM equipment.
The South Korean navy has apparently improved the quality of its MCM force,
but its quantity seems not yet sufficient for the current security and military
situation around the peninsula. In the realm of underway replenishment,
which is indispensable if the ROKN is to become a real blue-water navy, the
ROK fleet has its three domestically built Chunjee-class AORs. These three re-
plenishment oilers seem to meet the operational requirement today.
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With respect to the naval aviation, the ROKN has replaced its old S-2 mari-
time surveillance and patrol aircraft with new P-3Cs. Thanks to these new air-
craft, the ocean-surveillance capability of the ROK fleet has substantially
improved; however, only eight P-3Cs are now in the inventory. Otherwise, the
navy is introducing new multimission Lynx helicopters, useful for antisurface
and antisubmarine warfare. The strength of the Lynx helicopter force, which
numbers twenty-five today, seems enough for shipboard operations on board
the new KDXs and for land operations (see table 5).
TABLE 5
NAVAL AVIATION 1990–2008
With regard to the growing trend toward a navy capable of operations in dis-
tant waters, two important new initiatives were taken by the present Lee
Myung-Bak administration in 2009. In March, the government authorized
ROKN participation in international antipiracy operations in Gulf of Aden; in
May, South Korea became the ninety-fifth nation to join the Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative. These decisions clearly show the government’s intention to make
the Republic of Korea a nation of greater international responsibility and influ-
ence. They also show its determination to use its capable navy as a tool to realize
national objectives. The ROKN today seems to have sufficient capability to sup-
port and respond fully to the growing expectations and requirements of its
nation’s government and people.
TO THE FUTURE
The Republic of Korea Navy’s recent emphasis on the construction of a blue-
water navy is understandable if its perception of the threat has in fact changed
from that of previous years. As implied above, the military capability of North
Korea to fight a conventional, full-scale war against the South seems to be de-
clining. However, the North is still capable of small but determined intimidat-
ing or trap-setting operations along the coast of the peninsula.
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KODA 29
takes seriously the country’s peninsular geopolitical character and what cooper-
ation as a fully reliable partner in the ROK-U.S. alliance requires, it may now
have to strengthen and improve its ASW capability in general, and in particular,
to achieve the best possible underwater situational awareness.
This view is contradicted by a theory now current in China, where submarine
development is a subject of debate. One school of thought in the PLA Navy takes
the operations of British SSNs during the Falklands War, in 1982, as an model
for sea control in distant waters. In this view, the point is the high speed and long
endurance of the Royal Navy’s SSNs, which made it possible for the United King-
dom, a nonglobal power lacking a large network of overseas naval bases, to gain
sea control in a remote and distant operational area—the waters around the
Falklands.14 The attractiveness of this theory to navies like that of China is un-
derstandable, but the Chinese rationale raises a further point, a strategic
one—the antisurface (that is, tactical) capability of submarines. In the Falklands
War a British nuclear-powered submarine, HMS Conqueror, attacked and sank a
World War II–vintage Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano. The Argentine navy’s
surface operations ceased totally, and eventually Argentine maritime operations
of all kinds against British forces were substantially contained. With this single
submarine operation, the Royal Navy had gained sea control around the
Falklands. In other words, a tactical action by an SSN—a torpedo attack against
a surface ship—gained an unexpected strategic advantage, by establishing
regional, but total, sea control.
Many navies—notably the Imperial Japanese Navy, the U.S. Navy, and the
Royal Navy itself—have made every effort, over the entire course of other wars, to
achieve such a capability, regardless of casualties or damage to themselves, and yet
have failed. Gaining such a strategic advantage is the very raison d’être of an
armed force, the goal of its nation and people in wartime, the pride of its service-
men and women. Nonetheless, many navies have looked for a key to the true sig-
nificance of submarines in the single success of HMS Conqueror in the Falklands.
If the ROKN planners dare instead to seek the strategic significance of conven-
tional submarines in the sea surrounding the Korean Peninsula, taking full ac-
count of the limitations of diesel-electric-driven boats, they will have established a
good basis for future naval operations and strategy. There are indications suggest-
ing that some answers may become clearer in the near future.
Wide-Area Ocean Surveillance
The ROKN has been continuously modernizing its fleet, but its wide-area
ocean-surveillance capability—which is indispensable to both coastal defense
and blue-water operations—does not look sufficient at present. If the navy is to
achieve these two main missions, it will be necessary to collect and plot precise
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KODA 31
its area of responsibility. In this light, the present strength of the South Korean
15
MCM force seems questionable.
A new question therefore arises: How will the navy achieve a balance between
its “spear” (its destroyers and submarines) and its MCM force? The answer to
this question is not apparent now, but construction in the MCM force in the
near future may show the strategic direction of the ROKN in this regard.
The Strategic Mobile Fleet/Strategic Mobile Group
In 2001, the administration of then-president Kim Dae-Jung announced a plan
for building a “Strategic Mobile Fleet” in order to achieve “the protection of the
national interests in the five oceans in the world and the contribution to the
16
world peace.” Later the plan was downscaled from a “fleet” to a “group,” of flo-
tilla size. The first SMG is scheduled to be completed by 2010; according to the
plan, it will be composed of the LPD Dokdo, some KDX-IIIs (Aegis DDGs), and
17
six KDX-IIs.
Additionally, a new naval base for this group is under construction on
Cheju Island off the southern coast. The navy has announced that the mission
of the SMG will be to gain sea control in the waters surrounding the Korean
18
Peninsula. The combination of amphibious assault ships, destroyers, and
guided-missile destroyers—a mix of “L-ships” and “D-ships”—with their dif-
ferent operational requirements and characteristics, seems a little irregular for
a group intended to establish sea control. In fact, the declared employment
concept for this SMG—which resembles a small U.S. amphibious ready group
with escorting destroyers—is a bit ambiguous. The question may naturally
arise: What is the real objective of SMG? Is it amphibious warfare (that is,
power projection) or sea control, or both?
This argument aside, however, the noteworthy point is that this SMG will be
the first major tactical unit in the ROK fleet to focus on operations far from
home waters. The final number of SMGs to be organized is a point worth
watching.
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KODA 33
of its sailors. For that reason, the promotion of mutual understanding should be
actively pursued by sailors of both the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and
the Republic of Korea Navy, from the lowest to the highest levels. The mutual
understanding they achieve will be the key to the lasting security of the region.
NOTES
This article represents the personal opinion still in the fleet inventory in large number in
of the author and not any official position of the 1950s and ’60s. The program was also
the JMSDF or the government of Japan. The intended to upgrade the ASW capability of
author expresses special appreciation to Mr. many Gearing- and Sumner-class destroyers
John Niemeyer, a special adviser to the Com- in order to cope with the rapidly growing
mander, U.S. Naval Forces Japan (CNFJ), Soviet submarine threat. Major new ASW
and Ms. Amiko Imaizumi, a civil-affairs liai- systems installed on these DDs were the
son and language specialist in the CNFJ Japan SQS-23 sonar, ASROC (antisubmarine
Liaison Office, for substantial contributions rocket), DASH (the drone antisubmarine
to the development of the English text of this helicopter), and Mk-44 torpedo. It also re-
article. Japanese names are given in Western placed the electronic equipment of these
fashion, surname last; Korean names are ships with new radars and electronic warfare
given with surnames first. systems and thoroughly overhauled their
1. Kim Yan-gi, Monogatari-Kankoku-shi [Ko- propulsion plants.
rean History] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha, 9. ROKN website.
1989), pp. 123–24, 156. 10. Ibid.
2. “KDX” means “next-generation destroyer, 11. Ibid.
designed and built in South Korea.” The
KDX-1 class is the first generation of this 12. For example, the force strength of the JMSDF
group. since 2000 has been about fifty DDs, sixteen
SSs, twenty-five MCM ships, eighty P-3Cs,
3. Kim, Korean History, pp. 241–45. and eighty SH-60s. Of fast small craft for
4. Ibid., pp. 247–48. coastal operation, there are only six PGs. The
5. Ibid., pp. 266–73. JMSDF, which traditionally has laid relatively
light stress on coastal defense, has been allo-
6. At the third session of navy-to-navy talks, cating most of its national resources instead
held at MSO in January 2002, I (by then a to blue-water forces, especially ASW forces,
rear admiral and director of Operations and which the JMSDF thinks indispensable for its
Plans Department of MSO) was impressed by SLOC defense and cooperation with U.S. car-
the high morale and strong pride exhibited rier strike groups. In contrast, the strength of
by the ROKN representatives. They told me the ROKN in the early 2010s seems likely to
of this episode, which suggested the spiritual remain at about twelve DDs, eighteen SSs,
superiority of South Korean sailors in com- ten MCM ships, between eight and sixteen
parison to the members of the nation’s other P-3Cs, twenty-five Lynx helicopters, and
services. eighty to a hundred fast small craft of various
7. Republic of Korea Navy (English-language), types. This difference clearly points to the ex-
www.navy.mil.kr/english/main/main.jsp tremely heavy responsibility of the ROKN for
[hereafter ROKN website]. its nation’s coastal defense.
8. Gyrodyne Helicopter Historical Foundation, 13. In the fall of 1994, before the start of official
www.gyrodynehelicopters.com. The U.S. exchanges like the navy-to-navy talks, the au-
FRAM program was meant to extend, by thor (then a captain, deputy of the Plans and
five to eight years, the service lives of its Policy Division of MSO) escorted then–vice
World War II–era destroyers, which were admiral Ahn on a tour of the JMSDF’s Kure
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District and the Etajima education and train- developing the idea of staff talks between the
ing complex. Vice Admiral Ahn, the com- JMSDF and ROKN, which began three years
mander in chief of the ROK fleet, was visiting later.
unofficially, but I was a bit tense and ner- 14. Andrew S. Erickson and Lyle J. Goldstein,
vous—it was a rare visit by a South Korean “China’s Future Nuclear Submarine Force:
VIP, and I had to escort him alone. I was sur- Insights from Chinese Writings,” Naval War
prised to learn that Vice Admiral Ahn was College Review 60, no. 1 (Winter 2007), pp.
quite familiar with the Imperial Navy and the 55–79.
JMSDF. Also, during the three-day trip his
frank and honest personality gradually re- 15. The practical strengths of the MCM forces of
moved my tension. Shown around the head- the two navies are in strong contrast. The
quarters and base facilities, including those of JMSDF has two MLs/tenders, three ocean
submarines, the Kure District, and Etajima minehunters and minesweepers with deep-
(where the historic brick building of the Im- water MCM capability, and twenty-one
perial Naval Academy still stood), the admi- coastal minehunters and minesweepers, as
ral was impressed by the legacy, both physical well as a squadron of MCM helicopters. For
and intellectual, of the Imperial Navy to the its part, the ROKN has one ML, three MSCs
JMSDF. During the return “bullet train” trip, and MHCs, and six MHCs. This difference
he quietly but emphatically told me of his de- may generate serious strategic problems in
termination that the ROKN would build a securing the two channels of the Tsushima
submarine force and become a blue-water Strait in case of a peninsular contingency.
navy in the future, and of the necessity that it 16. Global Security, www.globalsecurity.org/
do so. By chance, this was just prior to his military/world/rok/navy.htm.
change-of-command speech. This encounter
17. ROKN website.
is one of the reasons why I, as a captain re-
sponsible for JMSDF policy, started 18. Ibid.
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