G.R. No.

192986 January 15, 2013

ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. and EDUARDO B.

OLAGUER, Petitioners,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL MONETARY BOARD, represented by its Chairman,
GOVERNOR ARMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., and its incumbent members:
JUANITA D. AMATONG, ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, PETER FA VILA, NELLY F.
VILLAFUERTE, IGNACIO R. BUNYE and CESAR V. PURISIMA, Respondents.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Petitioners, claiming that they are raising issues of transcendental importance

to the public, filed directly with this Court this Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, seeking to declare that the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB), replacing the Central Bank Monetary
Board (CB-MB) by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, has no authority to
continue enforcing Central Bank Circular No. 905,1 issued by the CB-MB in
1982, which "suspended" Act No. 2655, or the Usury Law of 1916.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner "Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc." (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-

stock corporation organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities
relating to money lending issues. It was incorporated on July 9, 2010, 2 and a
month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder and president, Eduardo
B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.

R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank (CB) of the Philippines on June
15, 1948, empowered the CB-MB to, among others, set the maximum interest
rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other credit
operations, within limits prescribed by the Usury Law. Section 109 of R.A. No.
265 reads:

Sec. 109. Interest Rates, Commissions and Charges. — The Monetary Board
may fix the maximum rates of interest which banks may pay on deposits and
on other obligations.

The Monetary Board may, within the limits prescribed in the Usury Law fix the
maximum rates of interest which banks may charge for different types of loans
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and for any other credit operations, or may fix the maximum differences which
may exist between the interest or rediscount rates of the Central Bank and the
rates which the banks may charge their customers if the respective credit
documents are not to lose their eligibility for rediscount or advances in the
Central Bank.

Any modifications in the maximum interest rates permitted for the borrowing
or lending operations of the banks shall apply only to future operations and
not to those made prior to the date on which the modification becomes
effective.

In order to avoid possible evasion of maximum interest rates set by the

Monetary Board, the Board may also fix the maximum rates that banks may
pay to or collect from their customers in the form of commissions, discounts,
charges, fees or payments of any sort. (Underlining ours)

On March 17, 1980, the Usury Law was amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe different maximum rates of
interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are
effected gradually and announced in advance. Thus, Section 1-a of Act No.
2655 now reads:

Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the maximum
rate or rates of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the forbearance of
any money, goods or credits, and to change such rate or rates whenever
warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions: Provided, That
changes in such rate or rates may be effected gradually on scheduled dates
announced in advance.

In the exercise of the authority herein granted the Monetary Board may
prescribe higher maximum rates for loans of low priority, such as consumer
loans or renewals thereof as well as such loans made by pawnshops, finance
companies and other similar credit institutions although the rates prescribed
for these institutions need not necessarily be uniform. The Monetary Board is
also authorized to prescribe different maximum rate or rates for different
types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit substitutes, or loans of
financial intermediaries. (Underlining and emphasis ours)

In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982,3 the CB-MB issued CB
Circular No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1, 1983. Section 1 of the

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Circular, under its General Provisions, removed the ceilings on interest rates on
loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, to wit:

Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and other
charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits, regardless
of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be charged or
collected by any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be subject to
any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as amended.
(Underscoring and emphasis ours)

The Circular then went on to amend Books I to IV of the CB’s "Manual of

Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries" (Manual of
Regulations) by removing the applicable ceilings on specific interest rates.
Thus, Sections 5, 9 and 10 of CB Circular No. 905 amended Book I, Subsections
1303, 1349, 1388.1 of the Manual of Regulations, by removing the ceilings for
interest and other charges, commissions, premiums, and fees applicable to
commercial banks; Sections 12 and 17 removed the interest ceilings for thrift
banks (Book II, Subsections 2303, 2349); Sections 19 and 21 removed the
ceilings applicable to rural banks (Book III, Subsection 3152.3-c); and, Sections
26, 28, 30 and 32 removed the ceilings for non-bank financial intermediaries
(Book IV, Subsections 4303Q.1 to 4303Q.9, 4303N.1, 4303P).4

On June 14, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law R.A. No. 7653
establishing the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) to replace the CB. The
repealing clause thereof, Section 135, reads:

Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. — Except as may be provided for in Sections 46

and 132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the provisions of any
other law, special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said Republic
Act No. 265, as amended, or parts thereof, which may be inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Presidential Decree No. 1792 is
likewise repealed.

Petition for Certiorari

To justify their skipping the hierarchy of courts and going directly to this Court
to secure a writ of certiorari, petitioners contend that the transcendental
importance of their Petition can readily be seen in the issues raised therein, to
wit:

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 a) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB had the
statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of
interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money,
goods or credit beyond the limits prescribed in the Usury Law;

b) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB

Circular No. 905, which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended
Act No. 2655 as regards usurious interest rates;

c) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to
enforce CB Circular No. 905.5

Petitioners attached to their petition copies of several Senate Bills and

Resolutions of the 10th Congress, which held its sessions from 1995 to 1998,
calling for investigations by the Senate Committee on Banks and Financial
Institutions into alleged unconscionable commercial rates of interest imposed
by these entities. Senate Bill (SB) Nos. 376 and 1860,7 filed by Senator Vicente
C. Sotto III and the late Senator Blas F. Ople, respectively, sought to amend Act
No. 2655 by fixing the rates of interest on loans and forbearance of credit;
Philippine Senate Resolution (SR) No. 1053,8 10739 and 1102,10 filed by
Senators Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr., Gregorio B. Honasan and Franklin M. Drilon,
respectively, urged the aforesaid Senate Committee to investigate ways to
curb the high commercial interest rates then obtaining in the country; Senator
Ernesto Maceda filed SB No. 1151 to prohibit the collection of more than two
months of advance interest on any loan of money; and Senator Raul Roco filed
SR No. 114411seeking an investigation into an alleged cartel of commercial
banks, called "Club 1821", reportedly behind the regime of high interest rates.
The petitioners also attached news clippings12 showing that in February 1998
the banks’ prime lending rates, or interests on loans to their best borrowers,
ranged from 26% to 31%.

Petitioners contend that under Section 1-a of Act No. 2655, as amended by
P.D. No. 1684, the CB-MB was authorized only to prescribe or set the
maximum rates of interest for a loan or renewal thereof or for the forbearance
of any money, goods or credits, and to change such rates whenever warranted
by prevailing economic and social conditions, the changes to be effected
gradually and on scheduled dates; that nothing in P.D. No. 1684 authorized
the CB-MB to lift or suspend the limits of interest on all credit transactions,
when it issued CB Circular No. 905. They further insist that under Section 109
of R.A. No. 265, the authority of the CB-MB was clearly only to fix the banks’

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maximum rates of interest, but always within the limits prescribed by the Usury
Law.

Thus, according to petitioners, CB Circular No. 905, which was promulgated

without the benefit of any prior public hearing, is void because it violated
Article 5 of the New Civil Code, which provides that "Acts executed against the
provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity."

They further claim that just weeks after the issuance of CB Circular No. 905, the
benchmark 91-day Treasury bills (T-bills),13 then known as "Jobo" bills14 shot up
to 40% per annum, as a result. The banks immediately followed suit and re-
priced their loans to rates which were even higher than those of the "Jobo"
bills. Petitioners thus assert that CB Circular No. 905 is also unconstitutional in
light of Section 1 of the Bill of Rights, which commands that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

Finally, petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not re-enact a provision
similar to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265, and therefore, in view of the repealing
clause in Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP-MB has been stripped of the
power either to prescribe the maximum rates of interest which banks may
charge for different kinds of loans and credit transactions, or to suspend Act
No. 2655 and continue enforcing CB Circular No. 905.

Ruling

The petition must fail.

A. The Petition is procedurally infirm.

The decision on whether or not to accept a petition for certiorari, as well as to

grant due course thereto, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. 15 A
petition for certiorari being an extraordinary remedy, the party seeking to avail
of the same must strictly observe the procedural rules laid down by law, and
non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.16

As provided in Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of certiorari is directed against a

tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.17 Judicial functions are
exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to determine what the
law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in

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controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action or
discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a
judicial nature.18

The CB-MB (now BSP-MB) was created to perform executive functions with
respect to the establishment, operation or liquidation of banking and credit
institutions, and branches and agencies thereof.19 It does not perform judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Certainly, the issuance of CB Circular No. 905 was
done in the exercise of an executive function. Certiorari will not lie in the
instant case.20

B. Petitioners have no locus standi to file the Petition

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a

given question." In private suits, Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest," who is "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit." Succinctly put, a party’s standing is based on his own right
to the relief sought.21

Even in public interest cases such as this petition, the Court has generally
adopted the "direct injury" test that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result."22 Thus, while petitioners
assert a public right to assail CB Circular No. 905 as an illegal executive action,
it is nonetheless required of them to make out a sufficient interest in the
vindication of the public order and the securing of relief. It is significant that in
this petition, the petitioners do not allege that they sustained any personal
injury from the issuance of CB Circular No. 905.

Petitioners also do not claim that public funds were being misused in the
enforcement of CB Circular No. 905. In Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato,23 involving
the on-line lottery contract of the PCSO, there was no allegation that public
funds were being misspent, which according to the Court would have made
the action a public one, "and justify relaxation of the requirement that an
action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest." The
Court held, moreover, that the status of Kilosbayan as a people’s organization

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did not give it the requisite personality to question the validity of the contract.
Thus:

Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for
bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as
civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an
action under the Rule 3, Sec. 2.24

C. The Petition raises no issues of transcendental importance.

In the 1993 case of Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,25 it

was held that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is
compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) that the
question must be raised by the proper party; (b) that there must be an actual
case or controversy; (c) that the question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (d) that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

In Prof. David v. Pres. Macapagal-Arroyo,26 the Court summarized the

requirements before taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators can
be accorded a standing to sue, viz:

(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;

(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public

funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;

(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity
of the election law in question;

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and

(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.

While the Court may have shown in recent decisions a certain toughening in
its attitude concerning the question of legal standing, it has nonetheless
always made an exception where the transcendental importance of the issues
has been established, notwithstanding the petitioners’ failure to show a direct

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injury.27 In CREBA v. ERC,28 the Court set out the following instructive guides as
determinants on whether a matter is of transcendental importance, namely: (1)
the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence
of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the
lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions
being raised. Further, the Court stated in Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v.
The Executive Secretary29 that the rule on standing will not be waived where
these determinants are not established.

In the instant case, there is no allegation of misuse of public funds in the

implementation of CB Circular No. 905. Neither were borrowers who were
actually affected by the suspension of the Usury Law joined in this petition.
Absent any showing of transcendental importance, the petition must fail.

More importantly, the Court notes that the instant petition adverted to the
regime of high interest rates which obtained at least 15 years ago, when the
banks’ prime lending rates ranged from 26% to 31%,30 or even 29 years ago,
when the 91-day Jobo bills reached 40% per annum. In contrast, according to
the BSP, in the first two (2) months of 2012 the bank lending rates averaged
5.91%, which implies that the banks’ prime lending rates were lower;
moreover, deposit interests on savings and long-term deposits have also gone
very low, averaging 1.75% and 1.62%, respectively.31

Judging from the most recent auctions of T-bills, the savings rates must be
approaching 0%. In the auctions held on November 12, 2012, the rates of 3-
1âwphi1

month, 6-month and 1-year T-bills have dropped to 0.150%, 0.450% and
0.680%, respectively.32 According to Manila Bulletin, this very low interest
regime has been attributed to "high liquidity and strong investor demand
amid positive economic indicators of the country."33

While the Court acknowledges that cases of transcendental importance

demand that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we
must, technicalities of procedure,34 the delay of at least 15 years in the filing of
the instant petition has actually rendered moot and academic the issues it now
raises.

For its part, BSP-MB maintains that the petitioners’ allegations of

constitutional and statutory violations of CB Circular No. 905 are really mere
challenges made by petitioners concerning the wisdom of the Circular. It
explains that it was in view of the global economic downturn in the early

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1980’s that the executive department through the CB-MB had to formulate
policies to achieve economic recovery, and among these policies was the
establishment of a market-oriented interest rate structure which would require
the removal of the government-imposed interest rate ceilings.35

D. The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it
issued CB Circular No. 905.

The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D. No.
1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court
explained in the landmark case of Medel v. CA,36 citing several cases, CB
Circular No. 905 "did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but
simply suspended the latter’s effectivity;"37that "a CB Circular cannot repeal a
law, [for] only a law can repeal another law;"38 that "by virtue of CB Circular No.
905, the Usury Law has been rendered ineffective;"39 and "Usury has been
legally non-existent in our jurisdiction. Interest can now be charged as lender
and borrower may agree upon."40

In First Metro Investment Corp. v. Este Del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc.41 cited in
DBP v. Perez,42 we also belied the contention that the CB was engaged in self-
legislation. Thus:

Central Bank Circular No. 905 did not repeal nor in any way amend the Usury
Law but simply suspended the latter’s effectivity. The illegality of usury is
wholly the creature of legislation. A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law.
Only a law can repeal another law. x x x.43

In PNB v. Court of Appeals,44 an escalation clause in a loan agreement

authorized the PNB to unilaterally increase the rate of interest to 25% per
annum, plus a penalty of 6% per annum on past dues, then to 30% on October
15, 1984, and to 42% on October 25, 1984. The Supreme Court invalidated the
rate increases made by the PNB and upheld the 12% interest imposed by the
CA, in this wise:

P.D. No. 1684 and C.B. Circular No. 905 no more than allow contracting parties
to stipulate freely regarding any subsequent adjustment in the interest rate
that shall accrue on a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. In fine,
they can agree to adjust, upward or downward, the interest previously
stipulated. x x x.45

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Thus, according to the Court, by lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905
merely upheld the parties’ freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of
interest. It cited Article 1306 of the New Civil Code, under which the
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

E. The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905.

Section 1 of CB Circular No. 905 provides that "The rate of interest, including
commissions, premiums, fees and other charges, on a loan or forbearance of
any money, goods, or credits, regardless of maturity and whether secured or
unsecured, that may be charged or collected by any person, whether natural
or juridical, shall not be subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to
the Usury Law, as amended." It does not purport to suspend the Usury Law
only as it applies to banks, but to all lenders.

Petitioners contend that, granting that the CB had power to "suspend" the
Usury Law, the new BSP-MB did not retain this power of its predecessor, in
view of Section 135 of R.A. No. 7653, which expressly repealed R.A. No. 265.
The petitioners point out that R.A. No. 7653 did not reenact a provision similar
to Section 109 of R.A. No. 265.

A closer perusal shows that Section 109 of R.A. No. 265 covered only loans
extended by banks, whereas under Section 1-a of the Usury Law, as amended,
the BSP-MB may prescribe the maximum rate or rates of interest for all loans
or renewals thereof or the forbearance of any money, goods or credits,
including those for loans of low priority such as consumer loans, as well as
such loans made by pawnshops, finance companies and similar credit
institutions. It even authorizes the BSP-MB to prescribe different maximum
rate or rates for different types of borrowings, including deposits and deposit
substitutes, or loans of financial intermediaries.

Act No. 2655, an earlier law, is much broader in scope, whereas R.A. No. 265,
now R.A. No. 7653, merely supplemented it as it concerns loans by banks and
other financial institutions. Had R.A. No. 7653 been intended to repeal Section
1-a of Act No. 2655, it would have so stated in unequivocal terms.

Moreover, the rule is settled that repeals by implication are not favored,
because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge
of all laws existing pertaining to the subject.46 An implied repeal is predicated

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upon the condition that a substantial conflict or repugnancy is found between
the new and prior laws. Thus, in the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and
old laws.47 We find no such conflict between the provisions of Act 2655 and
R.A. No. 7653.

F. The lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipulations
charging excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.

It is settled that nothing in CB Circular No. 905 grants lenders a carte blanche
authority to raise interest rates to levels which will either enslave their
borrowers or lead to a hemorrhaging of their assets.48 As held in Castro v.
Tan:49

The imposition of an unconscionable rate of interest on a money debt, even if

knowingly and voluntarily assumed, is immoral and unjust. It is tantamount to
a repugnant spoliation and an iniquitous deprivation of property, repulsive to
the common sense of man. It has no support in law, in principles of justice, or
in the human conscience nor is there any reason whatsoever which may justify
such imposition as righteous and as one that may be sustained within the
sphere of public or private morals.50

Stipulations authorizing iniquitous or unconscionable interests have been

invariably struck down for being contrary to morals, if not against the
law.51 Indeed, under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, these contracts are deemed
inexistent and void ab initio, and therefore cannot be ratified, nor may the
right to set up their illegality as a defense be waived.

Nonetheless, the nullity of the stipulation of usurious interest does not affect
the lender’s right to recover the principal of a loan, nor affect the other terms
thereof.52 Thus, in a usurious loan with mortgage, the right to foreclose the
mortgage subsists, and this right can be exercised by the creditor upon failure
by the debtor to pay the debt due. The debt due is considered as without the
stipulated excessive interest, and a legal interest of 12% per annum will be
added in place of the excessive interest formerly imposed,53following the
guidelines laid down in the landmark case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,54 regarding the manner of computing legal interest:

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II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:

1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a

sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due
should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore,
the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of interest
shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial
or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article
1169 of the Civil Code.

2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money,

is breached, an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be
imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No
interest, however, shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable
certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable
certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made
judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such certainty
cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made,
the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the
court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the amount finally
adjudged.

3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes

final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the case falls
under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be
by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.55 (Citations omitted)

The foregoing rules were further clarified in Sunga-Chan v. Court of

Appeals, 56 as follows:

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. synthesized the rules on the imposition of interest,
if proper, and the applicable rate, as follows: The 12% per annum rate under
CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or forbearance of money, goods,
or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of

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money, goods, or credit, while the 6% per annum under Art. 2209 of the Civil
Code applies "when the transaction involves the payment of indemnities in the
concept of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general," with the application of both rates reckoned "from the
time the complaint was filed until the [adjudged] amount is fully paid." In
either instance, the reckoning period for the commencement of the running of
the legal interest shall be subject to the condition "that the courts are vested
with discretion, depending on the equities of each case, on the award of
interest."57 (Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

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