Engineering As Social Experimentation: Chapter - 3
Engineering As Social Experimentation: Chapter - 3
Engineering As Social Experimentation: Chapter - 3
Chapter – 3
Experimentation
Design
Fabrication, Assembly,
physical Tests, Simulation
Final Design
Manufacture
Field Study
Several redesigns are made upon the feedback information on the performance or failure in the
field or in the factory. Besides the tests, each engineering project is modified during execution, based
on the periodical feedback on the progress and the lessons from other sources. Hence, the development
of a product or a project as a whole may be considered as an experiment.
3.0.1 Engineering Projects VS. Standard Experiments
We shall now compare the two activities, and identify the similarities and contrasts.
A. Similarities
1. Partial ignorance: The project is usually executed in partial ignorance. Uncertainties exist in
the model assumed. The behavior of materials purchased is uncertain and not constant (that
is certain!). They may vary with the suppliers, processed lot, time, and the process used in
shaping the materials (e.g., sheet or plate, rod or wire, forged or cast or welded). There may
be variations in the grain structure and its resulting failure stress. It is not possible to collect
data on all variations. In some cases, extrapolation, interpolation, assumptions of linear
behavior over the range of parameters, accelerated testing, simulations, and virtual testing
are resorted.
2. Uncertainty: The final outcomes of projects are also uncertain, as in experiments. Some
times unintended results, side effects (bye-products), and unsafe operation have also occurred.
Unexpected risks, such as undue seepage in a storage dam, leakage of nuclear radiation from
an atomic power plant, presence of pesticides in food or soft drink bottle, an new irrigation
canal spreading water-borne diseases, and an unsuspecting hair dryer causing lung cancer on
the user from the asbestos gasket used in the product have been reported.
3. Continuous monitoring: Monitoring continually the progress and gaining new knowledge
are needed before, during, and after execution of project as in the case of experimentation.
The performance is to be monitored even during the use (or wrong use!) of the product by
the end user/beneficiary.
4. Learning from the past: Engineers normally learn from their own prior designs and infer
from the analysis of operation and results, and sometimes from the reports of other engineers.
But this does not happen frequently. The absence of interest and channels of communication,
ego in not seeking information, guilty upon the failure, fear of legal actions, and mere
negligence have caused many a failure, e.g., the Titanic lacked sufficient number of life
boats—it had only 825 boats for the actual passengers of 2227, the capacity of the ship being
3547! In the emergent situation, all the existing life boats could not be launched. Forty
years back, another steamship Arctic met with same tragedy due to the same problem in the
same region. But the lesson was learned. In most of the hydraulic systems, valves had been
the critical components that are least reliable. The confusion on knowing whether the valve
was open or closed, was the cause of the Three-Mile Island accident in 1979. Similar
malfunctioning of valves and mis-reading of gauges have been reported to have caused the
accidents else where in some power plants. But we have not learnt the lesson from the past.
The complacency that it will not happen again and will not happen 'to me' has lead to many
disasters.
Engineering as Social Experimentation 47
B. Contrasts
The scientific experiments in the laboratory and the engineering experiments in the filed exhibit several
contrasts as listed below:
1. Experimental control: In standard experiments, members for study are selected into two
groups namely A and B at random. Group A are given special treatment. The group B is
given no treatment and is called the ‘controlled group’. But they are placed in the same
environment as the other group A.
This process is called the experimental control. This practice is adopted in the field of
medicine. In engineering, this does not happen, except when the project is confined to
laboratory experiments. This is because it is the clients or consumers who choose the product,
exercise the control. It is not possible to make a random selection of participants from
various groups. In engineering, through random sampling, the survey is made from among
the users, to assess the results on the product. .
2. Humane touch: Engineering experiments involve human souls, their needs, views, expectations,
and creative use as in case of social experimentation. This point of view is not agreed by
many of the engineers. But now the quality engineers and managers have fully realized this
humane aspect.
3. Informed consent: Engineering experimentation is viewed as Societal Experiment since the
subject and the beneficiary are human beings. In this respect, it is similar to medical
experimentation on human beings. In the case of medical practice, moral and legal rights
have been recognized while planning for experimentation. Informed consent is practiced in
medical experimentation. Such a practice is not there in scientific laboratory experiments.
Informed consent has two basic elements:
1. Knowledge: The subject should be given all relevant information needed to make the
decision to participate.
2. Voluntariness: Subject should take part without force, fraud or deception. Respect for
rights of minorities to dissent and compensation for harmful effect are assumed here.
For a valid consent, the following conditions are to be fulfilled:
1. Consent must be voluntary
2. All relevant information shall be presented/stated in a clearly understandable form
3. Consenter shall be capable of processing the information and make rational decisions.
4. The subject’s consent may be offered in proxy by a group that represents many subjects
of like-interests
Informed consent when bringing an engineering product to market, implies letting the customer
know the following: (a) the knowledge about the product (b) risks and benefits of using the
product and (c) all relevant information on the product, such as how to use and how not to
use (do’s and don’ts). The relevant factual information implies, that the engineers are obliged
to obtain and assess all the available information related to the fulfillment of one’s moral
obligations (i.e., wrong or immoral use of a product one designs), including the intended
and unintended impacts of the product, on the society. Still there exists a possibility of a
48 A Textbook on Professional Ethics and Human Values
large gap of understanding between the experimenter and the subjects (public). Sometimes,
the managements have not been willing to disseminate the full information about the project
or product beyond the legal requirements, because of the fear of potential competitions and
likely exposure to potential litigation.
People object to involuntary risks wherein the affected individual is neither a direct participant
nor a decision maker. In short, we prefer to be the subjects of our own experiments rather
than those of somebody else. If it is an asbestos plant or nuclear plant to be approved,
affected parties expect their consent to be obtained. But they are ready to accept voluntary
risks as in the case of stunts and amazing races.
In case of Koodangulam power project as well as the Sethusamudram Canal Project, Tamil
Nadu, several citizen groups including Fishermen Forums have responded. The Central
government was able contain many harsh apprehensions and protracted legal and political
battles, by providing all relevant information.
4. Knowledge gained: Not much of new knowledge is developed in engineering experiments as
in the case of scientific experiments in the laboratory. Engineering experiments at the most
help us to (a) verify the adequacy of the design, (b) to check the stability of the design
parameters, and (c) prepare for the unexpected outcomes, in the actual field environments.
From the models tested in the laboratory to the pilot plant tested in the field, there are
differences in performance as well as other outcomes.
responsibilities and provide statements and guidelines on interpretations for the professionals
and the professional societies.
2. Support to engineers. The codes give positive support to professionals for taking stands on
moral issues. Further they serve as potential legal support to discharge professional obligations.
3. Deterrence (discourage to act immorally) and discipline (regulate to act morally). The codes
serve as the basis for investigating unethical actions. The professional societies sometimes
revoke membership or suspend/expel the members, when proved to have acted unethical.
This sanction along with loss of respect from the colleagues and the society are bound to act
as deterrent.
4. Education and mutual understanding. Codes are used to prompt discussion and reflection on
moral issues. They develop a shared understanding by the professionals, public, and the
government on the moral responsibilities of the engineers. The Board of Review of the
professional societies encourages moral discussion for educational purposes.
5. Create good public image. The codes present positive image of the committed profession to
the public, help the engineers to serve the public effectively. They promote more of self
regulation and lessen the government regulations. This is bound to raise the reputation of the
profession and the organization, in establishing the trust of the public.
6. Protect the status quo. They create minimum level of ethical conduct and promotes agreement
within the profession. Primary obligation namely the safety, health, and welfare of the
public, declared by the codes serves and protects the public.
7. Promotes business interests. The codes offer inspiration to the entrepreneurs, establish shared
standards, healthy competition, and maximize profit to investors, employees, and consumers.
Limitations: The codes are not remedy for all evils. They have many limitations, namely:
1. General and vague wordings. Many statements are general in nature and hence unable to
solve all problems.
2. Not applicable to all situations. Codes are not sacred, and need not be accepted without
criticism. Tolerance for criticisms of the codes themselves should be allowed.
3. Often have internal conflicts. Many times, the priorities are clearly spelt out, e.g., codes
forbid public remarks critical of colleagues (engineers), but they actually discovered a major
bribery, which might have caused a huge loss to the exchequer.
4. They can not be treated as final moral authority for professional conduct. Codes have flaws
by commission and omission. There are still some grey areas undefined by codes. They can
not be equated to laws. After all, even laws have loopholes and they invoke creativity in the
legal practitioners.
5. Only a few enroll as members in professional society and non-members can not be compelled.
6. Even as members of the professional society, many are unaware of the codes
7. Different societies have different codes. The codes can not be uniform or same! Unifying
the codes may not necessarily solve the problems prevailing various professions, but attempts
are still made towards this unified codes.
8. Codes are said to be coercive. They are sometimes claimed to be threatening and forceful.
Engineering as Social Experimentation 51
built and it has fallen down, he shall rebuild the house which has fallen down from his own property.
If a builder has built a house for a man and does not make his work perfect and the wall bulges, that
builder shall put that wall in sound condition at his own cost”
This code was expected to put in self-regulation seriously in those years.
3.4.2 Steam Boat Code in USA
Whenever there is crisis we claim that there ought to be law to control this. Whenever there is a fire
accident in a factory or fire cracker’s store house or boat capsize we make this claim, and soon forget.
Laws are meant to be interpreted for minimal compliance. On the other hand, laws when amended or
updated continuously, would be counter productive. Laws will always lag behind the technological
development. The regulatory or inspection agencies such as Environmental authority of India can play
a major role by framing rules and enforcing compliance.
In the early 19th century, a law was passed in USA to provide for inspection of the safety of
boilers and engines in ships. It was amended many times and now the standards formulated by the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers are followed.
consisting of pairs of O-rings made of vulcanized rubber. The O-rings work with a putty barrier made
of zinc chromate.
The engineers were employed with Rockwell International (manufacturers for the orbiter and
main rocket), Morton-Thiokol (maker of booster rockets), and they worked for NASA. After many
postponements, the launch of Challenger was set for morning of Jan 28, 1986. Allan J. McDonald was
an engineer from Morton-Thiokol and the director of the Solid Rocket Booster Project. He was skeptic
about the freezing temperature conditions forecast for that morning, which was lower than the previous
launch conditions. A teleconference between NASA engineers and MT engineers was arranged by
Allan.
Arnold Thompson and Roger Boisjoly, the seal experts at MT explained to the other engineers
how the booster rocket walls would bulge upon launch and combustion gases can blow past the O-rings
of the field joints (Fig. 3.2).
External Fuel Tank
Orbiter
Payload bay
Main Engine
Booster Rocket
Field joints
Tang
Pressure from hot gas
Putty
Primary O-Ring
Secondary O-Ring
Exterior
Bolt
Interior
Clevis
Fig. 3.2 b Field joint before ignition Fig. 3.2 c Field joint after ignition
54 A Textbook on Professional Ethics and Human Values
On many of the previous flights the rings have been found to have charred and eroded. In
freezing temperature, the rings and the putty packing are less pliable. From the past data gathered, at
temperature less than 65 °F the O-rings failure was certain. But these data were not deliberated at that
conference as the launch time was fast approaching.
The engineering managers Bob Lund and Joe Kilminster agreed that there was a safety problem.
Boisjoly testified and recommended that no launch should be attempted with temperature less than
53 °F. These managers were annoyed to postpone the launch yet again. The top management of MT was
planning for the renewal of contract with NASA, for making booster rocket. The managers told Bob
Lund “to take-off the engineering hat and put on your management hat”. The judgment of the engineers
was not given weightage. The inability of these engineers to substantiate that the launch would be
unsafe was taken by NASA as an approval by Rockwell to launch.
At 11.38 a.m. the rockets along with Challenger rose up the sky. The cameras recorded smoke
coming out of one of the filed joints on the right booster rocket. Soon there was a flame that hit the
external fuel tank. At 76 seconds into the flight, the Challenger at a height of 10 miles was totally
engulfed in a fireball. The crew cabin fell into the ocean killing all the seven aboard.
Some of the factual issues, conceptual issues and moral/normative issues in the space shuttle
challenger incident, are highlighted hereunder for further study.
3.5.2 Moral/Normative Issues
1. The crew had no escape mechanism. Douglas, the engineer, designed an abort module to
allow the separation of the orbiter, triggered by a field-joint leak. But such a ‘safe exit’ was
rejected as too expensive, and because of an accompanying reduction in payload.
2. The crew were not informed of the problems existing in the field joints. The principle of
informed consent was not followed.
3. Engineers gave warning signals on safety. But the management group prevailed over and
ignored the warning.
3.5.3 Conceptual Issues
1. NASA counted that the probability of failure of the craft was one in one lakh launches. But
it was expected that only the 100000th launch will fail.
2. There were 700 criticality-1 items, which included the field joints. A failure in any one of
them would have caused the tragedy. No back-up or stand-bye had been provided for these
criticality-1 components.
3.5.4 Factual/Descriptive Issues
1. Field joints gave way in earlier flights. But the authorities felt the risk is not high.
2. NASA has disregarded warnings about the bad weather, at the time of launch, because they
wanted to complete the project, prove their supremacy, get the funding from Government
continued and get an applaud from the President of USA.
3. The inability of the Rockwell Engineers (manufacturer) to prove that the lift-off was unsafe.
This was interpreted by the NASA, as an approval by Rockwell to launch.